past revolutions, future transformations: what can the history of military revolutions in military...

title:

PastRevolutions,FutureTransformations:WhatCantheHistoryofRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairsTellUsAboutTransformingtheU.S.Military?

author: Hundley,RichardO.publisher: RAND

isbn10|asin: 0833027093printisbn13: 9780833027092ebookisbn13: 9780585163857

language: English

subject Militaryartandscience,Militaryhistory,UnitedStates--ArmedForces--Organization.

publicationdate: 1999lcc: U104.H891999ebddc: 355.4/0973

subject: Militaryartandscience,Militaryhistory,UnitedStates--ArmedForces--Organization.

UnitedStates--ArmedForces--Organization.

TheresearchdescribedinthisreportwassponsoredbytheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency.TheresearchwasconductedinRAND'sNationalDefenseResearchInstitute,afederallyfundedresearchanddevelopmentcentersupportedbytheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,theJointStaff,theunifiedcommands,andthedefenseagencies,ContractDASW01-95-C-0059.

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Hundley,RichardO.Pastrevolutions,futuretransformations:whatcanthehistoryofrevolutionsinmilitaryaffairstellusabouttransformingtheU.S.military?/RichardO.Hundley.p.cm"PreparedfortheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectAgency(DARPA)byRAND'sNationalDefenseResearchInstitute.""MR-1029-DARPA."Includesbibliographicalreferences(p.).ISBN0-8330-2709-31.Militaryartandscience.2.Militaryhistory.3.UnitedStatesArmedForcesOrganization.I.Title.U104.H891999355.4´0973dc2199-25786CIP

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PastRevolutions,FutureTransformationsWhatcanthehistoryofrevolutionsinmilitaryaffairstell

usabouttransformingtheU.S.military?

RichardO.Hundley

PreparedfortheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency

Approvedforpublicrelease;distributionunlimited

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PREFACEThehistoryofthe20thcenturyhasshownthatadvancesintechnologycanbringaboutdramaticchangesinmilitaryoperations,oftentermed"revolutionsinmilitaryaffairs"orRMAs.Technology-drivenRMAshavebeenoccurringsincethedawnofhistory,theywillcontinuetooccurinthefuture,andtheywillcontinuetobestowamilitaryadvantageonthefirstnationtodevelopandusethem.Accordingly,itisimportanttothevitalityandrobustnessoftheU.S.defenseposturefortheDepartmentofDefense(DoD)researchanddevelopment(R&D)communitytobeawareoftechnologydevelopmentsthatcouldrevolutionizemilitaryoperations,andfortheU.S.militaryservicestobeonthelookoutforrevolutionarywaysinwhichtoemploythosetechnologiesinwarfare.

Thisleadstothreeinterrelatedquestions:

Regardingpastrevolutionsinmilitaryaffairs(RMAs),

Whatlessonscanwelearnfromthehistoricalrecord?

RegardingbeingpreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothers,

Whatdoesittaketobeprepared?

RegardingtransformingU.S.militaryforcesbycarryingoutourownRMAs,

Whatdoesittaketobesuccessful?

Thisreportaddressesthesequestions,whichareparticularlyrelevanttodaywhentheDoDhassetoutonaconcertedefforttobringaboutatechnology-driventransformationoftheU.S.militarytoachieve

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theoperationalgoalsoutlinedinJointVision2010(Shalikashvili,1996).

ThisresearchwassponsoredbytheDirector'sOfficeoftheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency(DARPA)andconductedbytheAcquisitionandTechnologyPolicyCenterofRAND'sNationalDefenseResearchInstitute(NDRI).NDRIisafederallyfundedresearchanddevelopmentcentersponsoredbytheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,theJointStaff,thedefenseagencies,andtheunifiedcommands.

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CONTENTS

Preface iii

Figures ix

Tables xi

Summary xiii

Acknowledgments xxv

ChapterOneIntroduction 1

PartI.LessonsFromPastRMAs

ChapterTwoTheCharacteristicsofRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairs 7

WhatIsanRMA? 8

OtherNotableCharacteristicsofRMAs 11

LessonsfromtheBusinessWorldRegardingParadigmShifts

17

TheRelationshipbetweenBreakthroughTechnologiesandRMAs

19

IstheCurrentMilitary-TechnicalRevolutionaTrueRMA?

19

ChapterThreeTheBreakthroughProcessLeadingtoRMAs 21

RMAsResultfromSerendipitousConceptual 21

Breakthroughs

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RMAsAretheResultofMultipleInnovations 22

MuchoftheRMAProcessCanBeObservedandAnticipated

25

MuchCanBeLearnedfromFailedorIncompleteRMAs 26

NecessaryTechnologyExistsButContemplatedDevicesProveImpractical 26

NewDevicesCannotBeTurnedIntoViableSystems 27

NoOperationalConceptExiststoEmployanOtherwiseViableSystemConcept 27

WrongorIncompleteOperationalConceptIsUsed 28

NoDoctrineandForceStructuretoExploittheOperationalConceptBecausetheConceptIsUnacceptabletoPrevailingMilitaryCulture 29

NoForceStructuretoExploitOperationalConceptBecausetheNewForceStructureRequiresTooLargeaChangeinExistingMilitaryOrganizations 30

ForceStructureandOperationalConceptNotCongruentwithGrandStrategy 32

PartII.BeingPreparedforFutureRMAs(CarriedOutbyOthers)

ChapterFourBeingAwareoftheNextRMA:TheObservablesoftheEmergenceofNewRMAs 37

TheRMAProcessProducesObservablesinaNumberofVenues

37

OpenandClosedVenuesRequireDifferentCollectionApproaches

39

CollectionIsNotEnough;AssessmentIsAlsoRequired 41

InAssessingPotentialBreakthroughs,DoNotDependonExpertsAlone

42

TheEssentialElementsofaWorldwideRMABreakthroughWatchandAssessmentActivity 45

ChapterFiveBeingResponsivetotheNextRMA:TheCharacteristicsofaFuture-OrientedMilitaryOrganization 49

OvercomingtheObstaclestoResponsiveness 49

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OvercomingDenial 50

OvercomingEscapeorDiversion 52

AchievingAcceptanceandPertinentAction 53

TheCharacteristicsofaFuture-OrientedMilitaryOrganization

55

PartIII.BringingAboutFutureRMAs(OfYourOwn)

ChapterSixWhatDoesitTaketoBringAboutaSuccessfulRMA? 59

YouMustHaveaFertileSetofEnablingTechnologies 60

YouMustHaveUnmetMilitaryChallenges 60

YouMustFocusonaDefinite"Thing"oraShortListof"Things"

61

YouMustUltimatelyChallengeSomeone'sCoreCompetency

63

YouMustHaveaReceptiveOrganizationalClimate 65

YouMustHaveSupportfromtheTop 65

YouMustHaveMechanismsforExperimentation 66

YouMustHaveSomeWayofRespondingPositivelytotheResultsofSuccessfulExperiments 68

DoctrinalChanges 68

ResponsiveAcquisitionPrograms 70

ForceStructureModifications 71

ChapterSeven

Dod'sCurrentForceTransformationActivities:DoesAnythingAppeartobeMissing?WhatcanbeDonetoFillintheMissingElements? 75

Today'sForceTransformation/RMAActivities 76

DoesAnythingAppeartoBeMissing? 79

EnablingTechnologies 79

MilitaryChallenges 80

OrganizationalClimate 81

SupportfromtheTop 81

MechanismsforExperimentation 81

FocusonaDefinite"Thing" 81

ChallengingSomeone'sCoreCompetency 82

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WaysofRespondingPositivelytoSuccessfulExperiments

82

"TheRMA":WhereWeSeemtoBeToday 83

SomeKeyQuestionsfortheDoD 84

WhatCanBeDonetoFillintheMissingElements? 84

InSummary 88

Bibliography 91

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FIGURES

3.1.OneModeloftheRMAProcess:RMAsResultfromSerendipitousConceptualBreakthroughs 22

3.2.AnotherModeloftheRMAProcess:RMAsAretheResultofMultipleInnovations 23

3.3.MuchoftheRMAProcessCanBeObservedandAnticipated 25

4.1.SomeofTheseVenuesAreOpen,SomeAreClosed 40

4.2.SinceAllPotentialRMAsDoNotPanOut,CollectionIsNotEnough:Careful,BalancedAssessmentIsAlsoRequired 42

7.1.AnRMABranchoftheDoDAcquisitionSystem 87

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TABLES

S.1.DoesAnythingAppeartoBeMissingfromDoD'sCurrentRMAActivities? xxiii

2.1.RMAs:SomeIllustrativeExamples 12

4.1.ExpertsCan'tAlwaysForeseetheFuture 43

4.2.NorCanMilitaryExpertsAlwaysForeseetheMilitaryFuture 44

6.1.TheTechnologiesBehindSomeRMAs 61

6.2.The''Things"InvolvedinSomeRMAs 62

7.1.DoesAnythingAppeartoBeMissingfromDoD'sCurrentRMAActivities? 80

7.2.APossibleSetofMilestonesforan"RMABranch"oftheDoDAcquisitionSystem 88

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SUMMARYAstheGulfWarshowed,advancesintechnologycanbringaboutdramaticchangesinmilitaryoperations.Suchtechnology-drivenchangesinmilitaryoperationswillcontinuetobestowamilitaryadvantageonthefirstnationtodevelopandusethem.Accordingly,thevitalityandrobustnessoftheU.S.defenseposturedependontheDoDR&Dcommunitybeingontheleadingedgeofbreakthroughtechnologiesthatcouldrevolutionizemilitaryoperations.Also,theU.S.militaryservicesmustbeonthelookoutforrevolutionarywaysinwhichtoemploythosetechnologiesinwarfare.

LessonsFromPastRMAs

TheCharacteristicsofRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairs

Basedonanexaminationoftwohistoricalrecordsthelonghistoryofmilitarytechnologyandthemilitary"revolutions"inthe20thcenturyweconcludethatthedefiningcharacteristicofarevolutioninmilitaryaffairs(RMA)canbestatedasfollows:

AnRMAinvolvesaparadigmshiftinthenatureandconductofmilitaryoperations

whicheitherrendersobsoleteorirrelevantoneormorecorecompetenciesofadominantplayer,

orcreatesoneormorenewcorecompetencies,insomenewdimensionofwarfare,

orboth.

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WeelaborateonthekeytermsinthisdefinitioninChapterTwo.

Basedonceagainonthehistoricalrecord,wecanlistothernotablecharacteristicsofRMAs:

RMAsarerarelybroughtaboutbydominantplayers.

RMAsfrequentlybestowanenormousandimmediatemilitaryadvantageonthefirstnationtoexploitthemincombat.

RMAsareoftenadoptedandfullyexploitedfirstbysomeoneotherthanthenationinventingthenewtechnology.

RMAsarenotalwaystechnology-driven.

Technology-drivenRMAsareusuallybroughtaboutbycombinationsoftechnologies,ratherthanindividualtechnologies.

Notalltechnology-drivenRMAsinvolveweapons.

Allsuccessfultechnology-drivenRMAsappeartohavethreecomponents:technology,doctrine,andorganization.

ThereareprobablyasmanyfailedRMAsassuccessfulRMAs.

RMAsoftentakealongtimetocometofruition.

ThemilitaryutilityofanRMAisfrequentlycontroversialandindoubtupuntilthemomentitisproveninbattle.

WeprovidehistoricalexamplesofeachofthesecharacteristicsinChapterTwo.

Paradigmshiftsarenotlimitedtothemilitaryarena.Theyoccurinthebusinessworldaswell,whereinrecentyearstheyhavebeenamuchstudiedphenomenon.Oneoftheclearmessagesfromthebusinessliteratureisthatparadigmshiftsthatdestroycorebusinesscompetenciesarerarelybroughtaboutbydominantplayers.(This

reinforcesoneoftheRMAcharacteristicsnotedabove.)

TheNatureoftheBreakthroughProcessLeadingtoRMAs

RMAsaretheresultofmultipleinnovations:

Anewtechnology(orseveralnewtechnologies),whichenablesdevicesandsystemsnotpreviouslypossibleorcontemplated.

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Anewdevice,basedonthisnewtechnology,whichdoessomethingnotpreviouslydoable.

Anewsystem,basedonthisnewdevice,whichperformsamilitaryfunctioneitherdramaticallybetterordramaticallydifferentlythanithadbeenperformedbefore,orperformsanewmilitaryfunction.

Anewoperationalconcept,whichdescribesthemannerinwhichthenewsystemisemployedinsometypeofmilitarysituation,accomplishingsomemilitarytaskeitherdramaticallybetterordramaticallydifferentlythanithadbeenaccomplishedbefore,orperforminganewtaskthatdidnotexistpreviously.

Anewdoctrineandforcestructuredoctrinethatcodifiestheprinciplesgoverningtheemploymentofthenewsystemandforcestructurethatprovidesthemilitaryorganizationnecessarytofullyrealizeitspotential.

Thesevariousstagesculminateinanewmilitaryreality,inwhichaparadigmshifthasoccurredinsomesegmentofthemilitaryarena.

ThereareseveralimportantfeaturesofthisbreakthroughprocessleadingtoRMAs:

Unmetmilitarychallengesareanessentialelementdrivingcreativityateachstepintheprocess.Withoutoneormoreexistingchallenges,technologiesareunlikelytobecombinedintodevicesanddevicesintosystems,andnewoperationalconcepts,doctrine,andforcestructuresareunlikelytobedeveloped.

Thevariousinnovationssometimesoccuroutoforder:e.g.,anoperationalconceptis"invented"beforeatechnology,device,and/orsystemexistsadequatetorealizeitspostulatedpotential.

RMAscanfailinthefaceofobstaclesatanystepinthechain.Thenecessarytechnologymayexistbutthecontemplateddevicesprove

impractical.Itmaynotbepossibletoturnthenewdevicesintoviablesystems.Nooperationalconceptmayexisttoemployanotherwiseviablesystemconcept.Theforcestructurenecessarytoexploittheoperationalconceptmaynotexistbecausetheoperationalconceptisunacceptabletotheprevailingmilitaryculture,orbecausethenewforcestructurerequirestoo

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largeachangeinexistingmilitaryorganizations.(WeprovidehistoricalexamplesofeachofthesesituationsinChapterThree.)

BeingPreparedforFutureRMAs(CarriedOutbyOthers)

BeingAwareoftheNextRMA:TheObservablesoftheEmergenceofNewRMAs

ThefirststepinbeingpreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothersisbeingawarethatanRMAmaybeoccurring.MuchoftheRMAprocesscanbeobservedandanticipated,asdiscussedinChapterFour.Thisisparticularlytrueduringtheexploitationandsellingphasethatleadsfromanewdevice,operationalconcept,andsystemconcepttoanewdoctrineandforcestructureandwhichisabsolutelyessentialifthenewdoctrineandforcestructurerequiredtotrulyrealizeanRMAareevertobeachieved.DuringthesephasesoftheRMAprocess,readilyobservablesignalsareproducedinanumberofvenues,including:

Variouspressorgans,includingthetradepress(defense,aerospace,etc.),themilitaryartandsciencepress,thescienceandtechnologypress,theinternationalsecurityandforeignaffairspress,andthegeneralbusinesspress,aswellasleadingnewspapersandmagazines.

Theworldwidearmsmarket,bothlegitimateandclandestine.

Inferiormilitaryestablishments,whicharetryingtoleapfrogthedominantmilitaryplayers.

Dominantmilitaryplayers,whoaretryingtodiscreditnewideasthatthreatentheircorecompetencies.

Militaryresearch,development,test,andevaluation(RDT&E)activities,particularlythoseinvolvingnewtechnologies,systems,and/oroperationalconcepts.

Someofthesevenuesareopen,someareclosed.Theactivitiesinopenvenuesareusuallyreadilyobservablebyalmostanyone;theactivitiesinclosedvenuesarenormallyshutofffromviewby

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outsiders.Openandclosedvenuesobviouslyrequiredifferentinformation-collectionapproaches.

CollectionisNotEnough;AssessmentisAlsoRequired

NotallpotentialRMAscometopass;manyareabortedandfallbythewayside,foravarietyofreasons.Accordingly,thecollectionofobservablestotheemergenceofnewRMAsisnotenough;theseobservablesmustalsobecarefullyassessed,toseparateouttheseriousRMAcandidatesfromallofthewild-eyeddreams.Amultistepcollectionandassessmentprocessisrequired,withthefollowingcomponents:

Aninitial,wide-area-searchcollectionprocess,todetectanyandallRMAvisionsanddreams,nomatterwheretheyarisethroughouttheworld,nomatterhowfarouttheymayappear.TheoutputofthiscontinuallyongoingcollectionactivityisalivinglistofRMA"visionsanddreams."

Aninitialscreeningprocess,basedonsomesortofplausibilitycriteria,toweedoutthe"antigravity"ideas1(ortheirequivalent)fromthislistbutkeepinallthoseitemswithsomeprospectsofsuccess.TheoutputofthisstepisalistofpotentialRMAcandidates.

Amonitoringcollectionprocess,focusedoneachofthesepotentialRMAcandidatesandcontinuingoveranextendedperiod.

Amorecarefulassessmentprocess,whichcouldincludechallenges,hurdles,andteststhatacandidateRMAmustpass.TheoutputofthisongoingstepisalistofseriousRMAcandidates,tobecloselymonitoredandreassessedastheyevolveandmature.

Thisprocessrequirespatienceandstayingpower.SincefutureRMAscannotbescheduled,onemustestablishacollectionandassessmentprocessthatcanendureoveralongtime.

1Byantigravityideaswemeanconceptsthatareclearlynotfeasible,basedonfundamentalphysicalorengineeringconsiderations.

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TheEssentialElementsofaWorldwideRmaBreakthroughWatchandAssessmentActivity

ThisleadsustotheessentialelementsofaworldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivity:

Aninformationcollectionactivitythatconductstwotypesofcollection:worldwidesearch,primarilyopensource,touncovernewRMAvisions,andcontinuedmonitoring,usingopensourceand(ifnecessary)standardclosed-sourcetechniques,andfocusedonspecificRMAcandidatesthathavesurvivedtheinitialscreeningprocess.

AnRMAassessmentactivitythatconductstwotypesofassessment:initialscreening,whichkeepsinallthoseitemswithsomeprospectsofsuccess,andcontinuedandmorecarefulassessment,overtime,tofollowpotential/seriousRMAcandidatesastheymaturetoseeiftheysurmountvariouschallengesandhurdles.

ThesecollectionandassessmentactivitiescanbecarriedoutintwoseparatebutcloselycoupledorganizationsinformationcollectioninsomesortofintelligenceorganizationandRMAassessmentinsomesortofanadvancedmilitaryresearchanddevelopmentorganization,ortheycanbecarriedoutinoneorganizationhavingcombinedcapabilities.Whicheverwayitisdone,suchaworldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivityshouldensureU.S.awarenessoffutureRMAsbeingcarriedoutbyothers,ifproperlyimplementedinanenduringfashion.2

BeingResponsivetoanEmergingRMAisaMoreDifficultChallenge

BeingawareofemergingRMAsisnotenough;onemustalsoberesponsive.HistoryisfullofexamplesofmilitaryorganizationsthatwereawareofanemergingRMAbutfailedtorespondinanadequate

2ItisvitallyimportantthatthisRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessment

activityendureoverlongperiods,sinceonecannotpredictwhenanRMAharmfultoU.S.militarycapabilitiesmayarise.ThecurrentU.S.focuson"theRMA"mayconstituteaninformal,temporarybreakthroughwatch.Weareproposingaformal,morepermanentone.

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fashion.Failuretorespondcanleadanationtomilitarydisasterjustaseasilyasunawarenesscan.

HistoryshowsthatestablishedmilitaryorganizationsmoreoftenthannotfailtorespondadequatelytoemergingRMAsthreateningtheircorecompetencies,evenRMAsofwhichtheyareaware.ThisoccursprimarilybecauseofinherentobstaclestothechangesnecessarytocopewithanRMA.Theseobstaclesarenotuniquetomilitaryorganizations;rathertheyareforthemostpartgeneric,psychologicalobstaclestotheorganizationallearningandchangenecessarytocopewithparadigmshiftsthreateningcorecompetencies,nomatterwhattheirshapeorform.

Inrecentyears,analystsinboththemilitaryandbusinessarenashaveaddressedthisproblem,characterizingthevariousobstaclestoorganizationallearningandchangeinthefaceofparadigmshifts,andidentifyingproventechniquestoovercomethem.Usingthisliteratureasourpointofdeparture,wehaveidentifiedthefollowingcharacteristicsofwhatwewouldtermafuture-orientedmilitaryorganizationlikelytorespondadequatelytoanemergingRMA:

"Productiveparanoia"3regardingthefuture.

Acontinuallyrefinedvisionofhowwarmaychangeinthefuture.

Anorganizationalclimateencouragingvigorousdebateregardingthefutureoftheorganization.

Mechanismsavailablewithintheorganizationforexperimentationwithnewideas,evenonesthatthreatentheorganization'scurrentcorecompetencies.

Seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthings.

Newpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayof

war.

3WehavecoinedthistermtocapturethemajorthemeexpressedbyAndrewGrove,theformerCEOofIntel,inhisrecentbookregardingparadigmshiftsinthebusinessworld,OnlytheParanoidSurvive.

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WeexpandoneachofthesecharacteristicsinChapterFive.

Possessingthesecharacteristicsisnoguaranteeoffuturesuccess.However,amilitaryestablishmentlackingoneormoreofthemislesslikelytorespondadequatelytoanemergingRMAbeingcarriedoutbyothers.

BringingAboutFutureRMAs(OfYourOwn)

WhataboutdevelopingyourownRMA,ratherthanmerelyrespondingtosomeoneelse's?HistorysuggeststhatforamilitaryorganizationtobringaboutanRMAofitsownallofthefollowingitemsareprobablynecessary:

Youmusthaveafertilesetofenablingtechnologies.4

Youmusthaveunmetmilitarychallenges.

Youmustfocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things"adeviceorsystemexploitingtheenablingtechnologiestogetherwithaconceptforitsoperationalemployment.5

Youmustultimatelychallengesomeone'scorecompetency.

Youmusthaveareceptiveorganizationalclimate,whichfostersacontinuallyrefinedvisionofhowwarmaychangeinthefutureandwhichencouragesvigorousdebateregardingthefutureoftheorganization.

Youmusthavesupportfromthetop:seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthingsandabletoestablishnewpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.

Youmusthavemechanismsforexperimentation,todiscover,learn,test,anddemonstrate.6

4Assumingwearetalkingaboutatechnology-drivenRMA.5Thisfocusingprocesscantakeconsiderabletime;untilitoccursthereisnoRMA.6Thepurposeoftheseexperimentsistodiscoverwhatyoucandomilitarilywithnewtechnologiesandcombinationsofnewtechnologies;tolearnwhichcombinationsofdevices,systems,andoperationalconceptsworkbetterandwhichdonotworkaswell;totestpromisingdevices,systems,andoperationalconceptsinawidevarietyofreal-

(footnotecontinuedonnextpage)

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Youmusthavesomewayofrespondingpositivelytotheresultsofsuccessfulexperiments,intermsofdoctrinalchanges,acquisitionprograms,andforcestructuremodifications.

