Patrol-Level Response toa Suicide Bomb Threat:

Guidelines for Consideration

CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES:

Lisa L. Spahr withJoshua Ederheimer andDavid Bilson

CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES:

Patrol-Level Response to aSuicide Bomb Threat:

Guidelines for Consideration

April 2007

This publication was supported by Motorola, Incorporated. The points of view expressedherein are the authors’ and do not necessarily represent the opinions of Motorola, Inc., orindividual Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) members.

Websites and sources listed provide useful information at the time of this writing, butauthors do not endorse any information of the sponsor organization or other informationon the websites.

Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D.C. 20036Copyright 2007 by Police Executive Research Forum

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 978-1-934485-01-9

Cover design by Dave WilliamsPhotos are (clockwise from upper left corner): March 9, 2005 attack on Baghdad Head-quarters of the U.S. Police Advisory Mission in Iraq, courtesy of Michael Heidingsfield; July 2005 London bombings, EMPICS Limited of Pavilion House, 16 Castle Boulevard,Nottingham, NG7 IFL; September 2004 suicide bombing in Jakarta, courtesy of Reuters/Bea Wiharta; and December 2005 Miami International Airport bomb threat, © [2007] Lou Toman/South-Florida Sun-Sentinel.

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Acknowledgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Risks to the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Perspectives fromAround the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

United States: Los Angeles Police Department . . . . . . . 5

United Kingdom: Metropolitan PoliceService of London . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Iraq: Training Iraqi Police Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

The Development of thePERF Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Overview of Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Initial Conference: Suicide BombingPreparedness and Response, March 31, 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . 9

PERF Interview Guide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Site Visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Open-Source Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Restricted Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Guideline Development and Review Process . . . . . . . 11

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide BombThreat Summit, January 17–18, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Guideline Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Description of the Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Description of the GraduatedForce Options Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Patrol-Level Response toa Suicide Bomb Threat:PERF Guidelines forConsideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Graduated ForceOption Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Glossary of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

About the Authors/PERF/CFA/Motorola . . . . . . . . . . 23

Appendices

1. Participant List from the Suicide BombingPreparedness and Response Conference,Washington, D.C., March 31, 2006. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2. Suicide Bombing Preparedness andResponse Conference Agenda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3. Participant List from the Patrol-LevelResponse to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit,Baltimore, Md., January 17-18, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

4. Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

5. Site Visit and Interview Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

6. U.S. Army, National Ground IntelligenceCenter’s Improvised Explosive DeviceSafe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Contents

Foreword — i

he United States has not had an extensivehistory of dealing with suicide bomb attacks. As aresult, few police and sheriffs’ departments have feltthe need to develop policies and training programsspecifically addressing the issues raised by suchincidents.

However, the 9/11 attacks drastically changedhow the United States views its own vulnerability toterrorism in general. The implications of Septem-ber 11 regarding the threat of suicide bombers arestill being felt around the world. After all, the 9/11hijackers were the ultimate suicide bombers. Theyused commercial aircraft as bombs rather thandevices that fit inside a backpack. But at their core,their motivations were the same—they believedthat political or religious ideology justified murder-ing innocent bystanders and killing themselves inthe process.

There have already been several incidents inthis country over the last few years involving per-sons wearing or carrying explosives who killedthemselves or were killed by police. Knowledgeablepeople agree that potential suicide bomb attacks inthe United States are unfortunately part of what SirIan Blair refers to as the “New Normality.” Forexample, a 2006 survey of more than 100 foreign-policy experts—Republicans and Democratsalike—found that 91 percent said it is “likely or cer-tain” that within the next decade the United Stateswill suffer an attack similar in scale to the July 2005London bombings. And when the experts were askedwhich two types of attacks are most likely, the mostcommon response was “suicide bombing attacks,”followed closely by “attack on major infrastructure.”Other types of attacks, such as use of radiological orbiological weapons, were ranked far lower.

In 2006, the Police Executive Research Forum(PERF) began a dialogue with the policing commu-nity to better understand what needs to be done toprepare for the threat of suicide bombers. In Marchof that year, PERF held a conference in Washington,D.C. on suicide bombing preparedness. Fifty partic-ipants from federal, state, local, and internationalpolicing agencies identified policy issues thatshould be considered. PERF followed up on thatconference, and spent the remainder of 2006 con-ducting research, making site visits to police agen-cies in New York City, Los Angeles, London,Washington, D.C., and elsewhere, and writing a setof proposed guidelines for consideration by polic-ing agencies. In January 2007, PERF held a secondconference in Baltimore, during which we askedparticipants to vet the guidelines.

This report is the result of those meetings andresearch. It presents 68 guidelines for departmentsto consider—along with related documents such asa Glossary of Terms, to prevent confusion by ensur-ing that the terminology is used consistently. Someof the guidelines offer broad recommendationsabout law enforcement agencies’ entire approach toincidents that may involve a suicide bomber—forexample, setting criteria for assessing the threatsposed by the attacker and the risks of various policeresponses. Other guidelines offer very detailedadvice based on what we learned from policingagencies around the world—for example, how faraway from an attacker police should remain if theyare using various types of radios that could inad-vertently trigger a suicide bomber’s explosives.

Fundamentally, the purpose of the guidelinesis to answer this question: What should firstresponders do—and what should they not do—when encountering a potential suicide bomber?

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Foreword

ii — Foreword

The guidelines recommend that law enforce-ment agencies create a stand alone policy and/ortraining curriculum on suicide bomb threats. PERFrecognizes that this is controversial. At our firstmeeting in March 2006, it became evident thatthere was some reluctance to put suicide bomberpolicies into writing. Perhaps some chiefs think ofthe adage, “If the only tool you have is a hammer,you will see every problem as a nail.” In otherwords, if officers are trained to think carefullyabout suicide bombing scenarios, will it increasethe chance that they will misinterpret situations,seeing a suicide-bomber terrorist every time anincident involves someone wearing a backpack?This is particularly important because we also rec-ognize that a patrol officer is usually the first toarrive at a scene that may involve a suicide bomber.

But in the end, there was a strong consensusthat policing agencies need stand alone guidelinesbecause suicide bombing incidents are a unique

type of threat that involves many considerationsnot present in other types of incidents.

At the same time, it should be noted that theSuicide Bomb Threat Guideline Number 1 statesthat suicide bomb protocols generally should be“consistent with an agency’s use-of-force policies,procedures, and training.” In other words, suicidebomb policies should expand upon policing agen-cies’ existing policies on use of force in general.

Motorola, Inc. and PERF are pleased to pres-ent the Guidelines for Consideration, GraduatedForce Option Protocol, and Glossary of Termswhich culminated from our year-long efforts toresearch the international policing response to sui-cide bomb threats. It is our hope that this publica-tion will help more local law enforcementexecutives openly discuss this issue with other com-munity leaders, examine current policies and prac-tices, and create or modify planning and trainingstrategies to address the threat of suicide bombers.

Chuck WexlerExecutive DirectorPolice Executive Research Forum

Acknowledgments — iii

his publication represents a culmination ofPERF’s year-long effort to work with the interna-tional policing community on a highly sensitivetopic. We received many valuable contributionsfrom policing agencies, and had the pleasure tolearn about the committed efforts and interest of somany more.

We would like to thank the MetropolitanPolice Service of London for approaching PERFwith its concerns regarding the preparation, plan-ning, and training for suicide bomb attacks. Assis-tant Commissioner Stephen House, at the directionof Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner of the MetropolitanPolice, led PERF to investigate the matter, whichresulted in the joint research efforts of this project,a conference to lay out the issues, and a summit tofinalize much needed guidelines for consideration.

Special thanks are due to our partners atMotorola, Inc., for their support of the CriticalIssues in Policing Series. Motorola has supportedPERF for many years in our effort to stimulateprogress in policing. We are especially grateful toGreg Brown, President and Chief Operating Offi-cer; Mark Moon, Corporate Vice President andGeneral Manager, Government and CommercialMarkets; and Rick Neal, Vice President, Govern-ment Strategy and Business Development.

Our project would have been incompletewithout the openness and hospitality we receivedon our many site visits with departments here andabroad. We wish to thank the following people andagencies for sharing their insights on this complexissue: Assistant Director Michael Bouchard andDivision Chief Joseph Riehl, Bureau of Alcohol,Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Agent CharlesWood and Detective Jack Dineen, U.S. Capitol

Police; Chief Charles Payne and his staff from theDepartment of Homeland Security’s Office forBombing Prevention; Major General Mickey Levyand Brigadier General Simon Perry, Israel PoliceForce; Chief William Bratton, Deputy Chief MarkLeap, Commander Michael Downing, LieutenantJames West, Sergeant Sean Malinowski, and Detec-tive Supervisor Ralph Morten, Los Angeles PoliceDepartment; Commissioner Raymond Kelly,Deputy Commissioner Michael Farrell, InspectorMichael Healey, Captain Hugh O’Rourke, Lieu-tenant Mark Torre, Sergeant Bacharik, and mem-bers of the Emergency Services Unit, New York CityPolice Department; Former Chief Charles Ramseyand Chief Cathy Lanier, Washington, D.C. Metro-politan Police Department; Deputy Chief Consta-ble Ian Arundale, Association of Chief PoliceOfficers, West Mercia Police Department, UK;Commanders Simon Foy and Jo Kay, Staff OfficerHelen Cryer, Former Superintendent StephenSwain, and Police Constable Spike Townsend, Lon-don Metropolitan Police Service; Dr. JonathanCrego, Hendon Training Center, UK; Chief Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle Police Department; and ChiefLiz Woollen, University of Oklahoma PoliceDepartment.

