particles, consciousness, volition: a vedantic vision - ulrich mohrhoff

8/14/2019 Particles, Consciousness, Volition: A Vedantic Vision - Ulrich Mohrhoff

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Particles, Consciousness, Volition: A Vedantic Vision

Ulrich Mohrhoff Sri Aurobindo International Centre of EducationPondicherry 605002 India

[email protected]

Abstract

This essay puts forward a theory of existence that takes its cue from both contemporaryphysics and Vedanta. The quantum statistics of indistinguishable particles implies thatthe ultimate constituents of matter, considered out of relation to their relations, areidentical in the strong sense of numerical identity. This makes it possible to identify each fundamental particle with the Vedantic brahman , which relates to the world in a threefold

manner: as a substance constituting it ( sat ), as a consciousness containing it ( chit ), andas an innite quality/delight expressing itself in nite forms and movements ( ananda ).The fundamental identity of sat with chit makes it possible to understand how anythingmaterial can exist for anything material. The fundamental identity of sat with ananda holds the clue to the free will conundrum. A discussion of a series of Vedantically possibleworlds of increasing complexity solves these problems by showing how they arise and howthey become hard. An examination of our place in the Vedantic scheme of things atthis particular juncture of the drama of evolution is followed by a speculation about thedramas denouement.

1 Introduction

This essay puts forward a theory of existence that takes its cue from both contemporary physics

and Vedanta. By contemporary physics I mean the mathematical formalism of quantummechanics (QM) and the minimal interpretation needed to relate this to the physical world. 1

Vedanta is a more than millennium-long philosophic and commentarial tradition founded onthe Upanishads. The Upanishads, which decisively launched Indian philosophy, are above allmystical texts reporting mystical experiences (Phillips, 1995). I am particularly indebted tothe translations and commentaries by Sri Aurobindo (1981) and his further development of Upanishadic thought (Sri Aurobindo, 1987).

An essay of this kind runs the risk of being dismissed offhand as one of those efforts bywooly masters at linking quantum physics to mysticism (Pais, 1991). What unites these ef-forts are claims to the effect that QM presupposes observersergo consciousness. It oughtto be mentioned, therefore, that I have contested such claims (Mohrhoff, 2000, 2002bd). QMpresupposes measurements . Its mathematical formalism correlates the probabilities of mea-surement outcomes. The challenge known as the measurement problem is to demonstratehow a probability algorithm can be a complete physical theorya theory that not only presup-poses but also encompasses measurements. If this is done without dragging in consciousnesslike a deus ex machina , valuable ontological insights ensue (Mohrhoff, 2004, 2005), some of which are used in the present essay. An outline of this complex of issues is given in a companionessay (Mohrhoff, in review).

Part 1 (Sections 23) investigates an experiment which illustrates that the distinction be-tween this particle and that particle (over and above the distinction between this property

1 This common denominator of all physical interpretations of the formalism is known under several names,e.g., correlation interpretation (Laloe, 2001) and minimal instrumentalist interpretation (Redhead, 1987).

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and that property) is a distinction that Nature does not make. The implication is that theultimate constituents of matter, considered by themselves (divested of their relations) areidentical in the strong sense of numerical identity. QM thus lends unstinting support to thecentral idea of all monistic ontologies: ultimately there is only one substance. My embeddingof contemporary physics in a Vedantic framework of thought rests on the identication of thisone substance with the Vedantic brahman . The major Vedantic themes are listed in Section 4.

Foremost among them is the characterization of brahman as sachchid ananda . Brahman is exis-tence ( sat ) as well as consciousness (chit ) as well as something that is (subjectively speaking)an innite delight and (objectively speaking) the quintessence of quality and value ( ananda ).The identity of sat with chit and the relations supported by this identity are explored in the re-mainder of Part 2. Sections 57 discuss a series of Vedantically possible worlds of increasingcomplexity. The structures that dene these worlds throw light on structures that exist in ourown worldarguably the most complex of them all, and hence the most interesting but also themost difficult to make sense of. The subject of evolution, Vedantically conceived, is broachedin Sections 89, and Section 10 discusses our place in the Vedantic scheme of things at thisparticular juncture of the drama of evolution. Part 3 (Sections 1112) explores the identity of sat with ananda , which is crucial to understanding volition, and hazards a speculation aboutthe dramas denouement.

PART 1: PARTICLES

2 A Scattering Experiment

Lets see what QM has to say about the following experiment. Initially, we have two incomingparticles, one (N) heading northward and one (S) heading southward. We assume that theirtotal momentum is zero, so that if they scatter (deect each other) elastically, the outgoingparticles also head in opposite directions. (Elastic here means that no type conversion takesplace: a neutron remains a neutron, a proton a proton, and so on.) We are interested inthe probability with which the particles scatter at right angles, in which case we end up withone particle (E) heading in a direction we will call eastward and one particle (W) heading

westward.Suppose that it is possible to infer from an actual event or state of affairs whether S is thesame particle as W (and therefore N the same as E) or S is the same particle as E (and N thesame as W). In this case the following theorem of classical probability theory applies: an eventthat can come to pass in exactly two ways, with respective probabilities p1 and p2 , comes topass with probability p = p1 + p2 .2 QM assigns to each possibility or alternative a complexnumber A called amplitude, and it instructs us to calculate the corresponding probabilityby squaring the amplitudes magnitude |A | . Thus

p = p1 + p2 = |A 1 | 2 + |A2 | 2 .

Now suppose instead that there isnt any actual event or state of affairs that would permitone to infer whether S is the same as W or the same as E. (This rules out, inter alia , that

the incoming particles are of different types, for this would make it possible to nd out whichoutgoing particle is identical with which incoming particle.) In this case QM instructs us to rst add the amplitudes associated with the two possibilities (Figure 1) and then square themagnitude of the result. The probability with which the particles scatter at right angles nowis

p = |A 1 + A 2 | 2 .

More can be established if we take into account that every known particle is either a boson ora fermion. If there are no preferred directions (owing to external elds, particle spins, and

2 This is virtually self-evident if probabilities are dened in terms of relative frequencies. For an interestingproof that does not invoke relative frequencies see Caves, et al . (2002).

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Figure 1: The two possibilities that contribute to the probability with which particles scatterat right angles. The lines connecting incoming particles to outgoing ones indicate possibleidentities; they are not meant to suggest the existence of continuous trajectories.

such), then A2 = A1 holds for bosons while A2 = A1 holds for fermions (Feynman, et al .,1965). Thus for bosons we now have

p = |2A1 | 2 = 4 |A 1 | 2 .

This is twice as large as p = 2 |A1 | 2 , which we would have if S were either the same as W orthe same as E. The probability with which two fermions scatter at right angles, on the otherhand, works out at |A1 A 1 | 2 = 0, which also differs from p = 2 |A1 | 2 . It follows that neitheroutgoing particle is identical with either incoming particle. If nothing indicates which of thetwo possibilities depicted in Figure 1 takes place, neither takes place. The distinction we makebetween them has no counterpart in the actual world. It is a distinction that Nature does notmake. It exists solely in our heads.

3 An Ancient Conundrum and Its Solution

Imagine that in front of you there are two exactly similar objects. Because they are in differentplaces, they are different objects. But is their being in different places the sole reason for theirbeing different objects? Before committing yourself, consider what a positive answer wouldentail. If we disregard positions, we are left with no differences at all. But if we consider twoobjects with exactly the same properties, we consider the same object twice, or so the principleknown as the identity of indiscernibles asserts. Accordingly, if two objects differ solely bybeing in different places, then intrinsically (that is, considered by themselves, out of relationto their relations, including their spatial relations) they are identical in the strong sense of numerical identity. But this means that what there is in front of you is not two objects intwo placesthis is one two too manybut one and the same object in two places. Are youprepared to commit yourself to this view?

If not, what are the options? How can we avoid the conclusion that two exactly similarbilliard balls are the same billiard ball in different places, which sounds absurd? It might beargued that, in addition to being in different places, they are different substances . But howcan one substance (qua substance) differ from another? How can there be more than onesubstance? To solve these problems, philosophers have invented a property, called thisness ,meant to distinguish things without distinguishing them: if in front of you there are two things,one of them has the property of being this very thing while the other has the property of being that very thing. Demonstrative determiners, however, distinguish things by pointing at them, and this is the same as distinguishing things by their positions. So we are back tosquare one.. . .

