patriarchal struggles and state practices

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actions. Whereas multiracial feminism emphasizes the role racial inequalities play in shaping actors' politics in racially differentiated

social contexts, the socialistfeminist perspective focuses on the importance of economic factors in shaping the politics of male-domina

power elites. Thus, the multiple-power feminist theorizing both sensitizes us to the existence of the "matrix of domination" and, depend

on which aspect of power relations is salient in a given context, allows us to adjust our theoretical perspective to the historical context oactors' actions. Because of our interest in factors affecting actors' politics in a racially homogenous social context, we focus on socialis

feminist theory.

Socialist feminists assume that limited economic opportunities reproduce patriarchal domination, and they focus on the ways in which

state policies affect women's status (e.g., Burton 1985; McIntosh 1978; Pyle 1990; Wilson 1977). This occurs mainly through state

regulation of the relationship between paid employment and household labor or, in a more general sense, between production and

reproduction; state's regulation is driven mainly by economic considerations, including the level of unemployment and economic grow

which, in turn, are related to the continuation of patriarchy and capitalist accumulation (Walby 1986). Thus, depending on political-economic conditions, the male-dominated state may pursue economic interests primarily and gender interests only indirectly (McIntosh

1978), or it may pursue gender interests more aggressively: "The objectives of state personnel can involve maintenance of traditional

gender relations (male-domination) as well as the stimulation of economic development and growth" (Pyle 1990, xvii).By challenging genderless conceptions of the state and emphasizing the importance of economic conditions in shaping the interests of

male-dominated elites, socialist-feminist theory furthers our understanding of state policies. This perspective, however, has three

important shortcomings. First, similar to other feminist theories of the state, it can provide an overly abstract, "strategy-driven rather th

data driven" (Connell 1994, 146) view of the relationships between gender, political economy, and state policies. Second, while it

recognizes that male elite's interests may vary because of changes in the economic conditions, it glosses over the possibility that two

powerful, male-dominated institutions may have sometimes different and sometimes converging interests (Connell 1994, 148). Third, a

relatedly, it tends to assume that economic conditions can provide a sufficient explanation for policy formation. As a result, socialist

feminism underplays the complexity of men's interests, which also limits its ability to adequately understand historical variations in sta policies.

Connell stresses the need for more "data driven" theorizing of the state and suggests that we attend more closely to "the changing

circumstances in which state instrumentalities act, the strategic problems of state directorates, and the scope and limits of the state's

embroilment in gender relations" (1994, 148). In this context, Connell argues that the state is "not essentially patriarchal" but "is

historically patriarchal" (1994, 163). Connell's notion of a "historically patriarchal state" is important in that it "denaturalizes" and

"problematizes" gender interests by depicting them as historically contingent outcomes of social struggles rather than as a natural realit

At the same time, he recognizes that "state elites typically face shifting situations and contradictory pressures which their strategies can

only partially resolve" (1994, 160-61). These pressures result from uncertainty surrounding the gendered accumulation and exchange processes, legitimation crises in patriarchal institutions brought about by the "rise of the liberal state [which] gave weight to generaliza

claims of equality," and the emergence of the feminist movement (1994,161). And, although Connell does not specifically examine

Communist states, he suggests that his theoretical framework should be useful because "their sexual politics will differ from liberal stat

in the way interests in sexual politics are articulated, but in other ways will be similar" (1994, 139).

Former socialist states lack both the liberal state and an independent feminist movement. Thus, further theoretical development depend

moving beyond the experiences of Western nations to contexts in which state practices are shaped by struggles between male-dominate

institutions rather than conflicts between a feminist movement and the liberal state.

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONSWe focus on only one aspect of these broader interests and explore the role of ideological differences and power struggles between

patriarchal institutions in shaping specific state practices toward women. We undertake a historical case study of selected women-orienstate practices in Poland. Poland provides a theoretically interesting case because it has a relatively racially and ethnically homogeneou

population, it has neither a liberal state nor an independent feminist movement, and it features an opposition between two institutions: a

one-party political system and the Catholic Church. The coexistence of Communist and oppositional patriarchal forces presents an

excellent opportunity to examine state practices in relation to power struggles between male-dominated institutions.

Specifically, since the end of World War II, Polish history has been characterized by the existence of a male-dominated Communist Pa

(PUWP) that controlled state politics for more than 40 years, as well as a relatively strong, male-dominated opposition to the Commun

regime (Jancar 1978; Penn 1994). Since 1947, the party and the Roman Catholic Church have been the main, antagonistic political play

whose actions and strategies have shaped Polish internal politics. From 1947 to 1980, the relationships between the PUWP and the chuwere characterized by open political confrontation (1947-55), hidden ideological conflict (1956-59), amelioration (1960-70), and

accommodation (1971-80) (Monticone 1986).' In 1980, the male-dominated trade union Solidarity, which has always had strong ties to

Catholic Church, emerged as an important actor in the political arena. In the context of ensuing confrontation between Solidarity and thPUWP, the church assumed a role of a mediator between the party and political opposition. In 1983, after Solidarity was delegalized an

the economic situation worsened considerably, the PUWP and the church engaged in a mutual effort "to normalize their relationship"

(Monticone 1986, 8). As a result, between 1980 and 1989, state-church relations were characterized by a dialogue and cooperation whi

similar to the previous periods, resulted in some important changes in state practices toward women. Over the period of about 40 years

and against the backdrop of changing economic and political conditions, Polish state politics, including its gender practices, have beenconstructed by the struggle between the Communist Party, which has always been interested in reproducing its domination and

undermining the influence of the church, and the Catholic Church, which has always been at the forefront of opposition to Communist

rule.