We also would like to thank Chief John Tim-oney, Miami Police Department; Chief ThomasRobbins, Boston University Police Department;Assistant Director Michael Bouchard, Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Assis-tant Director John Miller and Deputy AssistantDirectors Joseph Billy and Donald Van Duyn, Fed-eral Bureau of Investigation; Assistant DirectorMichael Stenger and Assistant Special Agent inCharge Robert Novy, U.S. Secret Service; President

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Acknowledgments

iv — Acknowledgments

and CEO Michael Heidingsfield, Memphis ShelbyCrime Commission; Detective Supervisor RalphMorten, Los Angeles Police Department BombSquad; and Captain Jeffrey Herold, Washington,D.C. Metropolitan Police Department for their pre-sentations during the Suicide Bombing Prepared-ness and Response Conference in March 2006 andthe Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb ThreatSummit in January 2007.

Critically important to the completion of thisreport was the willingness of an exceptional groupof individuals to participate in these two events.These extremely busy professionals graciously gavetheir time and expertise to determine the key issuesrelated to suicide bomb preparedness at the firstconference and to produce and revise the Guide-lines for Consideration during the summit. (Acomplete list of participants can be found inAppendices 1 and 3.)

This report could not have been producedwithout the strong efforts of talented and dedicated

PERF staffers. Executive Director Chuck Wexlerguided the project from start to finish with insight,thoughtfulness, and determination to provide ameaningful product for the field. Corina Solé Britoand Andrea Luna coordinated the first conferenceand set the pace for the work to follow. Emily Mil-stein-Greengart was instrumental in planning asuccessful summit and conducting site visits perti-nent to the project. PERF Fellow Rick Weger, SanJose Police Department, assisted staff on site visits.Eric Albertsen delivered essential support at thesummit. Bill Tegeler, acting director of the CFA,contributed to the writing and editing of this pub-lication. Jerry Murphy and Craig Fischer both pro-vided helpful editorial reviews of this document.Jim Cronin and Jason Cheney provided additionalsupport throughout the project to ensure its suc-cess. We thank each of them for their valuable con-tributions. Finally, this document reflects the manytalents of Dave Williams, who provided layout andcover design.

Joshua EderheimerCaptainMetropolitan Police DepartmentWashington, D.C.

Lisa L. SpahrAssociatePolice Executive Research ForumWashington, D.C.

David BilsonChief SuperintendentMetropolitan Police ServiceLondon

Overview — 1

he United States is fortunate in comparisonto countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israelwith respect to suicide bomb threats. These coun-tries are constantly on heightened alert to the threatof suicide bombers. Security is at the forefront ofeveryone’s mind, not just those of the police forces.

And while the events of September 11, 2001opened our eyes to the threats to our homeland,particularly when a committed group of peoplewishes to cause unimaginable harm to our country,as time goes on the threat of a new suicide bombincident fades in many Americans’ minds. Thetragic bombings of underground trains and a busin London in 2005 were a terrible reminder that theUnited Kingdom, the United States, and othernations are at risk of continued attacks from indi-viduals and organizations that are willing to killinnocent people for a particular cause or out of dis-agreement with government actions.

RISKS TO THE UNITED STATES

Many experts agree that a suicide bomb attack isinevitable on U.S. soil. A 2006 survey of more than100 of America’s top foreign-policy experts foundthat 80 percent expect an attack similar in scale to9/11 within a decade. Ninety-one percent of the par-ticipants believe that an attack similar to that of the2005 London bombings is likely by 2016; 57 percent

of them said they considered such an attack likelywithin a year. Two-thirds of the participants pre-dicted that the next attack will be in the form of asuicide bombing.1 The increase in suicide bombingincidents internationally, coupled with the unrestover current foreign policy, should be reason enoughfor police and sheriffs’ departments to put plans inplace to combat such threats before they occur.

In fact, there have been a number of suchthreats and attacks that have already occurred in theUnited States. These include:

n In September 1995, a man killed himself and hisfamily in a car packed with explosives in Balti-more County, Md. The man lured his estrangedfamily into the car by promising to take themschool-shopping. The police ascertained that hefully intended to kill them in this manner.2

n In December 2001, Richard Reid (the “ShoeBomber”) attempted to ignite an explosive in hisshoe while on board an airplane from Paris toMiami. He was subdued by passengers and theflight crew. He pled guilty to the crime andacknowledged his associations with al-Qaeda.3

n In August 2003, a man, likely a victim himself,was killed by an explosive locked around his neckin Erie, Pa., after he was forced to rob a bank. Theexplosive detonated while he was surrounded by

T

Overview

1. The Terrorism Index. July/August 2006. Foreign Policy and the Center for American Progress Publica-tion. Retrieved February 7, 2007 from www.foreignpolicy.com

2. New York Times. September 13, 1995. Man Kills Estranged Wife and Children with Bomb. Retrieved February 6, 2007 from www.nytimes.com

3. CNN. January 22, 2003. Richard Reid Pleads Guilty. Retrieved on February 6, 2007 from www.cnn.com

2 — Overview

police, who were waiting for the bomb squad.4

This case remains unsolved, and no one has beencharged with any crime related to it.

n In June 2005, a 52-year-old male walked into afederal courthouse in Seattle with a backpackstrapped to his chest and a grenade in his hand. Hehad a history of legal battles over child-supportpayments. The man was shot twice and killed bypolice officers. The grenade was found to be inac-tive, and the man was carrying a living will.5

n In October 2005, a student with explosives in abackpack blew himself up outside a packed uni-versity football stadium in Oklahoma. It isunknown whether he intended to kill others ornot. A review of his background uncovered yearsof bomb-making and an interest in explosives.6

A search of his property yielded high quantitiesof explosive materials and a significant amountof jihadist literature.7

n In December 2005, Air Marshals at Miami Inter-national Airport shot and killed a man who ranfrom an airplane and onto the jetway, claiminghe had a bomb. The man’s wife said he was suf-fering from mental illness and had failed to takehis medication. The Air Marshals defended thedecision to shoot and noted the adherence toprotocol for use of lethal force.8

Subject matter experts often disagree aboutthe language and definitions related to suicidebombing, using terms such as “suicide terrorism,”“homicide bomber,” and “body bomber.” Depend-ing upon an agency’s definitions and terminology,some of the examples above may not fit into a

suicide bomber classification. This document is notmeant to delineate between a lone-wolf type ofbomber and one with a highly organized plot withmultiple bombers; it is intended to provide tools forlaw enforcement agencies to begin considering howpatrol-level officers should respond to a suicidebomber threat. Although each incident will beunique, they all require situation and threat assess-ments by the officer who responds to the call.Most law enforcement experts agree that a patrolofficer is the most likely person to identify andpotentially confront a suicide bomber. Althoughmany agencies have highly skilled specialized unitsto deal with bombs and active shooters, patrol offi-cers will require training to handle such situationsif they arise.

Some U.S. police departments, includingthose in Los Angeles and New York City, have iden-tified the risk of future suicide bombers as immi-nent. They have written policies and conducteddepartment-wide training, and are consistentlyassessing and improving their readiness. On theother hand, some departments have not yet begunto specifically address this issue. Some don’t see thethreat as imminent or they feel that their jurisdic-tion would not be a likely target. Others feel thatdue to the complexities, and specifically the uncer-tainties, of a suicide bomb attack, little can be doneuntil an event actually occurs. A lack of resources orexpertise remains an obstacle for readiness in somedepartments. Many police departments in theUnited States have recently experienced increases inviolent crime, and therefore are devoting moreresources to that area rather than to crisis prepared-ness. Although there are many reasons why policedepartments are not actively preparing for a suicide

4. Fox News. September 1, 2003. Investigators Probe Bizarre Bomb Death of Pizza Man. Retrieved February 6, 2007 from www.foxnews.com

5. Seattle Times. June 21, 2005. Man Killed at Court was Upset over Child Support. Retrieved February 15,2007 from www.seattletimes.nwsource.com

6. Chief Liz Wollen, Oklahoma University Police, Presentation at the Forum on Crime and Justice, Luncheon Series. August 25, 2006.

7. Accuracy in Media. October 7, 2005. Terrorism Strikes the Heartland. Retrieved February 6, 2007 from www.aim.org

8. New York Times. December 8, 2005. Marshals Shoot and Kill Passenger in Bomb Threat. Retrieved February 7, 2007 from www.nytimes.com

Overview — 3

bomb threat, we believe that police agencies wouldbe well served by devoting time to assessing theirown capacity to deal with these kinds of situations.Our country should not put off planning for a sui-cide bomb threat until another bombing of cata-strophic proportions occurs.

PERF set out to conduct research and developguidelines to assist departments in this area. Fordetails about PERF’s process in developing these

guidelines, see “The Development of the PERFGuidelines,” page 9. By absorbing the lessonslearned by our national and international policingpartners, the work of bomb squads and specialists,and the progressive actions of a number of depart-ments, PERF hopes to provide information to initi-ate the development of training and policy as wellas to foster further discussion on this complex andsensitive topic.

“Bus destroyed by a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in Baqubah, Iraq, January 2,2006.” Photo by Pfc. Danielle Howard, courtesy of Department of Defense (released to public).

Perspectives from Around the World — 5

As the paradigm shift in modern policing continuesto evolve, we must challenge ourselves to open ourminds to what may have been unthinkable in thepast. The reality is that as we improve our methodsof target hardening in response to the threat posedby terrorists in our cities and towns, we may at somepoint encounter individuals bent on destructionand willing to sacrifice their own lives in the process.

