partition of india and the princely states

7/27/2019 Partition of India and the Princely States

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Partition and the Princely States

S.R. Mehrotra British policy before and after 1857

Governor-General Lord Dalhousie (1848-56) believed that India – as a British dependency – should be ‘one and

indivisible’.1 He wanted the princely states to disappear. So in seven years he annexed seven princely states on one

pretext or the other. This became one of the chief causes of the rebellion of 1857-8.2 As A.O. Hume wrote: ‘The

whole grand apparatus of a highly civilized government shrivelled up in a single month over a vast country … like

some pompous emblazoned scroll cast into a furnace.’3 Dalhousie’s successor, Lord Canning (1856-62), who had to

face the storm, learnt a different lesson. According to him, some of the princes, like Sindhia and Holkar, who had

r efused to join the rebels, had proved themselves ‘breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over

us in one great wave’.4 After the revolt Dalhousie’s policy was given up, and the British decided to preserve and

pamper the princes.

In the later 19th century there were no fewer than 562 states in India and they formed a good one-third of the wholecountry. They differed from each other enormously in size and importance. The sovereignty over the states was

divided between the British government and the ruler of the state in proportions which differed greatly according to

the history and importance of the several states, and which were regulated partly by treaties or less formal

engagements, partly by sanads or charters, and partly by usage. As paramount power, the British government

exercised exclusive control over the foreign relations of the states; assumed a general but limited responsibility for

the internal peace and security of the state; and required subordinate co-operation in the task of resisting foreign

aggression and maintaining internal order. The Indian state did not have any international existence. It could not

make war. It could not enter into any treaty or arrangement with any of its neighbours. Indian princes could not even

directly communicate with each other.

The territories of British India and of the Indian states were inextricably interlaced. The territories of the Indian

states were intersected by British railway lines, postal lines and telegraph lines. For each state there was a British

political officer, representing the civil authority exercised by the paramount power, and in each of the moreimportant states there was a resident political officer with a staff of subordinates. Detachments of British troops

occupied cantonments in all the more important military positions. The states maintained a number of selected

troops in such a condition of efficiency as would make them fit to take the field side by side with British troops. The

officers and men of these troops were largely natives of the state, and they were under the command of the ruler of

the state, but they were inspected and advised by British officers. All these were limitations on the powers of the

state.

The princely states were scattered haphazard over the map of India. Though the geographical layout of the states

was a patchwork, taken together they constituted a great cruciform barrier, broken by gaps of varying width, but

more or less effectively separating the different parts of British India from one another. This fact had obvious

strategic and political importance, which was underlined by Professor Coupland in the early 1940s. ‘An India

deprived of the States’, he wrote in 1943 in his famous report on the constitutional problem in India, ‘would have

lost all coherence. For they form a great cruciform barrier separating all four quarters of the country. If no more thanthe Central Indian States and Hyderabad and Mysore were excluded from the Union, the United Provinces would be

almost completely cut off from Bombay, and Bombay completely from Sind. … India could live if its Moslem limbs

in the North-West and North-East were amputated, but could it live without its heart?’5 It is interesting to recall that

as one travelled by train from Delhi to Bombay in 1947 – a distance of about 600 miles – one crossed only 70 miles

of British Indian territory, the rest was all the territory of the Indian princes.



Most of the rulers of the states were Hindus, but their religion was not necessarily that of the majority of their

subjects. Whereas Muslims numbered one-fourth of the total Indian population, they numbered only about one-sixth

of the population of the states.

Though the points of contact between British India and princely India were many, the latter were slow in

assimilating the new principles and ideas, methods and practices current in the former. But the growing influence of

modern conditions of life was busy breaking down the isolation of the states from one another and from the rest of India. New forces of constitutional development and national movement were beginning to pose problems which

could not be solved by keeping India divided into two watertight compartments. It was an artificial division,

artificially maintained. But even with the best will in the world, the marriage of Indian India with British India

would not have been an easy task. And the British surely were not eager to act as the priest and bring about a happy

union. In fact, they had a vested interest in perpetuating the division.

States as bastions of conservatism and imperialism

In order to counter the Indian nationalist movement, the British played two trump cards: one was that of the

Muslims; the other that of the states. In the long run, the first proved to be a success; but the second proved to be a

failure. The relative failure of the British in using the states – which they regarded as bastions of conservatism and

imperialism – against the Indian struggle for freedom and unity was due to many factors: (i) the lack of unity among

the Indian states; (ii) the failure of the princes to get the support of their subjects; (iii) the dissatisfaction of the princes with the government of India’s Political Department which dealt with them; and (iv) the patriotism of some

of the Indian princes. But the British did not fail to try.

From Lytton (1876-80) in the 1870s to Hardinge (1910-16) in the second decade of the 20 th century repeated

attempts were made by the British to organize the Indian states as a conservative bloc against the Indian nationalist

movement, but they were not very successful. With the emergence of Gandhiji on the Indian stage and the

introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in the early 1920s, the British became more anxious than ever

before to use the princes as a counterweight to Indian nationalism. Under the smokescreen of bringing together

Indian India and British India and of working towards an ultimate federation of India, the British organized a

Chamber of Princes on 8 February 1921 which did little more than promoting joint action on the part of the Indians

states and bringing them closer to the Political Department of the government of India. But it had another and a far

more important consequence. So far the Indian question had been triangular (involving the British, the Indian

nationalists, and the Muslim communalists). From now onwards another element was introduced into the conflict,that of the Indian states, and it became quadrangular. It is this quadrangular situation which we encounter at the

Round Table Conferences in the early 1930s, and in the making of the Government of India Act of 1935.

The sham federation of 1935

When in the 1930s the British, under pressure from the Indian Liberals, agreed to the idea of an Indian federation,

they saw to it that if at all the federation came into existence, it would be controlled by them and not by the

Congress. The federal provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935 gave the Muslims one-third of the seats in

the central legislature, though they were only a quarter of the British Indian population. The princely states were

even more generously treated. They had 40 per cent representation in the upper house and 33.3 per cent in the lower

house, though the population of the states was less than a quarter of the total population of India. The representatives

of British India were to be elected, but the representatives of the states were to be nominated by their rulers. Therewas also a provision that all powers connected with the exercise of functions of the crown in its relations with the

states were not to be transferred to the federation, i.e. that paramountcy would not be transferred to the federation.

That was not all. The states were free to join or not to join the federation. And it was well known that the bigger

states like Hyderabad and Kashmir would never join it. The federation could come into existence only when a

sufficient number of states had joined it to ensure that half the states’ quota of seats had been filled in the upper

house and half the population of the states had been included. This was a condition almost impossible to be fulfilled.

The states were thus given a veto over the question of federation. The friends of the princes in Britain, Winston

Churchill and others, had got a promise from the British government that the princes would not b coerced, and



unless the princes were coerced they would not join the federation. The story of the appeasement of the states did

not end there. The federation could enjoy in the several states only those powers and functions which they agreed to

confer upon it by their instruments of accession.6

Could this ‘gigantic quilt of jumbled crotchet work’,7 as Winston Churchill described the federation envisaged by

the Government of India Act, 1935, really function? I personally believe that the federation proposed by the Act of

1935 was not only not meant to work, it was in fact unworkable.

Some persons have blamed Willingdon (1931-6) and Linlithgow (1936-43) for not pressing ahead with the scheme

of federation speedily enough during their viceroyalties. They have regretted that the Second World War intervened

and the federal proposals had to be shelved. They have gone further and asserted that if the federation had

materialized by 1939 the partition of India would have been avoided. As a student of modern Indian history who is

fairly conversant with the facts, I am not inclined to attach much weight to such ‘ifs’ and ‘might -have- beens’. The

Act of 1935 was not intended to give India either freedom or unity.

