What does the SNP’s influence formulating the Scotland Act 2016 tell us about the impact of small

parties at Westminster?

This research will consider whether small parties have an impact at Westminster, using the example

of the SNP in the formulation of the Scotland Act 2016. This study will use Deschouwer’s model to

both define what constitutes a small party, and to judge the impact that the SNP had in this case

(McAngus, 2015:637). In reviewing the literature, it becomes clear that the UK parliamentary system

creates a model which favours the party of governance and official opposition at the expense of

effective representation of smaller parties (Robinson, 2010; Norton, 1990). The Scotland Act 2016 is

a pertinent example as it takes a small party at its largest and most influential, and in dealing with an

issue closest to its core aims. The impact the SNP had on the Scotland Act will be measured through

content analysis of the debates, focusing on the first and second committee sittings (ibid; UK

parliament, 2016). This will be assessed by an analysis of the amendments proposed by the SNP in

regards to the prospect of Full Fiscal Autonomy. In reference to the emphasis in the literature, the

second part of the analysis will assess the informal impact that the SNP had in exercising ‘Blackmail

Potential’ in order to influence the more powerful parties to propose similar amendments

(McAngus, 2015:637). The research discerns that, despite being active in the debates and making

some progress influencing the Labour Party, the SNP had little substantive impact and were

unsatisfied with the final configuration of The Scotland Act.

Introduction

The importance of this topic is derived not just from the impact that small parties can have within

Westminster, but also how responsive the Westminster system is to the pervasive narratives of

independence and small parties that has proved effective in grassroots movements across the UK

and in the devolved assemblies. At the time of writing, the success of the SNP in the 2015 general

election and the success of UKIP in securing, and potentially being prominent enough to be claimed

to have won, an EU referendum (Usherwood, 2016:28) have combined with a period of change and

disruption which suggests that there is a distinct opportunity to reassess the impact smaller parties

can have within British politics. By extension, this essay also assesses the extent to which the

‘executive dominance’ thesis is accurate, through the analysis of the Conservative government’s

response to the SNP (Blühdorn and Jun, 2007:101).

This essay defines a small party using Deschouwer’s model (Table 1), as a party which is below the

‘Threshold of Governance’, and does not have ‘Coalition potential’, to be a strong enough party to

enter the executive alongside another party (McAngus, 2015:637). This is a more astute and

developed definition than those presented by Copus et al (2008:4), that subjectively defines small

parties as any smaller than the three (traditionally) dominant parties. Deschouwer’s model allows

for flexibility in definition and recognises the changing dynamics within Westminster following the

downfall of the Liberal Democrats in the 2015 general election (BBC News, 2015a). This flexibility

therefore suggests that at the stage Liberal Democrats were in coalition they had significant enough

influence to not be considered a small party, but could be considered a smaller party both before

and after this tenure. This research will measure impact through a small party’s ability to influence

legislation, in this sense using the example of the SNP in the formulation of the Scotland Act 2016.

This draws on Deschouwers model of the ‘Threshold of Relevance’, that to be relevant a party must

affect ‘government policy output’ in this case influencing the formulation of the Scotland Act 2016

(McAngus, 2015:637).

Literature review

The literature presents a clear picture that the UK political system sets significant barriers to entry

for smaller parties (Robinson, 2010). The UK employs a system of first-past-the-post in electing its

MPs, which extenuates the margin of victory of larger parties, creating a two party system (Lijphart,

1999:12). As such widespread, yet in no area dominant, support will translate to a lower share of

seats in the House of Commons than the share of the popular vote would suggest (Rogers and

Walters, 2006:28). This creates what has been termed a ‘manufactured majority’, or what is

sometimes accused of creating ‘a Cartel Party’, which has had a debilitating effect on the fortunes of

small parties (Lijphart, 1999:15; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002:119). Using Deschouwers’ model to

grade the importance of political parties, small parties have significant difficulty moving past both

the threshold of representation, the ability to win seats; and the threshold of relevance, the ability

to influence the current political system (McAngus, 2015:637). This essay takes the position that, in

order to have a genuine impact, a small party must approach the ‘Threshold of Relevance’ (ibid). The

electoral bias was shown in the 2016 general election; despite receiving 12.6% of the popular vote,

UKIP received an insignificant single seat out of the 650 parliamentary seats available (BBC News,

2015a). Despite this apparent unfairness, the SNP benefited from a highly concentrated share of the

public vote in Scotland, winning 56 out of 58 of the Scottish seats (ibid).