We define state practices toward women as those laws, regulations, policies, and ideological pronouncements whose goal is to encoura

the development of certain behaviors and roles on the part of women. Our selection of particular state practices for the present analysis

rests on the socialist-feminist assumption that women's and men's relative economic status is one of the main factors reproducing

domination, and that people's economic situation is shaped by their position in the productionreproduction nexus (Tong 1989). Thus, in



this article, we focus on women's access to public employment and reproductive rights. Because of the centrality of the Communist Par

ideological conflict with the Catholic Church to Polish internal politics, we focus on these two institutional actors in our analysis of the

formation of state practices toward women.

Finally, we apply a political-economic approach, which focuses on collective actors whose power rests in the control of economic,institutional, and ideological resources, "and who vie with each other for scarce resources in the pursuit of conflicting goals"

(Rueshemeyer, Huber Stephens, and Stephens 1992, 5). Following this view, state practices, including pronouncements about women,

men, and their rights and appropriate gender roles, are pursued by purposive social actors, typically men, located in positions of power

who have an interest in reproducing their power in the context of political struggles between different interest groups. These groups ma

be formed either from within the dominant parties or political elites or from without, by groups opposed to the politics of the dominant

party. More important, to maintain political and ideological advantage over their opponents, power elites must concern themselves with

economic prosperity. This translates into a mandate to successfully deal with a variety of economic instabilities brought about by changin labor supply and demand, and cycles of economic growth and decline. Thus, political legitimacy, which includes the popular accepta

of the ethical and intellectual leadership, and economic prosperity are the two main goals of power elites.

An adequate inquiry into the patriarchal struggles that shape state practices considers how opposing political actors will adjust their strategies and practices to the changing historical political-economic context without necessarily transforming their ideologies. The

context facilitates or limits the development of particular practices, strategies, and struggles. Specifically, the strategies of patriarchal

institutions and socialist state practices toward women have been influenced by the degree of economic legitimacy of the planned

economy, including its capacity to produce increases in the standard of living and to maintain balance between labor supply and deman

the degree of ethical legitimacy of the political system, including its capacity to generate popular consent; and the balance of power

between competing actors. In examining how the struggles between the party and the church produced state practices toward women, w

will consider the fact that these opposing political actors adjust their strategies to the changing politicaleconomic situations in which th

operate.2Data for this analysis come from government sources, including Communist Party publications, existing analyses of state-church relati

research on the history of gender ideologies, newspapers, and popular magazines. We examine five different periods in the relationship

between the PUWP and the church, including an open political confrontation (1947-55), hidden ideological conflict (1956-59),

amelioration (1960-69), accommodation (1970-79), and dialogue (1980-89), and their impact on the formation of state practices toward

women. In discussing each period we will attend to the degree of political and economic legitimacy of the PUWP, including its ability

avoid political repression and regulate economic growth and employment relations. We will conclude by discussing the implications of

our analysis for feminist theories of the state.

We begin by exploring the period between 1947 and 1955. In this postwar political-economic context we focus on how ideological powstruggles between the Communist Party and the church shaped the state's practices regarding women's position in the production-

reproduction nexus.

CONSOLIDATION OF STATIST PATRIARCHY AND OPEN POLITICAL CONFLICT WITH THE CHURCH, 1947-55

After World War II, the Soviet Union imposed its Communist political-economic regime on Poland, a nation proud of its strong Catho

tradition and the political independence it regained in 1918. The emergence of this new Polish statehood transformed state practices

toward women. Under communism, the state assumed the roles of employer, economic manager, and welfare agent, thereby monopoliz

the regulation of various aspects of the production-reproduction nexus, including wages, financial and institutional help to families,

provision of child care services, and gender representation in institutions of higher education. We refer to this highly centralizedorganization of social life, including gender relations, as a statist patriarchy.3

The first years of the statist patriarchy in Poland were characterized by the Communist Party's effort to undermine the strong religiousinfluence of the Catholic Church, on one hand, and to institutionalize a Marxist ideological rhetoric that emphasized the importance of

economic equality among people, on the other hand. But while "[t]he aim of all Marxist-Leninist states is the eradication of religious

thought, since religion has no place in the type of society they seek to attain" (Monticone 1986, 7), in Poland, the politics of the PUWP

toward the Catholic Church were mediated by the strength of religious convictions among the population and the attitudes of the church

hierarchy toward the regime.

More important, the issue of gender equality played a crucial role in state propaganda in two ways. First, in terms of garnering greater

power, promoting gender equality could undermine the religious teachings of the Catholic Church, which emphasized the social

importance of the family and women's reproductive role. Second, at an economic level, encouraging such equity could mobilize wome participate in the reconstruction of the devastated economy. In this context, the Communist Party envisioned that gender equality invol

removing women from the household and giving them some economic freedom to escape from reliance on men. Bringing women into

production would then erase the divisions between the sexes and put working women in the same plight as working men: under socialisthey would then both be free. (Robinson 1995, 207)

Significantly, the leaders of the party connected women's emancipation to their participation in the public sphere, but they did not cons

the division of reproductive labor an important dimension of gender equality. As a result, by encouraging women's participation in the

labor force, the party defied, at least to some extent, the religious teaching of the church but ultimately penalized women by creating th

double burden and reinforcing the notion that they were responsible for reproductive labor.4Specifically, after the male-dominated Communist Party took over the political system in 1947, it faced several economic and political

problems. The most pressing economic issue was to increase production of goods and foster rapid economic growth. This was not an ea

task considering that about 22 percent of the population died in the war and between 70 percent and 80 percent of the economic

infrastructure was destroyed (Goodwyn 1991, 46-47). The most important political challenge was to overcome the continued resistance

large segments of the population to Communist rule. This resistance was fueled by the church's insistence on trying to maintain an

influence on Polish politics (Raciborski 1994) and its role in the parliamentary elections in 1947, during which its dignitaries urged

Catholics to "vote only for those persons, electoral lists and programs that are not in opposition to Catholic teachings and morality" (Po



bishops' letter, quoted in Monticone 1986,14). One measure that the party leaders could use to diminish the influence of the church was

juxtapose the PUWP's rhetoric of gender equality and women's liberation with the church's discourse stressing women's subordinate ro

and family-centered responsibilities. And, in the context of a war-related shortage of male workers, one way in which the party leaders

could simultaneously achieve their political and economic goals was by encouraging women's labor force participation.5 Toward theseends, the party used two strategies.