WeelaborateoneachoftheseinChapterSix.

WithallofthesethingsandatleastonebrilliantideaamilitaryorganizationhasareasonablechanceofbringingaboutasuccessfulRMA.Withoutanyoneoftheseelements,thechancesaremuchless,evenifthereisabrilliantidea,andhistorysuggeststheRMAprocessislikelytofail.

Today'sForceTransformation/RMAActivities

Sincepublicationofthe1997QuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR)(Cohen,1997),theDoDhasbeeninvolvedinaconcertedeffortto"transform"theU.S.military,motivatedbyafourfoldsetofobjectives:

toachievetheoperationalgoalsoutlinedinJointVision2010(JV2010)(dominantmaneuver,precisionengagement,fulldimensionalprotection,focusedlogistics),

tobringaboutthecostsavingsnecessarytopayforforcemodernization,

toachieveanew,affordableforcestructurethatcanbemaintainedinthefuture,and

totakeadvantageofthe[so-called]revolutioninmilitaryaffairscurrentlyongoing"theRMA."7

(footnotecontinuedfrompreviouspage)

worldcircumstances,therebyfocusingonthecombinationofdevice(s),system(s),andemploymentconcept(s)mostlikelytobringaboutanRMA;andfinallytodemonstratethatthechosensetofdevice(s),system(s),and

operationalconcept(s)offersthepotentialforarevolutionaryimprovementinmilitarycapabilitiesinreal-worldconflictsituations.7BasedonthedefinitionofanRMAusedhereaparadigmshiftupsettingacorecompetencyofadominantplayerorcreatinganewcorecompetencyinsomenewdimensionofwarfareitistooearlytotellifthecurrentmilitary-technicalrevolutionwillresultinoneormoretrueRMAs.Thejuryisstillout.

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DoDforcetransformationactivitiesunderwaythusfarincludethedevelopmentofseveralfuturevisionsofwarfare,theestablishmentofanumberofbattlelaboratoriesandwarfightingcentersdedicatedtoexploringnewwaysofwarfare,anumberofwargamesexploringnewwaysofwarfare,anumberofdevelopmentalandfieldexperiments,andsomeneworganizationalarrangements.Thesevariousactivitiesarepursuingalargenumberoftechnology/device/system/operationalemploymentconceptcombinations,manyofwhichprobablyrepresentevolutionaryimprovementsoncurrentwaysofwagingwar,butseveralofwhichcouldpossiblyleadtoRMAs.Severaldifferentconceptshavebeenproposedasthekernelof''theRMA,"includinglong-rangeprecisionfires,informationwarfare,a"systemofsystems,""networkcentricwarfare,"anda"cooperativeengagementcapability."

DoesanythingappeartobemissinginthesecurrentDoDforcetransformation/RMAactivities?BasedonthehistoryofpastRMAsandtheRMAchecklistabove,theanswerseemstobe"yes."TableS.1summarizesourassessment;weelaborateonthisinChapterSeven.

"TheRMA":WhereWeSeemtobeToday

UsingSecretaryCohen'sQDRterminologytodescribetheforcetransformationprocess,whereis"theRMA"today?HarkingbacktothemodeloftheRMAprocesswepresentedearlier,wecansaythefollowing:

Newtechnology.Wehavealotofthis.

Newdevicesandsystems.Wehavealotofideasfornewdevicesandsystems.Many(butnotall)ofthemhavebeenorarebeingbuilt.Some(butnotmost)ofthemareundergoingexperiments,butnotnecessarilyriskyexperiments,coveringtheentirediscover,learn,test,

anddemonstratespectrum.

Newoperationalconcepts.Wehavemanyofthese,eachwiththeiradvocatesanddetractors.Afewareundergoingactualexperiments.Mostarestillinpaperdiscussionsandarguments.

Newdoctrineandforcestructure.Wearealongwayfromthis,averylongway.

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TableS.1DoesAnythingAppeartoBeMissingfromDoD's

CurrentRMAActivities?RMAChecklist DoD'sCurrentSituationYoumusthaveafertilesetofenablingtechnologies

Weclearlyhavethis

Youmusthaveunmetmilitarychallenges

Wehaveseveralofthese(butaretheycompellingenough?)

Youmusthaveareceptiveorganizationalclimate

WemayhavethisinsomeServices(butnotinothers)

Youmusthavesupportfromthetop

Wehavethis(butdoesitincludealloftheServices?)

Youmusthavemechanismsforexperimentation(todiscover,learn,test,anddemonstrate)

Wehavethese(butdotheycovertheentirediscover,learn,test,anddemonstratespectrum,anddotheyencourage"risky"experiments?)

Youmustfocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things"

Thusfar,thisseemstobemissing

Youmustultimatelychallengesomeone'scorecompetency


Youmusthavewaysofrespondingpositivelytosuccessfulexperiments(intermsofdoctrine,acquisition,andforcestructure)

Thiscouldbeaproblem(cantheDoDsystemrespondpositivelytoariskynewideainvolvingradicalchange?)

Wearealsoalongwayfromfocusingonashortlistofpotentiallyrevolutionarydevices,systems,andoperationalconceptsaroundwhichwecantransformtheforce.Thisnecessaryfocusingprocesscouldtakeafewyears,probablywilltakeseveralyears,andpossiblywilltakemanyyears.8

Anotherconcern:InmostpastRMAs,theforcewasnottransformedi.e.,oldforcestructureelementsreplacedbyRMAelementsuntiltheRMAhadbeenproveninbattle.Untilthen,theRMAelementsweretreatedasadd-onstothethen-existingforcestructure.BasedontheQDR,theDoDappearstobeplanningto

8OneormoretrueRMAs,inthesensedefinedhere,areprobablyrequiredtotransformtheforcetotheextentpostulatedintheQDR:alotmorecapabilityforalotfewerresources.

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transformtheforce,i.e.,replacingoldelementswithnewRMAelementsratherthanmerelyaddingthoseelements,before"theRMA"isprovenincombat.Thisfliesinthefaceofhistory.

WhatNeedstobeDone?

BasedonthehistoryofpastRMAs,thereappeartobesomekeyelementsmissinginDoD'scurrentforcetransformationactivities:

NoneoftheServices'currentcorecompetenciesarebeingchallenged;

Thereisinadequatefocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things";

TheDoDacquisitionsystemmaynotbeadequatelyreceptivetonovel/radicalinnovations.

Thesemissingelementscanbefilledinby:

SettingupDoDconceptgroupsandexperimentalgroupstoidentifyandexperimentwithnewsystemsandoperationalconceptsthat(a)challengecurrentServicecorecompetenciesand(b)increasethefocusofthecurrentRMAefforts;

Establishingprovisionaloperationalunitstoparticipateinexperimentswithnewsystemsandoperationalconcepts;

EstablishinganewbranchintheDoDacquisitionsystemthattoleratessubstantialuncertaintiesregardingmilitaryutilitytoamuchlaterstageintheacquisitionprocess.

WeelaborateoneachoftheseinChapterSeven.

DoingtheabovewillfacilitateDoD'sforcetransformationactivitiesandhelpensurethatthenextRMAisbroughtaboutbytheUnitedStatesandnotsomeothernation.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSTheintellectualfoundationsforthematerialpresentedinthisreport,alongwithmanyofthedetails,wereoriginallydevelopedinaseriesof1995workinggroupsessionsinvolvingtheauthorandfourofhisRANDcolleagues:BrunoW.Augenstein,StevenC.Bankes,JamesA.Dewar,andSamuelGardiner.Withouttheircontributions,theauthorcouldnothavewrittenthisreport.

TheresearchalsobenefitedgreatlyfromsubsequentdiscussionswithSamuelGardineronrevolutionsinbothmilitaryandbusinessaffairs;PaulK.DavisandEugeneC.GrittononDoD'scurrentforcetransformationprocess;JohnBirklerandGilesSmithonchangesintheDoDacquisitionprocess;MartinLibickiontherecentRMArelatedliterature;andF.L.(Frank)Fernandez,theDirectorofDARPA,andThomasTesch,OfficeoftheUndersecretaryoftheNavy,regardinginnovationinmilitaryandbusinessaffairs.Inaddition,PaulDavisandMartinLibickireviewedanearlydraftofthisreportandcontributedseveralinsightfulcomments.

Theauthorisdeeplygratefultoalloftheseindividualsfortheirnumeroussuggestionsandinsights.

ChapterOneIntroductionAsillustratedbytheGulfWar,recentadvancesintechnologyhavebroughtaboutdramaticchangesinmilitaryoperations:theuseoflow-observableaircrafttonegateairdefenses,smartweaponsforprecisionconventional-strikeoperations,theemploymentofbothballisticmissilesandantiballisticmissiles(ABMs)inconventionalwarfare,andsoforth.Thesedramatictechnology-drivenchangesinmilitaryoperations,sometimestermedarevolutioninmilitaryaffairs(RMA),arenotuniqueinthehistoryofwarfare,butmerelythelatestinachainofbreakthroughtechnologies1extendingbackovertimeandincludingexamplessuchastheironcladinthe1860s,themachineguninthe1890s1910s,themannedaircraftandthetankinthe1920s1930s,theaircraftcarrierandradarinthe1930s1940s,andnuclearweaponsinthe1940s1950s.2

Suchtechnology-drivenbreakthroughsinmilitaryoperationswillcontinuetooccur,andtheywillcontinuetobestowamilitaryadvantageonthefirstnationtodevelopandusethem.Accordingly,theDepartmentofDefense(DoD)researchanddevelopment(R&D)communitymustbeontheleadingedgeofbreakthroughtechnolo-

1Thetermbreakthroughtechnologieswasfirstused(inrecenttimes)bytheDefenseScienceBoardandDirectorDefenseResearchandEngineering(DDR&E)in19901991inconjunctionwithmajortechnology-drivenshiftsinthenatureandconductofmilitaryoperations.(SeeDSB,1990,andHerzfeld,1991.)2Thislistincludesjustsomeofthemorerecentexamples.Thelongbow,developedbytheEnglishduringthe13thcenturyandusedagainsttheFrenchwithdevastatingeffectatCrecy(1346),Poitiers(1356),andAgincourt(1415)duringtheHundredYears'War,isanearlierexampleofa

breakthroughtechnologyinthemilitaryarena.SeeChurchill(1958),pp.332351,354357,and400408.

giesthatcouldrevolutionizemilitaryoperationsinthefuture,andtheU.S.militaryservicesmustbeonthelookoutforrevolutionarywaysinwhichtoemploythosetechnologiesinwarfare.

Thisleadstothreeinterrelatedquestions:

Regardingpastrevolutionsinmilitaryaffairs,

WhatlessonscanwelearnfromthehistoricalrecordregardingthecharacteristicsofRMAsandofthebreakthroughprocessleadingtoRMAs?

RegardingbeingpreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothers,

WhatwillittakefortheUnitedStatestoanticipateandbepreparedforfuturetechnology-drivenRMAscarriedoutbyothers?

RegardingtransformingU.S.militaryforcesbycarryingoutourownRMAs,

Whatdoesittaketobesuccessful?

Thisreportaddressesthesethreequestions,whichareparticularlyrelevanttodaywhentheDoDhassetoutonaconcertedefforttobringaboutatechnology-driventransformationoftheU.S.militarytoachievetheoperationalgoalsoutlinedinJointVision2010.3

RegardingthefirstofourthreetopicslessonstobelearnedfrompastRMAswebegininChapterTwobyidentifyinganddescribinganumberofsignificantcharacteristicsofRMAsanddiscussingtherelationshipbetweenbreakthroughtechnologiesandRMAs.InChapterThreewedevelopanumberofmodelsdescribingvariousaspectsofthebreakthroughprocessleadingtoRMAs.Inbothofthesechapterswehavetakenasourpointofdeparturethehistoricalrecordofpasttechnology-drivenrevolutions,inbothmilitaryaffairsandinthebusinessworld.Wehavealsoconsideredthespecific

3SeeShalikashvili(1996)foradiscussionofJointVision2010.SeetheQuadrennialDefenseReview(Cohen,1997)forahigh-levelstatementofDoD'splanstobringaboutatechnology-driventransformationoftheU.S.military.

lessonslearnedinRAND'srecentinvestigationofRMAsfortheOfficeofNetAssessment.4

RegardingoursecondtopicbeingpreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothersinChapterFourweidentifyanumberofobservablesthatcouldbeusedtoanticipatetheemergenceofnewRMAs.WeusetheseobservablesasthefoundationsforaworldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivity,whichcouldbeusedtomonitorandassessworldwidedevelopmentsintechnologyandoperationalmilitaryconceptsthatmightgiverisetofutureRMAs.

Asthehistoricalrecordshows,beingawareofanemergingRMAisnotenoughtoavertmilitarydisaster;anationmustalsoberesponsivetotheimplicationsofthatRMA.Thiscanbeadifficultchallenge,particularlyforadominantmilitaryplayersuchastheUnitedStatesistoday.WediscussthissecondchallengeinChapterFive,whereweidentifythecharacteristicsofafuture-orientedmilitaryorganizationlikelytorespondadequatelytoanemergingRMA.

Regardingourfinaltopicsuccessfullycarryingoutone'sownRMAsinChapterSixwelistthevariouselementsthathistorysuggestsarenecessarytobringaboutasuccessfulRMA.InChapterSeven,wecompareDoD'scurrentforcetransformationactivitieswiththislistandask:IsanythingmissingtobringaboutanRMA?Theanswer,inourview,appearstobeyes.Weconcludebydiscussingwhatcanbedonetofillinthese(seemingly)missingelements.

4In1995,SamGardinerandDanielFoxofRANDcarriedoutanextensiveseriesofwargamingexercisestoinvestigatetheRMAprocess.

PARTI.LESSONSFROMPASTRMAS

ChapterTwoTheCharacteristicsofRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairsTechnology-drivenchangesinmilitaryoperationsarenotrecentphenomena.Indeed,technologicaldevelopmentshavebeenbringingaboutprofoundchangesinthenatureofwarfaresincethedawnofhistory.1Brodie(1973),Dupuy(1984),andvanCreveld(1989)provideoverviewsofthehistoricalpanoramaofmilitarytechnologyanditsimpactonwarfareoverthelast(roughly)4000years,fromtheearliestdevelopments(e.g.,thechariot)tothemostrecent(e.g.,nuclearweapons).

BeginningwiththeSovietfocusontheso-calledmilitary-technicalrevolution2andcontinuingwiththeworkinitiatedbytheOfficeofNetAssessmentonthecurrentrevolutioninmilitaryaffairs,3considerableattentionhasbeenpaidtothesometimesrevolutionarynatureofadvancesinmilitarytechnology,withparticularfocusoneventsin

1Arichliteratureofthehistoryofmilitarytechnologydescribesthisprocess.VanCreveld(1989)includesabibliographicalessayreviewingthisliterature,withnumerousreferences.2In1984,MarshalNikolaiV.OgarkovandotherSovietmilitarythinkersbegantostressthattheemergenceofadvanced,nonnucleartechnologieswasengenderinganewmilitary-technicalrevolutioninmilitaryaffairs.SeeFitzGerald(1987)foranoverviewofSovietthoughtonthissubject.3SeeMarshall(1993and1995)fororiginalstatementsoftheviewsofAndrewMarshall,theDirectoroftheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD)OfficeofNetAssessment,regardingthecurrentrevolutioninmilitaryaffairs.Ricks(1994)containsanearlypublisheddiscussionoftheseviews.

the20thcentury.Thishasledtoaresurgenceofwritingonthesubject.4

Weusethesetwohistoricalrecordsofthelongsweepofmilitarytechnologyandofthemilitaryrevolutionsinthe20thcenturyasourpointofdepartureindescribingthecharacteristicsofRMAs.

WhatIsAnRMA?

MuchhasbeenwrittenrecentlyregardingthecurrentRMA,whichisoftenviewedas

amilitarytechnicalrevolutioncombining[technicaladvancesin]surveillance,C3I[command,control,communications,andintelligence]andprecisionmunitions[withnew]operationalconcepts,includinginformationwarfare,continuousandrapidjointoperations(fasterthantheadversary),andholdingtheentiretheateratrisk(i.e.,nosanctuaryfortheenemy,evendeepinhisownbattlespace).5

AnumberofpeoplehavewrittenregardingthisRMA,includingKendall(1992),Marshall(1993and1995),Mazarretal.(1993),Mazarr(1994),Krepinevich(1994and1995),LibickiandHazlett(1994),Gray(1995),Barnett(1996),Libicki(1996and1999),Blaker(1997),Buchan(1998),andDavisetal.(1998).6ThisliteraturewelldescribestheelementsofthecurrentRMA,butdoesnotshedmuchlightonthecharacteristicsofRMAsingeneral.Thatis,itdoesnotaddressquestionssuchas:HowdoesonedescribegenericallywhatconstitutesanRMA?WhatarethedefiningcharacteristicsofanRMA?Toanswerthesequestions,wemustturntothehistoricalrecordoftechnology-drivenchangesinmilitaryoperations.

Basedonthehistoricalrecord,itappearsthatthedefiningcharacteristicofanRMAcanbestatedasfollows:

4SeeKrepinevich(1994),MurrayandWatts(1995),Gray(1995),Bartlettetal.(1996),Libicki(1996),MurrayandMillet(1996),andBlaker(1997)

forasamplingofthisrecentliterature.5SeeMcKendree(1996).6ThevariousDoDscienceboardshavealsodiscussedthecurrentRMA,notalwaysbyname.Forexample,seeSAB(1995),DSB(1996),andNSB(1997).

AnRMAinvolvesaparadigmshiftinthenatureandconductofmilitaryoperations

whicheitherrendersobsoleteorirrelevantoneormorecorecompetenciesofadominantplayer,

orcreatesoneormorenewcorecompetencies,insomenewdimensionofwarfare,

orboth.

Thereareanumberofkeytermsinthisdefinition:

Paradigm.Anacceptedmodelthatservesasthebasicpatternforasegmentofmilitaryoperations.7Forexample,opposinginfantryunitsarrangedinorderlyformationsmaneuveringintheopentoengageeachotheratclosequarters,withsupportingartilleryfire,wastheoperationalparadigmforlandcombatduringtheNapoleonicWars.Opposingwarshipsarrangedinline-of-battleonparallelcoursesandengagingwithgunfirewastheoperationalparadigmfornavalfleetengagementsduringthosesamewars,aswellasduringtheFirstWorldWar100yearslater.

Corecompetency.Afundamentalabilitythatprovidesthefoundationforasetofmilitarycapabilities.Forexample,theabilitytodetectvehiculartargetsfromtheairandattackthemwithprecisionweaponsistodayacorecompetencyoftheU.S.AirForce.IntheperiodbetweenWorldWarIandII,theabilitytodeliveraccuratenavalgunfireatrangesupwardsof20mileswasacorecompetencyofthesurfacecombatunitsoftheU.S.Navy.Inthe13thand14thcenturies,theabilityofalongbowmantoputanarrowaccuratelythroughthe

chainmailarmorofaknightonhorsebackoraman-at-armsonthegroundatrangesof250300yardswasacorecompetencyoftheEnglisharchers.8

7Paradigmsalsoplayacentralroleinotherareasofhumanendeavor.Forexample,Kuhn(1970)discussestheroleofparadigmsandparadigmshiftsinscience.Likewise,Barker(1992)andGrove(1996)discusstheroleofparadigmsandparadigmshiftsinbusiness.Groveusestheterm''strategicinflectionpoint"ratherthan"paradigmshift"todenotethephenomenon,butthemeaningisthesame.8Dupuy(1984,pp.8184)andBurke(1978,pp.5962)discussthecapabilitiesoftheEnglishlongbowmen.

Dominantplayer.Amilitaryorganizationthatpossessesadominatingsetofcapabilitiesinanareaofmilitaryoperations.Forexample,todaytheU.S.AirForceisthedominantplayerinair-to-aircombatandair-to-groundattack.AttheendofWorldWarII,thecarrierforceoftheU.S.Navywasthedominantplayerinnavalwarfare.AttheendofWorldWarI,thebattlefleets(e.g.,thebattleshipandbattlecruiserforces)oftheBritishNavyandtheU.S.Navywerethedominantplayersinnavalsurfacewarfare.Goingbackfurtherinhistory,duringtheMiddleAgesthearmoredcavalry(i.e.,knightsonhorseback)wasthedominantplayerinlandwarfareinEurope.Evenfurtherback,inRomantimestheRomanlegionwasthedominantplayerinlandwarfarethroughouttheRomanEmpire.

Dimensionofwarfare.Thedimensiononwhichwarfareisconducted,thefirstandmostancientofwhichwasthelandsurfaceoftheearth(landwarfare).Thesecondandalmostasancientdimensiononwhichwarfarewasconductedwasthewatersurfaceoftheearth(navalwarfare).Inthe20thcenturyseveralnewdimensionswereadded:theunderwaterportionsoftheoceans(underseawarfare),theairabovetheearth'ssurface(airwarfare),andthehomelandsofthecombatants(strategicwarfareandintercontinentalwarfare).AnotherdimensionmuchtalkedaboutsincetheSecondWorldWarbutinwhichactualcombathasnotyetoccurredistheregionoutsidetheearth'satmosphere(spacewarfare).Astheinformationrevolutioncontinues,thereisincreasingdiscussionofcyberspaceasstillanotherdimensionofwarfare(informationwarfare).9

Paradigmshift.Aprofoundchangeinthefundamentalmodelunderlyingasegmentofmilitaryoperations.Forexample,thecarrierwarfareparadigm,inwhichopposingnavalforcesengagedeachotherat100-to200-miledistanceswithoutevercomingwithinnavalgunfirerange,representedaprofoundchangeinthebasicmodelunderlyingnavalwarfare.Itrenderedobsoletethecore(navalgunfire)

competencyofthehitherto

9SeeToffler(1993),Molanderetal.(1996),andArquillaandRonfeldt(1997)forthreeviewsofthisnewestdimensionofwarfare.

dominantbattleshipfleets,andwasthereforeanRMA.10Theblitzkriegparadigm,inwhichhighlymobilearmoredforcesbrokethroughenemylinesandrapidlypenetratedtotherear,representedaprofoundchangeinthebasicmodelunderlyinglandwarfare.Itrenderedobsoletethecorecompetencyofthehithertodominantinfantryandartilleryforcesforstaticdefensesofpreparedpositions,andwasthereforeanRMA.11Thenuclear-warhead-tippedintercontinentalballisticmissile(ICBM)createdanewcorecompetency(anoverwhelming,virtuallyunstoppableabilitytodestroycitiesandotherlarge-scaletargetsinthehomelandofanopponentthousandsofmilesaway)inanewdimensionofwarfare(intercontinentalstrategicwarfare),andwasthereforeanRMA.

Ifadevelopmentinmilitarytechnologydoesnoteitherrenderobsoleteacorecompetencyofadominantplayerorcreateanewcorecompetency,itisnotanRMA.Ifitdoes,itis.12Table2.1givesafewillustrativeexamplesofdevelopmentsinmilitarytechnologythatsatisfythiscriteria.

