Repl'oduced fmm El11ile Durkheim's Le~OIlS de sociologíe by pennissíon or Presses Uniyersitaires de Franee

EMILE D URKHEli\f

Emile Durkheim, 1858~1917

A Collection of Essays,

with Translations and a Bibliography

EDITED BY KURT H. WOLFF .-........--

Contributors

CHARLES BLEND

PAUL BOHANNAN

LEWIS A. COSER

HUGH DALZIEL DUNCAN

JEROME D. FOLKMAN

ROSCOE C. HINKLE, JR.

PAUL HONIGSHEIM

KAZUTA KURAUCHI

JOSEPH NEYER

TALCOTT PARSONS

HENRIPEYRE

ALBERT PIERCE

MELVIN RICHTER

ALBERT SALOMON

KURT H. WOLFF

THE GHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

COLUMBUS J L1(;,{)

, ( , , , .

DURKHEIM'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF INTEGRATION

OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

T ALCOTT P ARSONS

It is appropriate at this time, just a little over one hund;red years after the birth of Emile Durkheim, to take stock .cf his contríbutions to what was perhaps the central area of hIS the­oretical interest. The development of theoretical thinking that has taken place in the intervening years enables us to achieve

clarity in the identificatíon and evaluation of these contributions.

1 t can be said, 1 think, that it was the problem of the integra­tion oí the social system, of what holds societies together, whith was the most persistent preoccupatíon of Durkheim's career. In the situatíon oE the time, one couId not have chosen a more strategic focus for contributing to sociological theory. More­over the work Durkheím did in this fieId can be saíd to have bee~ nothing short oE epoch-making; he did not stand entirely alone, but his work was far more sharply Eocused and deeply penetratíng than that oí any other author of his time. Because of this profundity, the full implications oE his work have not yet been entirely assimilated by the relevant professional groups. Furthermore, in addition to the intrinsic compIexity of rhe subject, the rather spedal frame of reference of French Positivism in which he couched his analysis has made it difficult to interpret him.

The present essay wiU not attempt to be a scholarly review either oE Durkheim's own printed work or of the secondary literature. It will rather attempt-in the light of a good many years of preoccupation with the problems for which Durkheim gave what were for his time classical formulations-to assess sorne oí the main lines of his spedal contribution and to indi~ cate the ways in which it has been both necessary and possible to try to go beyond th~ stage at which he left them.

There are two essential reference points in Durkheim's inidal /\ orientation: one is positive and the other negative. The posi- \

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THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS ' /-\ tive i8 tIle Comtean conception of Itconsen8US" as the focus of unity in sodeties. This was the prímary origin of the famous ,_, concept of the consGÍence collective; this rather than any Ger­man conception'of Geist is clearly what Durkheim ha~ in mind. It was a sound starting point, but it was much too SImple and undifferentiated to serve his purposes; primarily, perhaps, be cause it couId not account for the fundamental phenomenon of unity in diversity, the phenomenon of the integratíon of a highly differentiated system.

The negative reference point is the utilitarÍan conception of ¡ the interplay of discrete individual interest,. as first. put f~rward by Herbert Spencer who conceived of an Industnal soclety as a network of "contractual relations,"l The importance of rela­tions oí contract, that is, relations in which terms are settled'­by sorne type o[ ad hoc agreement, was an immediate. cons.e­quence of the divísion oI labor which had been emphaslzed In the long tradition of utílitarian economics derivin? from Loc~e and .fTom Adam Smith's famous chapter. Durkhelffi made thls u-adition the focal point of his criticism, tackling it in one of its main citadels; and, in so doing, he raised the problem of the differentiated system which Comte had not really dealt with.

In thís critique, Durkheim ShOW8, w~th charact.eristic th?r­oughness and penetration, that Spencer s assumptlons-whl.c? were those common to the whole liberal branch of the uuh­tarian tradition-failed to account for even the most elemen­tary com ponent oí order in a sys,tem ~f s.o~ial relati~ns that was allegedIy based on the pursult of IndIVIdual self-lnterest. To put it a little differently, no one ~ad. been abI~ ~o a2n~wer Hobbes's fundamental question from wzthzn the tradttton~ Slnce IIobbes's own solution was palpably unacceptable. As 18 well known, Durkheim's emphasis is on the institution of contract, which at one point he characterizes as consisting ~n the "non­contractual elements H of contract, These are not ltems agreed 'upon by contracting pardes in the particular si~uationJ b':t are norms established in the sodety, norms whlch underhe and are independent of any particular contract" They ar~ partly embodied in formal law, though not necessanly only In what in a strict technical sense is called the law of contract by jurists, and partly in more informal t'understandings" and practice. The content oE these norms may be surnmed up as follows:

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T?ey consist, first of aH, in definitions DE what content is per­mItted and what content is prohibited in contractual agree­mel1t-in Western society of recent times, for instance, contracts that infringe on .the personal liberty of either party or of any third party in his prívate capacity are prohibited; second, in definitions of the means of securing the assent of the other party that are legitimate and of those that are iIlegitimate-in general, coercion and fraud are considered illegitimate, how­ever difficult it may be to draw exact borderlines; third, in definitions of the scope and limÍts of responsibility which may be .reasonably (or legally) imputed to one or another party to a contractual relation, either oríginally on the basis of his Ucapacity" to enter binding agreements-as agent for a collec­tivity, for example-or subsequently on the basis of the conse­quences to himself and others of the agreements made; and, rourth, in definitions of the degree to which the interest of the society Ís' involved in any particular prívate agreement, the degree to which prívate contracts bear on the Ínterests of third parties or on those of the collectivity as a whole.3

Durkheim postulated the existence of what he called organic solidarity as a functional necessity underlying the institutional­izatíon of contracto This may be characterized as the integration of units, units which, in the last analysis, are individual persons in roles, who are performing qualitatively differentiated func­tions in the social system. The implication of such differenti­ation is that the needs of the unit cannot be met solely by his own activities. By virtue of .the specialization of his function, the unit becomes dependent on the activities of others who must meet the needs which are not covered by this specialized function. There is, therefore, a special type of interdependence that is generated by this functional differentiation. The proto. type i8 the kind of division of labor described by the economists. ClearIy, Durkheim's conception is broader than this. For ex­ample, he describes the differentiation of function between the sexes, in social as well as biological terms, as a case of the division of labor in his sense.

What, then, is indicated by "organic solidarity"? The most important problem in interpreting the meaning of the concept is to determine Íts relation to the conception of the conscience

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THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

collective. Durkheim's primary in terest is in the fact that units 1 agree on norrns because they are backed by values held in corumon, although the interests oí the differentiated units must necessarily diverge. Durkheim's original definition of the con· -!

science collective is as follows: "L' ensemble des croyances et des sentiments communs a la moyenne des membres d'une meme société forme un systcme dé terminé qui a sa vie propre; on peut l'appeler la conscience collective ou commune."4. The keynote oE this definition i5, clearIy, beliefs and sentiments that are held in common. This formula is essential, for it indicates that the problem of solidarity is located in the area oE what may very broadly be called the motivational aspects of commit­ment to the society, and to conformity with the expectations institutionalized within it. Taken alone, however, it is too general to serve as more than a point oE departure for an analysis of the problems oÍ solidarity and hence oí sodetal integration. Furthermore, Durkheim himself was seriously embarrassed by the problem oE how to connect the conscience collective with the differentiation resulting from the division of labor.

It seems to me that Durkheim's formula needs to be further elaborated by two sets oÍ distinctions. He himself made essential contributions to one of these, the distinction between mechani­cal and organic solidarity; but one oE the main sources of difficulty in understanding his work is his relative neglect of the second set of distinctions, and his tendency to confuse it with the first. This second set concerns the levels of generality " achieved by the cultural patterns-values, differentiated norms, collectivities, and roles-that have been institutionalized in a society. It also concerns the controls that articulate these levels ," and that determine the direction in which the controls. operate. A discussion of the levels of generality of these ·four cultural patterns will provide a setting for a consideration of mechanical and organic solidarity and of the re1ations betweell them.