First, freedom. The draftsman of the 1935 Act was being absolutely honest and correct when he described it as an

Act ‘to make further provision for the government of India’ 8 by the British. In order to prove this point I shall

produce only two witnesses. In the early stages of the consultations which led to the framing of the Act, Sir Samuel

Hoare, the then secretary of state for India, drew up, on 12 December 1930, a memorandum for the consideration of

the Conservative Party Business committee, in which he presented all-India federation as an opportunity of avoidingdemocracy and responsibility in the central government of India, of extricating ‘British India from the morass into

which the doctrinaire liberalism of Montagu [secretary of state for India, 1917-22, and the chief architect of reforms

of 1919] had plunged it’. Hoare pointed out that the British would be yielding ‘a semblance of responsible

government and yet retain in our hands the realities and verities of British control. The viceroy would have large

overriding powers. The army would be reserved to British control. Some eighty per cent of the Indian revenues

would be kept out of the hands of an Indian finance minister. The federal executive would not be responsible or

removable in the British sense.’9 In December 1939 Lord Linlithgow, the viceroy, wrote to Lord Zetland, the

secretary of state for India: ‘But there is also our own position in India to be taken into account. After all, we framed

the Constitution as it stands in the Act of 1935, because we thought that way the best way – given the political

position in both countries – of maintaining British influence in India. It is no part of our policy, I take it, to expedite

in India constitutional changes for their own sake, or gratuitously to hurry the handing over of controls to Indian

hands at any pace faster than we regard as best calculated on a long view, to hold India to the Empire.’10

Second, unity. Could ‘the paper federation’11 of 1935 preserve the unity of India? Could it have prevented the

partition of the country? I have argued at length elsewhere12 that the creation of an Indian federation, such as

postulated by the Government of India Act, 1935, before 1939 would not have prevented the partition of India. The

demand for Pakistan had already emerged.13 Only the Muslim League did not officially adopt it as its goal until

March 1940. If there was any prospect of the federation materializing earlier, the Muslim League would have

adopted the slogan of Pakistan also earlier. But this is not the point which I wish to discuss here.

Believing as I do in the unity of my country and rejoicing in the fact that the Indian states have been integrated with

the rest of India to form the present Indian Union, I do not regret that the federal provisions of the Act of 1935 were

never put into effect. I am glad that the princes were not wise enough in their time and were ultimately swept away.

It would have been a disaster if they had seen their way to join in the making of an Indian federation in the late

1930s. A federation which included some states and excluded other states, which enjoyed different powers and

functions in different states, was unlikely to promote Indian unity. If the integrity, sovereignty and autonomy of theIndian states had been recognized and institutionalized by some federation in the 1930s, it would have been

extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reverse the process in 1947.

After their sweeping victory in the elections of 1937 many Congressmen became eager to try even the wretched

federation proposed by the Government of India Act of 1935, because they thought they could dominate it. They

tried both the stick and the carrot with the princes. The stick was an intensification of the agitation by the All-India

States’ People’s Conference and the local Praja Mandals against the princes for constitutional privileges. Even

Gandhiji now came out openly against the princes and fasted at Rajkot in 1938. The carrot was the bait thrown out

to the princes by the Congress that they would be welcome in the proposed federation if only they would take care to



send representative men to the federal legislature. As soon as this was known, the Muslim League, which had so far

paid lip-service to the idea of federation, became openly inimical to it; and the British, who had hoped that they

would be able to control the federation with the help of the Muslims, the princes, and others, became lukewarm

about it. So the federation failed to materialize, not because the Congress opposed it, but because the Muslim

League, the British and the princes lost interest in it.

Once the Muslim League adopted the demand for Pakistan in March 1940 and the Muslims all over the country began increasingly to rally to its support, Congress leaders prepared themselves for the unpalatable eventuality of

partition. Their strategy was very simple. The Muslim League should have nothing but its pound of flesh. It should

get nothing more than what Jinnah later described as ‘a maimed, mutilated and moth -eaten Pakistan’,14 i.e. a smaller

Pakistan (without Assam, west Bengal and east Punjab). The struggle for Indian freedom must continue unabated,

and if unfortunately the Muslim League succeeded in getting the country partitioned, the unity of the rest of India

should be preserved.

The British were still playing the crescent card; but the more they played the Muslim card now, the more difficult it

became for them to play the state card effectively. The Indian problem now became more and more a Hindu-Muslim

or a Congress-Muslim League problem. The British accepted the principle of Pakistan publicly for the first time in

the famous Cripps proposals of March 1942 which said that any province which did not wish to accede to the future

union of India could stay out of it and enjoy the same status.15 And what applied to the British Indian provinces also

applied – and with greater effect – to the Indian states. Through its resolution of 2 April 1942 the WorkingCommittee of the Congress rejected the long-term proposals of Cripps. The resolution said:

The complete ignoring of ninety millions of people in the Indian States, and their treatment as commodities at the

disposal of their rulers, is a negation both of democracy and self-determination. While the representation of an

Indian State in the constitution-making body is fixed on a population basis, the people of the State have no voice in

choosing those representatives, nor are they to be consulted at any stage while decisions vitally affecting them are

being taken. Such States may in many ways become barriers to the growth of Indian freedom, enclaves where

foreign authority still prevails, and where the possibility of maintaining foreign armed forces has been stated to be a

likely contingency and a perpetual menace to the freedom of the people of the States as well as the rest of India.

The acceptance beforehand of the novel principle of non-accession for a Province is also a severe blow to the

conception of Indian unity and an apple of discord likely to generate growing trouble in the Provinces, and which

may well lead to further difficulties in the way of the Indian States merging themselves into an Indian Union.Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and unity and any break of that unity especially in the modern world

when people’s minds inevitably think in terms of ever larger federations would be injurious to all concerned and

exceedingly painful to contemplate. Nevertheless, the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people of

any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will. While recognizing this

principle the Committee feel that every effort should be made to create a common and co-operative national life.

Acceptance of this principle inevitably involves that no changes should be made which would result in fresh

problems being created and compulsion being exercised on other substantial groups within that area.

The proposal now made on the part of the British War Cabinet encourages and will lead to attempts at separation at

the very inception of the Union and thus create great friction just when the utmost co-operation and goodwill are

most needed. This proposal has been presumably made to meet the communal demand, but will have other

consequences also and lead politically reactionary and obscurantist groups among the different communities to

create trouble and divert public attention from the vital issues before the country.16

A careful reading of this resolution would reveal that while the Congress Working Committee rejected the long-term

proposals of the Cripps Mission because it feared that they might lead to the disintegration of India, it had implicitly

conceded (in the italicized portion of the statement) the Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan, provided, first that a

common centre was maintained, and, second, that the non-Muslim majority areas in Assam, Bengal and Punjab were

not to be compelled to join Pakistan. If Jinnah wanted the smaller Pakistan which he ultimately got in association

India, he could have got it any time after 1942.



Towards Partition

By 1946 the British were anxious to withdraw from India as early as possible. There were many reasons for this.

One of them was that they feared that there was going to be ‘a revolution’ in the subcontinent. 17

If the British had tried to fulfil their obligations to everybody in India, they would have still been here. There is no

convenient time for dying or withdrawing. They decided to divide and quit. They fulfilled their obligations to theMuslim League to a large extent, but they had to ditch the princes.

The British had a curious love-hate relationship with the princes. I cannot examine it here. But one point I would

like to make. The British gravely overestimated the power and authority of the Indian princes. Many of them hoped

– even until 1947 – that the bigger states might have an autonomous existence and some of the smaller ones could

do the same by forming unions. The British had clear obligations of honour to the princes. They had nostalgic

notions of the ‘gorgeous east’ and a belief in the stability of autocratic rule. But basically the belief of the British in

the stability of the princes sprang from their long-indulged preoccupation with the tactics of a triangular or

quadrangular situation in India.

On the eve of the transfer of power the British government spelled out its policy towards the Indian States in the

Cabinet Mission memorandum of 12 May 1946 (actually published on 22 May 1946).18 It was reiterated by Lord

Mountbatten on 3 June 1947.19 Briefly stated, the British policy towards the Indian States was as follows: when the

British withdraw from India, paramountcy would lapse and the rulers of the Indian states would become technically

and legally independent: they could enter into any relationship with the successor government or governments; or

they could remain independent; and they were free to decide all this at their convenience.

Lord Mountbatten made two qualifications to this general statement of policy. He advised the rulers to take their

history, geography and the composition of the population into account while deciding their future. And he also

advised them to make up their minds before the date of the transfer of power (which was later announced to be 15

August 1947).20

The Congress denounced this statement of British policy. It argued that paramountcy came into existence as a fact

and not by agreement and that on the British withdrawal from India the successor authority must inherit the fact

along with the rest of the context. It also insisted that no state should be allowed to declare independence, and thatthe princes must make up their minds to accede to India or ‘Pakistan’, taking into account their geographical

situation, before 15 August 1947.21

If Jinnah and the Muslim League wanted partition in a peaceful and friendly way, they should have supported the

Congress on all these points. I would go further and say that had Jinnah made up his mind before 15 August 1947

that the only state – outside the territory of the would-be Dominion of Pakistan – which he wanted, or could get, was

Kashmir, he could have easily got it. There could have been some straightforward horse-trading. He could have

asked the Indian leaders to keep out of Kashmir by promising to himself keep out of Hyderabad.

Kashmir was hardly a bone of contention between the Congress and the League leaders before 1947. Indian leaders

had enough problems of their hands. Of the 562 princely states, all but a dozen were contiguous to Indian territory.

