past and future meet. aleksandr gorchakov and russian foreign policy

University of Glasgow

Past and Future Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign PolicyAuthor(s): Flemming Splidsboel-HansenReviewed work(s):Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 3 (May, 2002), pp. 377-396Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/826482 .Accessed: 03/08/2012 06:30

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EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, e Carfax Publishing Vol. 54, No. 3, 2002, 377-396

Past and Future Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy

FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN

As STUDENTS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY will have noted, in recent years former tsarist

foreign minister Aleksandr Gorchakov (1798-1883) has gained a still more prominent position in Russian political thinking. This development has been clearly demonstrated, for instance, by the increasing number of studies and conferences discussing the principles of his diplomatic efforts, by the ostentatious celebrations surrounding the 200th anniversary of his birth in 1998 as well as by the introduction by the Russian foreign ministry of a new Aleksandr Gorchakov medal that same year.1 And, more importantly, it can be seen from the fact that part of his famous despatch to the imperial ambassadors abroad, 'la Russie qui ne boude pas, mais se recueille', is now being repeated again and again.2

This article will attempt to explain why Gorchakov has suddenly risen to such prominence almost 120 years after his death, and will discuss what this development suggests about current and future Russian foreign policy. The rationale behind this line of thinking is, of course, that as the Russians turn to the past for guidance for the future, in order to fully understand and anticipate their policy steps, we should view the world through that same prism of history.

The study, then, will have a dual purpose. First, to explain and identify the key elements of what in this article will be termed 'Gorchakovism'. And second, to apply these insights to a case study analysis of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. More specifically, the study will focus on Russia's recent involvement in the 'European question', that is, the restructuring of the European security architecture. This choice of case study rests partly on the fact that Gorchakov was primarily involved in European affairs3 and partly on the fact that the issue of European security arguably represents Moscow's most acute foreign policy concern today.

I perform four main tasks in this article. First, I introduce the policy of Gorchakov, demonstrating that after the Russian defeat in the Crimean War foreign policy interests were clearly subordinated to more urgent domestic concerns. This, however, was only done temporarily as later St Petersburg would again redirect its attention towards international issues-only this time building on the achievements of a multi-faceted policy designed to change the power distribution in the international system in Russia's favour.4 The concept of Gorchakovism is, so I argue on this background, best understood when seen as a revisionist tool; it is employed to first

















































































ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/030377-20 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130220129515 ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/030377-20 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130220129515 ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/030377-20 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130220129515 ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/030377-20 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130220129515 ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/030377-20 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130220129515 ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/030377-20 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130220129515 ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/030377-20 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130220129515 ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/030377-20 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130220129515 ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/030377-20 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130220129515 ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/030377-20 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130220129515 ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/030377-20 ? 2002 University of Glasgow DOI: 10.1080/09668130220129515

FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN

reduce and then eliminate the distance between the existing status quo and the acceptable order.5

Second, I briefly outline relevant realist theories on the rise and decline of individual states.6 While this paradigm is clearly facing an up-hill struggle to stay in fashion, as is suggested by the present study, it can be employed quite convincingly to explain the mechanics of 19th century European power politics7-and, by impli- cation, those of the contemporary era as well.8 This would seem, at least, to be the logical consequence of the adoption by Russian policy makers and scholars of Gorchakov's teachings.

In this part of the study I explain how a declining challenger can work, first, to halt the unfavourable growth differentials and, second, to narrow the power gap separating it from one or more leading states. By generating more resources, the challenger can hope to improve its position by adding weight to its own side of the power equation. And by undermining support for the status quo, it can hope to reduce the costs of overturning the existing order, thereby facilitating a more speedy rearrangement of the international system.

Third, I demonstrate how recent Russian foreign policy making has been influenced by the principles of Gorchakovism. Post-Soviet Russia, I argue, is striving to change the international power distribution and to challenge the present European order. To accomplish this, Moscow has adopted a strategy similar to the one employed by Gorchakov after the Crimean War. This means that Russia is implementing a foreign policy which is first and foremost designed to support the domestic restructuring. As part of this, Russia is also aiming at lowering the possible suspicion of other states towards it, thereby creating favourable conditions for both the internal reform efforts and the attempt to weaken support for the status quo. Finally, I present the conclusions of this study and offer an assessment of the way in which Gorchakovism will serve to shape future Russian foreign policy.

The Paris peace treaty and beyond

The despatch referred to earlier was sent by Gorchakov to the tsar's representatives abroad on 21 August 1856, that is, six months after the signing by Russia of the Paris peace treaty putting an end to the Crimean War and only five months after the appointment by Alexander II of Gorchakov as the new imperial foreign minister.9 This short time span, of course, was not a mere coincidence. The former head of the diplomatic service, Karl Nesselrode, had been forced into retirement in light of the Russian defeat in the Crimean War and Gorchakov instead was instructed to deal with the new conditions dictated by the Paris peace treaty.'0 After a brief period of silence, in which the entire Russian administration tried to get an overview of the apparently endless list of both domestic and foreign challenges," Gorchakov's policy statement then came with the despatch in August 1856.12 However, before this latter-or the concept of Gorchakovism-is discussed, the background to the new policy orientation should be briefly explained.

St Petersburg had entered the Crimean War in 1853 as a self-confident power. A series of victories in the 1812-14 campaign had eventually, together with the simultaneous weakening of Prussia and Austria, served to turn Russia into the most







































































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powerful state on the European continent.13 The continued rise of this great power was not only symbolised by the entry of Russian troops into Paris in March 1814; it was also felt quite strongly in the post-war settlement agreed upon at the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15. Although Russia had to accept a number of compromises-partly because the other states now joined forces in an attempt to prevent the establishment of a continental hegemon-it managed to improve its position still further, most notably so through the creation of Congress Poland.14 Overall, this development-the war and the subsequent peace agreement-led to a situation where 'Russia's immense power was felt in every corer of the Heartland' and where 'any settlement within the Heartland would have to require [Russia's] participation and consent'.15

If anything, the next 40 years only served to bolster Russia's position of continental dominance. This was especially so after the accession to the throne in 1825 of Nicholas I-the 'gendarme of Europe'. The new ruler was first and foremost committed to preserving the status quo in Europe, thereby clearly demonstrating that the redistribution of influence in the wake of the Napoleonic wars had, at least in this regional context, turned Russia into a satisfied power.'6

In order to maintain the existing balance of power-and to prevent liberal or radical ideas from gaining a breakthrough in other European countries-Nicholas I used the power build-up of his predecessor Alexander I to influence events and to intervene wherever necessary. Thus, through a series of conflicts, beginning with the Greek question and ending with the revolutions of 1848-49, St Petersburg succeeded in leaving a very heavy mark on, especially, Central and South-east European affairs. 17

Russia's determined action throughout this second quarter of the 19th century served to solidify its image as a powerful state with little patience for challenges to the post-Vienna order. And as it moved into the 1850s, Russia under Nicholas I had clearly managed to 'raise still further the estimate by friends and foes of [its] power'. 18

This, then, was the reputation with which Russia entered the Crimean War. Events on the ground, however, would soon demonstrate to both St Petersburg and the rest of the world that this reputation was undeserved. As first its offensive campaign against the Ottoman principalities was stopped and then next its defences were overrun by a combination of British and French troops, Russia had to acknowledge the fact that its strength had been overrated.19 This was clear from the fighting-and from the terms of the subsequent peace settlement.