OtherNotableCharacteristicsOfRMAs

Basedonthehistoricalrecord,othernotablecharacteristicsofRMAsare:

RMAsarerarelybroughtaboutbydominantplayers.Forexample,duringtheperiodbetweentheFirstandSecondWorldWars,theFrenchandBritishinfantryandartilleryforces,thedominant

10TheBattleoftheCoralSea(1942)wasthefirstengagementinwhichthisnewparadigmplayedadominatingrole.SeeMorison(1963),pp.140147.11Therearemanydescriptionsofthedevelopmentandimpactoftheblitzkriegparadigm.Guderian(1952)providesasubjective,firsthandview;Corum(1992)providesamoreobjective,balancedpresentation.

12Krepinevich(1994)hasproposedalogicallysimilardefinitionofanRMA:"Whatisamilitaryrevolution?Itiswhatoccurswhentheapplicationofnewtechnologiesintoasignificantnumberofmilitarysystemscombineswithinnovativeoperationalconceptsandorganizationaladaptationinawaythatfundamentallyaltersthecharacterandconductofconflict."WepreferourwordingbecauseoftheemphasisitplacesonchangesincorecompetenciesascentraltotheRMAprocess.

Table2.1RMAs:SOMEILLUSTRATIVEEXAMPLES

RMANatureof

ParadigmShiftCore

CompetencyAffected

DominantPlayerAffected

Carrierwarfare

Creatednewoperationalandtactical-levelmodelfornavalwarfare

Accuratenavalgunfireofbattleshipfleets(renderedobsolete)

Battleshipfleets(U.S.andBritish)

BlitzkriegCreatednewoperationalandtactical-levelmodelforlandwarfare

Staticdefenseofpreparedpositionsbyinfantryandartillery(renderedirrelevant)

Frencharmy

ICBM Creatednewdimensionofwarfare(intercontinentalstrategicwarfare)

Long-range,accuratedeliveryofhigh-yieldnuclearweapons(anewcorecompetency)

Machinegun

Creatednewtactical-levelmodelforlandwarfare

Abilitytomaneuvermassedinfantryforcesintheopen(renderedobsolete)

Allarmiesemployingmassedinfantryforcesintheopen

LongbowCreatednewtactical-levelmodelforland

Man-to-mancombatcapabilityof

Frencharmoredcavalry

warfare knightsonhorseback(renderedobsolete)

EuropeanplayersinlandwarfareattheendofWorldWarI,didnotdeveloptheblitzkriegconceptoftankwarfare,andtheBritishnavy,oneofthedominantplayersinseawarfare,didnotdeveloptheconceptofcarrierwarfare.13

13Ontheotherhand,theU.S.Navy,oneofthetwodominantnavalpowersintheworldattheendofWorldWarI(alongwiththeBritishnavy),didbringaboutthecarrierwarfareRMAinthe1920sand1930s.Thisisoneofthefewhistoricalcases(knowntotheauthor)ofadominantplayerdevelopinganRMA.Itmaytellussomethingaboutwhatittakesforadominantplayer(liketoday'sU.S.military)tobesuccessfulintransformingitsmilitaryforcesbycarryingoutitsownRMA.Forthisreason,wewillcomebacktothisexampleinChapterSix.ThecarrierwarfareRMAwasdevelopedindependentlybytheJapanesenavyduringthesameperiod.LittleisavailableinEnglishregardingtheJapanesedevelopmentof


RMAsfrequentlybestowanenormousandimmediatemilitaryadvantageonthefirstnationtoexploitthemincombat.AfewofmanyexamplesaretheuseofthelongbowbytheEnglishagainsttheFrenchatCrecyin1346,14theuseofthemachinegunbytheBritishagainsttheZulusin1879(wediscussthisfurtherbelow),theuseoftheblitzkriegbytheGermanarmyagainstthePolesin1939andtheBritishandFrenchin1940,and,mostrecently,theuseofstealthaircraftandprecision-guidedmunitionsbytheUnitedStatesagainsttheIraqisin1991.

RMAsareoftenadoptedandfullyexploitedfirstbysomeoneotherthanthenationinventingthenewtechnology.Forexample,eventhoughthekeyinventorsofthemachinegunwereallAmericans(WilliamBrowning,RichardGatling,IsaacLewis,andHiramMaxim),15machinegunswerefirstusedinadecisivefashionbyEuropeanarmiesagainstnativeforcesinAfricainthe1870s1890s.16TheAmericanarmydidnotbeginbuyingtheminquantityandactivelyincorporatethemintoitstacticaldoctrineuntilmanyyearslater,17aftertheywereemployedbytheGermanarmyinSeptember1914tostoptheAlliedadvanceattheChemindesDamesridgeontheriverAisne.18Similarly,theBritishinventedthetank.AlthoughtheyfirstemployeditincombatduringtheBattleoftheSommeonSeptember15,1916andlaterattheBattleofCambraionNovember20,1917,they


carrieraviation.Also,theJapanesenavywasnotadominantplayerattheendofWorldWarI,whenitsdevelopmentofcarrieraviationbegan.Forthesereasons,wedonotdiscusstheJapaneseexperienceinanydetailinthisreport.14TheEnglishhaddevelopedthetechnologyofthelongbowandoperationalconceptsforitsuseincombatduringalongseriesofcivilwarswithinBritain,buttheFrenchhadneverseenitemployedincombat.SeeChurchill

(1958),pp.332351.15SeeEllis(1975).16OneofthefirstengagementsinwhichmachinegunsplayedadecisiverolewastheBattleofUlundi,inNatalin1879,inwhichaBritishforceequippedwithfourGatlinggunsdefeatedtheZuluarmy.(Earlierthesameyear,asimilarsizeBritishforcewithoutGatlinggunshadbeenvirtuallywipedoutbythesameZuluarmyattheBattleofIsandhlwana.)SeeEllis(1975),pp.8284.17ItisalittleknownfactthatGeneralGeorgeArmstrongCuster'sSeventhCavalrypossessedfourGatlingguns.CusterleftthemingarrisonwhenhedepartedonthecampaignthatledtoLittleBigHornin1876,sincehefelttheydidnothavetacticalvalue(Ellis,1975,p.74).18SeeEllis(1975),p.119andp.124.TheGermanemploymentofmachinegunsfromdug-inpositionsinthisbattlemarkedthebeginningofWorldWarItrenchwarfare.

didnotunderstandhowtofullyexploititscapabilities.ThiswasfirstshownbytheGermansin19391940.19Likewise,in1914theBritishconductedthefirstcarrierairraidinhistory,yearsbeforeanyothernavyhadoperationalcarriersorcarrier-basedaircraft.However,theydidnotdeveloptheRMAofcarrierwarfare,theAmericanandJapanesenaviesdid,astheydemonstratedinthefourmajorcarrierbattlesof1942.20

RMAsarenotalwaystechnology-driven.Forexample,AmericancombattacticsduringtheRevolutionaryWar(i.e.,engaginganopponentfrombehindcoverratherthaninformationoutintheopen)broughtaboutarevolutionarychangeinlandcombatwithoutanychangeintheweapontechnologiesinvolved.

Technology-drivenRMAsareusuallybroughtaboutbycombinationsoftechnologies,ratherthanindividualtechnologies.Moreprecisely,technology-drivenRMAsareusuallybroughtaboutbyweaponsorsystemsexploitingcombinationsoftechnologies.Examplesincludetheblitzkrieg,whichwasenabledbythecombinationofthreetechnologiesthetank,thetwo-waytacticalradio,andthedivebomber;andtheICBM,whichwasenabledbythecombinationofthreetechnologieslong-rangeballisticmissiles,lightweightfusionwarheads,andhighlyaccurateinertialguidance.

Notalltechnology-drivenRMAsinvolveweapons.Forexample,thecomingoftherailroadtoEuropeandAmericainthe1830s1850sledtoarevolutioninstrategicmobility.ThiswasfirstdemonstratedbytheFrenchwhentheymoved250,000menatheretoforeunheard-ofspeedtothefrontinnorthernItalytoengagetheAustriansduringtheWarof1859.Itwaslaterdemonstrated(bybothsides)onnumerousoccasionsinthe1860sdur-

19SeeMacksey(1975),Corum(1992),andMurrayandWatts(1995)fordiscussionoftheinventionofthetankanditssubsequentexploitationin

theblitzkriegconcept.20ThebattlesoftheCoralSea,Midway,theEasternSolomons,andtheSantaCruzIslands(seeMorison,1963,pp.140163,177182,and190196).SeeMurrayandWatts(1995,pp.6184)andWattsandMurray(1996,pp.383405)forthestepsthatledtothecarrierwarfareRMA,whytheAmericans"gotit,"andwhytheBritishdidnot.

ingtheAmericanCivilWar,and(particularlybytheGermans)in1870duringtheFranco-PrussianWar.21

Allsuccessfultechnology-drivenRMAsappeartohavethreecomponents:technology,doctrine,andorganization.Technology,evenwhendevelopedintoarevolutionaryweaponorsystem,isnotenoughtoproduceanRMA.Itmustbecombinedwithdoctrine(i.e.,anagreed-uponconceptfortheemploymentofthenewweaponorsystem)22andorganization(i.e.,amilitaryforcestructurecraftedtoexploitthenewweaponorsystem).Forexample,theblitzkriegRMAresultedfromthecombinationofthetank,two-wayradio,anddive-bombertechnologies,anoperationalconceptinwhichhighlymobilearmoredforcesbrokethroughenemylinesandrapidlypenetratedtotherear,andaforcestructure(thepanzerdivision)thatconcentratedtheavailabletanksintoafewspecializeddivisions.23ThecarrieraviationRMAresultedfromthecombinationoftechnologiesenablingmilitaryaircrafttotakeoffandlandoncarrierdecks;theoperationalconceptallowedcarrieraircrafttoengageanopposingnavalforceatdistanceswellbeyondnavalgunfirerangeandconcentratetheirattackontheopposingcarriers.Theforcestructure(thecarriertaskforce)wasbuiltaroundtheaircraftcarrieranditsplanes.24

Thereareprobablyasmany"failed"RMAsassuccessfulRMAs.Somecomparativelyrecentexamplesincludethenuclear-

21SeeBrodie(1973,pp.148151)andvanCreveld(1989,pp.158159).22Dupuy(1966)definesdoctrineas"Principles,policies,andconceptswhicharecombinedintoanintegratedsystemforthepurposeofgoverningallcomponentsofamilitaryforceincombat,andassuringconsistent,coordinatedemploymentofthesecomponents."Doctrinenormallyincludesconceptsofoperation,tactics,and,atitsfullest,principlesofstrategy.23Incontrast,theFrench,whohadmore(andbetter)tanksin1940thandidtheGermans,spreadthemoutmoreorlessequallythroughoutallthedivisionsoftheFrencharmy(thewrongforcestructure)andusedthemas

mobilefiresupporttotheinfantry(thewrongdoctrine).Duringthe1920sand1930s,theU.S.Armyalsoviewedtanksprimarilyasinfantrysupportweapons(thewrongdoctrine);thisledthemtodeveloptankswithlow-velocityguns(thewrongsystem),whichweresignificantlyinferiortotheGermantanks(withhigh-velocityguns)theyfacedinWorldWarII.(SeeJohnson,1990and1998.)24Dupuy(1984)discussesthecriticalrolethatthemarriageofnewweaponsandnewdoctrineplaysinthecreationofanRMA.

poweredmilitaryaircraft,theelectromagneticgun,andthethus-farunfruitfulattemptstodevelophigh-energylaser(HEL)weaponsforuseinmilitarycombat.25(WewillcomebacktothesubjectoffailedRMAsinChapterThree.)

RMAsoftentakealongtimetocometofruition.Therearemanyexamplesofthis.TheU.S.Navybeganexperimentingwithaircraftin1910;ittookthemalmostthreedecadestofullydevelopthecarrierwarfareRMA.26Similarly,theGermanarmybeganexperimentingwithtanksintheearly1920s;ittookthemalmosttwodecadestocreatetheblitzkrieg.27Furtherbackintime,althoughallofthemajortechnologydevelopmentsembodiedinthemachinegunwereessentiallycompletedbythe1870s,itdidnotcometofruitionasanRMAinEuropeanwarfareuntilSeptember1914,some40yearslater.28Evenfurtherbackintime,theEnglishdevelopedthetechnologyofthelongbowandoperationalconceptsforitsuseincombatoveralmostacenturyofcivilwarsinBritain,beforespringingitontheFrenchatCrecyin1346.29Sothe"revolution"inrevolutionsinmilitaryaffairsdoesnotmeanthechangewilloccurrapidlysometimesitwill,oftenitwon'tbutultimatelyitwillbeprofound.30,31

25SeeJDR(1986)fordiscussionsoftheevolutionofHELapplicationthinkingasofthemid-1980s.SeeAPS(1987)foranassessmentoftheballisticmissiledefenseapplicationsofHELs.Thusfar,alloftheseattemptstodevelopmilitarilyusefulHELweaponshavebeenunsuccessful.However,thejuryisstillout;thelatestapplicationfocusisonairborneHELsasanantitheaterballistic(ATBM)weapon.(SeeAviationWeek,1996.)26WediscusstheU.S.Navy'sdevelopmentofthecarrierwarfareRMAmorefullyinChapterSix.27SeeGuderian(1952),Macksey(1975),andCorum(1992).28SeeEllis(1975).

29SeeChurchill(1958),pp.332351.30AndrewMarshall(1995)makesthissamepointinhis1995writingonRMAs,inwhichhesays:"Theterm'revolution'isnotmeanttoinsistthatthechangewillberapidindeedpastrevolutionshaveunfoldedoveraperiodofdecadesbutonlythatthechangewillbeprofound,thatthenewmethodsofwarfarewillbefarmorepowerfulthantheold."31SomeRMAsdohappenquickly,however.Thebestrecentexamplemaybetheatomicbomb,whichwasdevelopedandemployedoveraperiodofonlyfouryears.SeeRhodes(1986).

ThemilitaryutilityofanRMAisfrequentlycontroversialandindoubtupuntilthemomentitisproveninbattle.TheBritishdidnotbegintorealizethecombatvalueofthemachinegununtiltheyuseditwithdevastatingforceagainsttheZulusatUlundiin1879.ManyBritishandFrenchgeneralscontinuedtoseriouslydoubtthevalueofmachinegunsinaEuropeanwarupuntiltheGermansemployedthemtostoptheAlliedadvanceinSeptember1914.32NotonlymostFrenchandBritishgeneralsbutmanyGermangenerals,includingsomeintheGermanhighcommand,doubtedthevalueoftheblitzkriegupuntilthemomentGuderianbrokethroughatSedanonMay1314,1940,andwerevehementinexpressingtheirdoubts.SomeFrench,British,andGermangeneralscontinuedtodoubtitfordaysthereafter,evenafterGuderianreachedtheEnglishChannelonMay20.33ManyAmericanadmiralsseriouslydoubtedthepowerofcarrieraviationupuntilthebattleofMidwayinJune1942.34

LessonsFromtheBusinessWorldRegardingParadigmShifts

Paradigmshiftsarenotlimitedtothemilitaryarena.Theyoccurinthebusinessworldaswell,wheretheyhavebecomeamuch-studiedphenomenon.35Aclearmessagefromthebusinessliteratureregardingproductandprocessinnovationisthatproductrevolutionsthebusinessworld'sversionofparadigmshiftsarerarelybroughtaboutbydominantplayers.AccordingtoUtterback(1994):

Discontinuousinnovationsthatdestroyestablishedcorecompetencies...almostalwayscomefromoutsidetheindustry(23of29cases,with4frominsideand2inconclusive).36

32SeeEllis(1975).33SeeGuderian(1952),Macksey(1975),LiddellHart(1979),andCorum(1992).34SeeTurnbullandLord(1949).35SeeBarker(1992),Utterback(1994),Grove(1996),andChristensen

(1997)forfourrecentexamplesofthisliterature.(Groveusestheterm"strategicinflectionpoint"andChristensenusestheterm"disruptivetechnologicalchange"todenotethephenomenon,ratherthan"paradigmshift,"buttheirmeaningsarethesame.)36Utterback(1994,p.208).

Thefollowinglistisillustrative:37

Electrictypewritersdidnotcomefromamajortypewritermanufacturer.

Ballpointpensdidnotcomefromthepenindustry.

Levi'sdidnotcomeupwithdesignerjeansforwomen.

Semiconductorsdidnotcomefromthevacuumtubeindustry.

Radialtiresdidnotcomefromamajortiremaker.

Personalcomputersdidnotcomefromamajorcomputermanufacturer.

Winecoolerscamefromneitherthewinenorsodaindustries.

Disposablediapersdidnotcomefromthediaperservices.

Thetypicalimpactofthese"discontinuousinnovations"ondominantplayersinthebusinessworldisstatedbyBowerandChristensen:

Oneofthemostconsistentpatternsinbusinessisthefailureofleadingcompaniestostayatthetopoftheirindustrieswhentechnologiesormarketschange.38

OrinthewordsofGrove:

whenastrategicinflectionpointsweepsthroughtheindustry,themoresuccessfulaparticipantwasintheoldindustrystructure,themorethreateneditisbychangeandthemorereluctantitistoadapttoit.39

Thehistoricalmessageisclear:inneithermilitarynorbusinessaffairsare"revolutions"(i.e.,paradigmshiftsthatdestroycorecompetencies)oftenbroughtaboutbydominantplayers.

37PrivatecommunicationfromSamuelGardiner.38SeeBowerandChristensen(1995).

39SeeGrove(1996),p.50.

TheRelationshipBetweenBreakthroughTechnologiesandRMAs

WhatistherelationshipbetweenbreakthroughtechnologiesandRMAs?Asourpreviousdiscussionshows,technology-drivenRMAsarebroughtaboutbyweaponsorsystemsexploitingcombinationsoftechnologies,combinedwithsupportingdoctrineandorganization.Technologyalone,withoutaccompanyingdoctrineandorganization,cannotproduceanRMA.

Useoftheterm''breakthroughtechnologies,"therefore,focusesononeoftheinputstothebreakthroughprocess;useoftheterm"RMA"focusesontheoutputfromthatprocess.ThisistheessenceoftherelationshipbetweenbreakthroughtechnologiesandRMAs.

WediscusstheprocessthatleadsfrombreakthroughtechnologiestoRMAsinChapterThree.

IstheCurrentMilitary-TechnicalRevolutionaTrueRMA?

ThereisanotherinterestingquestionregardingRMAs:Isthecurrentmilitary-technicalrevolutioncalledbysome"theRMA"atrueRMA?Basedonourdefinition,itistoosoontotell.ForittobeatrueRMA,itmustrenderobsoleteorirrelevantoneormorecorecompetenciesofadominantplayer,orcreateoneormorenewcorecompetenciesinanewdimensionofwarfare.Thishasnotyethappened.

Butitcouldhappen.Forexample,theusebytheU.S.AirForceofair-delivered,precision-guided,antiarmorsubmunitionsinafutureregionalconflictmightconceivablystoptheadvanceofasizable(e.g.,division-sizeorgreater)enemyarmoredforceinitstracks,withoutrequiringinterventionbyU.S.Armymechanizedforces.40Ifthisweretooccur,andifitcouldbeconfidentlyaccomplishedinawidevarietyoftank-accessibleterrainandinthefaceofenemyairdefenses,itwouldbeatrueRMA,sinceitwouldrenderirrelevantacore

competency(tank/antitankwarfare)ofadominantplayer(thearmoredforcesoftheU.S.Army).

40SeeBowieetal.(1993).

Asanotherexample,theemploymentofcyberspace-basedtechniquesbyonesideinafutureconflictmightinflictstrategicdamageontheothersidesufficienttosignificantlyalterthecourseoftheconflict.41Ifthisweretooccur,itwouldalsobeatrueRMA,sinceitwouldcreateanewcorecompetency(informationwarfare)inanewdimensionofwarfare(cyberspace).

Neitherofthesenorotherexamplesthathavebeenmentionedintherecentmilitary-technicalrevolution/RMAliteraturehasasyetoccurred.Butbecausetheycould,thejuryisstilloutregardingwhetherthecurrentmilitary-technicalrevolutionwillresultinoneormoretrueRMAs.

ThisconclusionisinkeepingwithAndrewMarshall'sinitialwordsregardingwhathascometobecalled"theRMA":

Thereisalsoatendencytotalkaboutthemilitaryrevolution.Thiscouldhavethesensethatitisalreadyhere,alreadycompleted.Idonotfeelthatisthecase.Probablywearejustatthebeginning,inwhichcasethefullnatureofthechangesinthecharacterofwarfarehavenotyetfullyemerged;therefore,thereferentofthephase,"themilitaryrevolution,"isunclearandindeedshouldremaintosomeextentundefined.Itwouldbebettertospeakabouttheemergingmilitaryrevolution,orthepotentialmilitaryrevolution.Whatweshouldbetalkingaboutisahypothesisaboutmajorchangetakingplaceintheperiodahead,thenextcoupleofdecades.(Emphasisintheoriginal.)(Marshall,1993.)

Indeed,byprematurelydeclaringthecurrentmilitary-technicalrevolutiona"revolutioninmilitaryaffairs,"themostenthusiasticproponentsof"theRMA"mayhaveunnecessarilyopenedthemselvesuptocriticism.42

41SeeMolanderetal.(1996).42Mann(1998)isbutoneexampleofsuchcriticism.Evenworse,bytermingtheongoingmilitary-technicalrevolution"the"revolutioninmilitary

affairsratherthanmerely"a"revolutioninmilitaryaffairs,asifitweretheonlyRMAthateveroccurred,theproponentsof"theRMA"showalackofhistoricalsense.

ChapterThreeTheBreakthroughProcessLeadingtoRMAsHereagainthehistoricalrecordoftechnology-drivenchangesinmilitaryoperationsprovidesnumerousinsightsintothenatureofthebreakthroughprocessleadingtoRMAs.

RMAsResultFromSerendipitousConceptualBreakthroughs

OneinsightisthatRMAsalmostalwaysinvolvesomesortofconceptualbreakthroughthatcouldnotbeanticipatedinadvance,andoftenwasnotsoughtfor.1Basedonthisinsight,Figure3.1presentsourfirstandsimplestmodelofthebreakthroughprocess,inwhichRMAsresultfromserendipitousconceptualbreakthroughs.

Inthepreparatoryphase,oneormoretechnologydevelopmentsandvariousunmetmilitarychallenges2setthestageforthesubsequentconceptualbreakthrough.Inthebreakthroughphase,thekeycreativeeventintheRMAprocessthecriticalconceptualbreakthroughoccurs.Suchconceptualbreakthroughsusuallycannotbeanticipatedinadvance,andoftenarenotsoughtfor.Theyoftenoccuraccidentallyandhappenserendipitously.

1Burke(1978)givesmanyhistoricalexamplesofsuchserendipitousconceptualbreakthroughs,inthemilitaryaswellasinotherarenas.2Unpublished1995RANDresearchbySamGardinerandDanielFoxon"UnderstandingRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairs"showsthatwithoutoneormoreunmetmilitarychallenges,thereislittlelikelihoodofaconceptualbreakthrough.Theunmetchallengesprovideacreativeimpetusessentialtothebreakthroughprocess.

