part two declared nuclear weapon states · 2006. 1. 19. · 122 declared nuclear weapon states...

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PART TWO

Declared NuclearWeapon States

There are five legally acknowledged nuclear weapon states underthe terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-ons (NPT). All five—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and

the United States—are also permanent members of the U.N. Security

Council. Together, the five nations possess more than 25,000 nuclear

weapons, the vast majority of which belong to the United States and

Russia.

Under the terms of the NPT and the commitments taken at its five-

year review meetings, the five states have agreed to an “unequivocal

undertaking . . . to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear

arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament,” and to “pursue negotia-

tions in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the

nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”

The deployed arsenals of the nuclear weapon states are declining,

with many thousands of nuclear weapons having been withdrawn and

eliminated since the mid-1980s. Several countries, including the United

States and Russia, however, still stockpile huge amounts (hundreds of

metric tons) of nuclear-weapons-usable materials. This problem adds

to global concern regarding the security of nuclear materials, the pro-

tection of which is of major importance in preventing the prolifera-

tion of nuclear weapons.

The following chapters on the five nuclear weapon states review

the quantity of nuclear weapons and delivery systems possessed by

each nation. Each chapter also looks at the issues that affect efforts to

prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapons Capability

The Russian Federation is a recognized nuclear weapon state under the Treatyon the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and it possesses thou-sands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Under the accounting rules ofthe Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), Russia maintains an account-able strategic nuclear force of 981 delivery vehicles with 4,732 associated war-heads, although the actual number of deployed strategic weapons is about 3,800.Russia also is estimated to have 3,400 operational nonstrategic warheads andabout 8,800 additional intact warheads retained in reserve or inactive stockpiles.Overall, Russia may possess as many as 16,000 intact nuclear weapons.

To support this arsenal, Russia maintains a massive nuclear complex thatconsists of ten formerly secret nuclear cities that house hundreds of metric tonsof weapons-usable nuclear materials and hundreds of thousands of trained sci-entists and engineers with weapons-related knowledge. Russia is in the processof dramatically reducing the size of its nuclear arsenal and weapons complexowing to changed international security conditions, the negotiation of armscontrol agreements with the United States, and the retirement of older systemsthat are reaching the end of their service lives. If current trends continue, Russiamay only deploy 1,989 strategic nuclear weapons by the end of the decade, al-though it could maintain a substantially larger nuclear arsenal given adequateresources.1

The Soviet Union conducted 715 nuclear weapons tests, the first on August29, 1949, and the last on October 23, 1990. Russia has not conducted any testssince the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia has signed and ratified the Compre-hensive Test Ban Treaty.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has provided approximately$10.3 billion to assist the states of the former Soviet Union to secure nuclearweapons and materials; eliminate aging nuclear weapon delivery systems; andfind alternative, benign employment for its nuclear workforce, in addition towork on the former Soviet chemical and biological weapons complex.2 Despitethese efforts, Russia’s nuclear complex continues to pose a serious proliferationrisk, and much more remains to be done to adequately secure Russian nuclearmaterials and expertise. A failure to effectively address the proliferation chal-lenges in Russia could result in the spread of nuclear, biological, or chemicalweapons to other countries or subnational groups.

CHAPTER 6

Russia

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Declared Nuclear Weapon States122

Aircraft and Missile Capabilities

As of the spring of 2005, Russia deployed 777 land- and submarine-based stra-tegic ballistic missiles with intercontinental range, in addition to 78 strategicnuclear-capable bombers.3 Most of the major strategic ballistic missile produc-tion facilities of the former Soviet Union were located outside Russian territory,largely in Ukraine. Russia continues to possess an advanced and accomplished,albeit currently depressed, missile design and production infrastructure.

Many of Russia’s currently deployed strategic missiles are reaching the end oftheir service lives and are being retired, with the direct assistance of the UnitedStates under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program (also called theNunn-Lugar Program, after its original congressional sponsors). Russia contin-ues to produce limited numbers of its new SS-27 land-based intercontinentalballistic missile (ICBM) (40 were deployed as of the spring of 2005). It alsoseeks to test and develop a new submarine-launched ballistic missile, the Bulava(SS-N-27), for deployment on its next-generation strategic submarine, also un-der construction.4

As with Russia’s nuclear complex, the combination of Russia’s extensive mis-sile expertise with the economic hardships of its missile experts have raised con-cerns that, driven by economic necessity and profit motive, Russian equipmentand technology may be finding their way into the missile programs of othercountries. It appears that Russia may have had some limited missile-related con-tacts with Iraq before March 2003, in violation of U.N. sanctions, although thiscooperation was limited to surface-to-air missiles and does not appear to haveextended to ballistic missiles.5 The United States has levied sanctions againstmore than a dozen Russian groups for such cooperation since 1998. Russiangovernment officials deny that any assistance is being provided to the militarymissile programs of either India or Iran, and Moscow has taken significant stepsto improve its export controls over missile-related technology.6

Biological and Chemical Weapons Capability

The Soviet Union had vast offensive chemical weapons (CW) and biologicalweapons (BW) programs. Today, Russia is a state party to both the BiologicalWeapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, Rus-sia continues to possess almost 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, a mas-sive stock of BW samples, and a latent BW production capability. The SovietBW program reportedly weaponized plague, anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, bru-cellosis, and the Marburg virus and developed other possible agents.7 Russiainherited the vast majority of the Soviet Union’s chemical and biological weap-ons stocks and facilities and is responsible for the elimination of the weaponsand stocks in its possession. Russia faces significant problems in complying withits commitments to eliminate these weapons, despite extensive international as-sistance, and it is likely to retain a considerable chemical and biological weapons

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stockpile for many years to come. In the meantime, there is much concern overthe security of these materials as well as over the experts who are responsible fortheir production. The risk that chemical or biological weapons or critical pro-duction technology might leak out of Russia to proliferant states or terroristgroups remains high and will require a continued investment (domestic andinternational) to ensure that the Soviet chemical and biological weapons legacydoes not lead to further proliferation.

Nuclear Analysis

During the Cold War, the potential, deliberate use of Soviet nuclear weaponsposed the main security threat to the United States. In the aftermath of the ColdWar, concern over Russia’s nuclear arsenal shifted to a new set of concerns. Thesedangers included several risks:

• Nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine might notreturn to Russian control.

• Russia might lose control of nuclear weapons (especially tactical nuclear weap-ons) in its inventory.

• Russian nuclear materials and expertise might be bought or stolen and thusassist the efforts of countries or terrorist groups in developing nuclear weap-ons.

Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn summed up the risk when he said:

The old threats we faced during the Cold War, a Soviet strike or an invasion ofEurope, were threats made dangerous by Soviet strength. The new threats weface today—increased Russian reliance on early launch and first use and in-creased reliance on tactical-battlefield nuclear weapons—are threats made dan-gerous by Russia’s weakness. The threats of today go beyond nuclear forces andinclude terrorist groups. Much of Russia’s nuclear, biological, and chemicalweapons and materials are poorly secured; its weapons scientists and guards arepoorly paid. We can’t risk a world where a Russian scientist can take care of hischildren only by endangering ours.8

Those weapons deployed outside Russia when the Soviet Union dissolvedhave all been returned to Russia. The return of the nuclear weapons deployed inBelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was a tremendous achievement in interna-tional efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The creation ofthree new nuclear weapon states out of the Soviet Union would have been analmost certain fatal blow to international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclearweapons (see chapter 18).

Strategic Weapons

Russia possesses a large, diverse, and advanced arsenal of strategic and tacticalnuclear weapons. These weapons serve as the ultimate guarantor for Russian


national security. Some elements of Russia’s nuclear forces have taken on anenhanced role in Russian security as its conventional military strength has fal-tered. Russia succeeded the Soviet Union as a nuclear weapon state and has as-sumed its legal obligations under arms control agreements, including the NPT,START I, and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

Despite its continued importance to Russian security, the country’s nucleararsenal is shrinking. As the majority of Moscow’s strategic weapons reach theend of their service lives and are being retired, many suffer from a lack of main-tenance funds, raising questions about their long-term reliability and safety. Not-withstanding these concerns, the Russian nuclear arsenal remains formidable(see table 6.1; also see table 6.7 at the end of the chapter).

It is not yet clear to what level Russia’s strategic arsenal will drop by the endof the decade. On the basis of the most optimistic assumptions of Russia’s rela-tionship with the United States, the Russian deployed strategic arsenal coulddrop to just under 2,000 weapons by the end of 2010. However, Russia couldpotentially maintain as many as 2,800 weapons by the end of 2010 (table 6.2).

