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Causes and Effects in The Revival of the Religious Sciences

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2014.All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of amonograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: University ofChicago; date: 13 March 2014

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Al-Ghazali'sPhilosophicalTheologyFrankGriffel

Printpublicationdate:2009PrintISBN-13:9780195331622PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:September2009DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.001.0001

CausesandEffectsinTheRevivaloftheReligiousSciences

FrankGriffel(ContributorWebpage)

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331622.003.0009

AbstractandKeywords

InRevivaloftheReligiousSciences(Ihya’‘ulumal-din),aworkthatwaswrittenaftertheIncoherence(Tahafut),causesandeffectsplayaveryimportantrole.Everyeventinthisworldisconsideredcausedbyanotherandisalsothecauseofothereventsinthefuture.Yetalltheseeventsare“caused”onlybythefirstelementofthelongcausalchainsthattheyareelementsof,andthatisGod.Godistheonlycauseintheuniverse,andwhenwetalkofhiscreaturesascauses,wedosoonlybymetaphor.Everybodymustunderstandthattheusageof“cause”foranobjectofthisworldispurelymetaphorical.Atthesametime,wemustacknowledgethatthesecausesrepresentGod’swill.Thisisalsotrueforhumanactions.Thehumanisonlythe“vessel”(mahall)ofGod’sactions.Humanactionsaretriggeredbyourvolitionwhichitselfistriggeredbyourmotives.Themotivesdependontheknowledgethatwehaveandtheknowledgeofahumangoesbacktohisorherexperienceandtheeffectsoftheactiveintellectintheheavens.Goddeterminesouractionsbymeansofthiscausalchain.Equally,rewardand


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punishmentinthisworldandintheafterlifearethecausaleffectsofouractions.Godhasdeterminedthecausallawshowactionsinthisworldarerewardedorpunishedinthenext.AlltheseideasabouthumanactionsareverysimilartothatofAvicennaandshowaverystronginfluenceofphilosophicaltheoriesonhumanactions.LikeAvicenna,al-GhazaliheldthatthisisafullydetermineduniverseinwhichGodcontrolsanddeterminesallevents.

Keywords:humanaction,kasb,determination,inquiringwayfarer,al-salikal-sa’il,tawhid,possibleworlds,bestworld

ThevoluminousRevivaloftheReligiousScience(Iḥyāʾʿulūmal-dīn)isal-Ghazālī’smajorworkonethicalconductintheeverydaylifeofMuslims.Itisdividedintofoursections,eachcontainingtenbooks.Withtheexceptionofthefirsttwobooks,thefirstsectiondiscussesritualpractices(‘ibādāt),thesecond,socialcustoms(‘ādāt),thethird,thosethingsthatleadtoperdition(muhlikāt)andshouldthusbeavoided,andthefourth,thosethatleadtosalvation(munjiyāt)andshouldbesought.InthefortybooksoftheRevival,al-Ghazālīseverelycriticizesthecovetingofworldlymatters,remindinghisreadersthathumanlifeisapathtowardJudgmentDayanditscorrespondingrewardorpunishment.InthefirstbookofhisRevival,al-Ghazālīsaysthatonecannotexpecttoachieveredemptionintheafterlifewithoutafirmknowledgeofthisworld’scausesandeffects.1Throughoutthisbook,however,heshowsnointerestinclarifyingtheontologicalcharacteroftheconnectionbetweenwhatwecallacauseanditseffects.Intheintroduction,hesaysthathewishestoavoiddiscussionsthathavenoconsequencesintermsofhumanactions.2ThisfocusonthepracticalresultsofhumanknowledgeleadstoanattitudeinwhichitsufficestounderstandthatGodistheefficientcauseofallevents,regardlessofwhetherHecausesthemdirectlyorthroughthemediationofsecondarycauses.NowhereinhisRevivaldoesal-GhazālīevensomuchashintthattherearetwocompetingexplanationsforGod’screativeactivity.Sinceinthisbook,hewishestogiveclearanddetailedguidancetohisreadersonhowtoearnaplaceintheafterlife,thereisnotreatmentofcosmology.Consequently,causalconnectionsappearintheRevivalwithoutanyscrutiny,justdiscussedaccordingtohowtheyshouldbetreatedinallpracticalcontexts:asnecessaryconnections.

(p.216) Al-Ghazālīgenerallyseesitasself-evidentthatthecausesthatwewitnessinourdailyaffairsarethemselvesonlytheeffectsofothercauses.Thisistrueforallcausalconnectionsandthusalsotrueforhumanactions.Al-Ghazālī’sstanceonhumanactionsisverysimple:likeallothereventsinthisworld,theyareGod’screation.Thisistruenotonlyofthehumanactitself,butalsoofallcausesthathaveledtoit.Ahumanactispromptedbythehumanvolition(irāda),whichisitselfdeterminedbyoneormoremotives.3Godcreatesthesemotivesaswellasthevolition.Thehumanmotiveisajudgmentthatisprecededanddeterminedbytwoelements:thehuman’sknowledgeandhisorherdesire.4Al-Ghazālīdiscussestheexampleofamanwalkingonthestreetwhorealizesthatawomaniswalkingbehindhim;hewishestoseethewomenanddecidesthattoseeher,hemustturnaround.Themotivetoturnaroundistriggeredbytheknowledgethatthewomanisthereandthedesiretoseeher.Thismotivemay,however,beopposedbyacountermotive(ṣārif),andthusitmaynotleadtothevolition—andthus


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alsonotleadtotheaction—ofturningthehead.5Humansarenotheldresponsiblefortheirmotives,becausethemotivesdependbothonthehuman’sknowledgeandonhisorherdesires,twothingsgiventothem.Humansareresponsiblefortheirvolition,however,andthusresponsibleforthosemotivesthattheychoose.6Inhislaterwork,TheChoiceEssentials(al-Mustaṣfā),al-Ghazālīclarifiesthatreason(ʿaql)cannotbeconsideredamotive(dāʿin).Loveofoneselfandfearofpainaremotivesforhumanactions,andthesemotivesare“dispatched”(tanbaʿithu)bythesoul(nafs).Reasoncanonlybeaguide(hādin)thatshowshowbesttorealizethesemotives,whichthemselvescanvaryinstrength.7Theexistenceofdifferentmotivesleadstodeliberation(fikr)onthesideofthehumanandmayalsoleadtohesitation(taraddud).Al-Ghazālītreatsthehumanvolitionasacausaleffectofthemotive,withthemotiveasacausaleffectofthehuman’sknowledgecombinedwithhisorherdesires.ThefactthatGodcreatesallelementsinthiscausalchain—thehumanknowledge,thedesire,themotive,thevolition,andthehumanaction—stilldoesnotdiminishanyofthehuman’sresponsibilityforhisorheractions.

TheCreationofHumanActsAl-GhazālīexplainshisviewofhumanactionsafewtimesinhisRevival,albeitnevergivingthetopicthesystematictreatmentthatwouldanswerallthequestionsonthissubjectusuallydiscussedbyAshʿarites.Hismostilluminatingpassagescanbefoundinbooksthirty-one,thirty-two,andthirty-fiveoftheRevival.Thethirty-fifthbookcontainsaparticularlyclearpassageonhowtounderstanddivineunity(tawḥīd).8EarlierAshʿaritetheologianshaddifferentiatedbetweenvoluntaryandinvoluntaryhumanactions.Whensomeonehasatremor,forinstance,hehasnocontrolovercertainofhisactionsandcannotbemaderesponsibleforthem.Thetremorisaninvoluntaryact,acreationofGod,similartootheraspectsoftheoutsideworldthatinvolvenohumanvolition.Thehumanmustperformsuchactions,justasatreeiscompelledtomoveitsbranchesinthewind.

(p.217) AlthoughvoluntaryactionsarealsoGod’screations,astheAshʿaritesstress,theydifferinkeywaysfrominvoluntaryones.Withvoluntaryactions,humansmakeadecisionintheirwill,andtheyareindividuallyresponsiblefortheirchoices.EarlierAshʿaritesexpressthedoublenatureofsuchactionsbysayingthathumansacquiretheseactionswhileGodcreatesthem.Thelinguistictermsthathumans“acquire”or“appropriate”(kasabaoriktisaba)theiractionshavetheirrootsinthelanguageoftheQur’an(Q2:81,2:134,5:38)andprecedeal-Ashʿarī.Theearliestunderstandingoftheseideasmaysimplyhavestressedtheideathathumansareresponsibleforallthattheyperform,regardlessofthecosmologicalexplanationforhowtheseactionsarecreated.9Withal-Ashʿarīandhisfollowers,theunderstandingof“acquisition”becomesmorecomplex.MostoftheAshʿaritetheoriesofhumanactionthatprecedeal-GhazālīassumethatGodgivesa“temporarypower-to-act”(qudramuḥdatha)tothehumanthatallowshimorhertoperformtheactthatheorshehaschosen.ThisimpliesthatalthoughGodcreatestheactionanditsresultsintheoutsideworld,thehumanisregardedastheagent(fāʿil)andthemakeroftheact.10

InhistextbookofAshʿaritetheology,al-Ghazālīupholdsthedoctrinethathumanshavepower(theyareqādir)overtheiractions,orelsetheobligationsofthereligiouslaw


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wouldbemeaningless.11However,thetraditionalimplicationthathumansaretheagentsoftheiractionsisincompatiblewithal-Ghazālī’scosmologyinwhichthereisonlyoneagentorefficientcause(fāʿil).UnderstandingGod’struenature(tawḥīd)includestherealizationthatthereisnoagentorefficientcause(fāʿil)otherthanGodandthatHeistheonewhocreatesallexistence,sustenance,life,death,wealth,poverty,andallotherthingsthatcanhaveaname.12TheonlytrueagentinthisworldisGod.13Inthethirty-fifthbookofhisRevival,al-Ghazālīimplicitlydismissesthedistinctionbetweenvoluntaryandinvoluntaryactions.Openingandclosingone’seyelids,forinstance,isusuallyconsideredavoluntaryaction.Butonceasharpneedleapproachesthehuman’seye,thehumaniscompelledtoclosehiseyelids:

Evenifhewantedtoleavehiseyelidsopenhecouldn’t,despitethefactthatthecompelledclosingoftheeyelidsisavoluntaryact.Once,however,thepictureoftheneedleisperceivedinhissenseperception,thevolitiontoclose[theeyelids]appearsnecessarilyandthemovementofclosingoccurs.14

Thevoluntaryclosingoftheeyelidsiscompelledbyavolition(irāda),whichitselfiscompelledbyperceivingtheneedleapproachingtheeye.Thisisacausalchaininwhichthehumanknowledgecausesthevolitiontodevelopinacertainway,andthisvolitioncausesthepower-to-act(qudra),whichcausestheaction.InclassicalAshʿarism,thetemporarilycreatedpower-to-actdistinguishesavoluntaryhumanactfromaninvoluntaryone.Hereinal-Ghazālī’sthought,thepower-to-actisamerehumanfaculty,15neithersingledoutfromamongthebasicfacultiesofhumanlifenorcreatedinanywaydifferentfromothersofGod’screation.Thepower-to-actissimplyonelinkinachainofsecondarycauses:“Thevolition(irāda)followstheknowledge,whichjudgesthatathingispleasing(or:agreeable,muwāfiq)toyou.”16Thecausalchainof(p.218)knowledge,volition,power-to-act,andactionappliestoallvoluntaryhumanactions.Involuntaryactionshaveadifferentcausalchain,whichdoesnotincludethehumanpower-to-act,volition,andknowledge.Bothtypesofactions,however,aretheresultofcompulsion(iḍṭirār).

