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CASE 2.3 THE TROLLEY DODGERS In I S90, the Brooklyn Trolley [)odgers professional baseball team joined the N a ti nal League. Over the following years, the Dodgers would have considerable difficulty competing with the other baseball teams in the New York City area. Those teams, principal among them the New York Yankees, were much better fi- minced and generally stocked with players of higher caliber. In 1958, after nearly seven decades of mostly frustration on and off the baseball field, the Dodgers shocked the sports world by moving to Los Angeles. Walter O’Malley, the flam- bovant owner of the Dodgers, saw an opportunity to introduce professional base- ball to the rapidly growing population of the West Coast. More important, O’Malley saw an opportunity to make his team more profitable. As an induce- cn t to the Dodgers, Los Angeles County purchased a goat farm located in Chavez Ravine, an area two miles northwest of downtown Los Angeles, and gave th~ property to O’Malley for the site of his new baseball stadium. Since moving to Los Angeles, the Dodgers have been the envy of the baseball Id: “In everything from profit to stadium maintenance. . . the Dodgers are the prototype of how a franchise should be run.” 1 During the decade of the 1980s, the Dodgers were reportedly the most profitable franchise in baseball, with a pretax profit margin approaching 25 percent in many years. In late 1997, Peter O’Malley, Walter O’Malley’s son and the Dodgers’ principal owner, announced that the franchise was being sold for $350 million to the media mogul, Rupert Murdoch. A spokesman for Murdoch complimented the O’Malley family for the longstand- ing success of the Dodgers organization. “The O’Malleys have set a gold stan- dard for franchise ownership . . we will do all in our power to live up to that standard.”2 Peter O’Malley, who still serves as the Dodgers’ president, attributes the suc- ce~ of the organization to the experts he has retained in all functional areas: “1 1. RJ. Harris, “Forkball for Dodgers: Costs Up, Gate Off,” The Wall Strt’et Journal, 31 August 1990, 111, B4. 2. R. Newhari, “Dodger Sale Heads for Home,” Los Angeles Times, 5 September 1997, Cl, C12.

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Page 1: p 020070429019018107468

CASE 2.3THE TROLLEY DODGERS

In I S90, the Brooklyn Trolley [)odgers professionalbaseballteam joined theN ati nal League.Overthefollowing years,theDodgerswould haveconsiderabledifficulty competingwith the other baseballteamsin the New York City area.Thoseteams,principal amongthem theNewYork Yankees,weremuchbetterfi-mincedandgenerallystockedwith playersof highercaliber.In 1958,afternearlysevendecadesof mostly frustration on and off the baseballfield, the Dodgersshockedthe sportsworld by moving to Los Angeles.Walter O’Malley, the flam-bovantownerof theDodgers,sawan opportunityto introduceprofessionalbase-ball to the rapidly growing population of the West Coast. More important,O’Malley sawan opportunityto makehis teammore profitable.As an induce-

cnt to the Dodgers,Los AngelesCounty purchaseda goat farm locatedinChavezRavine,anareatwo milesnorthwestof downtownLos Angeles,andgaveth~ propertyto O’Malley for thesiteof hisnewbaseballstadium.

Sincemoving to Los Angeles, the Dodgershavebeenthe envyof the baseballId: “In everythingfrom profit to stadiummaintenance.. . theDodgersarethe

prototypeof how a franchiseshouldberun.”1 During thedecadeof the1980s,theDodgerswerereportedlythe mostprofitablefranchisein baseball,with a pretaxprofit marginapproaching25 percentin manyyears.In late1997,PeterO’Malley,Walter O’Malley’s son and the Dodgers’ principal owner, announcedthat thefranchisewasbeing sold for $350million to the mediamogul, RupertMurdoch.A spokesmanfor MurdochcomplimentedtheO’Malley family for the longstand-ing successof the Dodgersorganization.“The O’Malleys haveset a gold stan-dardfor franchiseownership . . we will do all in our powerto live up to thatstandard.”2

PeterO’Malley, who still servesas the Dodgers’president,attributesthe suc-ce~ of the organizationto the expertshe hasretainedin all functionalareas:“1

1. RJ. Harris,“Forkball for Dodgers:CostsUp, GateOff,” The Wall Strt’et Journal, 31 August1990, 111, B4.

2. R. Newhari,“Dodger SaleHeadsfor Home,” LosAngelesTimes,5 September1997, Cl, C12.

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164 SECTION TWO AUDITS OF HIGH-RISK ACCOUNTS AND INTERNAL CONTROL ISSUES

don’thave~obeanexpertontaxes,split-fingeredfastballs,or laborrelationswithour ushers.Thattalent is all available.”3EdwardCampos,a longtimeaccountantfor the Dodgers,wasseeminglya perfectexampleof oneof thoseexpertsin theDodgersorganization.Camposacceptedanentry-levelpositionwith theDodgersas a young man.By 1986,afteralmosttwo decadeswith theclub,hehadworkedhis way up the employmenthierarchyto becomethe operationspayroll chief.

After takingchargeof theDodgers’payroll department,Camposdesignedandimplementeda new payroll system,a systemthat reportedlyonly he fully un-derstood.In fact,Camposcontrolledthesystemsocompletelythathe personallyfilled out theweeklypayroll cardsfor eachof thefour hundredemployeesof theDodgers.Camposwasknownnot only for his work ethicbut also for his loyaltyto the club and its owners:“TheDodgerstrustedhim, andwhenhewason vaca-tion, he evencamebackanddid thepayroll.”4

Unfortunately,theDodgers’ trustin Camposwasmisplaced.Overa periodofseveralyears,Camposembezzledseveralhundredthousanddollars from theDodgersorganization.According tocourtrecords,CampospaddedtheDodgers’payroll by addingfictitious employeesto variousdepartmentsin the organiza-tion. In addition, Camposinflated the number of hours worked by severalemployeesandthensplit the resultingoverpaymentsfifty-fifty with thoseindivi-duals.The fraudulentschemewasfinally discoveredwhenCamposwasunableto work for a periodof timedueto illnessandhisresponsibilitieswereassumedtemporarilyby the Dodgers’controller.While completingthe payroll oneweek,the controllernoticedthat severalemployees,includingushers,securityguards,and ticket salespeople,were being paid unusualamounts.In somecases,em-ployeesearning$7 anhourwerereceivingweeklypaychecksapproaching$2,000.Following a criminal investigationandthe filing of chargesagainstCamposandhis cohorts,all theindividuals involved in the payroll fraudconfessed.

After pleadingguilty to embezzlementcharges,Camposwas sentencedtoeight years in state prison and agreedto make restitution of approximately$132,000to the Dodgers.Anotherof the conspiratorsalsoreceiveda prison sen-tence.Theremainingindividualsinvolved in thepayrollschememaderestitutionandwereplacedon probation.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the key objectives in the audit of a client’s payroll function?Commenton bothobjectivesrelatedto testsof controlsandthoserelatedto sub-stantiveaudit procedures.2. Whatinternal control weaknesseswere evidentin the Dodgers’ payroll sys-tem?3. Identify audit proceduresthat might haveled to thediscoveryof the fraudu-lent schememastermindedby Campos.

3. Harris,“Forkball for Dodgers,”Bi.

4. P. Feldman, “7 Accused of Embezzling $332,583 from Dodgers,”Los Angeles Times, 17September1986,Sec.2, 1, 6.