First, a new vision of "appropriate womanhood" was disseminated by different party-controlled organizations, such as the Women's

League (Robinson 1995, 210), and through the state-owned mass media. Central to this new notion was the image of a strong, young, a

healthy woman driving a tractor or working in the construction industry. This ascendant gender discourse broke from the prewar (1918

image of a more passive and domestic-oriented Polish woman. At the same time, the new gender ideologies tapped into, and continued

the image of the civic-minded and publicly active Polish matriarch that was dominant when Poland was partitioned between 1773 and

1918. The renewed postwar emphasis on the heroic and inherently patriotic aspect of Polish womanhood also defined a woman's body terms of physical strength and stamina, suggesting that, when necessary, she could be like a man. The focus on the fluidity of biologica

differences between women and men that emerged in this new image of womanhood thus signified a certain rift with the prewar image

The Communist government's newly constructed gender ideology was meant to help regulate women's place in the productionreproducnexus by downplaying the existence of socially consequential biological differences between women and men, differences that were

emphasized by the Catholic religion. More important, the dominant ideology did not challenge the normative symbolism of productivis

masculinity but instead constructed a parallel image of productivist femininity. At least in part, the image of a productionoriented,

physically robust masculinity remained because it corresponded to the needs of labor-intensive economic growth.

The second strategy the government employed was to enact several new laws and policies that encouraged women's labor force

participation and institutionalized the Communist ideology of gender equality. For example, in 1952, gender equality was codified in th

new Polish constitution, which stated that "omen in the Polish People's Republic have equal rights with men in all spheres of state,

political, economic and social and cultural life" (quoted in Reading 1992, 30). The pressing need for labor was reflected in new regulatthat, for instance, temporarily allowed women to work in the underground coal mines. And to assist women's incorporation into the pai

workforce, in 1952, the Polish government established gendered employment quotas for different enterprises, provided for vocational

training for women, and strove to increase their numbers in vocational schools (Holzer and Wasilawska-Trenker 1985, 163, endnote 1)

These new policies remained in line with the dominant ideology as they did not deconstruct the normative structure of patriarchal

masculinity. Yet, they were the first significant, albeit contradictory, attempts to formally challenge the notions of femininity embedde

the religious Catholic discourse. Thus, the concept of women's rights, as inscribed in Polish constitution, still posited men as the norm,

it also assumed that women can be just like men. At the same time, however, the concept of equal rights referred only to the public-me

sphere, leaving largely intact the patriarchal normative structure rendering women responsible for reproductive labor and unequal gendrelations in the private sphere. The emphasis on productive activities and the public sphere implied that women's reproductive work, w

was elevated by the church, was not important, unless it was performed in the productive sphere. Finally, despite the legislative change

undertaken by the government, a restrictive abortion law, a vestige of the church's earlier influence, was still in place.

This contradictory and piecemeal package of economic policies was due largely to the continued influence religion had on significant

segments of society. Despite the strong official pressures to be employed, a push sometimes compounded by forceful public criticism o

women who remained in the domestic sphere only, women's entry into the paid labor force was not widely accepted among the general

population, especially among rural men and women who comprised the majority of the surplus labor force. Resistance stemmed from

"traditional social attitudes [which] saw the woman as mother and housewife, active only in her own household" (Holzer and WasilawsTrenker 1985, 130). Such traditional attitudes were supported by the church, which continued to play a crucial role in Polish society

despite the censure it experienced at the beginning of the 1950s, including the imprisonment of two bishops, censorship of the church's printing materials, and restrictions on the legal status of the church (Monticone 1986, 21-23).

In sum, during the first period of statist patriarchy, the Polish state practices were dictated not only by the Communist Party's ideology

gender equality and time-specific economic conditions but also by the existence of an oppositional political player-the Catholic Church

this context, state gender practices became an important tool in the ideological struggle between the party and the church.

HIDDEN IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE: THE ABORTION ISSUE, 1956-59

Three notable trends emerged in the 1950s. First, between 1955 and 1960, the Polish economy continued to grow, although not at the s

spectacular pace as during the previous years. Labor shortages remained one of the most important obstacles for the economy based on

extensive growth. Second, the total fertility rate continued its slow but steady decline, from 3.66 in 1950 to 3.61 in 1955 (Anker 1985, Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1968, xvi). Third, after Stalin's death in 1953, which marked an end to political purges in most Communis

countries, and the Polish workers' uprising against the Communist regime in 1956, the ruling party experienced a brief legitimacy crisi

which was temporarily resolved by replacing the old guard with very popular leaders. The new party leadership liberalized some areas political life by making limited political concessions to diverse social groups and institutions, including workers, the intelligentsia, and

even the Catholic Church. These concessions were related to the growing recognition that political repression was actually increasing

people's discontent with the Communist rule, and that open warfare with the church "had caused many Catholics in their turn to oppose

building of socialism" (Monticone 1986, 28). In this context, concessions were meant to garner "the support of the dissident elements

within the nation" (Monticone 1986, 26). But while liberalization of political life ended a period of an open public confrontation betwethe state and the church, the importance of the ideological struggle with the church increased, as evidenced in new abortion legislation.

Specifically, despite fierce opposition by the Catholic Church, in 1956 the Communist government legalized abortions, followed in 195

by executive provisions that broadened the accessibility of abortions. As a result, first-trimester abortions were available for women wh

faced a difficult economic or social situation, and the medical procedure was subsidized by the government. A three-day leave from wo

was also guaranteed. Given the declining fertility rate and the renewed need for the biological reproduction of society, the Communist

government's legalization and liberalization of abortions can be understood only in the context of an ideological "campaign against the

Church [which] involved undermining doctrine as well as undercutting the financial foundations of the Church" (Monticone 1986, 34).