However, it is unlikely that even this significant parliamentary standing will lead to an effective role

in scrutinising executive power, due to the propensity of the executive to dominate the legislature

(Norton, 2013:101). Despite the fact Norton (1990:178) considers Westminster to be a ‘policy-

influencing legislature’, this is more likely to apply to the party of governance or the official

opposition, as opposed to smaller parties (Lijphart, 1999:125). In comparison to other countries, the

majoritarian UK system offers few opportunities for smaller parties to influence and scrutinise

legislation (Lijphart, 1999:12). This is noted by Tseblis (2009:16) whose analysis of the ability for the

governing party to set the agenda – a key tool to exert executive dominance (Blühdorn and Jun,

2007:101) – ranked the UK system highest in a study of 18 European countries. The Netherlands

employs a system of legislative formulation in which smaller parties have greater influence in

compelling the government to adopt its amendments (Andeweg, 2000:702). This resulted in the

radical, smaller, Communist party supporting 84% of government legislation between 1963 and 1986

(ibid). This is in contrast to the UK, in which 95% of government amendments were accepted

compared to only 0.1% of non-government amendments (Russell and Cowley, 2015:129).

Parliamentary procedure in the UK allows for informal channels such as the government discreetly

taking the basis of an amendment from an opposing party, and presenting it as their own

amendment. Russell and Cowley found that, when a government makes a ‘consequential’

amendment, over 60% were traceable to the influence of an opposing party (Russell and Cowley,

2015:129). To this end, Deschouwer suggests a party can ‘force other parties to respond to it’,

primarily by threatening not to cooperate with future initiatives (McAngus, 2015:637). Despite this,

it is notable that the power stays in the hands of the Minister; it is at their discretion to decide

whether to accept an opposing party’s suggestion (Russell and Cowley, 2015:127). The literature

therefore suggests that small parties can only have a limited impact on the formulation and scrutiny

of bills and what little impact they can have must be drawn from informal channels.

Methodology

This study will judge a small party’s impact at Westminster in theoretically favourable circumstances,

in this case the SNP’s role in formulating the Scotland Act 2016. The Scotland Act represented a large

devolution of powers from Westminster to the Scottish Assembly, seen as an important concession

in preventing Scottish Independence during the 2014 referendum campaign. As stated, the SNP had

a sizeable parliamentary presence of 56 seats. This case will therefore be chosen as there are few

examples where a small party has had the position, mandate and motivation to make an impact in

the formulation of policy at Westminster.

On the face of it, the SNP’s position in the formulation of the Scotland Act confirms the suggestion in

the literature that small parties do not have an impact at Westminster. Despite a number of

amendments proposed by the SNP, all were rejected under strict discipline by the Conservative whip

(Learmouth, 2015). In investigating this in more depth, this research will use content analysis to

establish whether the SNP had a formal or informal impact. Due to the expansive length of the

debate, this study will focus on the area which concerned the SNP the most, namely Full Fiscal

Autonomy (FFA) contained within clauses 12-18 in Part 2 of the Bill (BBC News, 2015b; Scotland Act,

2016). This was devised through an in depth analysis of the first committee stage, in which the topic

of FFA dominated the SNP’s narrative, intent on securing as close to a federal solution as was viable.

This research will analyse the votes on Fiscal Autonomy in the first and second committee sitting,

firstly by judging them on a simple success/failure basis (UK Parliament 2016).

As the assumption drawn from the literature is that these amendments will fail under strict

discipline from the Conservative whip, this study will also attempt to discern a more informal

influence, such as whether the SNP had any success convincing other, more influential, parties to

support their proposals. This will be performed through an analysis of what number of opposing MPs

voted in favour of amendments concerning FFA. Furthermore, two amendments proposed by a

Conservative backbencher and the Labour party will be discussed in greater depth. This will include a

discussion of the impact that the SNP had influencing these votes, but will conclude that they were

proposed by the two main parties to make political gain rather than as a direct response to the SNP’s

influence. This method is appropriate because it is more likely for the government to informally

‘accept’ the proposal of an opposing party by writing it as their own amendment than to outright

concede, and the circumstances concerning these concessions must be explored in order to discern

true impact (Russell and Cowley, 2015:129).