The Paris peace treaty of March 1856 reflected the new power distribution just as the Congress of Vienna had also done four decades earlier. Only now, however, the tables had been turned and the Russians had to negotiate from a position of relative weakness. Thus, while the final agreement did not represent a disaster to St Petersburg, its terms clearly mirrored the Russian defeat on the battlefields.

The most damaging provision of the peace treaty were articles XI-XIV demanding a full demilitarisation of the Black Sea.20 This term created a situation in which some of the country's most important naval facilities could no longer be used, thereby causing both a critical weakening of the southern shores and a general loss of influence for the Russians in the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Further humiliations were added when the Russian control of Bessarabia was removed and when St







































































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Petersburg also had to surrender its protectorship of the Christian peoples in the Balkan area.21

This sudden and highly unexpected demonstration of military decline caused a combination of shock and confusion in Russia, where the strongest defeatists even suggested that the diplomatic service should be completely eliminated.22 Such views, however, missed the central point: although Russia had lost its leading position won in 1815, it was still counted among the great powers of the day.

What was needed was a radical re-thinking of Russian foreign policy-and especially a swift departure from the principles of interventionism of Nicholas I. For this task, so the new tsar believed, Gorchakov seemed particularly well-suited.23 And thus, in April 1856 this former ambassador to Vienna was instructed to formulate and implement a foreign policy line designed to ultimately restore Russia's former position in the international system.

The resultant concept of Gorchakovism consisted of at least three pillars.24 First, a complete, albeit also only temporary, reversal of the foreign-domestic dichotomy of the preceding decades. As shown by the course of the war, Russia's internal development lagged well behind that of the other leading powers and Alexander II quickly realised the urgent need for reforms. The reign of this new 'Tsar Liberator' would therefore witness the subsequent implementation of a series of drastic changes, the most far-reaching of which were the abolition of serfdom, the introduction of a new system of local government and the reform of the judicial system.25

Understanding the primacy of domestic restructuring, the members of the diplomatic service made recueillement part of the foundation of Russia's post-1856 foreign policy.26 As later explained by Aleksandr Zhomini, then adviser to Gorchakov, following its defeat in the war, Russia needed to develop 'her internal life, her productive resources, her prosperity, her culture, her commerce [and] her industry ...'.27 Facing conditions like these, so Gorchakov noted in a policy recommendation to Alexander II, the Russian state 'will have to focus persistently on the realisation of [its] internal development and the entire foreign policy will have to be subordinated to this main task'.28 While this policy reversal would, in the opinion of Gorchakov, be 'protracted' rather than merely 'temporary', it is important to note that eventually it would also have to end: that Russia had pressing foreign policy concerns which would later have to be addressed. In the meantime, however, the domestic base had to be rebuilt so that Russia would again be in a position to press for changes-and by use of all means available.29

Second, to facilitate this entire development, Gorchakovism dictated the implementation of a foreign policy based on the twin principles of predictability and non- aggressiveness. A policy surrounded by uncertainty and characterised by open hostility was likely to cause anxiety in the other leading capitals. And this in turn could jeopardise the Russian reform efforts as more attention would have to be directed towards diplomatic issues.

While after 1856 the Russians continued their advance into Central Asia and the Far East, where opposition was relatively easily overcome, they took great care not to confront the other great powers.30 In striking contrast to this expansion into Asia, for instance, Gorchakov assured the European states that as far as this latter area was concerned, Russia in general 'is content with its territory'.31 What was clearly needed,







































































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in other words, was a period of peace and the duration of this phase would have to be determined by the pace of the domestic reforms. Until Russia had managed to first reverse the downward spiralling trend and then close the existing power gap, all foreign policy adventures had to be avoided; as noted earlier, Gorchakov believed that in the years immediately following the Crimean War Russia's position of relative weakness would have rendered it incapable of protecting its western and southern borders against invasions.32

As will be argued below, this more cautious foreign policy was implemented to support the third and last part of Gorchakovism-a policy of revisionism. Russia of course had accepted the conditions of the Paris peace treaty only because it was unable to prevent this rearrangement of the international system, and it was strongly committed to securing a return to the old order. Since the demilitarisation of the Black Sea was regarded by the Russians as the most harmful clause of the peace treaty, this was also the provision which they were most eager to annul. The Black Sea issue was therefore given a central position in the post-1856 foreign policy, making everything else, in the words of Gorchakov, 'secondary'.33

Thus, while initially the struggle to change the dictates of the peace treaty had necessitated both a heavy focus on domestic affairs and the attempt to create a non-revisionist reputation, as these two policies made it possible for Russia to move into this new phase, international objectives gradually re-emerged at the top of the agenda. Once brought to a certain stage, the internal restructuring and the relatively low-key foreign policy allowed Russia to press still more adamantly for the international changes considered so vital to its security interests. As it reduced still further the discrepancy between the realities of the international system and the Russian understanding of what constituted an acceptable order, Gorchakovism then also came still closer to turning full circle. The primacy of foreign policy was returning.34

The demilitarisation of the Black Sea eventually was abrogated unilaterally by Russia in 1870, an action which was in effect confirmed by an international conference held in London the following year.35 As demonstrated below, this step was made possible by a series of domestic and foreign changes, including the important defeat by Prussia of France, and the totality of these changes helped reshape in Russia's favour the distribution of influence among the European states.36 And while Russia would only be able to reclaim its former position of dominance some 75 years later, both the more immediate post-1856 development and the current adoption by Russian politicians and scholars of the principles outlined suggest that Gorchakovism was indeed quite successful.37

Dealing with decline

As will be clear by now, the problems confronting Russia in the international arena during and after the Crimean War were caused by a loss of power; using the definition of the same term presented earlier, we find that the changes imposed by the more influential states after 1856 were clearly greater than those which Russia was willing to accept.

When facing such conditions of declining power, so realism informs us, a state will have two principal options at its disposal. First, it can attempt to generate more







































































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resources, thereby hoping to be able to eliminate the adverse growth differentials threatening to undermine its position. This can be achieved through a number of different measures, two of which are of special relevance to the present study. Thus, as the declining state finds that one or more of the other states in the system are capable of undergoing faster development-for whatever reason-it can either work to use in a more efficient manner the means available or it can seek to increase these latter by entering into new alliances.38

Both these strategies were employed by Gorchakov. First, the urgent need for intensive growth provided a central part of the background to the reforms introduced by Alexander II.39 As noted by a Russian historian, the outcome of the Crimean War represented the victory of 'bourgeoisie Europe over feudal Russia', thereby indicating that in many ways this was a defeat suffered at home rather than at the front-and because of an economy of lower competitiveness.40

Second, Russia in 1863 formed an alliance with Prussia which would thereafter serve to add weight to its demands and in general act as a still heavier counterweight to the anti-Russian feelings shared by a number of leading states.41 In return for this, Russia had to offer a series of concessions, the most far-reaching of which was the acceptance of German unification under Prussian leadership.42

While the process leading to the unification of Germany was disturbing to Russia, the advantages of close cooperation were believed to outweigh the costs stemming from this overall development.43 And, in combination with the other measures introduced, this strategy of alliance making allowed Russia to score its long-awaited foreign policy success when already in 1870 it felt strong enough to force through the partial annulment of the Paris peace treaty; as the concern over the restored German empire grew in the states supporting the post-war settlement, Russia finally decided to use this opportunity, its new and less challenging international posture as well as its domestic reform record to announce the overturn of the 1856 settlement.44