For centuries philosophers have argued over the existence of (intrinsically) distinct sub-stances. At last QM has settled the question for good. Since the distinction we make between

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the possibilities in Figure 1 is a distinction that Nature does not make, particles cannot bedistinct substances. The concept of substance betokens existence but not individuality. Indi-viduality is strictly a matter of properties. If it were otherwise, even particles lacking distin-guishing characteristics could be re-identied. They would behave as if they carried permanentidentity tags. We would have to square the magnitudes of the two amplitudes and then addthe results. Instead we have to add the two amplitudes and then square the magnitude of the

result. So the distinction we make between this particle and that particle (over and above thedistinction between this property and that property) corresponds to nothing in the physicalworld.

If the property of being here and the property of being there are simultaneously possessed,how many substances does that make? The correct answer is one, for the substance thatbetokens the existence of the property of being here also betokens the existence of the propertyof being there. QM does not permit us to interpose a multitude of distinct substances betweenthe substance that betokens existence and a multitude of possessed positions. 3 It therebylends unstinting support to the central idea of all monistic ontologies: ultimately there is onlyone substance. A nucleon (proton or neutron) owes its existence not to the three quarks of which it is composed but to the one substance that lends existence to every existing bundleof properties, including the three quarks. This, rather than the three quarks, is the substancethat every nucleon is made of. This, rather than a multitude of fundamental particles, 4 iswhat constitutes every material object.

The challenge is to learn to think about the quantum world in ways that do not lead tomeaningless questions. The manner in which QM assigns probabilities to possible measurementoutcomes implies that the question Which incoming particle is identical with which outgoingparticle? is meaningless. This question arises as long as we say that initially there are twoparticles, one moving northward and one moving southward, and that in the end there are twoparticles, one moving eastward and one moving westward. If we say instead that initially thereis one thing moving both northward and southward, and in the end there is one thing movingboth eastward and westward, that meaningless question cannot be asked. If we could convinceourselves that what looks like two particles is really one and the same thing, the impossibilityof objectifying the difference between the possibilities in Figure 1 would no longer baffle us.We would no longer be bothered by the miraculous identity of particles lacking identity tags,

which Misner, et al . (1973) hailed as a central mystery of physics.5

It seems to me that in order to unravel the mystery called matter, we need to get used tothe idea that being one thing, or many things, or identical things, or different things are relativenotions. Two particles can be one thing in one sense, two identical things in another sense,and two different things in yet another sense. Considered without their relationsand thismeans divested of all properties, for the properties of fundamental particles are either relational

3 Even such a seemingly harmless expression as a possessed position is seriously misleading, inasmuchas it suggests the existence of a multitude of position-possessing substances. There are no individual sub-stances. There is only a substance that warrants the existence of positions, and this is the same for all existing(possessed) positions.

4 A fundamental particle lacks internal structure. According to the current standardmodel of the fundamen-tal particles and forces, the leptons (which include the electron) and the quarks (which make up nucleons,

pions, and such) are fundamental.5 It is sometimes claimed that the miraculous identity of two electrons is a consequence of the fact that

both are excitations of the same underlying ur-stuff, the electron eld, and that the latter is the primaryreality (Wilczek, 1999). The fact of the matter is that quantum elds are ingredients of an algorithm thatpermits us to calculate, for any given set of incoming particles, the probability of recording any given set of outgoingparticles. In the same article, Wilczek states thatwe can only requireandgenerallywe onlyobtainsensible, nite answers when we ask questions that have direct, operational meaning. The transmogricationof the ingredients of a probability algorithm into primary realities produces nothing but inconsistencies andabsurdities. Foremost among these inconsistencies is the following: considered as physical entities in theirown right, quantum elds are dened on a classical spacetime manifold, whereas the manner in which QMassigns probabilities to the possible outcomes of position measurements implies that this manifold cannot beconsistently objectied (Mohrhoff, 2002ab, 2004, 2005, in review).

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or dynamical in the sense of being descriptive of the evolution of relational properties 6 allfundamental particles are (numerically) identical. 7 If we take into account the relations thathold between fundamental particles (such as relative positions and relative momenta), theyare also many things, for a multitude of relations implies a multitude of relata. If these manythings lack properties by which they could be distinguished, as do the constituents of a Bose-Einstein condensate, they are many identical (exactly similar) things. 8 And if they possess

properties by which they can be distinguished, they are also different (dissimilar) things.We ought to have a name for that which every existing fundamental particle intrinsicallyisthe one substance that constitutes every existing material object, the one and only thingthat exists independently of anything else. Since all we can say about an existing fundamentalparticle in itself (considered out of relation to other things, and therefore divested of allproperties) is that it exists , we may as well call it pure existence. (If you fancy any othername, be my guest.)

Now that we have an appropriate name, we are in a position to formulate what is surely themost economical creation saga ever told (and its fully consistent with the empirical data toboot): by the simple device of entering into spatial relations with itself , pure existence createsboth matter and space, for physical space is the totality of existing spatial relations, whilematter is the corresponding apparent multitude of relata apparent because the relations areself -relations (Mohrhoff, 2002ab, 2005).

PART 2: CONSCIOUSNESS

4 The Principal Affirmations of Vedanta

At the heart of the Vedantic vision to be developed here lies the identication of pure ex-istence with the Vedantic brahman . All major Upanishadic themes concern the relations thathold between brahman the Absolute, the Realand the world (ourselves included). One

6 Positions and momenta are obviously relational properties. Charges (including colors and avors) aredescriptive of interactions, which are dynamical relations . Mass is an energy measured in mass units, energyis a frequency measured in energy units, and frequencies, too, have an objective, physical signicance onlyrelative to each other, as dimensionless ratios. Spin, nally, is both relational (insofar as its components aredened in relation to a reference frame) and dynamical (insofar as it controls how a particles momentumprobability distribution evolves in the presence of an electric current). Saying that charges are descriptive of the evolution of relational properties is the same as saying that they are determinative of the time dependenceof the corresponding probability assignments, and time dependence of a probability assignment is short fordependence of the probabilities assigned to the possible outcomes of (say) a position measurement on the timeof measurement.

7 A referee (of a different paper and for a different journal) has raised the objection that particles differin such intrinsic properties as charge and mass and therefore can be regarded as corresponding to differentsubstancesdifferent kinds of ur-stuff. To meet this objection, it suffices to consider the scattering of aproton and a neutron. If the scattering proceeds elastically, then in each of the alternatives in Figure 1 the twoparticles retain their identities. (This is not sufficient for the existence of transtemporal identities. Wheneverwe must add amplitudes instead of probabilities, no one alternative corresponds to what really happens.) Butthe scattering can proceed inelastically. The identity tags proton and neutron can be swapped, for instance

via the exchange of an electron and a neutrino. There is an alternative in which the incoming neutron emits anelectron, absorbs a neutrino, and turns into a proton, while the incoming proton emits the neutrino, absorbsthe electron, and turns into a neutron. It is clear, therefore, that belonging to a particular species of particlesis not an intrinsic property of particles, and that, a fortiori , charges and masses are not intrinsic to whateverit is that constitutes a particle.

8 The reason why the constituents of a Bose-Einstein condensate are nevertheless many (in apparent con-travention of the identity of indiscernibles) is that there exist nontrivial relations between them. A numericalexample: The mean distance between two noninteracting particles that are free to move in one dimension, andwhose positions relative to the laboratory frame are identically described by a probability distribution that isconstant over a distance of one meter and zero everywhere else, is about 41 cm. There exists a quantiablerelative position even though the particles positions relative to the rest of the world are identical, like thepositions of the atoms in a bottle of superuid helium.

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of these themes is that brahman is mystically discoverable: though ineffableit cannot bedescribed as it is in itself, out of relation to ourselves or the worldit can be known prelin-guistically and non-conceptually. The identication of pure existence with brahman appears justied by several other Upanishadic themes (Phillips, 1995):

Brahman is being (sat ), the ultimate substance of the world, its fundamental constituent.

Brahman is transcendent of names and forms ( n ama-r upa ): it transcends the individualand the particular.

Brahman is omnipresent and unitary (undivided).

Brahman is world ground, origin of the individual and the particular.

Pure existence, too, is the fundamental constituent of the world, is transcendent of individualityand property (including the property of having a form 9 ), and is evidently unitary and presentwherever there is anything. 10 And if my minimal creation saga is correct, it is also the originof matter and of the spatial relations that constitute both space and the shapes of all thingsmaterial.

What can we hope to gain from the identication of pure existence with the Vedanticbrahman ? By taking account of the remaining major Vedantic themes, we obtain a way of thinking about matter and consciousness that may help solve the double conundrum of howanything material can be conscious and how anything can be conscious of material things.Here they are (Phillips, 1995; Sri Aurobindo, 1981):

Brahman is self and/or consciousness ( chit ).