1 think it is correct to sa y that in the course of his career Durkheim gradually crystallized and clarified a conviction which can be stated in terms more modern than he himself used: The structure of a society, or of any human social

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system, consists in (is not simply influenced by) patterns of normative culture5 whích are institutionalized in the social system and internalized (thoug-h not in identical ways) in the per80nali~ies of its individual members. The cultural patterns ]U~t outhned are the four different types of components oE thlS structure. Elsewhere, they are referred io as Hlevels oE g-enerality oE normative culture." Though all are institutional­ized, eaeh has a different relatíon to the strueture and processes oí the society. Societal values eonstÍtute t,he eomponent whieh reaches the highest level of generality; for they are conceptions of the desirable society that are held in eoromon by its mem­bers. Societal values are thus distinguished from other types oI values---:-such as p.ersonal ones~in that the eategory of object evah~ated 18 the socIal system and not personalities, organisms, phYSlcal systerns, or cultural systems ('ltheories," for example).

The value system of the society is, then, the set of normative judgments he1d by the members of the society which define, with specific reference to their own society, what to them iti a good society. In so far as this set of values ls in fact held in comrnon and lS institutionalized, it is descriptive of the society as an empirical entity. This institutionalization i8 a matter of degTee, however; for rnembers of a going society will, to sorne extent,. difíer in their values even at the requisite level, and they wIlt to a certain degree, faíl to aet in accordance withthe values they hold. But with aH these qualifications, 1t is still correct to say that, values held in c~mmon eonstitute the pri­mary reference pOlnt far the analysls of a social system as an

, empírical system.6

, The p~rarnount vaIue system is re1evant to the description of the sOClety as a whole, but it does not distínguish normative ju.dg~ents wh~ch refer to differentiated parts or subsystems WIthln the Soclety. Therefore, when a differenee of values is imputed to the two sexes, to regional gTOUpS, to class groups, and so on, one has gone from describing societal values to describing those that eharacterize another social system, one which shouId be treated analytically as a subsystem of the society oE reference. When this step has been taken, it beeomes essential to make another distinction, the distinction between value and difíerentiated norm. ,

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At the subsystem level, members of the society who do and who do not participate in the subsystem of reference have evaluative judgments which they apply to the qualities and performances of those members who do, as distinguished fram those who do not, participate in it. These judgments are "speci­fications," that is, applications of the general principIes of the eommon societal value system at a more concrete level. The expectations of behavior of those who are members of the subsystern are not the sarne as those of non-members. Thus, in the case of sex role. the vaIues appIying" to the behavior of the two sexes are shared by both, but the norms which regulate that behavior apply differentially to the two sexes. In so fal' as a pattern oE behavior i8 sex-specific, rnembers of one sex group wiU conform with it, the other not. This is to say thai:' values are shared, presumptive1y, by all members of the most extensive relevant system, whereas norms are a funetion of the differentiation of socially significant behavior which is institu­tionalized in different parts oE that system.

It follows from this that values as such do not involve a reference to a situatíon, or a reference to the differentiation of the unÍts of the system in which they are institutionalized. N orms. on the other hand, make this differentiation explicito In one respect, they are derived frorn the evaluative judgments that have been institutionalized in the value system; but inde­pendently of this component, they also inelude, as is clear in the case of legal systems, three other specifications. The first specifies the categories of units to which the norm applies; this is the prablem ot jurisdiction. The seeond specifies what the J

eo~sequences will be to the unit that conforms and to the \ unIt that does not conform to the requil'ements of the norm J (variations in degree are, of eourse, possible) ; this is the prob- I

lem of sanctions or enforcernent. Finally, the third specifies that the meaning of the norrn shall be interpreted in the light of the eharaeter and the situations of the units to which it applies; this constitutes the prohlem of interpretation, which is roughly equivalent to the' appelIate funetion in law. It should be noted that in this case the referenee to the situation is eonfined to the one in which the unit acts vis-a-vis other unÍts. It is thus íntrasysternic. When the reference i8 to situ-

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ations external to the system, the levels of collectivity and role strueture; to be outlined later, must be brought into the picture.

Values, then, are the "normative patternsH that are descríp­tive of a positively evaluated social system. Norms are general­ized patterns of expectation which define differentiated patterns oE expeetation for the differentiated kinds of units withín a system. In a particular system, norms always stand at a lower level oE cultural generality than do values. Put a Hule differ-

, ently, norms can be legitimized by values, but not vice versa. t-··-- A collectivity stands at a still lower level in the hierarchy of

the nonnative control of behavior. Subject both to the more general values oE the system and to the norms regulating the behavior oI the relevant differentiated types of units within' the system, the normative culture of a collectivity defines and regu­lates a concrete system of eo-ordinated activity which can at any given time be characterized by the commitments of specifically designated persons, and which can be understood as a specifie system of colleetive goals in a specifie situation. The funetional reference of norms at the level of the colleetivity is, then, no' longer general, but is made specific in the particular goals, situations, and l'esources oE the colleetivity, including its "share" in the goals and resourees of society. This specification of fune­don, -rhough it is oI varying degree, emphasizes the faet that it is the goal of the collectivity which defines its level of concrete~ ness, since the goal of a unit in a system is, in so far as the system is well integrated, the basis on which its primary function in the system is specified.

The normative eharacter of a collective goal is precisely given by this specification of function in a system, but it is subject to given situational exigencies that are external to the system. This specifieation is not necessary for the definition of a norm, hut it ís essential for further specification at the level of the organization oI the collectivíty.

Collectivities constÍtute the essential operative units oE social systems, to such an extent that where relations of co-operation and /lsolidarity" for a given functional unit goal do not exist withfn collectivities, and the function is perfonned hy a single independent individual-by the independent artisan or profes~

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sional practitioner, for example-it is legitima te to speak of this as the limiting case of the collectivity: it is a collectivity consist­ing of one member.

AH social systenls arise out of the interaction of human Índi. viduals as units. Hence the most important exigencies of the situation in which collectivities as units perfonn social func­tions are the conditions for effective performance by the constituent human individuals (including their command oí physical facilities). But since the typical individual participa tes in more than one collectivity, the relevant structural unit is not the "total" individual or personality, but the individual in a role. In Íts normative aspect, then, a role may be thought of as the system of normative expectations for the performance oí a participating individual in his capacity as a member DE a e01-lectivity. The role lS the primary point of direct articulation between the personality of the individual and the structure of the social system.

ValuesJ norms, and collecdve goals-all in sorne sense control, "govern:' and "regula te" the behavior of individuals in roles. But only at the level of the role i8 the normative content of expectations specifically oriented to the exigencies presented by the personalities or l/motives" of individuals (and categories of them differentiated by sex, age, level of education, place of residence, and the like) and by the organic and physical environment.

In their functioning, social systems are, oE course, subject to still other exigencies. But such exigencies are not normative in the sense used in this discussion; they do not involve the orien­tation of persons to and through conceptions of what is desir­able. Thus the sheer facts of the physical environment are simply there; they are not altered by any institutionalization of human culture, although they may, of course, be controlled through such human cultural media as technology. This control, however, involves values, norms, collectivities, and role-expecta­tions; and, as part oE the social strueture, it should be analyzed in these terms.

Values, norms, collectivities¡ and roles are categories that are deseriptive of the structural aspect of a social system only.

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In addition to such categories, it is necessary to analyze the system in functional terms in order to analyze processes of differentiation and the operatian of these processes within a structure. Furthermore, process utilizes resources, carrying them thraugh a series of stages of genesis, and either "consuming'~ them or incorporating and combining' theln into types of output or product, such as cultural change. The structure of institu~ tionalized norms is the main paint of articulation between these sodetal structures and the functional exigencies of the system. These exigencies, in tum, determine the mechanisms and categories of input and output relative to integration. Let us try to relate these considerations to the categories of me· chanical and organic solidarity. "

Durkheim's conception of mechanical solidarity is rooted in' what 1 have called the system of common societal values. This is evident from the strong emphasis which he places on the relation of mechanical solidarity to the conscience collective. As a system of "beliefs and sentimentsH that are held in com­mon, Durkheim's conscience collective is more broadly defined than the system of societal values which 1 have given above. But it is certain that such a system is included in Durkheim's defini~ tion, and it can be argued that a system of values is the struc­tural core oE the system of beliefs and sentiments to which" he refers. It should be clear, however, that Durkheim did· not attempt to systematically distinguish and classify the compo­nents of the conscience collective.1 and this would ,seem to be essential if a satisfactory analysis of its relation to the problem of solidarity ís to be made.