Inmostvoluntaryactions,thereactionofthehumanvolitionisnotasimmediateasinthecaseoftheneedleapproachingtheeye.Aparticularsubclassofvoluntaryactionsincludesthoseactionsthatinvolveahumanchoice(ikhtiyār).Ourpreviousexampleoftheactionofclosingone’seyewhenaneedleapproachesisconsideredavoluntaryactionbutdoesnotinvolveachoice.Thepersonwhoseeyeisapproachedbyaneedlecannotchooseanactionthatisalternativetoclosingtheeyelid.Thehumanwilliscompelledtoclosetheeye.Humanchoice(ikhtiyār)meanstobeabletochoosebetweenalternatives.Thoseactionsthatinvolvechoice,however,donotdifferfundamentallyfromthoseperformedwithoutit.Foral-Ghazālī,choice(ikhtiyār)meansthehumancapacityofselectingwhatappearsmostagreeableormostbeneficial(khayr)tous.Oftenthevolitionhesitates,andtheintellect(ʿaql)findsithardtodecidewhethersomethingisagreeableornot.Insuchacase,wedeliberateuntilwedecidewhichactionsappearstobenefitusmost.Oncetheprocessofdeliberationleadstoaclearknowledgeaboutwhatpromisestobebestforus,knowledge“arouses”(or:“dispatches,”inbaʿatha)thevolitionandthus


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initiatesthepartofthecausalchainthatleadstoaction.Thejudgmentoftheintellectfollowswhatappearsbesttoit,andinthissense,thehumanactionisdeterminedbywhattheintellectjudgesasbest.Thisjudgmentofteninvolvessenseperception(ḥiss)andourinnersenseofimagination(takhyīl).Allconnectionsinthecausalchainbetweensenseperceptionandhumanactionareconsiderednecessary:

Themotiveofthevolition(dāʿiyatal-irāda)issubservienttothejudgmentoftheintellectandthejudgmentofsenseperception;thepower-to-actissubservienttothemotive,andthemovement[ofthelimb]issubservienttothepower-to-act.Allthisproceedsfromhim[scil.thehuman]byanecessitywithinhim(bi-l-ḍarūrafīhi)withouthimknowingit.Heisonlytheplaceandthechannelforthesethings.Asforthemcomingfromhim?Noandonceagainno!17

Giventhenecessarypredeterminedcharacterofallhumanactions,onemightthinkthathumansareforced(majbūr)todotheactionstheyperform.Yetthatisnotthecase,al-Ghazālīstresses,astheystillhaveachoiceabouthowtoact.Hereheimplicitlyusesal-Fārābī’sdistinctionbetweentwotypesofnecessity.InTheBalancedBook,al-GhazālīaddressesthequestionofwhethersomethingthatisnotcontainedinGod’sforeknowledgecanbecreated.18Viewedbyitself(yunẓaruilādhātihi),everyfuturecontingencyisapossibleevent.Whattheeternaldivinewilldetermines,however,iswhatisnecessary,anditsalternativeswillnothappen.Apossiblefutureeventthatisnotcontainedinthedivineforeknowledgewillneverbeactualized.Suchaneventisconsidered“possiblewithregardtoitself”(mumkinbi-ʿtibārdhātihi)yetatthesametime“impossiblewithregardtosomethingelse”(muḥālbi-ʿtibārghayrihi).19Itisrenderedimpossiblebythedivinewillandforeknowledge.When(p.219) thehumandecideshisaction—andherewereturntothepassageinthethirty-fifthbookoftheRevival—hedecidesbetweenvariousalternativesthatarepossiblewithregardtothemselves.Heisunawarethatallthealternativesthathewilleventuallyrejecthavealreadybeenrenderedimpossiblebythedivinewillandforeknowledge.Sincethedivineforeknowledgecontainsallfactorsthatcausesuchdecisions,itknowswhatappearsmostagreeabletothehumanintellectandthusknowswhichpossibleactionwillbeactualized.

Thehumanisafreeagent(mukhtār)inthesensethatheorsheistheplace(orsubstrate,maḥall)ofthefreechoice(ikhityār).Freechoicemeansthathumanschoosewhatappearsmostbeneficial(khayr)forthem;allhumanactionsaremotivatedbyself-interest.20Indeed,thehumanisforcedbyGodtodecidehisorherownactionsthatarecongruentwithhisorherself-interest.RespondingtooneoftheoldestdisputesofMuslimtheology,al-Ghazālīsaysthatonecansaythathumanslackagencyinthesensethattheyareforcedtomakeachoice(majbūrʿalāl-ikhtiyār).Whereascausalconnectionsintheoutsideworldsuchastheonebetweenfireandcottonarepurecompulsion(jabrmaḥḍ),andtheactionsofGodarepurefreechoice(ikhtiyārmaḥḍ),theactionsofthehumanlieinbetweenthesetwoextremes.Thisiswhyearlierscholarsdecidedtonamethisthirdcategoryneitherfreechoicenorcompulsion.Followingtheterminologyofrevelation,al-Ghazālīsays,theycametocallit“acquisition”(kasb).Thiswordisopposedneithertocompulsionnortofreechoicebut“rather,forthosewhounderstand,itbrings


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thesetwotogether.”21Al-Ghazālī’snovelinterpretationofthisterm“acquisition”thusdepartsfromearlierAshʿariteteaching.22

Al-Ghazālī’steachingsonhowhumanactsaregeneratedarequitereminiscentofthefalāsifa’steachingsingeneralandofAvicenna’steachingsinparticular.23Avicennadescribeshumanactionastriggeredbyavolition,andthisvolitionis“dispatched”(mubʿatha)eitherbyaconviction(iʿtiqād)thatfollowsfrom“anappetitiveorirascibleimaginativeact”orbyarationalopinionthatfollowsfromanactofcognitivethinkingorfromtheconveyingofanintellectualform.24Theseformscomefromtheactiveintellect.WhateverhappenswithinthehumanmindisjustasegmentinalargercausalchainthatbeginswithGod,passesthroughtheheavenlyrealm,passesthroughthehumanmind,andmanifestsitselfinthematerialworldoutsideourminds.Inthethirty-fifthbookoftheRevival,al-Ghazālīincludesaratherlongparableofan“inquiringwayfarer”(al-sālikal-sāʾil)whoinvestigatesthecauseofacertainwrittentext—awritofamnestygrantedbyaking—andfollowsitscausalchainfromthepaperandtheink,viathehuman,totheheavenlyrealmuntilhereachesGod.Inthisparable,thecausesandeffectsinthematerialworldarecalledthe“worldofdominion”(ʿālamal-mulk),thepartofthechainthathappensinthehumanmindiscalledthe“worldofcompulsion”(ʿālamal-jabarūt),andthepartofthecausalchainthatliesbeyondthehumanintheheavenlyrealmiscalledthe“worldofsovereignty”(ʿālamal-malakūt).25

Al-Ghazālī’stheoryofhumanactsisanoriginalcontributiontoacenturies-olddebateinMuslimtheologyofhowtoreconcileGod’somnipotencewithHisjustice.IfGodcreateshumanactions—bymeansofwhatappearstousas(p.220) causaldetermination—howcanHejudgehumanactionsandbaserewardandpunishmentonthatjudgment?Again,theanswerliesinasimplecausalchain.Inthethirty-secondbookoftheRevival,al-GhazālīshowsdivinerevelationtobeoneofthecausesthatGodemploystoleadhisservantstosalvation.Thepassagestartswhenaninterlocutoraskswhyhumansshouldeverbotherwithindependentactionifallispredetermined,includingtheirfateintheafterlife.Ifeverythingispredeterminedonemightwellrefrainfromdoinganythingandrestinfatalisticinactivity.Al-Ghazālī’sanswerfocusesonstatementsofrevelation,fortheQur’anandtheḥadīthcorpusurgehumanstoact.Bothtextscontaintheimperative“act!”26Thisformulationimpliesthatonewillbepunishedandcensuredforbeingdisobedientunlessoneacts.Theimperativelanguagetriggersacertainconvictioninus,withdivinewordscausing(sabab)ourknowledgethatGodwantsustoact.Thisknowledgeisthecauseofadecisivemotive(dāʿiyajāzima)thatpropelsthosewhobelieveinrevelationtoactandbeobedienttoGod.27Themotiveisthecauseforthevolitionthattriggersthemovementofthelimbs.Thus,divinerevelationbecomesacauseofgooddeedsinahuman.Al-Ghazālīexplainshowrevelationcausestheconviction(iʿtiqād)thatoneispunishedforbaddeedsandhowthatconvictioncausessalvationintheafterlife:

(…)andtheconviction[thatsomehumanswillbepunished]isacauseforthesettinginoffear,andthesettingoffearisacauseforabandoningthepassionsandretreatingfromtheabodeofdelusions.Thisisacauseforarrivingatthevicinityof


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God,andGodistheonewhocausesthecauses(musabbibal-asbāb)andwhoarrangesthem(murattibuhā).Thesecauseshavebeenmadeeasyforhim,whohasbeenpredestinedineternitytoearnredemption,sothatthroughtheirchaining-togetherthecauseswillleadhimtoparadise.28

God’srevelationisthecauseofthehuman’sfearofpunishmentintheafterlife.Thisfear,inturn,causesthehumantoheedthewordsoftheprophets,whichleadstogoodactionsinthisworldthatthencausesthebeliever’sredemptionintheafterlife.29Thischainisafurtherdevelopmentofal-Juwaynī’snotionthatGodmakesahumanintelligentandremovesobstacles“tomakeGod’spatheasyforhim.”30

Onegenerationafteral-Ghazālī,hisfollowerIbnTūmartillustrateshowGodcauseshumanstobecomebelievers.Hetracesthehuman’sdecisiontobecomeabelieverinGodthroughachainofcausesandeffectstoGod’spropheticalmiracle.InhisCreedoftheCreator’sDivineUnity(tawḥīdal-Bārī),IbnTūmartwritesthataMuslim’sbelief(īmān)andpiety(ikhlās.)isaccompaniedbytheknowledge(ʿilm)ofGod’sexistenceandHisattributes.Thebeliever’sknowledgeresultsfromhissearch(ṭalab)forit.Thissearchforknowledgeistriggeredbyavolition(irāda),andthevolitionistheeffectofdesireandfear.Desireandfeararepromptedbywhatrevelationpromisesregardingrewardandpunishmentintheafterlife(al-waʿdwa-l-waʿīdbi-l-sharʿ).Revelation,inturn,takesitsauthorityfromthetrustworthinessofthe(p.221) Prophet(ṣidqal-rasūl),andtheProphet’strustworthinessisestablishedbythepropheticmiracle(al-muʿjiza).Attheend,thischainofeventsexplaininghumanbeliefarrivesatGodbecause“theevidenceofthemiracleisbyGod’spermission(idhnAllah).”31

IbnTūmart’snarrativemaynotconcurinallitsdetailswithal-Ghazālī’sideaofwhatcauseshumanstopursueadevoutandreligiouslifestyle.32Yetthetwoagreethattheprocesscanbedescribedbyachainofsecondarycauses,onestartedandwhollycontrolledbyGod.Inthethirty-secondbookoftheRevival,al-Ghazālīmakeshisliteraryinterlocutorsummarizehisownperspectiveonhowhumanactionsarethecausesoftheirownredemption:

Youmightsay:Thegistofthis[scil.al-Ghazālī’s]talkistosaythatGodhasputapurpose(ḥikma)intoeverything.Hemadesomehumanactscauses(asbāb)forthefulfillmentofthispurposeandforitsattainingtheobjectivethatisintendedinthecauses.God(also)madesomehumanactionsobstaclestothefulfillmentofthepurpose.33

Inallofhisworks,al-GhazālīpromotestheperspectivethatGod’screationisaperfectconglomerationofcausesandeffects,withonecreationharmoniouslydovetailingwiththenext.InsuchworksashisRevivaloftheReligiousScienceorinthelesswell-knownIntellectualInsights(al-Maʿārifal-ʿaqliyya),wherethecompleteharmonyofGod’screationiselaboratedinfinedetail,hedoesnotdiscussthecosmologicalnatureofcausalconnection.34Intheseworks,itsufficesforal-Ghazālītosaythat“inactualtermsthereisonlyoneefficientcause(fāʿil)andHeistheonewhoisfeared,whoistheobjectofhope,inwhomonehastrust,anduponwhomonerelies.”35InanadaptationofQ85:16,he


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saysthatGodistheproducer(ortheactiveagent,faʿʿāl)ofeverythingthatHewillstocreate.36Godis“thecauserofthecauses”or,asRichardM.Franktranslates,“theonewhomakesthecausesfunctionascauses”(musabbibal-asbāb).37AlthoughthistermisconsideredofAvicennanorigin,theexpressionoriginallyusedbyAvicennawasmostprobably“causeofcauses”(sababal-asbāb).38Theexpression“theonewhomakesthecausesfunctionascauses”(musabbibal-asbāb)hasaSufibackgroundandhadalreadybeenused,forinstance,byAbūṬālibal-MakkīinhisNourishmentoftheHearts(Qūtal-qulūb).39“Causeofcauses”expressestheAvicennanpositionthatGodisthestartingpointofallchainsofsecondarycausesandthattherelationshipbetweensuchchains’elementsisthatofefficientcausestotheireffect.IncontrasttowhatwaslikelytheAvicennanformula,al-Ghazālī’stermavoidscommittingtoanexplanationofhowthe“causes”comeabout.Inal-Ghazālī’sRevival,Godisdescribedastheonewho“carriesoutHiscustomandbindstheeffectstocausesinordertomakeHiswisdomapparent.”40Allotherexistencesarefullysubservientoperators(musakhkharūn)ofHimandlackindependenceeventomoveaspeckofdust.41Usingtheseformulas,al-GhazālīwishestoleaveopenwhetherGod’sarrangementof“causes”happensbymeansofsecondarycausalchainsorbycreatingexistencesindependently,sidebyside.