Intercontinental ballistic missiles have historically made up the largest com-ponent of the Russian strategic nuclear triad. Yet of the five types of ICBMs thatRussia deployed in 2005, only three (the SS-18, SS-19, and SS-27) are expectedto be in service by the end of the decade. The other two systems—the SS-24 (railand silo) and SS-25—are expected to reach the end of their serviceable lives by2010.9 It is also not yet clear how many of the new SS-27 land-based ICBMsRussia will produce and deploy. It has produced only limited numbers of thatsystem, although its production capability could theoretically reach as high as

Table 6.1. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces

Type START I Data,

September 1990 START I Data, January 20051

Launchers 1,064 611 ICBMs

Warheads 4,278 2,436

Launchers 940 292 SLBMs


Launchers 79 78 Bombers

Warheads 570 624

Launchers 2,083 981 Totals


ABBREVIATIONS:

START I = Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty; ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles; SLBMs = submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

1START I Memorandum of Understanding Data Exchange, U.S. Department of State, April 1, 2005. Information contained in the April 2005 data exchange is for forces accountable as of January 31, 2005.

ABBREVIATIONS

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Table 6.2. Projection of Russian Nuclear Forces

Type

2010 Lower Limit (Launchers/ Warheads)

2010 Upper Limit (Launchers/Warheads)

ICBMs SS-181 50/500 50/500 SS-19 30/180 30/1802

SS-24 0/0 0/0 SS-25 0/0 0/0 SS-27 59/593 70/4204

SLBMs Delta III/SS-N-18 0/0 96/2885

Typhoon/SS-N-20 0/0 0/0 Delta IV/SS-N-23

(Sineva)6 96/384 96/384 Borey/SS-N-27

(Bulava)7 0/0 24/144 Bombers8 Bear

Tu-95 H-6 Tu-95 H-16

27/162 32/512

32/192 32/512

Blackjack (Tu-160) 16/192 16/192

Total 230/1,989 364/2,812

ABBREVIATIONS:ICBMs = intercontinental ballistic missiles; SLBMs = submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

NOTES:1. Russia currently deploys 100 SS-18 ICBMs. The older variant is expected to be withdrawn

from service in the next few years, while the newer variant is undergoing a life extension program that will allow it to remain in service until approximately 2015 or 2020.

2. It is theoretically possible that Russia, which currently deploys 130 SS-19 ICBMs, could extend the lives of these systems again (they have already been extended to 25 years), but it is much more probable that Moscow will simply retire its older SS-19s, replacing them with the 30 that it purchased from Ukraine in 2003. See www.cdi.org/russia/267-5.cfm.

3. Russia currently only has plans to purchase 4 SS-27 ICBMs in 2005, which would give Moscow a total of 44 deployed at the end of this year; experts estimate Russia’s production capability to range from 3 to 9 missiles per year. In a December 2004 interview, Strategic Missile Troops Commander Nikolay Solovtsov stated that Russia could add one regiment of SS-27s every two years (or roughly 5 missiles per year). The lower-limit calculation reflects the assumption that Russia will produce and deploy 3 missiles per year from 2006 to 2010, while the upper-limit calculation reflects the assumption that Russia will produce and deploy 5 missiles each year from 2006 to 2010.

4. This assumes that each SS-27 could be MIRVed with up to six warheads. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2005, pp. 70–72.

5. This assumes that all six Delta III nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) could remain in service if necessary. See Norris and Kristensen, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook,” pp. 70–72.

6. This estimate assumes that six Delta IV SSBNs will be deployed. 7. The lower limit assumes that no Borey class SSBNs will be deployed by 2010, while the

upper limit assumes that two will be deployed by that year. 8. The lower-limit numbers depend on how many strategic bombers are converted to

conventional roles. Experts speculate that some bombers will retain purely nuclear roles, while others will have the capability to carry out either nuclear or conventional missions.

NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS


50 a year with adequate funding. High-end projections suggest that Russia willhave just 70 SS-27s by the end of the decade (see table 6.2).

The Russian submarine force is also in a serious state of decline. The bulk ofits submarine force is slated for elimination by the end of the decade, and it islikely that Russia will deploy only eight submarines (six Delta IVs, with a sev-enth for testing purposes, plus one Borey-class submarine) by 2010.10 The sixDelta III submarines in the current arsenal are slated for retirement by the endof the decade, though it is possible that some could be retained if necessary.There are three Typhoon submarines in the current arsenal, but the missile theyare equipped to carry, the SS-N-20, is nearing the end of its service life. One ofthe Typhoon subs, the Dmitri Donskoi, serves as a test bed for Russia’s not-yet-deployed, next-generation submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the SS-N-27.11 It is possible that some submarine launchers will remain operational inport if sufficient funds are not available for seagoing operations.

Russia is pursuing work on the next generation of strategic ballistic missilesubmarines, known as the Borey class. Construction began on the first boat ofthis class, the Yuri Dolgoruki, in 1996. It may be deployed by 2006. Construc-tion of the second and third boats is under way, and both could enter service by2012.12

The Russian bomber force is likely to remain the most stable component ofthe Russian strategic triad during the next ten years, although it too will declinein numbers as aging systems are retired. The two main bomber types in theRussian military are the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95 Bear.

STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND REDUCTIONS. On July 31, 1991, the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty inMoscow. START I was the first arms control agreement to actually reduce thelevels of deployed strategic weapons; previous agreements had served to cap thegrowth of existing arsenals. Under START I, the United States and Russia re-duced their strategic accountable nuclear forces to 6,000 warheads each, deployedon no more than 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles—that is, ICBMs,SLBMs, and strategic bombers. The sublimits for warheads allow no more than4,900 weapons to be deployed on either side’s ICBMs and SLBMs and, of thissubtotal, no more than 1,100 warheads may be deployed on mobile ICBMs. Inaddition, no more than 1,540 warheads may be deployed on heavy ICBMs.13

The two countries completed their implementation of the agreement in Decem-ber 2001, on schedule.

The entry into force of START I was substantially delayed because many ofthe systems covered by the treaty were physically deployed in non-Russian re-publics when the USSR fell. To address this dramatic development, the coun-tries involved agreed that Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine would alsoneed to ratify the agreement before the treaty would take effect. Upon the col-lapse of the Soviet state, Russia was almost immediately recognized by the inter-national community as the main nuclear successor state of the Soviet Union, butobtaining agreement from the other three states required intensive diplomatic

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and strategic maneuvering by the United States, Russia, and the other countriesinvolved. The result was the negotiation of the Lisbon Protocol to the START Iagreement, signed on May 23, 1992, by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.Through the protocol, the four states agreed to participate jointly in START I assuccessors of the former Soviet Union and to “implement the Treaty’s limits andrestrictions” (article 2 of the protocol). In addition, Belarus, Kazakhstan, andUkraine agreed to “adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons” as non-nuclear weapon state parties “in the shortest possible time”(article 5 of the protocol). In separate letters to President George H. W. Bush,each of the three presidents of the state parties also agreed to the elimination ofall strategic nuclear arms on their territories within the seven-year START Iimplementation period.

In approving ratification on November 4, 1992, Russia’s Supreme Soviet stipu-lated that Russia not exchange instruments of ratification until after the otherthree successor states had acceded to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states andcarried out their other obligations under the Lisbon Protocol. The Belarusianparliament ratified START I on February 4, 1993, and Belarus formally accededto the NPT on July 22, 1993. Kazakhstan’s parliament ratified START I on July2, 1992, and Kazakhstan formally acceded to the NPT on February 14, 1994.Ukraine’s parliament approved START I and the NPT in two steps, on Novem-ber 18, 1993, and on February 3, 1994, and it deposited its accession to theNPT on December 5, 1994. All nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus, Kazakhstan,and Ukraine were returned to Russia by the end of 1996 (see chapter 18).

START II. At the June 1990 Washington Summit, Presidents George H. W.Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed that after the signing of START I, thetwo sides would begin new talks on further reductions at the earliest practicaldate. Those talks began in September 1991. At a subsequent summit in June1992, Presidents Bush and Boris Yeltsin agreed on the basic principles of whatwas known as START II, including a ban on multiple independently targetablereentry vehicle (MIRV) land-based ICBMs. This was a significant develop-ment for two reasons. First, MIRVed ICBMs have been considered “destabiliz-ing” weapons, posing an attractive target for a disarming first strike. Second,the majority of Russian nuclear arsenals were based on MIRVed ICBMs. Bushand Yeltsin signed the finalized START II agreement in Moscow on January 3,1993.

START II, had it ever entered into force, would have capped the number ofdeployed strategic warheads in both countries at 3,500 and resulted in the elimi-nation of all land-based MIRVed ICBMs by January 1, 2003. The U.S. Senateratified START II on January 26, 1996. After more than six years’ delay, theRussian Duma ratified the agreement on April 14, 2000.