Analysis

Full Fiscal Autonomy (The SNP)

The first vote regarding Full Fiscal Autonomy tabled by the SNP was held on the first committee

sitting (House of Commons, 2015b). Hostility among the larger parties to the amendment was

expressed by John Redwood who suggested that the Bill ‘would require transitional agreements’

which had not been acknowledged – implying that the amendment was poorly conceived by the SNP

(House of Commons, 2015b c.46). This is related to an institutional barrier which prevents the SNP

from making an impact, as a small party they have both significantly lower funding1 and experience

drafting legislation than the larger parties; a tool to prevent a challenge to the established parties

from smaller new entrants (Ryle, 1981:507; Katz and Mair, 2009:759). It was also argued that the

SNP’s mandate did not extend to deciding Scotland’s fiscal future: ‘the Scottish Nationalist Party

received just over half the vote. Because the Unionist vote was split … it is still the case that Scottish

opinion is fairly evenly balanced. The Scottish nationalists did not get 70% or 80% of the vote’ (House

of Commons, 2015b c.44). If this point is to be applied more broadly, it suggests that small parties

would never have the required mandate to legislate on matters of importance within the UK

parliament. The SNP had a surprisingly successful performance in the 2015 general election; to

expect them (or another small party) to perform better would be unrealistic and would likely mean

they could no longer be considered a small party (McAngus, 2015:637).

The amendment was defeated by a margin of 60 to 309 (Figure 1), with a strong parliamentary whip

from the Conservative government preventing any headway being made (House of Commons, 2015b

c.134). It suggests a strong apathy for the SNP’s argument in convincing other parties to vote for the

amendment, with Labour abstaining from the vote2 and only four MP’s other than the SNP voting for

the amendment (Table 2). The strength of the parliamentary whip in this scenario reinforces

Norton’s (2013:101-103) argument regarding executive dominance; the majority government and

the parliamentary whip means that parliament can rarely, if ever, exercise its ‘coercive capacity’ to

resist government legislation.

1 Particularly useful for employing researches in order to formulate legislation 2 This can be explained both by their apathy towards the SNP’s argument and also their plan to legislate towards an independent commission to decide the issue, described in more detail below.

The SNP also had little success influencing other parties to vote for a second amendment to a similar

effect in the second committee sitting. At this stage, Stewart Hosie of the SNP expressed frustration

concerning the lack of success their amendments were having: ‘So we have confirmation—Labour

and UKIP hand in hand, empowering the Tories to run the rule over Scotland again’ (House of

Commons, 2015a c.1287). Labour justified the approach towards the SNP amendment by suggesting

that: ‘it would cost £7.6 billion next year and up to £10 billion by 2020. It has made it clear that that

is … above the deficit of the UK at the moment and the spending profile of the current Conservative

Government … this has been misquoted by the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson) on a

number of occasions, that that figure is in addition to the current UK deficit’ This suggests that the

SNP were taken less seriously in the Westminster system due to their failure to grasp the intricacies

of drafting legislation and the command of statistics and research that underlies this (House of

Commons, 2015a C.1283).

The vote was defeated by 504 votes to 58 (House of Commons, 2015a c.1298; Figure 2). In this, the

full SNP contingent and only two other MPs voted for the amendment, the Conservative government

and the Labour Party voted unanimously against it (Figure 4; Table 2). Labour had proposed an

amendment within the same session proposing an independent commission – which explains their

reticence to vote for the measure. This shows the strength of the government whip and also that a

small party can be limited both by the governing and opposition parties. As such, when this example

is applied to Deschouwer’s model of grading political parties, it is clear that the SNP cannot achieve

‘Blackmail Potential’ (Table 1), either through the strength of its arguments or through the threat of

not cooperating with the government at a later date – asserting the thesis of executive dominance

within Westminster at the expense of smaller parties (Norton, 2013:101).

Full Fiscal Autonomy (Sir Edward Leigh)

In the first committee sitting a Conservative back bencher (Sir Edward Leigh), proposed an

amendment resembling the SNP’s call for FFA (House of Commons, 2015b c.30). On the face of it,

this asserts the argument presented within the literature that smaller parties can have informal

influence which influences the actions of government (Russell and Cowley, 2015:129). Despite this

attempt to assert Fiscal Autonomy, the likelihood was for ‘the Whips might ensure that my new

clause is defeated’ (House of Commons, 2015b c.34), acknowledging the power of the government

to limit the impact that the SNP could have on this issue. Within the debate, Sir Edward Leigh

suggested that the vote was ‘the acid test for the SNP over whether they will back their own policy’

(House of Commons, 2015b c.31).

The vote was defeated by a margin of 298 to 68 (House of Commons, 2015b c.142; Figure 3) – a

similar margin as the first vote proposed by the SNP. Despite this, the assistance of a

parliamentarian from an opposing party did yield a larger impact for the SNP, with 12 MPs from

opposing parties supporting the amendment (Table 2). Although the interest of a government

backbencher can be argued to be an indication of the impact of the SNP’s arguments, it is more a

testament of the ability of government to control the debate and set the agenda (Tseblis, 2009:13).