Brahman s self-awareness is nondual; it lacks the dichotomy of subject and object. Thereis no difference between brahman qua (ultimate) self and brahman qua (ultimate) sub-stance.

Brahman is (subjectively speaking) innite bliss ( ananda ) and (objectively speaking)quintessential quality or value.

Brahman is the essence or nest (most precious) part of every thing.

Brahman s being both the ultimate substance and the origin of the particular implies a creativeforce, inherent in the ultimate substance, by which brahman qua substance determines itself (takes on particular qualities and forms). Brahman s being both the ultimate self and theultimate substance implies (i) that this creative force is at the same time a creative imaginationby which brahman qua consciousness gives itself content, and (ii) that the determinations of brahman qua substancethe qualities and forms it assumesare at the same time contents of brahman qua consciousness. These implications are important enough to be added to our listof major Vedantic themes:

Brahman qua substance determines itself by a creative force inherent in brahman qua

substance. Brahman qua consciousness gives itself content by a creative imagination inherent in

brahman qua consciousness.

9 If physical space is the totality of existing spatial relations, then the form of an object is a subset of space,namely the totality of the objects internal spatial relations. Since a fundamental particle lacks internal spatialrelations, it also lacks a form. For more on this issue see (Mohrhoff, 2002ab, 2005, in review).

10 Is it also present where there is nothing? If space consists of the spatial relations that hold betweenparticles, there is no such thing as an unoccupied location or an unpossessed position. Where there is nothing(no thing) there is no there.

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The creative force inherent in brahman qua substance is identical with the creative imag-ination inherent in brahman qua consciousness.

The determinations of brahman qua substance are identical with the content of brahman qua consciousness.

5 Individuation and the Subject-Object DichotomyLet us try to imagine a world without individuals: there are variations in quality (possiblybut not necessarily of a spatial and/or temporal character), but there are neither individualsubstances nor localized standpoints from which the variations are viewed. In such a worldthe original identity of substance and consciousness remains intact and unqualied. Thereis no basis for the distinction between particulars qua determinations (of a substance) andparticulars qua content (of a consciousness). Nor can one differentiate between a force thatdetermines substance and a creative imagination that lls consciousness with content.

In a world in which consciousness and substance are the same, there consciousness is notof the determinations of a substance. There is no substance over and above consciousness.Using the language of consciousness, we may speak of consciousness, its content, and its powerto create its content. Using the language of substance, we may speak of substance, its de-terminations, and the self-determining force inherent in it. But we must not mix languages.We may not say that consciousness is of the determinations of substance, for to say so is toascribe to consciousness and substance different roles in the same ontology. If consciousnessis identical with substance, they can only play corresponding roles in different formulationsof the same ontology. By the same measure, we cannot say that substance is conscious if having determinations (and thus being a substance) is the same as having content (and thusbeing a consciousness). There is no consciousness over and above substance. Substance is notsomething that has consciousness; substance is consciousness.

An important aspect of this particular Vedantically possible world is the absence of adistantiating viewpoint: consciousness lacks the distances that exist between human perceiversand their perceptions, whether conceived as physical distances between a conscious organismand physical objects or as phenomenal distances between a conscious self and phenomenal

objects. The self is coextensive with the content of consciousness.The rst step towards individuation is a self-differentiation of brahman qua consciousnessinto consciousness qua self and consciousness qua container. Consciousness qua self stepsback from consciousness qua container, or else consciousness projects its content in front of aself. This enables brahman qua consciousness to apprehend its content perspectively from aparticular location rather than comprehend it aperspectively from everywhere at once. Itadds to the primary, comprehending poise of the creative consciousness, vij nana , a secondary,apprehending poise, praj nana (Sri Aurobindo, 1987, pp. 139-40, 146). Instead of being seen bya subject that is coextensive with them, objects are now seen from a distance. In addition theynow present themselves as surfaces . Individuation results if this self-distantiation takes placemore than once, and if each apprehending self adopts a different location as its viewpoint.

One may be tempted to look upon the dichotomy of subject and object as a direct out-come of this self-distantiation: what apprehends is the subject, what is apprehended is theobject. But this dichotomy exists within consciousness; by itself it does not suffice to differ-entiate brahman into a consciousness (with content) and a substance (with determinations).A precondition of individuation, it is also necessary for the existence of the subject-objectdichotomy, but it takes individuationthe multiple localization of the self in relation to thecontent of consciousnessto actually engender the dichotomy of consciousness and substance,as I proceed to show.

As long there is only one self, there is no basis for the distinction between the contentof a consciousness and the determinations of a substance. The content of an individual quaconsciousness, on the other hand, cannot be identical with the determinations of the sameindividual qua substance. For while an individual consciousness contains the determinations

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of many individuals, an individual substance possesses only its own determinations. Theisomorphism that exists between the content of brahman qua unitary consciousness and thedeterminations of brahman qua unitary substance, is lost in the process of individuation. Adistinction has to be made between the individual qua conscious self and the same individualqua determinate substance. The individual relates to surfaces in two distinct ways, as aconsciousness with content (the subject in front of a perceived surface) and as a substance

with determinations (the object behind a possessed surface).The differentiation of the individual brahman into a consciousness with content and a sub-stance with determinations does not amount to a Cartesian substance dualism. The individualis not made up of two things, a material substance with objective determinations and a mentalsubstance with subjective ones; it only relates to the worlds particulars in a twofold manner;to some it relates as a substance to its determinations, and to some it relates as a consciousnessto its content. Nor does this differentiation amount to a property dualism. It does not causeparticulars to exist twice, once as physical properties and once as mental properties. Individu-ation itself does not engender an indirect, representational consciousness. What differentiatesis not the particulars but their relation to individuals: to one individual a given particular(instance or token) relates as a determination to a substance; to other individuals (or to thisand other individuals) it relates as content to consciousness.

Thus far, then, the subject-object dichotomy is a dichotomy of relations . The individualbrahman takes on the double aspect of substance and consciousness, and the worlds particularstake on the double aspect of determinations and content, only because the relation betweenbrahman and the worlds particulars differentiates into the consciousness and determinationrelations.

6 Exclusive Concentration and Ignorance: The Veil of Avidya

We began by imagining the simplest Vedantically possible world, from which both individuationand the subject-object dichotomy were absent. Subsequently we discussed an individuatedworld containing both subjects and objects, but as yet no particles, no atoms, and no neurons.A further modicationthis time affecting the relation between brahman and the individualrather than the relation between brahman and the particulartakes us to another possibleworld, and one step closer to home.

In several Upanishads a distinction is made between knowledge ( vidya ) and ignorance(avidya ). What is meant by the former is an individual consciousness aware of its identitywith brahman and, consequently, of the (numerical) identity of all individuals. What is meantby the latter is an individual consciousness lacking this awareness. 11 The attainment of thesupreme personal good ( parama-purush artha ) of the Vedantist comes by lifting the veil thatseparates the ignorant individual consciousness from the consciousness of any other individualand from the all-encompassing unitary consciousness of brahman . What is the origin of thisveil?

One nice thing about the process of individuation is that we can feel as if we understandit. We all know rst-hand what it means to imagine things. So we can quite easily conceiveof a consciousness that creates its own content. With a little effort we can also conceive of

consciousness as simultaneously adopting a multitude of standpoints, and of some or all of itscreative activity as simultaneously proceeding from these several standpoints. We also knowrst-hand the phenomenon of exclusive concentration, when awareness is focused on a singleobject or task, while other goings-on are registered, and other tasks attended to, subconsciously(if at all). Further possibilities thus present themselves. The multiple concentration of thecreative consciousness within its own content may be inclusive or exclusive: one individualmay or may not be conscious of the content of another individual consciousness or of thecontent of the consciousness that exists in advance of individuation. The possible world we

11 Much the same distinction already occurs in the Rig Veda, where the corresponding terms are citti andacitti (Sri Aurobindo, 1987, p. 489).

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shall consider next is characterized by a multiple exclusive concentration of the consciousness-force (chit-tapas ) of brahman .

Neither the individuals direct awareness of, nor their ability to have direct effects on, eachother is lost in this particular world. There is as yet no need for internal representationsof external objects, nor is the causal efficacy of consciousness conned to the goings-on insomething like a brain. On the other hand, being unaware of their identity with brahman , the

individuals will also be unaware of how they come by their powers of direct transindividualawareness and causation, for it is to that identity (and the ensuing numerical identity of all individuals) that they owe these powers. Such individuals might be as perplexed by thepossibility of action at a distance as were Newton and his contemporaries.