Second, as either an alternative or a supplement to this first strategy, the declining state can reduce its expenditure, thereby attempting to re-establish the lost balance between costs and resources.45 One of the ways in which this can be done is through a reduction of its international commitments, for instance by introducing new and less ambitious foreign policy goals or by adopting a posture of greater amity.46 Again, this type of retrenchment was the rationale behind the second pillar of Gorchakov's foreign policy; the strategy of predictability and non-aggressiveness aimed to decrease the suspicion with which 'interventionist' Russia was viewed in the other great powers, ease international tension and, more importantly, reduce the time and costs otherwise needed for the completion of the internal transformation.47 A closely related way of cutting expenditure is by seeking rapprochement with one or more opposing states.48 This policy can be employed to lower the costs connected with the attainment of international objectives. When appearing in its purest form, this policy aims at undermining an opposing alliance by causing members of the latter to defect. In other and less clear cases the declining state can work, for instance, to persuade opposing powers to relax their alliance commitments or policies, to refrain from joining other groups of states or to observe a line of benevolent neutrality.49

Understanding the mechanics of balance-of-power politics, after the Crimean War Gorchakov advocated a policy line which would also bring closer cooperation with





























































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France-one of the states upholding the 1856 settlement. The subsequent rapprochement, which lasted until 1863, was built on Russian support of a wide range of French interests, primarily in Southern and South-eastern Europe, and it was expected that Paris would repay these favours; however, while St Petersburg was rewarded with support in other areas, it found that France was less forthcoming on the issue which mattered the most.50 The Russians of course wanted the abrogation of the Paris peace treaty and the entire policy rested on the hope and expectation that the existing international order could be recast if only they could bring the French government to reduce or perhaps even to remove its support of the peace settlement. However attractive the policy seemed at the time, it missed its main target as France rejected the Russian requests. And when in 1870 Russia decided to act unilaterally, it was supported by the defeat of France by Prussia-not by any assistance offered by the former state.51

Whatever the Russian experiences with this second policy option in the years after 1856, it has been argued that the theory of retrenchment runs counter to basic tenets of realist thought. Since states are seen as power maximisers, so these critics continue, the declining state should instead be expected to initiate preventive war against one or more states enjoying power increases.52

While the idea of preventive war does figure prominently in realist thinking, supporters of this latter argue that the policies of 'lashing out' and of retrenchment are highly context-specific.53 To explain the use of these very different strategies, more detailed theories have been developed to complement the general theories outlined above. As part of this, it has been hypothesised that while declining hegemons are more likely to respond with the initiation of preventive war, declining challengers, on the other hand, should be expected to retrench.

The reason for this is straight-forward. The declining challenger is, by the very nature of its position, already facing an unfavourable distribution of power. And while the initiation of preventive war may seem to be a both effective and tempting way to prevent a further widening of this gap, the existing power deficit makes it too costly an option. Under conditions like these, so one commentator has noted, 'policies of "lashing out" or "holding fast" [face] much longer odds than one opting for some form of retrenchment'.54 The decision to retrench therefore represents a rational response to a situation in which the declining state would otherwise have to accept an almost inevitable and additional loss of power.

Some of these more context-specific theories have been developed to help explain, in particular, Soviet behaviour during the final stages of the Cold War.55 Finding itself operating under a set of international conditions similar to the one just outlined, the Soviet leadership realised that their country would have to reduce its commitments. As then General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is reported to have explained at a Politburo session in 1986, 'our goal is to prevent the next round of the arms race. If we do not accomplish it, the threat to us will only grow. We will be pulled into another round of the arms race that is beyond our capabilities, and we will lose it, because we are already at the limit of our capabilities'.56 To the Kremlin, this policy of retrenchment offered the immediate prospects of a decrease in international tension and an increase in Soviet cooperation with other states.57 And ultimately, it held the promise of speeding up the implementation of the much-needed domestic reforms.58



















































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When viewed from the centre of the declining Soviet state, then, the recipe for a successful foreign policy was quite simple: 'Reduce other states' sense of threat, and they will reduce their commitment to defence and the tightness of their anti-Soviet alignment'.59

When formulating this policy, the last Soviet leaders could have drawn directly upon the experience of their 19th century predecessors. Just like the Soviet Union of the 1980s, so Russia in the years after the Crimean War was also a declining challenger. While the forceful and self-confident policies of Nicholas I had been both cause and consequence of his empire's pre-1853 position as a rising challenger, the sudden collapse of this system demonstrated the distance between Russia and the stronger European states.60 The decades following the Congress of Vienna were marked by waves of Russophobia in London, but the predominance of Great Britain within the international system was also strengthened by the defeat of France and the former therefore managed to stay ahead of the rising Russian state.61 By 1856 it was clear that this gap, which had become virtually non-existent in the eyes of the most fearful Britons, was actually quite wide-and widening.62 Moreover, Russia also slipped below some of the other challengers in the European state system, first France and, more importantly, later Germany.63

In this situation retrenchment was the policy response dictated by rationality. Once it had resigned to the superior forces of the opposing alliance and thereby prevented the further losses brought by a continuation of the fighting, St Petersburg had to avoid the devastating effects of a 'cold' war. Russia clearly found itself 'at the limit of its capabilities' and, like the Soviet Union 130 years later, it also drew the conclusion that it would have to reduce the costs of its foreign policy. By pursuing a more cautious line and by offering concessions to France, the Russians were acting according to the principles mentioned earlier and were hoping to reduce 'the tightness of the anti-Russian alignment'.64

Russian foreign policy

As already indicated, the wide currency of Gorchakovism in Russia today has to be explained by the similarities between the present situation and that of the post-1856 era.65 As will be demonstrated below, post-Soviet Russia essentially is confronted with the same basic challenge in the international arena as was Gorchakov. And if we accept the existence of more permanent security interests transcending policy justifications based on ideology, we find an even clearer picture.66 Thus, in the mid-1980s Moscow represented the losing side of the Cold War and its economic system had been proven inferior to that of its adversaries. Furthermore, and as a consequence of this, it had to accept a fundamental restructuring of the international order and to redirect its attention towards internal reform efforts.

These conditions underlie post-Soviet Russian foreign policy making also. It is this sameness which makes Gorchakov's legacy so appealing today-as well as the fact that his policies are seen as having met their main objective by successfully overturning the post-1856 status quo. This latter point is central as the Russians strive, with use of the same means, to accomplish a similar goal.

Returning to the three pillars of Gorchakovism, we find, first, that the policy of







































































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revisionism heads Russia's European agenda today also. Moscow's dissatisfaction with the existing international order is well known and will therefore not be discussed in greater detail here. It will suffice to note that the post-Cold War order is increasingly seen as a status quo dominated by the United States. As was made clear by the foreign policy doctrine published in June 2000, Russia is determined to fight 'the still stronger trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure' and to work for the strengthening of a multipolar system.67

As part of their opposition to this overall development, the Russians continue to warn against the adverse consequences stemming from a further enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.68 Generally, it is claimed that this process represents an attempt by the members of the Atlantic Alliance to take advantage of Russia's relative weakness to cause a further deterioration in the position of the latter. An example of this view is found, for instance, in the security doctrine published in January 2000: pointing first to the harmful effects of the policies of the 'developed, Western states', the security doctrine next finds that measures are being implemented to deliberately weaken Russia 'politically, economically, militarily and in other areas.'69

When dealt with more specifically, NATO enlargement at times is regarded as simply a tool for the advance of US interests throughout the world.70 In this way, then, the other NATO members serve to further US interests by accelerating the so-called 'unipolar trend' and by widening the power gap in favour of the USA-and against Russia.