While we must continue to fight crime, wenow have a clear mandate to continue to expandour mission into the homeland security arena. It isincumbent upon us as police leaders to anticipatethe myriad of possible threats posed by extremistgroups. We must actively pursue best practiceswhen it comes to scenario-based training, tacticalplanning and preparation.

There are still those who will say that we areerring on the side of caution as we explore all possi-ble scenarios, including the homicide bomber strik-ing in the heart of U.S. cities. They say, “That topicis too complex or sensitive to address,” or that thethreat posed is an unlikely one in our context. Theyare wrong. We would be doing ourselves and ourjurisdictions a disservice by not confronting thisthreat head-on and planning for all eventualities.

To that end, the Los Angeles Police Depart-ment has, for a number of years, been painstakinglyresearching, analyzing, and planning for the even-tuality that, at some point, an individual will

attempt to deto-nate an explosivedevice in an urban area, inflicting mass casualtiesand killing himself or herself in the process.

The Los Angeles Police Department is fortu-nate enough to have developed a cadre of personnelwith specialized knowledge in this area. Our officersand detectives have worked closely with the police invarious countries who have encountered thesethreats in the past. We have developed detailed poli-cies and tactics to respond to a rapidly unfoldingevent involving a homicide bomber. Recognizing theneed for an in-depth analysis leading to best practicein this area, PERF assembled a prestigious group ofprofessionals and other stakeholders to create guide-lines to assist departments across the country inaddressing this potential threat to public safety.

The work group developed a series of guide-lines for a patrol-level response to a suicide bombthreat. These guidelines represent the latest thinkingfrom some of the top names in counter-terrorismtraining and tactical response, and encompass rec-ommendations on threat assessment, operations,and training. By disseminating this information toas wide a range of police agencies across the countryas possible, we will be heightening officer awareness,spurring further discussion of the issue, and lessen-ing the possibility of a tragic outcome should thehypothetical threat become a horrible reality.

Perspectives fromAround the World

The United States Perspective WILLIAM BRATTONCHIEF, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

PRESIDENT, POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM

6 — Perspectives from Around the World

The Metropolitan Police Service has more than 30years of experience dealing with terrorist attacks onthe streets of London, but the July 7, 2005 attackson our public transport system were a type ofonslaught that was new to the city: “suicidebomber” attacks. It is impossible to overstate theimpact that those assaults had on the MetropolitanPolice Service, just as the police departments of theUnited States were changed forever by the 9/11 sui-cide bombers’ attacks on the World Trade Centerand the Pentagon.

I asked Assistant Commissioner StephenHouse to contact the Police Executive ResearchForum in order to progress further study of whatpolicing agencies in the United States and the UKare doing to plan for attacks by suicide bombers. Itis important that our two nations continue to worktogether to consider what this new threat means topolice departments.

One thing we have learned is that developinga response to counter the threat of a suicide bomberwill not be successfully achieved by the police serv-ice acting alone. Even with the best police work, itwill be communities that uncover terrorists anddefeat terror. That is why it is essential to build trustthrough strong working partnerships betweencommunities and the police, involving all levels ofgovernment as well as voluntary and private-sectororganizations. All have a crucial contribution tomake in protecting our citizens.

It is also important to understand that whilethere is always the need to protect operationallysensitive tactics, we must share policing plans withthose to whom we are held to account. Police man-agement and oversight authorities must ensure thatplans are appropriate and proportionate, while theyhold police to account and inform citizens aboutpolice activities, objectives, and outcomes.

The changedthreat, referred to inLondon as the “NewNormality,” demandsthat we identify new ways of working. But our efforts to counter terrorism must not become sepa-rated from mainstream policing as a new discipline.Terrorism is a crime, and like other crimes, it can be successfully frustrated through tried and provenapproaches in policing—visible patrol, intelligence,forensics, and detection. Efforts to counter terror-ism must not become separated from mainstreampolicing as a new discipline of science.

Successful resolution of such complex eventsalso requires the highest level of training to ensurethat officers fully understand their agencies’ plansand make the best decisions at all levels. We are veryproud of our Hydra and Minerva simulation train-ing systems, developed within the Police Service, inwhich officers train in a specially-built facility tosimulate the complexity, chaos, and challenges ofreal-time incidents. The approach allows officers toparticipate in scenarios that test and develop theiroperational decision-making and professional skills.

The MPS has developed strong operationalframeworks to respond to terrorist threats and inci-dents, to provide security and reassurance to thepeople of London, and to protect the city’s infra-structure. We must continually search to improveour response and find the best measures to protectour citizens and the cities that we serve. That is whyit is so important that PERF, with the support of theMetropolitan Police Service, New Scotland Yard,has developed this essential guidance for first-response officers. By preparing officers for thethreat of suicide bombers and training them torespond effectively, we can disrupt terrorism andsave life.

The United Kingdom Perspective SIR IAN BLAIRCOMMISSIONER, METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE OF LONDON

Perspectives from Around the World — 7

Suicide bombers in the United States? That seems tobe one of many of the dire challenges facing local lawenforcement in America today. The answer seems tobe more of a question of ‘when’ and not ‘if,’ but noone can be absolutely sure. However, as the target offour suicide bombing attempts while heading theU.S. Department of State Police Advisory Mission inIraq from 2004 to 2006, I can speak with absolutecertainty about the outcomes of such attacks: chaoticaftermaths, unprecedented frustration at the enemy’sability to strike with relative impunity, and frenziedsearches for countermeasures.

As we tried to rebuild Iraq’s Police Service, 13U.S. police advisors under my command lost theirlives; those losses were overwhelmingly tied to sui-cide bombers using improvised explosive devicesagainst us and against what we represented. For me,there were never the right words to express thedepth of our grief to those officers’ families. Multi-ply those scenarios, which were my personal expe-rience, against the impact of the thousands ofcivilian Iraqi casualties by suicide bombers, and youhave a measurable sense of just how quickly anysense of order can devolve out of control.

The public safety of our communities, ourmanagement of the risk to our police officers, andour control of the consequences of such attacks liein five elements:

n First, we must develop technology that detects,neutralizes, or destroys suicide bomb threats ateither a speed or distance that minimizes risk. Inthis effort, agencies in the defense industry, suchas the Department of Defense and the JointImprovised Explosive Device Defeat Organiza-tion, are expending blood, sweat and tears to

find and developthat life-savingtechnology.

n Second, we mustcontinue to pursue and strike the enemy where hebegins production or planning of such attacks.Once the threat is deployed and our adversariesare on the move against their targets, our ability tomitigate or defeat that threat is severely compromised.

n Third, we must never dismiss the experiences oflaw enforcement professionals who have dealtwith the specter of such attacks for decades. Wemust embrace, in particular, our Israeli andBritish counterparts, to whom we can turn forlessons learned. The concept of ‘jointness’ cannotbe overstated.

n Fourth, we must recognize that it is the patrolofficer on the street who will be the first to con-front this threat on American soil. We will nothave the luxury of containment and a traditionalExplosive Ordnance Disposal response. We musttrain patrol officers in the most foreign andunthinkable scenarios that they have ever faced.

n Fifth and finally, it is not just technology or streetskills that will save us. It is the development ofreal time intelligence that reveals the enemy’sintentions, tactics and strategies.

In Iraq, we continuously tried to understandand forecast the enemy course of action. Regret-tably, we must now bring that military concepthome to the domestic front.

The Iraq Perspective MICHAEL HEIDINGSFIELDPRESIDENT AND CEO, MEMPHIS SHELBY CRIME COMMISSION

“U.S. Air Force (USAF) Staff Sergeant (SSGT) Phillips, an Explosive Ordnances and Devices(EOD) specialist from the 824th Airborne Red Horse (ARH), examines a bomb attached toa simulated suicide bomber during a Safe Flag exercise at Avon Park Air Range, Florida (FL).Safe Flag exercise is designed to ready troops to become a highly capable and responsive teamwhen opening air bases worldwide.” Photo by SSGT Matthew Hannen (USAF), courtesy ofDepartment of Defense (released to public).

The Development of the PERF Guidelines — 9

OVERVIEW OFRESEARCH METHODS

Prior to the development of PERF’s “Patrol-LevelResponse to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Guidelines forConsideration,” little had been offered, nationally,to police departments about this topic. Our inter-national colleagues, specifically Israel and morerecently the United Kingdom, appear to have devel-oped the majority of the responses to suicide bombthreats as a direct result of their experiences. TheUnited States is less prepared, perhaps because oflimited experiences, other priorities, and/or thesheer number of departments nationwide to coor-dinate. Other challenges to preparedness includethe complexity of the issue, the belief of some thatan attack is not imminent, and the feeling that thereis little that can be done to prepare for such anunpredictable event.

PERF set out to examine the issues pertainingto suicide bomb threat response, identify Americanand international departments that have developedpolicy and/or tactics to address such threats, anddevelop guidelines that could assist departments inpreparing for a suicide bomb incident. The researchmodel included: a conference and summit withstakeholders, site visits, interviews, and review ofopen-source and restricted data for relevant arti-cles, training materials, and/or protocols.