The determining force inherent in an individual (qua substance) can be controlled in threeways: individually (by the creative imagination proceeding from the same individual quaconsciousness), transindividually (by the creative imagination proceeding from another indi-vidual), and supraindividually (by the creative imagination that antecedes and transcendsindividuation). In an ignorant world, the supraindividual self remains hidden behind the(subjective) veil of avidya . If it hides for a reason, we can expect it to conceal its creativeimagination also behind the objective veil of a mechanical actionan action that conformsto laws of causal concatenation or statistical correlation. For if brahman wants to remainout of sight, it must not disclose itself as originator and determiner of the universal action of chit-tapas ; only a mechanical action should originate from its supraindividual poise.

Here, in the existence of apparently self-effective mechanical laws, we have the psychologicalorigin of materialist, naturalist, and physicalist conceptions of the universe. For even if theinhabitants of a world that is ignorant in the technical sense of avidya are in possession of a genuine free will, they are not responsible for the existence of their determinations. Theyare able to originate changes in their determinations, but the determinations themselves arekept in existence by those seemingly self-effective laws; they exist independently of the causalefficacy of the individual consciousness. Unaware of the supraindividual self determinant of those laws, these ignorant individuals are therefore prone to assert that determinations existindependently of the causal efficacy of any consciousness: the universe exists by itself and isgoverned by self-effective laws of unknown origin and purpose. But if this is what they assert,they are bound to be perplexed by the fact that what exists by itself can also exist for them ,

as well as by the causal efficacy of their consciousness, which they are prone to deny. Clearly,avidya can generate a lot of ignorance of the more familiar kind.On the other hand, the inhabitants of an ignorant world may not look upon their direct

mutual awareness and their ability to directly affect each other as impenetrable mysteries. Theymay instead infer from these capacities the identity that makes them possible. As a furthermove to ward off discovery, brahman may deepen its multiple exclusive concentration to thepoint that the individual can neither be directly aware of nor directly affect the determinationsof other individuals. This takes us to a possible world in which transindividual awareness andthe transindividual causal efficacy of consciousness are indirect.

In such a world, an individual can be aware of the determinations of other individuals onlymediately , via representations , which form part of its own determinations. The individualremains directly aware of its representing determinations, and it can still directly affect someof its own determinations. But it falls to the mechanical action proceeding from brahman ssupraindividual poise to supply the causal links between the represented determinations andthe representing ones, as well as those between individual actions and their transindividualeffects. We are beginning to tread more familiar territory, but we arent quite there yet.

7 Involution

Let us return for a moment to the self-distantiation of the original creative consciousnessthat paved the way for individuation (Section 5). This stepping back of the self (or a self)from the content of consciousness has as its result a differentiation of the original creativeimagination into an observing, originating, and conceptively creative action, which takes place

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within the self, and an executive action, which takes place within the content. 12 There exists,accordingly, the possibility of deepening the exclusive concentration of consciousness to theextent that the originating and observing action disappears behind the veil of avidya . It is,however, a consequence of the inalienable unity of brahman that whenever an effective differencearisesa difference between brahman qua this and brahman qua thatit arises by a mutualinvolution: brahman qua this renders itself implicit in brahman qua that, and vice versa. In

Sri Aurobindos words, the whole process of differentiation by the Real-Idea13

creative of theuniverse is a putting forward of principles, forces, forms which contain for the comprehendingconsciousness all the rest of existence within them and front the apprehending consciousnesswith all the rest of existence implicit behind them (Sri Aurobindo, 1987, p. 129). Hence if the originating and observing consciousness disappears behind a veil, it nevertheless remainspresent in front, absorbed in the executive action, implicit, latent, or involved.

If the conceptively creative consciousness absents itself from the world scene, or if it in-volves itself in its executive force, does the latter cease to act? To see that this is not neces-sarily the case, we must recall that brahman is not only sat and chit but also ananda ; it issachchid ananda . These terms are descriptive of the three fundamental ways in which brahman relates to a worldas a substance to its determinations, as a consciousness to its content,and as an innite delight or quality that throws itself into nite forms and movements. TheVedantically possible worlds are so many conditions in which this innite quality/delight canbe variously expressed and experienced, and if here we think of them merely as logical possi-bilities, it is because it might overtask the readers imagination to think of them as actuallyexisting supraphysical worlds, though it is clear that this is precisely what the authors of several Upanishads had in mind (Sri Aurobindo, 1981, 1987).

The individuation of brahman qua ananda produces more of the samea multitude of individual ananda s each being in essence a particular aspect of the supraindividual ananda .(Brahman , recall, is also the essence or most precious part of each individual.) The true purposeof individual action, Vedantically conceived, is to develop the individuals innite essence of quality/delight into such forms and actions as are t to express it. This development beginswith the formation of expressive ideas, which takes place in the individual qua consciousness,and ends with their execution by the force inherent in the individual qua substance. The veilof avidya can fall at any stagebetween the individual ananda and its supraindividual source,

between ananda and the conceptive faculty that expresses it through ideas,14

or between thisfaculty and the force that executes expressive ideas. Wherever the veil falls, what lies behindis not an unstructured blank. In our own case, if we can believe the ancient Vedantists, itis, on the contrary, a vast, multi-tiered domain, into which the adept can enter by a (partial)reversal of the exclusive concentration that created the veil, and which can secretly inuencethe goings-on in front of the veil.

What makes this inuence possible is the fact that what is explicit in front of the veil isat the same time implicit behind. Hence in a world in which the conceptively creative facultyis involved, the executive force can all the same be the somnambulant vehicle of expressionof a subliminal creative imagination. This should be obvious to anyone but a hardnosedselectionist. How could the angiosperms not be the works of accomplished artists? What if not a frenzy of creative ecstasy could have produced the arthropods? On the other hand, if themultiple exclusive concentration of the original creative consciousness is carried to its absoluteextreme, the objectively executive faculty, too, is rendered latent. It then lies dormant in the

12 This is the origin of several dualities of classical Indian metaphysics, e.g., brahman and m ay a , purusha andprakriti , shwara and shakti .

13 A real-idea, in Sri Aurobindos terminology, is a self-realizing idea of the consciousness that is identicalwith existence/substance.

14 We humans are clearly in possession of a conceptive faculty and, generally, just as clearly unaware of ouressence of ananda . This lack of awareness virtually ensures that that faculty will be abused. Its improper useis likely to be a major cause of the suffering, ugliness, and evil that we see in the world. Becoming aware of our essence of ananda may therefore turn out to be the most potent remedy.

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individual substance. And since that faculty is needed to create individual forms, the result isan apparent multitude of formless substances 15 with spatial relations governed by mechanicallaws. Welcome to the physical world!

8 The Physical World:Setting the Stage for the Adventure of Evolution

In Section 3 we concluded that the ultimate constituents of matter, considered in themselves,are numerically one. This made it possible to formulate the most parsimonious creation sagaever told: by entering into spatial relations with itself, pure existence creates both space (thetotality of existing spatial relations) and matter (the corresponding multitude of relata). Whatcould not be said at that point was how pure existence enters into spatial relations with itself.Now we are in a position to elaborate. The existence of spatial relations is a consequenceof two self-modications of the original creative consciousness: a self-distantiation from itscontent, and a multiple localization within it. The result, objectively conceived, is a multitudeof substances in possession of relative positions. Add to this the involution of the executiveforce in the individual substance, and you end up with a multitude of formless individualswhose spatial relations are governed by a seemingly mechanical action that conforms to certain

correlation laws.So much for the how. But why should the exclusive concentration be carried to suchan extreme that nothing remains in front of the veil of avidya but a multitude of formlesssubstances with spatial relations? Why would sachchid ananda involve its innite creativedelight and its omnipotent consciousness-force in formless particles and a seemingly mechanicalaction? Sachchid ananda being what it is, there can be only one answer: for the fun of thething. In the physical world, sachchid ananda is playing Houdini, enchaining itself as best itcan, challenging itself to escape, to re-discover its true self and its powers, to affirm itself in conditions that appear to be its very oppositenonbeing rather than sat ,16 inconsciencerather than chit , insentience (and, at a later stage, pain) rather than ananda but which arealso the conditions that lend the greatest possible stability and concreteness to a progressiveself-realization that may go on for ever (Sri Aurobindo, 1987, pp. 41011).