Figure3.1OneModeloftheRMAProcess:

RMAsResultfromSerendipitousConceptualBreakthroughs

Intheexploitationandsellingphase,theconceptualbreakthroughisexploitedandsold.Itisdevelopedintoamilitaryweaponorsystem,combinedwithasuitableoperationaldoctrine,andexpressedinaforcestructureadequatetorealizethepotentialities.Itissoldbyovercomingtheresistanceofthemanyindividualsandorganizationswhocansay"no"tothenewidea.3Inthepayoffphase,thenewweaponorsystemisusedincombatandshowsitsrevolutionarypotential;theRMAbecomesareality.

RmasaretheResultOfMultipleInnovations

ThemodelinFigure3.1issimple,andportraystheaccidentalnatureofthekeycreativeeventintheprocess.However,insuggestingthateachsuccessfulRMAdependsononlyonesuchkeyinnovation,itis

3WediscussfailedRMAsinmoredetaillater,andgiveexamplesofsuchnaysayers.

deficient;historyshowsthateachindividualRMAisusuallytheresultofanumberofinnovationsintechnology,doctrine,andorganiza-tion.Accordingly,Figure3.2presentsasecond,morecomplexmodelofthebreakthroughprocess,inwhichRMAsaretheresultofmultipleinnovations.

Theinnovativestagesinthismodelare:

Anewtechnology(orseveralnewtechnologies)thatenablesdevicesandsystemsnotpreviouslypossibleorcontemplated.

Anewdevice,basedonthisnewtechnology,thatdoessomethingnotpreviouslydoable.

Anewsystem,basedonthenewdevice,thatperformsamilitaryfunctioneitherdramaticallybetterordramaticallydifferently

Figure3.2AnotherModeloftheRMAProcess:

RMAsAretheResultofMultipleInnovations

thanithadbeenperformedbefore.(Insomecases,itmayperformafunctionthathadneverbeenperformedbefore.)

Anewoperationalconceptthatdescribesthemannerinwhichthenewsystemisemployedinsometypeofmilitarysituation,accomplishingsomemilitarytaskeitherdramaticallybetterordramaticallydifferentlythanithadbeenaccomplishedbefore,orperforminganewtaskthatdidnotexistpreviously.

Anewdoctrineandforcestructuredoctrinethatcodifiestheprinciplesgoverningtheemploymentofthenewsystemandforcestructurethatprovidesthemilitaryorganizationnecessarytofullyrealizeitspotential.

Thesevariousstagesculminateinanewmilitaryreality,inwhichaparadigmshifthasoccurredinsomesegmentofthemilitaryarena.

Figure3.2alsoshowsthat

Unmetmilitarychallengesareanessentialelementdrivingcreativityateachstepintheprocess.Withoutoneormorechallenges,technologiesareunlikelytobecombinedintodevicesanddevicesintosystems,andnewoperationalconcepts,doctrine,andforcestructuresareunlikelytobedeveloped.

Thevariousinnovationssometimesoccuroutoforder:e.g.,anoperationalconceptis"invented"beforeatechnology,device,and/orsystemexistsadequatetorealizeitspostulatedpotential.4

RMAscanfailtooccurinthefaceofobstaclesatanystepinthischain.Thenecessarytechnologymayexist,butthecontemplateddevicesproveimpractical.Itmaynotbepossibletoturnthenewdevicesintoviablesystems.Nooperationalconceptmayexisttoemployanotherwiseviablesystemconcept.Theforcestructuretoexploittheoperationalconceptmaynotexistbecausetheoperational

conceptisunacceptabletothepre-

4Forexample,theoperationalconceptofstrategicbombardmentwasdevelopedduringthe1920sand1930s.(SeeMitchell,1925,foradiscussionbyoneofitsearlyproponents.)However,theaircraftandweapontechnologieswerenotrobustenoughtosupportanRMA.Itwasonlywiththedevelopmentofnuclearweapons,intercontinental-rangebombers,andICBMsinthe1940s1960sthatanRMAresulted.

vailingmilitaryculture,orbecausethenewforcestructurerequirestoolargeachangeinexistingmilitaryorganizations.

WewillreturntothesubjectoffailedRMAslaterinthischapter.

MuchoftheRMAProcessCanbeObservedandAnticipated

ThemodelinFigure3.1emphasizestheserendipitousnatureof(atleastsome)keycreativeeventsintheRMAprocess.ThemodelinFigure3.2emphasizesthemultipleinnovationsthatmakeuptheprocess.BothofthesemodelsdealwiththeinternalsoftheRMAprocess.ThemodelinFigure3.3,ontheotherhand,dealswithanaspectoftheexternalsoftheprocess:thesignalsthatcanbeseenbyoutsideobservers.

SerendipitousinventionthatistheessentialcreativeelementattheheartoftheRMAprocessandleadsfromthenewtechnologytothenewdevice,operationalconcept,andsystemconceptisdifficultto

Figure3.3MuchoftheRMAProcessCanBeObservedandAnticipated

anticipateandmaynotbereadilyobservable,particularlyatthemomentitoccurs.However,duringtheexploitationandsellingphasethatleadsfromthenewdevice,operationalconcept,andsystemconcepttoanewdoctrineandforcestructureandwhichisabsolutelyessentialifanewdoctrineandforcestructurearetobeachievedthereisusuallypublicdebateandexperimentationthatarereadilyobservable.Thus,thelatterstagesoftheRMAprocessarealmostalwaysaccompaniedbyreadilyobservablesignals,whichanticipatetheemergenceofnewRMAs.5Wediscusstheseobservablesinmoredetaillater.

MuchCanbeLearnedFromFailedorIncompleteRMAs

AdditionalinsightsconcerningtheRMAprocesscanbegleanedfromamoredetailedlookatthehistoryofsomefailedorincompleteRMAsandwhytheyfailedtoachievetheiranticipatedpotential.Asindicatedearlier,RMAscanfailtooccurinthefaceofobstaclesatanystepinthechainportrayedinFigure3.2.Wenextconsiderhistoricalexamplesassociatedwitheachofthesepossibilities.

NecessaryTechnologyExistsbutContemplatedDevicesProveImpractical

Inthe1950s,muchthoughtwasgiventoanuclear-poweredaircraft,whichwouldhavevirtuallyunlimitedrangeandendurance,andwouldtherefore(initsproponents'view)revolutionizeaerialwarfare.

Thisdreamnevercametofruition.Eventhoughthenecessarynuclearreactorandenergyconversiontechnologiesexisted,thecontemplateddevice(anuclear-poweredaircraftengine)provedmuchtooheavytobepractical.Becauseoftheweightoftheengine,suchanaircraftwouldliterallyhavenevergottenofftheground.

5Inthe20thcentury,theauthorknowsofonlytwoRMAsthatwerenotprecededbyreadilyobservable,publicsignals:theatomicbombandthe

stealthaircraft(andthejuryisstilloutastowhetherthestealthaircraftisatrueRMA).

NewDevicesCannotbeTurnedintoViableSystems

Morerecently,inthe1970sandearly1980s,thoughtwasgiventoanelectromagnetic(EM)gunthatwouldshootprojectilesatmuchhighermuzzlevelocitiesthanconventionalguns,andwouldtherefore(initsproponents'view)beasuperiorantitank,antiaircraft,andantimissileweapon.

Inthiscase,EMgunsorratherEMacceleratorsthatacceleratedsmallprojectilestovelocitiesofseveralkilometerspersecondwereinfactdevelopedandtested,andperformed(asadevice)moreorlessastheirproponentshadclaimed.However,eventhoughtheseEMgunsworkedinprinciple,inpracticetheywerecumbersome,withinternalbarrelcomponentsthatworeoutrapidlyandhadtobereplacedoften(sometimesaftereveryshot).Forthesereasons(andprobablyothersaswell)ithas,thusfaratleast,notbeenpossibletoturnEMgunsintoviablemilitarysystems.

NoOperationalConceptExiststoEmployanOtherwiseViableSystemConcept

Withoutanoperationalconcept,thebestweaponsystemintheworldwillneverrevolutionizeanything.ThemachinegunorratherthelackofapositionforthemachineguninmostEuropean-basedarmiesduringthelastquarterofthe19thcenturyprovidesagoodexampleofthis.By1885,thedevelopmentofaworkablemachinegunwasrelativelycomplete,andseveralfirmswereactivelymarketingsuchguns.ButmostEuropeanarmieswiththeexceptionoftheBritish(theymissedthefullsignificanceofthisRMAforadifferentreason)didnothavetheslightestconceptofhowtoemploythesegunseffectivelyincombat.InthebattlesofWissembourgandSpichernin1870duringtheFranco-PrussianWar,theFrenchtriedusingmachinegunsmountedonartillerycarriagesandsitedwiththefieldartilleryasindirectfireweapons.6TheywereoutrangedbythePrussianartillery

piecesandblowntobitsbeforetheyhadachancetofire.NoneoftheotherleadingEuropean-basedarmies(excepttheBritish,aboutwhichmorelater)cameupwithabetterideaduringtheperiodbefore1900.Theideathattheuseof

6SeeEllis(1975),pp.6364.

machinegunsasdirect-fireinfantry-supportweaponscoulddecimateinfantryforcesattemptingtocrossopengrounddidnotoccurtothem.7

WrongorIncompleteOperationalConceptisUsed

SometimesoneormoreseeminglysmallmissingelementsinanoperationalconceptcancausethefailureofanRMA,orcancauseoneplayertomissrealizingthefullpotentialofanRMAthatanotherplayerachieves.Carrierwarfareprovidesanexample.OnChristmasDay1914theBritishconductedthefirstcarrierairraidinhistorytheattackontheCuxhavenZeppelinbasenearWilhelmshavenbysevenBritishseaplanesfromthreeimprovisedcarriersintheHeligolandBight.8AtthecloseofWorldWarI,theRoyalNavyhadoverthreeyearsofwartimecarrieroperationsandpossessednearlyadozencarriersofonesortoranother,atatimewhennoothernavalpowerhadevenone.9

Inspiteofthisheadstart,theBritishcompletelymissedrealizingthefullpotentialofthecarrierwarfareRMA;atthebeginningofWorldWarII,thefirst-lineBritishcarrierswereincapableofgeneratingthecombatstrikingpowerofAmericanandJapanesecarriers,assoconvincinglydemonstratedinthecarrierbattlesof1942.WhydidtheBritishmissthisRMA?Fortheseeminglysmallestofreasons.Theirconceptofoperationsdidnotincludethe"deckpark,"thepracticeofstowingamajorfractionofacarrier'scomplementofaircraftontheflightdeck,andrefuelingandrearmingthereaswell.TheBritishstowed,refueled,andrearmedalloftheiraircraftbelow,onthe

7ItdidoccurtotheRussiansandlatertotheJapanese,whobothemployedmachinegunseffectivelyduringtheRusso-JapaneseWarof19041905.Germanobserversofthiswartooktheideabackhome,wheretheGermanarmyadopteditandbeganaddingmachinegunstoitsforces,thussettingthestagefortheiremploymenttostoptheAlliedadvanceon

theriverAisneinSeptember1914.SeeEllis(1975),pp.6568.8Threetroopcarriers,Engadine,Riveria,andEmpress,modifiedtocarrysmallnumbersofseaplanes,conductedthisraid.Forflightoperations,theseaplaneswereloweredintothewaterusingcranes.SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),WattsandMurray(1996),andFriedman(1988).9Thesevesselsrangedfromearlyseaplanecarriers,suchasEmpressandRiveria,toArkRoyal,thefirstshipdesignedandbuiltasanaircraftcarrier,andArgus,thefirstflat-deckcarrier.SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),WattsandMurray(1996),andFriedman(1988).

hangerdeck.Thus,in1939afirst-lineBritishcarriercarriedonly2430aircraft,whereasAmericanandJapanesecarrierscarried80100aircraft.10Itturnedoutthatthekeydeterminantsoftheoffensivestrikingpowerofacarrierforcewerethenumberofstrikeaircraftthatcouldbelaunchedinasingleattackandhowquicklysuccessiveattackscouldbemounted.BecausetheAmericanandJapanesecarrierscarriedmanymoreaircraft,theycouldlaunchmuchlargerattacks;becausetheyrefueledandrearmedtheiraircraftontheflightdeck,theycouldturnaroundreturningaircraftmuchfaster,therebylaunchingmoreandfastersuccessiveattacks.Thesefeaturesmadeallthedifferenceintheworld.11

ThedevelopmentoftankdoctrinebytheAmericanarmyduringthe1920sand1930sisanotherexampleoftheconsequencesofawrongorincompleteoperationalconcept.TheU.S.Armyviewedtanksprimarilyasinfantrysupportweapons,anincompleteoperationalconceptthatignoresthepossibilityandimportanceoftank-versus-tankengagements.Thisledthemtodeveloptankswithlow-velocityguns(thewrongsystem),whichweresignificantlyinferiortotheGermantanks(withhigh-velocitygunsdesignedtogoagainstothertanks)theyfacedinWorldWarII.12

NoDoctrineandForceStructuretoExploittheOperationalConceptBecausetheConceptisUnacceptabletoPrevailingMilitaryCulture

Sometimesbothaviablesystemandaneffectiveoperationalconceptexist,butbecausetheoperationalconceptisunacceptabletotheprevailingmilitaryculture,thedoctrineandforcestructurenecessarytoexploitthenewweaponarenotdeveloped.ThiswasthecaseregardingtheuseofthemachinegunintheBritisharmyduringtheperiodleadinguptoWorldWarI.

10TheBritishcarriersweresomewhatsmallerthantheAmericanandJapanesecarriers,whichalsolimitedthenumberofaircrafttheycould

carry.Butthebiggestlimitingfactorwastheirlackofdeckparks.11SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),pp.6184,andWattsandMurray(1996),pp.383405.12SeeJohnson(1990and1998).

IncontrasttothecontinentalEuropeanarmies,bythe1880stheBritishknewhowtoemploymachinegunsincombattoachievedevastatingeffect:asdirect-fireinfantryweapons.TheBritishlearnedthisinAfrica,fightingthenativetribes.MachinegunswereusedagainsttheZulusatUlundiin1879,intheassaultonTel-el-KebirinEgyptin1882,againsttheDervishatAbuKleaintheSudanin1884,andagainagainsttheDervishattheBattleofOmdurmanin1898.13

ButtheseweretheBritishcolonialforces,notthemainstreamBritisharmy;andthesewerenativetribes,notother''civilized"Europeanarmies.Simplyput,theprevailingBritishmilitaryculturecouldnotconceiveof"officersandgentlemen"employingsuchanuncivilizedweaponagainstotherofficersandgentlemen.InthewordsofEllis:

Sothemachinegunbecameassociatedwithcolonialexpeditionsandtheslaughterofnatives,andwasthusbydefinitionregardedasbeingtotallyinappropriatetotheconditionsofregularEuropeanwarfare.14

Thus,intheyearsbeforeWorldWarI,theBritisharmydidnotdevelopthedoctrineandforcestructurenecessarytoexploitthemachinegun.15

NoForceStructuretoExploitOperationalConceptBecausetheNewForceStructureRequirestooLargeaChangeinExistingMilitaryOrganizations

Sometimestheforcestructurenecessarytoexploitaviablesystemandarecognizedoperationalconceptrequirestoolargeachangeinexistingmilitaryorganizations,andisthereforenotdeveloped.Thiswasthecaseregardingthedevelopmentorratherthearrested

13SeeEllis(1975),pp.8286.Asbutoneexampleofthedevastatingeffectofmachinegunsintheseengagements,intheBattleofOmdurman11,000Dervishwerekilled,broughtdownprimarilybysixMaximguns;ontheBritishside,only28Britishsoldiersand20other(colonial)soldierswere

killed.14Ellis(1975),p.57.15SeeEllis(1975),pp.4860.

developmentoftankwarfareintheBritisharmyduringthe1920sand1930s.16

Asmentionedearlier,theBritishinventedthetankandwerethefirsttoemployitincombat,duringWorldWarI.Followingthatwar,anumberofBritishindividuals(mostprominentlyJ.F.C.FullerandB.H.LiddellHart)wroteandspokepassionatelyregardingthetank'spotentialtorevolutionizelandwarfare,laidoutoperationalconceptstothatend,andadvocatedanewforcestructurefortheBritisharmycenteredonall-tankunits.Further,theBritisharmycarriedoutaninnovativeseriesofexperimentsinthelate1920sandearly1930sinvolvingtheuseofarmorinmobile,mechanizedwarfare.Themostnotableoftheseexperimentswerethe1926maneuversontheSalisburyplain,inwhichanarmoredforcecarriedouta25-milepenetrationthatwreckedthedefendingforces'position.17

Inspiteoftheapparentlessonsofthesemaneuversandthepassionateargumentsofarmored-warfareadvocatessuchasFullerandLiddellHart,18theleadersoftheBritisharmyrejectedthisnewoperationalconceptandtheforcestructurethatwentalongwithit.ThenewforcestructureproposedbyFuller,LiddellHart,andtheirfollowersrequiredtoolargeachangeinthethen-existingorganizationalstructureoftheBritisharmy;itupsettoomanyapplecartsandprovokedtoomuchoppositionfromdefendersoftraditionalregiments.InthewordsofMurrayandWatts:

ThepathofBritishinnovationinarmor...remainedoutsidethearmy'smainstream,andtheeducationalprocessthattheexperi-

16SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),pp.2530,foradetaileddiscussionoftheabortedBritishattemptsduringthisperiodtodevelopadoctrineandforcestructurefullyexploitingthetank.17Germanobserverswerepresentatthese1926maneuversandcarriedthe(apparent)messageregardingthetank'soperationalpotentialbackhome,

whereitwaspickedupbyforward-lookingthinkersintheGermanarmy.(SeeMurrayandWatts,1995,pp.1830.)18Infact,theincreasinglyvehementandstridentargumentsofFuller,LiddellHart,andtheirfollowersmaywellhavebeenpartoftheproblem;theytendedtopolarizethedebateandantagonizethemainstreamBritishmilitaryleaders.(SeeMurrayandWatts,1995,pp.2530.)

mentswitharmormighthavedevelopedintobecamea"weversusthem"contestbetweenoldandnew.19

Thesplitofthe[British]armyintotwoseparatecamps(withtheradicalinnovators,byfar,thesmaller)insuredthat[theradicalinnovators']ideasplayedlittleifanyroleinthepreparationoftheBritisharmyforwarinthelate1930s.20

Thus,intheyearsbeforeWorldWarII,theBritisharmydidnotdevelopthedoctrine(mobile,mechanizedwarfare)andforcestructure(armoreddivisions)necessarytoexploitthetank,andtherebymissedoutontheblitzkriegRMA.

ForceStructureandOperationalConceptNotCongruentwithGrandStrategy

TheFrenchalsofailedtoadoptadoctrineofoffensivetankwarfareduringtheperiodbetweentheWorldWars,butforadifferentreason:theywerefocusedonagrandstrategyforlandwarfarethatwasprimarilydefensive.TheenormouscasualtylistsofWorldWarItrenchwarfarehadconvincedtheleadersoftheFrencharmythatinthefuturealloffensiveoperations,exceptthosethatwerelimitedandtightlycontrolled,wouldnolongerbeworththeprice.Theycouldnotconceiveofthetankovercomingthepowerofthedefensethathadbeendemonstratedin19141918.Accordingly,inthe1920sand1930stheyadoptedalandwarfaredoctrinethatwasalmostentirelydefensive.Moreover,andmoreimportant,theycouldnotconceiveofanyother(successful)waytofight.Doughtydescribes

thefundamentalunwillingnessandinabilityofseniorFrenchmilitaryleaderstoacceptthepossibilitythatothersmightwagefuturewarinafashionverydifferentfromtheirs.21

OffensivetankoperationshadnoplaceintheFrenchstrategy,sotheFrenchalsomissedoutontheblitzkriegRMA.

19SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),p.28.20SeeMurrayandWatts(1995),p.29.21Doughty(1985and1990),asparaphrasedbyMurrayandWatts(1995,p.25).

ThesehistoricalexamplesoffailedorincompleteRMAsreinforcesomeofthecharacteristicsofRMAsdiscussedinChapterTwo.

Successfultechnology-drivenRMAsrequiretechnology,doctrine,andorganization.Missingorincompleteelementsinanyoneoftheseareascancauseamilitaryforceto"missout"onanRMA.

RMAsarerarelybroughtaboutbydominantplayers,becausesuchplayersareoftennotmotivatedtomakethenecessarydoctrinalororganizationalchanges.22

RMAsareoftenadoptedandfullyexploitedbysomeoneotherthanthenationoriginallyinventingthenewtechnology,becausethatnation'smilitaryfailed(forwhateverreason)tomakethenecessarydoctrinalororganizationalchanges.

TheyalsohighlightsomeadditionallessonsregardingtheRMAprocess:23

Militaryinstitutionsmustbewillingtodevelopavisionofhowwarmaychangeinthefuture,ortheyareincapableofdevelopingRMAs.

Acceptanceofnewideasby(atleastsome)seniormilitaryleadersandby(atleastpartof)themilitarybureaucracyisessentialtothesuccessfuldevelopmentofRMAsbyexistingmilitaryinstitutions.24

22Asmentionedearlier,theU.S.Navy,oneofthedominantnavalplayersattheendofWorldWarI,diddevelopthecarrierwarfareRMAduringthe1920sand1930s.WediscussthisinChapterSix.23MurrayandWatts(1995,pp.8493)andWattsandMurray(1996,pp.405415)highlighttheseadditionallessons.24AsstatedbyMurrayandWatts(1995,p.87),"itseemsunlikelythatanysmallhandfulofvisionaries,howeverdedicatedandvocal,havemuchchanceofforcingmilitaryinstitutionstoadoptfundamentallynewwaysoffightingwithouttheacquiescenceorgrudgingcooperationimpliedbyemergingbureaucraticrecognitionandacceptance."SeealsoWattsandMurray(1996,

p.409).Asanexampleofthesuccessfulharnessingofthisbureaucraticprocess,Rosen(1991)discussesthekeyroleplayedbyafewseniornavalleadersinfacilitatingthedevelopmentofthecarrierwarfareRMAbytheU.S.Navyduringthe1920sand1930s.

Thepotentialforcivilianoroutsideleadershiptoimposeanewvisionoffuturewar(i.e.,thevisionofanRMA)onareluctantmilitaryservicewhoseheartremainscommittedtoexistingwaysoffightingis,atbest,limited.

Institutionalprocessesforexploring,testing,andrefiningconceptionsoffuturewari.e.,forconductingexperimentsandassessingtheirresultsareessentialtothedevelopmentofRMAs.(TheGermanarmyandtheU.S.Navy'saviationcommunityhadsuchprocessesduringthe19181939period;theBritishandFrencharmiesdidnot.)

WenowturntoadiscussionofhowonemaybepreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothers.