In June 1947 Mountbatten had gone to Kashmir with the promise of Sardar Patel in his pocket that if Kashmir

acceded to Pakistan before 15 August 1947 India would have no objection.22

I am not trying to argue that Kashmir was no problem. It was a problem – and a problem full of complications.

Kashmir was contiguous to both India and Pakistan. Its strategic importance was great. The Maharaja was a Hindu.

He was in a good bargaining position. He had evil counsellors of all races. One part of the state had a Hindu

Majority, the other had a Muslim majority, and the third had a Buddhist majority. And there was Sheikh Abdullah to

make confusion worse confounded. But, despite all these complications, I am inclined to think that if Jinnah would

have satisfied himself with Kashmir alone, he could have easily bargained with the Congress leaders. He could have

supported the Congress stand about paramountcy and about the desirability of all states acceding to one dominion or



the other before 15 August 1947, taking into account their geographical position and the composition of their

population.

Why did Jinnah not do this? Why did he come out with the astounding statement that the rulers had absolute

freedom of decision: they could join either dominion; and they could make up their minds leisurely. 23 Some say that

Jinnah was a barrister and he was being very legalistic. But this explanation is not satisfactory. Jinnah was not only a

barrister, he was also a politician. Had he such a regard for legal forms he would have quietly accepted Kashmir’saccession to India or at least not countenanced the invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani tribals. The second explanation

often given is that Jinnah was annoyed because he got only ‘a maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan’. This is a

plausible explanation, but not a sufficient one. The real reason, in my opinion, was very different. Jinnah was

playing for high stakes. He knew that Pakistan had no problem of princely states. Almost all the princely states were

in India or contiguous to Indian territory. And a good many of these states had Muslim rulers. He had an eye on

Hyderabad, Bhopal, Rampur and Junagarh. There was not one scheme of Pakistan drawn up ever since the early

1930s which did not include Indian states with Muslim rulers within the orbit of Pakistan. 24

Jinnah had very little to lose and he had much to gain. Kashmir, after all, was predominantly Muslim. He would

easily get it. Why forego the chance of acquiring other states? So he ran after the birds in the bush, leaving the bird

in hand.

Now, I would not say that Jinnah was just being greedy. No, there was a lot of sentiment attached to states likeHyderabad. But I would insist that Jinnah’s move was based on a very clear and cool calculation. Anybody who

knew anything about the Indian problem in those days realized that India could easily survive the surgical operation

of Pakistan, but it could not survive without the Indian states. I have already quoted what Coupland had said on this

point in 1943. He repeated it with a slight variation in 1945 in his well-known book India: A Restatement: ‘India

could live if its Moslem limbs in the north-west and north-east were amputated, but could it live without its

midriff?25 Sir Hamidullah Khan, the Nawab of Bhopal, who also happened to be the Chancellor of the Chamber of

Princes in the 1940s, was Jinnah’s adviser on this subject. He was an ardent Pakistani. He realized ‘the

undesirability of associating too many Hindu States with large Hindu population or even such Moslem states as have

large Hindu population, too closely with Pakistan’, because ‘if that were done it would disturb the Moslem

preponderance in population’ of Pakistan, so, in a note drawn up for Jinnah’s guidance in early June 1947, he

suggested that the latter should offer to associate Indian states with Pakistan in ‘some form of alliance or treaty

relations rather than entry through [the Pakistan] Constituent Assembly’. This, he added, was ‘likely to upset

completely the apple-cart of Hindustan’.26

The easiest was to destroy India was to encourage Indian states to become independent or to accede to or ally

themselves with Pakistan. Jinnah knew this full well. So did Conrad Corfield, the anti-Indian head of the Political

department of the government of India in 1947. And so Jinnah began to tempt Jodhpur, Bikaner, Jaisalmer,

Hyderabad, and even far-off Travancore to become independent or to accede to or ally with Pakistan.

No sooner did Congress leaders learn of Jinnah’s moves than they concentrated all their efforts on defeating him in

his own game. Jinnah found more than a match in Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. It was no treachery or duplicity. It was

a simple game of power politics in which the Sardar defeated the Quaid-e-Azam by his firm and tactful handling of

the problem of the Indian states. Before 15 August 1947 he persuaded almost all the rulers to accede to the

Dominion of India. The notable exceptions were Hyderabad, Kashmir and Junagarh. How they, too, later on acceded

to India is a story too well-known to be repeated here. What India lost by way of Pakistan, she more than made up

by the accession of the states.

Endnotes

1. The phrase was used by the Anglo-Indian weekly Friend of India, 16 March, 14 September 1854, then edited by Meredith Townsend.Dalhousie, in a famous minute, dated 30 August 1848, wrote: ‘I cannot conceive it possible for anyone to dispute the policy of taking

advantage of every just opportunity which presents itself of consolidating the territories which already belong to us, by tak ing possession of States that may lapse in the midst of them; for thus getting rid of those petty intervening principalities, which may be made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of strength, for adding to the resources of the public treasury, and for extending

the uniform application of our system of government to those whose best interest, we sincerely believe, will be promoted ther eby.’ Quoted in

T.R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of the Revolt. India, 1857-1870 (Princeton, 1965) pp. 31-2.



2. Metcalf says: ‘Foremost among the causes of the revolt was Lord Dalhousie’s policy of annexing the princely states of India. The fate which

befell so many states during his tenure of office excited widespread apprehension, not least among the remaining princes, and contributedlargely to that spirit of unrest from which the revolt gathered strength.’ Ibid., p.219.

3. Hume to Lord Northbrook, 1 August 1872, Northbrook Papers, India Office Library, London.4. Dispatch no. 43A of 30 April 1860, cited in Metcalf, op. cit., p.224

5. R. Coupland, The Future of India (O.U.P., London, 1943), pp.151-2.6. V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Bombay, 1961), pp;.34-5; U, Phadnis, Towards the Integration of Indian

States 1919-1947 (Bombay, 1968) pp.98-101.

7. Quoted in H.V.Hodson, The Great Divide (London, 1969), p.48.

8. M.Gwyer and A.Appadorai (eds.), Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-47 (Bombay, 1957), vol. i, p . 323.9. Quoted in R.J. Moore, The Crisis of Indian Unity 1917-1940 (Delhi, 1974), pp. 155-6.

10. Linlithgow to Zetland, 28 December 1939, quoted in Zetland, ‘ Essayez ’ (London, 1956), p.277. 11. The phrase is R.J Moore’s. See his ‘The making of India’s Paper Federation, 1927-35’ and ‘British Policy and the Indian Problem, 1935-

40’, in C.H.Philips and M.D.Wainwright (eds.), The Partition of India (London, 1970), pp.59-94.

12. See my Towards India’s Freedom and Partition (Delhi, 2005), 226-334, passim.13. The idea of Pakistan or a separate homeland for the Indian Muslims had been floating in the imagination of many Muslim intellectuals for

quite a long time. It was born of the feeling entertained and sedulously propagated by certain Muslim intellectuals that their community formed

a distinct cultural and political entity, different from the other Indian communities, especially the Hindus. It was encouraged and fortified bythe sentiment of pan-Islamism, the provision of an exclusive education system, the grant of separate electorates, and the fear that in a united

India the Muslims would inevitably by placed under the domination of the Hindus, who outnumbered them by three to one. But the demand for Pakistan received its real strength and substance from the fact that there were certain regions in India, particularly in the north-west and the

north-east, where the Muslims formed a majority of the population and which they thought they must dominate. But for this accident of geography, the idea of Pakistan – even if it were born – would never have materialized. If the Muslim population of India had been evenly

distributed throughout the subcontinent, it would have been a minority everywhere which could have neither willed nor been in a position to

dominate – as a community – any region. Kingsley Davies rightly observes that ‘had the Muslims been distributed evenly throughout India theidea of Pakistan might have never occurred ’. The Population of India and Pakistan (Princeton, 1951), p.196.

14. Quoted in Hodson, op. cit., p.113.15. Writing on 10 March 1942 to Linlithgow, the viceroy, L.S.Amery, the secretary of state for India, said about the proposals Cripps was

carrying with him to India that ‘the nest contains the Pakistan cuckoo’s egg’. N. Mansergh and E.W.R. Lumby (eds.), The Transfer of Power 1942-7, vol.i (London, 1970), no. 296, p. 396.

16. Gwyer and Appadorai (eds.), op.cit., vol.ii, p.525.

17. According to Sir Francis Wylie, then governor of the United Provinces, Sir Stafford Cripps, a member of the Cabinet Mission, told him inearly 1946: ’There is going to be a revolution here [in India] and we must get out quick.’ Francis Wylie, ‘Federal Negotiations in India 1935 -

1939, and After’, a paper presented in 1966 at the Seminar on the Partition of India, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of

London.18. Gwyer and Appadorai (eds.), op. cit., vol. ii, pp.767-9.