Such an analysis must do at least two things. In the first place, the value component must be distinguished from the others, tbat is, from cognitive (existential) beliefs, patterns of motiva­tional commitment (these are close to Durkheim's "senti~ ments"), and patterns of legitimation of collective action (these will figure in the discussion presentIy). The second task in~ volves the determination of the variations in tbe levels of gen­erality and degrees of specíficíty of the components-of values, in particular-which eventuates in a scale cOITesponding to the differentiation of a society into numerous subsystems. Because of his failure to perform these two tasks, Durkheim was not

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able to be very exact about the relation oE the conscience col~ lective to mechanical solidarity, and was forced to resort to con­trasting this relation with that of the conscience collective to organic solidarity-and this relation gave him considerable difficulty.

Mechanical solidarity is rooted in the common value com­ponent of the conscience collective and is an 41 expression" of it. Its relation to the other components is problematical. There is, however, another major aspect of mechanical solidaTity, nalnely, its relation to the structure of the society as a collectivity. Every society is organized in terms of a paramount structure of the total system as a coIlectivity. In the highly differentiated mod­ern society, this structure takes the form of governmental or­ganization. In addition, there is, of course, an immensely com­plex network of lower-Ievel collectivitiesJ some of which are subdívisions of the governmental structure, while others are independent of it in various ways and degrees. The problem of mechanical solidarity arises wherever a collectivity is or­ganized, but it is essential to understand what system is under consideration.

The focus of Durkheím's analysis oE mechanical solidarity, in so far as it concerns the structure of the social system, lies, 1 suggest, in the relation between the paramount values of tIle society and its organization as a collectivity at the requisite level; that is, the governmental organization of the society where the system oE reference is, as it is for Durkheim} the society as a whole. Mechanical solidarity i8 the integration of the common values of the society with the commÍtments of units within it to contribute to the attainment of collective goals-either nega­tively by refraining from action which would be felt to be dis~ ruptive of this function, or positively by taking responsibility for it.

This duality of reference is brought out with particular clarity in Durkheim's discussion oE criminallaw as an index or expression of mechanical solidarity. On the one hand, he makes reference to common "sentiments"; on the other, to obligations to the organized collectivity as such.7 Also, since in all advanced societies government is the paramount agent for the application of coercían, Durkheim strongly emphasizes the role of the ele-

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EMILE DURKHEIM

ment of sanction in the repressive type of law. Two of the four primary funetional referenees of a legal system noted above, legitimation and enforeement through sanctions, figure lm­portantly in what Durkheim calls repressive law.

The above considerations account for the loeatíon of the phenomenon of mechanical solidarity with· reference to the structure oE the social system. This solidarity or integration of the system Ís brought about by the interplay of the system of eommon values, which legitimizes organization in the interest of collective goaIs, with the commitments of units of the system (which are, in the last analysis, individual persons in roles) to loyalty and responsibility. This loyalty and responsibility are not only to the values themselves, but to the collectivity whose functioning is guided by those values and which institutionalizes ' them. This location in the social structure does not, however, telI us anything about the ·mechanisms by which the integration is generated.

Before approaching the question of the mechanisms which produce integration, it will be well to raise the corresponding question of struetural Iocation with respect to "organic soli­darity:' My suggestion is that, by contrast with the question of mechanical solidarity, this one do es not concern the value system directly, but rather the system of institutionalized norros in relatíon to the structure of roles in the society. This is not put­ting it in Durkheim's own terms, for he did not use the concept of role which has become so important to sociological theory in the last generation. The importance of the reference to norms in his analysis is, however, entirely clear.

Furthermore, Durkheirn's discussion is fully in accord with the distinction made previously between values and differenti­ated norms as structural components of the social system, sine e he so strongly emphasized the l"elation oE organic solidarity to the differentiation of functions among units in the system, and specifically to the differentiation of expectations of behavior.8

Though he enumerated a number of other fields, it i8 also clear that there lS, for Durkheim, a special l"elation between organic solidarity, contract, and the economic aspects of the organizatíon of societies. This relation can, 1 thinkJ provide the

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principal cIue to the way in which roles are involved. Collectivi­des, it has been suggested previously, constitute the primary operative agencies for the performance of social function. The resources necessary for that performance consist, in turn, besides solidarity Ítself and the related patterns of "organization: t in cultural resources, physical facilities, and human services. "Solidarity" cannot be treated as a component for Durkheim's purposes because it is his dependent variable; he is concerned with the conditions on which it depends. He does not treat cul­tural resources-knowledge, for example. He í8 carefu!, never­theless, to take account oE the role of physical facilí ties in dis­cusing the institutionalization of property rights. His main concern, however, is with human services and the ways in which they can be integrated for the performance of social functíon.

The central problem involved here may be looked at, in the first instance, in a developmental setting. It is a general char­acteristic of "primitiveH societies that the allocatíon of resources among their structurally significant unÍts is overwhelmingly ascribed. This is most obvious in the eeonomic sphere itself. The factors oí production are controlled by units which do not have specialized economic primacy of function, and they are typicaIly not transferable from one unit to another. Indeed, even products are seldom exchanged, and when they are, the transfer is likely to take place as a ceremonial exchange of gifts rather than in barter, as we understand ir-to say nothing of market exchange. This lS particularly true oí labor, the central factor of economic production.

The division of labor brings freedom from ascriptive ties regarding the u tilization oí consumable goods and services and the factors of production themselves. The structurallocation oí organic solidarity thus concerns the dual problem of how the processes by which the potentially eonflicting interests that have been generated can be reconciled without disruptive conflict (this leads, of CQurse, into the Hobbesian problem), and of how the societal interest in efficient production can be protected and promoted.

Every society must, as a prerequisite of its functioning, pre­sume sorne integration of the interest of units with those of the society-elsewhere 1 have called this the "institutional integraN

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tion of motivation."il But this by itseH is not enough. Qne path to further development is to use the organs of the collective attainment of goals as the agencies for defining and enforcing integration or solidarity oí this type. This involves a near fusion of mechanical and organic bases of solidarity of the sort that is most conspicuous in socialistic economies. An indepe.ndent basis oE integration can develop, however, frorn the institutionalizaw

tion of systems of norms and mechanisms that without een­tralized direcdon permit the allocation oí fluid resources to proceed in a positively integrated manner.

This set of nOTros and mechanisms is organized in terms of two complementary reference points. Qne of these is the socio­logical reference to economic analysis -and interests, the process by which generalized disposability of resources builds up. This eoncerns aboye all the institutionalization of contraet, of prop­erty, and of the disposability of labor service through employ­ment in oceupational roles. Property and labor then beeome generalized resources. They can be allocated and controlled through processes which establish functionalIy specific c1aims, rather than through prior (and, therefore, in all likelihood, functionally irrelevant) bases of ascriptive claim, such as mem­bership in a eommon kinship unit. This, oE course, involves sorne sort oE process oE exchange among functionally differenti­ated units in the system.

It is an essential aspect of Durkheim's argument that this genel'alizability and fluid disposability of resources requires more than a freeing from in'elevant, usually ascriptive con­straints. It also requires a positive institutionalization of correl­lative obligations and rights which are defined in terms of a normative structure. From the point of view of the definition of resources, this type of normative regulation becomes the more imperative the furtheT removed the ultimate utilization oí rhe Tesource is trom what luay be thought of as a "natuTal," to-be-taken~for-granted set oE rights to this utilizatíon. From the point of view of the resource, then, a dual process is necessary: First, the resource must be "generalized"-this involves freeing it from aseriptive controls; and, second, the positive obligation to enter into the generalized allocative system must be estab­lished. Thus in a primarily ascriptive society, the equivalent oE

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what are occupational roles in our own were filled on the basis oí kinship obligations, as in the case of a SOn who follows his father as the proprietor and cultivator of the land held by the continuing kinship unit. In our own society, to train for an occupation in which one can compete in the labor market, and to be willing to take one's chances on finding satisfactory em­ployment constÍtute a positively institutionalized obligation of the normal adult male, and of a considerable number oE the members of the other sexo Therefore, there is, in a sense, a "speculative" production of labor power which precedes any specification of its channels of use. This is, of course, even more true oE the control of physical facilities.

At the same time, there must also be a series of mechanisms which ean determine the patterns in which such a genel'alized resource is utilized. As the division of labor becomes more highly developed, the proportion of such resources which are utilized in colleetivities that have specific functions becomes greater. These collectivities cOIDluand monetary resources which can in turn be used to contract ,for labor services and to provide necessary physical facilities. The institutionalization of contract is the normative system which offers access to such resourees-­whatever the function oí the organization itself may be. The institution of property, then, regulates monetary resources and physical facilities; the institution oE oceupation control s human services.