That is, the state acted on women's behalf, and in a manner contradictory to its own long-term economic goals, to further reduce the

influence of the church (Plakwicz 1992).6 And although the law was continually attacked, especially in the wake of the Solidarity

movement in 1980-81, it remained largely unchanged until 1992.

The legalization of abortion is just one critical piece of evidence that indicates that even during a time of "outward cooperation betweenthe church and the state," a hidden ideological power struggle was being waged, with the state seeking to "destroy the bases upon whic

religion had developed and thrived" (Monticone 1986, 34). Moreover, it appears that, under the statist patriarchy, the state was not an

agent that merely expressed men's general interests or the economic interest of the Communist elites. On the basis of Communist ideol

and pressing politicaleconomic issues, many state practices were aimed at improving women's public situation and social status; at the

same time, the practices on women's behalf were an important aspect of its effort to undermine the politics of the church. From this

vantage, one can argue that state practices served the historically specific ideological interests of some men, especially the Communist

elites, who sought to counter the interests of other men, represented by the patriarchal Catholic Church. In this context, the generalassumption of policy makers was that the legitimacy of communism and, at times, economic stability, were reinforced by supporting

women's rights, which, in turn, also helped to ideologically undermine the tenets of the Catholic doctrine.

IMPROVED STATE-CHURCH RELATIONS, 1960-69Beginning in the 1960s, new economic conditions, characterized by economic stabilization, influenced employment policy by lowering

demand for women workers (Holzer and Wasilawska-Trenker 1985, 131). This change in policy was also possible because of a slight

increase in the ratio of women to men, from 110 women per 100 men in 1950, to 106 women per 100 men in 1965 (Glowny Urzad

Statystyczny 1991, xxiv). In this context, the continued decline in the total fertility rate, from 3.66 in 1950 to 2.52 in 1965 (Anker 1985

12) was not perceived to be a problem. At the same time, the new Communist leaders enjoyed a relatively high level of social support d

to some extent, to their improved relationship with the Catholic Church. Given this situation, mobilization behind the party, especially

women, declined in importance, as did the related emphasis on gender equality. In fact, the practical realization of gender equality thro

women's labor force participation became costly as it required more government subsidies for free child care.The abortion issue became the state's last significant attempt to use policies for women to oppose the church. The change in state practi

was at least partly due to the transformation of the church's attitude toward Communist rule. Namely, in an effort to gain more political

influence, church dignitaries began retracting their oppositional stance toward the Communist regime and tried to create a working

relationship with the government. Given the change in church politics, the importance of the Communist government's ideological stru

against organized religion declined somewhat but did not disappear. For example, in 1966, Gomulka, the first secretary of the PUWP,

stated that the party should "[I]et the Church continue its activities. Let it perform the function which is its duty. We demand, however

that it conduct a policy loyal to the state" (quoted in Monticone 1986, 42). Similarly, Trybuna Ludu, an official party newspaper, stated

that "the government did not wish to interfere with religious teaching" (Monticone 1986, 45). This shift in state-church relations openea new discursive space and gave the Communist Party more flexibility in conducting its gender politics. The propaganda apparatus did

have to emphasize the differences between its ideology and the church's teachings to the same extent as it had previously.

As a result, the disseminated gender discourse began emphasizing biological differences between women and men. From the 1960s

onward, the government's position with regard to women's labor force participation began slowly converging with the traditional disco

of the church. This does not mean that the former ideology and policies supporting women's paid employment immediately disappeare

they were altered as the dominant discourse quit "glorifying women miners and women masons" (Heinen 1990, 86). Instead, the

Communist propaganda began forging a pro-family campaign, "insisting on the role of women as wife and mother" (Heinen 1990, 86).

Yet, while the period of amelioration in state-church relations became conducive to the emergence of pro-family ideology, this stance, we discuss below, did not become an official one until the mid- 970s. Similarly, it did not dominate the political discourse until the ear

1980s when, in the context of another serious economic and legitimation crisis, the Communist Party made significant efforts to gain political support from the Catholic Church.

A PERIOD OF ACCOMMODATION: TOWARD A PATRIARCHAL ALLIANCE,1970-79

In 1970, Poland experienced another serious political-economic crisis that resulted in the accession to power of a new group of

Communist leaders. To overcome growing economic difficulties, the new government tried to fuel economic growth by increasing

investments, especially in heavy industries, and foreign debt. As a result, during the first half of the 1970s, the national economy

experienced a temporary economic boom. The increased investments in heavy industries contributed to the creation of new employmen

opportunities and labor demand continued to exceed labor supply (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1987, 236-37). More important, the new

employment opportunities were concentrated in financially attractive sectors of the economy, a factor that could increase the influx of women workers into heavy industry. However, this picture changed in the second half of the decade as new investments were halted an

economic stagnation ensued. Given the policy of full employment, the Communist government could not revert to laying off workers i

these high-paying industries. At the same time, as a result of the institutionalization of some pro-natalist policies, including increasedfamily allowances and extended unpaid maternity leave (Holzer and Wasilawska-Trenker 1985,132), total fertility began increasing slo

from 2.20 in 1970 to 2.27 in 1975 (Anker 1985, 12).

Politically, Gierek, the new first secretary of the PUWP, tried to introduce changes into state-church relations. His new approach could

partly attributed to his having been raised by "very devout Catholic parents," making him aware "of the strength of religious belief and

practice among the Polish people" (Monticone 1986, 52). Regardless, when Gierek became the first secretary, he was committed tonormalizing the relations between state and church and expected that the church would enthusiastically welcome his efforts. The churc

however, was increasingly aware of its political strength and influence, and also realized that the recent crisis had weakened the popula

of the party, even with new leadership. To capitalize on this new configuration of power, the church presented a set of political demand

including the incorporation of a clause about freedom of the church, into the new constitution. The state, "[kJnowing its lack of suppor

among the . . . people. . began to pursue a policy of detente with the Polish Church" (Monticone 1986, 53).