19. Allan Campbell-Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten (London 1951), Appendix, p. 367.

20. Ibid., p.141; Gwyer and Appodorai (eds.), op.cit., vol. ii, pp.773-5.21. See, for example, Nehru’s statement in Leader, 16 June 1947.

22. Campbell-Johnson, op. cit., p.120.

23. See Leader, 18June 1947.24. See R.J. Moore, Escape from Empire (Oxford, 1983), pp. 51-2.25. R. Coupland, India : A Restatement (London, 1945), p278.

26. See Waheed Ahmad (ed.), The Nation’s voice. Vol. VI : Achieving the Goal (Karachi, 2002), p. 549.



Accession of Princely states- who started the trouble ??

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/central-south-asia/261369-accession-princely-states-who-started-

trouble.html#ixzz2gJ9l0yfN

The early history of British expansion in India was characterised by the co-existence of two approaches

towards the existing princely states. The first was a policy of annexation, where the British sought to

forcibly absorb the Indian princely states into the provinces which constituted their Empire in India . The

second was a policy of indirect rule, where the British assumed suzerainty and paramountcy over princely

states, but conceded some degree of sovereignty to them.

Accession of princely states.

After British leave India princely states will become independent.This was the legal statues of Indian

states but like always practice because of political realities were different than theory.

Mountbattens instructions on practice.

Even though princely states are theoretically free to choose independence mountbatten insisted that

princely states should join either India or Pakistan to maintain unity, while doing so geographical

continuity should be considered.This instructions were non binding as a rule but it was suggested,

pressed and practiced by mountbatten for many practical reasons such as geography, peoples

aspirations, lack of resources, administrative ability etc.

Congress's position

congress maintained that princely states should join India or Pakistan according to the geographical

continuity and wishes of the people.when ever a dispute come on this matter a plebiscite should be held.

Jinnaha's position

jinaha did not think people have any say in it and maintained that ruler of the state can decide whether to

remain interdependent or to choose India or Pakistan.He also rejected the role of geographic realities.

kashm ir, junagadh , hydr abad and kalat

kashmir.

kashmir had a Hindu ruler who preferred independence and had a dominant Muslim population(75%). he

made standstill agreement with Pakistan but but couldn't reach one with India.

Nehru was intrusted in accession of Kashmir to India, but when the issue of the accession of junagadhcome up Nehru told liaqat ali khan on Sept 30 1947 that while

India objected to the Nawab’s accession, it would always be willing to abide by the verdict of a plebiscite.

Mountbatten played his role by adding that if need arose Nehru would apply the same principle to other

States too , whereupon, in Mountbattens words “Nehru nodded his head sadly. Mr Laiqat eyes sparkled.

There is no doubt that both of them were thinking of Kashmir”. SP (patel)made it clear that a plebiscite in

Kashmir would be conditional on one in Hyderabad. Not prepared for the latter, Jinnah offered no

plebiscite in Junagagadh.

“Indian Army had already landed in Kashmir. Mountbatten’s proposal was wherever ruler’s religion

http://www.defence.pk/forums/central-south-asia/261369-accession-princely-states-who-started-trouble.html#ixzz2gJ9l0yfN








differed from that of the majority of people, plebiscite should be held. But Jinnah urged for excluding

Hyderabad from the plan,” Noorani revealed.

Jinnah s refusal jinxed Kashmir Noorani Lastupdate:- Thu, 16 May 2013 18:30:00 GMT

GreaterKashmir.com

Patel didn't mind Kashmir joining Pakistan if the raja decides so. Visiting Kashmir between 18 and 23/6/47

Mountbatten had told Maharaja Singh “that if Kashmir joined Pakistan this would not be considered an

unfriendly act by the Govt of India”. According to Menon, Mountbatten said, “he had a firm assurance

from Patel himself”. But patel was angered by Pakistan's acceptance of accession junagadh on Sept 16,

1947 and thereafter he started to work for the accession of Kashmir to India.

Pakistan was already pressuring the raja through border raids and by blocking supplies . On Oct 22,

5000-armed tribesmen from Pakistan entered Kashmir. maharajd requested Indian help, on 26 October

1947 maharaja signed instrument of accession.on 27th it was accepted by Mountbatten.

Life Of Sardar Patel ::Great Indian Leaders

The number one argument in the case of Kashmir vs other princely states which was forcefully accessedby Pakistan is that, UN recognised it as a disputed land and it's an international dispute .

1)In domestic law, if A questions B's title to his bungalow and files a lis pendens (pending litigation)

notice, it ceases to have a marketable title. Internationally, however, the

existence of a political dispute does not becloud legal sovereignty. Ireland seeks reunion with Northern

Ireland but meanwhile the U.K.'s sovereignty over it is not affected. Even the U.N.'s plebiscite resolutions

did not contest India's legal sovereignty over the State

Navigation News | Frontline

2.) To people who ask for plebiscite - UN plebiscite is not legally enforceable with out both parties

agreement, when India was ready Pakistan refused act on UN instructions.

Thus Pakistan is responsible for the situation in Kashmir,

1.by not agreeing for plebiscite in Hydrabad as demanded by India for accepting the plebiscite

demand by Pakistan in Kashmir which was in return of Pakistan's demand for agreeing for a

plebiscite in junagadh. India was for plebiscite in all three princely states but Pakistan's non

cooperation in case of Hydrabad has become a stumbling block in reaching an agreement in other

two states too.

2. by initiating an attack on princely state Kashmir without respecting the standstill agreement

and there by starting the whole chain of military actions.

3. By not by withdrawing it's troops as demanded by UN for the requirement of a plebiscite.

junagadh and hydrabad

junagadh & hydrabad

Hydrabad 's ruler choose to remain independent with the support of jinaha. .There was a standstill

agreement on agreement that Hydrabad will not join Pakistan.

The Nizam of Hyderabad initially approached the British government with a request to take on the status

of an independent constitutional monarchy under the British Commonwealth of Nations . This request was

however rejected.

http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/May/16/jinnah-s-refusal-jinxed-kashmir-noorani-82.asp



http://www.esamskriti.com/essay-chapters/Life-of-Sardar-Patel--7.aspx


http://www.frontline.in/navigation/?type=static&page=flonnet&rdurl=fl1816/18160990.htm








India didn't like the idea of a independent state inside India, which even threatened to side with Pakistan

in case of any India pak war , nizam rejected even to surrender defence, communication and external

affairs and to conduct a plebiscite to decide the matter of accession with India,

Patel warned Nizam that India would never agree to Hyderabad’s independence. Instead he offered to

hold plebiscite in Hyderabad to determine the will of the people on the issue of accession. Nizam first

rejected the idea but pursuant to hard negotiations later accepted it and issued a firman (Ruler’s order)

on April 23rd 1948 specifically stating that a plebiscite will be taken on the basis of adult franchise. But

this agreement fell apart on issues like disbanding of Razakars, Stationing of Indian army on peripheries

& installation of responsible Govt. with the result that plebiscite could not be held.

Hyderabad and Kashmir some parallels Lastupdate:- Sat, 2 Jul 2011 18:30:00 GMT GreaterKashmir.com

so finally India had to overthrew the nizam by a military action called operation polo on Sept 1948 , and

subsequently conducted a plebiscite to secure Hydrabad.

Ruler of junagadh acceded to Pakistan on sept 15, 1947 (Pakistan accepted it on16th in line with it'sview that rulers has all the freedom to take decision regardless of peoples opinion, completely ignoring it's

earlier claim that Hindus and Muslims could not live together ), against the instructions of mountbatten

that only those princely states which share a boundary should accede to Pakistan, by sighting possibility

of sea link with Pakistan.it was against the wishes of the people who were 80% Hindu. India tried to

negotiate by sending menon on Sept 19 , but both nawab and bhutto were evasive, India

surrounded the state (on Sept 24) and asked Pakistan to take back the acceptance of accession

and invited to conduct a plebiscite, India waited for four weeks however Pakistan refused this

offer(Pakistan was ready for a plebiscite if India agree to conduct a plebiscite in Kashmir India in

turn said it would agree if Pakistan willing to accept a plebiscite in Hydrabad ) saying that the

accession was in accordance with the Scheme of Independence announced by the outgoing

British and that Junagadh was now part of Pakistan. Indian cabinet aapproved the take over of

junagadhs three feudatories on Oct 21st and completed by Nov 1. As invited by the diwan of junagadh

who took charge when nawab and bhuto escaped to Pakistan, India conducted plebiscite to secure the

state.