PARTII.BEINGPREPAREDFORFUTURERMAS(CARRIEDOUTBYOTHERS)

ChapterFourBeingAwareoftheNextRMA:TheObservablesoftheEmergenceofNewRMAsThefirststepinbeingpreparedforfutureRMAscarriedoutbyothersisbeingawarethatanRMAmaybeoccurring.AsmentionedinconjunctionwithFigure3.3,muchoftheRMAprocesscanbeobservedandanticipated.Thisisparticularlytrueduringtheexploitationandsellingphase(seeFigure3.3)thatleadsfromanewdevice,operationalconcept,andsystemconcepttoanewdoctrineandforcestructureandwhichisabsolutelyessentialifthenewdoctrineandforcestructurerequiredtotrulyrealizeanRMAareevertobeachieved.Wediscusstheseobservablesinthischapteranddescribetheessentialelementsofanactivitytomonitorandassesssuchobservablesonacontinuingbasis.

TheRMAProcessProducesObservablesinaNumberofVenues

DuringtheexploitationandsellingphaseoftheRMAprocess,observablesareproducedin:

Variouspressorgans,includingthetradepress(defense,aerospace,etc.),themilitaryartandsciencepress,thescienceandtechnologypress,theinternationalsecurityandforeignaffairspress,andthegeneralbusinesspress,aswellasleadingnewspapersandmagazines.

TradepressorganscoveringthedefenseandaerospacearenaincludeAsia-PacificDefenseForum,AsianDefenceJournal,Asia-PacificDefenceReporter,AviationWeek&SpaceTechnology,CanadianDefenceQuarterly,Defense&AerospaceElectronics,

DefenseNews,DefenseWeek,InternationalDefenseReview,Jane'sDefenceWeekly,MilitaryTechnology,andSignal.1

MilitaryartandsciencepressorgansincludeAirForceMagazine,AirForceTimes,AirpowerJournal,ArmedForcesJournalInternational,Armor,Army,ArmyTimes,FieldArtillery,Infantry,MarineCorpsGazette,MilitaryReview,NavalWarCollegeReview,NavyInternational,NavyTimes,andProceedingsoftheUnitedStatesNavalInstitute.ScienceandtechnologypressorgansincludeNature,Science,ScientificAmerican,andTechnologyReview.

TheinternationalsecurityandforeignaffairspressincludesDefense&ForeignAffairs,EuropeanSecurity,ForeignAffairs,InternationalAffairs,NATOReview,NATO'sSixteenNations,StrategicReview,andTheJournalofStrategicStudies.GeneralbusinesspressorgansincludeBarron's,BusinessWeek,Forbes,Fortune,TheEconomist,TheFinancialTimes,andTheWallStreetJournal.LeadingnewspapersandmagazinesincludeDerSpiegel,DieWelt,DieZeit,FrankfurterAllgemeine,InternationalHeraldTribune,NeueZürcherZeitung,TheNewYorkTimes,TheTimes(ofLondon),andTheWashingtonPost.

Becausetheemergenceofany"true"RMAisalmostcertaintoprovokeconsiderablepublicdebate(becauseoftheestablishedmilitaryinstitutionswhosepositionitthreatens)andhavesignificantbusinessandeconomicimpact(becauseofthechangesitimpliesinthedefenseindustry),itishighlyunlikelythatsuchanRMAwouldnotbecoveredinanyofthesepressorgans.Itisboundtoshowupsomewhere.

Theworldwidearmsmarket,bothlegitimateandclandestine.Armsdealersandtheirsalesmentouttheirproductsworldwide.Theiractivitiescouldbeusefulindicationsofanemergingtechnology-drivenRMA.

Inferiormilitaryestablishmentstryingtoleapfrogthedominantplayers.Often,suchmilitaryestablishmentsareamongthefirsttotryoutanewanddistinctlydifferentmilitarysystem/

1Thislistandtheonesthatfollowaremeanttobeillustrative;theyaremostcertainlynotexhaustive.

operationalconceptthatoffersthehopeofrenderingobsoleteacorecompetencyofadominantmilitaryplayer.MonitoringtheactivitiesofsuchlessermilitaryestablishmentsmayleadtoearlyindicationsofanemergingRMA.

Dominantmilitaryplayerstryingtodiscreditnewideasthatthreatentheircorecompetencies.Thefocushereshouldnotbeonthenewmilitarysystems/operationalconceptsthatthedominantmilitaryplayersarepursuing,butratherthenewsystems/conceptsthatthedominantplayersarearguingagainstandthemorevehementlytheyarearguingagainstsomethingnewandpotentiallyrevolutionary,themorelikelyitisthatthismightindeedbeanemergingRMA.

Militaryresearch,development,test,andevaluation(RDT&E)activities,particularlythoseinvolvingnewtechnologies,systems,and/oroperationalconcepts.2

Anyprocessdesignedtobeonthelookoutforemergingtechnology-drivenRMAsshouldwatchallofthesevenues,bothwithinandoutsidetheUnitedStates.3

OpenandClosedVenuesRequireDifferentCollectionApproaches

Someofthesevenuesareopen,someareclosed.Theactivitiesinopenvenuesareusuallyreadilyobservableby(almost)anyone;theactivitiesinclosedvenuesarenormallyshutofffromviewbyoutsiders.AsindicatedinFigure4.1,thelegitimatearmsmarketisgenerallyanopenvenue;itsactivitiesarenormallyreadilyobservable.(Indeed,frequentlytheyareactuallyadvertised.)Theunclassified

2AnillustrativeexampleofthepotentialusefulnessofthisvenueisthatoftheGermanswhoobservedthe1926BritishmaneuversontheSalisburyplainandcarriedthemessageregardingthetank'soperationalpotentialformobilewarfarebackhometotheintellectualleadersofthe(thenembryonic)Germanarmy.

3Unpublished1997RANDworkbyJeffreyIsaacson,ChristopherLayne,andJohnArquillapresentsanumberofpredictorsonwhetherastateislikelytoachievemilitaryinnovation.Suchpredictorscanhelpfocusthisprocess.

Figure4.1SomeofTheseVenuesAreOpen,SomeAreClosed

pressisanopenvenue.Theclandestinearmsmarket,ontheotherhand,isaclosedvenue;participantsinthismarketgotogreatlengthstohidetheiractivitiesfromgeneralview.Theclassifiedpressisalsoaclosedvenue,accessibleonlytothosewiththepropersecurityclearances.

Openandclosedvenuesrequiredifferentcollectionapproaches.Foropenvenues,thestandardopen-sourcecollectiontechniquessurveyingnewspapers,periodicals,andbooks,monitoringtelevisionandradiobroadcasts,attendingconferences,etc.areapplicable,albeittailoredtotargetsofspecificrelevancetotheRMAprocess.Forclosedvenues,standardhumanintelligence(humint)andcommunicationsintelligence(comint)techniquesareapplicable,mostlikelytargetedbasedonopen-sourcecueinginformation.

CollectionisNotEnough;AssessmentisAlsoRequired

AsthediscussionsinChaptersTwoandThreehaveshown,notallpotentialRMAscometopass;manyareabortedandfallbythewaysideforavarietyofreasons.Accordingly,thecollectionofobservablesemanatingfromtheemergenceofnewRMAsisnotenough;theseobservablesmustalsobecarefullyassessed,toseparateouttheseriousRMAcandidatesfromthewild-eyeddreams.Figure4.2illustrateswhatisneededinthisassessmentprocess.

Asshowninthefigure,amultistepcollectionandassessmentprocessisrequired,withthefollowingcomponents:

Aninitial,wide-area-searchcollectionprocess,todetectanyandallRMAvisionsanddreams,nomatterwheretheyariseandnomatterhowfar-outtheymayappear.Theemphasishereshouldbeoninclusionratherthanexclusion.TheoutputofthiscontinuallyongoingcollectionactivityisalivinglistofRMAvisionsanddreams.4

Aninitialscreeningprocess,basedonsomesortofplausibilitycriteria,toweedoutthe''antigravity"ideas5(ortheirequivalent)fromthislistbutkeepinallthosewithsomeprospectsofsuccess.Atthisstageintheassessment,itismuchsafertokeepquestionableideasinthantothrowgoodideasout;theplausibilitycriteriausedshouldbeselectedaccordingly.TheoutputofthisstepisalistofpotentialRMAcandidates.

Amonitoringcollectionprocess,focusedoneachofthepotentialRMAcandidatesandcontinuingoveranextendedperiod.Thespecificsofthiscollectionwillvary,dependingonthenatureofeachpotentialRMA,andmayfocusonspecificchallenges,hurdles,orteststhatagivencandidateRMAmustpass.

Acarefulassessmentprocess,whichcouldincludechallenges,

hurdles,andteststhatacandidateRMAmustpass.6Theoutput

4Alivinglistmaybechangingallthetime,oratleasteveryyearorso.5"Antigravity"ideasareconceptsthatareclearlynotfeasible,basedonfundamentalphysicalorengineeringconsiderations.6Thespecificswillvary,basedonthenatureofeachRMAcandidate.

Figure4.2SinceAllPotentialRMAsDoNotPanOut,CollectionIsNotEnough:Careful,BalancedAssessmentIsAlsoRequired

ofthisongoingstepisalistofseriousRMAcandidates,tobecloselymonitoredandreassessedastheyevolveandmature.

Thisprocessrequirespatienceandstayingpower.SincefutureRMAscannotbescheduledandmaytakeyearstocometofruition,onemustestablishacollectionandassessmentprocessthatcanendureoveralongperiod.

InAssessingPotentialBreakthroughs,DoNotDependonExpertsAlone

Inconductingboththeinitialscreeningandcarefulassessmentstepsinthisprocess,onecannotrelyontheviewsofexpertsalone;theycannotalwaysforeseethefuture.Table4.1,takenfromCerfandNavasky(1984),givesexamplesofcaseswhereexperts"gotitwrong."7Table4.2,fromthesamesource,showsthatmilitaryexpertssimilarlycannotalwaysforeseethemilitaryfuture.

7CerfandNavasky(1984)haveover300pagesofsuchexamples.

Table4.1ExpertsCan'tAlwaysForeseetheFuture

"Thephonograph...isnotofanycommercialvalue."

ThomasAlvaEdison,inventorofthephonograph,c.1880

"Heavier-than-airflyingmachinesareimpossible."

LordKelvin,Britishmathematician,physicist,andpresidentoftheBritishRoyalSociety,c.1895

"Manwillnotflyforfiftyyears."

WilburWrighttohisbrotherOrville,1901

"Icannotimagineanyconditionwhichcouldcauseashiptofounder....Modernshipbuildinghasgonebeyondthat."

CaptainEdwardJ.Smith,WhiteStarLine(futurecommanderoftheTitanic),1906

"Withthepossibleexceptionofhavingmorepleasinglinestotheeyewhileinflight,themonoplanepossessesnoadvantagesoverthebiplane.''

GlenH.Curtiss(FounderofCurtissAircraft),December31,1911

"Whothehellwantstohearactorstalk?"

HarryM.Warner(PresidentofWarnerBrothersPictures),c.1927

"Aseveredepressionlikethatof19201921isoutsidetherangeofprobability."

TheHarvardEconomicSociety,16November1929

"Ithinkthereisaworldmarketforaboutfivecomputers."

ThomasJ.Watson,chairmanofIBM,1943

"Wedon'tliketheirsound.Groupsofguitarsareonthewayout."

DeccaRecordingCo.executive,turningdowntheBeatlesin1962

"Withoverfiftyforeigncarsalreadyonsalehere,theJapaneseautoindustryisn'tlikelytocarveoutabigsliceoftheU.S.marketforitself."

BusinessWeek,2August1968

"Thereisnoreasonforanyindividualtohaveacomputerintheirhome."

KenOlson,president,DigitalEquipmentCorporation,1977SOURCE:ChristopherCerfandVictorNavasky,TheExpertsSpeak,PantheonBooks,NewYork,1984.

Table4.2NorCanMilitaryExpertsAlwaysForeseetheMilitaryFuture

"Makenomistake,thisweaponwillchangeabsolutelynothing."

FrenchDirectorGeneralofInfantry,dismissing(beforemembersoftheFrenchparliament)theimportanceofthemachineguninwarfare,1910

"[Themachinegunis]agrosslyoverratedweapon."

BritishFieldMarshalDouglasHaig,attheoutbreakofWorldWarI,c.1914

"Itishighlyunlikelythatanairplane,orfleetofthem,couldeversinkafleetofNavyvesselsunderbattleconditions."

FranklinD.Roosevelt(formerAssistantSecretaryoftheNavy),1922

"Asfortanks,whicharesupposedbysometobringusashorteningofwars,theirincapacityisstriking."

MarshalHenriPhilippePétain(formerFrenchMinisterofWarandformerCommander-in-ChiefoftheFrenchArmies),1939

''Their[theGerman]tankswillbedestroyedintheopencountrybehindourlinesiftheycanpenetratethatfar,whichisdoubtful."

GeneralA.L.Georges(Major-GénéraldesArmées),1939

"TherearenourgentmeasurestotakeforthereinforcementoftheSedansector."

GeneralCharlesHuntziger(CommanderoftheFrenchSecondArmy),May13,1940

"Nomatterwhathappens,theU.S.Navyisnotgoingtobecaughtnapping."

FrankKnox,SecretaryoftheNavy,4December1941,justbeforetheJapaneseattackonPearlHarbor

"Thisisthebiggestfoolthingwehaveeverdone....Thebombwillnevergooff,andIspeakasanexpertinexplosives."

AdmiralWilliamD.Leahy,advisingPresidentHarryS.TrumanontheimpracticalityoftheU.S.atomicbombproject,1945

"Theycouldn'thitanelephantatthisdist..."

GeneralJohnB.Sedgwick(UnionArmy),lastwords,utteredduringtheBattleofSpotsylvania,1864

SOURCE:ChristopherCerfandVictorNavasky,TheExpertsSpeak,PantheonBooks,NewYork,1984.

ThemessageofTables4.1and4.2is(atleast)twofold,insofarastheassessmentofpotentialRMAsisconcerned:

Onecannotalwaysdependontheviewsofexpertsregardingtheprospectsforrevolutionarychange.

Theviewsofexpertscanbeparticularlyunreliablewhentheyhaveastakeintheoldwayofdoingthings.

BoththeinitialscreeningandcarefulassessmentstepsintheprocessoutlinedinFigure4.2mustbestructuredwiththeseadmonitionsinmind.

TheEssentialElementsofaWorldwideRMABreakthroughWatchandAssessmentActivity

Wehaveidentifiedtheessentialelementsofwhatweterma"worldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivity":8

Aninformationcollectionactivitythatconductstwotypesofcollection:

Worldwidesearch,primarilyopen-source,touncovernewRMAvisions.

Continuedmonitoring,usingopen-sourcetechniquesand(ifnecessary)standardclosed-sourcetechniques(e.g.,HumintandComint),focusedonRMAcandidatesthathavesurvivedtheinitialscreeningprocess.

AnRMAassessmentactivitythatconductstwotypesofassessment:

Initialscreening,toweedouttheequivalentofanti-gravityideasbutkeepinallthoseitemswithsomeprospectsofsuccess.

8EugeneGritton(RAND)andDavidSignori(thenattheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency[DARPA]andnowatRAND)

suggestedthistermtotheauthor.

Continuedandmorecarefulassessment,overtime,tofollowpotential/seriousRMAcandidatesastheyevolveandmatureandseeiftheysurmountvariouschallengesandhurdles.

Asmentionedearlier,sinceoneneverknowswhenafutureRMAmayariseorcometofruition,thesecollectionandassessmentactivitiesmustbeestablishedinsuchawaythattheycanendureoveralongperiod.TheycanbecarriedoutintwoseparatebutcloselycoupledorganizationsinformationcollectioninsomesortofintelligenceorganizationandRMAassessmentinsomesortofanadvancedmilitaryresearchanddevelopmentorganizationortheycanbecarriedoutinanorganizationhavingcombinedcapabilities.Ineithercase:

Theorganizationcarryingouttheinformationcollectionactivitiesmustbeabletoaccessopensourcesofinformation(newspapers,periodicals,books,televisionandradiobroadcasts,conferences,etc.)onaneffective,worldwidebasis,andmustalsobeabletocalluponclosed-sourcehumintandcomintcollectiontechniqueswhereneeded.

TheorganizationcarryingouttheRMAassessmentactivitiesmusthaveaccesstocreativethinkerswithexpertiseinscience,technology,militarysystems,andmilitaryoperationscreativethinkerswhocancombine"outofthebox"thinkingwithanappreciationforpracticalrealities.9

ThisworldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivity,ifproperlyimplementedinanenduringfashion,shouldensureU.S.

9DARPAisanobviouscandidatetobetheorganizationentrustedwithRMAassessmentactivities.Infact,itperformssomewhatsimilarfunctionstoday,albeitfocusedinanumberofareasDARPAmanagementhasidentifiedaspotentiallyrevolutionaryinsofarasU.S.militaryoperationsareconcerned,ratherthanencompassingtheentiretyofRMA"dreamsandvisions"throughouttheworld,whetherornottheywouldapplytoU.S.militaryforcesandthecurrentU.S.militarystrategy.

DARPAcertainlyhasaccesstocreative,"outofthebox"thinkerswithexpertiseinscience,technology,militarysystems,andmilitaryoperations.DARPAalsohasahistoryofcloseandfruitfulinteractionswithintelligenceagenciesskilledinaccessingopensourcesofinformationandinconductingclosed-sourcecollectionoperations.

awarenessoffutureRMAsbeingcarriedoutbyothers.10ButbeingawareofemergingRMAsisnotenough;onemustalsoberesponsive.WeturntothatchallengeinChapterFive.

10InadditiontoalertingtheUnitedStatestoRMAthreatsbeingdevelopedbyothers(intimefortheUnitedStatestopreparecountermeasures),theRMAbreakthroughwatchcanalsogenerateRMAopportunitiesfortheUnitedStatestodevelopitself(astheGermansdidafterobservingthe1926BritishtankmaneuversontheSalisburyplain).

ChapterFiveBeingResponsivetotheNextRMA:TheCharacteristicsofaFuture-OrientedMilitaryOrganizationBeingadequatelypreparedtocopewithanemergingRMAbeingdevelopedbyothersisatwofoldchallenge:

BeingawareofapotentialemergingRMA

BeingresponsivetotheimplicationsofthatRMA.

Failuretomeeteitheroneofthesechallengescanleadanationtomilitarydisaster.TheZuluswereunawareofthemachinegunRMAbeforetheBattleofUlundi,whichledthemtodisasterinthatbattle.TheBritishandFrencharmieswereawareoftheblitzkriegRMAwellbeforetheeventsofMay1940,butfailedtorespond;thisledthemtodisasterintheBattleofFlandersandthesubsequentBattleofFrance.

ChapterFourdealtwiththefirstofthesechallenges,describingtheessentialelementsofaworldwideRMAbreakthroughwatchandassessmentactivitydesignedtoensureawarenessoffutureRMAs.Thischapterdealswiththesecond.

OvercomingtheObstaclestoResponsiveness

EstablishedmilitaryorganizationsmoreoftenthannotfailtorespondadequatelytoemergingRMAsthreateningtheircorecompetencies,evenonesofwhichtheyareaware,primarilybecauseofinherentobstaclestothechangesnecessarytocopewithanRMA.ThiscanbethoughtofintermsofobstaclesinthepathofeachofthestepsintheRMAprocess;wetookthisviewpointinChapterThree.

Itcanalsobethoughtof,moregenerally,intermsofgenericpsychologicalobstaclestotheorganizationallearningandchangenecessarytocopewithparadigmshifts,nomatterwhattheirshapeorform;1wewilltakethisviewpointhere.

PsychologicalobstaclestochangeareascommonforbusinessorganizationsconfrontingparadigmshiftsasformilitaryorganizationsconfrontingRMAs.AndrewGrove(1996,p.124),theco-founderandformerCEOofIntel,laysoutthetypicalstepsinanorganization'sresponsetoaparadigmshiftthreateningoneofitscorecompetencies:

Denial

Escapeordiversion

Acceptanceandpertinentaction.

HowdoesamilitaryestablishmentcopewithorganizationaldenialwhenconfrontedwithapotentialRMA?HowdoesamilitaryestablishmentcopewithorganizationalescapeordiversioninthefaceofapotentialRMA?HowdoesamilitaryestablishmentachieveacceptanceandpertinentactioninresponsetoapotentialRMA?Weaddressthesequestionsnext.

OvercomingDenial

Psychologiststellusthatthefirststageinanindividual'sresponsetothedeathofalovedoneisalmostalwaysdenial:psychologicaldenialthatthepersonisgone.Thesameistrueformilitaryorganizationsthreatenedwiththeforthcoming"death"ofacherishedcorecompetency(corecompetenciesareamilitaryorganization's"lovedones").

RecenthistoryisfullofexamplesofmilitaryorganizationsthatwereawareofanemergingRMAbutfailedtorespond,mostoftenbecause

ofdenial.IntheperiodbeforeWorldWarI,theleadersoftheinfantryandcavalryforcesofmostEuropeanarmieswereawareofthe

1Weuse"psychological"inthesenseoforganizationalpsychologyi.e.,thebehavioroforganizations.

machinegunandwhatithadaccomplishedagainstnativearmiesinAfrica,buttheydeniedthepossibilitythatitwouldbeusedincombatbetweencivilizedarmiesinEurope,aswellasthepossibilitythatitcouldovercomethemoraleofproperlytrainedinfantryorthechargeofproperlymotivatedcavalry.IntheperiodbeforeWorldWarII,theleadersoftheBritishandFrencharmieswereawareoftheclaimsoftheproponentsofwhatbecametheblitzkriegRMA,buttheydenieditsefficacy.Thelistgoesonandon.

Howdoesoneovercomesuchorganizationaldenial?AccordingtoGrove(1996,pp.13):

Onlytheparanoidsurvive.Soonerorlater,somethingfundamentalinyourbusinessworldwillchange.

Whenitcomestobusiness,Ibelieveinthevalueofparanoia.Businesssuccesscontainstheseedsofitsowndestruction.Themoresuccessfulyouare,themorepeoplewantachunkofyourbusinessandthenanotherchunkandthenanotheruntilthereisnothingleft.Ibelievetheprimeresponsibilityofamanageristoguardconstantlyagainstotherpeople'sattacks[onhisorganization'scorecompetencies]andtoinculcatethisguardianattitudeinthepeopleunderhisorhermanagement.

Thisattitudeof"productiveparanoia"ourterm,notGrove'sisjustasapplicabletosuccessfulmilitaryorganizationsastosuccessfulbusinessorganizations.Abasicsenseofproductiveparanoiaregardingthefutureisausefulfirststepinovercomingorganizationaldenial,particularlyforadominantplayersuchastheU.S.military.

Butthat'snotallthatisrequired.AccordingtoMurrayandWatts(1995,p.85),basedontheiranalysisofinstancesofmilitaryinnovation(andnoninnovation)duringtheperiodbetweenWorldWarIandII:

Theevidence...attests,firstofall,totheimportanceofdevelopingvisionsofthefuture.Militaryinstitutionsnotonlyneedtomakeup-front

intellectualinvestmentstodevelopavisionoffuturewar,buttheymustcontinueagonizingoverthatvision,strugglingtodiscernhowthenextwarmaydifferfromthelast.