This example therefore asserts the ability of the government to limit the SNP, rather than an

example of ‘Blackmail Potential’ (McAngus, 2015:637). By proposing the amendment themselves,

they ensure that questions are directed at a member of government, that they can assert their own

argument, and be comfortable that the party line is followed and the amendment is ultimately

defeated. Tseblis (2009:13) claimed that this is a form of ‘government agenda setting’, and provides

the government with the ‘institutional means to prevent [the Bill] being altered on the floor’. It

reinforces the view expressed in the literature that the UK has a particularly dominant executive

which can set agendas and decide legislation without the need to make compromises with smaller

parties (Tseblis, 2009:16).

Independent Commission (Labour)

In the second committee sitting the Labour Party proposed an amendment suggesting that a

decision concerning the viability of Full Fiscal Autonomy should be turned over to an independent

commission (House of Commons, 2015a c.1278-1279). In this example it is clear that the SNP had a

greater influence on the debate than previously – indirectly influencing 192 opposing MPs to vote

for the amendment (Figure 4). In discerning the source of this influence, the most convincing

argument is that by showing some sympathy for the SNP’s proposals shows the impact of their

presence in reducing Labour’s parliamentary presence in Scotland, necessitating a change of policy

to regain ground against the SNP. This is mirrored by the Scottish Labour party’s submission to the

Smith Commission, despite the assertion that their proposal including that ‘the Scottish Parliament

can increase the rates of tax in the higher and additional bands… the Scottish Parliament will be able

to alter both the level of tax and the progressivity of the tax system’, they concluded that ‘VAT,

national insurance contributions, corporation tax, alcohol, tobacco and fuel duties, climate change

levy, insurance premium tax, vehicle excise duty, inheritance tax, capital gains tax and tax on oil

receipts should remain reserved’ (Boyack et al, 2014:9-10). This submission was made far in advance

of the debates concerning the Scotland Act, and the fact that Labour decided that the viability of

FFA, a proposal which goes much further than their favoured solution outlined above, should be

decided by an independent commission, shows the impact that the SNP are exerting upon Labour.

This form of external impact that a small party can have was seen in England in the previous

parliamentary term; the possibility of losing voters to UKIP forced the Conservatives to mimic their

policy and hold a referendum on EU membership. When using Deschouwer’s method of grading the

importance of political parties, it is arguable that in this sense the SNP is showing a movement

towards a higher grade, to having ‘Blackmail Potential’, or the ability to make other political parties

respond to it (McAngus, 2015:637; Copus et al, 2008:8). The vote, alike the one proposed by the SNP

and Sir Edward Leigh was defeated, by a smaller margin of 192 to 376 (House of Commons, 2015a

c.1288). This shows the importance of a small party developing ‘Blackmail Potential’ but the picture

is significantly more complex than this. Despite the possibility that this could move the SNP towards

their goal of Full Fiscal Autonomy the SNP voted against the amendment (House of Commons, 2015a

c.1288-1290).

As such, using this amendment as an example of the SNP having a genuine impact can be criticised in

two ways. Firstly, the amendment was unsuccessful; although the SNP showed some ‘Blackmail

Potential’, it was not directed at the governing party and therefore had no overall impact on the.

Secondly, the Labour Party was not truly sympathetic to the SNP’s goals, if it were the SNP would

surely have voted in favour in the second vote, they did so in order to regain a footing in Scotland.

Labour effectively admitted their still negative perception of FFA by arguing that ‘If the SNP plan for

full fiscal autonomy were to go ahead … that would lead to very, very severe austerity in Scotland’

(House of Commons, 2015a c.1285).

Discussion and conclusions

This study finds that all four votes on FFA failed and therefore asserts the view in the literature that

small parties only have a minimal impact on legislation. The example of the SNP and the Scotland Act

was chosen due to their uniquely favourable circumstances, a topic core to their beliefs, with a large

parliamentary standing, lobbying against a government with only a slender majority. Despite these

extraordinary circumstances, the SNP were disappointed with the final version of the Act in

accordance with their main aim of securing Full Fiscal Autonomy – Westminster remains insulated to

the recent success smaller parties have had in achieving their goals outside of its walls. The

amendments were defeated by large margins with only a minority of opposing MPs voting in favour

of their amendments, showing little to no evidence of ‘Blackmail Potential’ (Figure 5; McAngus,

2015:637). The SNP were fundamentally constrained by executive dominance and therefore their

inability to make arguments which appealed to the reasoning of the larger parties. It can be argued

that the SNP had a large impact in influencing the proposal of an Independent Commission, however

this view is flawed because the SNP did not support the amendment and, more broadly, it failed to

make the final draft of the Bill. Angus Robertson MP presented a damning assessment of the role

allowed for the SNP in the report stage debate: ‘with less than six hours allocated for debate—

notwithstanding the fact that an offer was made by the SNP for a second full day on Report—the

Government tabled 200 new clauses and amendments, and we had an opportunity for only seven

Divisions. On an issue that is supposed to be defining for Scotland’s constitutional future, that is no

way to legislate. The idea that legislating as we just have is worthy… is way out of place’ (House of

Commons, 2015c c.189).