It is important to note here the complex relation which exists between the eeonomic and non-economÍc aspects of the con­stellation oE faetors that 1 am outlining. Economic production as su eh is only one of the primary societal functions served by the processes of production and mobilization of fluid resources through the institutionalization oE contraet, markets, money, property, and occupational roles. Indeed, any major function may be promoted in that way-edueation, health care, scientific research, and governmental administratíon. There are only certain speciallimiting cases, like the family and certain aspects oE the polítical process, which cannot be "bureaucratized" in this sense.

At the same time, ir is correct to say that the mechanisms involved here-regardless of the ultimate function that they

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subserve in any particular case-are primarily economic; namely, contract, markets, rooney, and the líke. We must ex­ercise great care, therefore, when using such a terro as <t

eco-noroicH in this kind of analysis.

The generalized disposability of resources, then, is one major aspect of the functional complex whích is institt,ltionalized through organic solidarity. The other aspect concerns the standards and mechanisms by which their allocation aroong alternative claimant units of the social structure is worked out. Here it i8 clear that, within the institutional framework of contract, property, and occupation, the primary direct mech­anisms concern the structuring of markets and the institution-alization of money.

This brings us back to the aubtle way5 in which conventional economic and non-economic elements áre involved. The market mar be regarded as the structural framework for the allocation of diaposable resources in so far as the mechanism of this alloca­don is primarily íTee1y contractual at the level of the operative organization or collectivity. Two other types of mechanism must be dístinguished froID this one, however. The first is adminis­trative allotment, which i8 a "free" disposal of resources by those who supposedly- enjoy nearly full control of thero. Theo­retically, this would be the case if the economy were fully social­ized, for a central planning body would simply make decisions and assign budgetary quotas-indeed it might also directly distribute labor and physical facilities. The second mechanism involves negotiation between the higher agencies which hold the resources and their prospective users in such a way that political power plays a prominent part in determining the out­come whether or not governmental structures are prominently involved. An example oE this would be the distribution through legislative action of public works benefits on the basis of re· gional and local interests, a procedure .which -aften involves a good deal of Hlog-rolling."

Empirically, there is shading-off between these types. Typo­logically, however, in the market the bargaining powers of the contracting partners are approximately equal; neither the hold­ers nor the utilizers of resources are simply utold

H

where tbey are to go or what they are to get; and the degree of power held

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by the higher level oE the goal-directed organization of the rele­vant colIectivity structure i5 not the decisive mechanism in the process of allocation. The market ls an institutionalized mech­anism which neutralizes both these porential mechanisms of allocat~on in a num?er oE arcas, preventing them ·from being the pnmary determlnants of more detailed allocations. This means essentially that there i8 a hierarchy of allocative mech­a?ism~, whose relations to each other are ordered by institu­uonahzed norms. Among these norms are those which define the areas within which, and the oecasions on which, the more :~drast~,cH contro~s may and may not be allowed to supersede the

freer mechanlsm of the market. Thus the taxing power oE government determ~nes a co~pulsory allocation of monetary reso~rces; an,d ~ert~In alloeauons are subject to legislative con· trolln that lImltatIons are placed on the freedom of individual units to contraet for them at will.

However, it i8 clearly in accord with Durkheim's views oE organic s?lidarity to point out that within the roarket sphere E:eedo.m 15 balanced and controIled by complex sets of institu­tlonahz~d n?rms, so t~at the ~reedoms thelTIselves and the rights and obltgatlons assoClated WIth them are defined in terms of 8uch institutionalized nOl'ros. There are, in this are a, two maÍn categories oE such institutionalized structures. One conceros the institutionalization or the monetary mechanism itself, the defi­nÍtion of the spbere of its legitimate use, and, of course, the limits of thi8 sphere. The other concerns the institutionalization of conditions ~nder which market transactions involving differ­ent subcategones of resonrces may be entered into. Let us take up the latter class of nOTms first.

In general tenns, nOTms of the highest order in a modern s?ciety clearly have the status of formal legal rules and prin­CIpIes. They are subject to the legislative power, and the task of interpreting and administering thero is the responsibility of the courts of law. For organic solidarity, as noted aboye, the complex of contract, property, and occupation is central; whereas leadership, authority, and what 1 llave elsewhere called llregulation" are central to mechanical solidarity.

Freedom of contract, then, includes the freedom to define the conditions and limitations of the various terros which-as 1

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have previously set forth-are involved in a contractual system with respect to the content of agreements, the means oE secur-

assent, the scope of responsibility, and the societal int.e:est. At both the legal and informal levels, then, these condltIOnS and limitations vary in accordance with the societaI functíons performed by the contracting units, the vario"?s .aspects ~f the situations in which they operate. and other simIlar consIdera­tions. Thus a private relationship between a physician and a patient, established to serve the interest of the patient's health, i8 sanctioned. However, the offering oE certain types oE health service is restricted, partIy by law and partly by infonnal insti­tu tionalization. and may be performed only by licensed and "adequately trainedH physicians; and the acceptance of such services ÍS, if it is legitimate, restricted, in a more informal sense, to persons who are really "sick." There is abundant evidence that there is wide area in which illness í8 not so much an objective "condition" as a socially defined role.

Thererore, the problern of the content of contractual rela­tions involves differentiating between role-categories which are regarded as the legitimate bearers of various social functions and those which are llOt. A Clconsumer" or "client" may contract for a very wide range of goods and services, but he ís not com* pletely free to choose the agencies with which he will contract, since institutional norms define the functions which certain agencies may perform.

In addition, the ways in which the terms of the contract are settled are institutionalized in various ways, and this influences the structure oE the market. Economists have been particularly con cerned with one type, the "commercialH market, where prices are arrived at on the basis of Itcompeti~ion," and where it is an institutionalized expectatioll that the nght oí the purvey­ing agency to continue in operation is a function oE its ability to meet expenses and to show a profit. Furthermore, it is the customer's expectation that the price he pays will cover the full cost of what he purchases. I-Iowever, the structure of the market in which a large number of governmental, pl'ofessional, and other services are purveyed, is quite different. Although a service may be entirely free in the rnonetary sense, the condi­tions of eligibility may be sharply defined, as in the case oE those

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regulating admissÍon to public hospitals. Or, as i8 often the case in private medical practice, there may be a sliding scale oE costs, so that one participant in the conu'act, the patient-contrary to what Í8 expected of the customer in the commercial market -fulfills only part oE his obligatíon in that the iee he pays covers only a portion of the costs of performing the service C011-

tracted for. Furthermore, there is the problem oE the scope of the re­

sponsibility involved in such a reJatíon. The Spencerian version of theJdea of contract tended to assume that the question of the participants' abilities to Ildelivert> presented no complicated problem. The typical economic exchange in which the buyer has sufficient money and the seller sufficient goods i8 taken as the prototype. But this i8 by no means always the situation. As an illustration, let us again take a certain type oE professional relationship. A sick person cannot be held responsible for end­íng his deplored condirion simply by making a. voluntary effort: his helplessness is a primary criterion by which his need bf, and right to. professional service is determÍned. But he ls responsible for recognizing his helplessness and for actively co-operating with therapeutic agencies in bringing about his recovery. These agencies, in turn, though their role may be defined in terms of technical competence, must recogníze a wide variation in the capacities of individuals so that i.f there is a failure in certain cases, the physician is not held responsible, provided he has done his best. Another good example is found in education where because _of the youth of the ignorant person, ignorance is Dot cODsidered culpable. Nor js a child expected to educate himself without the help of schools. He i5, however, expected to work hard in acquiring his educatíon within the framework of the schoo1. And sorne children are harder to educate than others, and failures are not treated as being always or wholly the teach­er's fault. There are elaborately institutionalized norms cover­ing fields such as these.

The protection of the interest of society in contractual rela­tions is more diffusely institutionalized; it is, in a sense, an aspect of a11 the norms in this area. At the legal level, however, there are a number oí provisions which enable the courts and other governmental agencies that represent the public inteTest

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to intervene in order to prevent or modify such arrangements. Because oí its very nature, the institutionalization of -a con­tractual system involves the imposition of a whole system oí limitations on the powers of government. But the residual op­portunities ror priva te interests to exploit their freedom against the rest of the society require the maintenance of a delicately balanced equilibrium of integration.