The Russian ratification included an important caveat, however, requiringthe U.S. Senate to approve protocols to the 1972 Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM)Treaty before START II would enter into force. When the George W. Bushadministration chose to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on June 13, 2002,


Moscow responded by declaring that it would no longer be bound by the limitsagreed upon under START II, effectively killing the treaty.14

START III. At their March 20–21, 1997, Helsinki Summit, Presidents Yeltsin andBill Clinton agreed to begin negotiations on a START III agreement immedi-ately after START II entered into force and identified certain parameters for thenew treaty. First, they agreed that the pact would limit deployed strategic forceson both sides to between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads by the end of 2007. Sec-ond, they agreed that START III would be the first strategic arms control agree-ment to include measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warheadinventories and the actual destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. In addition,they pledged to explore measures for long-range nuclear sea-launched cruisemissiles and tactical nuclear systems. These discussions were to take place apartfrom, but in the context of, START III negotiations.15

Despite several years of informal discussions between U.S. and Russian offi-cials on issues to be addressed in the START III process, no negotiations evertook place and no agreement was ever produced.

THE TREATY OF MOSCOW (SORT). During his November 2001 summit withPresident Vladimir Putin, President George W. Bush announced that the UnitedStates would reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200operationally deployed nuclear weapons over the next ten years. Bush had previ-ously announced that this would be the level of U.S. nuclear forces. Although in2000 Putin had declared his interest in reducing the Russian nuclear arsenal to1,500 or fewer weapons, he did not announce a formal Russian target for reduc-tions. In a joint press conference with Bush after their summit meeting, Putindid express his interest in having the reductions made part of a formal treaty:“For our part, [Russia is] prepared to present all our agreements in a treaty form,including the issues of verification and control.”16

This agreement, now known as the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty(SORT), was signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002. The United States had pre-viously resisted having the reductions codified in any legal agreement, but itfinally accepted the Russian request to do so. The U.S. Senate ratified the pact inMarch 2003, and the Russian Duma followed suit in May 2003. The agreementcapped the number of each side’s strategic, offensively deployed, nuclear war-heads at between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012.

SORT is a significant departure from past arms control treaties. It is just twopages long, compared with the much lengthier and more detailed START agree-ments. It abandons the START II pledge to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs, andits elimination and verification measures are much weaker than those under theSTART agreement. Whereas START I and START II called for the total, verifi-able elimination of all delivery systems that were subject to strategic reductions,SORT only requires that these systems, and their corresponding warheads, notbe deployed.17 Nor does SORT follow up on the ambitious START III agenda,which considered including controls on warheads, long-range nuclear-capablecruise missiles, and tactical nuclear weapons.

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THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY. U.S. and Russian nucleardeployments are also partly controlled by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear ForcesTreaty (INF Treaty) signed by Presidents Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan onDecember 8, 1987. The INF Treaty required both countries to eliminate allnuclear-capable ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles in their arsenalswith a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers no later than June 1, 1991(three years after the agreement entered into force).18 The INF Treaty is the onlypact to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. Its implementation resulted,by May 1991, in the verified destruction of 846 long- and short-range U.S. INFmissile systems and of 1,846 Soviet missile systems.19 Under the terms of theagreement, implementation was completed on May 31, 2001, and the two gov-ernments announced that they would no longer need to verify the completeelimination of weapons systems covered under the agreement.

Tactical Weapons

Much less is known about the size, composition, and deployment of the Russianarsenal of tactical nuclear weapons (table 6.3). At one point during the ColdWar, Russia is believed to have possessed about 30,000 tactical weapons.20

Table 6.3. Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles

Tactical Weapon Type

Totals in 19911

Total to Remain under 1991 Bush–Gorbachev Agreements

Total Tactical Nuclear Weapon

Stockpiles 20042

Deployed Tactical Nuclear

Weapons, 20053

Land-based missiles

4,000 0 0 0

Artillery 2,000 0 0 0

Mines 700 0 0 0

Air defense 3,000 1,500 1,500 1,200

Air force 7,000 3,500 3,500 1,540

Navy 5,000 3,000 3,000 640

Total4 21,700 8,000 8,000 3,400

NOTES:1. Alexei Arbatov, ed., Yadernye Vooruzheniya Rossii (Moscow: IMEMO, 1997), p. 56. 2. Gunnar Arbman and Charles Thornton. Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Stockholm:

Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2003), p. 17. 3. See William M. Arkin and Hans M. Kristensen, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2002,”

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2002, pp. 71–73. The authors note in subsequent notebooks (2003, 2004, 2005) that their estimates on tactical nuclear weapons remain unchanged since 2002.

4. All totals are approximations.

NOTES


Russia has substantially reduced its stocks of tactical weapons, and informedestimates suggest that Russia has between 3,400 and 8,000 of these weapons.21

In October 1991, President Gorbachev responded to President George H. W.Bush’s September initiative to dramatically reduce the deployment of tacticalnuclear weapons. Gorbachev matched Bush by announcing a plan that wouldeliminate all Soviet nuclear artillery, short-range missile, and land-mine war-heads; remove all nuclear weapons for air defense missiles from deployment ar-eas (for storage or elimination); and remove tactical nuclear weapons from navyforces (ships, submarines, and land-based aircraft). In 1992, Russian presidentYeltsin went further, announcing an end to the production of warheads for land-based tactical missiles, artillery, and land mines, as well as the decision to elimi-nate the stockpiles of those weapons. He also announced that Russia would elimi-nate one-third of its tactical sea-launched nuclear warheads, half of its tacticalair-launched nuclear weapons, and half of its nuclear warheads for antiaircraftmissiles.22

Russian tactical nuclear weapons deployed in non-Russian republics were re-turned to Russia in early 1992, and tactical weapons elimination is believed tohave continued through the beginning of the new century. There are no formalverification procedures in place or associated with the initiatives, however, toensure that the systems were in fact removed and destroyed. This uncertaintywas reinforced in January 2001, when the Washington Times reported that Russiawas transferring tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad Oblast, which is anisolated enclave of Russian territory between Poland and Lithuania. Russia de-nied the claim, but in the absence of a formal inspection or other verificationprocedure, the truth of the allegations cannot be either confirmed or discounted.23

Uncertainty about the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons has lingered, par-ticularly with the general decline of Russia’s conventional military forces. Withthat decline, tactical nuclear weapons have taken on greater importance in Rus-sian security planning. This raises questions about whether Moscow will con-tinue to eliminate these weapons. In late 2003, a high-ranking Russian generalreaffirmed these concerns, saying that Russia would “hold onto its stockpiles” oftactical nuclear weapons.24 In fact, it is likely that Russia is at least consideringthe development and deployment of new types of these weapons.25 In October2004, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control, Stephen G. Rademaker,stated that Washington remains concerned that Russian commitments on tacti-cal weapons in Europe have not been fulfilled.26

“Loose” Nuclear Weapons and Materials

There has been great concern that the security of Russia’s nuclear complex sincethe collapse of the Soviet Union made the possible theft or unauthorized use ofa Russian nuclear weapon a very real threat. As a result, the U.S. Congress startedseveral programs to assist Russia in ensuring the security of its nuclear arsenal.U.S. assistance has been critical to improving the security of both nuclear weap-ons and nonweaponized nuclear materials in Russia and in other former Soviet

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states. Nuclear weapons generally enjoy a greater level of security than do Rus-sian nonweaponized nuclear materials (highly enriched uranium and separatedplutonium). Although Russia has never disclosed the total number of sites wherenuclear weapons and materials are stored, as of the spring of 2005, the U.S.Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Energy had identified atleast 91 warhead storage sites27 and 40 fissile material storage sites.28

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY. U.S.-funded programs have helped to secure thetransport of Russian nuclear warheads and to develop a modern warhead ac-counting and tracking system. The program demonstrates an unprecedented levelof cooperation between two former Cold War adversaries as well as their abilityto cooperate in addressing common security threats.