Both this actions were in line with the congress view that princely states should join India Pakistan

according to geography and wishes of the people not buy the decision of the ruler alone.technically

incorrect yet ethnically and morally correct actions.This situation could have been avoided if jinaha

agreed to the mountbatten proposal on Nov 1 1947 to conduct plebiscite in al three states

Accession of kalat

British considered kalat to be a India princely state, just like many other princely states whichwere free to stay independent by rule but not allowed to do so in practice for already explained

reasons.how ever only mountbatten and India shared this view,( jinaha being a lawyer have took a

legaly correct but often politically and practically impossible or incorrect decision).jinaha

recognised kalat as an independent state different than other Indian princely states because

1) jinaha calculated that by doing so Pakistan will become successor of British in terms of treaty

relations with kalat.

2) Pakistan would get direct control of leased areas given by khan to British.

http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/Jul/2/hyderabad-and-kashmir-some-parallels-11.asp





3) Pakistan's official position was that princely states are free to become independent so jinaha

feared if India enters into an agreement with kalat as a counter strategy against Pakistan's

support for Hydrabad and accession of junagadh it will be a difficult situation, so if Pakistan gain

the trust of kalat by accepting it as a sovereign state then Pakistan has a better chance to reach

an agreement with khan of kalat.

khan opted for such a agreement because

1) it will allow him the freedom to stay independent(except for defence, communications and foreign

affairs, Since British were not ready to accept kalath any different than Indian princely state and in

practice none of them were allowed to stay independent . Pakistan's acceptance of kalat's soverginity will

allow them to stay independent. 2) khan considerd jinaha to be a friend so he trusted him to protect

kalath's internal freedom 3) khan was of the impression that leased areas also will return to him, he failed

to see legal complexity.

On 12 th August 1947 the Khan of Kalat proclaimed independence and the flag of Kalat was hoisted.

at a round table conference held in Delhi on August 4, 1947, and attended by Lord Mountbatten, the Khan

of Kalat, chief minister of Kalat and Mohammed Ali Jinnah, in his capacity as the legal advisor of Kalat

State, it was decided that Kalat State would become independent on August 5, 1947. Subsequently, the

rulers of Kharan and Lesbela were informed by the British that control of their regions had beentransferred to Kalat State and the Marri and Bugti tribal regions which were under the British control were

also returned into the Kalat fold, thereby bringing the whole of Balochistanunder the suzerainty of the

Khan of Kalat .

A meeting of the Kalat National Assembly (elections for which had been held a few weeks earlier) held on

August 15, 1947 as well as subsequent meetings of the Assembly, decided not to join Pakistan and

Affirmed the position that Kalat was an independent

state and would only enter into friendly treaty relations with Pakistan.

What was the position of the Muslim League on this issue? The League had, in fact, signed a joint

statement with Kalat and repeated the declaration two or three times

that the League recognized that Kalat was not an Indian state and constituted an independent entity and

the League would recognize and respect this independence. In

fact, as late as August 11, 1947 a joint statement was signed in which the League leaders, now as the

government of Pakistan,again recognize the independence of Kalat. The operative portions of the

communiqué dated August 11, 1947 is worth quoting from:

"As a result of a meeting held between a delegation from Kalat and officials of the Pakistan States

Department, presided over by the Crown Representative, and a series of meetings between the Crown

Representative, HH the Khan of Kalat, and Mr Jinnah, the following

was the situation:

1. The Government of Pakistan recognizes Kalat as an independent sovereign state; in treaty relations

with British government, with a status different from that of Indian

states.

2. Legal opinion will be sought as to whether or not agreements of leases made between the British

government and Kalat will be inherited by the Pakistangovernment.

3. Meanwhile, a Standstill Agreement has been made between the Government of

Pakistan and the Khan of Kalat.

4. Discussions will take place between Pakistan and Kalat at Karachi at an early date with a view to

reaching decisions on Defence, External Affairs and Communications (currency was not mentioned as it

was understood that the Pakistani Rupee was to be used in Kalat, as a successor to its previouscurrency,

the British Indian Rupee). [3]



By October 1947, Muhammad Ali Jinnah had a change of heart on the recognition of Kalat as an

“Independent and a Sovereign State”, and wanted the Khan to sign the same form of instrument

of accession as the other states, which had joined Pakistan. The Khan was unwilling to abandon

the nominally achieved independent status but ready to concede on Defense, Foreign Affairs and

Communications.

However, he was unwilling to sign either a treaty or an Instrument, until and unless he had got a

satisfactory agreement on the leased areas.

As negotiations were not reaching anywhere, The Khan summoned both the houses of the legislative and

a joint session was held on 14 th December 1947 in Dhadar. The issue of accession to Pakistan was

presented before the lower house (Dar-ul_

Awam) by Mr. Douglas Y. Fell, the foreign minister of Kalat. Mr. Fell told

the house that the Government of Pakistan wanted the state of Kalat to announce accession with

Pakistan and subsequent to this the fate of leased areas, Kharan and Lasbela would be decided. He

further told that the Khan categorically told Jinnah that Kalat was not prepared for accession with

Pakistan.

Bizenjos speech of December 14, 1947, in the Kalat Assembly is noteworthy for the ample warnings thatit conveyed to the Pakistani state:

"Pakistan’s unpleasant and loathsome desire that our national homeland, Balochistan should merge with

it is impossible to consider. We are ready to have friendship with that

country on the basis of sovereign equality but by no means ready to merge with Pakistan. We can survive

without Pakistan. But the question is what Pakistan would be without us? I do not propose to create

hurdles for the newly created Pakistan in the matters of defense and external communication. But we

want an honorable relationship not a humiliating one. "

When the Dar-ul-Awam met on February 21, 1948, it decided not to accede, but to negotiate a treaty to

determine Kalat’s future relations with Pakistan.

The Khan of Kalat also called a meeting of the Dar-ul-Umara to consider Quaid’s request for Kalat to

accede to Pakistan. An intelligence report on the proceedings of the meetings reported that the Kalat

State National Party was “propagating that accession meant restriction on their forces and armament,

undesired freedom for their women and

migration of Muslim refuges into the State which will weaken the voice of the original residents”. The

Khan of Kalat, the report said, made a brief speech before the Dar-ul Awam, in which he emphasized the

need to have friendly relations with Pakistan, and also said that the intentions of the Quaid towards Kalat

were good. The Prime Minister of Kalat spoke next, and said that since this House had voted for Kalat ’s

independence,

he went to see the Quaid in January and had a two-and-a-half hour meeting. He said the Quaid wasprepared to help the State in every way, and while independence of the State would remain intact, the

only way forward for Kalat was to accede to Pakistan in the matters of Defence, Communications and

Foreign Affairs.41 The Prime Minister argued

that with accession in respect of the three subjects, the internal independence of Kalat would not be

affected. But Mir Ghaus Baksh Bizanjo spoke against accession to Pakistan, and he argued that if

Pakistan wanted friendship with Kalat, it should restore its leased territories as well as Kharan and Las

Bela. The House dispersed without any intention of meeting again. Dar- ul-Umara asked for three months

to study the terms of accession in order to understand its implications.



The Khan then sent the unanimous decision of both the houses to Pakistan’s Foreign Office through

Prime Minister of Kalat that both houses rejected to accede to Pakistan and will only enter with treaty

relations with Pakistan.he also.asked three months time to study the implications of accession.apparently

Pakistan's claims on kharan lasbela and leased territories were the reasons which provoked leaders of

kalat.

On 17 th March 1948 the Government of Pakistan announced accession of Kharan and Lasbela. Similarly

Makran which was part of Kalat for 300 years was declared a separate state and annexed.

The Khan of Kalat objected to their accession, arguing that it was a violation of Kala t’s Standstill

Agreement with Pakistan. He also said that while Kharan and Las Bela were its feudatories, Mekran was

a district of Kalat. The British Government had placed the control of the foreign policy of the two

feudatories under Kalat in July 1947, prior to

partition.

All these actions generated unrest and strong negative sentiments among the people of Balochistan. On

27 March 1948, Lt.Colonel Gulzar of the 7 th Baluch Regiment under GOC Major General Mohammad

Akbar Khan invaded the Khanate of Kalat. General Akbar escorted the Khan of Kalat to Karachi andforced him to sign on the instrument of accession, as reported by Selig Harrison in his book “On the

Shadows of

Afghanistan”, while Pakistan Navy’s destroyers reached Pasni and Jiwani.

The Khan of Kalat signed the accession papers on 28 th March 1948. Mr. Jinnah signed them on 31st

March 1948.The Khan was then detained, his cabinet dissolved, a large number of Baloch “dissidents”

arrested and the army assumed full control of the state.

let's see some counter arguments.