The monetary mechanism is essential because, in the first place, the division of labor cannot develop very far if aH ex­changes are restricted to the level of barter. In a fully developed system, money has four primary functions. It serves, first, as a measure of the economic value of resources and products. 1 t is in this connection that we speak or the gross national product as a monetary SUID. Second, it serves as a standard for the ra­tional allocation oE resources, for comparing cost and outcome. Only in the "business" sector, where productive function in the economic sense has primacy, is the monetary standard the pri­mary one applíed. But in other functional areas, too, such as education or health, monetary cost is a very essential evaluative mechanism in that it is, trom the point of view oE the unit, the basis ror evaluating one major component in the conditions necessary to accomplish whatever goal is involved, and ¡s, from the point oE view of the system at large, a measure of the sacri­ficed uses to which the resourees in question might have been puto

'lt is thus essential to diseriminate profitability as a measure of the worth-whileness of a function from the use of monetary cost as one component of the conditions which must be weighed in arriving at a judgment of worth-whileness. The capacity somehow to cover monetary cost, the ability to raise the money somehow, is, of course, a necessary limiting eondition oE those functíons which require resourees that are acquired through the market.

In serving as a measure and standard, money does not cireu­late; nothing changes hands. In perrorming its other two func­tions, however, money is a medium of ·exchange. In the first of these, money is an essential facility wherever the attainment of

_goals is dependent on resources accessible through market chan-136

THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

nels. Not only is it necessary to have it, but, it must be noted in a .highly develope~ market system, th.ere is an extraordina~ily wlde range of cholces open to the unlt that possesses sufficient funds. The other mediating function of money is to serve as a reward. Rere the reference is in the nature of the case compara­tive and relative; what counts is the amount of monetary in­come received by one unit or resource as compared with that reeeived by another. I t is this íunction of money which is the primary focus of the regulation of the process of alloeation of resources, in so .far as this is the result of market transactions. The basie principIe is the economie one: A resouree will flow to that one oí the situations in which it is utilized which offers the highest relative reward, the reward being, in this case, monetary.

Rere again it is essential, however, to insíst on the same basic distinction which was made in conneetion with the standards of alloeatíon. Money is not the sole component of the complex of rewards. It has primacy over other components only when the function of economic productíon has primacy over other functions, that is. in the ~'business" sector of the organizational and occupational system. It is essentiaHy for this reason that the monetary remuneratíon for human services in that sector is higher than other sectors 5uch as governme~t, educatíon, and so on. But even where other components of reward-political power, integrative acceptance or solidarity, or cultural prestige -have primacy within a given subsystem, it is essential that the monetary remuneration correspond to the quality of the services performed, as determined on the basis of the dominant criteria for that subsystem. In the academic profession, for example, contrary to the situation in the business occupations, the arnount of one's income is not a valid measure of one's relative prestige in the general occupational system. Within the pro­fession, however, and especially within the same faculty, there Ís strong pressure to establish a correspondence between pro­fessional eompetence and the salaries paid. Failure to do so is a prime source of integrative strain.

1 have taken the space to discuss the relation among the aUo­cation oí fluid resources, the institutionalization of contract, property, and occupation, and the market and money in sorne

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detail because such an analysis is more comprehensive than any Durkheim was in a position to give, and thus provides a larger setting in which to evaluate the true importance of bis basic insights about organic solidarity. His cru<:ial ~nsi?ht is. that there must be, in this area, a whole complex of InstltutIonahzed norrns as a condition of the stability of a functionally differentiated system. In De la division du travail social, Durkheirh díd not go very far in analyzing the rnotivations underIying adherence to such norms. But he was entirely cIear on one central point, namely, that thís adherence on the part oE the acting unit in the system couId not be motivated prünarily by considerations of expedient utility. Th,is is the ~as~c r:as~n ~hy the con~ept of the conscience collectzve as consIstlng In behefs and sentlments held in common" is of such central importance. In his later work, he took three major steps bearing on this question of motivatíon. Before attempting to outHne these, however, it is well to discuss briefly the relation oE the conscience collective to organic solidarity and the relation of organic and mechanical solidarity to each other. .

Concerning the first of these two problems, DurkheIm seems to have been genuinely conEused, for he failed to clarify the structural distinction between values and norms, which 1 have presented earlier, and did not se: that this disti~ction ~pp~ies and is relevant equally to organlc and mechanlcal sohdanty. Instead, he got-bogged down in the identificatíon of mechanical solidarity with a lack of differentiation of structure, and hence with the similarity oí roles which are personal expressions of the community of beliefs and sentiments. Consequently, he had no clear criteria for defining the relation of functionally differ~ entiated norms to the conscience collective. Durkheim's treat­ment of the conception of the ¡'dynamic density" of a social system and its relation to competitionJ represents, as Schnore has pointed out,10 a valid atteI?P~ to solve th~ problem of ~e processes oí structural differentlatIon, but he dl~ not succee~ In linking it to his master concep~ of the consaence ~ollecttVe.

It is now possible to state thlS fundamental relatlon more adequately: As noted aboye, the. crucial componen.t of the conscience collective is common sOCletal values. Commltment to such values, carefully interpreted with reference to the object

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concerned-that is, the society as such-and to the level oE generality or specification, is one major component of the gen~ eral phenomenon oE institutionalization. Institutionalization is, in turn, the primary basis, at the level of the integration oI t:he social systern, of Durkheim's "solidarity." But with respect to any fundamental function of the social systern, values must be specified in terms oE their relevance to that particular function. Furthermore, values must be brought to bear on the legitima­tion of the differentiated institutionalized norms which are necessary to regulate behavior in the area of that fllllctlon-to regulate ir, on the one hand, in relation to the concrete exigen­cies under which it operates, and, on the other, in relation to the interest oí the society as a system. Legitimatíon itself, how" ever, is not enough; in addition, there must be the functÍons of defining jurisdiction, of defining and administering sanctions, and of interpreting the norms themselves.

This basic complex of relationships and functions can be quite c1early worked out for the division of labor as an economic phenomenon and for the institutions clustering a~ound it. This complex was Durkheim's primary reference; and

J except for the

fact that his formulation of Íts re1ation to the conscience col­lective is ambiguous, he marle an excellent start on anaIyzing ir. But he did not see that the properties of the contractual com­plex are directly paralleled by those of the complex involving mechanical solidarity. 1 have suggested that this parallel pri­marily concerns the relations between common values and the institutionalization of polítical function in the society. Here also, the values must be specified at a concrete level in order to legitimize not only society in the broadest sense, but also the type of organization which ís institutionalized in it for the at­tainment of collective goals. This organizatíon is, however, a differentiated functional area which in certain fundamental respects is parallel to, or cognate with, that of the mobilization of fluid resources. Furthermore, it involves differentiated struc­tures within itself at the norm, colIectivity, and role levels. Hence the Telation oE values to norms is essentially the same in this area as in the economic. The norms must be legitimated, but, in addition, jurisdictions must be defined, sanctions sped-

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fied, and norros interpreted. The conscience collective does llot perform these functions directly or automatically. The differen­tiated normative complex which centers on the institutionaliza­tion of leadership and authority parallels the complex which centers on contract, property. and occupational role in . the economic area. Power is a measure and medium that in those respects which are relevant is parallel to money.ll

Durkheim's treatment involves a further complication, namely, the problem of evolutionary sequence. Re made two crucíally important points in this connection. The first is that the development of the patterns of organic solidarity that are connected with an extensive division of labor presupposes the existence oI a system of societal integratíon characterized by mechanical solidarity. The second i8 that the economic divisíon ' of labor and an elaborated and differentiated govemmental organization develop concomitantly. It is not a case of one's developing at the expense of the other.