And what accounts for the actual form of the correlation laws? It is eminently plausible thatthe well-established laws of physics (the so-called standard model of fundamental particlesand forces plus general relativity) are preconditions (conditions of possibility) of brahman sevolutionary adventure. The validity of these laws, at least as effective theories, 17 is guaranteedby the existence of chemistrythe existence, that is to say, of a variety of building blockssuch as that listed in the Periodic Table (Mohrhoff, 2002c). Chemistry in turn is likely to bea precondition of the adventure of evolutionparticularly biological evolution (Barrow andTipler, 1986), the rst act of the Vedantically conceived drama of evolution.

The affinity between panpsychism and the Vedantic theory of existence developed so far isobvious. Each fundamental particle is brahman , and brahman is not only sat but also chit .However, since a fundamental particle lacks internal structure, it cannot be in possession of an indirect, representational consciousness. Nor does the multiple concentration that sustainsmatter, given its exclusiveness, allow particles to be directly conscious. If there is something

15 Recall note 9: fundamental particles are formless entities.16 We have seen how brahman manifests an apparently unconscious and insentient world. How does it create

something that appears to lack being ? Think of space. Seen from the aperspectival poise of the creativeconsciousness, this is a self-extension of what is at once, indistinguishably, a unitary substance and a unitaryself. It is sat-chit extendingitself to make room for variations. Now look at the same thing from the perspectivalpoise of an ignorant consciousnessaconsciousness that has lost sight of the one self and substance. Space thenpresents itself as a void, an extended nothing, a nonbeing , which nonetheless somehow, mysteriously, exists.

17 Effective theories are theories that are valid over many but not all length and time scales. Recent observa-tions indicating that there may after all be physics beyond the standard model do not invalidate the standardmodel as an effective theory. On the contrary, the standard model is now so well tested that it has beensuggested that it be known simply as the theory of matter (Wilczek, 2001).

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it is like to be a fundamental particle, it may be compared with what it is like to be brahman minus the power to give itself determinations/content. The goings-on in the physical worldexist for the creative consciousness that supports them from behind the veil of avidya , as wellas for certain aggregates of particlesfor aggregates have internal structure, and a sufficientlycomplex internal structure can support a representational consciousnessbut they do not existfor a particle. In the physical world, consciousness emerges .

Most panpsychist ontologies are beset by the combination problem (Seager, 1995) orconstitution problem (Chalmers, 1997), while emergentism has been criticized for leavingthe meaning of emergence completely unclear (Hut and van Fraassen, 1997). The combi-nation problem boils down to the question of how atomic experiences can be combined intoa unied experience such as that we possess. Since the present ontological framework doesnot countenance atomic experiences, this problem does not arise in it. Experiencetheconsciousness relationdoes not go all the way down. The present ontological framework isequally immune to the criticism of Hut and van Fraassen, for if a clear meaning can be given tothe submergence or involution of the capacities of sachchid ananda , as was done in the previouscouple of sections, the emergence of these capacities is equally well-dened.

9 The Beauty of a Rose

Evolution, Vedantically conceived, is the coming into existence of individuals that are increas-ingly in possession of the creative capacities of sachchid ananda . It proceeds by a series of reversals of the involutions considered in Sections 6 and 7, albeit with this difference thatthe reversals do not take us from one possible world to another; they occur in the same worldand result in a partial integration of the previously evolved capacities into the newly evolvedone (Sri Aurobindo, 1987, Chap. XVIII). 18

Near the end of our tour of various Vedantically possible worlds, we passed through aworld in which the conceptively creative faculty was involved in the objectively executiveone, which nevertheless was the perfect vehicle of expression of a subliminal creative imagi-nation. The terrestrial plant kingdom reects something of that world, albeit with a crucialdifference. In the physical world, forms are realized as sets of spatial relations among formlessparticles, and the internal spatial relations of a plant appear to be governed by the same pairof factors that shape, say, a rock: (i) a seemingly mechanical action (which issues from thesupraindividual poise of chit-tapas , conforms to the laws of physics, and sets the stage forthe drama of evolution) and (ii) randomness. (A terrestrial rock is part of a chaotic systemin which the quantum-mechanical randomness of the microdynamics gives rise to genuinelyrandom macroevents such as a downpour or a lightning strike.) How, then, can a subliminalcreative imagination be causally efficacious? How can it be responsible for the shape of a rose?

One might conceive of a substance that relates to the particles constituting a given organ-ism in the same way as brahman relates to all particles. From this intermediate substanceintermediate between brahman qua unitary substance and the (apparent of effective) multitudeof fundamental particlesthere could issue an individual self-determining action in the sameway as a universal self-determining action issues from brahman . While the latter action con-forms to the laws of physics, the former could exert, within the organism, a modicatory

inuence patterned by a species-specic law. However, this speculation fails to reckon with theresistance that the physical action of chit-tapas must offer to modicatory inuences. Evolu-tion was meant to be a difficult and protracted adventure, not a swift and easy escape fromself-imposed fetters. While modicatory inuences must occurfor otherwise matter couldnever be the medium of expression of a creative imaginationwe should expect such inu-ences to be resisted to the greatest possible extent: they will not occur where they need notoccur. Since the physical action of chit-tapas provides for a wide variety of chemical buildingblocks, it appears to be quite capable of mimickingwithin a sufficiently complex and appro-

18 It is to be expected that only the evolution of the original creative principle has the power to achieve acomplete integration of the previously evolved capacities.

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priately structured aggregatethe modicatory action just contemplated. While we cannotreject offhand the possibility that morphogenesis 19 is guided by patterned modications of thephysical dynamisma morph(ogenet)ic eld (Sheldrake, 1982)a Vedantist has reasons tobelieve that physicalism is right where morphogenesis is concerned.

Phylogenythe coming into being of a biological speciesis a different matter. Contempo-rary Darwinism capitalizes on the well-known ability of fortuitous microevents to signicantly

affect an organisms heritable morphology. It postulates that the relevant microevents aregenuinely random, and that environmental selection pressures do the remaining work. If nopatterned modications of the physical dynamism occur, these microevents provide the onlypossible interface between a subliminal creative imagination and the shapes of material things.Since the emergence of such an interface is an essential ingredient in a Vedantic theory of evo-lution, the relevant microevents cannot be all that random. Such a theory entails an element of unnatural selection without, however, entailing detectable violations of physical laws. Forthe modication of the probability of a random event is detectable only as an altered relativefrequency, and thus only if the event occurs frequently, whereas a speciating microevent (or se-quence of microevents) happens just once. An action that involves no detectable violationsof physical laws is obviously the most stealthy way for a nonphysical agent to be causallyefficacious in the physical world. 20

10 Representational Consciousness

If subjectivity emerges, it is appropriate to ask at what stage. Are plants conscious? Areprotozoa conscious? A Vedantist has reason to believe that they are. If evolution is to be anadventure, the experience of the adventure ought to begin as soon as possible. To give theindividual plant or protozoon the sense of being an agent with a stake in the proceedings, twothings are needed: lawful stimulus-response relations 21 and psychophysical bridging laws of the sort proposed by Chalmers (1995). These make it possible to associate with an automaticresponse the sense of a voluntary pursuit/avoidance of the pleasant/unpleasant.

While rudimentary varieties of consciousness may well be present in organisms that lackbrains, a richly differentiated representational consciousness needs the support of a sufficientlycomplex structure with a sufficiently complex physiology, such as the animal brain. To whatextent can we hope to understand the link between conscious experience and the brain? Atpresent there is no hint of a theoretical understanding of the nature of that link that wouldtake us beyond brute correlation towards a transparent theory of causal connection (Gray,1995). This is nothing that consciousness theorists need to be ashamed ofphysicists are inthe same boat. 22 Quantum mechanicians keep designing increasingly counterintuitive gedanken experiments (some of which performed meanwhile) demonstrating the inconsistency of the

19 The development of form and structure in an organism during its growth from embryo to adult.20 The genetic paradigm invoked in this paragraph has been undermined by a plethora of uid genome

processes, which destabilize and alter genes and genomes in the course of development. Since many of thesegenetic changes are passed on to the next generation, heredity can no longer be seen to reside solely in the DNApassed on from one generation to the next. The stability and repeatability of development is distributed overa whole gamut of extremely sensitive feedback interrelationships (Ho, 1996). This allows a subliminal creative

imagination to realize its expressive designs also through weak, one-time modications of the physical laws.21 Plants respond in a variety of ways to a variety of stimulilight (phototropism, phototaxy, photonasty,

photoperiodism), water (hydrotropism, hydronasty), chemicals (chemotaxy), heat (thermonasty), touch (thig-motropism, thigmonasty), gravity (geotropism). Paramecia exhibit responses such as avoidance and habitua-tion, which involve several types of movement performed by hundreds of hairlike appendages called cilia. Thecomplex ciliary actions are coordinated by a peripheral cytoskeletal network, which is connected to internal mi-crotubulesand other cytoskeletal structures. Several authors have identied a central conuence of cytoskeletalstructures (the neuromotorium), which has been dubbed the paramecium brain. In addition, cilia havesensory functions; their perturbations are transmitted to the cell via microtubules (Hameroff, 1994).