As already noted, the amelioration of state-church relations in the 1960s decreased the necessity for direct ideological confrontation

between the two institutions even further. This, in turn, opened up a discursive space wherein the state propaganda could safely exploit



some ideological tenets of Catholic discourse, especially the notion of gender difference, for its own ends. Of course, the ideological

struggle between Marxism and Christianity did not end (Monticone 1986, 54), but the Communist Party and its propaganda apparatus h

to make important strategic choices regarding the arenas in which concessions to the church could and could not be made. In this conte

the party opted to continue, and even increase, the ideological struggle with the church in the economic and educational arenas.In the economic arena, the Polish state focused on socializing agriculture and including private farmers in the pension system if they

contracted the products with the government or sold their land to the state (Monticone 1986, 60). A successful program of socialization

agriculture would draw "private peasants closer to socialized economy" and foster migration to the cities, thus undermining "the pillars

traditional life" and the church's influence (Heneghen cited in Monticone 1986, 61). With regard to educational reform, school curricul

were modified to include more Marxist-Leninist ideas in course content, late afternoon classes were introduced to hinder "children from

attending religious instruction," and new school superintendents sympathetic to the party were appointed (Monticone 1986, 61). Thus,

socializing agriculture and school reform became the two critical arenas of confrontation between the state and the church (Monticone1986, 60-62). Since the issue of gender equality was important, but not very critical, to Marxist-Leninist ideology, it could be easily

sacrificed as part of concessions to the church and its followers. Furthermore, de-emphasizing gender equality had an economic

component as well. As the economic situation continued to worsen, the change in the dominant gender ideology and policies towardwomen was a rational measure that could help accomplish three important goals: show that the party was ready to make ideological

concessions to the church, help employment stabilization while controlling women's influx into the heavy industries, and ameliorate th

party's image as an alien force trying to eradicate "natural differences between the sexes."'

The change in gender ideology began in the 1960s when government propaganda started disseminating gender discourse, which

emphasized biological differences between women and men. The political-economic climate of the 1970s helped to institutionalize the

differences in social policies and in legal discourse. In the first half of that decade, the government passed several pro-natalist social

policies that sought to stabilize the economy by encouraging .gainfully employed women to return to the home. They included increase

family allowances and childbirth benefits, the extension of fully paid leave to care for sick children and for maternity, the introduction reward for every child born, and material aid to young couples (Holzer and Wasilawska-Trenker 1985).

The publication of the first postwar Labor Code in 1974 presents yet another example of government's efforts to strengthen families an

institutionalize gender differences in public life. For example, the code stated that women could not perform tasks considered dangerou

their health (Kodeks Pracy 1974, art. 176). This new law served to exclude women from almost 90 occupations in 18 industrial branch

and to limit women's access to jobs that required carrying, lifting, or transporting materials beyond established norms (Uscinska and

Pracka 1990). In this case, the state's legal discourse constructed and deployed gender differences to weaken women's position in

production relative to men. Indeed, in 1975, Florczak-Bywalec noted that

despite the fact that men and women have equal rights guaranteed by the Constitution and although the demand for labour concerns allemployees, regardless of their sex, male labour force is preferred.... It is far easier for a man than for a woman to find a job. (quoted in

Malinowska 1995, 37)

Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s, the dictum concerning women's emancipation through their participation in the public sphere was slowly

disappearing from ideological discourse. Instead, the government began promoting pro-natalist policies and women's return to the hom

THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE CHURCH: THE CONSOLIDATION OF PATRIARCHAL ALLIANCE, 1980

89

The importance of the 1980s in Polish political-economic history is not limited to the emergence and subsequent delegalization of the

oppositional social movement organized around the trade union Solidarity and the beginning of a serious political-economic crisis that to the collapse of communism. It also marks a critical turning point in the history of state-church relations.

With regard to the political-economic crisis, in August 1980 Poland experienced a wave of strikes in several strategically positionedindustries, including shipyards, coal mining, and construction, which lasted until the imposition of the martial law in December 1981.

These strikes deepened the crisis that had been haunting the Polish economy since the beginning of the 1970s. Thus, in 1981, the gross

national product fell 5.3 percent, the gross investment declined 22 percent, and the foreign debt increased from 20.7 billion dollars in 1

to 25.5 billion dollars in 1981 (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1988, 8; 1991, xxiv-v). In this context, the state budget experienced serious

difficulties, the standard of living declined even further, and the gap between consumer needs and the supply of goods grew larger

(Robinson 1995). At the same time, the pro-natalist policies introduced in the 1970s led to an increased fertility rate from 76.1 to 79.1 l

births per 1,000 women (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny 1985, 6).

This crisis was shaped by the struggle between the party and the Solidarity trade union, a movement that had close ties to the church anan ideology shaped by Christian ethics (Monticone 1986, 112-33; see also Tygodnik Solidarnosc 1981). Solidarity not only played an

important role in destabilizing the Communist regime but also shaped pro-family gender discourses and policies throughout the decade

For example, one of the union's "Twenty-one Demands," and the only demand dealing with gender issues, was a three-year maternityleave for women workers. Also, the First National Congress of Solidarity declared that "the Union defends the rights of the family" and

resolved that one of the union's tasks was to lobby against women's nighttime work and for the introduction of part-time work

opportunities for mothers and pregnant women (Dokumenty 11 Tury Zjazdu 1981, 74). Interestingly, when Solidarity was delegalized

1981 and its political and economic agreements with the government were annulled, maternity leave and the ban on women's work at n

remained intact.In terms of state-church relations, discussion concerning the need for a dialogue between the state and the church surfaced in 1978, but

was not until 1983 that this conversation began. The first sign of change in state-church relations was a 1983 article published in a

semiofficial party weekly, Polityka, which stated that "the struggle against religion should be halted since religion is indestructible"