Sound as these two insights were, Durkheim's association of mechanical solidarity with a lack of structural differentiation inelined him toward identifying this ,association with primitive­ness in an evolutionary sense, and prevented hím from making the essential connection between common values and the legiti­matíon of the political order and organization in a mOTe differ­entiated, modern type of society. The relation of modem polítical institutions to solidarity-very much like that of eco­nomic ínstitutions to solidarity-was simply left hanging in the

airo 1 should liIte to suggest, therefore, a refinement of Durkheim's

classification. If organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity are eorrelative terms, one should refer to the type of solidarity which focuses on the legitimatíon of political institutions, and the other to that type which focuses on economic institutions. Broadly speaking, we may say that, although the situatíon varíes substantially with the type of social structure, both exist simul. taneously in parts of the same social system, parts that can be distinguished on the basis of structure and through analysis; and there should be no general tendency far one to repIace the other. The solidarity which exists prior to the development of any of the higher levels of social differentiation is not the same

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thing as this "politi~al" type. The latter is closer to the principal referent of Durkhelm's mechanical solidarity, hut 1 should pre­fer another term-"diffuse solidarity," for example. It is the eommon matrix out of which both the others have emerged by a process of differentiation. D~rkh~im seems to have faced a very common diffieulty in

deahng w1th th~ processes of differentiation. When a component oE ~ system reta~ns the same name at a later, more highly differ­entlate~ phase Ir: the development of the system that it had ~t ano e.arher, less ~lfferentiate~ one, the component can-ying the onglnal,na~e wlll have less Importance in the later phase. This follows l~evItably from the faet that in the earlier phase ít may ha ve deslgnated one of,. say, four eognate eomponents, and in th~ later P?ase one oftlelght. This diminishing of importance is ofren attnbu ted to a los8 of functions" 01' "a decll'n . h" e In ?trengt on the part of the c?mponent named. Coad examples In contemporary Western soelety are IIfamily" and "religion."12 These names have been used throughout the suecessive phases of our development, but the components they have designated ~ave ,nor remained ?ognate. T~e modern urban family whose funct:on of econ?m~c prOductlon has been transferred to oc· eupatIon~1 o~ganlza~lo~s i5 not cognate with the peasant house­ho~d w~lch lS a pnne1pal unit of production, in addition to be1ng, hke rhe ~odern one, a unit for the rearing of ehildren and the. regulatlon of personality. In its capacity as a unit of product102' th~ peasant family is, in fact, a tlfamily firm/' but the term firm 15 usually llot applied to ir.

O?e qualifi~ation oí this argument, touching upon the hier­arc~lc.al ordenng of functions in social systems, should be made. ThlS 18 that politicaI organization, within an instltutionalized framework of order, must indeed precede, in the developmental sequence, the emel'genee o~ a highly differentiated market type oi. e~onomy. Rence there 18 sorne empírical justification, even wlthln the t:amew?rk ! have sketched, fol' Durkheim's saying that mechanlcal sohdaTlty precedes organic solidarity.

~s previously noted, in De la division du travail social Durk· helm ~ad mueh to say about the role of institutionalized norms but httle about the eharaeter of the motivation underlying

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commitment to values and to confonnity with norms. However, his clear insight that the operation oE the "rational p~rsuit of selfainterest" as interpreted in u tilitarian and economlC ~heory does not offer an explanation of this commit:nent, provlded a setting for approaching the problem. In hlS ear~~er p~as~s, Durkheim tended to be content with the ·formula of, extenonty and constraint" in an interpretation which treated norms as though they were simply among the "!acts .of lHe" in the situa­tíon of the individual, a formula WhlCh dld not help to solve the fundamental difficulty presented by utilitarianism. In Le suicide however, and in his work on the sociology of education, he took two important steps beyond this position which 1 shall sketch briefly. .

The first is his discovery and pardal development of the Idea' of the internalization DE values and norms. The second is the discrimination he makes, with spedal reference to the problem of the nature oE modern "individualismJ " between two ranges oE variation. One of these concerns types of institutionalized value-norm complexes, and is exemplified by the distinction be­tween egoism and altruismo The other concerns the types oE relations that the individual can have to whatever norms and values are institutionalized. Rere the discrimination between "egoism" and "anomie" is crucial; it .is parallel to that ~etween Haltruism" and "fatalism: t 1 shall bnefly take up each In tUl'n.

Concerning the internalization of values ~nd. norms, we m~y say that, within certain limits, a~tual beha~lOr In the e~onomlC and polítical fields can be reIatIv~ly well lnterpr~ted In te~'ms· of the processes by which the indlvIdual adapts. hlmself ratlon­ally to the existence of the norms and the 8anct1On8 attached to them, so that they simply become a part of the "fa~ts oE ,life:" Durkheim saw clearly that the existence and functlona.l l?dIS­pensability of the institutionalizati?n of these ~orms 18 lnde­pendent of the interests of the unIts.. but he dld not hav~ a theory to explain, in t~rms of motiv~tio?J the p:O~;8S ?y w~lc.h institutions are estabhshed and malntalned. RIS sOClologlStlC positivism"13 prevented his fo~ulating SUC~l .a theory.

Durkheim was led to make hlS study of SUIClde by a paradox: According to utilitarian theory, a rising standard of living should bring about a general increase in "happiness"; howeverJ

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concomitant with the certain rise in the standard of living in Western countries, there was a marked rise in the suicide rate. Why was it that as people became happier, more of them Idlled themselves?

It ls not necessary to review here Durkheim's famous mar­shalling of facts and his analysis of them. What concerns us is that the decisive break-through in solvíng the paradox carne ahout with his working out of the concept DE anoroie. To be sure, anomie was only one of the four components in his. analysis DE the reasom underlying variations in the suicide rateJ but it i8 the decisive theoretical one in the present contexto

The older viewJ which the early Durkheim shal'ed, saw the goals of the action of the individual as located within his own personality. and saw sodal norms, which were "exterior" to himJ as located in society, which was a "reality sui generis." Because they were located in two different systems, the goaIs of the individual and the norms of society were dissociated from each other. Durkheim's concept of anomie was a formu]ation of his great insight that th18 dissociation was untenable, that the goals of the individual could not be treated as being inde­pendent of the norms and values of the societYJ but were, in factJ "given meaning," that i5J legitimized, by these values. They must, therefore, belong to the same system. If personal goals were part of the personality, then values and nonns, the con­science collective~ must also be part of the personality. At the same timeJ Durkheim couId not abandon the doctrine oE the independence DE institutional norms from the "individual." This was the very core of his conception of solidarity J and to abandon it would have meant reverting to the utilitarian posi­tion. Hence the only solution was the conception of the inter­penetratíon oE personality and social system, the conception that it must be true, in sorne senseJ that values and norros were parts of the {{individual consciousness," and were, at the same timeJ

analytically independent of Hthe individual:' In the earlier stages, Durkheim attempted to solve this problem by the con­ception that there were two "consciousnesses" within the same personality, but gradually he tended to abandon this view.

It is noteworthy that Durkheim, working in sociology, dis­covered esseutially the same basic phenomenon of internaliza-

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tion and interpenetration as did Freud in his study oE the personality, and that the same discovery was made independ­ently by Charles I-Iorton Cooley and George Herbert Mead. This convergence is, in my opinion, oue of the great landmarks in the development of modern social science.,

To restate Durkheim's main point concerning tl).e operation of anomie: An individual does not commit suicide primarily because he lacks the llmeans" to accomplish his goals, but be­cause his goals cannot be meaningfully integrated with the expectations which have been instÍtutionalized in values and nonns. The factoys responsible foy this malintegration may be social, cultural, or psychological in any combination, but the crucial point of strain concerns the meaningfulness of situatíons and of alternatives of action. This problem of meaning could' not arise if norms and values were merely parts of the external situation and not of the actual "beliefs and sentiments" oE the individuaL

Durkheim left many problems connected with the clarifica­tion and interpretation of anomie unresolved, but his concept clearly pointed the way to a theory of the problem of social control which was not susceptible to his own criticism oE utili­tarianism, and could, when linked to modern psychological insight into the personality, lead to a theory of the motivation underlying conformity and deviation, and hence to a theory of the mechanisms by which solidarity is established and maintained.