22 It is therefore unfair to criticize dualist philosophersof mind for failing to explain how a nonmaterial mindcan act on matter. Such critics must be reminded that we do not even know how matter can act on matter(Mohrhoff, 2005, in review).

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world in compliance with psychophysical laws. In this way it all looks natural, as if Ihad nothing to do with it.

6. The laws that correlate the content of your phenomenal world with neurally presentedinformation about the external world, are designed to maximize the likeness of yourphenomenal world to the relevant aspects of the physical world, subject to the constraintsimposed by the limited scope of the neurally presented information. By the relevantaspects of the physical world I mean those that are intended to feature in the experiencesfor which this world has been created, as distinct from those that are instrumental inmaking these experiences possible. 24

Among the aspects that the phenomenal world owes to our subliminal selves, the most promi-nent is unity . We allude to this unity (as well as to the unity of experience in general) when wedescribe consciousness as the relation between a (unifying) container and its (unied) content .It is also implicit in our description of consciousness as existence (of a multitude) for a (single)self. This twofold characterization reects a twofold relation of the subliminal self to the phe-nomenal world: (i) Self-extended to make room for private determinations, it is right whereits immediate objects are; it is coextensive with the expanse that contains them. (ii) Sep-arated from phenomenal objects by a distance that is psychological rather than physical, it

creates a view that exists for it. This twofold relation corresponds to the two fundamentalpoises of the original creative consciousness vis- a-vis its creation: comprehending ( vij nana )and apprehending ( praj nana ). 25

While phenomenal objects supervene on neural ring patterns (in the sense of no changein consciousness without a change in neurobiology), neither the self for which they exist northe expanse in which they exist are supervenient; these lack neural correlates. This conictswith the prevailing approach to consciousness, which Searle (2000) has dubbed the buildingblock approach. According to the latter, specic ring patterns of specic neurons or groupsof neurons produce specic sensory experiences, complete with an expanse that contains themand a self for which they exist. 26 If this were the correct approach, one would have to explainhow individual experiences come to constitute a unied experience featuring one containingconsciousness and one viewing self. A somewhat different formulation of this notorious problemis obtained by noting that although the visual cortex is teeming with feature maps, 27 it appearsto lack a master map where it all comes togetherwhere features attain the integratedform in which they are perceived. Yet another way of stating the binding problem is to pointout that the brain processes visual information along several pathways (concerned, respectively,with form, color, motion, and stereopsis), and that these do not seem to converge anywherein the brain. This lack of neural feature integration or neural convergence is to be expectedif the phenomenal world is the private creation of a subliminal self, and if the creation takesplace as stipulated under item (5) above. There is no reason why instructions to place certainfeatures in the same phenomenal location should be present in the same cortical location. We

24 The phenomenal world is not optimized to represent these latter aspects, which is another reason whymaking sense of the laws of physics is so hard (Mohrhoff, 2001, in review).

25 When we try to discern the container consciousness in itself or the viewer self in itself, we at rst draw

a blank. This is so because what we are trying to discern is subliminal. The veil of avidya is not so easilypenetrated. A sufficiently persistent effort, however, can lead to the experience of that which contains andviews, as skilled meditators will conrm. Consciousness and existence being fundamentally the same, it is clearwhy this experience is ambivalently described either as a content-free (pure) consciousness (Deikman, 1996;Forman, 1990, 1998; Prigge and Kessler, 1990; Shear, 1996) or as the experience of an indeterminate (pure)existence (Haney, 1998; Shear, 1998).

26 According to Searles unied eld approach (Searle, 2002), neural ring patterns only modify an intrin-sically unied, pre-existing consciousness. From the Vedantic point of view, this is the correct approach.

27 A feature map is a layer of the cerebral cortex in which cells map a particular phenomenal variable in sucha way that adjacent cells generally correspond to adjacent locations in the visual eld. In the macaque monkeyas many as 32 distinct feature maps have been identied (Clark, 2000).

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shouldnt expect to nd copies of the nished productsphenomenal objectsin our heads(that is, in the physical world) if these products exist in the phenomenal world.

Vision is now widely recognized as a process of reconstruction: from optical images atthe eyes, human vision reconstructs those properties of the physical world that are useful tothe viewer (Marr, 1982). Research on spatial localization in various sense modalities, percep-tual illusions, and virtual reality has demonstrated that perception is essentially an act of

imagination guided by relatively sparse clues from out there (Velmans, 2000; Durgin, 2002).According to Ballard (2002), one of the most astonishing observations is the extent to whichour perceptions are inventions. For Davies, et al . (2002) this warrants the conclusion thatthe constructions of vision cannot justiably be called re constructions. 28 On the other hand,it is widely recognized that a signicant part of the activity of the human brain is dedicatedto an analysis of visual and other sensory data, while synthetic neural processes engaged inthe construction of complete percepts are conspicuous by their absence. These complemen-tary neurobiological ndings lend strong support to the idea that the phenomenal world isthe product of a subliminal creative imagination. What the subliminal self requires for theconstruction of the visual world is parameters specifying such features as the relative locations,shapes, directions of motion, and viewer-centered depths of outlines, the reectances and tex-tures of surfaces, and the positions and spectral compositions of light sources. For several of these parameters it is known in considerable detail how the brain extracts them (Hubel, 1995).The analyzing brain knows nothing of the phenomenal signicances of these parameters. Itis the constructing self that interprets them in terms of outlines, surface colors, textures, andso on.29 In this it is guided by rules that incorporate an implicit knowledge of the externalworld: the shapes of things are bounding surfaces; objects tend to move rigidly or piecewiserigidly; surface reectances tend to change abruptly; light sources tend to be overhead, 30 andso on (Davies, et al ., 2002). These rules form part of the psychophysical laws according towhich the phenomenal world supervenes on neural ring patterns.

A purely supervenient consciousness is epiphenomenal 31 and therefore, from the selection-ists point of view, completely useless. A selectionist who recognizes the irreducibility of con-sciousness is duty-bound to repudiate supervenience: consciousness must have a raison detre ,and for this it must be causally efficacious (Gray, 1995; Cotterill, 2001). From the Vedanticpoint of view, this is putting the cart in front of the horse. Consciousness does not have a

raison detre . Consciousness is the raison detre not just consciousness as we know it butthe evolution of all that is still involved, including the omnipotent consciousness-force creativeof the physical world. Evidently, this is anything but epiphenomenal, even though our surfaceconsciousness is indeed epiphenomenal. Causal efficacy is a prerogative of a consciousness that,

28 While the phenomenal world can certainly be a useful graphic interface to the external environmentwithoutactually resembling it, a wholesale denial of resemblance would be self-defeating. Whatever has been learnedabout the brains part in vision has been learned by studying phenomenal brainsbrains-as-we-see-them. Thebrains that play a part in the process of vision, on the other hand, are real-world brains. If neurosciencehas something to say about the process of vision, phenomenal brains must bear a signicant resemblance toreal-world brains.

29 Like pink and turquoise, spatial extension is a quale that can only be dened by ostentationby drawingattention to something of which we are directly aware. While it can lend a phenomenal quality to numericalparameters, I cannot be reduced to such parameters. If you are not convinced, try to explain to my friendAndy, who lives in a spaceless world, what phenomenal space is like. Andy is good at maths, so he understandsyou perfectly if you tell him that it is like the set of all triplets of real numbers. But if you believe that this giveshim a sense of the expanse we call space, you are deluding yourself. We can imagine triplets of real numbersas points embedded in space; he cant. We can interpret the difference between two numbers as the distancebetween two points; he cant. (At any rate, he cant associate with the word distance the remoteness itconveys to us.) He is as incapable of knowing the ultrasmooth expanse (Metzinger, 2000) of phenomenal spaceas Mary was of knowing red before her release from the black-and-white room in which she grew up (Jackson,1986).