(Monticone 1986,184). At the same time, and despite the church's political interest in strengthening antigovernment opposition, the new

Polish Cardinal Glemp asked priests to stay away from politics, denounced the leaders of the banned Solidarity movement for continui

underground oppositional activities, and defined the role of the church in terms of uniting "those who are disunited" (Monticone, 1986

814-15). This conciliatory attitude of the church's hierarchy toward the PUWPwhich delegalized Solidarity in 1981, arrested its membe



and kept the country under the grip of the martial law for nearly two years-severed the relationship between the church's moderate

hierarchy and the political opposition, including some Catholic priests who were involved in political activism (Monticone 1986, 184-8

Also, the church's public withdrawal of support for the delegalized Solidarity and continued emphasis on women's social role as the

biological reproducers of the nation, guardians of morality and family, and agents of moderation and unification could be seen as goingagainst the grain of the long-established politics of opposition to the regime. In fact, given the widespread participation of women in

strikes and other resistance activities at the beginning of the 1980s (Nowakowska 1988; Penn 1994), the emphasis on domesticity and t

push to exclude women from political life could have decreased the strength of the resistance movement. In this context, the question

becomes, Why did the church encourage actions that could have resulted in weakening the opposition?

Two factors seem to underlie the church's emphasis on gender differences and women's reproductive roles. First, in 1983, the Vatican

published the Card of Family Rights, which among other things stated that governments should guarantee a family wage to the male

breadwinner (Janicki 1992,10). Since the Polish Catholic Church established a very close relationship with the Vatican after a Polishnational became the Pope, the publication of the Card of Family Rights had a strong impact on the church's pronouncements regarding

women. Second, after martial law was imposed and many male leaders were detained, Solidarity was transformed into a clandestine

organization in which women members became the main pillars (Penn 1994). In this context, the church's ideological push towardwomen's domestication did not really threaten and may have strengthened oppositional activities. After the military crackdown occurre

the private sphere remained the only sphere where antigovernment activities could continue.

From the party's point of view, the church's conciliatory approach made it easier for the government to implement social policies that w

in line with the church's earlier demands, including the demand that the government should "respect the rights of the Family and [give

prominence] to the priority of the Family over the professions and over other social and political groups" (Raina 1978, 226). It is in this

context that the official policy and the ideas promoted by the church converged; as a result, a family-oriented gender ideology officially

became the dominant gender discourse. Communist Party leaders began insisting that "the social policy of our Party and of the state is t

strengthen the family and procreative and educational functions" (quoted in Reading 1992,40). Images supportive of a "good andresponsible mother" abounded. The family was depicted as the nucleus of Polish society, and Polish mothers'-not women's-contribution

society and the economy were increasingly stressed. Biological gender differences were emphasized repeatedly, even by members of th

League of Polish Women, a Communist Party-affiliated organization concerned with women's rights (see, e.g., Kobiety w zyciu 1987,

69). And, in 1989, Nowe Drogi, a Communist Party magazine, suggested that women's emancipation promotes family crisis and the

neglect of elderly people (Jankowska 1989, 5). Indeed, the notion of women's political activism, so touted in the 1940s and 1950s,

disappeared from public discourse, and women's representation in political and administrative bodies dropped from an already paltry 1

percent to 10 percent (Reading 1992, 65).

Several factors account for the state promotion of this new family-oriented discourse and for the convergence of otherwise antagonisticsocial forces on the issue of "women's place." First, the government sought to ease the financial burden that it had accrued because of

strikes, and to forestall the threat of unemployment in the context of weakening economy. Preserving maternity leave allowed the

government to shift some of the costly reproductive responsibilities it had assumed by providing free preschool, day care, and kinderga

back to women (Robinson 1995, 215-16), while simultaneously stabilizing the labor market by encouraging them to stay at home. Seco

as we have already noted, women played a central role in developing the Solidarity movement, in subsequent strikes, in the so-called

hunger marches, and in maintaining opposition after the men were detained. In this context, the ideological push toward women's

domestication was meant to counter women's political activism; in reality, however, it politicized the private realm even further. The

Communist Party misjudged the nature and role of women's oppositional activities at the time (Penn 1994).Thus, during the final years before the collapse of communism and statist patriarchy, the historical developments in state-church relatio

in the 1980s created a situation wherein the state could and did exploit the themes underlying patriarchal religious discourse for its ownends. While the notion of gender difference and the focus on women's role in biological reproduction surfaced in the 1960s, it was not

until the 1970s that the ideology of "radical gender differences" (Watson 1993) was used as a vehicle for women's economic

marginalization, and it was not until the 1980s that the notion of radical gender difference was reinforced by the ideology of domesticit

that was used to legitimize women's exclusion from economic activities and neutralize women's role in political opposition. More

important, this historical shift in state practices might not have occurred to the same extent if state-church relations had remained as

antagonistic as they were in the 1940s and 1950s.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Poland does not necessarily typify state-church relations in Communist countries. Some of the conflicts between the Communist Party the Catholic Church could have been exaggerated for ideological reasons. As a result, we cannot determine which of the conflicts

discussed were consequential struggles and which were merely symbolic. Still, despite these possible shortcomings, the postwar history

gender politics in Poland can provide several important insights for feminist, especially socialist-feminist, theories of the state. In this fsection, we summarize the results of our study and discuss their theoretical importance.

First, official state discourse and policies toward women, especially concerning the production-reproduction nexus, have changed over

time in Poland as a result of ideological conflicts between the Communist Party and the Catholic Church and in relation to political-

economic pressures. When the party sought to consolidate its political power in the context of fast economic growth, a shortage of

manpower, and a heightened ideological struggle with the church, its discourse and policies emphasized gender similarities and stronglencouraged gender equality through women's labor force participation. As a result, the previous patriarchal strategy of gender

differentiation through the imposition of gender dichotomies gave way to a different strategy embedded in a productivist gender discou

By creating this alternative discourse and enacting policies stimulating women's paid employment, the Polish government sought to

regulate women's place in the production-reproduction nexus, on one hand, and transform the traditional gender belief system embedde

Catholic doctrine, on the other. In so doing, the party hoped to undermine the church's influence while also mobilizing women to help t

economy and to gain their political support in exchange for policies that benefited them.