Whatever the Russian views on the specific role of the US and the other NATO member states as far as enlargement is concerned, the general conclusion drawn by the Kremlin is the same: in Europe, as well as at the system level, since the end of the Cold War changes have been introduced which Moscow has been unwilling to accept-but also unable to prevent. This situation reflects the discrepancy which

gradually developed between Soviet strength and influence-a discrepancy which was best illustrated by the decision of Gorbachev to drastically reduce the international commitments of the Soviet Union and to retrench.71

When major power shifts like these take place, as Robert Gilpin explains, on the basis of the new realities on the ground it is determined 'who will govern the international system and whose interests will be primarily served by the new international order'.7 As suggested earlier, Russia today is still feeling the effects of the sudden power shift of the late 1980s and this is why it finds itself in a situation characterised by a marked imbalance between ambitions and resources.73 The post- Cold War international order, in other words, does not serve Russia's interests to the extent either wanted or expected by Moscow. And this in turn is why the status quo is opposed.

Second, in order to facilitate a speedy overturn of this status quo, the Russians have adopted the dual strategy of increasing the resources available and reducing their expenditure. The former policy is supported by the large-scale internal transformation which has witnessed the introduction of market ideas to replace the centrally planned economy. Whether correctly or not, the market economy was seen as explaining 'the West's phenomenal success and the defeat of the Soviet Union', and through the introduction of private ownership it promised to minimise waste, lower production







































































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costs, restore positive growth rates and ultimately secure a larger base of taxation for the Russian state.74 As in post-1856 Russia, reforms were introduced, inter alia, to raise the competitiveness of the economy.75

While the focus of this market transition is on the question of how to release to the fullest extent possible the potential held within Russia, attempts have also been-and are being-made to attract external support. This has primarily been done through the military cooperation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. A stronger military component within the Russian-led CIS would allow Russia to put more pressure on the status quo powers, thereby making it easier to reach an acceptable order. So far, however, Russia has largely been unsuccessful as it finds itself aligned with some of the weaker CIS member states and even has to witness the still closer cooperation of the regional heavy-weights Ukraine and Uzbekistan with the West.76 The main problem, when seen from the other CIS capitals, is Moscow's imperial legacy; it continues to dominate the assessment of Russian policy steps and, together with a strong pro-Western orientation on the part of some of the other CIS members, has prevented Russia from generating the kind of support which could have made a difference in its relations with the West.77

Struggling to rebuild their economy and having an abysmal alliance record, the Russians have, for obvious reasons, complemented these attempts to generate more resources with a policy of weakening the coalition upholding the status quo. Rather than forcing these states into retreat, which is the rationale behind the unsuccessful alliance making, Russia has started building on a different aspect of Gorchakovism by emphasising the predictable and non-aggressive nature of its foreign policy. The latter point in particular, however, has become pronounced only relatively recently, as before 1997 Russia seemed to rely more on scare tactics.78 While designed to attract the respective national electorates also, the close cooperation and subsequent union between Russia and Belarus represented such a measure.79 When in September 1995, for instance, then Russian president Boris El'tsin threatened to deploy tactical nuclear warheads on Belarusian territory, he was clearly hoping that this step would effectively deter NATO from announcing the first enlargement round.80

This pre-1997 strategy suffered from the now obvious fact that in itself it almost seemed to provide NATO with a reason to enlarge. Its failure became all too apparent at the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid at which Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to begin accession talks. Moscow then decided to follow a different line instead. The Kremlin is now striving to avoid this past mistake by taking on a more constructive role and by offering alternatives to the alleged US-dominated order.

One of the first signs of this new policy came in October 1997 when El'tsin suddenly proposed to extend Russian security guarantees to the three Baltic states, adding later that 'security in Europe is a matter for the Europeans themselves'.81 El'tsin's offer was, not surprisingly, flatly rejected by the Balts, but the fundamentals of this new line are still present.82 First, with the important exception of NATO, Russia has started giving stronger support to all the major European security organisations; this includes not only its own long-term preferences, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe as well as the Council of Europe, but also, and more importantly, the European Union.83 By offering answers to the question of



















































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how the European security architecture should be constructed, Russia has a real hope of cultivating the image of itself as a both constructive and realistic partner, thereby raising the prospects of a less antagonistic relationship with the West. An attempt at this was made, for instance, at a news conference in Strasbourg in October 1997 when El'tsin declared that 'there are no longer any grounds for being afraid of anyone in greater Europe or for being anxious about one's security if Russia is part of it'.84

Second, the comments later added by El'tsin to his Baltic proposal made it fully clear that the Russians were hoping to see a future European security architecture which is, in essence, 'made in Europe' only. The US involvement should, in other words, be reduced as much as possible. Prior to his late 1997 policy statements, for instance, El'tsin had appealed directly to the other European states by declaring that 'we do not need any uncle from outside', adding that the potential of Europe 'cannot be compared with any other region in the world'.85

Working to derail the 'unipolar trend' and to detach the USA from Europe, Russia has undoubtedly been looking for a policy tool which would allow it to accomplish these closely connected goals. To the Russians, the answer may seem to have come with the development by the EU of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, as part of this framework, of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP); as noted by one observer, 'seen from Moscow ... [the ESDP] looks like a godsend: a tool with which Russian diplomacy may engineer the demise of the Atlantic Alliance'.86

While Russia was aware of the potential of the CFSP before 1997 also, its relations with the EU within the political field have been stepped up considerably since then.87 This has not only been a sign of the failure of Russia's pre-1997 strategy and the resultant need to seek rapprochement with some of the status quo states but also reflects the continued development by the EU of the CFSP, as illustrated by the strengthening since late 1998 of the ESDP, and a growing Russian belief in the viability of the former.88 Thus, when in October 1999 Moscow presented a paper expressing its view on the future of Russia-EU relations, the ESDP was labelled a possible 'counterbalance' to the 'NATO-centrism in Europe'.89 This line is being echoed by the new foreign policy doctrine which emphasises the importance of increased cooperation between the two parties and stresses Russia's particular interest in the ESDP.90

In order to promote the continued development of the ESDP, Russia has sought rapprochement with a number of leading states enjoying both EU and NATO membership, first France and Germany and, more recently, the United Kingdom. Building on its newly launched policy of predictability and non-aggressiveness, Russia in the years 1997-98 tried, without much success though, to establish a Moscow-Bonn-Paris axis.91 Without abandoning this cooperation, Russia under Putin seems to have looked more towards the UK for support, apparently believing that the possible breakthrough will have to be delivered by a state which is not only by tradition one of the most loyal European allies of the USA but also a Euro-sceptic.92

This policy of rapprochement seeking serves the same purpose as when employed-unsuccessfully though-by Gorchakov. Like the more cautious post-1997 foreign policy line of which it forms part, ultimately this strategy aims at lowering the costs connected with an overturn of the existing order by reducing support for this





























































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latter. Working to encourage some of the status quo states to agree to a voluntary restructuring of the post-Cold War order, Moscow has started offering concessions, the most prominent of which is the endorsement of the CFSP and the ESDP.