(p.222) TheConditionalDependenceofGod’sActionsAl-GhazālīpostulatesthatGodcreatedtheuniversesuchthatwhatwecallaneffectalwaysexistsalongsidewithwhatwecallitscause.Godwillalwayscreatecombustioninacottonballwhenitistouchedbyfire.IntheIncoherence,al-Ghazālīarguesthattheconnectionbetweencauseandeffectisnotnecessaryandcouldhavebeenconstructeddifferently.IntheRevival,theseconnectionsaredescribedastheresultofGod’svoluntaryactions.Al-GhazālīpositsthatGod’swill,whichexistsfrometernity,includesthevoluntarydecisionalwaystocombustacottonballifacertainotherevent—inthiscase,aclosecontactwithfire—precedesit.InHiseternity,GodfreelydecidestolimitHiscreativeactivitysuchthathumansjustifiablyconcludethattheconnectionbetweenfireandcombustionisaninseparable—andinthismeaning:necessary—causalconnection.

Inthethirty-secondbookoftheRevival,al-GhazālīdiscussestheconceptthathumansmustbethankfultoGod.Al-GhazālīopensthepassagewithaquestionofacriticalinterlocutorwhoinjectsthatsinceGodisthecreatorofeverything,itisnotplausiblethathumansshouldbegratefultoHim.GoddoesnotgiveanythinginparticulartoHiscreaturesforwhichtheyshouldbethankful.Indeed,Godisthecreatorofallhumanactionsanddecisions—includingthedecisiontobegratefultoGod.Aftertheusuallamentationthatthisproblembelongstothe“mysteryofpredestination,”whichhecannotsharewithhisreaders,al-Ghazālīexplains:theaction,whichGodcreateswithinthehuman,isthegiftforwhichoneshouldbegrateful.IfthatactionispleasingtoGod,itwillleadtorewardintheafterlife:“YouractionisagiftfromGodandinasmuchasyouareitsplace(or:substrate,maḥall),Hewillpraiseyou.”42Thecreationofthegoodactionisthefirstblessing(niʿma)ofGod,andtherewardintheafterlifeforthisveryactionisasecondblessingfromHimtothehuman(niʿmaukhrāminhuilayka).ThisisagainanexampleforhowGodhasarrangedthecauses.God’screationofthegoodactioninthehumanisacauseforHisrewardintheafterlife.God’sfirstaction(creatingagoodaction


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inahuman)isthecauseforHissecondaction(rewardingthehumanintheafterlife).ThisalsoapplieswhenGodcreatesthankfulnessinahuman:

OneofGod’stwoactionsisthecause(sabab)fortheturningofthesecondactioninthedirectionofwhatpleasesHim.IneachcaseGodhasthegratefulness(al-shukr).Youare[simply]describedastheonewhoisgrateful(shākir),andthismeansthatyouaretheplaceofthethingthat“gratefulness”isanexpressionof.Thisdoesn’tmeanthatyouaretheonewhobringsgratefulnessintoexistence(mūjid).Similarly,ifyouaredescribedassomeonewhoisknowledgeable(ʿārifwa-ʿālim),thisdoesn’tmeanthatyouareacreatoroftheknowledgeandtheonewhobringsitinexistence.ItrathermeansthatyouareaplaceforitandthatithasalreadybeenbroughtintoexistenceinyoubytheEternalPower(al-qudraal-azaliyya).43

(p.223) AllcausesthatleadtosalvationintheafterlifeareindividualactsofGod(fiʿlminafʿālAllāh).ThecausalchainforhowGod’srevelationleadstosalvationintheafterlifeischaracterizedasfollows:Godsendshumansarevelationthatgivesthemknowledgeabouttheconnectionbetweendeedsinthisworldandredemptioninthenext.Godusesrevelationasasecondarycausetocreatethisknowledgeinhumans.Next,theknowledgeofthisconnectioncausesamotive(dāʿiya)thatencouragestheobeyingofGod’simperativesandtheperformanceofgooddeeds.ThismotiveisalsoGod’screation.ThedesiretoavoidpainintheafterlifeandtoachievethepleasuresofparadisecombinedwiththeknowledgethatcomesfromrevelationcausethehumanmotivetoactjustlyandthuspleaseGod.PleasingGodwillindeedleadtotheenjoymentofparadise.God’sactionofcreatingpiousdeedsforthehumanisthecauseofanotherofGod’sactions,namely,rewardinthenextlife.

Al-Ghazālī’sexplanationforhowactionsinthisworldleadtorewardorpunishmentinthehereafterisessentiallythesameasAvicenna’sexplanation.InhisPointersandReminders(al-Ishārātwa-l-tanbīhāt),AvicennaaddressesthequestionofwhyGodpunisheshumansiftheiractionsarepredetermined.Punishmentforone’stransgressions,hesays,islikeadiseasethataffectsthebodyfollowinggluttony(nahma):“Punishmentisoneoftheconsequencesthatpaststateshaveledto.Theoccurrenceofthesepaststatesandtheoccurrenceofwhatfollowsthemarebothinevitable.”44Punishmentorrewardinthehereafterisacausaleffectofone’sactionsinthisworld.Ourgoodactionsinthisworldarethusthecausesofhappinessinthenextwork,al-Ghazālīsays,andourbadactionsarethecausesofdistress,justasmedicineisthecauseofrecoveryfromasicknessandpoisonthecauseofdeath.45

HumanshaveeveryreasontobegratefultoGod,al-Ghazālīargues,sinceHecreatesinthemtheactionsthatlatercausetheirredemption.Next,al-Ghazālīaddressesanobjectionthathedoesnotexplicitlystate,althoughhisanswermakesthenatureoftheobjectionquiteevident:ifallhumanactionsareinrealityGod’sactions,al-Ghazālīexpectshisreaderstoask,whydoesHenotsimplytransferahumanintoparadisewithoutthewholeprocessofcreatingknowledgeinthehuman,creatingamotive,andcreatinghumanactions?IfGodistrulyomnipotent,couldHenothavemaderedemptionmucheasierforHiscreation?Al-Ghazālīanswers:


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OneofGod’sactsisthecause(sabab)foranother;Imeanthatthefirstoneisthecondition(sharṭ)forthesecond.Thecreationofthebody,forinstance,isthecauseforthecreationoftheaccident(ʿaraḍ),sinceHedoesnotcreatetheattributebeforeit.Thecreationoflifeisaconditionforthecreationofknowledgeandthecreationofknowledgeisaconditionforthecreationofvolition.AllthesearefromamongGod’sactionsandoneofthemisacausefortheother,meaningthatitisacondition.Beingaconditionmeansthatonlyasubstance(jawhar)ispreparedtoreceivetheactoflife,andonlysomethingthatlivesispreparedtoreceiveknowledge.Thereisnoreceptionofvolitionotherthanbysomethingthathasknowledge.(p.224) Therefore,“someofGod’sactionsareacauseforothers”meansthisanditdoesn’tmeanthatoneofHisactionsbringstheotherintoexistence.Rather[oneofGod’sactions]clearsthewayforacondition[whosefulfillmentisrequired]fortheexistenceofanotherofGod’sactions.46Ifthetruthofthisisgrasped,itelevatestothe[higher]stageofbeliefinGod’sunitythatwehavespokenabout.47

Godcannotsimplymovehumansfromtheircradleintoparadise,becausethe“conditions”ofenteringparadisearenotyetfulfilledwhenthehumanisstillinthecradle.Enteringparadisehasaspecificcause.Havingacausemeansoneormoreconditionsmustbefulfilledbeforethecreationoftheeventcantakeplace.Withoutthefulfillmentoftheseconditions,Godcannotcreatetheevent.ThusGodcannotcreatesomeone’sentryintoparadiseunlessHehasearliercreatedgooddeedsintheperson.Gooddeeds,inturn,cannotbecreatedinahumanwithoutapriorvolitionforperforminggooddeeds.Thevolitionrequiresthepriorexistenceofknowledge.Knowledge,inturn,requireslife,andlifecanonlybecreatedinasubstance(jawhar),beitinabodyorinastableincorporealentitysuchasacelestialorhumansoul.48Thehuman’sgooddeeds,hisvolition,hisknowledge,hislife,andhissubstanceareallindividualelementsinachainofconditionsthatmustbefulfilledbeforethehumancanenterparadise.Apropheticalḥadīthsaysthat“peoplewillbeledintoparadiseinchains.”Foral-Ghazālī,thisstatementexpressestheideathatonecanonlyenterparadise“ledbychainsofcauses”(maqūdbi-salāsilal-asbāb).49

Asecondpassageinal-Ghazālī’sRevivalconfirmstheviewthatGod’screativeactivityislimitedbyratherstrictconditions.Inthispassagefromthethirty-fifthbookonunderstandingGod’sunity(tawḥīd),al-Ghazālīrejectstheviewthatknowledgegenerates(wallada)volition,volitiongeneratesthehuman’spower-to-act,andthispowerthengeneratesthemovementofthelimbs.Thereaderknowsthathereal-GhazālīreferstoaMuʿtaziliteunderstandingofthe“generation”(tawallud)ofhumanactsandtheireffects.TheMuʿtazilitepositioniswrong,al-Ghazālīstresses:“[t]osaythatsomeofthesecomeintobeing(ḥadatha)fromothersispureignorance,nomatterwhetheronecallsit‘generating’(tawallud)oranythingelse.”Alltheseeventsgobacktoanentity(maʿnā)thatisknownasthe“EternalPower”(al-qudraal-azaliyya),andonlythosewhoaredeeplyrootedinknowledge(al-rāsikhūnafīl-ʿilm)understandthetruenature(kunh)ofthisbeing.50Inthenextsentence,al-Ghazālīexplainssomeoftheworkingsofthe“EternalPower”:


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Someoftheobjectsofthispower(muqdarāt),however,arearrangedsothattheircomingintobeingfollowsothers.Thearrangement(tartīb)isthatsomethingconditioned(al-mashrūṭ)followsafterthecondition(al-sharṭ).Avolitiononlycomesoutof(taṣduruʿan)theEternalPowerafterknowledge,andknowledgeonlyafterlife,andlifeonlyafterthereisasubstrateforlife.Andlikeonecannotsaythatlifeisbroughtintobeingbythebody,whichistheconditionforlife,so[onecannotsaythis]inthecaseofallotherstepsofthearrangement.(p.225) Someconditionsareapparenttotheordinaryperson,butothersareonlyapparenttotheelite(al-khawāṣṣ),whoexperienceunveilingbythelightoftheTruth.

Inanycase,nothingprecedingprecedesandnothingfollowingfollowsexceptbymeansofrightandnecessity.ThisappliestoallofGod’sactions.51

Accordingtothispassage,theconditionedprocessionofbody,life,volition,andhumanactionsis“bymeansofrightandnecessity”(bi-l-ḥaqqwa-l-luzūm).RichardGramlich,inhisvaluableGermantranslationofbooks31–36oftheRevival,renderstheArabicwordḥaqq(lit.“truth,”oralso“one’sdue”)insuchpassagesas“laws”or“regulations”(Gesetzmäßigkeiten),probablymeaningthelawsofnature.52Althoughitisnotimpossiblethatal-Ghazālīhadinmindthelawfulcharacterofthearrangementofconditionsandtheconditioned,itseemsalongstretchtoextractthismeaningfromtheadmittedlyhighlyambiguousArabicwordḥaqq.Morelikely,al-Ghazālīmeanstosaythatthearrangementfollowsarightnessthatgiveseachelementitsallocateddue.InAshʿaritetheology,“justice(ʿadl)istoputthingsintheirappropriateplace.”53Theword“necessity”thatfollowsafterthisexplanationislessproblematicinitsmeaning,thoughmoreproblematicwithregardtowhatitimplies.ItsuggeststhatGod’sactionsaretheresultofanarrangementthatworksbynecessityandleavesnoroomforalternatives.

InsomebooksofhisRevival,al-Ghazālīviewscausesaseventsthat“cleartheway”(mahhada)forthecreationoftheireffects.Theperspectivethatunderstandscausesas“conditions”fortheexistenceoftheireffectssuggeststhatGodcannotsimplycreateasHewishes,butrather,Hemustfollowamatrixofsuchconditions.Al-GhazālīhadalreadyputforwardaverysimilarpositionaboutconditionsforGod’screationintheThirdPosition(al-maqāmal-thālith)oftheseventeenthdiscussionintheIncoherence.HereintheRevival,asinhisIncoherence,al-Ghazālīavoidsclarifyingthenatureoftheseconditions.ThisnecessitycanbeeithertheresultofGod’schoosingortheconditionsthatareimposeduponGod’sactions.Al-GhazālīleavesopentheideawhetherGodHimselfchoosessuchconditionsuponHisactionsorwhethertheyarerequirementsbeyondGod’scontrolwithwhichHemustcomply.