Initial Russian weapons security programs, collectively known as Coopera-tive Threat Reduction (CTR), focused on helping to protect nuclear warheadsduring transit, especially those coming from the former Soviet republics to Rus-sia. The programs also assisted with emergency planning and response in theevent of an accident. For this purpose, the United States provided Russia with4,000 Kevlar blankets, 150 supercontainers (used to carry several warheads at atime) for the physical and ballistic protection of nuclear weapons, and 117 spe-cial railcar conversion kits (100 cargo, 15 guard, and 2 prototypes) to ensure thesecurity of warheads. In addition, the CTR programs have also provided Russiawith five mobile emergency response complexes to deal with accidents. (An ad-ditional 150 supercontainers were provided by the United Kingdom in May 1997.)The railcars themselves were produced in Russia using U.S. funds and some U.S.materials; the rest of the equipment was produced in the United States. This pro-gram continues, and on November 1, 1999, the U.S. Department of Defense andthe Russian Ministry of Defense signed a new memorandum for $41.7 million inadditional assistance to purchase security systems for railcars. The program’s aimshave now shifted to the replacement of railcars that are nearing the end of theirservice lives.29

Soviet-era warhead accounting and management relied upon the manual (hand-written) tracking of its nuclear arsenal. Through the U.S. CTR program, a newautomated system of tracking and accounting is being implemented in Russia.Under the program, the United States has provided Russia with 100 personalcomputers, as well as software and training. It is also identifying additional needs,including site preparation for the installation of permanent communicationequipment. The program has certified hardware and software for the trackingsystem at nineteen key field and regional sites. A demonstration facility, the Se-curity Assessment and Training Center, was completed in 2003, and installationhas begun at additional sites. The program is scheduled to be completed in 2005.30

With shipments beginning in 1997, the U.S. Department of Defense CTRprogram transferred 123 “quick-fix” sets to the Russian Ministry of Defense forupgrading security at weapons storage sites. In 2002, however, the ministry in-dicated that it has installed only one-third of the fencing sets at 52 locations.31

The ministry planned to install all the upgrades, but it then asked the UnitedStates for additional funding assistance. Disputes over U.S. access to Russian


weapons sites have seriously stalled the upgrades. As of the spring of 2005, ap-proximately half of the total 123 quick-fix sets had been installed.32 At the sametime, the U.S. Department of Energy has been working successfully to improvesecurity at Russian navy sites that contain nuclear weapons. The project startedin 1999, and the Energy Department expects to complete security upgrades atall 39 navy sites in 2006.33

NUCLEAR MATERIALS SECURITY. Even if Russia were to eliminate its nuclear weap-ons, the country’s vast holdings of nonweaponized nuclear materials will remaina major proliferation concern for decades to come.

President Bush and President Putin have acknowledged this concern on anumber of occasions. In a joint statement from November 2001, the two presi-dents said, “Both sides agree that urgent attention must continue to be given toimproving the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials of allpossessor states, and preventing illicit nuclear trafficking.”34 President Bush statedin February 2004 that the countries of the world must do all they can to protectnuclear materials.35

Russia has the world’s largest stocks of weapons-grade and weapons-usablenuclear materials: highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium. Much ofthis material is not adequately protected against theft or diversion. A U.S. De-partment of Energy advisory group, chaired by the former Senate majority leader,Howard Baker, and the former White House counsel, Lloyd Cutler, concludedin 2000: “The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United Statestoday is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable mate-rial in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states andused against American troops abroad or citizens at home. This threat is a clearand present danger to the international community as well as to American livesand liberties.” Though some progress has been made since that time, many ex-perts believe this assessment is still correct.36

Reliable estimates of the total Russian nuclear material stockpile vary, butRussia is believed to have produced roughly between 180 and 185 tons of weap-ons-usable separated plutonium (civil and military) and close to 1,100 tons ofHEU.37 Of this material, approximately 600 to 700 metric tons are thought tobe in nuclear weapons. It is not possible to be absolutely certain of the actualamount of nuclear material that Russia has produced and holds because theirproduction cannot be fully accounted for even under the best circumstances (forexample, even the United States’ own nuclear production accounting system—considered vastly superior to the former Soviet system—has a margin of account-ing error of almost 1 percent for plutonium).38

Nuclear smuggling from Russian or former Soviet facilities continues to presentan acute proliferation risk, despite considerable efforts to improve the securityof “loose” Russian materials. The International Atomic Energy Agency has con-firmed that, from January 1993 to December 2003, seventeen cases of smugglednuclear-weapons-usable materials occurred, many originating in the former So-viet Union. For example, in 1994 and 1995, the Czech authorities recoveredsmall amounts of HEU that had likely originated in Obninsk, Russia. In 1999,

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Kyrgystani officials arrested two persons who were attempting to sell 1.5 gramsof plutonium.39 Hundreds of similar cases have been reported and investigatedduring the past decade.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTING. U.S. pro-grams, run primarily by the Department of Energy, work to enhance security inthe Russian nuclear complex. Initial security efforts covered more than two-thirdsof the total number of sites containing fissile material, and emphasized lockingdown the most vulnerable facilities. Even after ten years of effort, however, amajority of nonweaponized Russian nuclear materials are inadequately protected.By the end of 2004, only 26 percent of materials had received comprehensivesecurity upgrades.40

Current U.S. government projects plan to complete comprehensive safeguardsfor all civilian and military material sites by the end of 2008.41 Experts, however,believe that such a timetable may be unrealistic, for two reasons. First, Moscowand Washington still have unresolved issues regarding American access to Rus-sian military sites. Consequently, much more has been done to install upgradesat civilian sites than at military sites. Upgrades at the civilian facilities had beennearly completed by the end of 2004, while a relatively small number of militarysites, which hold about 83 percent of Russia’s fissile material, lagged far behind.42

Second, the Department of Energy’s current plans anticipate that 50 percentof the material will be secured in 2007 and 2008, the last two years of the pro-gram, even though it will have taken the first twelve years of the program tosecure the first 50 percent. If the rate of comprehensive upgrades remains thesame as it was in fiscal year (FY) 2003, then the program will not be completeduntil 2013.43 Even this final level of protection, however, will be below the ac-cepted international standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials.No plans currently exist to provide Russia with the resources needed to reachthis level of physical security and accounting.

The U.S. Congress has broadly supported the Material Protection, Control,and Accounting Program (MPC&A), funding the program at the annual levelrequested by the Clinton administration. Despite statements of support fromthe George W. Bush campaign and then administration, its first budget requestreduced funding for Russian nuclear material security from a little more than$170 million in 2001 to $138 million in 2002. Additional cuts in Russian non-proliferation programs, including the disposition of nuclear materials and braindrain programs (see below), totaled more than $100 million from the previousyear’s budget. Congressional action on the FY 2002 budget restored funding fornuclear security upgrades to 2001 levels.

After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress passed two supple-mental appropriations for MPC&A, increasing total 2002 funding to $267million. Budgets in the following years contained $194 million (FY 2003), $212million (FY 2004), and $275 million (FY 2005) (see table 6.4). The Bushadministration’s request for FY 2006 was $246 million.44

In addition to protecting nuclear materials in place, the United States alsofunded the construction of a large nuclear material storage facility in Russia to


securely store nuclear materials released from dismantled nuclear weapons. TheFissile Material Storage Facility in Mayak was originally planned to have twowings, with each holding 25,000 canisters of nuclear material (50 tons of pluto-nium and 200 tons of HEU). The first wing was completed in December 2003,but Russia announced that it planned to store only 25 tons of plutonium and noHEU in the facility. No written agreement between the United States and Russiarequires Moscow to store any material at Mayak, and the two states have been atodds over the need to amend agreements to include storage obligations. Addi-tionally, the two sides have not agreed on transparency measures to verify theorigin of the nuclear materials to be stored at the facility. Though they havemade progress on resolving some transparency issues, disputes over measuringtotal mass of material remain a significant hurdle.45 There are no current plansto construct the second wing.

Even the best long-term storage and security of nuclear materials cannot elimi-nate the proliferation risks associated with these huge stocks. The continuedpossession of large stocks of excess nuclear materials is a recognized “clear andpresent danger.”46 The disposal of those materials no longer required for defensepurposes is vital to reduce the risk that these materials might again be used toproduce nuclear weapons in Russia or in other states or by subnational groups. Tothis end, the United States and Russia have been cooperating on two importantprograms: the HEU purchase agreement and the plutonium disposition program.

The Purchase of Highly Enriched Uranium

On February 18, 1993, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the UnitedStates would purchase 500 metric tons of Russia’s HEU from dismantled

Table 6.4. Funding for Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (millions of dollars)1

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2.7 3.4 10.2 85.0 112.6 137.0 139.8

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 138.7 169.5 266.62 193.9 212.1 275.5 245.53

SOURCES:

Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget Database: FY 1992–FY 2006,” available at www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.asp

NOTES:1. The budgets for fiscal years 1993 to 2000 were submitted by the Bill Clinton

administration. The budgets for fiscal years 2001 to 2006 were submitted by the George W. Bush administration.

2. This figure includes funding provided by supplemental appropriation passed by Congress in fiscal year 2002 in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

3. This is the level of funding proposed by the Bush administration in February 2005. The actual appropriation will not be made until the fall of 2005.