As such, this research concludes that small parties exercising influence due to the convincing nature

of their arguments, or their ability to exercise ‘Blackmail Potential’, as can be seen within the

consociational Dutch model, cannot be observed due to the institutional constraints of the

Westminster parliamentary system. Further findings include that it is more likely for a small party to

have influence by convincing larger parties to suggest their amendment3 but that this in itself

requires a degree of prior influence. Despite the usefulness of this case study in establishing whether

it is ever likely that small parties can have an influence on legislation formulation, caution should be

exercised when applying these results to the wider debate on the impact of small parties. The

drawback of using a small party in extraordinary circumstances is that it cannot be applied to all

cases, most debates are shorter, mostly technical rather than substantive, and smaller parties rarely

have the same motivation in scrutinising one particular bill as the SNP did in regards to the Scotland

Bill. This study therefore asserts the executive dominance theory, and suggests that this dominance

is unlikely to be challengeable by a smaller party, however determined or well positioned.

3 As seen in the example of the Independent Commission

Appendices

Table 1: Deschouwer’s (2008) Integrated Party Lifespan Model (as Shown in Elias and Tronconi,

2011)

Reference: McAngus, C. (2015), ‘Party elites and the search for credibility: Plaid Cymru and the SNP

as new parties of government’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 18(3), pp.

634–649

Table 2: Table to show results of Content Analysis investigating the SNP’s role in formulating The

Scotland Act 2016 (with regards to Full Fiscal Autonomy)

Table to show votes on Full

Fiscal Autonomy

Success/Failure? Votes

for:

Votes

against:

Opposing

MPs in

favour

Margin

of defeat

1st Committee (The SNP) Failure 60 309 4 249

2nd Committee (The SNP) Failure 58 504 2 446

Sir Edward Leigh Failure 68 298 12 230

Independent Commission

(Labour)

Failure 192 376 192* 184

*The SNP did not support this amendment, limiting conclusions that they had significant influence in

this case.

Figure 1: First vote on Full Fiscal Autonomy (SNP)

Reference: House of Commons. (2015b), ‘Committee of the whole house’, Scotland Bill, Monday 15

June 2015, c.134, Available at: http://bit.ly/1QRG1k3 (Accessed: 10/12/16).

Figure 2: Second vote on Full Fiscal Autonomy (SNP)

Reference: House of Commons. (2015a), ‘Committee of the whole house’, Scotland Bill, Monday 29

June 2015, c.1298, Available at: http://bit.ly/2glJrQq (Accessed: 01/11/16).

60

309

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Ayes Nays

Nu

mb

er o

f V

ote

s

Vote on Full Fiscal Autonomy (1st Committee Sitting)

58

504

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Ayes Nays

Nu

mb

er o

f V

ote

s

Vote on Full Fiscal Autonomy (2nd Committee Sitting)

Figure 3: Vote on Full Fiscal Autonomy (Sir Edward Leigh)

Reference: House of Commons. (2015b), ‘Committee of the whole house’, Scotland Bill, Monday 15

June 2015, c.142, Available at: http://bit.ly/1QRG1k3 (Accessed: 10/12/16).

Figure 4: Vote on an Independent Commission to decide Full Fiscal Autonomy (Labour Party)

Reference: House of Commons. (2015a), ‘Committee of the whole house’, Scotland Bill, Monday 29

June 2015, c.1288, Available at: http://bit.ly/2glJrQq (Accessed: 01/11/16).

Figure 5: Summary of all votes on Full Fiscal Autonomy

68

298

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Ayes Nays

Nu

mb

er o

f V

ote

s

Vote on Full Fiscal Autonomy (Sir Edward Leigh, 1st Committee Sitting)

192

376

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

Ayes Nays

Nu

mb

er o

f V

ote

s

Independent Commission on FFA (2nd Committee Sitting)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Ayes Nays Ayes Nays Ayes Nays Ayes Nays

Nu

mb

er o

f V

ote

s

Four votes on Full Fiscal Autonomy

Summary of votes on Full Fiscal Autonomy

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