Initial Conference: Suicide BombingPreparedness and Response

PERF began this project with the first of two stake-holders meetings, the Suicide Bombing Prepared-ness and Response Conference, on March 31, 2006

in Washington, D.C. The 50 participants were fromfederal, state, and local policing agencies in theUnited States; policing units in Canada, NewZealand, the United Kingdom, and Israel; and private-sector partners, including the MemphisShelby Crime Commission and the Center forTechnology Commercialization (See Appendices 1and 2 for the Participant List and Agenda respec-tively). The conference participants discussed thenature of suicide bombing missions, internationalexperiences, and challenges to policy and trainingdevelopment and implementation. They also iden-tified policy concerns, such as whether a policeagency’s suicide bomb policies should be developedas a separate document or should be encapsulatedinto the general use-of-force policy. This workallowed the PERF staff to begin developing theguidelines, as well as to identify site visits and fur-ther research that would be necessary to completethe project.

PERF Interview Guide

PERF developed an interview guide to facilitate dis-cussion during the site visits and interviews (SeeAppendix 5). This guide was designed to help theinterviewers focus their research on certain topics,such as: whether a police agency’s existing policiesspecifically addressed suicide bombers; how anagency would respond to various scenarios suggest-ing that a suicide bombing might be imminent;agencies’ use of various terms regarding suicidebombings; agencies’ use of bomb squads; and thespecific tactics that patrol officers are taught toaddress threats of suicide bombers.

The Development of thePERF Guidelines

Site Visits

PERF conducted site visits with the following policedepartments/agencies: New York City; Los Angeles;U.S. Capitol Police; Metropolitan Police Service ofLondon; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms andExplosives; Department of Homeland Security;U.S. Secret Service; and the Israel Police Force. Dur-ing each site visit, PERF staffers met with bombsquad specialists, special weapons and tactics(SWAT) and related specialized units, counter-ter-rorism units, and patrol divisions. Site visits wereintegral to identifying department policies, proce-dures, equipment, and future needs with regard tosuicide bomb threat response.

Interviews

In addition to the interviews conducted during thesite visits, PERF interviewed a number of individu-als with expertise in this area, including TerryGainer, then-chief of the U.S. Capitol Police; MajorGeneral Mickey Levy, former Israel Police com-mander of the district of Jerusalem; and MichaelHeidingsfield, former U.S. State Department PoliceAdvisor to Iraqi Police Forces. Interviews alsoincluded various meetings and briefings attended byPERF staff to obtain further insight on the topic:

n The U.S. Department of Homeland SecurityOffice of Bombing Prevention held an AdvisoryGroup Conference on December 4–5, 2006 todiscuss a national strategy for bombing preven-tion to present to the President.

n The Forum on Crime & Justice, a University ofPennsylvania program that brings federal legisla-tive- and executive-branch officials together withcriminal justice practitioners and other leaders todiscuss critical issues, held a luncheon discussionon suicide bombers on August 25, 2006. Speakersincluded Chief (and former PERF President) GilKerlikowske, Seattle; Chief Liz Wollen, Universityof Oklahoma; and Jeff Fuller of the NationalBomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board.

n The International Law Enforcement Forum, aninternational network of security professionals,held an event on November 7–9, 2006 to discuss

a myriad of topics pertinent to internationalpolicing communities and less-lethal force alter-natives, including suicide bomb response and thepotential use of chemical “calmatives” to inca-pacitate individuals or crowds.

n The Federal Bureau of Investigation created twomulticast DVDs related to suicide bombingthreats. The multicasts feature prominent policechiefs and federal officials talking about pre-paredness and response to threats and related situations.

Data

Open-Source Data

PERF utilized open-source materials such as:academic articles related to suicide bomber ideolo-gies and evolutions; military documents related toexplosives and standoff distances; police doctrinessuch as active-shooter protocols; explosives trainingmaterials offered by government and private-sectorsources; and media reports of bombing incidents. Asample of articles and documents reviewed include:Robert Pape’s The Chicago Project on Suicide Terror-ism; the Institute of Land Warfare’s paper on Sui-cide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2004);Penn State University’s Advantages and Limitationsof Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal Technique(2000); and Department of the Army, NationalGround Intelligence Center (NGIC), Intelligenceand Security Command’s Improvised ExplosiveDevice Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet. All of thisinformation was useful in understanding the widepicture of suicide bomb threats, policing, and soci-ety at large, as well as the specifics of thwarting suchattacks, such as training opportunities and tactics.

Restricted Data

PERF examined restricted-source data frompolice departments, bomb specialists, policing andspecialized membership organizations, and othersources. These documents are labeled “sensitive,”“for law enforcement only,” “for official use only,”and so on. The material contained in the docu-ments included information such as specific tacticalmaneuvers and drafts of departmental protocols.

10 — The Development of the PERF Guidelines

GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT ANDREVIEW PROCESS

The PERF site visits, interviews, and open andrestricted-source research led to the development ofnearly 100 initial draft Guidelines for Considerationregarding patrol-level response to a suicide bombthreat. The overall purpose of the guidelines wasto answer the question: What should first responders do—and what should they not do—when encountering a potential suicide bomber?

The guideline development process posed achallenge: Those drafting the guidelines strove toavoid too much specificity, which could renderguidelines inapplicable to certain agencies, but alsoto avoid writing guidelines that were so general theywould fail to offer much assistance. Guidelinesoften were based on multiple sources of informa-tion; in some cases guidelines were based on astrong consensus in the literature and research,while other guidelines reflected a melding of severalperspectives. Guidelines were first vetted by PERFexecutive management and lead researchers on theproject. As a result of this review, guidelines wererevised, eliminated or newly created.

Patrol-Level Response to aSuicide Bomb Threat Summit

The most critical step in the process was the vettingof the guidelines at the summit meeting in Balti-more on January 17–18, 2007. Participants fromthe previous conference were invited, as well as oth-ers identified during the project, to review thePERF proposed guidelines, protocol, and glossary.(See Appendices 3 and 4 for the Participant List andAgenda respectively.) Prior to the summit, theguidelines and supporting materials (the Glossaryand the Graduated Force Options Protocol) weresent to each participant for preliminary review. Par-ticipants were asked to review the guidelines withtheir police leadership and bring feedback to thesummit. During this event, participants from morethan 30 policing agencies, both national and inter-national, revised the guidelines through discussionand debate on each guideline’s appropriateness topolicy and/or training domains for individual

departments. The event highlighted the complexi-ties and sensitivities surrounding various prepared-ness and response methods that could be utilized.However, it was abundantly clear that most depart-ments wanted national guidelines to help thembegin developing policies within their own agen-cies. Nearly two days’ worth of discussion regardingthe guidelines resulted in another evolution of theprocess, with the nearly 100 initial draft guidelinesboiled down to 68 vetted guidelines.

Guideline Considerations

The Guidelines for Consideration were finalizedand vetted by PERF. Feedback from Summit partic-ipants resulted in modification of some guidelines,elimination of others, and creation of new ones.Inclusion of guidelines in the final document (andexclusion of others through the vetting process) arenot meant to imply 100-percent consensus. PERFtook into consideration all feedback and commentsrelated to each guideline. And while the guidelinesmay not necessarily reflect the individual views ofeach participant or each participating department,they do reflect the amassed wealth of knowledgecollected during this project regarding suicidebomb threat preparation and response.

PERF recognizes that each potential suicidebomb threat will include a dynamic set of variablesthat may not be fully covered by each guideline. Theguidelines do not discount the need for proper train-ing in risk and situational assessments. Further, theguidelines are meant to be considered in conjunc-tion with existing use-of-force policies and train-ing protocols. Departments should consult theirlegal counsel prior to guideline implementation toensure that the guidelines are legally sound andacceptable within their jurisdiction and in conjunc-tion with other legal requirements. This legal reviewwill also encourage the cooperation of local govern-ment officials and employees in a comprehensiveand collective approach to this very sensitive issue.Further, guidelines should be examined in the con-text of the National Incident Management System(NIMS) and coordinated at the local, state, regionaland federal levels as most appropriate.

The Development of the PERF Guidelines — 11

The following guidance alone will not preventor successfully eliminate threats of suicide bombingincidents. However, our goal is to provide someassistance to preparing for a sensitive and complexissue: first-responder actions in a suicide bombthreat situation.

Description of the Glossary of Terms

The Glossary of Terms was developed early inPERF’s work to ensure that the research staff wasusing terminology consistently and uniformly indiscussions. Further, PERF identified subtleties interminology and definitions during site visits andinterviews that, if not clarified with a glossary,could have led to confusion when speaking aboutthe topic to a wider audience.

Items were included in the glossary if theycommonly appeared in research or conversation re-garding the topic. Definitions were adopted usingopen source materials, departmental definitions, ora hybrid of both. This glossary proved useful in de-veloping guidelines and sharing them with others.

The glossary was also vetted through the Summitparticipants and modified as necessary.

Description of theGraduated Force Options Protocol

PERF developed the Graduated Force Options Proto-col, a visual tool to use in conjunction with the guide-lines, to demonstrate how threat assessments ofvarious suicide bomb incident scenarios lead to differ-ent levels of intervention and force. Although eachscenario is likely to be different, a threat assessmentmust take place based on the scenario, and an inter-vention level will be determined based on the assess-ment. Assessments are not static and may in factchange as the scenario develops. Therefore, continualassessments may change the level of intervention ap-plied to each scenario. The Graduated Force OptionsProtocol is meant to highlight the various dynamicsrelated to assessments and interventions while also al-lowing mobility between the categories as the threatchanges. The Protocol should be considered as a toolin conjunction with the Guidelines for Consideration.

12 — The Development of the PERF Guidelines

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration — 13

GENERAL

1. Generally, the principles of an agency’s suicidebomb response protocols should be consistentwith an agency’s use of force policies, proceduresand training.

2. Similarly, the principles of an agency’s activeshooter protocol should be considered in thedevelopment of the suicide bomb response policy.