TheConditionsofaCreationThatIstheBestofAllPossibleCreationsAssumingthattheconditionsthatapplytoGod’sactionsarebeyondGod’scontrolwouldmeanfollowingAvicennaandacceptingthatGodisnotafreeagentwhocannotchooseHisactions.BecauseeverycausalconnectionisessentiallysuchaconditionandarestrictionuponGod’sactions,adoptingtheviewthatGodcannotviolatecausalconnections,evenifHewantedto,wouldmaketheworldinwhichwelivenecessarywhiledeprivingGodofallfreedomforHisactions.ForAvicenna,Godnecessarilyactstoestablishthebestorder.


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Avicenna’s(p.226) positionsimplydoesnotallowfortheworldtobeanydifferentfromthisbestandnecessaryorder.Thedivineprovidence(al-ʿināyaal-ilāhiyya)thatallowsforcreationresultsfromGodbeingthepuregood(al-khayral-maḥḍ)thatonlyemanatesthebest.TheorderthatfollowsfromGod’sknowledgeisthebestorderthatispossible.ForAvicenna,Goddoesnothaveaparticulardesiretocreatethebestofallpossibleworlds;ratherHesimplycannothelpdoingso.EverythingthatHecreatesisthebestofallpossiblecreations.54

Al-Ghazālīgivesadetailedaccountoftheseteachingsinthetwobooksinwhichhereportsthepositionofthefalāsifa.55InthebookpreservedinMSLondon,Or.3126,al-GhazālīreproducestherelevantpassagesfromAvicenna’sPointersandRemindersandfromthemetaphysicsofhisHealing,whileaddinghisowncomments:ifonestudiestheanimalsandplantsandrealizesthatnature(al-ṭabīʿa)cannotgenerateallthesedetailsbyitself,oneunderstandsthatallthismustbe(lāmaḥāla)theproductofdivineprovidence.Thesameistrueifoneevaluatestheprivateinterchanges(muʿāmalāt)betweenpeople.Differentpeoplehavedifferenthabitsanddifferentunderstandingsofjustice.Divineprovidencerespondstothesedifferencesbysendingprophetstoteachthevariedpeopleonetruesenseofjustice.Theexistenceoftheseandotherbenefits(manāfiʿ)cannotpossiblycomefromanysourceotherthanGod.56

AlthoughthesethoughtsaimtoillustrateAvicenna’steachings,theyarenot,strictlyspeaking,partofthelatter’sdoctrine.ObservationalorempiricalevidenceoftheperfectionofGod’screationplaysnexttonoroleinAvicenna’sthought.Hemerelysaysthat“youcannotdenythewondrousmanifestations(al-āthāral-ʿajība)intheformationoftheworld(…)allofwhichdonotproceedbycoincidencebutrequiresomekindofordering(tadbīrmā).”57ForAvicenna,thisarrangement—howeverperfectitmayappear—cannotcountasevidenceforthisworld’sperfection.TheperfectioncanonlybededucedfromreflectingonGod’sknowledge,whichistheoriginofdivineprovidence.Theempiricalperceptionofthisworld’sperfectionisamotifofSufiliteratureandappearsprominentlyinAbūṬālibal-Makkī’sNourishmentoftheHearts(Qūtal-qulūb),amongotherplaces.ItisalsoanelementoftraditionalAshʿarism.ForAshʿarites,theskillfulness(itqān)andorderliness(intiẓām)ofGod’screationisaclearsignthatGodhasall-encompassingknowledge.58Suchargumentsbasedondesignandteleologicalmotifsalsoplayanimportantroleinal-Ghazālī’stheology.59InhisBalancedBookonWhat-to-Believe,al-GhazālīstressesthatallofGod’screationsareskillfullyandwiselyarranged.StudyingGod’screationmakesonerealizehowperfectlyitisordered.Here,asinmanyotherplaces,al-Ghazālīusestheparableofaskillfullyhandwrittentexttopointtothemanyaccomplishmentsofitsauthorandscribe.60

Inthethirty-fifthbookofhisRevival,al-Ghazālīincludesarelativelybriefpassageinwhichhealsoarguesthatthiscreationisthebestpossiblecreation.Theteachingsonthesetwopagesbecamefamousfortheircompressedformula:“Thereisinpossibilitynothingmorewondrousthanwhatis”(laysafī-l-imkānabdaʿmimmākān).61Thisteachingwasalreadyseenascontroversialinal-Ghazālī’slifetime,andoverthefollowingcenturies,itstirredalong-lastingdebateamongMuslimtheologiansaboutwhatexactlyal-Ghazālī(p.227)


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meanttoexpresshereandwhetherthestatementthatthisworldisthebestofallpossiblecreationsisactuallytrue.62Oncemore,al-Ghazālīfailedtobeexplicitaboutthetheologicalandphilosophicalimplicationsofhisteachings.ThispassageintheRevivalendswithacrypticstatementthatthepositionexpressedisaseaofarcanemattersinwhichmanyhavealreadydrowned.Behinditliesthesecretofpredestination(sirral-qadar)inwhichthemajorityofpeoplewonderinperplexity,andthosetowhomthingshavebeenunveiled(al-mukāshafūn)areforbiddentodivulgethesecret.63Later,al-Ghazālīcommentedonthispassageinashortexplanatorybook,TheDictationonDifficultPassagesintheRevival(al-Imlāʾfīishkālātal-Iḥyāʾ),writteninresponsetocritics.Here,heconfirmsthepositionthatthisworldisthebestofallpossiblecreationsbuthardlyaddsanythingthatcouldclarifythetheologicalbackground.64

Al-Ghazālītooksignificantpartsofthistwo-pagepassageonthebestofallpossibleworldsfromAbūṬālibal-Makkī’sSufihandbook,TheNourishmentoftheHearts.65Whatinterestedal-Ghazālīaboutal-Makkī’searliertextwastheapparentorderlinessoftheworld’sdesignthatal-Makkīillustrates.Basedontheseexamples,al-Ghazālīpositshistheorythatthiscreationisthebestofallpossibleones,aconclusionnotexplicitlyfoundinal-Makkī’swork.Thepassagemarkstheendofal-Ghazālī’sexplanationofwhyonemust“believeinGod’sunity”(tawḥīd),atwhichpointthetexttriestoconnectGod’sunitywiththeideaof“trustinGod”(tawakkul).Thediscussionoftawḥīdmakesclear,al-Ghazālī’sliteraryinterlocutorclaims,thathumanactionsarenotfree,butrathertheyarecompelledbythecauses(asbāb)thatdeterminethehuman’svolition.AlleventsinGod’screation,includinghumanactions,arecompulsory(al-kullujabrun).Ifthisisthecase,theinterlocutorasks,whydoesGodrewardandpunishhumansfortheiractions?SincesuchactionsareinrealityGod’sactions,whydoesGodbecomeangryatHisownactions?Al-Ghazālī’sresponserefersthereaderbacktothepassageinwhichhewritesthatoneofGod’searlieractions,namely,theactionthatHecreateswithinahuman,isthecauseforoneofGod’slateractions,thatis,bestowingrewardorpunishmentintheafterlife.66OnlythosewhohaveachievedahighdegreeoftrustinGodwillunderstandthisaspectoftawḥīd.

CompletetrustinGod,al-Ghazālīcontinues,resultsfromafirmbeliefinGod’smercy(raḥma)andinHiswisdom(ḥikma).Suchbeliefisitselfcreatedbyaninquiryinto“theonewhomakesthecausesfunctionascauses”(musabbibal-asbāb).Itwouldtaketoolong,al-Ghazālīwrites,toexplainhowthosetowhomtruthshavebeenrevealedreachtheirstronglevelofbeliefinGod’smercyandwisdom.Onecanonlygivethegist(ḥāṣil)oftheirmethod:theonewhoaimstodevelopafirmanddecisivetrustinGodbelievesthat,ifGodhadgivenallhumanstheunderstandingofthemostunderstandingamongthem,theknowledgeofthemostknowledgeableamongthem,andthewisdomofthemostwiseamongthem,andifHehadtaughtthemthesecretsofthisworldandthehereafter,andifHehadgiventhemtheopportunitytoorderthisworldanew,theycouldnothavecomeupwithanarrangementbetterthanorevendifferentfromthisone,notevenbyagnat’swingoraspeckofdust.67

(p.228) Al-GhazālīcopiedthislastlongsentencealmostverbatimfromAbūṬālibal-


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Makkī’sbook.68Inal-Makkī’stext,however,thesentencehasaverydifferentfunction.HeconstructsanargumentthataimstoillustratethefactthatGodcreatedthisworldinaccordwithhumanmeansforunderstandingit.Al-MakkīwishestoshowthatGod’screationisinaperfectorder,asviewedfromtheperspectiveofhumans.ThecompatibilitybetweenhumanmindsandtheorderofGod’screationgiveshumansreasontotrusttheaccuracyoftheirknowledgeandtheirunderstandingsoftheworld,anditallowsthemtomakepredictionsregardingfutureeventsinthisworld.Accordingtoal-Makkī,trustinGod(tawakkul)issynonymouswithtrustintheorderlinessofthisworld,whichisadirectresultofGod’smercy.Al-Makkīwrites:

Godcarriedoutthiscreationaccordingtothearrangementoftheminds(ʿalātartībal-ʿuqūl)andaccordingtothecustomarynotions(maʿānīl-ʿurf)andhabitualarrangementsthatcomewiththewell-knowncausesandfamiliarmediatorsaccordingtotheyardstickthatisimprintedinthemindsandthattheyhavebeenendowedwith.69

Al-Ghazālīdoesnotreiterateal-Makkī’sconclusionthatGodcreatedthisworldaccordingtothearrangementofhumanminds.Whatfascinatedhimwastheimplicationthatthisworldismostorderlyinitsdesign.Asaresult,hecopiedonlythatpartofal-Makkī’stextthatservesasafittingillustrationforthetwofactsthatthisworldiscreatedaccordingtoaperfectarrangementandthatthearrangementisaccessibletohumanunderstanding.Eventhemostperfecthumanmindswillperceivenothingbutorderlinessintheworld.Foral-Ghazālī,thisorderisnottheresultofasimpleaccordbetweenhumanmindsandGod’screation.Hecomestoamoreradicalconclusionandsaysthattheorderisthebestofallpossibledesignsfortheworld.Thisistrueinabsoluteterms,notjustaccordingtohumanunderstanding:

EverythingthatGoddistributesamonghumans,suchassustenance,life-span(ajal),pleasureandpain,incapacityandcapacity,beliefandunbelief,piousandsinfulactions,isallofsheerjustice,withnoinjusticeinit,andpureright,withnowronginit.

Indeed,itisaccordingtothenecessaryrightarrangement(ʿalāl-tartībal-wājibal-ḥaqq)inaccordtowhatshouldbe(ʿalāmāyanbaghī)andlikeitshouldbe(kamāyanbaghī)andinthemeasureinwhichitshouldbe(wa-bi-l-qadralladhīyanbaghī);andthereisinpossibilitynothingmoreexcellent,moreperfect,andmorecompletethanit.70

Ifpeoplelivewiththeimpressionthattheirlotinthisworldisunjust,al-Ghazālīexplains,theyshouldwaitforthenextworldtoseehowtheywillbecompensatedforthelossesthatmightbeinflictedontheminthisworld.Thosewhogainadvantagesinthisworldbydoinginjustice,however,shallhavetopayforthatintheafterlife.