On psychological grounds, it can be said that since inter­nalized values and norms, as well as some oE the components of goals, are involved in the motivation to conformity, certain crucial components oE that motivatíon, and of the mechanisms by which it is established, maíntained, and restored, are not fully or direct1y attributable to ltreason." In other words, it is not enough merely to make clear to the actor what the sÍtua­tion is and what the consequences of alternative courses of action are likely to be; for the mechanisms and components of motivation, and the components of the mechanisms of social control that mirror the various aspects oE this motivatíon, are non-rationaI. This puts the mechanisms of social control in a dass that is different from that of the market, the ordinal)'

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exercise :>f. poli:icall~adership and power, of legislatíon and of the admlnIstratlon-lll its higher judicial aspects-of the le al ~~m. g

Those aspects oE il1ness which can be associated with "psychic" factors= and the correspondíng features of the therapeutic proc­ess Whl~h treats them, can serve as a prototype of this kind of me~hanIsm: and can be systematically related to the processes of . ln~~ract:on that are involved in the socialization of the chIld. ~t 18, however, equally cIear that there is need for an elaboratlon oí theory in this fie1d which is parallel to that which 1 ~ave. pr~viously outli~ed for the problem area of organic sohdanty In so far as 1t concerns economÍc institutions and ~ar~ets. Clearly, not all social control that is oriented to mo­t~vatlon concerns illn~ss and therapy. For example, it seems very hke1y that the practIce of Iaw has coguate functions Over a consld<:rable area in our own society. Lawyers, however, are not theraplsts. !he subsystem o~ the society which presents prob­~em.s ?f SOCIal control to WhlCh lawyers are relevant. is not an IndIVIdual personality, as is the one to which physicians are relev.ant, but a system that iuvolves two or more parties in their relatIOns to the normative system which regulates all of them Hence there is more than one attorney. and there are courts: Her~ the analogue of anomie is a situation in which nor,ms, and posslbly the values th~t He, behind ~hem, are not sufficiently well defined to place clIents In a meanlngful situatíon for action so that the pressure of this situation tends to motivate them to act Hirrationally." ~his need llOt, however, imply that they have psychopathologlcal personalities. Again it is the relational system, not the individual, which needs straightening out. It seem.s to me that Durkheim's own treatment of religious ritual provldes another example, on which 1 shall remark brieHy later. , I~ sh~uld also be noted that in following up this line of rea­

sonlng m the years following the publicatíon oE Le suicide Durk~ei~ made, in h~s w~rk on ed~cation, the first majo; contnbutlon to the soclologlcal analysls of the socialization of the child.15 It. was in this connection that he was able to clarify more fully hlS theory of the nature of the internalization of values and norms by redefining constraint as the exercise of moral authority through the conscience oí the individual. In

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this way, it became clear that the moral component oí the conscience collective is social: first, in that it is made up of values that are common to, and shared by, the members of the society; second, in that through the process of socialization the new members oí the society undergo a process by which these values are internalized; andJ third, in that there are special mechanisms which re-enforce the commitment 'to the values thus made in ways that involve the non-rational layers of the personality structure, so that deviation is counteracted by cura~ tive mechanisms. With this definition, Durkheim provided a new understanding of the operation DI the social system-one which was scarcely within the purview of the Durkheim of De la division clu travail social.

The other main contribution of Le suicide to the present discussion is the conception of what may be called t/institu­tionalized individualism," at the center oI which is Durkheim's concept or égo'isme as distinguished from anomie. This is an extension of the basic insight of De la division du tTavail social ~ but here Durkheim applies it in an altogether novel context and links it with the problems of social control just discussed.

Utilitarianism and with it the methodological individualism (verging on reductionism) of our intellectual tradition have tended to interpret the emphasis placed on the sphere oí free­dom and the expected independent achievement of the unÍt of a system as meaning that the unit is free from the controls of the system. It has thus reduced the importance of the integra­tion of the system, whether positively or negatively valued. Spencerian individualism was the negation oí social control in the present sense oí this concepto

There is, of course, an obvious sense in which this is true, for immediate control by direct authority is incompatible with in~ dividual freedom. But there is another and deeper sense in which it is DOt true. An institutionalized order in which indi­viduaIs are expected to assume great responsibility and strive for high achievement, and in which they are rewarded through socially organized sanctions of such behavior, cannot be ac­coun ted for by postulating the lessening of all aspects of insti­tutionalized control. Instead, Buch an order, with its comlnon values, its institutionalized norms} its sanctions and media, its

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THE INTEGRATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS

:nec~an.isms of social control, represents a particular mode of lnstlt~tlOna~ St1:uctllring. It emphatically does llOt represent anomle, Wh1Ch 18 the weakening of control in the sense of the weakening of solidarity.

<. !he cIassic. empi~ical ·formulation of this point in Le suicide IS In connectIon WIth the Protestant-Catholic differential. The Catholic is, in matters of religion, subjected to the direct con~ trol of the authorities of his church: he must accept official dogma on penalty . DE excommunication; he must accept the sacrame.ntal authonty of the priest in the matter of his own salvation, and. so 0I?' ~he Protestant church as a collectivity does not exerClse thlS }ond of authority. A Protestant is free oI these types oI controL But he is not free to choose whether or not. to accept such controls, for he may not, if he wishes to re­T?a,ln a good ~r~t~stant, relinquish his freedom to accept re­hglouS responslbIllty imposed on him in his direct relation to God. The obligation to accept such responsibility is legitimized ?y the coromon va~ues of the Protestant group and is translated lnto norms governlng behavior.

Largely for ideological reasonsJ this basic insight is still far ~'om being fully assimílated into the thinking of social scien­tIsts. But there are few of Durkheim's contributions which do mo~e in relating the theoretical approach to the analysis of soclal.systems, to the elnpirical interpretation oE the major features oE the modern type of society.

. This problem brings' us around to another very important lInk between the two dominant themes in Durkheim's original treat~ent oE the problems of social integration; namely, the relatlO? betwe~n organic and mechanical solidarity. Clearly, there 18 a relatlon between the egoistic factor in suicide and organic solidarity, and between the altruistic factor and me­chanical solidarity. This becomes manifest in the association ~etwee~ areas of the social structure in whích the collectivity is tlght1y Integr~te~ (s~c~ as the army) and there is a high inci­dence of altrulstlc sUICIde, and those in which market relations predo:ninat~ (the professions and business, for example) and t?ere lS a hlgh frequency of egoistic suicide. A parallel con'ela­uon may be seen between types of societies.

However, correlations such as these raise the question of the 147

EMILE DURKHEIM

kinds of mechanisms which are associated with the different problems of integratían. Very early ~urkheim e~P?asized the importance of the definitions of certaln acts. as cnmlnal and of prescriptions for punishing them a~ ~~chanlsms th~t re-e~force mechanical solidaríty. In De la dtvz.ston du travavl soctal, he used this re-enforcement prímarily as a foil- to highlight t~e contrast with the functioning of civillaw in relation to organlc solidarity. In this connection, ~~s primary re~erence was dearly to the solidarity of the collectlvlty as tIle maln structural focus of the problem of integTat~on. . . .

It is noteworthy that, In hIS last penod, DurkhelI~ carne around to a fieId which ÍSJ in terros of the aboye analys1s, very closely related to the problems of mech~nical s~lidarity, but this time the relatíon is seen from the pOlnt of Vlew of values . rather than from that of their political implementation. 1 am referring to his anal ysis of religion in its relation to society in Les formes élérnentai1'es de la vie religieuse. Ther~ ar~ many notable features in this work, but the one of speclal lnterest here is the treatment of religious ritual as a mechanism for the re-enforcement of social solidarity.

The most important link between this wor~{ a~d De la ~iv!­sion du travail social, written twenty years earher, lS Durkhe1l1~ s continuing concern with the conscience collec#ve. However, In the earEer work this concept was used merely as a reference point for the analysis of the economic level of social differentia­tion and the attendant problems of integration. In the later ane,' by contrast, the question of the primary role of the con­science collective in the social system as a whole comes to the center oE the stage. As Durkheim treats it, ritual of the com· munal sort is the direct expression of the commitment af me~­bers of the collectivity-that is, the highest-level relevant socIal system-to the values which they hold in. common. But it, is~ at the same time, more than just an expresslon of the~, for It 18 a way in which through "dramatization" these commltments may be renewed and any tendencies to weaken them may be fore-stalled.

lt is quite clear that religious ritual as it is co~ceived ~n this work is not directly concerned wíth the formulaUon and lmple­mentation of norms, but rather with the HinwardJ " the inter-

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nalized aspects DE the systems of values and norffis, with their direct involvement in the structure oE personalíties. Moreover, it concerns theÍr relation to motivation in the context of the non-rational components referred to above. Thererore, in this last major phase of his work, Durkheim was clearly building on the results he had attained in his studies of suicide and edu­cation. But here for the first time he regarded the maintenance oE the institutionalized value system in the society as a focus of social process, rather than as a point of reference from which to analyze other structures and processes.