3. Law enforcement agencies should create a standalone policy and/or training curriculum ad-dressing the response to suicide bomb threats.

4. The suicide bomb response policy should stateclear strategic objectives that include:

n Preservation of life;

n Prevention and reduction of the impact ofterrorism;

n Providing for responses that include otheragencies; and

n Providing a framework for law enforcementand emergency response for other similarincidents of crime, significant accidents, ornatural emergencies.

5. A suicide bomb response policy should includeincident response and contingency plans for pre-incident, incident, and post-incident phases, aswell as address required support unit response.

6. Policy development should include a review ofofficers’ legal authority and tactics (on privateand public property).

7. Agencies’ suicide bomb response policies shouldbe flexible in order to adapt to the variation inthreats and level of response.

8. Agencies should develop strong operational link-ages between patrol and SWAT, bomb squad andspecialized units.

9. Agencies should partner with other public andprivate organizations, as necessary, to developinteragency and multijurisdictional collabora-tion, policy, planning and training.

10. In developing a suicide bomber response pro-tocol, agencies should consider graduated useof force options consistent with the depart-ment’s use of force policies (see suggested sui-cide bomb Graduated Force Option Protocol).

11. Officers should consider the suicide bombgraduated force option protocol prior to the useof deadly force.

12. In the event of any suicide bomb threat, asupervisor should immediately respond andtake charge.

13. Upon confirmation of a credible suicide bombthreat, a member of the executive commandshould assume responsibility for the incident assoon as practical.

Patrol-Level Responseto a Suicide Bomb Threat:

PERF Guidelines for Consideration

NOTE: Words/phrases in boldface in the guidelines are included in the glossary of terms. Some guidelinesare repeated because they are applicable to more than one section of the document.

14 — Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration

14. Agencies should consult, inform and engageelected and other community leaders aboutsuicide bomb response policies.

Threat and Risk Assessments

15. Agency response plans should includeprocesses that require the completion of threatand risk assessments and the extent of the dan-ger posed to police and the public.

a. Threat assessments should include:

n Location of the incident, whethercontained, static or mobile;

n The method of the attacker (i.e., bombworn on the body, carried, or in a vehicle);

n Descriptions of suspects and suspecteddevices; and

n If possible, identify the intended/possibletarget (e.g. crowded public spaces, notablebuildings, events, VIP presence, etc.).

b. Risk assessment should include:

n Danger posed by the device and potentialevacuation area size;

n Risks of evacuation (versus sending tocover);

n Hazards and danger to emergencyresponders; and

n Other safety issues.

c. Responders should continue to review thethreat and risk assessments throughout theincident and consider designating a specificofficer to that task.

OPERATIONS AND TACTICSCommunications

16. Officers should limit the use of electronic com-munications in close proximity to a suspectedsuicide bomber.

17. Officers should position themselves at least 100ft. (6 police car lengths) away from a suspect if

they use a handheld police radio (0-29 watts) inproximity to a suspected suicide bomber.

18. Officers should position themselves at least 170ft. (10 police car lengths) away from a suspect ifthey use a vehicle-mounted police radio (30–49watts) in proximity to a suspected suicidebomber.

19. Upon arrival at the scene, responding officersshould report the following information:

n Location of suspect and officer;

n Description of suspect and/or device;

n Areas/streets unsafe for responding units orgeneral public to enter;

n Number and location of innocent personsin close proximity to suspect; and

n Presence of any injured persons and thepossibility of safe evacuation.

20. Officers should request the response of special-ized support units when threat and risk assess-ment dictates such a response.

Safe Distances and Evacuations

21. When possible, officers should confront a sus-pected suicide bomber in an isolated or lesspopulated area.

22. While every effort should be made to maintaina safe distance from a suicide bomb suspect,there may be unanticipated situations in whichofficers find themselves within close proximityto the suspect. Under these extreme circum-stances, it may be necessary to grab a suspect’sarms and keep them away from the torso or insome other restraint tactic.

23. If the bomber is on the ground while detainedby an officer(s), officers should restrain the sus-pect’s hands to prevent movement.

24. When maintaining a safe distance, officersshould seek cover from a potential blast, heatand shrapnel from both the device and otherobjects (glass, bomb debris, etc.).

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration — 15

25. Officers should attempt to contain the sus-pected suicide bomber, and should not allowthe suspect to leave the area or enter a vehicle.

26. In general, take cover and attempt to maintaina safe standoff distance from a suspected sui-cide bomber.9

27. If a suspect is aware of the officers’ presence,officers should not close on these distances tonegotiate with, or handcuff, a suspect.10

28. Where applicable, officers should evacuateendangered citizens.

29. In evacuation decisions, officers should con-sider background and collateral injuries tobystanders upon the possible detonation of anexplosive device.

30. Officers should be aware that evacuation ofpersons from public areas or buildings cancarry as great of a risk as keeping them in place.

31. Locking or making a building secure at the timeof the threat or attack can disrupt an attacker’smovements, bar entry and save lives (be mind-ful that a need may arise to evacuate premisessoon after).

32. Officers should remain vigilant in their efforts todetect secondary devices, additional suspects orattacks. Consideration should be given to deploy-ing plainclothes officers to conduct such duties.

33. Agencies should maintain different colorperimeter tape to designate inner and outerperimeters (e.g. red and yellow).

General Operations and Tactics

34. Consider all suspected bombs live devices.

35. If available, and if time allows, plainclothesofficers should respond to conduct surveillance

and assess the situation in a possible suicidebomb threat.

36. Patrol vehicles should include specific equip-ment needed to implement suicide bomb/critical incident plans. Equipment may include:

n 3 rolls each of inner and outer perimetertape

n Megaphone/bullhorn

n Maps

n Personal Protective Equipment

n Visibility gear

n Reference/flashcards

n Copies of operational plans

n Decision logs

n Radiation Protection Pagers

n Gauze masks; eyewear; gloves and bootcoverings

37. Officers should not use Conducted EnergyDevices on a suspected suicide bomber.

38. Shooting an area of the body that might containa bomb carries an increased risk of detonation.

39. If the area is secure and contained, officers shouldgenerally not approach a suspect (bag, vehicle, orbody), even if a suspect is willing to surrender(or appears to be dead/incapacitated) until theexplosives are rendered safe by bomb technicians.

40. In order to manage the police response to a sui-cide bomb threat, agencies should considerdeveloping suggested defined tasks for the firstofficers arriving on the scene with three pri-mary objectives:

a. Identify, locate, and contain the suspect,take cover, pass information back to a com-mand center, and challenge the suspect ifappropriate.

9. See the U.S. Army, National Ground Intelligence Center’s IED Safe Standoff Distance Cheat Sheet in Appendix 6.10. Ibid.

16 — Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration

b. Focus on warning bystanders, clearing theimmediate vicinity of people, and securingwitnesses/informants.

c. Conduct perimeter search and surveillanceactivities, seeking secondary devices and/oraccomplices.

41. To avoid confusion and conflicting messages,a single lead officer should be designated tocommunicate with the suspect.

42. The deployment of a canine in order to intercepta suspected suicide bomber may be considered.

43. Officers should attempt to seek compliance/surrender of a suspected suicide bomber.

If the Suicide Bomb Suspect is Compliant

44. Officers should order the suspect to show his/her hands with palms open.

45. When responding officers identify a suspect inpossession of a bomb, they should order thesuspect to gently and slowly place the object onthe ground and have the suspect step awayfrom the device.

46. If the bomber wants to surrender, officersshould order him/her to remove all explosivesand clothing, and turn 360 degrees. Itemsshould be gently placed on the ground.

47. Officers should avoid ordering the suspect todrop to his knees or lie on the ground. Somebomb switches are located in the chest or waistarea and may cause the explosive device to det-onate if the suspect lies down.

If Suicide Bomb Suspect is Noncompliant

48. If the suicide bomb suspect is contained and ata safe distance from others, attempts should bemade to negotiate with the suspect to resolvethe situation without the need to use deadlyforce.

49. Based on the actions of the suspect (e.g. theofficers have established probable cause tobelieve the suspect is in possession of an explo-sive device) and the officers’ belief that the sus-pect represents an immediate threat of death orserious bodily injury to the officers or others,officers may need to utilize deadly force to inca-pacitate the suspect and/or prevent detonation.

50. Shooting an area of the body that might containa bomb carries increased risk of detonation.

TRAININGBehavioral Anomalies

51. Law enforcement officers should focus onbehaviors rather than age, race, ethnicity, andgender in regard to suicide bomber suspects.

52. Suicide bomb suspects may display behavioralanomalies that would draw attention to them-selves (such as behaviors or indicators thatwould be out of the ordinary). However, lawenforcement agencies should work to developskills in identifying behavioral anomalies.Anomalies include:

a. Irregularity—something that deviatesfrom the norm or from expectations.

b. Peculiarity—something strange anddifficult to identify or classify.

General Training

53. Law enforcement agencies should create astand alone policy and/or training curriculumaddressing the response to suicide bombthreats.

54. Suicide bomb training should include decisionmaking and critical thinking components inorder to strengthen an officer’s ability to con-duct a situational assessment.

55. Patrol officer training should regularly includebomb technicians and representatives frompartner agencies as expert presenters.

Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: PERF Guidelines for Consideration — 17

56. Officers should be aware that a suicide bombtriggering device may be in hands, on belt,waistband and/or chest. Triggers may also beheld by a third party (handler) in the crowd.

57. Suicide bomb response training for patrol offi-cers should incorporate live explosives demon-strations to highlight realistic threats.