MurrayandWatts(1995,p.85)andWattsandMurray(1996,p.407)recounttheimportanceofGeneralHansvonSeeckt's"postWorldWarIvisionofmobilewarfarebyahighlyprofessional,well-trained,well-ledarmy"tothesubsequentdevelopmentoftheblitzkriegconceptbytheGermanarmy.2

Thecombinedmessagefromthebusinessandmilitaryarenasisthatdenial(ofchange)canbeovercomebymaintainingabasicsenseofproductiveparanoiaregardingthefuture,andbydevelopingandcontinuallyrefiningavisionofhowthefuture(i.e.,futurewars)maydifferfromthepast.Twousefultechniquesforthedevelopmentofsuchvisionsoffuturewarsarewargaming,asemployedbyGardinerandFox,3andtheconceptofasymmetricstrategies,describedinBennettetal.(1994a,1994b,1998,1999).4,5

OvercomingEscapeorDiversion

Inthebusinessworld,escapeordiversionisoftenthenextstepinanorganization'sresponsetoanoncomingparadigmshift.TurningagaintoGrove(1996,pp.124125):

Escape,ordiversion,referstothepersonalactionsoftheseniormanager.Whencompaniesarefacingmajorchangesintheircorebusiness,theyseemtoplungeintowhatseemtobetotallyunre-

2GeneralvonSeecktwasheadoftheGermangeneralstaffandchiefoftheGermanarmyduringtheperiod19191926.Corum(1992)makesthissamepoint.3Intheir1995unpublishedRANDworkon"UnderstandingRevolutionsinMilitaryAffairs,"SamGardinerandDanielFoxconductedanextensiveseriesofwargamesexploringsixfuturewarsinSouthwestAsia.Thechallenge-responsecycleinthisse-riesoffutureGulfwarsfirstonesidegainstheadvantage,thentheothergeneratedacontinuallyevolvingvisionofhowfuturewarsmaydifferfrompreviouswars.4Theterm"asymmetricstrategies"denotesacertainclassofmilitary

strategies(oroperationalconcepts)employedbyanopponentofadominantmilitaryplayer.Thesestrategiesareasymmetricinthesensethattheydonotmimicthedominantplayer'sapproachtowarfare.Rather,theydeliberatelychooseadifferentwayofconductingcombatawaychosentonegatethedominantplayer'smanyadvantages.5Other"futuringtechniques"recentlyemployedinthebusinessormilitaryarenaswhichmaybeusefulhereinclude"scenario-basedplanning"(Schwartz,1991),"microworlds"(Senge,1990),"futuresearch"(WeisbordandJanoff,1995),''assumption-basedplanning"(Dewar,1993),"discovery-drivenplanning"(McGrathandMacMillan,1995,andChristensen,1997),and"TheDayAfter..."methodology(Molanderetal.,1996).

lated[activities].Inmyview,alotoftheseactivitiesaremotivatedbytheneedofseniormanagementtooccupythemselvesrespectablywithsomethingthatclearlyandlegitimatelyrequirestheirattentiondayinanddayout,somethingthattheycanjustifyspendingtheirtimeonandmakeprogressininsteadoffiguringouthowtocopewithanimpendingstrategicallydestructiveforce.

Militaryorganizationsfacingparadigmshiftsareoftensubjecttothesamephenomena.

Howdoesoneovercomesuchorganizationalescapeordiversion?Developingandcontinuallyrefiningavisionofhowfuturewarsmaydifferfrompastwars,mentionedaboveasameansofovercomingdenial,willcertainlyhelpherealso.Broadandintensivedebateregardingthefutureoftheorganizationisalsoofvalue.InthewordsofGrove(1996,p.99):

Howdoweknowwhetherachangesignalsastrategicinflectionpoint[Grove'stermforaparadigmshift]?Theonlywayisthroughtheprocessofclarificationthatcomesfrombroadandintensivedebate.

Themessageisclear:escapeordiversioncanbeovercomebydevelopingandcontinuallyrefiningavisionofhowfuturewarsmaydifferfrompastwars,andbyfosteringanorganizationalclimateencouragingbroadandintensivedebateregardingthefutureoftheorganization.

AchievingAcceptanceandPertinentAction

Overcomingdenial,escape,anddiversioninthefaceofanemergingRMAisnottheendofthestory.Theorganizationmustthenunitebehindaneffectiveresponsetothechallenge(whatGrovecalls"acceptanceandpertinentaction").AccordingtoGrove(1996,p.121):

Resolutioncomesthroughexperimentation.Onlysteppingoutoftheold

rutswillbringnewinsights.

Or,inthewordsofMurrayandWatts(1995,p.88),basedontheiranalysisofmilitaryinnovationbetweenWorldWarIandII:

Institutionalprocessesforexploring,testing,andrefiningconceptionsoffuturewar...areliterallythesinequanonofsuccessfulmilitaryinnovationinpeacetime.

Inboththebusinessandmilitaryarena,theremustbemechanismsavailablewithintheorganizationforexperimentationwithnewideas,eveniftheythreatentheorganization'scurrentcorecompetencies.

Moreisrequiredtoachieveacceptanceandpertinentaction.Rosen'sinvestigationofthepoliticsofpeacetimeinnovationin20thcenturymilitaryorganizationsshowsaneedfor(atleastsome)seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswhosponsorthenewwaysofdoingthings(withinatleastpartoftheorganization).6InRosen'swords(p.76):

Innovationsoccurredwhenseniormilitaryofficerswereconvincedthatstructuralchangesinthesecurityenvironmenthadcreatedtheneed.Theseseniorofficers,whohadestablishedthemselvesbysatisfyingthetraditionalcriteriaforperformance,hadthenecessarypowertochampioninnovations.

GeneralvonSeecktplayedthisroleduringtheinitialstagesofdevelopmentoftheblitzkriegRMA;7AdmiralWilliamS.Sims(thepresidentoftheNavalWarCollegeduring19171922)8andRearAdmiralWilliamA.Moffett(thedirectoroftheU.S.Navy'sBureauofAeronauticsfrom1921to1933)playedthesameroleduringtheearlydevelopmentalstagesofthecarrieraviationRMA.9

Inaddition,newpromotionpathways(withinatleastpartoftheorganization)forjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwararealsonecessary.InthewordsofRosen(1991,p.251):

6SeeRosen(1991),pp.76105.7SeeCorum(1992).8InApril1917,AdmiralSimswascalledawayfromhisNavalWarCollegepositiontobecomeCommander,U.S.NavalForcesinEurope,inpreparationfortheU.S.entryintoWorldWarI.SimsreturnedtotheNavalWarCollege

inDecember1918,whereheremaineduntilhisretirementin1922.(SeeMurrayandWatts,1995,pp.6970.)9SeeTurnbullandLord(1949),Melhorn(1974),andMurrayandWatts(1995,pp.1922and6974).

Peacetimeinnovationhasbeenpossiblewhenseniormilitaryofficerswithtraditionalcredentials,reacting...toa[perceived]structuralchangeinthesecurityenvironment,haveactedtocreateanewpromotionpathwayforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.

Insummary,threethingsappeartobenecessarytoachieveacceptanceandpertinentactioninamilitaryorganizationconfrontedwithanemergingRMA:mechanismswithintheorganizationforexperimentationwithnewideas,seniorofficerswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthings,andnewpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.

TheCharacteristicsofaFuture-OrientedMilitaryOrganization

Thecharacteristicsofafuture-orientedmilitaryorganizationlikelytorespondadequatelytoanemergingRMAinclude:

"Productiveparanoia"regardingthefuture.

Acontinuallyrefinedvisionofhowwarmaychange.

Anorganizationalclimateencouragingvigorousdebateregardingthefutureoftheorganization.

Mechanismsavailablewithintheorganizationforexperimentationwithnewideas,evenonesthatthreatentheorganization'scurrentcorecompetencies.10

Seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthings.

10AsarecentstudybytheCNO[ChiefofNavalOperations]ExecutivePanelshows,thisusuallyrequiresseparationoftherevolutionaryinnovativeactivitiesfromthemainstreamactivityofthemilitaryorganizationi.e.,inseparate,nonbureaucraticorganizations.R.RobinsonHarris(CAPT,USN),ExecutiveDirector,CNOExecutivePanel,"NavalWarfareInnovation,"briefingtoRAND,August5,1998;andThomas

Tesch,staffmember,CNOExecutivePanel,"NavalWarfareInnovationTaskForce,"briefingtotheCNOExecutivePanel,June16,1998.Christensen(1997)makesthesamepointregarding"disruptive"productinnovationinbusinessorganizations;tobesuccessfulitmustbecarriedoutinspeciallycreatedorganizationsseparatefromthemainstream.

Newpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.

Possessingthesecharacteristicsisnoguaranteeoffuturesuccess.However,amilitaryestablishmentlackingoneormoreofthesecharacteristicsislesslikelytorespondadequatelytoanemergingRMA.

Thereisafinalchallenge:Thesecharacteristicsmustcomefromwithinthemilitaryestablishmentinquestion;theycannotbeimposedfromtheoutside.AsMurrayandWatts(1995,p.87)concludedbasedontheircasestudiesofmilitaryinnovationinthe1920sand1930s:

Thedynamicsevidentinthecasestudiessuggestthatthepotentialforcivilianoroutsideleadershiptoimposeanewvisionoffuturewaronareluctantmilitaryservicewhoseheartremainscommittedtoexistingwaysoffightingis,atbest,limited.

Thus,thisfuture-orientedmilitaryorganizationmustbewithinthemilitaryestablishmentinquestion(i.e.,theU.S.Army,Navy,AirForce,orMarineCorps)ratherthanoutside.

PARTIII.BRINGINGABOUTFUTURERMAS(OFYOUROWN)

ChapterSixWhatDoesitTaketoBringAboutaSuccessfulRMA?WhatdoesittakeforamilitaryorganizationtobringaboutanRMAofitsown,ratherthanmerelyrespondingtoanRMAbeingdevelopedbysomeoneelse?Historysuggeststhatallofthefollowingitemsareprobablynecessary:

Youmusthaveafertilesetofenablingtechnologies.

Youmusthaveunmetmilitarychallenges.

Youmustfocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things."

Youmustultimatelychallengesomeone'scorecompetency.


thatfostersacontinuallyrefinedvisionofhowwarmaychangeand

thatencouragesvigorousdebateregardingthefutureoftheorganization.


seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthings

newpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.

Youmusthavemechanismsforexperimentation

todiscover,learn,test,anddemonstrate.

Youmusthavesomewayofrespondingpositivelytotheresultsofsuccessfulexperiments

intermsofdoctrinalchanges,acquisitionprograms,andforcestructuremodifications.

Inwhatfollowsweexpandoneachoftheseitems.

YouMustHaveaFertileSetofEnablingTechnologies

Foratechnology-drivenRMA,youmusthaveafertilesetofenablingtechnologies.1Ithelpsgreatlyifthesetechnologiesarenewand/oremergingratherthanoldandmature:newandemergingtechnologiesaremuchmorelikelytobefertilebreedinggroundsforrevolutionarydevelopmentsthanold,maturetechnologies,whose"revolutions"areusuallywellinthepast.Indeed,militaryhistoryisfullofRMAsintheyearsimmediatelyfollowingmajoradvancesintechnology.Table6.1givesafewexamples.

YouMustHaveUnmetMilitaryChallenges

UnmetmilitarychallengesareessentialelementsdrivingcreativityateachstepintheRMAprocess.Withoutoneormorechallenges,technologiesareunlikelytobecombinedintodevicesanddevicesintosystems;andnewoperationalconcepts,doctrine,andforcestructuresareunlikelytobedeveloped.

Inferiormilitaryestablishments,particularlythosethatlostthelastwar,areusuallywellsuppliedwithunmetmilitarychallengesobviousunmetchallengesthatcanserveasadrivingforceforsubstantialchange.Thismaynotbethecaseforsuperiormilitaryestablishments,particularlythosethatwonthelastwar.Suchmilitaryorganizationsfrequentlyfeelontopoftheworld,withnoneedforchange,certainlynotradicalchange.SpecialattentionisthereforerequiredtomotivatetheRMAprocess.

1AsmentionedinChapterTwo,notallRMAshavebeentechology-driven.Butmostofthemhavebeen,andthefocusofrecentRMA-relateddiscussionsandofthisreportisontechnology-drivenRMAs.

Table6.1TheTechnologiesBehindSomeRMAs

RMAPeriodof

DevelopmentEnablingTechnology

YearsofEmergencea

ICBM 19551965 Fusionweapons19501955Multistagerockets

19451955

Inertialguidance

19501955

Atomicbomb

19411945 Nuclearfission 1938

Carrierwarfare

19211939 Aviation 19001915

Radiocommunications

19001915

Blitzkrieg19211939 Tanks 19151918Radiocommunications

19001915

Divebombing 19211926aTheyearsofemergenceare(approximately)wheneachtechnologyfirstappeared.Eachcontinuedtodevelopandmatureformanyyears.

YouMustFocusonaDefinite"Thing"oraShortListof"Things"

Fertileenablingtechnologiesbythemselvesarenotenough.Theymustcometogetherinadefinite"thing":adeviceorsystemexploitingtheenablingtechnologiestogetherwithaconceptforoperationalemployment.Table6.2illustratesthis,showingthedevice/systemandemploymentconcept"things"involvedinseveralRMAs.

Themorefertileasetofenablingtechnologies,themorepossibilitiesitoffersforcombinationsofdevices,systems,andemployment

concepts,andthemoreofachallengeitistofocusdownontherightcombinationofdevice,system,andemploymentconcepttobringaboutanRMA.Thisfocusingprocesscantakeconsiderabletime;untilitoccursthereisnoRMA.

TheU.S.Navy'sexperienceindevelopingthecarrierwarfareRMAisillustrative.Beginningintheearly1910s,theNavyexperimentedwithanumberofairvehicles:seaplanes,flyingboats,planeswithwheels,andthreetypesoflighter-than-airvehicles(rigidairships,blimps,andkiteballoons);anumberofdifferentbasingconceptsfor

Table6.2The"Things"InvolvedinSomeRMAs

RMA Device/System EmploymentConcept

ICBM Long-rangeballisticmissilewithfusionwarheadandinertialguidance

Bombardmentofstrategic,fixedtargets

Carrierwarfare

Wheeledplanesoperatingfromfast,flat-deckships

Airborneattackofnavalsurfacetargets

BlitzkriegTanks,two-wayradios,anddivebombers

Mobilemaneuverwarfare

Machinegun

Rapidfire,anti-personnelgun

Direct-fireweaponagainstmassedinfantryformations

theseairvehicles:airfieldsonland,seaplanetenders,shipswithcatapults,andshipswithflatdecksforlandingandtakeoff;andavarietyofmissions:scouting,spotting(thefallofnavalgunfire),airdefense(ofthefleet),attackoflandtargets(e.g.,navalbases),andattackofnavaltargets(e.g.,shipsatsea).Alloftheseairvehiclesweremadepossiblebytheevolvingaviationtechnology,aswereallofthebasingconcepts.AndallofthedifferentmissionsseemedofvaluetosomepartoftheU.S.Navy.

IttooktheNavyover20yearstoexperimentwiththedifferentcombinationsofairvehicle,basingconcept,andmissionapplicationandfinallyconcentrateonwheeledplanes,basedonfast,flat-deckshipsthatcouldkeepupwiththebattlefleetwhereveritwent(i.e.,fleetaircraftcarriers),tobeusedprimarilytoattacknavaltargetsandsecondarilyforairdefenseofthefleetthatis,thecarrierwarfareRMA,whichfinallyemergedinthe1930sandwasprovenincombat

in1942.2

2SeeTurnbullandLord(1949),Melhorn(1974),MurrayandWatts(1995),andWattsandMurray(1996)fordetaileddiscussionsoftheU.S.Navy'sdevelopmentofcarrieraviation.

YouMustUltimatelyChallengeSomeone'SCoreCompetency

RMAsareallaboutcorecompetencies:creatingnewonesandupsettingoldones.TocreateanRMA,youhavetochallengeanexistingcorecompetencyofadominantmilitaryplayer.Thisisnatural(albeitpossiblydifficult)foranondominantplayertodo;itisnotsonaturalforadominantplayertodo,becauseitmayhavetochallengeoneofitsowncorecompetenciesitmayhavetorenderobsoletesomethingthatmakesitapowerful,superiormilitaryorganization.

Aswesaidearlier,historyisfullofexamplesofinferiormilitarypowersdevelopingRMAsthatovercomeasuperioropponent.Inmanyofthesecases,theinferiorpowerdeliberatelysetouttoupsetacorecompetencyofitssuperioropponent.TheGermanarmyunderGeneralvonSeecktdeliberatelysetoutinthe1920stoovercomethecorecompetencyoftheFrencharmy(demonstratedduringWorldWarI)forstaticdefenseofpreparedpositionsbyinfantryandartillery;theysucceededandcreatedtheblitzkriegRMA.3Somewhatearlier,theGermannavydevelopedandexploitedtheU-boat(duringWorldWarI)asacountertothedominant(surface)navalpoweroftheBritishnavy.Stillearlier,intheearly1800s,Napoleoncombinedthelevéeenmasse(themobilizationofmassarmies),thegrandebatterie(thephysicalmassingofartillery),the''attackcolumn,"andseveralothertacticalandoperationalinnovationsintoanoverallsystemofwartoovercomethePrussianarmy,thendominantinEuropeanwarfare.4Muchearlier,inthe1300s,theEnglishdeliberatelysetouttoovercomethenumericallysuperiorFrencharmy'scorecompetencyforman-to-mancombatbyknightsonhorsebackbyexploiting(inatacticalsystem/operationalconcept)thelongbowtechnologytheyhaddevelopedduringaseriesofcivilwarsinGreatBritain.

Again,therearefewhistoricalexamplesofasuperiormilitarypowerdevelopinganRMAthatupsetsoneofitscorecompetencies.ThedevelopmentofcarrierwarfarebytheU.S.Navyistheonlyclearexampleknowntothisauthor.Inthiscase,thedevelopersofU.S.navalaviationrenderedobsoletethecorecompetencyoftheU.S.

3SeeCorum(1992).4SeeDupuy(1984),pp.154168.

battleshipforceforaccurate,overwhelmingnavalgunfire,acorecompetencythatmadetheU.S.Navyoneofthetwodominantnavalwarfareplayersintheworld(alongwiththeBritishnavy)attheendofWorldWarI.

However,thepeoplewhodevelopedU.S.navalaviationdidnotsetouttochallengethebattleship'scorecompetency;theyinitiallysetouttosupportthebattleshipforcetoprovidescoutingsupport,gunfirespottingsupport,andairdefensesupporttothebattleshipforce,sothatitcouldcontinuetodominateanddefeatanopposingbattleshipforce,anyopposingbattleshipforce,insurfacecombat.5ItwasonlyovertimethattheycametorealizethatcarrieraviationcouldreplacethebattleshipforceastheprincipalcombatforceoftheU.S.Navy.6

Youdonothavetostartoutchallengingsomeone'scorecompetency,althoughthatistheusualhistoricalpattern.Butultimatelyyouhavetomountsuchachallenge,oryouwillnothaveanRMA.

5Intheearly1920s,Brig.Gen.WilliamMitchelloftheArmyAirServicewastheapostleofthosewhobelievedthatairpowerwouldmakethebattleshipobsolete.(SeeMitchell,1921and1925).Theleadersofthethen-fledglingnavalaviationdidnotsubscribetoMitchell'sview.TheybroughtaboutthecreationoftheBureauofAeronauticsin1921explicitlytodevelopnavalaviationinsupportofthebattleshipforce,nottoeliminatethebattleship.(SeeTurnbullandLord,1949,andMelhorn,1974.)Thisprimaryfocusofnavalaviationasasupporttothebattleshipforcecontinuedthroughoutthe1920sandwellintothe1930s.Aslateas1938,theNavyversionofWarPlanOrange,theplanformilitaryoperationsagainstJapaninthePacific,envisagedcarriersaccompanyingthebattleshipforcetoprovidescoutingandairdefensesupportasitfoughtitswayacrossthePacifictoregainthePhilippines.(SeeMelhorn,1974.)6Somenavalaviatorscametothisrealizationearlierthanothers.AmongtheearliestwerethestaffofAircraftSquadrons,BattleFleet(COMAIRONS),whoin1928beganthinkingaboutthepossibilityofcarriertaskforcesoperatingindependentlyofthebattleshipforceconductingoffensive

operations(includingattackingopposingbattlefleets).TheCOMAIRONSstaffplannedthefirstsuchindependentcarriertaskforceoperation,conductedduringthe1929fleetexercise:ThecarrierUSSSaratoga(CV-3)accompaniedbythecruiserOmahabrokeofffromthemainRedforceoffthecoastofsouthernMexico,steamed660milessoutheast,andthennortheastaroundtheopposingBlueforceovera24-hourperiod,pasttheGalapagosIslands,alongthenorthcoastofSouthAmerica,andintotheGulfofPanama.Then150milesoffofthePanamaCanal(Red'sobjectiveinthefleetexercise),itlauncheda66-planeairstrikethat(theoretically)destroyedthelocksoftheCanalandheavilydamagedArmyairfieldsintheCanalZone.(SeeWilson,1950.)

YouMustHaveaReceptiveOrganizationalClimate

WesaidinChapterFivethatyouneedareceptiveorganizationalclimatetorespondtosomeoneelse'sRMA.Youalsoneedonetodevelopyourown.Youneedanorganizationalclimatethatencouragesvigorousdebateregardingthewaysinwhichwarmaychangeandtheimpactofthosechangesonthemilitaryorganizationinquestion.Youneedaclimatethatencourageschange,wantstheorganization'sfuturetobedifferentfromitspast,andthatwantsandwelcomeschange.YouneedthisreceptiveorganizationalclimateevenmoreiftheRMAinquestion,inthiscaseinternallyratherthanexternallygenerated(thecaseinChapterFive),threatensacorecompetencyoftheorganization.Ittakesabraveorganizationtomakeapartofitselfobsolete.Historically,thishasbeenrareinthemilitaryworld.

Ithasalsobeenrareinthebusinessworldrarebutnotunknown.Therehavebeenafewcompaniesthatforperiodsoftimehavehaddeliberatepoliciesofmakingtheirleadingproducts(i.e.,theircorecompetencies)obsolete,ofmakingthemobsoletebeforesomeoneelsedid,andhadorganizationalclimatessupportingthesepolicies.7Theseexamplesshowthatitcanbedone,thatsuchorganizationalclimatescanexist.

Inanutshell,ifamilitaryorganizationwantstobringaboutasuccessfulRMA,itmusthaveareceptiveorganizationalclimate.IfthemilitaryorganizationisadominantplayerandwantstobringaboutanRMAthatupsetsoneofitscorecompetencies,itmusthaveaveryreceptiveorganizationalclimate.

YouMustHaveSupportFromtheTop

WealsosaidinChapterFivethatyouneedsupportfromthetoptorespondtosomeoneelse'sRMA.Youneedsupportfromthetopto

developyourown,too.Youneed(atleast)twotypesofsupport:seniorofficerswithtraditionalcredentialswillingtosponsornewwaysofdoingthings,andnewpromotionpathwaysforjuniorofficerspracticinganewwayofwar.BothareessentialifanRMAistooccur.