30 Optical illusions arise in situations in which these rules do not apply, such as when a bump in a wall litfrom below is seen as a dip lit from above.

31 At any rate, it seems safe to say that it hasnt yet been shown how a supervenient mind might be causallyrelevant (Kim, 1998; Vaas, 2002).

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for most of us, remains subliminal, or so I will argue in the nal part of this essay.

PART 3: VOLITION

11 The Illusion of Free Will

There is one point on which psychological evidence, neurological data, philosophic analysis,phenomenological introspection, and spiritual experience all seem to agree (Libet, et al ., 1999):the folk model of free will, which plays such an important part in our daily lives, is seriouslyawed. There are at least two gaps in the phenomenology of rational volition, a gap betweenreection on the reasons for a decision and the actual decision, and a gap between the intentionto carry out a particular action and its actual performance (Searle, 2000). Reection does notappear to be causally sufficient for the ensuing decision, and an intention does not appearto be causally sufficient for the ensuing action. While folk psychology lls these gaps with aself-in-charge I reected, I decided, I actedall that is warranted by introspection is thatthoughts occurred, a decision was taken, and an action was performed. We nd nothing toback up our claims of authorship or the spontaneous conviction thatof course!we could

have decided or acted otherwise.What we do have is evidence to the contrary. Our psychological make-up is such as toencourage a sense of authorship where it is clearly illusory. It is pretty well documented,for instance, that we remove our hands from a re before we feel the pain, even though itseems to us that we removed our hands in response to the pain. (The trick is based on asubjective reversal of the objective temporal order.) We seem to be designed to entertainillusions of authorship and causal sufficiency, and not just in the metaphorical sense in whichadvantageous motor responses like the pulling of hands out of res are said to be designedby natural selection.

It comes as no surprise that our rst attempt to deal with the gaps between reasons, rationaldecisions, and deliberate actions (once the dummy self has been discounted) conforms to whatSearle (2000) lists as Hypothesis 1 : the indeterminacy at the psychological level is matched byan unbroken determinism at the neurobiological level. Searle himself rejects this hypothesisas intellectually very unsatisfying because it is a modied form of epiphenomenalism:It would have the consequence that the incredibly elaborate, complex, sensitive andaboveallbiologically expensive system of human and animal conscious rational decision-makingwould actually make no difference whatever to the life and survival of the organisms. Asan alternative he puts forward Hypothesis 2 , according to which the absence of causallysufficient conditions at the psychological level is matched by a parallel lack of causally sufficientconditions at the neurobiological level.

Searle apparently believes that the ability to make rational decisions enhances an organismsprospects for survival. I dont think it does. If Hypothesis 2 is true and rational decisions arecausally efficacious, the neurobiological state at a given time is not sufficient to determinethe organisms subsequent behavior, so selection pressures cannot be responsible for it. Tothe extent that a particular behavior lacks causally sufficient conditions at the neurobiological

level, it offers no handle for natural selection. Does the ability to envision and (to someextent) choose between alternative futures afford a Darwinian edge? It seems to me that, onthe contrary, the ability to choose between alternative futures reduces an organisms prospectsfor survival. An organism that is compelled by its neurobiology to act in the selectionally mostadvantageous manner (as judged by the information available at the neurobiological level)has a clear advantage over an organism that is allowed the luxury of acting (if it so chooses)in a less advantageous manner. To the extent that rational behavior lacks causally sufficientconditions at the neurobiological level, it appears to place us at a selectional disadvantage. 32

32 This seems to be borne out by our prociency at rationalizing the irrational, bungling consistently, andself-destructing methodically.

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According to Searle, an explanation citing the reason someone acted on, rather than acausally sufficient condition, requires us to postulate an irreducible self to account for theadequacy of such an explanation. I grant Searle that such an explanation is not intelligibleunless something or someone has the power to take decisions and to initiate actions. But theintelligibility of an explanation is not sufficient for its adequacy. If the self postulated by Searleis to be more than a souped-up version of the dummy self-in-chargeif it is to account for

more than the adequacy of the folk model of free willthen we need to know how it relates tothe rest of our psychophysical make-up. Suppose that supervenience is true, that Hypothesis2 is true, and that in spite of this there is a clinchersomething that in conjunction with theinitial overall state uniquely determines the subsequent overall state. (Searle actually defendsthis unusual combination of claims.) Then, owing to the insufficient causation at both levels,the clincher is neither physical nor mental . What I mean is that it is neither a physical stateor event nor among the contents of the surface consciousness. It can only be a subliminalintervention. The self postulated by Searle has to be our subliminal self.

A subliminal self can easily supply the causally sufficient conditions of the decisions whichthe surface self arrogates to itself. It can just as easily be causally efficacious, if only by causingtemporary and localized modications of the laws that govern the physical or default modeof chit-tapas .33 Such modications can have two kinds of effects. The causal concatenationof events at the neurobiological level depends, inter alia , on the synaptic strengths of some1015 interconnections. A temporary subliminal intervention at this level could modify someof these interconnections and thereby have a lasting effect on the natural functioning of abrain. It is possible that many, perhaps most, of our rational decisions have causally sufficientconditions at the neurobiological level (in agreement with Hypothesis 1), but that the causallinks between these sufficient conditions and the ensuing decisions were forged by subliminalinterventions. It is equally possible that at least some of our rational decisions result from directsubliminal interventions and thus lack causally sufficient conditions at the neurobiological level(in agreement with Hypothesis 2).

Where does this leave my near-incorrigible conviction that I could have decided or acteddifferently? If this means that I could have decided differently because the neurobiologicalantecedent conditions could have been different, it leaves it intact. If it means that I couldhave decided differently given the same neurobiological antecedent conditions, it also leaves it

intact, for there could have been a different subliminal clincher. But if it means that I couldhave decided in the absence of any causally sufficient conditions, then I think it is an illusion.Neurology helps expose the illusion by demonstrating that cortical precursors of voluntarymovements can be used not only to anticipate (Deecke, et al ., 1969; Libet, 1985, 1999) butalso to pre-empt 34 (Grey Walter, 1963) peoples own conscious decisions. We can expect sucheffects when we are dealing with decisions that have sufficient conditions at the neurobiologicallevel. On the other hand, the neurobiological data do not rule out the possibility of causallyefficacious decisions lacking neurobiological precursors. In particular, readiness potentials arenot causally sufficient (Searle, 2000; Haggard and Libet, 2001).

A stronger case against the libertarian kind of free will can be derived from the testimonyof yogins, mystics, and others who to some degree have succeeded in penetrating the veilof avidya and exploring their subliminal selves. A frequent rst result upon entering thisdomain beyond the neurally determined surface consciousness is the spontaneous attitude of adetached witness ( s akshin ) who monitors the goings-on at the surface without taking part in

33 Nothing nonphysical can be causally efficacious without modifying (violating) physical laws. The hopethat a causally efficacious consciousness can act through the loophole of an indeterminism a la QM, withoutmodifying physical laws, does not bear scrutiny (Mohrhoff, 1997, 1999).

34 Patients with electrodes implanted in the motor cortex were invited to look at a sequence of slides,advancing from one to the next, at their own speed, by pushing a button. Unbeknownst to them, however,the button was a dummy. What actually advanced the slides was a burst of activity in the motor cortex,transmitted directly to the projector via the implanted electrodes. The patients reported the curious feelingthat the projector was anticipating their decision, initiating a slide change just as they were about to moveon, but before they had decided to press the button (Glaxton, 1999).

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them: thoughts, feelings, intentions, and actions are experienced impersonally and undistortedby any sense of ownership, authorship, or responsibility (Blackmore, 1986; Bricklin, 1999;Glaxton, 1999). 35 A second possible result is a growing awareness of the true origins anddeterminants of our thoughts, feelings, intentions, and actions. 36 Either result is sufficient todispel whatever libertarian delusions we may have harbored.

Paradoxically as it may seem, these results are the rst steps towards a genuine control. For

what at rst appears to be simply a witness is actually the giver of the sanction, anumant a .The determinism of Nature ( prakriti ) could not function, nor could subliminal inuences beeffective, without its permission. The subliminal self ( purusha ) can learn to withhold itssanction, to either accept or reject subliminal inuences, to choose. 37 To understand how itschoice can be both free and determined by causally sufficient conditions, we need to return tothe principal affirmations of Vedanta.