NOTES

SOURCE

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Russian nuclear weapons.47 The program reduces the risk of the theft of Russiannuclear material and speeds the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons byfreeing storage space for released nuclear materials. Under the program, Russiadilutes, or “downblends,” weapons-grade HEU into low-enriched uranium, whichcannot be used directly in nuclear weapons. This process takes place under in-trusive monitoring arrangements. Russia then ships the material to the UnitedStates for fabrication into fuel for nuclear power reactors. The entire program isdesigned to take place over 20 years and was originally expected to pay Russia$12 billion for the material and services. The agreement has since been renego-tiated. Russia will now be paid according to market forces, which will be lessthan the original payment envisioned.48

Executing agents appointed by the two governments carry out the pact. TheU.S. executive agent is the privatized United States Enrichment Corporation(USEC), and the Russian executive agent is Techsnabexport (Tenex), the com-mercial arm of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosaton formerlyMinatom). As of the spring of 2005, the United States (through USEC) hadpurchased the equivalent of 237 metric tons of HEU (6,974 metric tons of low-enriched uranium fuel) from Russia (enough material to produce 9,482 nuclearweapons), for which Russia received over $3.5 billion.49

Russia may have hundreds of additional metric tons of HEU not covered bythis purchase agreement, much of which could eventually become excess toRussian military needs. Numerous nongovernmental experts have called for anexpansion of the HEU agreement to include the purchase of larger amounts ofHEU. The economic considerations of such a move are complicated by the factthat the private USEC lacks a financial incentive to expand its purchases. Thisconflict between national security and financial considerations is a major pointof contention between experts and government officials. There are no firm offi-cial plans to expand the scope of the purchase agreement, although the issue isreportedly under review by the Bush administration.

Plutonium Disposition

The United States and Russia have both declared large amounts of former de-fense-purpose plutonium to be excess to defense needs. On March 1, 1995, Presi-dent Clinton designated 50 metric tons of plutonium as excess,50 and Boris Yeltsindeclared that “up to” 50 metric tons of plutonium would be made excess throughthe nuclear disarmament process in 1997.51 Collectively, this material is enoughto produce 25,000 nuclear warheads, and both countries have pledged to takesteps to ensure that the material is never again used for weapons.

These amounts represent significant portions of the plutonium produced inboth countries. However, both countries will have large stocks of weapons-usable materials even after these amounts are dispositioned.

At the June 2000 summit in Moscow, the United States and Russia agreed todispose of 34 metric tons each of their excess weapons plutonium. Under theagreement, the two approved methods for the disposal of this material werethe irradiation of plutonium in a nuclear reactor and the immobilization of


plutonium with high-level radioactive waste (in either glass or ceramic form).The agreement called on both countries to “seek to” begin the operation of “in-dustrial-scale” facilities no later than December 2007, at a disposal rate of 2metric tons of plutonium per year.52

There are several major problems looming over the implementation of theagreement, however. These include technical and political challenges to the U.S.program and a lack of financing for the Russian disposition effort. The Bushadministration has decided to abandon immobilization and to pursue only reac-tor-based irradiation of this material.53 The biggest remaining problem is a li-ability dispute, which has delayed the beginning of construction of special mixed-oxide fuel facilities in each country by at least ten months. It appears unlikelythat either side will begin disposing of significant amounts plutonium by the2007 deadline.

Russia has also stated that it does not possess the funds required to carry outthe disposition alone and would simply store the material if international sup-port were unavailable. Since the program was first funded in FY 1996, the UnitedStates has appropriated approximately $494 million for this effort.54 Estimatesnow suggest that the entire Russian disposition program, including the con-struction and operation of facilities, could cost $2 billion.55 Moreover, for theprogram to succeed, efforts to dispose of U.S. plutonium must also be suffi-ciently funded because Russia would be unwilling to dispose of its excess pluto-nium unless the United States does so as well. The 2005 budget sets fundinglevels for Russian disposition at $73 million, and U.S. disposition efforts at $464million.56

Furthermore, both countries are hoping that third parties can assist in thisessential nonproliferation endeavor. The U.S.–Russian agreement completed atthe June 2000 summit in Moscow “recognizes the need for international financ-ing and assistance” in order for Russia to implement its plutonium dispositionplans.57 The July 2000, Group of Eight (G-8) summit in Okinawa called uponthe G-8 to develop an international financing plan by the 2001 meeting thatwas held in Genoa. Although this deadline was not met, by the spring of 2005,Canada, the European Union, France, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, and theUnited Kingdom, in addition to the United States, had pledged $981 millionfor Russian plutonium disposition as part of the “G8 Global Partnership Againstthe Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” an initiative launchedin 2002.58 These pledges are signs of progress, but still only amount to 50 per-cent of the anticipated cost of the program.

Nuclear Expertise

The breakup of the Soviet Union and prolonged economic strain in Russia alsopose serious nonproliferation risks in the form of Russian nuclear weapons ex-pertise and technical know-how. International efforts to prevent the prolifera-tion of nuclear weapons have focused not only on trying to protect Russiannuclear materials but also on preventing Russian nuclear experts from sellingtheir skills to would-be nuclear weapon states and organizations.

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Russia’s nuclear complex is filled with tens of thousands of scientists, engi-neers, and technicians who are responsible for the construction, maintenance,and dismantlement of Russia’s nuclear weapons. Counts vary, but there are ap-proximately 35,000 excess weapons scientists and workers in the Russian nuclearcomplex, many of whom have direct access to weapons-usable nuclear materi-als.59

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the employees of Russia’s nuclear com-plex fell on hard times. Formerly the privileged inhabitants of Russia’s nuclearcities, after the Soviet collapse, these nuclear elite found themselves in geographi-cally remote locations with rapidly dropping living standards and diminishingwork orders from the central government.

Collectively referred to as a brain drain, the risk that Russian nuclear expertsmight be forced by economic deprivation to sell their expertise or materials onhand rapidly changed the dynamics of Russian and U.S. security considerations.A 2002 National Intelligence Council study indicated that economic improve-ments in Russia would mitigate the problem slightly, but it also noted that offic-ers responsible for warhead storage and maintenance receive wages that “rarelyexceed $70 a month.”60 A 2003 survey of Russian scientists with weapons exper-tise found that 20 percent of respondents would consider working in NorthKorea, Syria, Iran, or Iraq.61

Both the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Energy areinvolved in efforts to help prevent the brain drain. These efforts consist of projectsdesigned to provide grants for civilian research to scientists and institutions for-merly involved in weapons development, as well as to help in the conversion andcommercialization of former defense industries. The three principal programsin this area are the International Science and Technology Centers (ISTCs), theInitiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), and the Nuclear Cities Initiative(NCI). In 2002, IPP and NCI were combined under the Russian TransitionInitiative. In 2005, these efforts were extended to countries such as Iraq andLibya under the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention.

Science Centers

The State Department manages U.S. participation in both the ISTC in Moscowand the Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU). These centers aremultilateral organizations designed to prevent the spread of weapons of massdestruction and missile technology expertise by providing civilian employmentopportunities to former weapons scientists and engineers in the newly indepen-dent states (NIS) of the former USSR.

The ISTC was founded in Moscow in 1992. Its current members include theEuropean Union, Canada, Japan, Norway, South Korea, and the United Statesas donors. Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia,and Tajikstan are recipient countries.62 To ensure the full participation of all NISmember states, branch offices of the ISTC have been established in Almaty,Kazakhstan; Yerevan, Armenia; Minsk, Belarus; Tbilisi, Georgia; and Bishkek,Kyrgyz Republic.63 In July 1995 the STCU, a separate but parallel organization,


commenced operations in Kyiv, Ukraine. Currently, under the STCU auspices,Canada, the European Union, and the United States fund projects in Ukraine,Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan.64 In addition to its headquarters in Kyiv,the STCU also has field offices in the Ukrainian cities of Dnipropetrivsk, Kharkiv,and Lviv, as well as in Baku, Azerbaijan; Tbilisi, Georgia; and Tashkent,Uzbekistan.65

Since its inception, the ISTC has funded 2,000 projects valued at a total of$600 million. A total of 58,000 specialists at more than 765 institutions havereceived grants from ISTC, making it less likely that they will need to sell theirservices to would-be proliferators.66

The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention and the Nuclear Cities Initiative

The U.S. Department of Energy manages and funds IPP and NCI. The Bushadministration, however, announced in December 2001 that the programs wouldbe merged into one, “and restructured to focus more effectively on projects tohelp Russia reduce its nuclear warhead complex.”67 Like the Science Centers, theIPP program aims to provide productive nonmilitary projects for former NISweapons scientists and engineers. IPP seeks to promote the conversion of NISdefense industries to civilian production through the commercialization of tech-nologies and the development of links between NIS institutes and U.S. indus-trial partners. Thus far, 22 projects have been commercialized, generatingcombined revenue of $24 million.68 Unlike the ISTC and the STCU, IPP isexclusively a U.S.-NIS program and does not involve additional internationalpartners. Since its inception, the IPP program has funded projects involvingnearly 16,000 former Soviet weapons scientists at 180 institutes.69

In 1998, the U.S. Department of Energy launched NCI, designed to assistRussia in the development of non-defense-related industries in Russia’s ten“closed” nuclear cities. Those cities, which are geographically isolated, are hometo hundreds of thousands of skilled scientists, engineers, and technicians andhundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials. As noted before,the desperate financial situation of nuclear scientists and technicians in the So-viet Union’s remote nuclear complex has sparked proliferation fears, and theNCI aims to develop paths to peaceful employment. In addition, the NCI pro-gram was designed to assist in downsizing the complex, which would reduceRussia’s ability to reconstitute its Cold War nuclear arsenal rapidly, therebystrengthening strategic stability.