While this may seem surprising in light of the aforementioned, commentators argue that Russia is hoping to convince some of the European NATO members that by accepting these policies it is actually accommodating the EU. The British prime minister Tony Blair, for instance, has been warned by parts of the domestic media to 'beware of Mr Putin's embrace' and his alleged attempt to persuade the Kremlin of the benefits of the ESDP during his visit to Moscow in November 2000 was termed 'positively naive'.93 Speaking at a press conference during that same visit, Putin declared that Russia did not intend to 'either ... interfere with these processes or to encourage them or to provide impetus',94 thereby suggesting that Russia is in fact a disinterested party-the possible 'godsend' quality of the ESDP notwithstanding.95

As suggested by the media comments cited above, it is highly doubtful whether this strategy will be successful. The Russians do not, however, have much to offer in return for a weakening of the status quo, and the idea of 'accepting' the CFSP and the ESDP may therefore represent the most attractive policy option-especially of course if in fact the development of these EU processes mirrors their own goals. In the likely event of failure, Russia will have to either offer more substantial concessions in the hope that these will prove more effective or simply accept the fact that it has few means with which to influence the overwhelming status quo coalition in a more direct manner.96

Moscow will admit this only reluctantly as doing so will deny it whatever initiative is left in the important question of the future of European security. However, since it is clearly holding a weak hand, Russia may eventually find that the predictable and non-aggressive foreign policy represents the most realistic policy option.97 While this is a very indirect way of reducing support for the status quo and thus cutting expenditure, it also seems much more likely than the policy of rapprochement seeking to cause a voluntary reassessment among the Western states of the present European order.

Third, as mentioned in the introduction to this article, in Russia the central part of Gorchakov's 1856 despatch is now being repeated again and again. This fact illustrates the central importance in current policy making of sosredotochenie-the key concept announcing the reversal of the foreign-domestic dichotomy. As in the post-1856 era, Russia today is directing the bulk of its attention towards domestic restructuring, using foreign policy as a valuable tool in this process.98

This can be seen, for instance, in the foreign policy doctrine in which the need to create 'international conditions favourable to the development of a [market] economy' is being emphasised; among the relevant forums, so the doctrine explains, are the G8, the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.99 Prior to this, in his New Year speech delivered to the Russian electorate on 31 December 1999, Putin had also stressed the urgency of an economic recovery, adding that the low level of foreign investment was a major impediment to the achievement of this. The rise towards a 'worthy future', so the then prime minister warned, 'would be long without foreign capital ... Consequently, we must do our best to attract foreign capital to the country'.1??





























































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The appointment by Putin a few months later of Mikhail Kasyanov to the position of prime minister seemed to indicate that the task of attracting foreign investors was indeed a top priority for the Russian government-and that it would remain so in the future also. When addressing the Duma before being finally approved by that body on 17 May 2000, Kasyanov informed the legislature that 'the level of foreign investment into the Russian economy is still not very high', adding a promise to the members of the Duma to work for the implementation of 'measures to improve the investment climate and to lay a solid foundation for economic growth'.'10

While, as noted by Kasyanov, a precondition for an increase in the amount of foreign investment is a successful 'stabilisation of the rules of the game on the Russian market','02 these internal measures will have to work in concert with the country's general foreign policy orientation. The much-needed foreign investment is, to put it simply, less likely to materialise when negotiated against a background of open revisionism. In this case, so the logic of power politics informs us, the more prosperous status quo states will oppose a narrowing of the power gap separating themselves from the revisionist challenger.'03

This point illustrates the imperative of formulating a foreign policy which will serve to support the ongoing transition-at least under conditions of retrenchment. It also explains why the Russian foreign policy doctrine, in the words of Putin, 'stipulates the primacy of internal objectives over external ones'.?04 Being a challenger in the international system, Russia simply should avoid any attempt to overturn the status quo until the existing power gap has been sufficiently closed.105 And since Moscow has found it difficult to attract external support, its own side of the power equation will have to rely mostly on the internal resource build-up.106

This domestic restructuring, so Putin has warned, will be a complicated process; 'it will take us approximately fifteen years and an annual growth of our Gross Domestic Product by 8% ... to reach the per capita level of present-day Portugal or Spain, which are not among the world's industrialised leaders'. When viewed in this light, so Putin correctly concludes, the transition 'will still require many years of work'.107 The latter comment, made in reference to what is clearly considered by the Kremlin to be a less than satisfactory standing in the international arena, is made even truer by the fact that post-Soviet Russia has yet to consistently produce an annual growth rate of more than 5%.108

Whatever the immediate prospects of rapid growth, Putin is adamant about the eventual success of the reforms, assuring the electorate that '... to put it mildly, it is too early to bury Russia as a great power'.109 While this comment indicates that Moscow will eventually allow its foreign policy to dominate the agenda again, the projection presented by Putin in turn suggests that the current subordination of this policy area to internal interests will be more than short-lived. The reason for this is simple and it is found in the Russian government's own catalogue of ills. Echoing the post-1856 evaluation made by Zhomini, Kasyanov has explained, for instance, that Russia is still facing the challenge of dealing with technological backwardness, including '19th-century communications facilities' and a labour productivity ranging 'from 10-25% of the corresponding figures in the developed countries', as well as with 'distorted moral principles and norms of behaviour'.110

Comments like these illustrate the enormity of the internal tasks facing Russian





























































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policy makers and they also indicate that the policy of retrenchment will not soon be brought to an end. As in the post-1856 years, the speed at which the domestic restructuring is being completed will determine when Moscow will again be viewed as the great power sought by Putin. In the meantime, Russian foreign policy will have to support the reform efforts and thus avoid costly adventures threatening to undermine the domestic base and raising international tension.

Conclusion

Addressing the audience at one of the now many Gorchakov conferences, the Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov explained that 'the main thing is that we have started not only to interpret, but also to implement his legacy which is remarkably suited to [our] current tasks ...'.11 While at first glance it may seem surprising that even today in Moscow direct lessons can be drawn from the experience of this 19th century Russian diplomat, as suggested by this study, the main reason has to be found in the obvious similarities between then and now. As argued, the international challenges faced by Moscow in the post-Cold War years have been largely identical to the problems encountered by St Petersburg after the Crimean War. Both eras were initiated by dramatic and unfavourable changes in the international distribution of power and these changes, in turn, were to a large extent caused by inferior economic systems.

Consequently, just as in post-1856 Russia, so contemporary Russia also has to focus on its internal restructuring, temporarily reversing the traditional foreign- domestic dichotomy in this process. However unsatisfactory for a state accustomed to playing a greater role in international affairs, this step has been dictated by the sudden power decline which has left Russia behind a number of leading states. And just as Alexander II hoped that Gorchakov would be able to restore the position enjoyed by St Petersburg before 1853, so Russian leaders today also hope that Gorchakovism will serve to close the power gap signalling Moscow's defeat in the Cold War.12 This important aspect of Gorchakov's legacy-revisionism-suggests a second reason for the current adoption of his principles. This reason is as much psychological as it is political and it has to do with the fact that Gorchakovism seems to inspire confidence in a state alienated from the existing status quo."l3 In other words, the implementation of Gorchakov's legacy referred to by Ivanov promises to deal effectively with the temporary setback suffered by Russia and this also serves to explain is present use.

Turning then to the actual foreign policy-both current and future-the study has two key findings. First, working to correct what is seen as a post-Cold War power imbalance, the Russians will primarily have to rely on two sources. On the one hand, their own economic transition seems still more promising, demonstrating growth rates not recorded earlier during the reform years.l14 This means that, all things being equal, Moscow should be able to put still more weight behind its demands for a rearrangement of the European order, thereby reducing the period of existence of the present status quo.