When state-church relations improved, the sex ratio and hence worker availability stabilized, and the party faced political or economic

legitimation crises, its gender politics tended to cross over the boundaries of the gender discourse disseminated by the church. That is,

beginning in 1960, the Polish state slowly withdrew from the Marxist principles of gender equality and started developing a new gende

strategy embedded in a reproductivist gender discourse. This new discourse consisted of messages and policies intended to limit womeaccess to employment and to reinforce traditional stereotypes, such as the value of motherhood. Until 1970, both productivist and

reproductivist gender discourses coexisted, but by the early 1970s, the institutionalization of gender differences brought the latter

discourse to the fore where it has since prevailed.

This convergence in official and unofficial gender discourses did not signal the end of the ideological conflict between the Polish state

the church. Rather, it indicated the Communist Party leaders' choices regarding arenas in which they would struggle with the church.

Given women's relative lack of power and the declining need for their paid labor, turning to more conservative gender politics did not p

a great threat to the legitimacy of Communist rule. Instead, other issuessuch as maintaining full employment, reversing the expansion othe private sector in agriculture, or increasing Communist and decreasing religious indoctrination through education-appeared to be mo

important arenas of political struggle. Furthermore, creating the appearance of a good relationship with the church, especially during th

1970s and 1980s, boosted the party's legitimacy. Consequently, changing gender politics seemed a relatively safe gesture for thegovernment to make to enter a dialogue with the church. In effect, then, these two otherwise antagonistic institutions converged in the

1980s over women's issues as their leaders seemed to agree that women's "intrusion" into the public sphere had gone too far.

Second, the political and economic interests that drive state practices can contradict each other, even for the same group of men. Indeed

political-economic context alone cannot explain how state policies are formed. For example, the legalization of abortion in 1956

contradicted the existing economic context but fit with party efforts to continue the ideological struggle with the church and create a

secular society. Similarly, although the church played both a direct political and indirect ideological role in the Solidarity movement, th

church's politics after Solidarity was outlawed in 1981 were rather conciliatory toward the regime and continued to define the role of

women in terms of their moral and biological, not political, responsibilities. Yet, this ran counter to the church's political interest instrengthening the antigovernment opposition. By insisting on cooperation with the party and by maintaining its conservatism even after

most of the male Solidarity leaders were arrested in 1981, the church seemed to be more willing to risk weakening of oppositional forc

than to act in ways that might challenge its political position and patriarchal ideology. This political stance resembles that of the party w

regard to political opportunism and contrasts with that of the PUWP with regard to gender ideology. As we have seen, the party would

easily change its position regarding gender equality to secure its political or economic ends. Thus, while we can at least attribute these

changes to the party's effort to deal with changing economic conditions, the historically specific power struggles with the church also

played an important role in shaping state practices. Overall, our exploration of state-church relations in forming gender practices sugge

that state policies can simultaneously serve and undermine the interests of different groups of men, and that men can be fragmented political actors who, depending on the configuration of power relations among them, legitimacy of their politics, and economic pressur

may either struggle against or create alliances across ideological antagonisms.

Our analysis of the changes in the Polish state's gender politics indicates the existence of contextual bases for a more or less monolithic

assertion of patriarchal power, and for the changing emphasis on gender similarities or differences. Perhaps periods of consolidation of

political power, heightened ideological confrontation between leftist and Christian politics, and economic growth aid the emergence of

emphasis on gender similarities. In contrast, the declining legitimacy of leftist politics, the realization that cooperation with the church

another conservative organization with popular support helps maintain power, and economic stabilization or crisis, as was the case in th

1970s and 1980s, create a political-economic climate conducive to creating patriarchal alliances and political discourses stressing genddifferences.

This analysis has important implications for socialist-feminist theories of the state. First, such theories should examine the experiencesnon-Western societies and nonliberal political systems because the relations peculiar to them highlight gender politics that are not easil

visible under other, oftentimes more heterogeneous, arrangements. Second, the experience of Poland, a statist patriarchy, suggests that

socialist-feminist perspective should attend to ideological divisions and alliances among groups of men and their impact on state practi

that are context specific and issue specific; a specific issue, an economic policy, or political rhetoric can be fashioned in a way that seem

to contradict some men's economic interests but supports their ideological fight against other patriarchal institutions.

The recognition of different patriarchal players with conflicting interests aids inquiries into the politics of states dominated by one poli

party or socially homogeneous political elites. In such cases, we can too easily conclude that the state's gender practices are ahistorical

result from only one factor: men's attempts to control women. Furthermore, in many Communist countries ideological and policydevelopments can occur at the same time, and people may attribute them to the economic pressures of a centrally planned economy, su

as full employment or shortages of consumer goods. Taken at face value, this observation may appear to support the socialist-feminist

reliance on economic explanations. However, if we compare what we have learned from our analysis of gender practices in Poland witthe dynamics of gender politics in, for example, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), we might conclude that although the shift in

policies toward women occurred in both countries at approximately the same time-in the 1970sthese changes occurred for different

reasons. In Poland, the institutionalization of reproductivist gender discourse, which was meant to encourage women to stay at home,

cannot be separated from the changes in state-church relations. By contrast, in the GDR "mommy politics" were meant "to facilitate

women's combining paid employment with motherhood" (Ferree 1993, 93) and were not linked to a struggle between the state and theCatholic Church. Thus, even in such relatively "simple" and homogeneous political contexts, at various historical moments the

maledominated parties could introduce similar gender practices for very different reasons.

