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Eastern Question First coined at the Congress ofVienna (1815) by the Russian delegates to describe thegrowing tensions between the Ottoman sultan and hisGreek subjects, this phrase gained popularity during the19th century as diplomats debated the fate of the declin-ing Ottoman Empire. Simply put, the Eastern Questionrevolved around the question of how to eliminate thepower vacuum in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and themodern Middle East that emerged with the decline ofthe Ottoman Empire and the partitioning of the Polish-

Lithuanian Commonwealth (P ) without harmingthe delicate balance of power in Europe.There is no consensus among historians as to when

the Eastern Question emerged, or when—or even if—itwas resolved. The diplomatic circles of the 19th cen-tury understood it as a matter of contemporary politicsand tried to find the best solution by improvising vari-ous reforms. However, the Great Powers of Europe werenever in agreement about what to do with the OttomanEmpire, that is, whether to try to sustain it or let it die.Each power changed its position regarding the SublimePorte based on that power’s ambitions in the easternMediterranean.

Although it first came into use in 1815, the termEastern Question is now used by historians to identifyissues of imperial stability dating to the second siegeof Vienna (1683), which ended Ottoman expansion inEurope; some historians even see the question as goingback to the 14th century when “Turks” first set foot onthe Balkan Peninsula. Conventional history now datesthe issues of the Eastern Question in this sense as havingbeen born out of the 1774 T K K ,which marked the emergence of R as a Great Power.

There is also significant controversy as to the finaldate of the resolution of the Eastern Question. Loaded asit is with imperialist ambitions, the Eastern Question wasnot resolved with the final dismemberment of the Otto-man Empire in 1918; rather, it paved the way for a newset of political problems in the Balkans and the MiddleEast that continue into the 21st century.

Acting to further their own strategic interests, theGreat Powers all attempted to create their own zone ofinfluence in the Ottoman Empire by claiming the status of

protector of a particular Christian subject people and urg-ing the Sublime Porte to undertake political reforms. TheOttomans, however, viewed all attempts to advance therights of particular Christian subject peoples through suchdiplomatic pressures as an encroachment on the rights oftheir sovereignty. They viewed European interventionin internal Ottoman affairs as a smokescreen that hid theGreat Powers’ ambitions to dismantle the empire. Thus theEastern Question has a legacy in shaping contemporarypublic opinion of some in modern Turkey toward the Euro-pean Union (EU); they fear that EU demands that Turkeyenhance the political and cultural rights of ethnic and reli-gious minorities, and reconsider the Armenian deportationin 1915, might simply be a pretext to dismember Turkey.

The Eastern Question also became a code to covera number of other “questions,” including dissension andpolitical unrest over the Romanian principalities (1774–1878); the Serbian revolt (1790s–1828); the French inva-sion of E (1799–1801); the G (1820s);the revolt of M A of Egypt (1830s); the problemof the straits on the Sea of Marmara (1830s); the prob-lem of the Polish and Hungarian refugees (1848); theC W (1853–56); the Bulgarian revolt (1870s);

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the Russo-Ottoman War (1877–78); the war with Greece(1897); the Armenian question (1878–1915), the questionof Macedonia (1880s–1912); the War with Italy (1911);the B W (1912–13); and finally W WI (1914–18). A glance at this list reveals that the EasternQuestion has been stretched to its limits in an attempt toexplain the entire history of the relations between Europeand the Ottoman Empire. Contemporary historians gen-erally avoid the term, considering the “Eastern Question”to be a Eurocentric reduction of the Ottoman Empireand its peoples to passive recipients of the power politicsof the Great Powers.

Kahraman ŞakulFurther reading: Virginia Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700-

1870: An Empire Besieged (Longman, 2007); M. S. Ander-son, The Eastern Question, 1774–1923 (New York: St. Martin’s,1966); M. S. Anderson, ed., The Great Powers and the NearEast, 1774–1923 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1970); Selim Derin-gil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitima-

tion of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876 –1909 (London:I.B. Tauris, 1998); Caroline Finkel, Osman’s Dream: TheStory of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1923 (London: JohnMurray, 2005); Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire,1700–1922 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);F. A. K. Yasamee, Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdulhamid II and theGreat Powers, 1878–1888 (Istanbul: Isis, 1997).

economy and economic policy Ottoman economichistory can be divided into two main periods: the first,or classical, period from the beginning of the empire inthe 14th to the end of the 18th century, which witnessedlittle change with regard to the basic institutions, values,objectives, and tenets; and the second period, character-ized by modernization and , from the second halfof the 19th century.

PRINCIPLES OF OTTOMAN ECONOMIC POLICY

Ottoman economics in the classical period was centeredon the concept of need and was motivated by three mainprinciples, provisionism, fiscalism, and traditionalism.Provisionism was the policy of maintaining a steady sup-ply of goods and services, which had to be cheap, plentiful,and of good quality. Fiscalism was the policy of maximiz-ing treasury income. Traditionalism was the tendency topreserve existing conditions and to look to past modelswhen changes occurred. These three policies created thereferential framework of the Ottoman economic system.

The first principle was that of provisionism. Becausethe early Ottoman economic atmosphere was character-ized by low productivity and because it was difficult toincrease productivity while transportation costs werehigh, the Ottomans built an extensive network of produc-tion and exchange facilities in the fields of ,

artisanship, and . Family-run farms of between 60and 150 acres were thought to be the most productivelandholding pattern in agriculture, and the state, as theowner of the land, protected these units so that holdingswould not be broken into smaller units through inheri-tance. While the state would allow the transfer of landbetween individuals to prevent potential setbacks in pro-duction, it restricted peasants from abandoning villagesand leaving land untilled.

The basic economic, fiscal, and administrative unitin the empire at this time was the kaza, or judicial dis-trict, overseen by a or judge with extensive powers.The kaza usually consisted of a town with a populationof 3,000–20,000 and a number of villages varying from20 to 200 with a total area of 200–1200 square miles.Small-scale artisanship was the norm in the kaza as wasthe small-scale landholding pattern in the village, and itwas the responsibility of these small farmers to markettheir own agricultural produce in the town. Marketing of

produce and goods out of the kaza was prohibited unlessthe demand within the town was already satisfied. Excessgoods were offered first to the army and the palace, thento the city of I , followed by other regions. Exportwas an option only after domestic demands were satisfied.

Export was not an objective of provisionist Ottomaneconomic policy, which aimed at satisfying domesticdemand. The state regularly intervened in export, forc-ing quotas and special customs taxes on export goods.Imports, by contrast, were fostered. This economicapproach differs considerably from the export-orientedmercantilist policies pursued in Europe at that time. For

this reason, Ottoman , or trade privilegesoffered to foreigners who sold goods within the empire,were not restricted until the end of the classical period.

Although provisionist policy always took priorityin this period, another economic policy followed dur-ing this era was fiscalism, which may be defined as thepolicy of maximizing treasury income and trying to pre- vent its level from falling. Like increases in productioncapacity, increases in treasury income were difficult andslow to achieve, especially when transportation costswere so high and gold and silver stocks were very lim-ited. The reliance on provisionism was considered indis-pensable for social welfare, but this policy actually madeany attempt to grow the economy both risky and costly,creating a situation in which any growth in revenues wasdifficult to achieve, which is evidenced by the or treasury balance sheets from the 1550s to the 1780s.

Also falling within this period, though not arisinguntil provisionism and fiscalism had come into matu-rity by the mid-16th century, was the economic policy oftraditionalism. This may be summarized as the tendencyto preserve existing conditions, to look to past modelsinstead of searching for a new equilibrium when changes

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