On the other hand, the Russians may also pin their hopes on seeing a gradual weakening of support for the alleged US-dominated and NATO-centric status quo among some of the states upholding this order. As noted earlier, it is highly doubtful whether the rapprochement which Moscow has been seeking with a number of


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leading EU member states will eventually convince a critical mass of the benefits of a security regime greatly reducing the influence of the USA in Europe. As suggested in the study, Russia simply does not have enough to offer in return.

This overall scenario is not thereby ruled out. Russia will, however, be dependent on processes which it can influence only very indirectly. Thus, from the sidelines it will have to watch the development within the EU, hoping to see a future strengthening of the CFSP-and with it the ESDP. As mentioned, more substance has been added to the CFSP since 1998, leading critics to warn that EU member states 'risk undermining-even destroying-the NATO alliance'.115

Whatever the views on the CFSP, its recent development does seem to suggest that the EU will be able to assume a greater role, both politically and militarily, in coming years.116 Later research will have to determine whether Moscow has in any way been able to influence this apparent transfer of momentum from NATO to the EU, but at this stage it could be hypothesised that the post-1997 foreign policy has served its purpose by reducing international tension and thus increasing support for the 'softer' conflict prevention tasks of the EU.117 While this question is still surrounded by uncertainty, the policy of predictability and non-aggressiveness does seem to represent a viable option for Russia as it promises to influence-albeit indirectly-the EU member states and their respective views on the future policy areas of this organisation.

Second, current growth rates and internal EU processes notwithstanding, all indications are that the power gap will prove quite durable. The comments made by Putin about the 'many years of work' clearly indicate that Russia will not soon be in a position to reverse the foreign-domestic dichotomy again and then press more determinedly for international changes.

This fact in turn suggests that Gorchakovism will continue to underlie Russian foreign policy thinking under Putin's presidency-and possibly even beyond. Though probably minimised, the power gap will not be closed by either 2004 or 2008 and Putin's eventual successor will therefore be facing the same basic conditions. Even as a rising challenger, Russia will first and foremost remain a challenger. And in this situation, retrenchment will also remain the rational response. In contemporary Russia Gorchakovism may, in other words, prove just as durable as the power gap which it is designed to eliminate.

University of Copenhagen

I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Denmark's International Study Programme which made part of the research for this article possible. Also, I thank the staff at the Latvian National Library for their kind assistance during a research stay in Riga in March and April 2001.

1 See for example Evgenii Primakov, 'Rossiya v mirovoi politike', Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn ', 1998, 5, pp. 3-9; and Petr Stegnii, 'Yubileinye torzhestva v Rossii', Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn', 1998, 11-12, pp. 148-153.

2 In Joseph Wieczynski (ed.), The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History (Gulf Breeze, FL, Academic International Press, 1979), vol. 13, p. 43.

3 This 'Eurocentrism' notwithstanding, Russia under Gorchakov also made significant advances into Central Asia and the Far East; see Anatolii Ignatiev, 'A. M. Gorchakov-Ministr inostrannykh del', Otechestvennaya istoriya, 2000, 2, p. 5; and D. Beyrau, 'Aussenpolitik zwischen Staatssicherung und Expansion', in M. Hellmann et al. (eds), Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands (Stuttgart, Anton Hiersemann, 1981), vol. 3, part 3/4, p. 190.





































































































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4 'Power' in this study is seen as 'the difference between the amounts of changes imposed and changes accepted by the actor' (Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (NY, The Free Press, 1966), p. 115). This definition captures the essence of the concept of power: it is a relative matter.

5 As correctly pointed out by Buzan, we should be careful not to associate revisionism with 'aggressive' and 'immoral' policies; revisionist states, for whatever reason, simply feel 'alienated from [the status quo], threatened by it and oppose its continuation' (Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (NY, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 300).

6 For a brief list of basic realist assumptions see B. Frankel, 'Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction', in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London, Frank Cass, 1999), pp. ix-xx. For the development of the arguments found in this study the most important assumption is number four, according to which 'the international system (the distribution of capabilities, power trends) is mostly responsible for state conduct on the international scene' (p. xv).

7 See for example R. Gilpin, 'No One Loves a Political Realist', in Frankel (ed.), Realism: Restatements and Renewal, pp. 3-26.

8 For a discussion of this see for example James Goldgeier & Michael McFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the post-Cold War Era', International Organization, 46, 2, 1992, pp. 467-491.

9 Nina Kinyapina, 'Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov', Voprosy istorii, 1997, 12, pp. 34-62. 10 See N. Khitrova, 'Rossiya sosredotochivaetsya', in Anatolii Ignatiev et al. (eds), Istoriya

vneshnei politiki Rossii-Vtoraya polovina XIX veka (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1999), p. 50.

1 Viktor Lopatnikov, 'Rossiya sosredotachivaetsya', Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn', 1998, 9, p. 80. 12

Kinyapina, 'Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov', p. 42. 13 B. Friedmann & H.-J. Krautheim, 'Wiener Kongress-Heilige Allianz-Restauration', in K.

Zernack et al. (eds), Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands (Stuttgart, Anton Hiersemann, 1996), vol. 2, part 13, p. 996.

14 See for example Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 314; and Friedmann & Krautheim, 'Wiener Kongress-Heilige Allianz-Restauration', pp. 997-1001.

15 In John LeDonne, The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 254.

16 While working to uphold the status quo in Europe, Russia at the same time focused on the expansion of its southern and eastern frontiers, a measure designed to bring additional improvements to its position and eventually allow it to challenge the system level status quo power-Great Britain; see for example ibid., p. 117.

17 H-J. Krautheim & L. Kolm, 'Grossmachtpolitik und Expansion des Imperiums in der Nikolaitischen Ara', in K. Zemack et al. (eds), Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands (Stuttgart, Anton Hiersemann, 2000), vol. 2, part 15, pp. 1100-1144; and Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, pp. 329-336.

18 In Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 280.

19 Ibid., p. 316. Gorchakov would later claim that 'if we had continued the fighting, then we would

have lost Finland, the Baltic provinces, the Caucasus, Georgia and we would have been confined to what was once known as the Great Principality of Muscovy' (Vadim Makarenko, Kto soyuzniki Rossii? (Moscow, Stradiz, 2000), p. 17).

20 E. Adamov (ed.), Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s drugimi gosudarstvami, 1856-1917 (Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1952), pp. 26-27.

21 For a full list of the provisions of the Paris peace treaty see ibid., pp. 23-34. For brief interpretations of these see Khitrova, 'Rossiya sosredotochivaetsya', pp. 49-50; and Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, p. 339.

22 This was the view expressed, for instance, by Nesselrode shortly before he left the foreign ministry. Equally alarmed by the Russian defeat, Petr Valuev, who would later occupy the important position of interior minister, noted in his diary: 'Sometimes I think: Are we on the brink of perishing? Is the Russian Empire doomed?' (Lopatnikov, 'Rossiya sosredotachivaetsya', pp. 78 and 80).

23 For studies on Gorchakov's background see for example Kinyapina, 'Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov'; and Khitrova, 'Rossiya sosredotochivaetsya', pp. 50-51.

24 Then Russian foreign minister Evgenii Primakov in 1998 drew a slightly different set of lessons from Gorchakov's practices. Totalling five, some of these conclusions are highly politicised; most researchers, for instance, would probably find it difficult to agree with the claim that Russia will objectively occupy one of the leading positions in the international system (Primakov, 'Rossiya v mirovoi politike', p. 7).