7Intelisarecentexampleofsuchacompany.(SeeGrove,1996.)

TheU.S.NavyhadbothoftheseduringtheperiodbetweenthetwoWorldWars.SeveralNavyadmiralsprovidedessentialsupportatcrucialperiodsduringthedevelopmentofcarrieraviation,mostnotablyincludingAdmiralWilliamS.SimsandRearAdmiralWilliamA.Moffett.Promotionofnavalaviatorstotherankofcommanderandcaptainwasaproblemintheearlyyears,butfromthemid-1930son,allcaptainscommandingcarriersandnavalairstationshadtobequalifiednavalaviators;thisprovidedapromotionpathwaytohigherranks.8

TheU.S.Army,ontheotherhand,didnothavehigh-levelsupportduringtheinterwarperiodforchangesinthewayitwagedwar,particularlychangesinvolvingnewwaysofemployingtanksoraircraft.NotonlydidthegeneralscommandingthetraditionalbranchesoftheArmy(infantry,artillery,andcavalry)opposethedevelopmentofinnovativewaysofusingtanksandaircraft,theyalsoputpromotionroadblocksinthewayofanyofficerspersistingincareersinthefledglingArmoredCorpsorArmyAirCorps.9

Insum,theinnovatorsintheU.S.Navyhadsupportfromthetopduringtheinterwarperiod;theyproducedthecarrierwarfareRMA.TheinnovatorsintheU.S.Armylackedsuchsupport;theArmyenteredWorldWarIIwithbotharmorandaviationdoctrineandtechnologymarkedlyinferiortothatoftheGermans.10

YouMustHaveMechanismsforExperimentation

TobringaboutanRMA,amilitaryorganizationmusthavemechanismsavailablewithintheorganizationforexperimentationwithnewideas,todiscover,learn,test,anddemonstrate:

8SeeTurnbullandLord(1949).9SeeJohnson(1990and1998)foradetaileddiscussionofhowtheU.S.Army"gotitwrong"regardingthedevelopmentofinnovativearmorand

aviationdoctrinesandtechnologiesduringthe1920sand1930s.AsbutoneofmanyexamplesofpromotionroadblocksputinthewayofjuniorArmyofficerswantingtopursuenewwaysofwar,bothDwightEisenhowerandGeorgePattonwereadvisedtotransferoutoftheArmoredCorpsiftheyeverwantedtomakemajor.(PrivatecommunicationfromDavidE.Johnson,1998.)10SeeJohnson(1990and1998).

Todiscoverwhatyoucandowithnewtechnologiesandcombinationsofnewtechnologies,whatnewdevicesandsystemsbecomepossible,whatexistingmilitarytaskscanbedonedifferently,whatnewmilitarytasksbecomeachievable,whatworksandwhatdoesnot.

Tolearnwhatcombinationsofdeviceandsystemparametersworkbest,whatoperationalconceptsthenewdevicesandsystemssupportwellandwhichonestheydonotsupportwell,whichoperationalconceptsappearmorepromisingandwhichlesspromising,whatworksbetterandwhatdoesn'tworkaswell,whatmakessenseandwhatdoesnot.

Totestpromisingdevice,system,andoperationalconceptcombinationsinawidevarietyofreal-worldcircumstances,therebyfocusingonthecombinationofdevice(s),system(s),andemploymentconcept(s)mostlikelytobringaboutanRMA.

Todemonstrate,finally,thatthechosensetofdevice(s),system(s),andoperationalconcept(s)offersthepotentialforarevolutionaryimprovementinmilitarycapabilitiesinreal-worldconflictsituations.

Theseexperimentalmechanismsmustallowonetotakerisksandfail(fromtimetotime),particularlyintheearlierdiscoverandlearnstagesbutalsointheteststage.Itisthroughtakingrisks,failingfromtimetotime,andtherebylearningwhatdoesnotworkthatthenecessaryfocusingdiscussedearlierisaccomplished.

Theseexperimentalmechanismsmustbeavailableevenfornewideasthatthreatentheorganization'scurrentcorecompetencies.Thiscanbedifficult.Itusuallyrequiresseparationoftheexperimentalactivitiesinvolvingrevolutionaryinnovationfromthemainstreamactivityofthemilitaryorganizationi.e.,insomeseparate,nonbureaucraticorganizations.11


11TheU.S.Navy'sCNOExecutivePanelmakesthispointstronglyinitsrecentinvestigationofinnovationinnavalwarfare.Seefootnote10inChapterFive."Nonbureaucratic"isthetermitusestodescribetherequiredorganizationalattribute.Inthebusinessarena,Christensen(1997)makesasimilarpointregardingtheprocessofdiscoveryrequiredtofindmarketsfornewproductsthatthreatentodisruptthemainstreamproductlinesofacompany;tobesuccessfulthesemarketdiscoveryactiv-

TheU.S.Navy'sdevelopmentofcarrieraviationfollowedthepatternoutlinedhere.TheearlynavalaviationexperimentswerecarriedoutseparatefromthemainstreamNavyinanumberoftemporaryorganizationsduringthe1910sandbytheBureauofAeronauticsfrom1921onandfeaturedagreatdealofdiscovery(ofwhatworkedandwhatdidnot)andlearning(whatworksbetterandwhatlesswell,whatmakessenseandwhatdoesnot)intheearlystages.Itwasnotuntilfleetexercisesbeginningin1929thatinnovativecarrieraviationexperiments(ofthetestanddemonstratevariety)werecarriedoutinconjunctionwithmainstreamNavyactivities.12

YouMustHaveSomeWayofRespondingPositivelytotheResultsofSuccessfulExperiments

Evenifeverythingworksyouhaveafertilesetoftechnologies,youfocusonagoodideathatchallengessomeone'scorecompetency,youhaveareceptiveorganizationalclimateandsupportfromthetop,youhavemechanismsforexperimentation(evenforanideathatthreatensoneofyourorganization'scorecompetencies),andtheexperimentssuccessfullydemonstratethetechnicalfeasibility,operationalutility,andpotentiallyrevolutionaryimpactofyourRMAcandidateyoustillneedmorebeforeyouhaveanRMA.Youneedwaysofrespondingpositivelytosuccessfulexperimentsintermsofdoctrinalchanges,acquisitionprograms,andforcestructuremodifications.Thesearethefinalthreehurdles.

DoctrinalChanges

DoctrinalchangestoaccommodateandfullyexploitthenewdeviceorsystemareanessentialelementofanysuccessfulRMA.13Future-orientedmilitaryorganizationshavemechanismsforperiodicallyrethinking,refining(insmallways),andrevising(inbigways)theiroperationaldoctrine.RMAsusuallyrequiremajordoctrinalchanges.


itiesmustbecarriedoutinspeciallycreatedorganizationsseparatedfromthemainstream.12SeeTurnbullandLord(1949)andMelhorn(1974)fordetailsofthe20-plusyearsofNavyexperimentsthatledtothecarrierwarfareRMA.13Asindicatedearlier,militarydoctrinenormallyincludesagreed-uponconceptsofoperation,tactics,andprinciplesofstrategy.

OnemightassumethattherethinkingleadingtoRMA-relateddoctrinalchangesnormallycomesaftersuccessfulexperimentshaveproventhepotentialoftheprospectiveRMA;thishasnotalwaysbeenso.Inthecaseofcarrieraviation,AdmiralSimsbeganaseriesofstrategicandtacticalexercisesattheNavalWarCollegein1919toexploretheuseofaircraftinnavaloperations.TheseWarCollegegamingexercisescontinuedthroughoutthe1920sand1930s,inparallelwiththeBureauofAeronautics'developmentofnavalaviationtechnologyandexperimentswithsystems,basingconcepts,andoperationalconcepts.Theyledtoanevolvingseriesofdoctrinesfortheemploymentofnavalaviation,culminatinginthecarrierwarfaredoctrineof19411942.Inthiscase,thedoctrinalrethinkingwascarriedoutinparallelwiththeRMAexperiments.14

Inatleastonecase,theGermandevelopmentoftheblitzkrieg,thedoctrinalrethinkingtookplacelargelybeforetheRMAexperiments.UndertheleadershipofGeneralHansvonSeecktbetween1919and1926,theGermanarmydevelopedadoctrineofmobile,maneuverwarfarethatemphasizedcombinedarmsandindependentactionbycommandingofficersatalllevels;itwasdesignedtoregainprimacyfortheoffense(incontrasttothedefensedominanceofWorldWarI).Thisdoctrinaldevelopmentwaslargelycompleteby1926whenvonSeecktsteppeddownasheadoftheGermanarmy.Overthenexttenyears,theGermansproceededtodevelopthedevices/systems(thetank,two-waytacticalradio,anddivebomber)andforcestructure(thepanzerdivision)tobringthisdoctrinetofulfillmentintheblitzkrieg.15

TheU.S.Navy'sdevelopmentofcarrierwarfareandtheGermanarmy'sdevelopmentoftheblitzkriegarecaseswherethedoctrinalchangesnecessarytorealizeanRMAwereaccomplishedinastraightforwardfashion.AswediscussedinChapterThree,manypotentialRMAshavefailedbecauseofdoctrinalhurdles.Inthe1920s

and1930s,forexample,theAmericanandBritishadvocatesofnewlandwarfareparadigmsexploitingthetankwereunabletobring

14TurnbullandLord(1949)andMelhorn(1974)discussthecentralrolethattheNavalWarCollegegamingexercisesinitiatedbyAdmiralSimsplayedintheNavy'sdevelopmentofcarrierwarfaredoctrine.15SeeCorum(1992)foradetaileddiscussionofvonSeeckt'sroleindevelopingtheconceptualfoundationsfortheblitzkrieg.

aboutthenecessarydoctrinalchangesbecauseofoppositionfromleadersofthetraditionalbranches(infantry,artillery,andcavalry)oftheU.S.andBritisharmies.16

DoctrinalchangesprobablymostoftencomeaftersuccessfulRMAexperiments,althoughsometimestheycomeinparallelwiththeexperiments,andonatleastoneoccasiontheycamebeforetheRMAexperimentsbuttheyalwaysmustcome,ortherewillnotbeanRMA.

ResponsiveAcquisitionPrograms

AmilitaryacquisitionsystemabletorespondpositivelytoradicalinnovationsisanothernecessaryelementofanysuccessfulRMA.17Thechallengehereishowthemilitaryservice'sacquisitionsystemdealswithrisk,specificallyriskassociatedwithuncertaintiesregardingthemilitaryneedandutilityofthecandidateRMA.SuchuncertaintiesoftenpersistupuntilthemomenttheRMAisproveninbattle.18

Typically,militaryacquisitionsystemsaresetuptodealwithnewequipmentembodyingevolutionaryimprovementsinmilitarycapability,operatingwithinthewell-definedcontextofexistingdoctrine(i.e.,operationalconcepts,tactics,andstrategy).Suchimprovementsusuallyinvolvelimitedandwell-understoodrisk,ofbothatechnicalandmilitary-utilitynature,andmeetawell-recognizedmilitaryneed.Operatinginthisenvironment,present-daymilitaryacquisitionsystemsarenormallydesignedtoberiskadverse,takingasfewchancesaspossibleandusuallyrequiringthatalluncertainties(regardingtechnicalissues,militaryneed,andmilitaryutility)areresolvedbeforefull-scaleproductionbegins.19

16Johnson(1990and1998)discussestheU.S.Army'slackofdoctrinalinnovationduringthe1920sand1930s.17By"militaryacquisitionsystem"wemeanthetotalityofrules,regulations,

processes,andproceduresgoverningtheacquisitionofnewequipmentforthemilitaryserviceinquestion.18CandidateRMAsofteninvolvetechnicalrisks,buttheyareusuallyresolvedearlierinthedevelopmentprocessthanarethemilitary-utilityrisks.19TheDoD5000Series'policiesandproceduresisanexampleofsucharisk-adverseacquisitionsystem.SeeDoD(1996and1997).

AnRMApresentsadifficultsituationforsuchanacquisitionsystem,evenaftertheRMA'spotentialhasbeendemonstratedinasuccessfulexperiment.Whiletheprincipaltechnicalissuesmayhavebeenresolved,themilitaryneedandutilityofthenewRMAsystemmaystillbeindoubt,oratleasthighlycontroversial,becauseitinvolvesanewconceptofoperation,newtactics,andperhapsevenanewstrategyalluntestedinbattle.Theusualacquisitionsystem,withitsnumerousrisk-reduction/eliminationmilestones,offersnumerousopportunitiesfordisbelieversinoropponentsoftheRMAtoimpedetheacquisitionprocessbyraisingquestionsregardinguncertaintiesandrisk.20

WhatisrequiredforamilitaryacquisitionsystemtorespondeffectivelyandefficientlytoanRMAisthatabranchoftheacquisitionsystembesetuptohandlenovelandradicalinnovations.ThisRMAbranchoftheacquisitionsystemshouldtoleratesubstantialmilitary-utilityriskstoamuchlaterstageintheacquisitionprocess,insomecasesallthewaytoinitialoperationalcapability(IOC).ThestagesanddecisionpointsinthisnewacquisitionbranchshouldbeconstructedinkeepingwiththelikelyuncertaintiesateachstageintheRMAprocess,withanemphasisonfosteringnovel/radicalinnovationsratherthanavoidingmistakesandsavingmoney.21

ForceStructureModifications

Finally,aftereverythingelseisaccomplished,theforcestructureofthemilitaryorganizationinquestionmustbemodifiedtoaccommodatenewunitsequippedwiththenewdevicesandsystems,operatingaccordingtothenewdoctrine.InthecaseofthecarrierwarfareRMA,thenewandessentialforcestructureelementwasthecarriertaskforce,organizedaroundtheaircraftcarrierwithsupportingcruisersanddestroyers.Theconceptofacarriertaskforcewasfirst

20Ifthenewsystemisatallnovel(andRMAsare),therewillalwaysbe

uncertaintiesanddisbelievers.IfthecandidateRMAchallengesanycorecompetencyofthemilitaryorganizationinquestion,therewillalwaysbeopponents.21Birkleretal.(1999)proposethatjustsuchabranchbeaddedtotheDoDacquisitionprocess,tohandlenovelandradicalinnovationswhetherornottheyqualifyasRMAs.

triedoutbytheU.S.Navyduringthe1929fleetexercise.22Followingitssuccessinthatexercise,carriertaskforceswereplayedinmostsubsequentfleetexercisesduringthe1930s.By1941thecarriertaskforcewasarecognizedelementoftheNavy'scombatorganization.23

InthecaseoftheblitzkriegRMA,thenewandessentialforcestructureelementwasthepanzerdivision,madeupofacombined-armsteamoftanks,motorizedinfantry,artillery,reconnaissancetroops,engineers,andsupportandsupplyunits.Thepanzerdivisionwasdevelopedinthe1930sbyHeinzGuderian,onthedoctrinalandequipmentfoundationsestablishedbyvonSeecktandhisfollowersinthe1920s.24

Toalargeextent,thecarriertaskforcesintheU.S.NavyinDecember1941(priortoPearlHarbor)andthepanzerdivisionsintheGermanarmyinSeptember1939(priortotheinvasionofPoland)andMay1940(priortotheinvasionofTheNetherlands,Belgium,andFrance)wereadd-onstothepreviouslyexistingforcestructures,notreplacementsformajorelementsofthosestructures.ThebulkoftheGermanarmyin19391940andthebulkoftheU.S.Navyin1941wereorganizedin"pre-RMA"units.25

ThisistypicalofthehistoryofpastRMAs.Mostoften,thenewRMAelementsaretreatedasadd-onstotheexistingforcestructureuntilthecandidateRMAhasbeenproveninbattle.26Majorreplacements

22SeeWilson(1950).23Aslateas19401941,manyoftheU.S.Navy'sleaderscontinuedtoviewthecarriertaskforces'primarywartimemissionassupporttothebattleshipforce,notindependentoperations.FollowingPearlHarbor,however,thecarriertaskforceshadtowageindependentoperationsagainsttheJapanesenavy;essentiallyalloftheU.S.battleshipsinthePacifichadbeensunkorheavilydamaged.24SeeGuderian(1952),Macksey(1975),andCorum(1992).Thiswasone

ofGuderian'stwokeycontributionstotheblitzkriegRMA;theotherwashisoperationalleadershipinPoland(September1939)andFlanders(May1940).25Forexample,theGermanforceinvadingPolandonSeptember1,1939,includedsixpanzerdivisions,fourlightpanzerdivisions,and48old-fashionedinfantrydivisions;theGermanforceinvadingTheNetherlands,Belgium,andFranceonMay10,1940,included10panzerdivisionsand126infantrydivisions.(SeeChurchill,1948,pp.442443;andChurchill,1949,pp.2931.)26Thecarriertaskforceadd-onstotheU.S.Navy'sforcestructureinthe1930swerefinanciallypossiblebecauseoftheexpenditureincreasesinitiatedbytheRooseveltAdministrationbeginningin1934aseconomicstimulants.Ifthebudgetpoliciesof


ofoldforcestructureelementsbyRMAelementsdonotoccuruntilafterthathashappened.

*

Withafertilesetofenablingtechnologies,unmetmilitarychallenges,focusonadefinite''thing"orashortlistof"things,"achallengetosomeone'scorecompetency,areceptiveorganizationalclimate,supportfromthetop,mechanismsforexperimentation,andwaystorespondpositivelytosuccessfulexperimentsintermsofdoctrinalchanges,acquisitionprograms,andforcestructuremodificationsandatleastone"brilliantidea"amilitaryorganizationhasareasonablechanceofbringingaboutasuccessfulRMA.Withoutanyoneoftheseelements,thechancesaremuchless,evenifthereisabrilliantidea,andhistorysuggeststheRMAprocessislikelytofail.


theHarding,Coolidge,andHooveradministrationshadbeencontinuedinthe1930s,theseforce-structureadd-onswouldnothavebeenpossible.(SeeTurnbullandLord,1949,pp.284295.)

ChapterSevenDod'SCurrentForceTransformationActivities:DoesAnythingAppeartobeMissing?WhatCanbeDonetoFillintheMissingElements?Sincepublicationofthe1997QuadrennialDefenseReview(QDR)(Cohen,1997),theDoDhasbeeninvolvedinaconcertedeffortto"transform"theU.S.military,motivatedbyafourfoldsetofobjectives:1

ToachievetheoperationalgoalsoutlinedinJointVision2010(JV2010)(dominantmaneuver,precisionengagement,full-dimensionalprotection,focusedlogistics)(Shalikashvili,1996;andJointStaff,1997)

Tobringaboutthecostsavingsnecessarytopayforforcemodernization2

Toachieveanew,affordableforcestructurethatcanbemaintainedinthefuture(inthewordsoftheQDR,"morecapabilityforlessmoney")3

Totakeadvantageofthe[so-called]revolutioninmilitaryaffairscurrentlyongoing"theRMA."

1Davisetal.(1998)pointoutthatforcetransformationisalsonecessarytomeetfuturemilitarychallenges,"alreadyvisibleandcertaintoworsen."2Muchofthecapitalequipment(e.g.,planes,tanks,ships)oftheU.S.militaryisagingandgraduallywearingout.Soonerorlaterthisequipmentmustbereplaced.Thus,theforcemustbemodernizedwhetherornotitis"transformed."3ItappearsthatthecurrentU.S.forcestructurecannotbemaintainedwithinlikelyfuturebudgetlevels.Transformationisneededtoshifttheforceto

smallerbutmorecapableforces.OtherwisetheU.S.militarywilllosecapabilitiesandthenation'sabilitytoshapetheinternationalenvironmentwillbereduced.TransformationisthereforeanecessityfortheDoD,notanoption.(SeeDavisetal.,1998.)

Wefirstbrieflydescribetheforcetransformationeffort.

Today'SForceTransformation/RMAActivities

Thecurrenteffortsto"transformtheforce"arebroadbased,extendingacrosstheDoD.DoDcomponentsinvolvedincludeOSD,theJointStaff,theAtlanticCommand(ACOM),theServices(Army,Navy,MarineCorps,andAirForce),andtheDefenseScienceBoard(DSB).Forcetransformationactivitiesthusfarinclude:4

Thedevelopmentofseveralfuturevisionsofwarfare,includingtheChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff'sJointVision2010,theAirForce's"GlobalEngagement,"theArmy's"ArmyVisionXXI,"theNavy's"Forward...fromtheSea,"andtheMarineCorps'"OperationalManeuverfromtheSea."

Theestablishmentofanumberoflaboratoriesdedicatedtoexploringnewwaysofwarfare,includingtheJointWarfightingCenter,theJointBattleCenter,anumberofArmyandAirForceBattleLabs,theNavySea-BasedBattleLab,andtheMarineCorpsWarfightingLab.

Anumberofwargamesexploringnewwaysofwarfare,includingOSDNetAssessmentwargames,theArmyAfterNextWargames,theNavy'sGlobalWargameseriesandStrategicConceptsWargames,theMarineCorpsConceptGameseries,andtheAirForce'sGlobalEngagementWargames.

Anumberofdevelopmentalandfieldexperiments,includingAdvancedConceptTechnologyDemonstrations(ACTDs)andAdvancedTechnologyDemonstrations(ATDs)conductedunderthesponsorshipandsupervisionoftheUndersecretaryofDefenseforAcquisitionandTechnology(USDA&T),JointexperimentssponsoredbytheJointStaff(e.g.,theJ-6'sInformationSuperiorityexperiments),ArmyAdvancedWarfightingexperi-

4ThislistingofDoDforcetransformation-relatedactivitiesisbasedonmaterialfromEdwardL.WarnerIII(AssistantSecretaryofDefense,StrategyandThreatReduction),"PreparingNowforanUncertainFuture:ModernizationandtheRMA,"andGeorgeT.SingleyIII(ActingDirector,DefenseResearchandEngineering),"DoDResearchandDevelopment:PlanningforMilitaryModernization,"briefingspresentedatDefenseWeek's18thAnnualDefenseConference,December10,1997.

ments(e.g.,WarriorFocusandForceXXI),NavyFleetBattleexperimentsand"DistantThunder"AntisubmarineWarfare(ASW)experiments,MarineSeaDragonexperiments,andAirForceExpeditionaryForceexperiments.

Neworganizationalarrangements,includingtheArmy'sbrigade-sizedExperimentalForce(EXFOR),andtheAirForce'sAirExpeditionaryForcesandinformationwarfare(IW)andunmannedaerialvehicle(UAV)squadrons.

Theseactivitiesarepursuingvarioustechnology/device/system/operationalemploymentconceptcombinations,manyofwhichprobablyrepresentevolutionaryimprovementsoncurrentwaysofwagingwar,butseveralofwhichcouldpossiblyleadtoRMAs.Amongspecificconceptsproposedasthekernelof"theRMA"arethefollowing:

Long-RangePrecisionFires.ThisRMAcandidatewasproposedbyAndrewMarshall(Director,OSDNetAssessment)inhistwoinitialRMApapers(1993and1995).Itwasalsoproposed,inmoredetail,byWalterMorrow(CNOExecutivePanel)(1997).TheessenceofthisideaisexpressedbyMarshall(1995):5

Long-rangeprecisionstrikeweaponscoupledtoveryeffectivesensorsandcommandandcontrolsystemswillcometodominatemuchofwarfare.Ratherthanclosingwithanopponent,themajoroperationalmodewillbedestroyinghimatadistance.