58. Training should provide a comprehensiveunderstanding of suicide bomb preparationand delivery processes (e.g. recruiting, training;planning, reconnaissance, surveillance; bombassembly; support, etc.).

59. Patrol officers should receive suicide bomb-making recognition training—enabling them todetect/identify bomb making equipment, odors,supplies and other paraphernalia (such as explo-sive device switches and various types of bothcommercial and homemade explosive materials).

60. Dedicated in-service training should be consid-ered for patrol officers on terrorism/suicidebomb intelligence, situational assessments, andexplosives recognition. Training should includetabletop exercises, simulation-based trainingand/or role-playing activities.

61. Terrorism and suicide bomb topics (to includecurrent events) should occur regularly in rollcall training and agency bulletins.

62. Training should include multiple variations ofan incident (e.g. number of bombers, threats

and other hazards) as well as variation in thenumbers of responding officers.

63. Training should include exercises that simulateterrorist activities to be played out by a groupof officers to test and better prepare responsesto such situations (e.g. the purchase of explo-sive materials at a local hardware store, parkinga large vehicle in front of a precinct, etc.).

64. Training should include instructions not toapproach the bomber, even if dead/incapaci-tated, wounded or apparently willing to sur-render. In this scenario, officers should beaware that a threat still exists; and the bombermay be attempting to initiate the explosivedevice when officers approach.

65. Agencies should develop training for officersthat allows them to make contact with, andimmobilize, suspected suicide bombers whendeadly force is not reasonable (intermediatestrategies).

66. Training should include instructions not to usea Conducted Energy Device on a suspectedsuicide bomber.

67. Training should include use of force options toincapacitate suicide bombers.

68. Training should incorporate the Department ofHomeland Security’s reference library (knownas TRIPwire), for contemporary suicide bomb/terrorism information.

18 — Graduated Force Option Protocol

THREATASSESSMENT

SUICIDE BOMBINCIDENT SCENARIO

GRADUATED FORCEINTERVENTION LEVEL

Low Person acting suspiciously and:

a. No device seen

b. No intelligence other than call

c. Possibly some behavioralanomalies

Citizen contact: Conventional stop and/or frisk without firearms drawn

Medium Person acting suspiciously and:

a. No device seen

b. Suspicion from intelligence,information, or behavioralanomaly

Armed felony stop (includingless lethal options—not CED)

High Suicide bomb device observed or probable cause that device is present.

Armed Intervention GraduatedForce Option Sequence

1. When feasible, warning

2. Critical shot to incapacitate

Detonation

Graduated ForceOption Protocol

A

Active Shooter — An active shooter is an armedperson who has used deadly physical force on otherpersons and continues to do so while having unre-stricted access to additional victims.

Active Shooter Protocol — An agency protocol foraddressing a situation involving an active shooter(see above).

Authorization to Use Deadly Force — An officer isauthorized to use lethal force when it reasonablyappears necessary: to protect himself or othersfrom an immediate threat of death or serious bod-ily injury; or to prevent a crime where the suspect’sactions place persons in jeopardy of death or seri-ous bodily injury; or to apprehend a fleeing felonfor a crime involving serious bodily injury or theuse of lethal force where there is substantial riskthat the person whose arrest is sought will causedeath or serious bodily injury to others if appre-hension is delayed.

B

Bomb — Any article, detonated by mechanical orelectrical means, which may possibly containchemical, gas, liquid or other substance capable ofcausing a fire, explosion, burn, or other chemicalreaction intended to cause injury to a person orresult in damage and/or destruction of property.

Bomb Threat — Any communication, includingwritten correspondences or telephone calls,

received by the public or a member of the service,indicating that an explosive device has been, or willbe placed at a particular location(s).

C

Conducted Energy Device (CED) — A weaponprimarily designed to disrupt a subject’s centralnervous system by means of deploying electricalenergy sufficient to cause uncontrolled muscle con-tractions and override an individual’s voluntarymotor responses.

Contained — An incident is fixed at a location, orlaw enforcement has secured the scene so that a sus-pect(s) is unable to move away from that point.

D

Deadly Force — Any tactic or use of force that hasan intended, natural, and probable consequence ofserious physical injury or death.

E

Executive Command — A level/rank of lawenforcement leadership that is beyond simply oper-ational or supervisory, and which maintainsresponsibility for the wider resources of the agency.

G

Graduated Force Option Protocol — A graduateduse of force model that may be considered whenresponding to a threat of a suicide bomb suspect.

PERF Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Glossary of Terms — 19

PERF Patrol-Level Responseto a Suicide Bomb Threat:

Glossary of Terms

Graduated Use of Force — A training philosophythat supports the progressive and reasonable escala-tion and de-escalation of officer-applied force inproportional response to the actions and level ofresistance offered by a suspect. The level ofresponse is based upon the situation encountered atthe scene and the actions of the suspect in responseto the officer’s commands. Such a response mayprogress from the officer’s physical presence at thescene to the application of deadly force.

H

Handler — A person who delivers a bomb to a sui-cide bomber and then escorts them to the target.The handler also provides security and instructionon how to detonate the bomb.

Homicide Bomber — See suicide bomber.

I

Incapacitate — To make someone unable to per-form a certain action.

Inner and Outer Perimeter Tape — The innerperimeter tape in a suicide bomb threat situation isused to alert law enforcement personnel of dangerfrom the possible detonation of an explosive deviceor to secure an area immediately adjacent to wheresuch an incident occurred. The outer perimetertape is used to protect others from similar risks orto secure the area adjacent to the inner perimeter.

M

Mobile — A suicide bomb incident/suspect is notat a fixed location, and suspects are traveling ormoving, and law enforcement has not secured thescene.

P

Probable Cause — Knowledge of articulable factsor circumstances that are objectively, and withoutresort to arbitrary profiling, sufficient to induce a

reasonable person under the attendant circum-stances to believe that an individual has committedor is committing a criminal offense or an infraction.

R

Reasonable Suspicion — Knowledge of articulablefacts or circumstances that are objectively, andwithout resort to arbitrary profiling, sufficient toinduce a reasonable person under the attendant cir-cumstances to suspect that an individual hasengaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in crim-inal activity.

S

Secondary Devices — Explosive devices placed atthe scene of an ongoing emergency response thatare intended to cause casualties among responders.Secondary explosive devices are designed toexplode after a primary explosion or other majoremergency response event that has attracted largenumbers of responders to the scene in order toinflict additional injury, damage, and fear.

Specialized Units — Law enforcement and/oremergency response personnel trained in uniqueareas that require particular knowledge and skills.Examples include: special weapons; bomb disposal;air support; hostage negotiation; investigations;media interaction; surveillance; hazardous materi-als; and canines.

Stand Alone Policy — An agency sanctioned docu-ment that is specific to an issue or circumstancefocusing narrowly on the subject.

Static — A suicide bomb incident/suspect is sta-tionary at a point or location, but, which has notbeen secured by law enforcement personnel.

Suicide Belt/Vest — A garment filled with explo-sive materials and armed with a detonator (toggleor rocker-type switch attached to the mid-sectionof the device or handheld), worn by suicidebombers. Explosive belts and vests are usually

20 — PERF Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Glossary of Terms

packed with nails, screws, bolts, and other objectsthat serve as shrapnel to maximize the number ofcasualties in the explosion. Belts and vests may con-tain some types of anticoagulant making themmore deadly.

n Belts may be worn on the stomach or lowerabdomen area.

n Vests may be worn on the chest and stomacharea. They often have shoulder straps.

Suicide Bomber — An individual (including a ter-rorist) who is willing to die by means of an explo-sion in order to kill or injure other people and/orcause property damage.

Suicide Bombing — An attack using explosives onpeople or property, committed by a person whoknows the explosion will cause his or her own death.

Suicide Mission — A scheme in which planningtakes place to facilitate a person killing him/herselfby means of an explosion in order to kill or injureother people and/or cause property damage.

Surrogate — A third party or person who is used totransport, carry or wear a bomb or improviseddevice, whether knowingly (by coercion or threat) orinnocently (without knowledge of the explosives).

T

Terrorist — A person who employs terror as apolitical weapon.

Third-Party Attackers — Additional suspect(s) ina suicide bombing that may include support teamto the initial attack phase (transport, logistics, look-out, camera operator, and third-party explosivedetonator) or second phase (suspects that launch afurther attack after the primary assault).

TRIPwire — Technical Resource for Incident Pre-vention: an online, collaborative, information-shar-ing network for bomb squads and other lawenforcement officials to learn about current terror-ist bombing tactics, techniques, and procedures,including improvised explosive device (IED) designand emplacement.

PERF Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat: Glossary of Terms — 21

Lisa L. Spahr

Lisa Spahr is an Associate for Police ExecutiveResearch Forum’s (PERF) Center on Force andAccountability (CFA). She has more than 14 years ofexperience in research and development in variousareas including law enforcement, military applica-tions, and the dual field of law and psychiatry. AtPERF, Ms. Spahr manages multiple research projects,including: the 2006 Critical Issues in Policing Series,patrol response to suicide bombing threats;redesigning an officer discipline system; less lethalweapons’ impact on injuries and liabilities; and iden-tifying effective homicide investigative strategies.

Prior to joining PERF, Ms. Spahr served as aproject manager for the University of Pittsburgh,Law and Psychiatry Research Department, inter-viewing psychopaths in prisons and juvenile deten-tion facilities. In this capacity, she screened andinterviewed more than 400 prisoners, trained inter-viewers on various interviewing techniques, andadministered a battery of clinical assessments. Ms.Spahr has also served as adjunct faculty, instructingin both law enforcement and psychology course-work, and has managed a community correctionsfacility in Philadelphia. She has traveled extensivelyand has experience working with both interna-tional and domestic policing communities.