25 See for example A. Zakharov (ed.), Istoriya Rossii-s nachala XVIII do kontsa XIX veka







































































































































































































































392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392 392


(Moscow, AST, 1998), pp. 381-403; Larisa Zakharova, 'Aleksandr II', Voprosy istorii, 1992, 6/7, pp. 58-79; and Dietrich Geyer, Der russische Imperialismus (G6ttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977), pp. 20-31.

26 Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914 (Philadelphia, PA, J. B. Lippincott, 1964), pp. 133-134. 'Recueillement' is usually translated into the Russian term 'sosredotochenie' (concentration).

27 In ibid., p. 173. 28 In Nina Kinyapina, Vneshnyaya politika Rossii vtoroi poloviny XIX v. (Moscow, Vysshaya

shkola, 1974), p. 13. 29 See ibid., p. 13 and Kinyapina, 'Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov', p. 43. For a discussion of

the traditional relationship between foreign and domestic policy issues see for example A. Rieber, 'Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay', in Hugh Ragsdale (ed.), Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 315-359; R. Pipes, 'Domestic Politics and Foreign Affairs', in Ivo Lederer (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy (New York, Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 145-169; and LeDonne, The Russian Empire, pp. 347-369.

30 See N. Kinyapina, 'Srednyaya Aziya vo vneshnei politike Rossii' and G. Melikhov & V. Khevrolina, 'Prisoedinenie Priamurya i Primorya', both in Ignatiev et al. (eds), Istoriya vneshnei politiki Rossii, pp. 99-103 and 131-144 respectively; and LeDonne, The Russian Empire, pp. 130-151 and 178-199.

31 In Khitrova, 'Rossiya sosredotochivaetsya', p. 57, where the question of Galicia is mentioned as an example of this new and 'satisfied' policy.

32 Cf. Makarenko, Kto soyuzniki Rossii?, p. 17. 33 In Kinyapina, 'Aleksandr Mikhailovich Gorchakov', p. 42. 34 See for example Ignatiev, 'A. M. Gorchakov'; and Geyer, Der russische Imperialismus, p. 31 35 Adamov (ed.), Sbornik dogovorov Rossii, pp. 103-110. 36 On the domestic reforms see for example M. Hildermeier, 'Industrialiserung, sozialer Wandel

und Rtickstandigkeit', in M. Hellmann etal. (eds), Handbuch der Geschichte Russlands (Stuttgart, Anton Hiersemann, 1981), vol. 3, part 1/2, pp. 102-144; Erich Donnert, Ruf3land (Regensburg, Pustet, 1998), pp. 206-212; Geoffrey Hosking, Russia-People and Empire (London, Fontana Press, 1998), pp. 315-344; and Geyer, Der russische Imperialismus, pp. 20-43.

37 On the 1815 and 1945 comparison see Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, p. 42. There is a general agreement among Russian scholars today that the termination of the demilitarisation of the Black Sea was Gorchakov's single greatest accomplishment. They also suggest, however, that his star would have shined even brighter if he had resigned shortly after this rather than staying in office for an additional decade; see for example V. Khevrolina, 'Preobrazovaniya v Rossii i vneshnyaya politika', in Ignatiev et al. (eds), Istoriya vneshnei politiki Rossii, p. 11.

38 See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 118; and Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 188-191.

39 For a discussion of the liberal inclinations of the tsar see for example V. Zhirovov, 'Razvitie Rossii v XIX veke', in A. Radugin (ed.), Istoriya Rossii (Moscow, Tsentr, 2001), pp. 153-158; W. Mosse, Perestroika under the Tsars (London, I. B. Tauris, 1992), pp. 25-54; and Zakharova, 'Aleksandr II', pp. 58-79.

40 Khitrova, 'Rossiya sosredotochivaetsya', p. 49. A contemporary of Alexander II would later explain how in 1861 the tsar had argued that the laziness of the peasants was 'a consequence of serfdom' (Nikolaj Notovitsch, Kejser Aleksander III (Copenhagen, Reitzel, 1893), p. 6).

41 'Alliances' are seen here as 'formal or informal commitment[s] for security cooperation between two or more states' (Stephen Walt, 'Why Alliances Endure or Collapse', Survival, 39, 1, 1997, p. 157).

42 On the Russian-Prussian alliance see Diether Raff, A History of Germany (Oxford, Berg, 1990), pp. 129-144; Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, pp. 149-157; and Khitrova, 'Rossiya sosredotochivaetsya', pp. 68-73.

43 This policy towards Prussia, while part of a more complex pattern, approached profit-driven bandwagoning; see Randall Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit', International Security, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 72-107.

44 Khitrova, 'Rossiya sosredotochivaetsya', pp. 73-80. 45 When changes like these occur, the declining state finds that 'the costs of maintaining the

international status quo have increased, producing a serious discrepancy between [its resources] and [its] commitments' (Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 186-187).

46 Ibid., pp. 191-197. 47 For general comments on this see for example Khevrolina, 'Preobrazovaniya v Rossii', pp. 8-22;

Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, p. 187; and Geyer, Der russische Imperialismus, p. 31.









































































































































































































393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393


48 In principle, as this entails some form of 'security cooperation' between the states involved, this rapprochement forms part of the policy of alliance making. However, since it is also based on passive rather than active support, these kinds of alliances are normally characterised by loose structures and low levels of commitment; see Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 152; and Gilpin, War and Change, pp. 192-193.

49 See for example Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118. 50 Khitrova, 'Rossiya sosredotochivaetsya', pp. 54-60. 51 Ibid., pp. 73-80. 52 See for example Mark Webber, The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States

(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1996), p. 42. 53 On the idea of preventive war see for example Gilpin, War and Change, p. 191. 54 William Wohlforth, 'Ideology and the Cold War', Review of International Studies, 2000, 26,

p. 329. 55 See for example William Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War', International

Security, 19, 3, 1994-95, pp. 3-41. 56 In Wohlforth, 'Ideology and the Cold War', p. 329. 57 Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War', p. 24. 58 Facing a need for intensive growth as urgent as that of Alexander II, Gorbachev in the mid-1980s

announced a reform policy aiming at a 'profound structural reorganisation of the economy', adding that what was clearly needed was an 'acceleration of scientific and technological progress' (Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika (London, Collins, 1987), p. 27). 59 Wohlforth, 'Realism and the End of the Cold War', p. 23.

60 While already at some point before 1853 a discrepancy developed between Russia's influence and its actual strength, the important thing is the way in which this latter was perceived; the assessment by a state of its allies and adversaries-whether correct or incorrect-serves as an indispensable part of its foreign policy making; see for example D. Allen, 'The Context of Foreign Policy Systems: The Contemporary International Environment', in Michael Clarke & Brian White (eds), Understanding Foreign Policy (Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1989), pp. 60-83.

61 Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (London, Little, Brown, 1994), pp. 169-183; and LeDonne, The Russian Empire, pp. 308-319.

62 As noted by Lawrence James, 'the [Crimean War] exposed the emptiness of Russia's military pretensions. Its army was poorly led, armed with antiquated weaponry, supported by systems that fell apart under the slightest pressure and which could not be repaired' (James, The Rise and Fall, p. 182).

63 Khitrova, 'Rossiya sosredotochivaetsya', p. 50; and LeDonne, The Russian Empire, pp. 264-285. 64 This strategy represented an appeasement policy based on threat-driven bandwagoning; see Walt,

The Origins of Alliances, p. 21. 65 An earlier attempt to explain in particular the domestic similarities between the post-1856 and

post- 1985 years is Valerie Bunce, 'Domestic Reform and International Change: The Gorbachev Reforms in Historical Perspective', International Organization, 47, 1, 1993, pp. 107-138.