Imperfectionsinthisworldarereal,al-Ghazālīsays,yettheyservethehigherpurposeofrealizingthemostperfectworld.Inthetwenty-secondbook(p.229) oftheRevival,al-Ghazālīsaysthatdesire(shahwa)andanger(ghaḍab)arecharactertraitsresponsible


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formuchharminthisworld.Yettheyarenecessarybecausewithoutdesireforfoodandsex,humanscouldnotsurvive;withoutanger,theywouldnotbeabletodefendthemselvesfromthosethingsthatthreatentheirlives.71Eventhemostperfectarrangementfortheworldincludesacertainamountofharmthatmanifestsitselfasimperfectionsthat,inturn,pointtowardtheperfect.Iftherewerenosickness,thehealthywouldnotenjoyhealth.Ifbeastshadnotbeencreated,thedignityofmanwouldnothavebecomemanifest.Althoughthepunishmentsinhellmayseemlikeimperfections,theyarenecessaryinordertohonorthosewhowillenterparadiseandshowtherighteoustheextentoftheirreward.Inasense,themeritsoftherighteousareransomedbythesufferingoftheunbelievers.Thisislikesavingthehealthofapersonbyamputatinghisgangrenoushand.Perfectionandimperfectiondonotbecomeapparentinabsolutetermsbutonlyinrelationtoeachother.Theperfect,therefore,needstheimperfectinordertodemonstrateitsperfection:“[God’s]generosityand[His]wisdomrequirethesimultaneouscreationoftheperfectandtheimperfect.”72

Thenotionthatthebestofallpossibleworldsnecessarilyrequiresthecreationofimperfectionscomesfromphilosophicalliterature.EricOrmsby,whooffersaninsightfulanddetailedanalysisofthispassage,observedthatal-GhazālīhadtakenthisideafromtheworksofAvicenna.73InhisPointersandReminders,Avicennawritesthatitisnecessarytocreatethingsthatarelackinginperfectioninasmuchastheyarebadorharmful(sharr).74Inordertorealizeaperfectorder,itisalsonecessaryforthegoodtopredominateovertheharmful.Yetsomeharmmustbethere,orelsethegoodwouldnotbeabletoshowitsadvantages(faḍīla).Aperfectworld,therefore,mustcontaincreationsthatareabsoluteevilaswellasthoseinwhichtheevilaspectspredominateoverthebeneficialones.Thisisbecauseasmallamountofevilpreserves(taḥarraza)thegoodcreationsandsafeguardsthatharmfuleffectswillalwaysbelimited.AllthisistakenintoaccountinGod’sprovidenceforHiscreation.God,whoaccordingtoAvicennapursuesnogoalsforHiscreationandhasnodesires,createstheharmfulasifHedesiresitbyaccident.OnecanthereforesaythatharmentersGod’screationbyaccident,likeadiseaseaccidentallyaffectslivingbeings.75

Althoughharmaffectsexistenceaccidentally—thatis,harmisnotnecessaryfortheexistenceofanykindofworld—harmisindeednecessaryfortherealizationofaworldthatisthebestofallpossibleworlds.Itisnotanundesiredsideeffectofcreatingthegood,butratheritisintrinsictoitsestablishment.Thecreationofperfectionnecessarilyrequiresthesimultaneouscreationofimperfectionsfortheperfecttoexist.Harmisanecessaryconcomitantofthisworld’sgoodconstitution:“[t]heexistenceofevilisanecessitythatfollowsfromtheneedforthegood.”76ForAvicenna,harmisaprivationofperfection,andthemostessentialprivationisthenonexistent(al-ʿadam).77Somethingthatexistsisalwaysbetterthansomethingthatdoesnotexist.Therefore,thefactthatGodcreatesthisworldisabenefitthatbyitselfoutweighsmanyofitsprivations.Ifthingsareaffectedbyharm,theysufferfromprivationofperfection.Such(p.230)imperfectionsmanifestthemselvesasignorance,forinstance,orasphysicalweakness,deformation,pain,ordistress.78Harmandevilexist,however,onlyinthesublunarsphereofgenerationandcorruption,andinthatsphere,theyaffectonlyindividualsand


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notclassesofbeings.79Theheavenlyspheresandtheuniversalsareperfectandnotaffectedbyit.EchoingAristotle,Avicennasaystheharminthesublunarsphereisinsignificant(ṭafīf)incomparisontotheperfectionoftherestofexistence.80

Al-GhazālīwasevidentlyimpressedbyAvicenna’ssolutiontothequestionoftheodicy.Inthethirty-secondbookoftheRevival,al-Ghazālīmentionstheexampleofafatherwhoforceshisinfantsontoundergothepainfulprocessofcuppinginordertohealanillness.Thisfatherismorebeneficialtothechildthanhismotherwho,inherlove,wishestosparehimalldistress.81HeelaboratesfurtheronthisexampleinhisHighestGoal(al-Maqṣadal-asnā),inwhichhecommentsonthedivinename“theMerciful”(al-raḥmānal-raḥīm).TotheobjectionthatGodshouldnotbecalledmercifulaslongHecreatessomuchpoverty,distress,sickness,andharminHiscreation,al-Ghazālīrespondswithaparable:

Amothercareslovinglyforhersmallchildanddoesnotallowthatitundergoescupping,yetthefatherisinsightful(ʿāqil)andforciblytreatsthechildwithit.Anignorantpersonthinksthatonlythemotherismercifulbutnotthefather.Aninsightfulpersonknowsthatitispartoftheperfectionofthefather’smercy,hisaffection,andhiscompletecompassionwhenhecausespaintothechildbymakingitundergocupping.[Theinsightfulpersonalsoknows]thatthemotherisanenemytothechildintheguiseofafriend.Thepain[causedbycupping]issmallandyetitisthecauseformuchpleasure.Soitisn’tharmful,ratheritisgood.82

Thisexplanationappliestoallimperfectionsandharminthisworld.Theyservethelargergoodofpreservingtheperfections:“Thereisnoharminexistencewhichdoesnotcarryinsidesomegood;werethatharmeliminated,thegoodthatithasinsidewouldvanish.Theresultwouldbeanincreaseinharmincomparisontowhatithadbefore.”83GodreferredtothisrelationshipwheninaḥadīthHerevealed:“[m]ymercyoutstripsmywrath.”Beneathallthisinsight,however,liesasecretthatrevelationcannotfullydisclose.84

Whileal-GhazālīevidentlyacceptsAvicenna’sjustificationofwhyharmexistsinGod’screation,hedoesnotacceptthemetaphysicalpremisethatcreatingperfectionisanecessaryresultofthedivinenature.Al-Ghazālī,forinstance,nowheresaysthatitisinGod’snaturetocreatethebestcreation.KnowledgeaboutthebestofallpossibleworldsisnotacquiredbyreflectiononGod’sattributes.Rather,weknowthatGodcreatesthebestbylookingathiscreatures.InhisDictationonDifficultPassagesintheRevival,inwhichal-GhazālīapologeticallycommentsonteachingsintheRevivalthatpromptedoppositionamonghispeers,hedevoteslittlemorethanonepagetotheissueofthebestofallpossibleworlds.Hereheexplainshowweknowthatthiscreationcouldnotbemoreperfect:(p.231)

IfeverythingthatGodcreatesweredefectiveincomparisontoanothercreationthatHecouldhavecreatedbutdidn’tcreate,thedeficiencythatwouldinfectthisexistenceofHiscreationwouldbeevidentjustlikeitisevidentthatthereareinHis[actual]creationparticularindividualswhomHedidcreatedeficientinorderto


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showtherebytheperfectionofwhatHecreatesotherwise.85

GodcreatesdeficienciesinordertopointthoseinsightfulhumanstowardtheperfectionofHiscreation.Withoutthemanifestimperfections,theperfectionofothercreationswouldsimplyremainunknown.ImperfectcreationsdrawattentiontotheperfectonesandmakeGod’sperfectionobvious:

InasmuchasHeshowshumansHisperfection,HepointsthemtowardsHisdeficiency;andinasmuchHemakesthemknowHisomnipotence,HemakesthemseeHisincapacity.86

Studyingthecreatedbeings(makhlūqāt)istheonlymeansofknowingthatthisworldisthemostperfect.Revelationcanonlyhintatthisfactbecauserevealingthisworld’sperfectiontothemassesofthepeoplewouldmakeitsperfectionvoid.InhisDictation,al-Ghazālīsaysthatthesubjectofthebestofallpossibleworldsisoneofthesecretsofworship(asrāral-ʿibāda)andcannotbediscussedopenly.Godgivesuspreciselytherightamountofknowledgetoenableustocontributeourbestactionstothisworld.TheamountofknowledgeHegivesusispartofthemostperfectarrangementofHiscreation.Ifpeoplewithweakintellectsweretobecomeawarethateverythingisforeseenandinaperfectorder,theywoulddrawwrongconclusionsandbepromptedtoperformactionslessperfectthanthosetheydowithoutthisknowledge.WouldGodhavegiventhosehumansdestinedtoenterparadiseawaytoknowtheirfuturebliss,forinstance,theywouldneverarrive.Suchknowledgewouldleadtobadactionsandpreventredemptioninthehereafter.Thesameistrueforonewhohasbeentoldthathewillendupinhell.Hewouldmakenofurtherefforttorestrainhisbadpassions.ItispartofGod’sperfectarrangementtopreventallbutthemostlearnedfromgainingknowledgeofthisworld’sperfection.87

TheNecessityoftheConditionsinGod’sCreationAl-GhazālīteachesthatGodchoosestoshowutmostmercytoHiscreationandthatHecreatesthebestofallpossibleworlds.Heisliketheinsightfulfatherwhochoosestobemercifultohischild.Yet,suchastheactionsofthiswisefather,God’swiseactionscaninflictpainuponHiscreation.Itisasignofwisdomthattheworldiscreatedwithacertaindegreeofharmfulnessintrinsictoit.EvenifGodfreelychoosestofollowthewisdomoftheplantocreatetheworld,onceHedecidestocreatethebestpossibleworld,Henolongerhasachoiceaboutwhattocreate.Amongallpossibleworlds,thereisonlyonethatisthebestofallpossibles.InhisDictationonDifficultPassagesintheRevival,al-GhazālīsaysthatGod’sactionsaretheresultofthefreechoice(ikhtiyār)that(p.232) thisfreeagent(fāʿilmukhtār)hasaboutHisactions.OnceGodchoosestocreatethemostperfectworld,however,Hisactionsfollowanecessarypaththatisdictatedbywisdom.Al-Ghazālīexplainshowwisdom(ḥikma)determinesthedivineactions:

OnceGodacts,itisonlypossibleforHimtodowhatis[within]thelimitthatthewisdom(al-ḥikma)requires,ofwhichweknowthatitis[true]wisdom.GodletsusknowaboutthisonlybecauseweknowthechannelsofHisactionsandtheoriginsofHisaffairsandbecauseHeverifiesthateverythingwhichHedecidedandwhich


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HedecreesinHiscreationisbymeansofHisknowledge,andHiswill,andHispower,andthatitisofutmostwisdom,ofextremeskillfulness,andofthefullamountofthecreation’sgenerosity.[Godletsusknowaboutthis]becausetheperfectionofwhatHecreatesisadecisiveargumentandanevidentdemonstrationforHisperfectionintheattributesofHisglory(jalāl)thatmakeitnecessarytocallHimthemostglorious(al-mūjibali-ijlālihi).88

ThedivinemotivetocreatethebestofallpossibleworldsexplainswhyGodcreatesthisworldasitisandwhyHeputsspecificconditionsonachievingcertainbenefits.Itexplains,forinstance,whyGoddoesnotmovehumansimmediatelyfromthecradletoparadise.Inthethirty-secondbookofhisRevival,al-Ghazālīonlypartlyanswersthisquestion.Certainconditionsexist,whichmustbefulfilledforhumanstoenterparadise.Humanshavetoperformpiousdeeds,whichinturnrequirethepriorexistenceofavolitionthattriggersthesedeeds.Thevolitionrequiresthepriorexistenceofknowledgeonthepartofhumans,andsoforth.Aswehavealreadysaid,theseconditionsmayalsobeunderstoodascausalconnections.Thecorrectsortofknowledgethatanindividualhaswillcausethecorrectkindofvolition,whichwillcausethecorrectkindofactiontocauseentryintoparadise.Yetthelargerquestionremains:whydoalltheseconditions—orcausalconnections—exist?SinceGodhasauniversalanddetailedpre-knowledgeofalleventspastandfuture,andsinceHecreatesallhumanactions,whycanHenotmakehischosenpeopleenterparadiseevenbeforetheyexperiencethehardshipofbirthandchildhood?Whyallthesecomplications?Whynotsimplycreatehumansoulsandplacethemintoparadise?

ForanAshʿarite,thereisnoanswertothisquestionandthusnoreasontoask.Yetinthisparticularquestion,al-GhazālīclearlygoesbeyondtheAshʿariteapproachandventurestoanswertheproblemopenly,albeitwithoutdiscussion.Thearrangementsoftheworldinwhichwelivearethoseofthebestofallpossibleworlds.Thisworldcannotbebetter,becauseitisalreadythebestpossible.Italsocannotbeworse,becauseGoddecidedinHismercynottosatisfyHimselfwithlessthanwhatisthebest.ThearrangementisthereforedeterminedbyGod’sdecisiontocreatethebestpossibleworld.