Ms. Spahr received her Bachelor of Artsdegree in psychology from Temple University inPhiladelphia, and Master of Science degree in inves-tigative psychology from the University of Liver-pool, England. She is a member of the AmericanPsychological Association, the Psychology-LawSociety, and the American Society of Criminology.

Josh Ederheimer

Joshua Ederheimer is a Captain with the Metropol-itan Police Department of the District of Columbia.He is currently serving in the Executive Office ofthe Chief, coordinating the transition efforts fornewly appointed police Chief Cathy L. Lanier.

Captain Ederheimer is the former Director ofthe Police Executive Research Forum’s (PERF) Cen-ter on Force & Accountability (CFA) in Washing-ton, D.C. He joined PERF in January 2004, as aSenior Associate after a successful career with theMetropolitan Police Department. He subsequentlyreturned to MPD in January 2007.

At MPD, he had attained the rank of Inspectorand was named Director of the D.C. Police CivilRights and Force Investigations Division. During histenure at the MPD, he acquired expertise as a com-manding officer in several areas, including: internalaffairs; use of force; equal employment opportunity;and civil rights divisions. Captain Ederheimerreengineered numerous processes, and developedand led several operational units that emerged asnational models in such areas as: internal and forceinvestigations; consent decree implementation,police accountability, policing in public housing,and environmental crimes investigations.

He specializes in police leadership, managementreform, and business process reengineering. CaptainEderheimer is also an adjunct professor at AmericanUniversity’s Department of Law, Justice, and Society,where he has taught both graduate and undergradu-ate courses. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in justicefrom American University, and a Master’s Degree inmanagement from Johns Hopkins University.

About the Authors — 23

About the Authors

David Bilson

Chief Superintendent David Bilson has served inthe Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), New Scot-land Yard, London, for over 28 years. He has sub-stantial borough policing experience at operationaland command levels in addition to more strategicposts at command group and corporate headquar-ters levels. He has worked on policy and programdevelopment; leadership, performance and reviewframeworks; and in internal affairs investigations.He holds a Master’s Degree in Business Administra-tion from Middlesex University, where he attendedfull-time on an MPS Scholarship, completing

research to develop a model for police leadership.For the past three years Chief Superintendent

Bilson has been focused on the development ofpolice performance metrics and operational frame-works within the operational commands, withpartner agencies and at group command and cor-porate levels. He has continued to develop hisknowledge of performance metrics, frameworksand mapping systems through field research visitsto U.S. policing agencies in Philadelphia, New York,Baltimore, Chicago, Newark and Washington. Cur-rently, he is a Fellow at PERF, contributing his inter-national experience to a host of ongoing projects.

24 — About the Authors

he Police Executive Research Forum(PERF) is a professional organization of progressivechief executives of city, county and state lawenforcement agencies who collectively serve morethan 50 percent of the U.S. population. In addition,PERF has established formal relationships withinternational police executives and law enforce-ment organizations from around the globe. Mem-bership includes police chiefs, superintendents,sheriffs, state police directors, university policechiefs, public safety directors, and other lawenforcement professionals. Established in 1976 as anon-profit organization, PERF is unique in its com-mitment to the application of research in policingand the importance of higher education for policeexecutives. Besides a commitment to police innova-tion and professionalism, PERF members musthold a four-year college degree.

PERF continues to conduct some of the mostinnovative police and criminal justice research andprovides a wide variety of management and techni-cal assistance programs to police agencies through-out the world. PERF’s groundbreaking work oncommunity and problem-oriented policing, racialprofiling, use of force, less lethal weapons, and crimereduction strategies has earned it a prominent posi-tion in the police community. PERF continues towork toward increased professionalism and excel-lence in the field through its publications and train-ing programs. PERF sponsors and conducts theSenior Management Institute for Police (SMIP).This program provides comprehensive professionalmanagement and executive development training topolice chiefs and law enforcement executives.Convened annually in Boston, SMIP instructorsinclude professors from leading universities, though

they are primarily from Harvard University’sKennedy School of Government.

PERF’s success is built on the active involve-ment of its members. The organization also hastypes of membership that allow it to benefit fromthe diverse views of criminal justice researchers, lawenforcement professionals of all ranks and otherscommitted to advancing policing services to allcommunities. As a nonprofit organization, PERF iscommitted to the application of research in polic-ing and to promoting innovation that will enhancethe quality of life in our communities. PERF’sobjective is to improve the delivery of police serv-ices and the effectiveness of crime control throughthe exercise of strong national leadership, the pub-lic debate of criminal justice issues, the develop-ment of a body of research about policing and theprovision of vital management services to all policeagencies.

PERF has developed and published some ofthe leading literature in the law enforcement field.Recently, PERF released three publications on con-temporary law enforcement issues. The books—entitled Exploring the Challenges of Police Use ofForce, Police Management of Mass Demonstrations:Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches and AGathering Storm—Violent Crime in America—serveas practical guides to help police leaders make moreinformed decisions. In addition, PERF has releaseda series of white papers on terrorism in the local lawenforcement context, including: Protecting YourCommunity from Terrorism: Strategies for Local LawEnforcement, which examined such issues as local-federal partnerships, working with diverse commu-nities, bioterrorism, and intelligence sharing. Otherpublications include Increasing Community-Police

About the Police Executive Research Forum — 25

About the Police Executive Research Forum

T

Partnerships to Fight Crime: A Case Study ofUSAID’s Grants Pen Anti-Crime Initiative inJamaica (2005); Managing a MultijurisdictionalCase: Identifying Lessons Learned from the SniperInvestigation (2004); Community Policing: The Past, Present and Future (2004); and Command Performance: Career Guide for Police Executives(1999). Other PERF titles include the only authori-tative work on racial profiling, Racial Profiling: APrincipled Response (2001); Recognizing Value inPolicing (2002); The Police Response to Mental Illness(2002); Citizen Review Resource Manual (1995);Managing Innovation in Policing (1995); Crime

Analysis Through Computer Mapping (1995);And Justice For All: Understanding and ControllingPolice Use of Deadly Force (1995); Why Police Organizations Change: A Study of Community-Oriented Policing (1996); and Police Antidrug Tactics: New Approaches and Applications. PERFpublications are used for training, promotionexams and to inform police professionals aboutinnovative approaches to community problems.The hallmark of the program is translating the lat-est research and thinking about a topic into policepractices that can be tailored to the unique needs ofa jurisdiction.

26 — About the Police Executive Research Forum

To learn more about PERF, visit www.policeforum.org.

Other publications in the “Critical Issues in Policing” series are:

Challenge to Change: The 21st Century Policing Project

Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force

Police Management of Mass Demonstrations

A Gathering Storm—Violent Crime in America

Violent Crime in America: 24 Months of Alarming Trends

Police Planning for an Influenza Pandemic: Case Studies and Lessons from the Field

Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force

About the PERF Center on Force and Accountability — 27

reated in April 2005, the PERF Center onForce and Accountability (CFA) is designed to be asignificant resource for PERF members and othersin law enforcement, and to serve as the principalclearinghouse for ideas, strategies, and data thatwill address problems related to police use of forceand accountability. Ultimately, the CFA provideslaw enforcement executives with information andstrategies that will help them make more informeddecisions as they serve their communities.

The PERF Center on Force and Accountabil-ity has four primary objectives:

n Identify emerging trends and seek effective newstrategies;

n Conduct groundbreaking research;

n Provide high quality technical assistance to lawenforcement agencies;

n Create a central resource for information regard-ing use-of-force and police accountability issues.

To that end, the CFA is continually develop-ing competencies in several specific areas. For use offorce, CFA competencies include community out-reach and accountability; equipment and weapons;investigations; police canines; policy development;review boards; tactics; technology; training; trendsand identification of promising approaches;

statistics, tracking, and analysis; vehicle pursuits;and violence against law enforcement officers. As itrelates to police accountability, CFA competenciesinclude community involvement; consent decrees/memoranda of agreement; discipline and conductreview; early intervention systems and processes;equal employment opportunities; internal investi-gations; law enforcement ethics; misconduct statis-tics, tracking, and analysis; policy development;technology; training; and trends and identificationof promising approaches.

The CFA released national guidelines for con-ducted energy devices that have been embraced bylaw enforcement agencies throughout the country.Most recently, the CFA gained national recognitionfor work conducted on the rise in violent crime.The outcome was a 2006 publication entitled,A Gathering Storm—Violent Crime in America.Further, the CFA completed two guides on earlyintervention systems to help agencies better man-age their human resources. The CFA provided technical assistance to municipalities seeking toassess their use of force and disciplinary systemswithin their police departments. The CFA alsoexamined critical use of force issues in a 2005publication entitled Exploring the Challenges ofPolice Use of Force, and a 2006 publication entitledStrategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force.

About the PERF Center onForce and Accountability

C

To learn more about PERF and theCenter on Force & Accountability, visit www.policeforum.org.

28 — About Motorola

About Motorola

otorola is a Fortune 100 global com-munications leader that provides seamless mobilityproducts and solutions across broadband, embed-ded systems and wireless networks. Seamlessmobility means you can reach the people, thingsand information you need in your home, auto,workplace and all spaces in between. Seamlessmobility harnesses the power of technology conver-gence and enables smarter, faster, cost-effective andflexible communication. Motorola had sales of U.S.$35.3 billion in 2005.