66 As noted by Herman, 'the debate over the future direction of Russia domestically and internationally is inextricably linked to the ongoing, spirited argument over the origins of the end of the Cold War'. Or, to put it slightly differently, the question is whether the end of the Cold War signalled a fundamental change in Moscow's outlook or whether the Soviet Union and Russia in reality are one and the same; see Robert Herman, 'Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War', in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 271.

67 Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 28 June 2000, www.mid.ru.

68 See for example Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 21 April 2000, www.mid.ru; and Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki.

69 Kontseptsiya natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 10 January 2000; www.mid.ru. 70 See for example Krasnaya zvezda, 22 May 1998, p. 5. 71 See for example Milan Svec, 'East European Divides', Foreign Policy, 77,4, 1989-90, pp. 41-63. 72

Gilpin, War and Change, p. 198. 73

Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard-American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York, Basic Books, 1997), pp. 96-118.

74 Thane Gustafson, Capitalism Russian-style (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 12; see also Peter Boettke, Why Perestroika Failed (London, Routledge, 1993), pp. 46-56; and Egor Gaidar, Gosudarstvo i evolyutsiya (St Petersburg, Norma, 1997), pp. 9-17.

75 The command economy to a large extent was also introduced to maximise the intrinsic strength of the Soviet Union - only it was expected to overcome 'all the irrationality, spontaneity and waste of









































































































































































































394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394


the market' (Mark Sandle, A Short History of Soviet Socialism (London, University College London Press, 1999), p. 227, emphasis added).

76 Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, 'GUUAM and the Future of CIS Military Co-operation', European Security, 9, 4, 2000, pp. 92-110.

77 Ibid., pp. 96-99. 78 This change, it could be argued, put into question the predictability of Russia's foreign policy.

Realising this, the Kremlin has since then emphasised quite strongly that this is indeed a key element of its foreign policy; see for example Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki.

79 Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, 'Russia's Relations with Belarus: NATO Enlargement and Beyond', COMPASS International Relations Research Papers, 1998, 5.

80 In Franz Walter (ed.), 'NATO-Osterweiterung-ein Spektrum russischer Meinungen', Osteuropa, 46, 8, 1996, pp. A392-393.

81 ITAR-TASS, 24 October 1997/British Broadcasting Corporation-Summary of World Broad- casts-The Former Soviet Union (BBC-SWB-SU)/3060, 27 October 1997, B/9; and ITAR-TASS, 3 December 1997/BBC-SWB-SU/3093, 4 December 1997, B/3, respectively.

82 Russian TV, 8 November 1997/BBC-SWB-SU/3072, 10 November 1997, E/1. 83 See for example Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki. 84 Russian TV, 3 October 1997/BBC-SWB-SU/3042, 6 October 1997, B/6. 85 Russian TV, 3 October 1997/BBC-SWB-SU/3042, 6 October 1997, B/6; and ITAR-TASS, 10

October 1997/BBC-SWB-SU/3048, 13 October 1997, B/8, respectively. 86 The Daily Telegraph, 21 November 2000, www.dailytelegraph.co.uk. 87 ITAR-TASS, 6 July 1995/BBC-SWB-SU/2350, 8 July 1995, B/10. 88 See for example Krasnaya zvezda commenting on this issue only a few days after the signing

of the Amsterdam Treaty, 14 October 1997, p. 3. For the development of the ESDP see Maartje Rutten (ed.), 'From St-Malo to Nice', Chaillot Papers, 2001, 47, www.weu.int.

89 Strategiya razvitiya otnoshenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii s Evropeiskim Soyuzom na srednesrochnuyu perspektivu (2000-2010 gg.), October 1999, www.eur.ru.

90 Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki. 91 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 October 1997, pp. 1-2; and Krasnaya zvezda, 24 March 1998, p. 3. 92 For a discussion of British relations with the US and the EU see for example Robert Conquest

& Julian Barnes, 'Toward an English-speaking Union', The National Interest, 1999, 57, pp. 64-70; and Owen Harries, 'The Anglosphere Illusion', The National Interest, 2001, 63, pp. 130-136.

93 The Guardian, 22 November 2000, www.guardian.co.uk. 94 BBC News, 21 November 2000, www.bbc.co.uk. 95 When hosting the Russia-UK summit in November 2000 Putin also explained that if the ESDP

is 'designed to promote international stability ... [then] we can go along with this approach. We share the basic principles underlying it' (The Daily Telegraph, 22 November 2000, www.dailytelegraph. co.uk).

96 As already noted, Russia does not have much to offer the status quo states. However, 'more substantial' concessions could be given, for instance, on domestic reform issues, the war in Chechnya and relations with the so-called CIS 'dissidents'.

97 See for example Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, pp. 118-122. 98 For a strong critique of the reversal of the foreign-domestic dichotomy see for example Krasnaya

zvezda, 29 October 1998, p. 3. 99 Kontseptsiya vneshnei politiki. 100 Vladimir Putin, Russia at the Turn of the Millennium, 31 December 1999, www.govemment.ru. 101 Mikhail Kasyanov, Address to State Duma before Confirmation, 17 May 2000,

www.government.gov.ru. 102 The Russia Journal, 1-7 June 2001, www.russiajoumal.com. 103 See for example Splidsboel-Hansen, 'GUUAM and the Future', pp. 103-104. 104 Vladimir Putin, Vystuplenie pri predstavlenii ezhegodnogo Poslaniya Prezidenta Rossiiskoi

Federatsii Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 8 July 2000, www.president.kremlin.ru. 105 Gilpin, War and Change, p. 187. 106 The foreign investment is of a very different nature than the resources generated through alliance

making and it is therefore not labelled 'external support' here. Among other things, the foreign investment is a much less direct source of support and it is primarily welcomed as a means of boosting the local economy. The difference between the two sources is illustrated most clearly perhaps by the fact that an overwhelming part of the foreign investment into Russia actually originates in status quo states; see Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik 1999 (Moscow, Goskomstat, 1999), p. 541.

107 Putin, Russia at the Turn of the Millennium.





























































































































































































































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396 FLEMMING SPLIDSBOEL-HANSEN

108 See for example The World Bank, Russian Federation at a Glance, 31 August 2000, www.worldbank.org.

109 Putin, Russia at the Turn of the Millennium. 110

Kasyanov, Address to State Duma. 1ll Igor Ivanov, Rossiya i mir na rubezhe tysyacheletii, presentation delivered at the MGIMO

Gorchakov Lectures, Moscow, 23 May 2000. 112 The third basic realist assumption listed by Benjamin Frankel says that 'states seek to maximise

their security or their power' (Frankel, 'Restating the Realist Case', p. xv). 113 See for example Makarenko, Kto soyuzniki Rossii?, p. 17. 114 See for example Stanley Fischer, The Russian Economy: Prospects and Retrospect, Moscow,

19 June 2001, www.imf.org. 115 Letter to The Daily Telegraph by US Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Gordon Smith (R-OR),

28 December 2000, www.dailytelegraph.co.uk. 116 See for example the decisions of the December 2000 EU Summit in Nice (Maartje Rutten, (ed),

'From St-Malo to Nice', pp. 168-210). 117 On these tasks see ibid., pp. 211-221.



























































































past and future meet. aleksandr gorchakov and russian foreign policy

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