1) British didn't recognise kalat as independent state but as a Indian princely state by including it

in 1935 govt of India act.

when khan of kalat contested the inclusion of kalat as Indian state , mountbatten in his personal letter

assured him that his excellency recognised the treaty of 1876 and it would henceforth form the basis of

relation between British govt and kalath state.despite of personal assurance it seems mountbatten was

reluctant to recognise kalat as an independent state because, it was obvious that khan if khan is allowed

to stay independent his position will make the position of nizam of Hydrabad adamant and it will create

trouble for unification of India.

As the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, sought to settle the question of accession of all princely states, Kalat

was the subject of a meeting on July 19, 1947. At this meeting Lord Mountbatten, the Crown

Representative, said that those districts which all acknowledged to be administered by Kalat wereMekran, Jhalawan, Sarawan, Kachhi, Dombki and Kaheri. He also said that Las Bela and Kharan were

disputed, as their rulers claimed not to be under the suzerainty of the Khan of.Kalat.

At this meeting, the Prime Minister of Kalat, Nawabzada Aslam Khan, claimed that the relationship of

Kalat with the British Government was defined in the Treaty of 1876 as one of an independent, sovereign

state. While the Viceroy said he would accept this for the purposes of negotiations, Nishtar, the Pakistan

government representative said thathe would not contest this claim.



so you can see that even though kalat was deserving to be independent mountbatten didn't allow its claim

of independence option, to force the khan to come to an agreement with Pakistan. If mountbatten did not

followed that policy then kalat as an Indian state had full right to stay independent, kalat wouldn't have to

claim to be different than India states, it didn't have to enter into a agreement with Pakistan to be

recognised as a sovereign state in order to retain it's soverginity, the leased ares would have come back

to kalat instead of Pakistan, it was same the mountbatten practice which Pakistan used to oppose

benefited Pakistan. Pakistan initially recognised kalaths independence status, of kalat but later back

tracked and forced the merger .

2 . khan was not forced but he willingly signed accession document.

A) khan of kalat didn't have the authority to sign accession without the agreement of upper and lower

house of parliament, and it's clear that they rejected the proposal of accession.khan himself acknowleged

this fact later.

B). khan himself many times declared his wish to stay independent when he was not under the control of

Pakistan,(he was only ready to surrender defence, communication and foreign affairs, when he get a

satisfactory agreement on leased areas) what he spoke under the control of Pakistan is just like

someone's statements recorded under police custody, can't be trusted to be true because he was under

Pakistani pressure. even under such pressure he and his brother who finished jail term once againagitated against Pakistan govt in 1958, although not successful it will give an idea of what he really

wanted.

3. makren, lasbela and kharan were independent princely states.

lord mountbatten, the crown's representatives only acknowledged(on July meeting ) that kharan and

lasbela are ' disputed ' because the there rulers contested the claim of kalat's control over them.makren

was always under the control of kalath,dipute calls for a stand still and settlement as per legal decision

not one sided action of accepting their accession. British never recognise makren as separate state.After

the meeting on August 4 ,the British themselves informed kharan and lasbela that the control of their

territories is given back to kalat state.

For argument sake let's assume that these states were not part of kalath and they had the right to decide

for themselves,even then kalath's situation becomes same as " Hydrabad " was, or even better because

there was no conflict of interest between ruler and his subjects unlike Hydrabad, where he ruler was a

Muslim and population was Hindu,Pakistan already agreed that kalat is not mearlly a Indian princely state

but it's even above that.

This will now show jinaha's hypocrisy, in Hydrabad he supported independent state even when he knew

that it was completely surrounded by India, but he didn't allow kalath to stay independent, he merged it by

pressure and force so Pakistani who shout about Kashmir plebiscite should think about that first before

giving long passionate speeches about self determination and plebiscite in Kashmir.

4) Kashmir is international dispute kalat is not

Any dispute when two countries are involved is a international dispute, not because the merit or validity of

the claims but simply because two countries are involved .In kalat's case it was recognised as a

independent state, so technically it becomes a international issue , but it's not considered as such onlybecause kalath as a country didn't exist today, it lost it's existence to Pakistan,so Pakistan is ble to

contain it as a domestic issue.Regardless of whether today it's an international issue or not we have the

right to talk about and draw comparisons , to the actions of both countries in accessing the princely states

especially when Pakistan is alleging that India is illegally occupying Kashmir, against the will of the

people.so it's only fair to look at the policys and actions of India and Pakistan regarding the accession of

princely states to know who is what?

The argument of "you shouldn't talk about kalat because we don't talk about khalistan,maoists ,goa, etc is



just a escapist strategy to prevent Indians from questioning the hypocrisy in Pakistan's arguments and a

strategy to keep Indian arguments always in defensive position so Pakistan can pretend to be the

champions of self determination, once the whole history of ' kalat's accession comes into the picture,

hypocrisy in Pakistani argument will be exposed.

Finally Pakistan in the beginning stood with the ruler's supremacy and freedom of choice

regardless of peoples aspirations, congress and mountbatten stood for peoples choice over

rulers's decision if there is a conflict, but of course byconsidering geographical realities also.

Pakistan accepted junagadh's choice /India opposed it - consistently with their policy

Pakistan accepted Hydrabads choice/India objected - consistently with their policy

Pakistan accepted kalats independence/India rejected it, nor did India wanted to accede it - again

both nations are consistent in their approach

But hypocrisy is started by Pakistan

1)By not respecting the free choice of Kashmir maharaja and standstill agreement when it

attacked Kashmir.

2) Again another hypocrisy by forcing the kan of kalat to sign a instrument of accession on terms

which were against his wishes as well as against both house of parliament of kalat. where is Indian hypocrisy ?? as accused by Pakistan ?? only thing Pakistan can show as a hypocrisy is

India's withdrawal of plebiscite offer. Pakistan is in no position to expect India to continue with the offer of

plebiscite after it rejected the plebiscite offer twice

1)Initial offer by Indian leaders and mountbatten to conduct plebiscite in all three states

2) Rejection of UN plebiscite offer by not agreeing to withdraw it's troops as requested by UN as a pre

condition for conducting a plebiscite.

referencee

Balochistan conflict - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Balochistan in history: BALOCH INSURGENCIES 1948-1977

Balochistan in history: PAKISTAN ABSORBS THE KHANATE

The Accession of Kalat: Myth and Reality - Crisis Balochistan

http://www.bso-na.org/files/The_Ille...ati_478B7B.pdf

Jinnah, Muslim League and Accession of Princely States - wiki

Source: http://www.defence.pk/forums/central-south-asia/261369-accession-princely-states-who-started-

trouble.html#ixzz2gJ9dWA4h

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_conflict


http://balochistaninhistory.blogspot.com/2008/10/baloch-insurgencies-1948-1977_09.html?m=1


http://balochistaninhistory.blogspot.com/2008/10/pakistan-absorbs-khanate.html?m=1


http://www.crisisbalochistan.com/secondary_menu/analysishistory/the-accession-of-kalat-myth-and-reality.html


http://www.bso-na.org/files/The_Illegal_Annexati_478B7B.pdf


http://wiki.qern.org/pakistan/jinnah-muslim-league-and-accession-of-princely-states


http://www.defence.pk/forums/central-south-asia/261369-accession-princely-states-who-started-trouble.html#ixzz2gJ9dWA4h














Quaid-i-Azam, Muslim League and the Accession of PrincelyStates

By Arbab Adnan

The study of princely States is a fascinating chapter in Indian history and is mainly consisted of

confused facts and deviating policies. The areas which come under direct British subjugation were

called as British India while the remaining territories entered into the British government through

treaties and agreements were known as Indian states.

It is commonly believed that Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah and All India Muslim League had a weak policy

towards princely states and thus they are mainly responsible for the mess created in shape of the

illogical accession and merger of princely States in India and Pakistan. But let's analyze the sequence

of events which created that mess and then decide was Mr. Jinnah only and solely responsible for it:

The question of political future of some 565 Indian states, ruled by native princes, constituted about

one fourth of India's population, had engaged the serious attention of the British rulers, the Congress

and Muslim League leadership. Unfortunately, the widely divergent policy approaches of the three

major actors in respect of states' future created challenging situation for Quaid-i-Azam who was

already pre-occupied with more and severe problems arising out of partition. The manner in which the

British implemented their laconic policies through Crown Representative Mountbatten, who due to his

open conflict with the Quaid and blatant commitment of the proto-Indian Government's policy, made

the Quaid's task difficult indeed.