InhisRevival,al-GhazālīstatesafewtimesthatGod’sactionsarenecessary.Oneofthemostoutspokenpassagesisinthethirty-fifthbook,which(p.233) focusesontawḥīd,shortlybeforeal-Ghazālīwritesthatthiscreationisthebestpossibleone.Inthispassage,creationisdescribedasanecessaryprocess:

Everythingbetweentheheavenandtheearthhappensaccordingtoanecessaryarrangementandabindingrightnessandonecannotimaginethatitwouldbedifferentfromhowithappensordifferentfromthisarrangementthatisfound.Whatcomeslatercomeslateronlybecauseitwaitsforitscondition.Theconditioned(al-mashrūṭ)isimpossiblebeforethecondition(al-sharṭ).TheimpossiblecannotbedescribedasbeingwithinGod’spower.Thereforeknowledgeonlycomesafterthespermbecausetheconditionoflifeneedstobefulfilled,andvolitiononlycomesafterknowledgebecausetheconditionofknowledgeneedstobefulfilled.Allthisisthewayofthenecessary(minhājal-wājib)andthe


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arrangementoftherightness(tartībal-ḥaqq).Thereisnoplayinitandnocoincidence(ittifāq);ratherallthisisthroughwisdomandordering.89

God’screativeactivityfollowsa“necessaryarrangement”(tartībwājib)andcontainsa“bindingrightness”(ḥaqqlāzim)thatcannotbeotherwise.ThenecessityofGod’sactionsexists“throughwisdomandordering”(bi-ḥikmawa-tadbīr);wisdomdictatestheconditionsofthebestofallpossibleworlds,andGodchoosetoabidebyitsprecepts.ThenecessityofGod’screationalsoappearsinthethirty-secondbookofhisRevival.Inasentencethatwehavealreadyquotedabove,al-Ghazālīsaysthat“nothingprecedingprecedesandnothingfollowingfollowsexceptbymeansoftherightnessandthenecessity(bi-l-ḥaqqwa-l-luzūm).”90ThenecessityofGod’sorderisalsoexpressedinthepassagewherehedescribesthebestofallpossibleworldsascreated“accordingtothenecessaryrightarrangement”(ʿalāl-tartībal-wājibal-ḥaqq)and“inaccordtowhatshouldbe”(ʿalāmāyanbaghī).91ThenecessityinthispassageneednotbetheabsolutenecessityofAvicenna,butratheranecessityrelativetothedecisiontocreatethebestpossibleworld.

WehavethusfargivenarelativelysmoothinterpretationofdifferentmotifsintheRevival.Iftheseinterpretationswereallthathavebeenproposed,however,al-Ghazāliwouldnotbeseenassuchacontroversialauthor.Theabovequotedpassageincludesatleastoneformulathatcannotbeexplainedbyreferringtothenecessitiesthatspringfromthedecisiontocreatethebestofallpossibleworlds.WhereasitisplausiblethatthebestorderrequiresthatGod’sactionsabidewithcertainconditions,al-Ghazālīcontinuesandsaysthatanyarrangementdifferentfromwhatexistsisimpossible,and“theimpossiblecannotbedescribedasbeingwithinGod’spower”(al-muḥāllāyūṣafubi-kawnihimaqdūran).

Therearetwowaystounderstandimpossibilityinthissentence,astrongwayandaweakway.Triggeredbythispassage,RichardM.Frankproposedthesetwointerpretations.92Frankprefersthestrongwayofunderstandingimpossibility,whichsuggeststhatGod’sactionshavetocomplywiththenecessityofGod’snature.GodmustfollowHisgenerosity(jūd);Godmustcreatethebestofallpossibleworlds.Whenal-Ghazālīsays,Frankhasargued,thatGod’s(p.234) decisionsaremadebypurefreechoice(ikhtiyārmaḥḍ),hesimplymeansthatGodisnotdistractedfromchoosingwhatistrulybeneficial(khayr)forHiscreation.Inreality,however,Godcannothelpchoosingthegood,whichmeansthateffectivelyHedoesnotactuallychooseandcannotmakefreedecisionsaboutHisactions.ThecreationofthisworldproceedsfromHislackoflibertyasanecessaryact.Readingsuchstrongsenseintothewords“impossible”and“necessary”assumesthattheactionsofal-Ghazālī’sGod—liketheGodofAvicenna—aredeterminedbyHisnature.ThisistheGodofthefalāsifawhosewillisidenticalwithHisknowledgeandHisessence.

Al-Ghazālī,however,rejectedtheideathatcreationtakesplaceasadirectandinevitableconsequenceofGod’sbeing.InAvicenna,God’sknowledgeistheoriginofthebestofallpossibleworlds.Inal-Ghazālī,however,itisGod’swill.Godchoosestobegenerous,andthischoiceisundetermined.God’swillisthereforetheundetermineddeterminingfactorofcreation.Thisideaisexpressedforcefullyinmanyofhiswritings,andFrank


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acknowledgestheimportanceofthismotifinal-Ghazālī’stheology.93FailingtodetachGod’swillfromHisknowledgeandthusconstructingaGodwhoactsoutofnecessityratherthanoutofHisdecisionsisal-Ghazālī’smainobjectionagainstthefalāsifainhisIncoherence.94Foral-Ghazālī,itisanaffronttoreasontoclaimthatitisnotinGod’spowertocreatethisworlddifferentlyfromhowitis.Becausewecaneasilyimaginethisworldtobelargerorsmaller,forinstance,itisthereforenotimpossibleforittohavebeencreatedlargerorsmaller.Theworldwaspossiblebeforeitcameintoexistence,andGodwasneverincapableofcreatingit.95InhisLetterforJerusalem,al-GhazālīsaysthatGodchooseswhatHecreatesamongthealternative(ḍidd)ofnotcreatingit.96InthecontextofAshʿaritetheology,al-Ghazālīexpressesthedivineliberumarbitrium—thedivinecapacitytochoosefreely—inthetenetthatGod’swillandHisknowledgeare,likeHislife,power,hearing,seeing,andHisspeech,attributesthatarenotidenticaltobutrather“additionaltoGod’sessence”(zāʾidʿalāl-dhāt).97TheubiquityandforcefulpresentationofthistheologicalmotifmakesitallbutimpossibletoacceptFrank’sstronginterpretationofwhyanothercreationwouldnotbewithinGod’spowertocreate.

Theimpossibilityofanyothercreationmeans—accordingtoasecond,weakerreading—thattheexistenceofwhatGoddoesnotwilltocreate(thatwhichHeknowswillneverexist)thoughpossibleinitself,isactuallyimpossible.ThisformulationreferstotheFarabiandistinctionbetweenthetwotypesofnecessities,restatedbyal-GhazālīinhisBalancedBook.AnyfuturecontingencythatGodknowsHewillnotcreateis“possiblewithregardtoitself,”yet“impossiblewithregardtosomethingelse,”meaningimpossiblewithregardtoGod’sforeknowledge.CreatingwhatisnotpartofGod’sforeknowledgecannothappen,evenifitremainspossibleinitself.ItwouldturnGod’sknowledgeintoignorance,andthatissimplyimpossible.Therefore,onecansaythatwhateverisnotpartofGod’sforeknowledge“isnotwithinGod’spowertocreateinthesensethatitsexistencewouldamounttoanimpossibility.”98Acreationdifferentfromthisoneisnotimpossibleinabsoluteterms,asGodcouldhavechosentocreateit.ButitremainsimpossiblerelativetothechoicesGodhasalreadymade.

Notes:

(1).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,1:27.3–5/27.11–13.ForasynopsisandanindexofsubjectsintheIḥyāʾ,seeBousquet,Ih’yaʿouloûmad-dînouvivicationdessciencesdelafoi.

(2).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,1:12.21–23/5.4–7.

(3).Thepositionthatthehumanactisthecausaleffectofamotive(dāʿinordāʿiya)goesbacktotheBasranMuʿtaziliteAbūl-Ḥusaynal-BaṣrīandtoIbnSīnā.InAshʾaritekalām,itappearsalreadyinal-JuwaynīandhadaconsiderableinfluenceonlaterAshʿaritethought,particularlyonFakhral-Dīnal-Rāzī.OnAbūl-Ḥusayn’stheoryofaction,seeGimaret,Théoriesdel’actehumain,59–60,124–26,130–31,143;Shihadeh,TheTeleologicalEthicsofFakhral-Dīnal-Rāzī,25–29;Madelung,“LateMuʿtazila,”250–56;andMcDermott,“Abūl-Ḥusaynal-BaṣrīonGod’sVolition.”Ontranslatingirādawhenitappliestohumansas“volition”ratherthanas“will,”seeFrank,Creation,32–34.


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(4).Heer,“MoralDeliberation,”166–68.

(5).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,3:53.19–20/1417.12–13;Heer,“MoralDeliberation,”166,168.

(6).Heer,“MoralDeliberation,”170.

(7).Al-Ghazālī,al-Mustaṣfā,1:196.6–9/1:61.12–14.

(8).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:315.11–318.4/2508.21–2512.11;theperspectiveinthispassageisdistinctlycausalist.Anotherpassageinthethirty-firstbookontawba(ibid.4:7.19–9.7/2084.11–2086.10)usesmoreoccasionalistlanguage.Seealsoapassageinthethirty-secondbookonshukr(ibid.4:111.7–112.18/2223.21–2225.18).TheparableofthewayfarertoGodinthethirty-fifthbook(ibid.4:307.ult.–314.6/2498.11–507.5)alsoincludesanexplanationofthecompelledcharacterofhumanactions.Onal-Ghazālī’stheoryofhumanactionintheIḥyāʾ,seeFrank,Creation,23–27,31–37;idem,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʾariteSchool,42–47;Gimaret,Théoriesdel’actehumain,130–32;Marmura,“GhazaliandAshʿarismRevisited,”102–10;Heer,“MoralDeliberation”;Gardet,Dieuetladestinéedel’homme,74–77;andAbrahamov,“Al-Ghazālī’sTheoryofCausality,”88–90.OnthemoreAshʿariteformulationofthesametheoryintheIqtiṣādandotherworks,seeMarmura,“Ghazali’sChapteronDivinePowerintheIqtiṣād”;Gimaret,Théoriesdel’actehumain,129–30;Gyekye,“GhazâlîonAction”;andDruart,“Al-Ghazālī’sConceptionoftheAgent.”

(9).Schwarz,“’Acquisition’(kasb)inEarlyKalām.”

(10).Seetheexplanationofal-Ashʿarī’stheoryofhumanactionaboveonp.128.OnkasbinearlyAshʿaritetheology,seealsoGimaret,Théoriesdel’actehumain,79–128,esp.84–85;Watt,FormativePeriod,189–94;andAbrahamov“ARe-examinationofal-Ashʿarī’sTheoryofkasb.”

(11).Al-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,86.ult.–87.3;Marmura,“Ghazali’sChapteronDivinePower,”303;Druart,“Al-Ghazālī’sConceptionoftheAgent,”436.

(12).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:307.14–18/2497.19–22;4:314.24–25/2508.3–4.

(13).Analyzingthelessexplicitworkal-Iqtiṣād,Druart,“Al-Ghazālī’sConceptionoftheAgent,”439,concludesthathumansare“agentsonlyinametaphysicalway.”

(14).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:316.5–7/2509.paenult.–2510.2;al-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:421.

(15).Frank,Creation,33–34.

(16).(…)annal-irādatabiʿal-ʿilmaalladhīyaḥkumubi-annal-shayʾamuwāfiqunlaka;al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:316.10–11/2510.7.

(17).Ibid.4:317.4–6/2511.8–10;correctedtoal-kulluyaṣduruminhuaccordingtoal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:422.10.


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(18).innakhilāfal-maʿlūmimaqdūr?al-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,83–86.Marmura,“Ghazali’sChapteronDivinePower,”299–302.Seeabovep.192.Seealsoal-Juwaynī,al-Shāmil(ed.Alexandria),375–76.

(19).Al-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,85.1–3;85.5–7;Marmura,“Ghazali’sChapteronDivinePower,”301.

(20).kār-ikhalq-ihamaba-rāykhweshast;al-Ghazālī,Ḥimāqat-iahl-iibāḥat,9.3/169.13.

(21).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:317.6–11/2511.10–16.

(22).Fakhral-Dīnal-Rāzī,al-Tafsīral-kabīr,4:88.5–9(adQ2:134),alreadyascribesthispositiontoal-Juwaynīandhisal-ʿAqīdaal-Niẓāmiyya.HeaddsthatthispositionisclosetothatofAbūl-Ḥuṣaynal-Baṣrī.