InformationWarfare.ThisRMAcandidatewasalsoproposedbyAndrewMarshallinhistwoRMApapers.IthasalsobeenimplicitlyproposedbyRogerMolanderandhiscolleagues(1996)in

5Long-rangeprecisionfireshavebeenunderactivedevelopmentforatleast20years.MorrisonandWalker(1978)quoteWilliamPerry(thenDirectorofDefenseResearchandEngineering)assaying:

[TheUnitedStatesis]convergingveryrapidly[onthreeobjectives:]tobeabletoseeallhigh-valuetargetsonthebattlefieldatanytime,tobeabletomakeadirecthitonanytargetwecansee,andtobeabletodestroyanytargetwecanhit...[inorderto]makethebattlefielduntenableformostmodernforces.

AlthoughnotexpressedinRMAterms,thisisclearlyanearlyexpressionofthelong-rangeprecisionfiresconcept.

theirworkonstrategicinformationwarfare.TheessenceofthisideaisalsoexpressedbyMarshall(1995):

Theinformationdimensionoraspectofwarfaremaybecomeincreasinglycentraltotheoutcomeofbattlesandcampaigns.Therefore,protectingtheeffectiveandcontinuousoperationofone'sowninformationsystems,andbeingabletodegrade,destroyordisruptthefunctioningoftheopponent's,willbecomeamajorfocusoftheoperationalart.

SystemofSystems.ThisRMAcandidatewasfirstexplicitlyproposedbyAdmiralWilliamA.Owens(ViceChairman,JointChiefsofStaff)(1996).IthassubsequentlybeenelaboratedonbyBlaker(1997).Theessenceofthisideaisthatcombiningavastassemblageofintelligencecollection,surveillance,andreconnaissance(ISR);advancedcommand,control,communications,computers,andintelligenceprocessing(C4I);andprecision-weaponsystemsresultsinawholewithcapabilitiesmuchgreaterthanthesumoftheparts.6

Network-CentricWarfare.ThisRMAcandidatewasproposedbyViceAdmiralArthurK.CebrowskiandhiscolleaguesinJointStaff/J-6(CebrowskiandGarstka,1998).Thenetwork-centricwarfareconceptemploysanoperationalarchitectureinvolvingthreegridstoenabletheoperationalobjectivesofJV2010:an"InformationGrid,"a"SensorGrid,"andan"EngagementGrid."TheInformationGridprovidesthecomputingandcommunicationsbackbonefortheothertwogrids.TheSensorGridisanassemblageofspace,air,ground,sea,andcyberspacesensorsandsensortasking,processing,andfusionapplications,providingbattlespaceawareness.TheEngagementGrid,anassemblageofplatformsandweapons,exploitsthisbattlespaceawarenesstoenabletheJV2010forceemploymentobjectivesofprecisionengagement,dominantmaneuver,andfull-dimensionalprotec-

6Somewhatearlier,Perry(1991and1994)alsodiscussedthesystem-of-

systemsconcept,althoughnotstrictlyintheRMAcontext.

tion.Eachofthesethreegridsisconnectedandfunctionsinanetworkfashion.7

CooperativeEngagementCapability.Thisconcepthasbeenproposed,developed,anddemonstratedbytheU.S.Navy.8TheessenceofthisconceptasappliedtoaNavybattlegroupisthat

combatsystems[ongeographicallyseparatedplatforms]shareunfilteredsensormeasurementdataassociatedwithtrackswithrapidtimingandprecisiontoenablethebattlegroupunitstooperateasone[intheirengagementofenemytargets].(APL,1995.)

Ratherthanastand-aloneRMAcandidate,thisconceptshouldprobablybethoughtofasanimportantharbingerofnetwork-centricwarfare.

Thereareundoubtedlyadditionalitemsthatcouldbeaddedtothislist.

DoesAnythingAppeartobeMissing?

DoesanythingappeartobemissingfromtheseDoDforcetransformation/RMAactivities?BasedonthehistoryofpastRMAsandtheRMAchecklistwedevelopedinChapterSix,theanswerseemstobe"yes."Table7.1summarizesourassessment;weelaborateinwhatfollows.

EnablingTechnologies

Theongoinginformationrevolutionisclearlyprovidingafertilesetofenablingtechnologies.

7ThenotionofanRMAemergingfromnetworkingdistributedsensorsandweaponshadearlierbeenbroachedinaneverdistributed1991study,"Project2025,"bytheNationalDefenseUniversity'sInstituteforNationalStrategicStudies.ThetechnologyportionsofProject2025werelaterpublishedinLibicki(1994)andinArquillaandRonfeldt(1997,Chapter8).

8SeeAPL(1995).

Table7.1DoesAnythingAppeartoBeMissingfromDoD's

CurrentRMAActivities?RMAChecklist DoD'sCurrent

SituationYoumusthaveafertilesetofenablingtechnologies

Weclearlyhavethis

Youmusthaveunmetmilitarychallenges

Wehaveseveralofthese(butaretheycompellingenough?)


WemayhavethisinsomeServices(butnotinothers)


Wehavethis(butdoesitincludealloftheServices?)

Youmusthavemechanismsforexperimentation(todiscover,learn,test,anddemonstrate)

Wehavethese(butdotheyencourage"risky"experiments?)

Youmustfocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things"


Youmustultimatelychallengesomeone'scorecompetency


Youmusthavewaysofrespondingpositivelytosuccessfulexperiments(intermsofdoctrine,acquisition,andforcestructure)

Thiscouldbeaproblem(cantheDoDsystemrespondpositivelytoariskynewidea?)

MilitaryChallenges

EventhoughtheUnitedStatesisnowcommonlybelievedtobetheworld'sonlysuperpower,therearestillmilitarytasksitcannot

performasconfidentlyasitwouldlikeinawiderangeofcircumstances.Moreover,theseunmet(oratleastnottotallymet)challengesarelikelytogrowinnumber.9

Butarethesechallenges,particularlythosefuturechallengesthatarenothereyetforalltoseeandnonetodeny,compellingenoughto

9TheQDR(Cohen,1997)sketchesoutsomeofthesechallenges;RANDworkonasymmetricthreats(Bennettetal.,1994a,1998,1999)identifiesstillothers.

causeconservativemilitaryorganizationstoacceptsubstantialchange?Thejuryisstillout.10

OrganizationalClimate

ThereappearstobeareceptiveorganizationalclimateinsomeoftheServices;reportsfromotherServicesaremixed.

SupportfromtheTop

WeconcludethereissupportattheverytopintheDoD:i.e.,theSecretaryofDefense,theChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,andtheirimmediatesubordinates.ButdoesthissupportextendacrossallbranchesofallfourServices?Reportsaremixed.

MechanismsforExperimentation

Asourearlierlistingofdevelopmentalandfieldexperimentsindicates,therearealargenumberofRMA-relatedexperimentsgoingonintheDoDtoday.Buttheseexperimentsmaynotcovertheentirediscover,learn,test,anddemonstratespectrum.Itappears(atleasttothisauthor)thattoomanyoftheseexperimentsare"successoriented";thattoomanyoftheexperimentersdonotfeelfreetotakethekindsofchancesnecessarytoreallydiscoverandlearnwhatworksandwhatdoesnotwork,whatmakessenseandwhatdoesnot;andthattoomanyoftheseexperimentalmechanismsdonotencourageriskyexperimentsandtoleratefailure.

FocusonaDefinite"Thing"

DoD'scurrentRMAactivitiesclearlylackfocusononedefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things"whichwillbethecentralkernelof"theRMA."Suchafocusisstilltocome.Itisnotapparenthowthe

10Davisetal.(1998)haveproposedasetof"operationalchallenges"fortheSecretaryofDefensetouseasamanagementtechniquetomotivate

andfocustheServices'forcetransformationefforts.FutureeventswilldeterminetheefficacyofsuchOSD-imposedplanningchallenges.

vastpanoplyofDoDRMA-relatedexperimentsnowunderwaywillbringaboutsuchafocus.11

ChallengingSomeone'sCoreCompetency

ThereisnoevidencethatanyoneanywhereintheDoDisdeliberatelysettingouttochallengeacorecompetencyofoneoftheServices.12Untilthathappens,wewillnothaveanRMA.13

WaysofRespondingPositivelytoSuccessfulExperiments

Inprinciple,eachoftheServiceshasmechanismsformakingdoctrinalchangesandtheDoDhaswell-establishedproceduresforacquiringnewsystemsandmodifyingforcestructures,allofwhichcouldrespondtosuccessfulRMA-relatedexperiments.Inprinciple.But,inpracticetheseformalmechanismsandproceduresworkbest

11ThecurrentlackoffocusofDoD'sforcetransformation/RMAactivitiesisreminiscentofthesituationintheU.S.Navy'saviationcommunityinthelate1910sandearly1920s.Atthattime,theNavywasexperimentingwithmanydifferentcombinationsofairvehicles,basingconcepts,andmissionapplications.ItwasseveralyearsbeforetheNavybeganfocusingonwheeledplanes,basedonflat-deckships,usedtoattacknavaltargetsi.e.,theessenceofcarrieraviationandwhatbecamethecarrierwarfareRMA.12Inprinciple,itisimmaterialwhetheraU.S.-ledrevolutionischallengingoneofitsowncorecompetenciesorsomeoneelse's.Ineithercase,iftheUnitedStatessucceedsinupsettingthatcorecompetence,bytheauthor'sdefinitionitwillhaveachievedarevolutioninmilitaryaffairsitwillhaveoverturnedtheestablishedmilitaryorderandreplaceditwithaneworder(insomemilitaryarena).AU.S.-ledRMAcouldaffectseveralcorecompetenciesotherthanitsown.TherearearenasofconflictinwhichtheUnitedStatesisnotsuperior,notthedominantplayer.Terrorismandcounterterrorismareexamples.Today,andforthelastfewdecades,anumberofterroristgroupshavehadacapablecorecompetencytocausesubstantialcivilianandmilitarycasualties,andtheUnitedStates'scapabilitiestocounter,

prevent,anddefeatsuchattackshavebeenlimited.Guerrillawarfare,particularlyincities,isanotherexample.TheUnitedStatesdidnothandlethiswellduringtheVietnamWarorinSomalia.Anumberofadditionalexamplescanbefoundinthegeneralareaofasymmetricstrategies.Havingsaidallthis,however,themostprofoundchangesinwarfarewouldoccuriftheUnitedStatessuccessfullychallengedoneofitsowncorecompetencies.13Todaythecorecompetenciesembodied1inthetank,mannedaircraft,andaircraftcarrierappeartobesacredintheirrespectiveServices,withnosignificantin-Servicechallengesallowed.Wherearethechallenges(andchallengers)intheU.S.militarytoday?Noneisapparenttothisauthor.Withoutsuchchallengesandchallengers,theUnitedStatesmaymissoutononeormoreimportantRMAs.

whenthedoctrinalchangesaresmallanddonotchallengeanyone'straditionalwaysofwagingwar,thenewsystemstobeacquiredrepresentevolutionaryimprovementsonexistingsystems,andtheforcestructuremodificationsareminor,notmajor.IthasbeenalongtimesincetheformalDoDdoctrinal,acquisition,andforce-structure-modifyingsystemshavehadtorespondtoradicalchange.14Itisunclearhowwelltheywilldo.15

"TheRMA":WhereWeSeemtobeToday

UsingSecretaryCohen'sQDRterminologytodescribetheforcetransformationprocess(inspiteofthereservationsexpressedearlierconcerningthischoiceofwords),whereis"theRMA"today?HarkingbacktothemodeloftheRMAprocessinFigure3.2,wecansaythefollowing:

Newtechnology.Wehavealotofthis.

Newdevicesandsystems.Wehavealotofideasfornewdevicesandsystems.Many(butnotall)ofthemhavebeenorarebeingbuilt.Some(butnotmost)ofthemareundergoingexperiments,butnotnecessarilyriskyexperimentscoveringtheentirediscover,learn,test,anddemonstratespectrum.

Newoperationalconcepts.Wehavemanyofthese,eachwiththeiradvocatesanddetractors.Afewareundergoingactualexperiments.Mostareinpaperdiscussionsandarguments.

Newdoctrineandforcestructure.Wearealongwayfromthis,averylongway.

Wearealsoalongwayfromfocusingonashortlistofpotentiallyrevolutionarydevices,systems,andoperationalconceptsaround

14Inrecentyears,mosttrulynovel/innovativesystems(e.g.,theF-117A)havebeenacquiredvia"blackprograms,"notthroughtheformal

acquisitionsystem.15TherecentcancellationoftheArsenalShipbecauseoflackofNavysupport,withoutbuildingevenonetotryouttheconcept,isnotreassuringinthisregard.Imaginewhatwouldhavehappenedtothedevelopmentofcarrieraviationtechnologyandoperationalconceptsinthe1920sand1930siftheNavyhadcanceledthe19191922conversionofthecollierJupiterintothecarrierLangley(CV-1),theNavy'sfirstexperimentalcarrier.

whichwecan''transformtheforce."Thisnecessaryfocusingprocesscouldtakeafewyears,probablywilltakeseveralyears,andpossiblywilltakemanyyears.Untilithappens,wearewheretheU.S.Navywasin1920:alongwayfromanRMA,alongwayfrombeingabletotransformtheforce.

Anotherconcern:InmostpastRMAs,theforcewasn't"transformed"i.e.,oldforcestructureelementsreplacedbyRMAelementsuntiltheRMAhadbeenproveninbattle.Untilthen,theRMAelementsweretreatedasadd-onstothethen-existingforcestructure.16BasedontheQDR,theDoDappearstobeplanningto"transformtheforce,"i.e.,replacingoldelementswithnewRMAelementsratherthanmerelyaddingthoseelements,beforetheRMAisprovenincombat.Thisfliesinthefaceofhistory.

SomeKeyQuestionsfortheDod

WeareleftwithsomekeyquestionsconcerningDoD'scurrentforcetransformation/RMAactivities:

CantheDoDbringaboutatrueRMAwithoutultimatelychallengingoneormoreoftheServices'currentcorecompetencies?

CantheDoDbringaboutatrueRMAwithoutfocusingonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things"?

CantheDoDbringaboutatrueRMAusingitscurrentacquisitionprocess?

CantheDoD"transformtheforce"totheextentpostulatedintheQDR(alotmorecapabilityforalotlessresources)withoutbringingaboutoneormoretrueRMAs,inthesensedefinedhere?

Theauthorfearstheanswertoeachofthesequestionsis"no."

WhatCanbeDonetoFillintheMissingElements?

Threethingsinparticularseemtobeneeded:

16Inthe1930s,theGermanarmyaddedpanzerdivisions,butitkeptallofitsinfantrydivisions;theU.S.Navyaddedaircraftcarriers,butitkeptallofitsbattleships.

Somemechanismtoencouragechallenges(overtime)tooneormoreoftheServices'currentcorecompetencies

Somemechanismtobringaboutafocus(overtime)oftheforcetransformation/RMAprocessonadefinite"thing"ora(fairly)shortlistof"things"

ChangesintheDoDacquisitionsystemtomakeitmorereceptivetonovel/radicalinnovations.

Meetingthefirstoftheseneeds,encouragingchallengestocorecompetencies,initiallyrequiresoneormoremultidisciplinarygroupsofcreativepeople,withtechnology,militarysystems,andmilitaryoperationsbackgrounds,workingtogetherforanextendedperiodtoconceptualizenewsystemsandoperationalconceptsthatchallengeoneormorecorecompetencies.TheseconceptgroupsmustbefreetochallengewhateverServicecorecompetencytheirexpertise,vision,andintuitiontellthemisripetobeoverturned,withnothingheldsacred.17

ContinuingtheRMAprocessbeyondtheconceptualstageandmeetingthesecondoftheabovementionedneedsbringingaboutafocusoftheforcetransformationprocessonadefinite"thing"requiresoneormoreexperimentalgroupsthatwilllayoutexperimental

17Othershaveproposedentitiessimilartoourconceptgroups.Krepinevich(1995)proposesapermanentConceptDevelopmentCenter(CDC)to"facilitatethe'intellectualbreakthroughs'inoperationalconcepts,andincorrespondingmilitarysystemsandorganizations...toprovidethefoundationforsuccessfulU.S.[military]adaptation."Heestimatesthatsuchanorganizationshouldhaveroughly100individuals.Inasimilarvein,theCNOExecutivePanel'sNavalWarfareInnovationTaskForceproposestheestablishmentofConceptGenerationTeam(s)toaccomplishmuchthesamepurpose,limited,however,tonavalwarfare.Theseteamswouldhavethefollowingcharacteristics:"CNOtoenunciate

objectives;strongleadership(RADMlevel)providingcontinuityoverseveralyears;locationatnavaleducationfacility(s)wellinsulatedfromWashington,D.C.;separateactivityfromcurrentfunctionoffacility;smallteam(s)(<10)ofNavyandMarineCorps'mostinnovativethinkersatO-5/O-6levelsandequivalentlevelcivilians;abilitytoutilizemostinnovativemembersofcurrentfacultiesandstudentclasses;abilitytodrawonresourcesofleadinguniversities;teamstooperateona46monthtemporarydutybasiswithoutputsbriefedtoCNO;outputsanalyzedpromptlybyindependentresidentcapability."(Harris,briefingtoRAND,1998).Alternatively,theRANDConceptOptionsGroup(COG)constructmightbeusedasthefoundationforanumberoftemporaryconceptgroups(seeBirkleretal.,1998).

roadmaps(coveringtheentirediscover,learn,test,anddemonstratespectrum)forpromisingconceptscreatedbytheconceptgroups,andthendesign,conduct,andevaluatetheexperiments,iteratingtheprocessasmanytimesasrequired,foraslongasisrequired(withnoartificialdeadlines).18Theseexperimentalgroupsmustbefreetotakerisksandtofail(fromtimetotime).Theyshouldinteractfrequentlywiththeconceptgroups;theycouldbepartofthesameorganization(s).

Establishingtheproperorganizationalposition(s)forboththeconceptandexperimentalgroupsrelativetothemainstreammilitaryiscomplicatedandproblematic.Ontheonehand,theCNOExecutivePanelemphasizestheimportanceofseparatingsuchconceptualandexperimentalactivitiesinvolvingrevolutionaryinnovationfromthemainstreamactivityofthemilitaryorganization(s),sothattheywillbefreetotakechancesandtrulychallengecorecompetencies.19Ontheotherhand,MurrayandWatts(1995)emphasizethedangerofsuchinnovativeactivitiesbeingtooseparatedfromthemainstreammilitaryorganization(s),inwhichcasetheymaybeviewedasoutsidersandtheirnewideasmaynotbeacceptedbythepeoplewhowillfightthenextwar.

Thus,theconceptgroupsandexperimentalgroupsshouldbesomewhatseparatedfromthemainstreammilitary,butnottoomuchclearlyadelicatetaskinorganizationaldesign.Onepossiblesolution,suggestedbyBirkleretal.(1999),istocreateprovisionaloperationalunitsthatwouldparticipateinthe(learn,test,anddemonstrate)experimentsalongwiththeexperimentalgroups,therebyaccumulatingfieldoperatingexperience,developingmilitaryuser"buyin"forthenewsystems,motivatingandinformingthenecessarydoctrinaldevelopments,and(ifallofthisissuccessful)providinganearly,limitedbutusefulcombatcapability.20

MeetingthethirdoftheabovementionedneedsmakingtheDoDacquisitionsystemmorereceptivetonovel/radicalinnovations

18IttooktheBureauofAeronauticsabouttenyearstoestablishthefoundationsofcarrieraviation.19Seefootnote10inChapterFive.20Suchunitshavebeentriedinthepast.TheinitialF-117Asquadronswereofthisnature,aswastheUSSLangley(CV-1).

requiresthatanewbranchbeaddedtotheacquisitionsystem.21AsdiscussedinChapterSix,this"RMAbranch"oftheacquisitionsystemshouldtoleratesubstantialmilitary-utilityriskstoamuchlaterstageintheacquisitionprocess,insomecasesallthewaytoIOC.ThephasesanddecisionpointsinthisnewacquisitionbranchshouldbeconstructedinkeepingwiththelikelyuncertaintiesateachstageintheRMAprocess.Figure7.1andTable7.2illustratewhatthisnewbranchmightlooklikeintermsofacquisitionphasesandmilestones.22

Figure7.1AnRMABranchoftheDoDAcquisitionSystem

21JohnBirklerandhisRANDcolleagueshaveproposedasimilarbranchbeaddedtotheDoDacquisitionprocesstohandlenovelandradicalinnovations,whetherornottheyqualifyasRMAs.22TheacquisitionphasesandmilestonesshowninFigure7.1andTable7.2aresimilartobutslightlydifferentfromthoseproposedbyBirkleretal.(1999).

Table7.2APossibleSetofMilestonesforan"RMABranch"

oftheDoDAcquisitionSystemMilestone Certainties

RequiredUncertaintiesandRisksTolerated

MilestoneA

Ifitworksasadvertised,itcouldbringaboutamajorincreaseinU.S.militarycapabilities.

Technicalfeasibility,exactoperationalsystemconfiguration,exactoperationalemploymentconcept,differencesofopinionregardingmilitaryutility.

MilestoneB

Proof-of-conceptdemonstrationofmajortechnicalissues.

Exactoperationalsystemconfiguration,exactoperationalemploymentconcept,differencesofopinionregardingmilitaryutility.

MilestoneC

Operationalsystemconfigurationdetermined;initialoperationalemploymentconceptestablished;plausiblecasemadeformilitaryutility.

Finaloperationalemploymentconcept;somedifferencesofopinionregardingmilitaryutility.

Doingthesefourthingssettingupconceptgroups,experimentalgroups,andprovisionaloperationalunits,andaddinganewbranchtotheDoDacquisitionsystemshouldgoalongwaytowardfillinginthemissingelementsinDoD'scurrentforcetransformation/RMA

activities.

InSummary

BasedonthehistoryofpastRMAs,thereappeartobemissingelementsinDoD'scurrentforcetransformationactivities:

NoneoftheServices'currentcorecompetenciesarebeingchallenged.

Thereisinadequatefocusonadefinite"thing"orashortlistof"things."

TheDoDacquisitionsystemmaynotbeadequatelyreceptivetonovel/radicalinnovations.

Thesemissingelementscanbefilledby:

SettingupDoDconceptandexperimentalgroupstoidentifyandexperimentwithnewsystemsandoperationalconceptsthat(a)challengecurrentServicecorecompetenciesand(b)increasethefocusofthecurrentRMAefforts.

Establishingprovisionaloperationalunitstoparticipateinexperimentswithnewsystemsandoperationalconcepts.

EstablishinganewbranchtotheDoDacquisitionsystemthattoleratesmilitary-utilityriskstoamuchlaterstageintheacquisitionprocess.

DoingtheabovewillfacilitateDoD'sforcetransformationactivitiesandhelpensurethatthenextRMAisbroughtaboutbytheUnitedStatesandnotsomeothernation.

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