The NCI agreement was signed by U.S. Secretary of Energy Bill Richardsonand Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov on September 22, 1998.The original concept was developed by the U.S. government in cooperation withan initiative from several nongovernmental organizations. According to the agree-ment, the initiative aims to “create a framework . . . that will provide new jobsfor workers displaced from enterprises of the nuclear complex.”70 The U.S.Department of Energy and Minatom agreed to focus initial activities at three ofthe ten Russian nuclear cities: Sarov (Arzamas-16), Snezinsk (Chelyabinsk-70),and Zheleznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26). Minatom closed the Avangard weapons

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facility at Arzamas-16 in 2003, with NCI contributing to the conversion of 40percent of the facility to nonweapons uses. In addition, Minatom has stated itsintention to cease weapon-related activities at Penza-19 by 2008.71 In September2003, however, the NCI agreement was allowed to expire when Washington andMoscow could not work out a liability agreement that, from the United States’perspective, would sufficiently protect U.S. officials and workers. Three daysbefore the expiration of the agreement, the United States and Russia signed aprotocol that allowed the 69 ongoing NCI projects to be completed. No newprojects will be taken up, however, without a new agreement.72

Biological and Chemical Weapons Analysis

The Soviet Union had active and large-scale chemical and biological weaponsprograms, the bulk of which were inherited by Russia when the Soviet Unionceased to exist in 1991 (table 6.5). Several key biological weapons facilities arelocated in non-Russian former Soviet republics, including Kazakhstan andUzbekistan. Russia’s stocks of chemical weapons and biological weapons samples,and the expertise it took to produce them, continue to pose serious proliferationthreats. The risk that such materials or expertise might leak out of the formerSoviet Union and aid countries or terrorist groups in the acquisition or use ofchemical or biological weapons is a serious global security concern—a concernthat has increased in the wake of the post–September 11 anthrax attacks in theUnited States. Weapons expert Amy Smithson told the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee in March 2003, “The Soviets had a prodigious bio-weapons pro-gram involving over 65,000 weapons scientists and technicians. They weaponizedcontagious diseases, hardened others against antibiotic treatment, and had ro-bust capabilities in anti-crop and anti-livestock agents. Without a doubt, thisreservoir of talent is the deepest in the world, and I fear that terrorists may,indeed, go there for help.”73 Similar concerns exist for Russia’s chemical weap-ons capabilities.

Russia continues its efforts, with the assistance of the United States and othercountries, to eliminate its chemical and biological weapons capabilities in com-pliance with its treaty commitments. Progress to date, however, has been slowowing to inadequate funding, poor management, and bureaucratic conflicts.Moreover, the United States remains wary that Russia may not be fully comply-ing with all of its obligations under the chemical and biological weaponsconventions.74

Chemical Weapons

Russia possesses the largest stocks of chemical weapons in the world. Moscow’sholdings include an estimated 39,280 metric tons of chemical weapons at sevenstorage sites. Eighty one percent of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile consistsof nerve agents, including sarin, soman, and VX viral agents. The remaining 19percent is made up of blistering agents, including lewisite, mustard, and lewisite-mustard mixtures. These materials are stored in both munition containers


(including projectiles, rocket warheads, bombs, spray devices, and Scud missilewarheads) and bulk storage containers.75 All the nerve agents are in weaponizedform, but some of the blister agents are contained in bulk storage.

Russia is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), whichrequires the elimination of all chemical weapons and the conversion of chemicalweapon production facilities. Russia signed the treaty on January 13, 1993, andratified it on November 5, 1997. There are continued suspicions, however, thatRussia has not made a full and complete declaration of all its past chemicalweapons activities. The terms of the treaty require that all parties eliminate theirchemical weapons stockpiles in four phases, completing the destruction of por-tions of the national stocks within three, five, seven, and ten years of theagreement’s entry into force.76 Russia was the only one of the first four declaredchemical weapon-possessing states (India, Russia, South Korea, and the UnitedStates) that failed to meet the initial April 2000 deadline for the elimination of1 percent of its chemical weapons. (Other countries, including Syria, Israel, andNorth Korea, are known to have or are thought to have chemical weapons, buteither they have not made official declarations or are not parties to the CWC.Since 2003, Libya and Albania have both officially declared chemical weapons

Table 6.5. Chemical Weapons by Storage Location and Form

Chemical Weapons Storage Site Chemical Type

Percentage of Original

Stockpile1 Storage Form

Shchuch’ye Nerve agent 13.6 Projectiles and rocket warheads

Popchep Nerve agent 18.8 Air-delivered munitions

Leonidovka Nerve agent 17.2 Air-delivered munitions

Gorny Blister agent/mustard, lewisite, and mixture

2.9 Bulk containers

Maradykovsky Nerve agent 17.4 Air-delivered munitions

Kizner Blister agent/lewisite

14.2 Projectiles and rocket warheads

Kambarka Blister agent/lewisite

15.9 Bulk containers

NOTE:1. As of the spring of 2005, approximately 1.8 percent of the total stockpile (an estimated

720 metric tons) had been destroyed at the Gorny site. See Russian Munitions Agency, Facilities of CW Stockpiling and Destruction, available at www.munition.gov.ru/eng/ objects.html.

NOTE

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stockpiles.) As of the spring of 2005, Russia had completed destruction of nearly2 percent of its stockpile.77 Its second deadline, to eliminate 20 percent of thestockpile, was extended five years to April 29, 2007, at the Eighth Session of theConference of States Parties. There is little hope that Russia will meet this dead-line. At the same session, the 45 percent and 100 percent deadlines were alsoextended “in principle” for both Russia and the United States.78

The Russian government’s new plan for the elimination of chemical weaponswas approved on July 5, 2001. Under the new plan, blister agent destruction isongoing at Gorny, largely thanks to German funding, and is scheduled to becomplete by the end of 2005. The large majority of Russia’s stockpile of blisteragents will be destroyed at the Kambarka facility, which is now under construc-tion. Shchuch’ye, which is also currently under construction, will likely be themain CW destruction facility for all Russian nerve agents, building upon thesupport provided by the United States and Germany. Still, some press reportshave indicated that Moscow may have new plans to destroy its nerve agents atthe various locations where they are already stored (including Shchuch’ye).79 ASeptember 2003 accord between the U.S. Department of Defense and the Rus-sian Munitions Agency determined that all nerve agents would be destroyed atShchuch’ye, but Russian concerns about transportation make their compliancewith the agreement anything but certain.80

Russia is receiving considerable assistance from the United States and othercountries to facilitate its CW destruction. The United States has agreed to pro-vide funds for the construction of the plant in Shchuch’ye, but it has been de-layed, in part, by a U.S. Congress decision not to fund the construction in 2000and 2001. In October 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense, which overseesthe program, estimated that the facility would be up and running by July 2009.81

In 2004, one Russian official offered a slightly accelerated timetable, stating thatthe facility would be complete in 2007.82 Meanwhile, Russia has completed thedestruction of “unfilled munitions and devices, and equipment specifically de-signed for use directly in connection with employment of chemical weapons,”controlled as Category III items under the CWC. Moscow has also finishedeliminating its World War I chemical agents, controlled as Category II itemsunder the CWC.83

Biological Weapons

The former Soviet Union possessed the world’s largest offensive BW program.The covert program continued to expand even after the USSR signed the Bio-logical Weapons Convention in 1972 and eventually included a network of morethan 50 institutes that produced vast amounts (metric tons) of biological agents,including anthrax and smallpox. The Soviet program, however, relied mainly ona surge capability to produce large amounts of weaponized agents in a time ofcrisis. Russia, according to U.S. and Russian officials and experts, is thought tohave destroyed its stocks of offensive weapons, although this destruction cannotbe independently verified and significant amounts of offensive stocks may con-tinue to exist in Russia.


Russia is known to maintain a large quantity of biological weapons samplesthat could be used to grow and produce large amounts of offensive biologicalagents. In addition, Russia continues to maintain many of the former facilitiesthat would have been used in the production of BW stocks, representing alatent ability to weaponize biological agents. Though this residual productioncapability is of concern to some, the main proliferation risks posed by theformer Soviet BW capability is the risk that the samples of BW agents couldbe stolen or that the experts responsible for their production might sell theirskills to others.