Finally, feminist scholars have begun to analyze the changes in gender relations in Eastern Europe brought about by the shift to a free-

market economy. Although insightful, some of these analyses appear to take the existence of "traditional definitions of gender" in

Communist countries for granted (Moghadam 1995a, b; Watson 1993). For example, Watson argues that "the absence of civil society

fostered the neo-traditional organization of society, one aspect of which was the valorization and entrenchment of traditional definition

gender" (1993, 71). More important, these "[r]adical claims of gender difference are the sole basis for the legitimacy of the rule of men



and constitute an explicit justification of the exclusion of women from power in Eastern Europe" (Watson 1993, 72-73). Yet, as our stu

has revealed, the Communist government can construct and reproduce a variety of gender meanings that change even within the same

political-economic era. The emergence of the "radical ideology of gender difference" as the dominant discourse did not depend on the l

of a civil society in Poland or on the fact that the Communist Party was male dominated. In fact, the Catholic Church and the Solidaritymovement, both of which could be seen as representing civil society in an embryonic form, may have actually contributed to the

construction of gender differences through official Polish state discourse. We suggest that the emergence and entrenchment of the radic

ideology of gender difference in the official ideology of Communist states was a historical contingency and that, given a different

combination of gendered political and economic pressures, the transition to free-market economies could have occurred in the context

productivist, not reproductivist, discourse. The existence or absence of a civil society does not determine the gender ideology.

Thus, both feminist theories of the state in general, and inquiries into the gender relations in transitory societies such as Eastern Europe

countries specifically, should attend to when and how the state constructs different meanings of gender. Even though government practmay tend to benefit men more than women overall, their content is not a given and can change rapidly. In fact, as the Polish case sugge

gender politics depend not only on the country's economic situation, as many socialist-feminist scholars have acknowledged, but also o

the degree of political legitimacy enjoyed by the ruling elites, and on the power of oppositional patriarchal organizations such as theCatholic Church. Recognizing the influence of ideological differences in shaping the gender politics of actors who are homogeneous w

regard to their class, race, and gender helps theorists move beyond identity politics; that is, interpretations "stuck in the realm of the bo

not the realm of belief and action" (Senna 1995, 20).[Footnote]

AUTHORS' NOTE: An earlier version of this article was presented as a paper at the annual meeting of the American Sociological

Association, Washington DC, August l9-23, 1995. We would like to thank Beth Schneider. Judy Root Aulette, Rachel Parker-Gwin, N

King, Thelma McCormack, Brigitte Young, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

[Footnote]

NOTES

[Footnote]

1. This periodization is based on Monticone's (1986, ?-8) work on state-church relations in Poland. However, since he does not include

state gender politics in constructing this periodization, we adjusted it so that it better reflects the gender dimension of the power strugg

between the state and the church.

2. We do recognize that the state is not a single, monolithic entity acting in a rational manner (see, e.g., Connell 1994; Evans,Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). However, since our interest is in the changing relationships between patriarchal institutions and

resultant state policies, for our present purposes we gloss over the internal dynamics in these institutions. Moreover, Polish state practi

toward women were controlled by the PUWP (Communist Party), which dominated the Parliament and the government, the two

institutions responsible for formulating and executing state actions. Thus, in this article, we will also assume that state practices

represented the position of the Communist Party with regard to women and gender roles.

3. We are not suggesting that the ensuing changes in state policies and gender discourses were influenced only by the new political-

economic situation. Rather, the political-economic system itself was built on, and in the context of, preexisting patriarchal structures

characterized by women's relatively low labor force participation, political involvement, and limited reproductive rights. Before WorldWar II, these patriarchal structures were reinforced by a gender ideology that elevated women's role in the private sphere and their

contributions to the Polish culture through their reproductive labor, broadly understood.

[Footnote]

4. Although the Communist state tried to mediate the contradictions experienced by gainfully employed women by providing free child

came facilities; subsidizing food services in the workplace; and by passing legislation protecting mothers, pregnant women, and childre

these actions were too limited in scope. In fact, between 1950 and 1955 the number of places in day care centers per 1,000 children

decreased from 165 to 143. Many married women experienced a double shift consisting of four types of jobs-paid work, housework, ch

rearing, and work as a wife. It is estimated that in the 1950s, an average Polish woman spent a minimum of 50 hours per week on dome

labor (Sokolowska 1963, 146).5. At the end of World War II the ratio of women to men stood at 114; by 1955 it diminished to 108, and it has been 105 since 1977

(Ciechocinska 1993, 305).

6. In fact between 1955 and 1965 the total fertility rate declined from lI.Olive births per 100 women to 7.0 live births per 100 women aIS-49.

7. The policy of full employment was one of the most important tenets of Marxism-Leninism. That in practice this tenet implicitly refe

to men only was another issue. 8. While these new developments held sway over some types of women's employment opportunities, th

did not visibly discourage women from combining paid employment, family responsibilities, and motherhood. When the economy pick

up in the 1970s, women's movement into the paid labor force increased. Thus, the share of women in the total paid labor force, andwomen's economic role, continued to rise from 33.7 percent in 1960 to 39.6 percent in 1970 and 44.2 percent in 1980 (Holzer and

Wasilawska-Trenker 1985, 31).

[Reference]

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[Author note]

REPRINT REQUESTS: Anna M. Zajicek, Department of Sociology, University of Arkansas, 216 Old Main, Fayetteville, AR 72701; e

mail: [email protected]

[Author note]

Anna M. Zajicek is an assistant professor of sociology and gender studies at the University of Arkansas. She is currently the principal

investigator of the oral history project examining the interactions of race, class, and sexual orientation in the local women's movement.

Toni M. Calasanti is an associate professor of sociology and women's studies at Virginia Tech, where she is also a faculty affliate of th

Center for Gerontology. Her research centers on gender, class, race, and age as these conditions are shaped by work/retirement.

patriarchal struggles and state practices

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