The 3rd June Plan was, on purpose, kept ambiguous about the future of the States. It merely affirmed

that the British Government's policy towards Indian states remained as enunciated in the Cabinet

Mission's Memorandum of 12 May 1946, which stipulated that paramountcy would lapse with the

withdrawal of the British from India and would in no circumstances be transferred to an Indian

government. The void crated by the lapse of paramountcy and the cessation of political and other

arrangement s between the states and the British Crown was "to be filled either by the States entering

into a federal relationship with the successor government or governments in British India, or failing

this , entering into particular political arrangements with it or them". 1 In their statement of 16 May

1946, the Cabinet Mission pronounced that paramountcy would neither be retained by the British

Crown nor transferred to any new government in India. The states, released from the obligations of paramountcy, would work out their own relationship with the succession states, and it by no means

followed that such relationship would be identical for all the states. 2

These policy parameters did not define the precise status of the states after the British colonial rule in

India had come to an end rather it had confused the whole situation. However, during discussions with

the States Negotiating Committee, which comprised the Rulers or their representatives, the Crown

http://www.jinnaharchive.com/articles/accprincestates3.htm#01










Representative observed that, in order that no administrative vacuum might result from the lapse of

paramountcy, standstill arrangement would have to be made for the interim period until fresh

agreements had been made. He also confirmed that the accession of a State to one or the other

Constituent Assembly was a matter of free choice". 3 But the same Mountbatten only some three

months later, in a volte-face urged that the rulers take into account the geographical factor in decidingwhich dominion to join, so that the balkanization of India be avoided. Moreover, although the right of

the states to determine their own future had been conceded by the British Government, Mountbatten

chose to go along with the Congress plan to pressure the princes into accession before 15 August

1947.

The policy of Mountbatten was scarcely compatible with the states policy of the British Government.

Referring to the deadline of 14 August 1947 that Mountbatten had given the States for accession,

Secretary of State Listowel reminded him that his "statement was inconsistent with the thrust of the

debate in Parliament on the Indian Independence Bill." 4

Whereas the States had accepted the British plan for the transfer of power in so far as it concerned

them, this was far from true of both the Congress and the Muslim League leadership. At a meeting

between Mountbatten and the Indian leaders on 13 June 1947, Nehru reiterated the oft-repeated

Congress policy that paramountcy would devolve on the succession states upon the transfer of power.

He claimed that the states had no right to declare independence and that the Cabinet Mission's

Memorandum of 12 May 1946 did not permit of this. Jinnah had a legalistic approach towards the

states. The British Government policy of not merging the Indian states and retaining their status quo

was far beyond any logical justification. The only justification we find is their policy of indirect rule.

Now Jinnah had to cope with the legacy, so special care was needed. Jinnah took the view that the

States would regain sovereignty with the lapse of paramountcy and their treaties and agreements with

the British would cease to be valid until fresh agreements were concluded on a voluntary basis with

the Succession states. Nehru had to concede that "he was not intending to lay down that every state

must join one or other Constituent Assembly; but if they did not come in, they would have to come to

some other arrangement could not and should not be preceded by declaration of independence." 5

Jinnah reaffirmed that, constitutionally and legally, the states could not be mandated by the British

Government to join one Constituent Assembly or the other. If a state wished to come in, he said, it

could do so by agreement.

Jinnah's stand was in conformity with that of the Nawab Hameedullah Khan of Bhopal, Chancellor of

the Chamber of Princes, who held that the states should be free to decide which constituent Assembly

to join and suggested that the All India Muslim, League (AIML) offer liberal terms for future

relationship with Pakistan to those States that might wish to associate with it. The states should be

assured that "their sovereignty, integrity and autonomy are in no manner to be jeopardized". 6 He



















even resigned as Chancellor and declined to attend the meeting of the States Negotiating Committee

called for 25 July 1947 protesting that the Rulers have been invited like the oysters to attend the tea

party with the walrus and the carpenter.

A firm believer in constitutional process and political fair play, Jinnah's statement of 17 June 1947

exhibited his legalistic and constitutional approach. He said that "constitutionally and legally the Indian

States will be independent sovereign states on the termination of paramountcy and they will be free to

decide for themselves to adopt any course they like. It is open to them to join the Hindustan

Constituent Assembly, or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, or decide to remain independent". 7

The policy of the All Indian Muslim League, as clarified by Quaid-i-Azam was that "we do no wish to

interfere with the internal affairs of any state… Such States as wish to enter the Pakistan Constituent

Assembly of their free will and desire to negotiate with us, shall find us ready and willing to do so. If

they wish to remain independent and … to negotiate... any political or any other relationship… with

Pakistan, we shall be glad to come to settlement which will be in the interest of both". 8

The Muslim League leadership from the very beginning stood for faithful adherence to the doctrine of

non-interference in the affairs of the states which in turn overlook the insidious political developments

taking place in states of vital interest to Pakistan like Jammu and Kashmir. Even among the 12 states

located within the geographic limits of Pakistan, at least two rulers initially attempted to keep away

from Pakistan. Mountbatten quoted in an aid-memoir that "a large state-Kalat-approached the

Government of India for political relationship, but was refused; and unofficial overtures from

Bahawalpur [for acceding to India] were similarly discouraged". 9 The Muslim League was not looking

into the merits of each of these cases and their political hold over the prospective areas of Pakistanappeared to be loose.

The Muslim, League had admittedly no political ambition as far as Hyderabad was concerned except

for maintaining centuries' old culture and religious bonds existing between the States' Muslims and

Pakistan.

On the contrary the Congress had taken a lead in extending its political influence in the princely

states. It actively helped to establish the All-India States Peoples' Conference in 1927. During 1928-

46, the Congress leadership worked for establishment of representative institutions in the states and

lent active support for their legitimate and peaceful struggle for responsible government.

By 1946, the Congress was successful in establishing a strong political hold and propagated for

majority rule for the states' people. Its resolution of 15 June 1947 stood for a comprehensive political

framework in respect of the states which did not concede the right of any state in India to

independence and to live in isolation from the rest of India. All states had to accede to one or the

other Dominion in respect of only three subjects like Defence, External Affairs and Communications.















Nehru had apprehension about the "balkanisation of India" if the States were allowed to opt for

independence following the lapse of paramountcy. He urged that administrative and other

arrangements concerning matters of common interest, especially in the economic and fiscal spheres,

be made in time. 10

In the course of negotiations between the British Government and the Rulers of the States, the

Congress leaders, Nehru and Patel, adopted a stance based on intimidation and coercion of the Rulers

as well as resorting to clandestine and crafty dealings. On 9 April 1947, speaking at Gwalior as

President of the States' People's Conference, Nehru threatened the Rulers to join the Indian

Constituent Assembly or be treated as hostile. 11 On 5 July Patel invited the Rulers and the people to

the Constituent Assembly in a spirit of friendly cooperation. The states, he warned, should "bear in

mind that the alternative of cooperation in the general interest is anarchy and chaos which will

overwhelm great and small in common ruin if we are unable to act together in the minimum common

tasks." 12 Patel told Mountbatten, in discussing on the future of the States that "he need not bother

about the States because after the transfer of power the States' peoples would rise, depose their

Rulers and throw in their lot with the Congress." 13 Such was the attitude of the Congress; they

wanted to grab as many states as they can no matter with fraud, violence or intimidation. The Indian

Government had criticized the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan but were not ready to handover

Kashmir to its people even Nehru once wrote, before partition, in a letter to the Maharaja that "the

idea of accession of Kashmir to Pakistan is hateful to me. I want to do anything that is reasonably

possible to prevent its accession to Pakistan." 14

Conrad Corfield, Political Adviser to Mountbatten, a man with a strong sense of duty and moral

obligation, believed that the States would act in concert in asserting their "theoretical" right to

independence. He held the view that the states should not sign anything before the transfer of power

and lapse of paramountcy. At that point, he thought, they would be free as independent entities to act

in unison and even dictate the terms of any merger with India. Mountbatten, however, was opposed to

this approach because of the Congress pressure. Corfield had flown to London with Ismay in May 1947

to seek direct support from the India Office. His trip, without Mountbatten's consent, provoked the

Viceroy to dub his Political Adviser as a "son of a bitch". 15

H. V. Hodson, a Constitutional Advisor to Viceroy Linlithgow, in his book the Great Divide mentions of

a deal between Mountbatten and Sardar Patel on States' accession to India at all costs. Patel is quoted

to have told Mountbatten; "I will buy a basket of 565 apples", the computed number of states-but if

there are even two or three apples missing, the deal is off". Mountbatten responded: "if I give you a

basket with, say, 560 apples, will you buy it?" Patel replied "I might". 16 The bargain was struck and

the ostensible reward was the assurance of Governor Generalship of independent India.