The Soviet BW program produced large amounts of many BW agents. Inaddition, the Soviet program developed genetically altered strains of weapons tomake them resistant to common antibiotics. Thousands of samples of these agentsexist in several dozen “libraries” in Russia, each sample of which could be usedto grow large amounts of virulent, offensive BW agents.

The nonproliferation threats posed by the former Soviet BW program aretwofold. The first is that the samples of BW agents are not adequately protectedagainst theft. These samples are extremely portable, many consisting merely oftest tubes of agents, and an adequate security and tracking system for these agentsdoes not exist. In addition, the official closure of the former BW program by theRussian government means that tens of thousands of experts and employees havebeen forced to find other ways to support themselves, raising concerns that theymay have migrated to help BW programs in other countries.

In response to the Russian BW threats, the United States funds a number ofbiothreat reduction activities, all through ISTC grants. The U.S. Department ofDefense runs the Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention program, whichseeks to improve security and safety measures at institutes (in Russia and theother states of the former Soviet Union) involved in legitimate research withdangerous pathogens. Five Russian institutes and an additional eight inKazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia have applied for assistance with securityenhancements.84 The State Department also provides employment for formerbioweapons scientists through the ISTC grants.85

Missile Analysis

Russia’s advanced missile capabilities also pose important proliferation challenges,especially given the continued economic stress in Russian society and in theRussian weapons complex. Just as Russia relied on dedicated nuclear cities in theproduction of its nuclear arsenal, so too did it construct a series of missile designand production enterprises. Those factories and design bureaus maintain Russia’scurrent missile arsenal, including the only missile in production, the SS-27 ICBM.Although initial plans seemed to allow for the production of as many as 50 SS-27s per year, Russia only produced and deployed 6 new SS-27s in 2003, addingjust 4 more in 2004.86

With the post–Cold War decline of its conventional forces, Russia has begunto rely on its nuclear forces as a source of national pride and strength. Such

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domestic political concerns, in addition to the desire to counter U.S. antimissileefforts, have led to a number of boastful statements, like President Putin’s No-vember 2004 claim that Russia is developing and preparing to deploy “weaponsthat not a single other nuclear power has, or will have in the near future.”87

Presumably, he was referring to the new mobile version of the SS-27. In thissame vein, Russia is developing a maneuverable reentry vehicle that can report-edly change its flight path after separating from its missile. This would increaseits ability to evade antimissile systems, such as those being developed by theUnited States.88

Despite much talk, the current level of missile production is quite low, and,as a result, there is a large body of underpaid and underemployed missile expertswho must find alternative ways to make a living. This, along with the parallelconcerns in the nuclear realm, has raised serious concern that Russia’s missileexpertise may be assisting other countries in the production of advanced ballisticmissile capabilities. Chief among these concerns is the possible role of Russia inhelping Iran develop long-range missiles. In addition, there continues to be con-cern over Russia’s role in helping India develop its advanced missile and spacelaunch capabilities, which are virtually identical to long-range missile programs.These worries remain, despite the fact that Russia became a member of the MissileTechnology Control Regime in 1995 and has adopted internal reforms to tightencontrols over missile-related exports. Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, the director ofthe Defense Intelligence Agency, testified in February 2004 that “Russian enti-ties support missile and civil nuclear programs in China, Iran, India, and to alesser degree in Syria.”89

In a 2003 report to the U.S. Congress then–Central Intelligence Agency di-rector George Tenet focused on Russian missile assistance to Iran, stating, “Iran’searlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian entities helpedto accelerate Iranian development of the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic mis-sile, and continuing Russian entity assistance has supported Iranian efforts todevelop new missiles and increase Tehran’s self-sufficiency in missile produc-tion.”90

It has never been shown conclusively, however, whether the assistance to Iranis carried out by organizations within Russia operating in violation of Russiangovernment policy and export controls, or whether the assistance is part of anofficial Russian government policy to aid Iran. The goal of the assistance wouldbe to ensure Russia’s relation with a key potential ally in the Middle East, espe-cially one with which the United States has no formal relations. Russian officialsvigorously deny any formal assistance to Iran’s missile or nuclear weapons pro-grams.

The United States has been highly vocal in its concern that Russian missileexpertise is being exported to countries of proliferation concern. U.S. law, in-cluding Executive Order 12938 (amended in 1998) and the Iran Nonprolifera-tion Act of 2000, authorizes the president to impose sanctions on companiesthat provide equipment or technology to Iran’s ballistic missile program (seetable 6.6). These sanctions prohibit any U.S. government assistance to, or con-tracts with, the sanctioned entities, and last a minimum of two years. Of the


fourteen Russian entities sanctioned for missile proliferation since 1998, penal-ties have been lifted against five (INOR and Polyus in April 2000 and Europalace,Grafit, and MOSO in April 2004). The most recent group to be targeted forsanctions was Khazra Trading in September 2004.91

NOTES

1. See the calculations in table 6.2.

2. These calculations are based on Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Interactive Threat Reduction BudgetDatabase: FY 1992–FY 2005,” available at www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/charts/cnm_funding_interactive_table.asp.

3. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces,2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2005, pp. 70–72.

4. Ibid.

5. Charles Duelfer, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI for Iraq’s WMD,”September 30, 2004, vol. 1, pp. 116–119; available at www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol1.pdf.

Table 6.6. U.S. Sanctions against Russian Entities

Year Organization

1998 Baltic State Technical University

Europalace 2000 (sanctions lifted April 2004)

Glavkosmos

Grafit (sanctions lifted April 2004)

INOR Scientific Center

MOSO Company (sanctions lifted April 2004)

Polyus Scientific Production Association

1999 Moscow Aviation Institute

Mendeleyev University

2000 Yuri Savelyev, Director, Baltic State Technical University

2004 Baranov Engine Building Association

Federal Scientific Research Center Altai

Khazra Trading

Vadim Vorobey

SOURCES:

Sandy Berger, U.S. national security adviser, speech at Carnegie Endowment International Non-Proliferation Conference, January 12, 1999. Joseph Cirincione, ed., Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: Routledge, 2000). Howard Diamond, “Clinton Vetoes Sanctions Bill; Sets, Imposes New Sanctions on Russia,” Arms Control Today, June/July 1998. “U.S. Slaps Sanctions on 14 Firms, People for Arms and Missile Sales to Iran,” Agence France-Presse, September 29, 2004.

SOURCES

Russia 145

6. Jon Wolfsthal et al., eds., Nuclear Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Material, and ExportControls in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace and Monterey Institute, 2001), p. 175.

7. Amy Smithson, Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical andBiological Weapons Complexes, Report 32 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1999).

8. Senator Sam Nunn, Acceptance Speech at Eisenhower Institute Awards Dinner, April 26, 2001,available at www.nti.org/c_press/c1_speeches.html.

9. Wolfsthal, Nuclear Status Report, p. 35.

10. Norris and Kristensen, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook,” pp. 70–72.

11. Ibid. See also Pavel Podvig, “Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces: Strategic Fleet,” October 19, 2004,available at www.russianforces.org/eng/navy/.

12. Norris and Kristensen, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook,” pp. 70–72.

13. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, START I Treaty.

14. Arms Control Association, “START II and Its Extension Protocol at a Glance,” Fact Sheet, Janu-ary 2003; available at www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/start2.asp.

15. White House Fact Sheet, “Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reduction in Nuclear Forces,”Helsinki, March 21, 1997.

16. White House press conference transcript, November 2001.

17. Joseph Cirincione and Jon Wolfsthal, “SORT of a Treaty,” Carnegie Analysis May 14, 2003,available at www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=print&id=13823.

18. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Treaty between the United States of America and theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-RangeMissiles.

19. Defense Threat Resolution Agency, DOD, “Onsite Inspection Operations, Intermediate-RangeNuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,” available at www.dtra.mil/toolbox/directorates/osi/programs/ops/inf/index.cfm.

20. Natural Resources Defense Council, “USSR/Russian Nuclear Warheads” (table), October 23, 2001;available at www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab10.asp.

21. Norris and Kristensen, “NRDC Nuclear Notebook,” pp. 72–74. See also Amy F. Woolf, “Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Congressional Research Service, September 9, 2004, p. 17.

22. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook 1991: World Armament andDisarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Richard Fieldhouse et al., “NuclearWeapon Developments and Unilateral Reduction Initiatives,” chap. 2 in Yearbook 1991, SIPRI, p.70. SIPRI, Yearbook 1992: World Armament and Disarmament (New York: Oxford UniversityPress, 1993). Dunbar Lockwood and Jon Wolfsthal, “Nuclear Weapon Developments and Prolif-eration,” chap. 6 in Yearbook 1992, SIPRI, p. 228.