(23).SeeIbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,360.6–9,362.16–19.OnIbnSīnā’steachingsaboutthegenerationofhumanacts,seeMichot’sintroductiontoIbnSīnā,Réfutationdel’astrologie,59*–75*;Belo,ChanceandDeterminism,115–17;andJanssens,“TheProblemofHumanFreedominIbnSînâ.”Al-GhazālīgivesacolorfulreportoftheseviewsinhisMaqāṣidal-falāsifa,2:82.4–paenult./236.3–23,wherehediscusses,ashedoesinmanyworksthatpresenthisownteachings,theexampleofhowwritingiscaused.OntheAvicennaninfluenceonal-Ghazālī’stheoryofhumanaction,seeFrank,Creation,24–25;andMarmura,“GhazaliandAshʿarismRevisited,”107.VandenBergh,“Ghazalion‘GratitudeTowardsGod,’”pointstowardstheStoicoriginsoftheseteachings.

(24).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,133.13–15.Seealsothedetaileddiscussionofhumanactioninchapter6.5oftheIlāhiyyāt,220–35.Theword“motive”(dāʿinordāʿiya)appearsinIbnSīnā’sIlāhiyyātafewtimes,sayingthatGodhasnomotive(233.4–6,303.11)orthattheactionsofhumansareguidedbymotives(223.9,230.12,372.18).ItisveryprominentincertainpassagesinIbnSīnā,al-Taʿlīqāt,50–51,53/108,295–97.OnthesepassagesaboutthegenerationofhumanactionsinIbnSīnā,seeMichot’sintroductiontoIbnSīnā,Réfutationdel’astrologie,68*–75*.

(25).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:307.ult.–314.6/2498.11–507.5.AbriefversionoftheparableisinIḥyāʾ,4:103.5–ult./2213.4–ult.;andinal-Arbaʿīn,241.4–242.9/220.5–221.5.Inthisparable,al-Ghazālīoffersaviewofhumanknowledgeinwhichthe“pen”intheʿālamal-malakūtwritesonablanktabletinthehumansoul.ThisisanapplicationofphilosophicalideasbasedonAristotle,Deanima,III.5.Al-Ghazālī’s“pen”istheactiveintellectthatwritesknowledgeonwhatisinAristotlethe“erasedtablet”(thetabularasa)withintheindividualhumansoul(Aristotle,Deanima,430a.1–2).Inal-Ḥikmaal-ʿarshiyya,12.4–5,IbnSīnāidentifiestheactiveintellectwith“thepen”andthesouloftheprophetwith“atablet.”Onal-Ghazālī’sparable,seeGimaret,Théoriesdel’actehumain,131;Nakamura,“Ghazālī’sCosmologyReconsidered,”40–43;Gianotti,Al-Ghazālī’sUnspeakableDoctrine,152–55.Ontheactiveintellectinal-Ghazālī’sMishkātal-anwār,seeAbrahamov,“IbnSīnā’sInfluenceonal-Ghazālī’sNon-PhilosophicalWorks,”8–12.Ontheterms


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malakūt,jabarūt,andmulkinal-Ghazālīandinpreviousauthors,seeNakamura,“Ghazālī’sCosmologyReconsidered”;Davidson,Alfarabi,Avicenna,andAverroesonIntellect,119,133–35;Lazarus-Yafeh,Studies,503–22;Frank,Creation,19;andWensinck,“OntheRelationshipBetweenal-Ghazālī’sCosmologyandHisMysticism.”

(26).Theimperative“act!”(iʿmalū)appearsnumeroustimesintheQur’an(e.g.Q6.135).Fromthecanonicalḥadīthcorpus,al-Ghazālīquotes:“Act!becauseeverythinghasbeenmadeeasyifithasbeencreatedforyou”(Iḥyāʾ,4:111.18/2224.12).Forthisḥadīth,seeal-Bukhārī,al-Ṣaḥīh,qadar4;orIbnMāja,Sunan,muqaddima10;cf.Wensinck,Concordance,7:364b.ThetheologicalimplicationsofthisḥadītharediscussedinvanEss,ZwischenḤadīṯundTheologie,39–47;andGramlich,Muḥammadal-ĠazzālīsLehre,194–95.

(27).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:111.21–23/2224:17–19.Thathumanactsarepromptedbyamotive(dāʿinordāʿiya)goesbacktotheBasranMuʿtaziliteAbūl-Ḥusaynal-BaṣrībuthasalsobeentaughtbyIbnSīnā.Seeabovenotes3and24.Theusageofjāzima(“decisive”)isentirelyAvicennan.ForIbnSīnā’sdistinctionbetweenadecisivevolition(irādajāzima)andanincliningvolition(irādamumīla),seeMarmura,“TheMetaphysicsofEfficientCausality,”183;andidem,“AvicennaonCausalPriority,”70.

(28).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:112.5–8/2225.2–6.Seeal-Zabīdī,Iṭhāfal-sāda,9:62.17–21,whohasyussirainsteadoftayassaraandtaqūdahuinsteadofyaqūdahu.Cf.Gramlich,Muḥammadal-ĠazzālīsLehre,195.

(29).Seealsoal-Ghazālī,Iqtiṣād,6.10–7.6;onthispassage,seevanEss,Erkenntnislehre,338.

(30).Seeabovep.133.Cf.Q80.20“(…)then[God]makesthepatheasyforhim(…)”;Al-Subkī,Ṭabaqāt,3:386.5–6,alreadyremarkedthatal-Ghazālī’stheoryofhumanactionisidenticalbothtothatofal-JuwaynīandtothatoftheMuʿtazila.SeeGimaret,Théoriesdel’actehumain,129.

(31).IbnTūmart,Sifrfīhijāmiʿ,taʿālīqal-Imām,214.1–5.Thischainalsoappearsinthetext“al-Kalāmʿalāl-ʿibāda”;ibid.,205–6.

(32).See,however,asomewhatsimilarpassageinIqtiṣād,6.10–7.6.

(33).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:119.14–15/2235.9–11.Cf.al-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:72.8–11;andGramlich,Muḥammadal-ĠazzālīsLehre,207.

(34).IntheIḥyāʾ,seemostofalltheBayānfīkayfiyyatal-tafakkurfīkhalqAllāhattheendofthethirty-ninthbookonmeditation(tafakkur);al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:540–57/2822–44;Ormsby,Theodicy,45–51.Onal-Ghazālī’sal-Maʿārifal-ʿaqliyya,seeCabanelas,“UnopusculoinéditodeAlgazel:Ellibrolelasintuiconesintelectuales.”

(35).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:318.17–18/2513.9–10.Cf.ibid.,4:323.14/2520.4;4:307.17–22/2497.21–2498.3.


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(36).Ibid.,1:124.paenult./156.7;1:148.16/189.1;Tibawi,“Al-Ghazālī’sSojourn,”85.6,105.

(37).Frank,Creation,18.Thetermappearsnumeroustimesinal-Ghazālī’sIḥyāʾ;see,e.g.,1:104.20/126.6;4:58.9/2151.peanult.;4:120.21/2237.4;4:136.11/2258.11;4:149.23/2277.16;4:321.4/2516.20;4:355.11–13/2565.6–8.Forthesynonymousmudabbiral-asbāb(“theonewhoorders[or:governsover]thecauses”),seeibid.,4:340.22/2545.23.Seealsoal-Ghazālī’sTahāfut,65.4/38.22,182.9/107.19;andal-Maqṣad,116.13.IntheMunqidh,49.20,al-GhazālīreferstoGodasthemuqallibal-qulūb,“theonewhochangesthehearts,”meaningtheonewhodeterminespeople’sopinionsandmoods.

(38).FortheAvicennanbackgroundofmusabbibal-asbāb,seeJanssens,“FilosofischeElementenindemystiekeLeer,”341–42;andFrank,Creation,18.ThetermappearsatleasttwiceinworksofIbnSīnā,inal-Ḥikmaal-ʿarshiyya,9.7,andal-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,2.16.Basedonaclosestudyofthemanuscriptevidence,Bertolacci,ReceptionofAristote’sMetaphysics,489,rejectsthereadingofmusabbibal-asbābinIbnSīnā’sal-Shifāʾ,Ilāhiyyāt,2.16,andcorrectsittosababal-asbāb.TheLatintranslationconfirmsthisandtranslatescausacausarum(IbnSīnā,Avicennalatinus.Liberdephilosophiaprima,1:3.2).Asimilarcorrectionmightbenecessaryforthepoorlyeditedal-Ḥikmaal-ʿarshiyya.Al-Juwaynī,al-Irshād,235.3–4,reportsthatthephilosopherssayGodisthesababal-asbāb.InhisTahāfut,102.4/59.10,al-Ghazālīreportsroughlythesame(cf.alsoibid.,97.1/56.2).Itispossiblethatal-Ghazālī’sprominentuseofmusabbibhadaninfluenceontheAvicennanmanuscripttraditionandpromptedsomecopyiststochangetheoriginalAvicennansababtomusabbib.

(39).Al-Makkī,Qūtal-qulūb,1:209.8;2:11.9;GermantranslationinGramich,DieNahrungderHerzen,2:97,317;seeFrank,Creation,18.Al-Ghazālī’sstrategyofcombiningacausalistviewofeventsinthisworldwithapossibleoccasionalistperspectiveonGod’sactionsseemstogobacktoal-Makkī;seeforexamplehischapteronasbābandwasāʾiṭinQūtal-qulūb,2:10–15;GermantranslationinGramlich,DieNahrungderHerzen,2:315–29.

(40).musabbibul-asbābiajrāsunnatahubi-rabṭil-musabbabātibi-l-asbābiiẓhāranli-l-ḥikma;al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:355.3/2564.16–17.

(41).Ibid.4:307.20/2498.2.TheusageoftheverbsakhkharaisQur’anic;seeforexampleQ13:2,16:14.

(42).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:111.11/2224.3–4.

(43).Ibid.4:111.12–15/2224.5–8.Ḥalabī’seditionhasmūjidinsteadofmūjib.

(44).IbnSīnā,al-Ishārātwa-l-tanbīhāt,188.17–19.Cf.Marmura,“DivineOmniscience,”91–92.Abrahamov,“IbnSīnā’sInfluenceonal-Ghazālī’sNon-PhilosophicalWorks,”14–16,dealswithIbnSīnā’sinfluenceonsomeofal-Ghazālī’sviewsaboutrewardinthe


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hereafter.

(45).Al-Ghazālī,al-Maqṣadal-asnā,98.4–6.

(46).bal[huwa]mumahhidusharṭil-ḥuṣūlli-ghayrihi.

(47).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:111.23–112.3/2224.19–ult.Cf.Frank,Creation,26.

(48).Onal-Ghazālī’sunderstandingofjawhar—whichdoesnotconcurwiththeearlierAshʿarites’understandingofjawharasanatom—seeFrank,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,48–67.

(49).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:112.11–12/2225.9–10.Ontheḥadīth,seeal-Bukhārī,al-Ṣahīh,jihād,144;andWensinck,Concordance,2:501a.

(50).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:317.17–20/2511.paenult–2512.1;al-rāsikhūnafī-l-ʿilmistakenfromQ3:7inwhich—accordingtoal-Ghazālī’sinterpretationofthisverse—those“deeplyrootedinknowledge”areidentifiedasthescholarswhoknowthemeaningofdifficultpassagesfromrevelation.Onal-Ghazālī’sunderstandingofQ3:7,seeGriffel,ApostasieundToleranz,448.

(51).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:317.20–25/2512.3–6.Seeal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:423.20–26,wholacksthewordazaliyyainthethirdsentence.

(52).Gramlich,Muḥammadal-ĠazzālīsLehre,542–43.

(53).Al-Isfarāʾīnī,“al-ʿAqīda,”168,fragm.94.Cf.al-Ghazālī,al-Maqṣad,105.17:“Godarrangesthem(scil.allthings)intheirappropriateplacesandtherebyHeisjust(ʿadl).”SeeFrank,Creation,64–65,andparticularly56–57,wherehediscussesthemeaningofḥaqqinaverysimilarpassagetotheonewearelookingat.Onḥaqq,cf.apassageinal-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,102.2–3,ontherelationshipbetweenGod’swillandhisforeknowledge:“Thedivineforeknowledgeistrueto(ḥaqqaal-ʿilm)[thedecisionofthedivinewill]andcontainsthemastheyare.”

(54).Seeabovepp.141–43.

(55).Al-Ghazālī,Maqāṣidal-falāsifa,2:82.paenult.–85.2/236.24–239.3;MSLondon,Or.3126,foll.237b–240a.ThetextinMaqāṣidisafreeadaptationofIbnSīnā,Dānishnāmah-yiʿAlāʾ-i,Ilāhiyyāt,95–97,thatillustratesIbnSīnā’steachingswithoriginalexamples.FortheAvicennantextsusedinthepassageoftheLondonMS,seeGriffel,“MSLondon,BritishLibrary,Or.3126:AnUnknownWork,”15.

