paradoxes of community forestry formal devolution covering informal expansion of state control:...
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Rosan R. Devkota, Ahmad Maryudi and Max KrottCommunity Forestry Working GroupInstitute for Forest and Nature Conservation PolicyGeorg August University Goettingen, [email protected] Presentation for the conference on Taking stock of smallholders and community forestryMontpellier FranceMarch 24-26, 2010TRANSCRIPT
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
“Paradoxes of Community Forestry: Formal Devolution Covering Informal Expansion of State Control – Cases from
Nepal and Indonesia”
Rosan R. Devkota, Ahmad Maryudi and Max KrottCommunity Forestry Working Group
Institute for Forest and Nature Conservation PolicyGeorg August University Goettingen, Germany
“Taking stock of smallholder and community forestry: Where do we go from here?”
24 - 26 March 2010, Montpellier, France
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Talk outline
Community forestry in devolution paradoxes
Study methods: elements of power and quantitative network
Explaining community forestry devolution in specific power networks
Conclusion
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Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Devolution model of
community forestry
„returning the (state) forest to the local people”
Rural development (e.g. road, school, drinking water, health post, rural electrification, community building), livelihhod support, forest management..............
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Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
“The real challenge of devolution is whether local forest users get control
over the community forest and can fetch benefits derived from the forests.
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Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
“In real devolution, those to whom responsibilities are devolved should be allowed to make a real input in the setting of objectives, rather than being expected to meet objectives set by others”.
(Fischer, 1999)
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Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Practice of devolution process in community forestry
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Stage I
Initial stage
Stage II
Formal handover
Stage III Stage IV
Trigger Administrative bargening
Autonomy -
Forest management
Outcomes?
Sanctions +
Getting started
Facilitation -
“state holds the key in devolution processes”
Implementation + Normal operation
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
“Devolution processes in community forestry depend mostly on interests of the most powerful external actors”
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Power drives devolution processes in community forestry
Inside CF
Users
User Group
Internal organization of community forestry are probably not the key factors
Outer sphere
IndustryNGOs
Local government
Media
Users network
Ministry
donor
Political parties
Research institutions
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Elements of power analysis
The power (P)= f {Trust (coercive and liberal), Incentives}
Incentives
Coercive trust
Power
Liberal trust B A
Definition of power: “Power is a social relationship where an actor ‘A’ exercises influence on another actor B, independent from the will of actor ‘B’”
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“A is powerful than B”
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Quantitative network analysis Complete network survey was used to identify the partners of the network in each
community forests (snowball effect).
Each actor was asked for his/her estimation of the power of all other actors who are the part of specific community forests.
The sum of estimations of each power factor is a robust indicator of the most powerful actor.
The quantitative data were checked by qualitative analysis.
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Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Cases:
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1. Pashupati community forest, Makawanpur, Nepal
Forest Area: 168 ha. Handed over- 2005Total households in the FUG:211 Economic status: poor-135 hhs, medium-65, rich-11
2. Sedyo Rukun community forest,Gunungkidul, Indonesia
Forest Area: 17 ha. Formal agrement: 2007Total households in the FUG:50
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
1. Power network of Pashupati community forest, Makawanpur, Nepal (Sept. 2009)
Coercive trust
Liberal trust Incentives
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2. Power network of Sedyo Rukun CF,Gunungkidul, Indonesia (Sept. 2009)
Coercive trust
Liberal trustIncentives
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Calculation of power percentage
• The power of one actor is measured by estimation of all other actors in the network of specific community forestry case.
• Power factor measuring scale:
• The sum of the specific power factor are set 100%.
• The share of each actor is shown in each factor in %.
Complete trust Not at all 1 32
Coercive Trust: 0 = No 1 = Yes
Liberal Trust:
Incentives: 0 = No 1 = Yes
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Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
1. Power network of Pashupati community forest, Makawanpur, Nepal (Sept. 2009)
Coercive trust
Liberal trust Incentives
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2. Power network of Sedyo Rukun CF,Gunungkidul, Indonesia (Sept. 2009)
Coercive trust
Liberal trustIncentives
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Power features
State- coercive trust Setting of conditionalities through legally binding and non-legally
binding rules Ecological agenda Technical rationale
Forest user group/committee- coercive and liberal trust Failure of state centric management Sovereignty over the people Trade-offs and easy access
Donor/University/NGO- liberal trust, incentives Create financial dependency syndrome Technical expertise for forest management Coalition building with state and non-state actors
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Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Power distribution is uneven and very often with 2-3 dominant actors.
Uneven distribution of power due to powerful external actors does not give the freedom of ‘autonomy’ to the local forest user groups.
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StateState
Forest user group/committeeForest user group/committee Donors/research institutionsDonors/research institutions
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Conclusion: Paradoxes of devolution
Formal devolution delegates „autonomy“ to local forest user groups. However, the reality rarely reflects this rhetoric.
In pratice, the state forest administration become powerful actor in community forestry informally.
Therefore, formal devolution covers informal espansion of state control in community forestry.
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Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
“Community Forestry Working Group”on
‘‘Stakeholders, Interests and Power as Drivers of Community Forestry” (2007-2011)
Group members
Supervision and coordination: Prof. Dr. Max Krott
(Chair of Forest and Nature Conservation Policy)
Nepal Indonesia Namibia Thailand Germany Albania Cameroon Peru
Rosan Raj Devkota
Ahmad Maryudi
Carsten Schusser
Ratchannath Rotchana-Phattharawit
1. Helene Aurenhammer
2. N.N.
Manjola salla
Yufanyi Mbolo
Mariana Vidal
Theory and comparative project
Team
Web: http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/67088.html
Goettingen Graduate School of Social Science