23. Nikolai Sokov, “The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Scare of 2001,” Monterey Institute of StrategicStudies, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/tnw.htm.

24. Woolf, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” p. 17.

25. Ibid., “Executive Summary.”

26. Stephen G. Rademaker, assistant secretary of state for arms control, Press Roundtable at Interfax,Moscow, October 6, 2004; available at www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/2004/37275.htm.

27. This figure is the sum of 52 Ministry of Defense weapons storage sites identified by the U.S.Department of Defense CTR program and 39 Russian Navy weapons storage sites identified bythe National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). For Depart-ment of Defense (DOD) numbers, see U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Addi-tional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites,GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 2003), p. 34; available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d03482.pdf. For Navy sites, see Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agendafor Action (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom,Harvard University, 2004), p. 52, footnote 51, and p. 54.

28. DOE has identified 243 buildings at 40 materials sites in Russia. These figures include both mili-tary and civilian sites. GAO, Additional Russian Cooperation Needed, p. 24.

29. Discussions with DOD officials, 2001. See also Wolfsthal, Nuclear Status Report, 2001.


30. DOD, “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 2006,” p. 38,available at www.ransac.org/documents/fy06_ctr_annual_report_to_congress.pdf.

31. GAO, Additional Russian Cooperation Needed, p. 8.

32. DOE, Detailed Budget Justifications, Volume 1, National Nuclear Security Administration, pp. 447–448; available at www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/content/DEFNN/nn.pdf.

33. Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 52–54.

34. White House transcript, November 13, 2001.

35. White House transcript, February 11, 2004.

36. DOE, “A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia,”Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, January 10, 2000. p. 1.

37. The actual number may not even be known in Russia. This estimate includes 95 metric tons ofmilitary plutonium, 50 metric tons of plutonium in excess of defense needs, and 38.2 metric tonsof separated civil plutonium. See IAEA, INFCIRC/549/Add.9/6, “Communication Received fromthe Russian Federation Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium.” Seealso David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, “Plutonium Watch: Tracking Plutonium Inventories,”ISIS, June 2004, p. 5. See also David Albright, “Civil Inventories of Highly Enriched Uranium,”Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), June 11, 2004, p. 11. See also David Albright,“Military and Excess Stocks of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) in the Acknowledged NuclearWeapon States,” ISIS, June 25, 2004, p. 2. All ISIS documents are available at www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/tableofcontents.html.

38. DOE, “Plutonium: The First Fifty Years,” 1994.

39. International Atomic Energy Agency, “Illicit Nuclear Trafficking: Facts and Figures,” available atwww.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/Fact_Figures.html. See also Willaim C. Potter andElena Sokova, “Illicit Trafficking in the NIS: What’s New? What’s True?” Nonproliferation Review,Summer 2002, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/92/92potsok.pdf.

40. Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, Securing the Bomb 2005: New Global Imperatives (Washington,D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Securing the Atom, May 2005), executivesummary.

41. Bunn and Wier, Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action, pp. 46–47.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. The full $150 million supplemental included funding for other programs managed by the MPC&Aoffice, including Second Line of Defense. For more budget information, see Matthew Bunn, “Ma-terials Protection Control and Accounting, 2003”; available at www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/securing/mpca.asp. See also Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget Da-tabase: Subtotals by U.S. Government Department, FY 1992–FY 2006”; available at www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/overview/cnwm_home.asp.

45. See Matthew Bunn, “Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility,” available at www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/securing/mayak.asp.

46. National Academy of Science, Plutonium Disposition Report (Washington, D.C.: National Acad-emy of Science, 1994).

47. For a complete review of this program, refer to Wolfsthal, Nuclear Status Report.

48. Thomas Neff, “Privatizing U.S. National Security: the U.S.–Russian HEU Deal Risk,” Arms Con-trol Today, August/September 1998.

49. USEC Fact Sheet, March 31, 2005, available at www.usec.com/v2001_02/html/megatons_fact.asp.

50. President Clinton, Speech at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, March 1, 1995.

51. Statement delivered by Minatom Minister Mikhailov at 41st International Atomic Energy AgencyGeneral Conference, September 26, 1997.

52. Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, DOE, “Strategic Plan,” June 2000.

53. DOE, “Disposing of Surplus U.S. Plutonium,” available at www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-26/pu.htm.

54. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget.”

55. Group of Eight, “G8 Global Partnership Annual Report: G8 Senior Group, June 2004,” availableat www.g8usa.gov/d_060904i.htm.

56. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Interactive Threat Reduction Budget.”

Russia 147

57. White House Fact Sheet, June 4, 2000.58. Strengthening the Global Partnership, “Donor Fact Sheets,” available at www.sgpproject.org/

Donor%20factsheets/Index.html.59. V. Tikhonov, Russia’s Nuclear and Missile Complex (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 2001), p. 7.

60. National Intelligence Council, “Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of RussianNuclear Facilities and Military Forces,” February 2002, available at www.cia.gov/nic/special_russiannucfac.html.

61. “Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise,” available at www.state.gov/t/np/c12265.htm.

62. International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), “Parties,” available at www.istc.ru/ISTC/sc.nsf/html/profile-parties.htm.

63. ISTC, “Branch Offices,” available at www.istc.ru/ISTC/sc.nsf/html/branch-offices. Also, in accor-dance with U.S. policy, the United States has not funded any new projects in Belarus since 1997,although Belarus is still a party to the ISTC.

64. Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), available at www.stcu.int/info/.

65. Information about the STCU field offices is available at www.stcu.int/about/structure/offices/kyiv/index.php. Also, the decision to open the joint office in Tbilisi is contained in “Joint State-ment: STCU Governing Board Meeting, December 15, 1999,” available at www.stcu.int/docu-ments/gbm/gbm9.

66. ISTC Fact Sheet, available at www.istc.ru/ISTC/sc.nsf/html/public-info-fact-sheet.htm.

67. White House Fact Sheet, December 27, 2001.

68. National Nuclear Security Administration, DOE, “Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP),”available at www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/ipp.shtml.

69. National Nuclear Security Administration, “Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention.” Also, per-sonal communication with DOE staff, November 2001.

70. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the RussianFederation on the Nuclear Cities Initiative, September 22, 1998.

71. Nuclear Cities Initiative home page, “Notable Successes,” www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/nci/about_success.shtml.

72. Joe Fiorill, “U.S.-Russian Liability Dispute Could Bode Ill for Threat Reduction Programs,” Glo-bal Security Newswire, September 22, 2003.

73. Amy Smithson, “Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” March 19, 2003.

74. Paula A. DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance, “Cooperative ThreatReduction,” testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, March 4, 2003; available atwww.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rm/18736.htm.

75. GAO, “Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention Raise Concerns About Pro-liferation,” GAO-04-361, March 2004, p. 20; available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d04361.pdf.

76. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of ChemicalWeapons, article 4.

77. Mike Nartker, “Russian Official Outlines Detailed Schedule to Eliminate Chemical Weapons Ar-senal by 2012,” Global Security Newswire, November 19, 2004; available at www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004_11_19.html#4215509C.

78. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference on State Parties, Fifth SessionDecision Document C-8/Dec. 13, October 24, 2003; available at www.opcw.org/docs/c8dec13.pdf.

79. Nartker, “Russian Official Outlines Detailed Schedule.”

80. GAO, “Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention,” p. 22.

81. Ibid., pp. 21–22.

82. Nartker, “Russian Official Outlines Detailed Schedule.” See also Viktor Kholstov, “Urgent Prob-lems of Chemical Weapons Disarmament in the Russian Federation,” presentation at the GreenCross National Dialogue, Moscow, November 10, 2004; available at www.globalgreen.org.

83. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Conference on States Parties, First Re-view Conference Technical Secretariat Background Paper RC-1/S/6, April 25, 2003; available atwww.opcw.org/html/global/docs_frameset.html.


84. DOD, “Cooperative Threat Reduction Annual Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2005,” pp. 67–68.

85. Bureau of Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: The U.S. Bio-Chem RedirectProgram,” August 17, 2004; available at www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/32398.htm.

86. Pavel Podvig, “Changes in the Russian Strategic Forces,” October 20, 2004, available at http://russianforces.org/eng/news/archive/000101.shtml.

87. Mike Eckel, “Russia Developing New Nuclear Missile Systems, Putin Says,” Associated Press,November 17, 2004. For additional commentary on this issue, see Rose Gottemoeller, “NuclearNecessity in Putin’s Russia,” Arms Control Today, April 2004.

88. Wade Boese, “Putin Boasts about Russian Military Capabilities,” Arms Control Today, March 2004;available at www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_03/Putin.asp.

89. Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy director, Defense Intelligence Agency, “Current andProjected National Security Threats to the United States,” testimony before the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence, February 24, 2004; available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/0402hrg/040224/jacoby.pdf.

90. Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of TechnologyRelating to

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