(56).Al-Ghazālī,MSLondon,Or.3126,foll.238a.8–238b.9.

(57).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,339.4–8;al-Najāt,284.12–13/668.14–16,quotedinal-Ghazālī,MSLondonOr.3126,fol.238a.5–8.

(58).Al-Juwaynī,al-Shāmil(ed.Alexandria),621.21–22and622.3–8(withtheexample—


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alsousedbyal-Ghazālī—thatawell-writtenmanuscriptgivesnecessaryevidencetotheskillsofthescribe);al-Makkī,Qūtal-qulūb,2:35–36.ThemotifthatGod’screationisskillfullyarrangedgoesbacktotheQur’an,inwhichinvariouscontextsitsaysthatGod’screationcontains“signs(āyāt)forthosewhocanunderstand.”TheideathatcertaindivineattributesshowinHiscreationisalsoQur’anic.TheusualproofforGod’sonenessandunityinkalāmliteratureisbymutualhindrance(tamānuʿ).ItappearsalreadyinQ23:91,17:42–3:Becausethiscreationshowsnosignsoftheactivityofmorethanonedivinecreativeforce,whichwouldnecessarilycompetewithandhinderoneanother,thereisonlyoneGod.SeealsothestoryofAbraham’sconversiontomonotheisminQ6:75–79,discussedbelow.

(59).Kukkonen,“Plentitude,Possibility,andtheLimitsofReason,”545–46;Davidson,Proofs,226–27,234;Goodman,“Ghazâlî’sArgumentfromCreation,”69.Onargumentsfromdesigninthethirty-secondbookoftheIḥyāʾ,seevandenBergh,“Ghazalion‘GratitudeTowardsGod,’”86–88,97–98.

(60).Al-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,99–100.

(61).Ormsby,TheodicyinIslamicThought,37,75.Foradiscussionofal-Ghazālī’sposition,seeibid.,39–74;Frank,Creation,60–66;andidem,Al-GhazālīandtheAshʿariteSchool,20–21.

(62).ThedebateisdocumentedandanalyzedinOrmsby,TheodicyinIslamicThought,92–265,andal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:434–60.

(63).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:322.1–3/2518.5–8;EnglishtranslationinOrmsby,TheodicyinIslamicThought,40–41.Cf.al-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:433.ThesewordsseemtobeinspiredbythebeginningparagraphofIbnSīnā’sRisālaFīsirral-qadar,inwhichallelementsinal-Ghazālī’spassage(theobscurityofthematter,thedeepsea,theprohibitiontoteachittotheʿāmma)alsoappear.SeethetextoftheRisālaFīsirral-qadarinHourani,“IbnSīnā’s‘EssayontheSecretofDestiny,’”27–31;andinʿāṣi,al-Tafsīral-Qurʾānī,302–5.

(64).Al-Ghazālī,al-Imlāʾfīishkālātal-Iḥyāʾ,50–51/3083–85;MSYale,Landberg428,pp.55–56.ForanEnglishsynopsisofthispassage,seeOrmsby,TheodicyinIslamicThought,75–81.Theavailableeditionsofal-Imlāʾfīishkālātal-Iḥyāʾ,printedattheendoronthemarginsofmanyeditionsoftheIḥyāʾʿulūmal-dīnandonthemarginsofal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,1:192–204,areofverypoorquality,withsometextualpassages(likelysomelinesintheunderlyingmanuscript)missing.Theyalsorepresentarecensionofthetextthatisnotoriginal.Inthisrecension,theorderofthefuṣūldoesnotmatchthedescriptionofthecontentsgivenbyal-Ghazālīatthebeginningoftheworkonpp.19–20/3038–39.AmoreoriginalrecensionandamuchbettertextisavailableinmanuscriptssuchasMSYale,Landberg428(onceownedbyal-Murṭadāal-Zabīdī),and,withslightvariationsintheorderofthetext,MSBerlin,PetermannII545(Ahlwardt1714).

(65).Onal-Makkī’sQūtal-qulūb,seetheveryhelpfulGermantranslationbyRichard


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Gramlich,DieNahrungderHerzen,whichincludesnotesandananalyticalindex.

(66).Seeabovep.222.

(67).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:321.1–16/2516.17–2517.13.EnglishtranslationinOrmsby,TheodicyinIslamicThought,38–39.

(68).Al-Makkī,Qūtal-qulūb,2:35–36.Cf.Ormsby,TheodicyinIslamicThought,41,45,81.

(69).Al-Makkī,Qūtal-qulūb,2:35.paenult.–ult.EnglishtranslationinOrmsby,Theodicy,58;GermantranslationinGramlich,DieNahrungderHerzen,2:396;andidem,Muḥammadal-Ġazzālī’sLehre,549.

(70).wa-laysafī-l-imkāniaṣlanaḥsanuminhuwa-lāatammawa-lāakmala;al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:321.16–18/2517.13–16.Cf.al-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:430.18–26.SeetheEnglishtranslationinOrmsby,TheodicyinIslamicThought,39.

(71).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,3:73.10–13/1446–47.

(72).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:321.20–26/2517.18–2518.2.SeetheEnglishtranslationinOrmsby,TheodicyinIslamicThought,40,andhiscommentaryonpp.64–69.

(73).Ormsby,TheodicyinIslamicThought,257.

(74).IbnSīnā,al-Ishārātwa-l-tanbīhāt,186.5–6.Ormsby,TheodicyinIslamicThought,257,saysthataccordingtoIbnSīnā,harmappearsaccidentalwhengoodiscreated.Thisis,however,amisunderstandingthatseemstobebasedonIbnSīnā’swordinginal-Ishārāt,186.1and187.1–3.Frank,Creation,61,sharesthismisunderstanding.Creatinggood,however,necessarilyrequiresthecreationofharm.

(75).IbnSīnā,al-Ishārātwa-l-tanbīhāt,185–87.OnIbnSīnā’steachingsonharmorevil(sharr),seeSteel,“AvicennaandThomasAquinasonEvil,”173–86.

(76).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,342.4–5.Steel,“AvicennaandThomasAquinasonEvil,”179–81.

(77).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,340.11;idem,al-Najāt,285.11/670.17.Steel,“AvicennaandThomasAquinasonEvil,”174–77.Thisseemstobeapremisenotsharedbyal-Ghazālī.InhisImlāʾ,50.10–11/3083.20–21;MSLandberg428,p.55.20,al-Ghazālīcounterstheobjectionthattheideaofthebestofallpossibleworldsisincompatiblewiththepositionoftheworld’screationintime.Hisbriefresponsemakessenseonlyifexistenceisnotregardedasbetterthannonexistence.Ontheapparentincompatibilityofthebestofallpossibleworldsandcreationintime,seeOrmsby,Theodicy,76–77;andFrank,Creation,66.

(78).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,339.13–15;al-Najāt,284.18–19/669.9–10.


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(79).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,341.8–10;al-Najāt,286.4–7/672.9–13.Thepositionthatspeciesareunaffectedbyharmdoesnotseemtohavebeensharedbyal-Ghazālī,whoconsidersthespeciesofbeasts(bahāʾim)harmful(Iḥyāʾ,4:321.24–25/2518.1).

(80).IbnSīnā,al-Shifāʾ,al-Ilāhiyyāt,341.8–9;al-Najāt,286.5/667.9–10.Cf.Aristotle,Metaphysics,1010a.25–30.

(81).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:124.21–125.2/2242.17–2243.2.Itisherethatal-Ghazālīsays:“Anignorantfriendisworsethananinsightfulfoe.”VandenBergh,“Ghazalion‘GratitudeTowardsGod,’”92,remarksthatal-Ghazālī“mayhavereadit”inKalīlawa-Dimna.VandenBergh’sarticlehasnoreferences,andasfarasIamaware,thereisnosuchsentenceinthatwork.

(82).Al-Ghazālī,al-Maqṣadal-asnā,68.1–5.

(83).Ibid.68.6–8.

(84).Ibid.68.15–16;69.15–16.Fortheḥadīth,seeal-Bukhārī,al-Ṣaḥiḥ,tawḥīd15,22,28,55;orMuslimibnal-Ḥajjāj,al-Ṣaḥīḥ,tawba14–16.Cf.Wensinck,Concordance,4:526a.

(85).Al-Ghazālī,MSYale,Landberg428,p.56.4–7.Intheprintedtextinal-Imlāʾ,50.16–18/3084.6–8,andinthemarginsofal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,1:201,thissentenceiscorrupted.SeealsothetranslationinOrmsby,Theodicy,78,basedonMSBerlin,PetermannII545,fol.16b.

(86).Al-Ghazālī,al-Imlāʾ,50.20–21/3083.10–11;idem,MSYale,Landberg428,p.56.9–10.Cf.thetextinthemarginsofal-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,1:201.

(87).Al-Ghazālī,al-Imlāʾ,50.23–51.7/3084.14–3085.5.ThispassageisnotinMSYale,Landberg428.Itisthisreasoningthatlikelyliesbehindal-Ghazālī’sdecisiononlytowriteabouttheworld’sperfectionintwocomparativelybriefpassagesinhisIḥyāʾʿulūmal-dīnandinhisal-Imlāʾfīishkālātal-Iḥyāʾ.ThesubjectisnotexplicitlydiscussedinotherbooksoftheIḥyāʾcircle,suchasal-ArbaʿīnorKīmiyāʾ-yisaʿādat.Al-Ghazālī,however,alludestoitinTahāfutal-falāsifa,289.4–6/172.17;al-Iqtiṣād,165–66;al-Maqṣadal-asnāʾ,47.12–13,68.6–8,105–6,81.12–13,109.8–15,152.11–13;andprobablymanyotherpassagesofhisworks.

(88).Al-Ghazālī,al-Imlāʾ,50.13–16/3084.2–6.CorrectedaccordingtoMSYale,Landberg428,pp.55.ult.–56.4,whichvariesinthefollowingreadings:wa-l-yataḥaqqiqa;wa-annadhālikaʿalāghāyatil-ḥikma;andburhānanwāḍiḥan.

(89).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,4:317.ult.–318.4/2512.12–16.Cf.al-Zabīdī,Itḥāfal-sāda,9:423–24.ThispassageistranslatedanditslanguagediscussedinFrank,Creation,56–61.SeealsoGramlich’sGermantranslationinMuḥammadal-ĠazzālīsLehre.543.

(90).Seep.225.


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(91).Seep.228.

(92).Frank,Creation,55–63.

(93).Ibid.,69.

(94).Thisismostforcefullyexpressedinal-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,96–103/56–60;155–60/91–94.Seealsoabove,pp.184–85.

(95).Al-Ghazālī,Tahāfut,64.5–66.6/38.12–39.13.Logicallyimpossiblemeans“conjoiningnegationandaffirmation”(al-jamʿbaynal-nafīwa-l-ithbāt).

(96).Al-Ghazālī,Iḥyāʾ,1:148.16–18/189.1–3;Tibawi,“Al-Ghazālī’sSojoun,”85.6–7,105.Kukkonen,“PossibleWorlds,”480,concludesthatal-Ghazālī’sinnovationstothephilosophyofIbnSīnā“havetheirrootintheideaofGodfreelychoosing(arbitrating)betweenalternativesequaltohim.”

(97).Al-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,129–39.ThiscategorycametobeusedbytheNishapurianAshʿarites,mostprobablyinconsciousresponsetothefalāsifa’steachings.ʿAbdal-Qāhiral-Baghdādī’sUṣūlal-dīn,117–18,121–22,referstoagroupofdivinenamesthatarederivedfromGod’sessenceandtoasecondgroupthat“arederivedfromanattributethatHehasresidingwithinHim”(mushtaqqminṣifalahuqāʾimatanbihi).AthirdgroupisderivedfromGod’sactions.Onal-Baghdādī’sdivision,seeGimaret,LesnomsdivinsenIslam,107–8.IbnSīnāalreadyreferstothisconceptandsaysinal-Ḥikmaal-ʿarshiyya,9.9,thatGod’sknowledgeisnotzaʾidʿalāl-dhāt.Onal-Ghazālī’sconceptionofthedivineattributes,seeFrank,Creation,47–52.

(98).ghayrumaqdūrinʿalāmaʿnāannawujūdahuyuʾaddīilāstiḥāla;al-Ghazālī,al-Iqtiṣād,85.8–86.4.Marmura,“Ghazali’sChapteronDivinePower,”301–2.Onthissenseofnecessityinal-Ghazālī,seeKukkonen,“CausalityandCosmology,”41–42.

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