12 Compatibilism: The Vedantic Version

While brahman s freedom is absolute and its consciousness-force omnipotent, if it creates aworld, it creates it in accordance with a world-governing idea that is a particular cosmicexpression of its innite quality/delight ( ananda ). The fact that in any given world brahman s

creative knowledge connes itself to the realization of one

cosmic potentiality in no wise robsit of the sense of its omnipotence. Even if the creative knowledge proceeds, in part, froma multitude of individual standpoints, the individual may experience an absolute freedom,for each may nd its self-realization not hindered but complemented and completed by theself-realization of the others.

The sense of a curtailed freedom arises along with the experience of conict, in which thecreative knowledge, though always one at its origin and in its fundamental truth, appears tobe at variance with itself: the action proceeding from one individual appears to be impededor foiled by the actions proceeding from other individuals and/or by the action proceedingfrom brahman s supraindividual poise. Such an appearance is prone to arise in a consciousnessthat, like our surface consciousness, is too crude to be aware of its true self and potentiality.Such a consciousness is incapable of comprehending the true reasons and causally sufficientconditions of the decisions it seems to take or the actions it seems to initiate. It is thereforeat least a logical possibility that what the surface self, in light of its reasons, judges to be astruggle of conicting wills or forces, the self behind the veil experiences as the spontaneousand unhampered realization of its nature and potentiality (Sri Aurobindo, 1987, 9641014).

On the other hand, it stands to reason that a subliminal self forced to realize its potentialitythrough occasional weak modications of the physical dynamism in a human brain and by the

35 This detachment can bring with it a keen sense of the unreality of all particulars, or it can deepen into thepure consciousness mentioned in note 25.

36 Our subliminal self . . . is the concealed origin of almost all in our surface self that is not a construction of the rst inconscient World-Energy or a natural developed functioning of our surface consciousness or a reactionof it to impacts from the outside universal Nature,and even in this construction, these functionings, thesereactions the subliminal takes part and exercises on them a considerable inuence.. . . Our waking state isunaware of its connection with the subliminal being, although it receives from it. . . the inspirations, intuitions,

ideas, will-suggestions, sense-suggestions, urges to action that rise from below or from behindour limited surfaceexistence. (Sri Aurobindo, 1987, pp. 42526).37 [W]e discover that that which observes all this is a mental being.. . . This mental being or Purusha rst

appears as a silent witness. . . . But afterwards we nd that the Purusha, the mental being, can depart from itsposture of a silent or accepting Witness; it can become the source of reactions, accept, reject, even rule andregulate.. . . If the Purusha in us becomes aware of itself as the Witness and stands back from Nature, that isthe rst step to the souls freedom; for it becomes detached, and it is possible then to know Nature and herprocesses and in all independence, since we are no longer involved in her works, to accept or not to accept, tomake the sanction no longer automatic but free and effective; we can choose what she shall do or not do in us,or we can stand back altogether from her works and withdraw easily into the Selfs spiritual silence, or we canreject her present formations and rise to a spiritual level of existence and from there re-create our existence(Sri Aurobindo, 1987, pp. 308, 348).

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instrumentality of reasons and values within the surface selfs ken, does feel hampered in itsself-realization. The integrality of the original Vedanta of the Upanishads accommodates all of these experiences: there is the jva , the individual brahman experiencing its existence in time asan unhindered self-unfolding, there is the emergent surface self with its illusions of authorshipand causal efficacy, and there is the individual purusha , who at rst passively supports thedeterministic workings of prakriti , but who can also take charge. The purusha s taking charge

begins in earnest when he38

comes to the surface or, to use an equally valid metaphor, whenthe surface consciousness penetrates the veil and recognizes the hitherto subliminal purusha as its true self.

Evolution, Vedantically conceived, may be likened to the construction of a bridge acrossan initial gulf between the innite principle of ananda and the nite principle of form. Forevolution, so conceived, starts out not with one but with two sets of individuals: (i) a multitudeof fundamental particles whose spatial relations constitute material forms; and (ii) a multitudeof entities that individuate the ananda at the origin of the physical worlda multitude of self-aware and mutually complementary potentialities of the one self-aware potentiality that isto realize itself here. Between these multitudes there initially yawns a gulf. As mentioned inSection 6, the development of ananda into mutable forms passes through at least two distinctphases: the formation of expressive ideas by a conceptive faculty, and the realization of suchideas by an executive force. At the outset both the conceptive faculty and the executive forceare missing. The individual ananda lacks the means to issue expressive ideas, while matter,owing to its fragmentation into formless particles and the initial subjection of their spatialrelations to the physical determinism, lacks the means to express ideasexcept one: the ideaof the physical determinism, which sets the stage for the drama of evolution.

The construction of the bridge across the gulf between ananda and form takes place fromboth ends. On the outside we witness the emergence of an executive, formative force anda rudimentary emergence of sachchid ananda s conceptive faculty. Initially, both are heavilydependent on reproductive structures, which are kept in existence by the physical mode of chit-tapas , and which are brought into being through temporary weak modications of the same.The origin of these modications is a complex subject beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice itto say that they might proceed from a hierarchy of supraphysical worlds, and that this mightbe one raison detre of the possible worlds considered in Section 6 (Sri Aurobindo, 1987, pp.

76591). The subliminal interventions that make up our minds could have a similar origin.The bridge building from the other end begins in earnest when we become aware of thehitherto subliminal purusha as our true self. We then begin to exercise a genuine control, byeither rejecting or willingly accepting the (no longer subliminal) inuences that mould our (nolonger surface-centered) existence, or by exerting such inuences ourselves. This possibilityimplies a causal efficacy, and it is this that enables our self of ananda to express itself in thephysical world. For the choices made and the inuences exerted by the purusha are determinedby this self of ananda our self-aware qualitative essence, our true individual nature andpotentiality, svabh ava . There thus emerges a soul dynamism by which this modies thedeterminism that supports our surface existence. The outer evolution of life and mind iscomplemented by the inner evolution of a dynamism by which the ananda at the origin of the physical world is at last able to make its presence felt.

This brings us back to the question that arose at the end of the previous section: how canthe choices made by the purusha be both free and determined by causally sufficient conditions?The causally sufficient conditions reside in his self of ananda , our qualitative essence. But todecide and act as prompted by our qualitative essence, our svabh ava , is to decide and act withgenuine freedom. Our true freedom (as compared with the illusory freedom of our surfaceself) is limited only to the extent that we are unaware of our svabh ava , or lack the conceptivefaculty to develop it into expressive ideas, or lack the means or the will-power to realize theseideas.

38 The complementary principles of purusha and prakriti are traditionally regarded as male and female,respectively.

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The scope of the emergent soul dynamism is at rst curtailed by two factors. On the onehand, its causal efficacy is conned to occasional interventions in the deterministic workings of Nature. On the other hand, Natures inner dimension is not sufficiently differentiated, herevolved conceptive faculty not sufficiently vast and supple, to permit an adequate developmentof the individuals qualitative essence into expressive ideas. At a certain stage of spiritualdevelopment we are able not only to take the right decision but also to know intuitively that

it is the right decision, but our comprehension still lacks the depth and breadth necessary tosee why it is the right decision.There is more to attain. The purusha s interventions in the course of Nature serve two pur-

poses: to manifest his essence of quality/delight as best he can with the expressive dynamismcurrently at his disposal, and to increase the power and scope of this dynamism until it be-comes commensurate with his svabh ava . By the very logic of an evolutionary manifestation of sachchid ananda , what has been involved must evolve. This includes a conceptive faculty thatis equal to the task of expressing the worlds and each individuals essence of ananda , as wellas an executive force that is unrestricted in its scope. One can foresee a progressive integrationof the workings of Nature into a growing soul dynamism (Sri Aurobindo, 1987, pp. 70241).Natures determinism will be increasingly susceptible to modications up to the point where itceases to exist because all causation has become the spontaneous outow of soul quality: all isdetermined solely by that; nothing is determined any more by the transtemporal concatenationto which we tend to reduce the intension of causation.

If there is no libertarian free will, why should there be the illusion of such a free will?The outer evolution proceeds in inverse logical orderthe executive force emerges beforethe conceptive faculty that ought to control it, and the conceptive faculty emerges before theself-aware quality that ought to use it for self-expression. Until the conceptive faculty is inplace, expressive ideas are supplied by subliminal inuences of various kinds, and until our self of ananda comes to the surface, the conceptive faculty, too, is used by subliminal inuencesof various kinds. Unaware of the true determinants of its decisions, the surface consciousnesscannot but fall prey to the libertarian illusion. For a conceptive faculty generates reason

particles, consciousness, volition: a vedantic vision - ulrich mohrhoff

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