In open opposition to Jinnah, Mountbatten actively prevented the accession of 5 Kathiawar Statesnamely Dasuda, Vanod, Jainabad, Bajuna and Radha to Pakistan. Each of these states had a Muslim































ruler who requested for union with Pakistan. In the case of Junagadh, Manavadar and Mangrol, whichhad acceded to Pakistan, India ordered military action in September 1947, which culminated in theirforceful annexation on 9 November 1947. Four months later, Mountbatten justified the illegal militaryaction against Junagadh, in an aide-memoire to the King of England. He maligned Jinnah in acceptingaccession of the State, aimed at "deliberately teasing the Government of India into taking precipitousand aggressive action." 17 He accused Jinnah of launching a wider campaign in which Pakistanappeared as the innocent small nation, the victim of aggressive designs of its large, bullying neighbor.

Mountbatten boasted that the accession exercise was a convenient bargaining counter for Pakistanvis-à-vis Kashmir. "When I saw Mr. Jinnah at Lahore on 1 November," Mountbatten informed his King,"he gave me his view that there was no sense in having Junagadh in the Dominion of Pakistan, andthat he had been most averse to accepting this accession. He had in fact demurred for long but hadfinally given way to the insistent appeals of the Nawab and his Dewan". 18Both the views are anapparent contradiction in the first instance and an insult to the sagacity and wisdom of the greatMuslim statesman that Jinnah was, on the other. Jinnah has long been criticized for his acceptance of accession of Junagadh State to Pakistan. Actually it was in conformity with League policy of givingright to states to decide their political future. Not only the Muslim League but the British Governmenthad assured them of this option but with certain ambiguities and contradiction and later the sameadvocate of free will i.e. Mountbatten, broke his previous promises.

The case of the Rajasthan Hindu States of Jodhapur, Jaisalmer and Bikancer, contiguous to Pakistan,

who favoured independence and accession to Pakistan in accordance with the ground rules provided

by the British Government, is proof how Mountbatten cajoled and threatened them into submission by

joining India. According to Hodson, Jinnah had offered Jodhpur the use of Karachi as a free port, free

import of arms, jurisdiction over Jodhpur-Hyderabad Sindh railway and a large supply of food grains

for famine-struck state population.

Bhopal, Indore and Travancore, influenced by Jinnah's political stance on States' future stood for

independence, as against acceding to India or Pakistan. Mountbatten talked them with deceit

intimidation and got them into the Indian fold. According to the Viceroy's personal Report No. 15 of

1st August, the "adherence of Travancore after all C.P [Ramaswamy Aiyar] declarations of independence has had a profound effect on all the other states and is sure to shake the Nizam". 19

Accession of Kashmir is the best example of Congress deviation and contradiction of their stance of

representative and responsible government. Following partition, Jinnah had to confront the Indo-

British conspiracy with the Maharaja of Kashmir as a pawn, and the anti-Pakistan National Conference

of Sheikh Abdullah as perpetrators. According to reports filed by Charles W., Charge d'Affaires at U.S

Embassy in Delhi with his State Department in October-November 1947, "that Maharaja had been

intending to bring his state into the Indian Union…but at all costs to prevent it from adhering to

Pakistan." 20 The ruler demonstrated open partially towards National Conference and other pro-India

elements with a view to "faking popular support for an anti-democratic decision amounting to the

political murder of the state's majority community." 21 Nehru's anxiety over Kashmir is evident from

a letter he wrote to the Maharaja on 12 December 1947: "I have an intimate and personal interest in

it and the mere thought that Kashmir joins Pakistan and become a part of foreign territory for us is

hateful to me. I want to do everything that is reasonably possible to prevent it". 22 He had been

directing Sardar Patel for arranging accession of Kashmir "as rapidly as possible."


























The final act of the conspiracy was therefore initiated by the Maharaja by letting loose a reign of terror

against the pro-Pakistan Muslim Conference and their Muslim supporters and by hurling baseless

charges of infiltration of Pakistani nationals in his state. Pakistan made repeated attempts to defuse

the alarming political situation by mutual discussions. In return Maharaja sent an ultimatum to

Pakistan to invite external help to solve the problem. Jinnah wrote back: "the real aim of yourGovernment policy is to seek an opportunity to join the Indian Union as a coup d'etat." 23 He advised

the Maharaja to depute his Prime Minister to discuss all contentious issues. Earlier, a Pakistan

representative sent to Srinagar with peace proposals had been turned away by Kashmir Prime

Minister.

Eventually, on 27 October 1947, Indian troops marched into Kashmir after getting the Maharaja to

sign the instrument of accession in a dubious manner. Pakistan declared that the accession was

predicated on fraud and violence. On 1 November 1947, Jinnah told Mountbatten at a Lahore meeting

that he felt from beginning to end this was a deliberate, long worked out, deep laid plot to secure

Kashmir's permanent accession. 24

Mountbatten sharply reacted to these statements as did the Indian leadership at Delhi. He somewhat

scolded Jinnah by terming these as "unstateman-like, inept and bad mannered". It was like a

conspirator reprimanding the victim of the conspiracy. In contrast, one finds him arguing before his

Kings, in February 1948, with no scruple of conspiracy that "from the strategic and economic point of

view… while Pakistan had no interest in Junagadh, India has considerable interest in Kashmir." 25 It

was scarcely surprising that Mountbatten persuaded the King to believe that India had put no pressure

to bear on the Maharaja to cause him to accede, even though there is overwhelming evidence that

India had done all the dirty work to force the Maharaja into accession.

Another problem which the nascent country faced was the accession of Kalat to Pakistan. The British

Government had given more autonomy and independence to Kalat through their treaties of 1841,

1854 and 1876. The khanate were power drunken. They were literally Kings of Kalat through

Sandeman System of administration and the privileges granted to them by the British Government

due to the geo-strategic location of the state. Now Quaid-i-Azam had to cope with that mindset of

Kalat and it was not easy for him to topple down the state and merge it with Pakistan with just a

stroke of pen. So tact was required and that was what Quaid-i-Azam did.

Jinnah had problems in dealing with his friend, the Khan of Kalat, who claimed independent sovereign

status for his State. In the negotiations held on 19 July 1947, with Crown Representative Mountbatten

in chair, who stated that on the lapse of paramountcy "states would de jure become independent; but

de facto, very few were likely to benefit… that although Kalat would have gained freedom, no practical

course other than some from of association with Pakistan was open to it." 26 On 11 August 1947,

Jinnah recognized Kalat as independent sovereign state in treaty relationship with British Government,



















with a status different from that of Indian states, although the British Government had earlier

disallowed the Kalat's position other than an Indian state.

It is surprising that even though the Indian Independence Act 1947 did not give the option of

independence to any Indian state, Pakistan conceded such a status to Kalat. This position was

incompatible with the policy adopted towards all the states and resulted subsequently in strained

relationship and conflict between Pakistan and Kalat. Britain also objected to this policy and advised

against recognition to the State as a separate international entity. Jinnah was anxious to complete the

formalities of accession which the Khan of Kalat promised to complete shortly. Not favorably disposed

towards accession to Pakistan; the Khan stood for establishment of relations on a treaty basis and

took several unwelcome steps to press his demand through his state assembly. Jinnah took a dim

view of his "most disappointing and unsatisfactory" attitude. The six-month delay in the completion of

legal formalities taxed his patience, and on 27 March 1948, he instructed Foreign Secretary Ikramullah

that "there should be no negotiations of any kind or any further discussion to create slightest

impression that anything but accession is possible". 27A.S.B. Shah, a Joint Secretary in the Foreign

Office, and Ambrose Dundas, Agent to the Governor-General of Balochistan, were also asked to make

it clear to Kalat to give us his answer whether he is prepared to accede as promised by him more than

once or not". While these developments were going on, the All India Radio broadcasted accession of

Kalat to India. Khan of Kalat retaliated and somewhat dramatically decided to accede to Pakistan since

Las Bela, Kharan and Mekran had already acceded to Pakistan on 17 March 1948.

We can conclude that Jinnah was not solely and only responsible for what had happened in respect of

its accession. Policy of Jinnah and AIML from the very beginning was of non-intervention and favoring

maximum autonomy and sovereignty for the states. Though the policy of Muslim League and Jinnah,

regarding princely states, had certain discrepancies and weakness but whatever it was; they stood

firm on it. On the contrary British Government and Indian National Congress changed their stances

from time to time. Let the readers decide for themselves who was right and who was wrong. Let this

issue be discussed and debated so that the truth may come to surface.

Arbab Adnan is a Research Officer at the Quaid-i-Azam Papers Wing, Ministry of Culture, Islamabad