There is, at the same time, an interesting return to his orig­inal reference points, for he explicitly takes up the problem of the role of the conscience collective-that iSJ of collective values -at the level of the value system, rather than at that of the structure DE the concrete collectivity and of the obligations to it. Therefore, he ends up placing his original problem of organic solidarity within a more general framework oE order, one in which there is a polítical organization which can enforce a uni­form criminal law, but in which there is also a system of values which can legitimize norms that are independent oE the particu­lar political order and its Horgans."

This was a ma jot" step in the differen tiatian of the theoretical components of the hydra-headed problem oE social integration. It is perhaps significant, however, that Durkheim dealt with the problem of religious ritual in empirical detail only in the con­text oI the primitive religions. 1 interpret this to mean that the old problem aI the reIation between the genetic and the ana­lytical aspects oE the problem of discriminatíon of components still plagued him. In a way, he simply drove the problem of mechanical solidarity back to a more generalized level, seeking the Horigins" of repressive law in the religious commitments that are ritualized in the great tribal ceremonies. In so doing, he contributed enonnously to our understanding of processes of social control at this level, an understanding that definitely in­cluded their motivational reference. But by virtue of his un­fortunate confusion, he obscured rather than illuminated the pl'oblem of the relations of solidarity to the structural differen­tiation of modern society, the analysis of which was his original point of reference.

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There is almost complete agreement that Durkheim was one oí a very small company oí sociological theorists who, during a critical phase in the development of the discipline, penetrated to deeper levels oí analysis than had been reached by any of their predecessors and who formulated the main problems on which we have been working ever since. The subject of this paper is, 1 think, the rocal center of Durkheim's contribution to theory. He was the theorist par excellence of the problem are a oí social integration. He was more concerned with the primary core oí the social system itselÍ than with the relations of that system to those that border it--culture, personalitYJ and the organism in the physical environment. In addition, he was not, in a sense, greatly concerned with problems of social struc­ture. Though he always retained an interest in making com-' parative studies, he did not attempt to probe the crucial problems of comparative morphological dassification so deeply as did his contemporary Max Weber.

Durkheim's central problem, the solution of which he pur~ sued with rare persistence, was to determine the major axes around which the integrative functions and processes of a society are organized. His analysis was marred by many crudi~ des, and there are many aspects of it which have become obso­le te; but his criticism of the utilitarÍan tradition and his conceptions of the conscience collective) and oí mechanical and organic solidarity-though raising many problems of in ter­pretation-served both him and the discipline well.

The important thing about these conceptions is that they cut across the Unes of the conventional structural analysis of social systems, which broke them down into political, economic, religious, and other similar categories. Only with a conceptuali~ zatíon such as Durkheim's was it possible to approach the problems of social integration on a level that is general enough to permit the establishment of a new theoretical orientation. The fact that he succeeded in developing this conceptualization is the basis of Durkheim's stature as a theorist.

Durkheim díscovered determinate theoretícal relations among a whole range of empirical subject matters which are usually parceled out among different disciplines and specialties within disciplines. In De la division du travail social) he established

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relations between law and the traditional empirical matter oí economics, subsuming both of them under a theoretical perspective. He also included fru itfu 1 discussions of polítical matters, in which he observed that governmerlt" has de:eloped .concomitantly with the economy of private enterpnse. In hIS later work, he carried his analysis of connec­tions Ínto the field of psychological theory; he was driven to this by the logic of the problems he wished to solve, although he had said originaIly that psychological considerations are irrelevant to sociological problems. I-lis investigations into psychological theory enabled him not only to enrich his own analysis but also to establish the basis of a remarkable con­vergenc~ with Freud, thereby providing a means by which the conceptlons of rationality of the economic tradition of thought and the role of the non-rational components of motivation in the psychoanalytic tradition could be linked. Fin ally , in. his later work he analyzed the relevance of religion to the secular aspects of social organization.

This remarkable ability to see relations among fields usually treated as unconnected was possible only because Durkheim constantly kept in mind the fact that he was dealing with the p:oblem of integration of a single system, not a congeries of dlserete subsystems. He was a theorist par excellence of the functioning of systems.

In the above discussion, 1 have stressed many of the compli­cations and difficulties underlying Durkheim's analyses. He was undoubtedly highly selective and was, therefore, in a sense, "biased"-take, for example, his confusing of the evolu­tionary and the analytical problems in relation to the status of mechanical solidarity. The structural problems can be greatly clarified by building on the tradition of Weber, and the relations to personality can be greatly clarified by mobili­zing psychological knowledge which either did not exist in Durkhe~m's time or was contained in works in which (like the earher ones of Freud) he showed no interest.

Such critical analysis results in considerable revision of Durkheim's positions. It does not result in refutation of them, however. It involves only extension and refinement, for Durk­heim established the basic foundations for developing a fruidul theory of social integration.

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EMILE DURKHEIM-

1. 1 have always considered the focal point of Durkheim's early work in this respect to lie in "Organic and Contractual Solidarity" (Book 1, Chapo vii) , The Division of Labor in Society, transo George Simpson (Glen­coe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1947). It starts as a critique of Spencer but actually goes c1ear back to Hobbes. '

2. One reason for this is that the hypothetical turning-over of absolute authority to an unrestricted sovereign was empirical1y incompatible with the existence of the liberal governmental regimes which were a common­place in the Western World of Durk.heim's time. On this phase of the his­tory oí thought the best source is stilI. without question, Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, t!"ans. Mary :Morris ([1901-4] New York: Macmillan Co., 1928) .

3. Durkheim does not, oí course, in his more general discussion, confine himself to contract at the legal or other levels. He relates organic solidarity also to domestic, commerciaI. procedural, administrative, and constitutional law. Cf. The Division of Labor in Society, p. 122.

4. De la dívision du tmvail social (Paris: Félix Alean, 1893), p. 46.

5. The term "normative culture" will be used a number of times below. Here "normative" refers to any "level" of culture, the evaluative judg­ments of which govern or define standards and allocations at the leve1 be­low. This usage is to be distinguished from those which refer to differen· tiated norms designating, in a particular system, one level in the hierarchy of nonnative culture.

6. Such a system of societal values may, of course, change over a period of time, but it is the most stable component of the social structure.

7. "The acts that it [repressive law] prohibits and qualifies as crimes are of two sorts. Either they directly manifest very violent dissemblance be­tween the agent who accomplishes them and the collective type, or else they offend the organ of the common conscience."-The Division of Labor in Society, p. 106. The context makes cIear that by the "organ" Durkheim means the government.

8. There is, of course, a sense in which the crimina1law also lays down norms. Essentially, these norms concern the minimum standards of behavior which are considered acceptable on the part of members of the society­regardless of their differentiated functions--who are not disqualified by mental incapacity, and so on. In a highly differentiated society, however, the largest body of norms increasingly concerns the relations between dif· ferentiated functions in the fields Durkheim enumerated; namely, contraet, family life, commerce, administration, and the constitutional structure of the collectivity.

9. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, lIt: Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1951), pp. 36-45.

10. Cf. Leo F. Schnore, "Social Morphology and Human Ecology," Ame1'ican Journal of Sociology~ LXIII (1958), 620-34.

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11. Unfortunately, space does not permit developing this line of analysis further. SeveraI statements, which, though brief and in complete, are sorne. what more extensive than the one found here, will be found in TaIcott Parsons, "~u~lOrity, Legi~imation and Political Process," in Authority, ed. Cad J. Fnednch (Cambndge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), and Talcott Parsons, lO 'Voting' and the Equilibrium of the American Polítieal System," in American Voting Behavior, ed. Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (Glencoe, III.: Free Press of Glencoe, l1linois, 1958). Max Weber's treatment of authority constitutes an essential complement to Durkheim's of mechanieal solidarity.

12. 1 have deaIt with these two cases in, respectively, Family, Socializa­tion and Interaction Process (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois. 1956), Chapo i, and "Sorne Reflections on Religious Organization in the UnÍted States," Daedalus, LXXXVII (1958). This, and the paper from Auth.ority cited in n. 11. above, are included .in the collection of my essays pubhshed under the tItle Structure and Process in J..lodern Societies (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1960).

13. TaIcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: Mc­Graw-Hill Book Co., 1937), Chaps. viii-ix.

14. Parsons, The Social System, Chapo vii.

. 15. Most notably in L~Education morale (Paris: Félix Alean, 1923), and In the volume of essays, Education and Sociology~ transo Sherwood Fox ([1922} Glencoe, lB.: Free Press of Glencoe,.Illinois, 1956) .

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