Today, Motorola is comprised of three busi-nesses: Connected Home Solutions; MobileDevices; and Networks & Enterprise.

Connected Home Solutions provides a scala-ble, integrated end-to-end system for the delivery ofbroadband services that keeps consumersinformed, entertained and connected. Its technol-ogy enables network operators and retailers to create and execute on new business opportunities

by providing innovative products and services tothe home.

Mobile Devices offers market-changing iconsof personal technology—transforming the deviceformerly known as the cell phone into a universalremote control for life. A leader in multi-mode,multi-band communications products and tech-nologies, Mobile Devices designs, manufactures, sellsand services wireless subscriber and server equip-ment for cellular systems, portable energy storageproducts and systems, servers and software solutionsand related software and accessory products.

Networks & Enterprise is a leading providerof end-to-end infrastructure, integrated voice anddata communications, and information solutions.Networks & Enterprise delivers mission-criticalsecure two-way radio, cellular and wireless broad-band systems to meet the needs of public safety,government, private, service provider and enter-prise customers worldwide.

M

To learn more about Motorola, visit www.motorola.com.

Appendix 1. Participant List from the Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference — 29

Major Barry BarnardPrince William County Police Department

Anna Berke Conference ManagerPolice Executive ResearchForum

Joseph Billy Deputy Assistant DirectorFBI, Counter Terrorism Unit

Michael BouchardAssistant DirectorATF, Field Operations

Tim BoyleVice President Motorola, Inc.

Lieutenant Jeff Cotner Dallas Police Department

Jim Cronin AssociatePolice Executive ResearchForum

Lieutenant Mike Crosbie Prince William County Police Department

Helen CryerStaff Officer to AC HouseMetropolitan Police Service,London

Lieutenant Richard CundiffPrince William CountyPolice Department

Captain Nancy Demme Montgomery County Police Department

Josh EderheimerDirector, Center onForce and AccountabilityPolice Executive ResearchForum

Chief Terrance Gainer U.S. Capitol Police

Sergeant Joseph Gentile D.C. MetropolitanPolice Department

Chief Polly Hanson Metro Transit PoliceDepartment

Michael Heidingsfield President and CEOMemphis Shelby CrimeCommission

Captain Jeffrey HeroldD.C. MetropolitanPolice Department

Chief Melvin High Prince George’s CountyPolice Department

Deputy Chief Stephen Holl Arlington Police Department

Assistant Commissioner ofOperations Stephen House Metropolitan Police Service,London

Sergeant John Ingoldsby New York Police Department

Clifford Karchmer Director of Federal ProgramsCenter for TechnologyCommercialization

Inspector Matthew Klein Director of InternalAffairs DivisionD.C. MetropolitanPolice Department

Sergeant Apollo Kowalyk Edmonton Police ServicePolice Executive ResearchForum Fellow

A P P E N D I X 1

Critical Issues in Policing Series:Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response

Washington, D.C. n March 31, 2006

PARTICIPANTS

Commander Cathy Lanier D.C. MetropolitanPolice Department

Commander Mickey Levy Israel Police Department

Deputy Chief Sharon Lubinski Minneapolis Police Department

Andrea LunaSenior Associate Police Executive ResearchForum

Chet Lunner Acting DirectorOffice of State and LocalCoordination, DHS

Superintendent NevilleMatthews New Zealand Embassy

Lieutenant Mike McCrimon Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

Lieutenant Tom Monahan Las Vegas Metro PoliceDepartment

Emeka MonemeChief of StaffWashington MetropolitanArea Transit Authority

Major Larry Moser Fairfax County PoliceDepartment

Jerry MurphyDirector, Homeland Securityand Program Development Police Executive ResearchForum

Officer Marcos Perez Miami Police Department

Brigadier General Simon Perry Israel Police Department

Captain Charles Roper Los Angeles Police Department

Thomas Ryan D.C. Emergency ManagementAgency

Michael SeelmanManagement and Program AnalystFBI

Commander David Sobczyk Chicago Police Department

Corina Solé BritoSenior Associate Police Executive ResearchForum

Lisa Spahr AssociatePolice Executive ResearchForum

Michael Stenger U.S. Secret Service

Captain Kathy Suey Las Vegas Police Department

Chuck WexlerExecutive DirectorPolice Executive ResearchForum

Lieutenant Andrew WhiteD.C. MetropolitanPolice Department

30 — Appendix 1. Participant List from the Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference

Friday March 31, 2006

9:00 AM – 10:00 AM

Welcome & IntroductionsChuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum

10:00 AM – 10:30 AM

U.K. Police Preparedness and ResponseStephen House, Assistant Commissioner of Operations, London Metropolitan Police Service

10:45 AM – 11:30 AM

Israel Police Force: Lessons LearnedBrigadier General Simon Perry, Israel Police

11:30 AM – 12:15 PM

Lessons from IraqMichael Heidingsfield, President and CEO, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission

1:00 PM – 1:30 PM

Facilitated Group Discussion: U.S. Federal Law Enforcement and Security Preparedness ResponseMichael Stenger, Assistant Director Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service

Joseph Billy, Deputy Assistant Director Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of InvestigationMichael Bouchard, Assistant Director Field Operations, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

1:30 PM – 3:30 PM

Facilitated Group Discussion: Critical Issues for Major U.S. Cities—Local Law Enforcement Preparedness

3:30 PM – 4:30 PM

Where Do We Go From Here?

Appendix 2. Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response Conference Agenda — 31

A P P E N D I X 2

Critical Issues in Policing Series:Suicide Bombing Preparedness and Response

Washington, D.C. n March 31, 2006

AGENDA

Appendix 3. Participant List from the Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit — 33

Eric AlbertsenProject AssistantPolice Executive ResearchForum

Kristopher BaumannChairmanFraternal Order of Police,D.C. Metropolitan PoliceDepartment

David BilsonChief SuperintendentMetropolitan Police Service,London

Michael BouchardAssistant DirectorATF, Field Operations

Major Sean BreslinU.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Office

Major Jeff CaslinBaltimore CountyPolice Department

Shawn CoffeyDeputy ChiefU.S. Secret Service,Uniformed Division

Jim CroninAssociatePolice Executive ResearchForum

Captain Mike CrosbiePrince William County Police Department

Lieutenant Richard CundiffPrince William County Police Department

Sergeant Dennis DudleyFrederick Police Department

Josh EderheimerDirector, Center on Forceand AccountabilityPolice Executive ResearchForum

Errol EttingDirector of IntelligenceMaryland TransportationAuthority Police Department

Captain Horace FrankLos Angeles Police Department

Captain Gregory FreminHouston Police Department

Lieutenant Kevin GaddisMetro Transit PoliceDepartment

Captain Steven GallagherNorfolk Police Department

Major Dale GreeneCharlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department

Michael HeidingsfieldPresident and CEOMemphis Shelby CrimeCommission

Captain Jeffrey HeroldD.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Steven IzzettStaff InspectorToronto Police Department

Lieutenant Randy JonesAnne Arundel County Police Department

Matthew KleinInspectorD.C. Metropolitan Police Department

A P P E N D I X 3

Critical Issues in Policing Series:Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb

Threat SummitBaltimore, MD n January 17 – 18, 2007

PARTICIPANTS

Neville MatthewsSuperintendentNew Zealand Embassy

Sergeant Kevin McGoldrickBoston Police Department

John MillerAssistant DirectorFederal Bureau of Investigation,Office of Public Affairs

Ken MillerDeputy ChiefCharlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department

Emily Milstein-GreengartProject AssistantPolice Executive ResearchForum

Ralph MortenDetective SupervisorLos Angeles Police, Bomb Squad

Jerry MurphyDirector, Homeland SecurityPolice Executive ResearchForum

Lieutenant Col. Eric NaesethU.S. Army AsymmetricWarfare Office

Rick NealVice President,General ManagerMotorola, Inc.

Robert NovyAssistant to SACU.S. Secret Service

James OwensDeputy ChiefLas Vegas Metropolitan Police Department

Albert PearsallSenior Policy AnalystCOPS Office DepartmentU.S. Department of Justice

Carl PeedDirectorCOPS OfficeU.S. Department of Justice

Joseph PietroBaltimore County Police Department

Lieutenant Fred PlittAnne Arundel County Police Department

Capt. Dave PressleyActing Deputy ChiefAnne Arundel County Police Department

Jim PryorAssistant ChiefSeattle Police Department

Lisa QuinnAssistant to SACU.S. Secret Service

Chief Joseph RiehlATF, Arson & ExplosivesPrograms Division

Chief Thomas RobbinsBoston University Police Department

Amy SchapiroSenior Research AnalystCOPS OfficeU.S. Department of Justice

Sergeant Thomas SharkeyMetro Transit PoliceDepartment

Lisa SpahrAssociatePolice Executive ResearchForum

Chief John TimoneyMiami Police Department

Drew TracyAssistant ChiefMontgomery County Police Department

Donald Van DuynDeputy Assistant DirectorFederal Bureau of Investigation,Counterterrorism Unit

Dee Walker Assistant ChiefMontgomery County Police Department

Chuck WexlerExecutive DirectorPolice Executive ResearchForum

Lieutenant Andrew WhiteD.C. Metropolitan Police Department

Col. Scott WilliamsBaltimore City PoliceDepartment

Special Agent Charles WoodU.S. Capitol Police Department,Bomb Squad

34 — Appendix 3. Participant List from the Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit

Appendix 4. Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit Agenda — 35

Wednesday, January 17, 2007

8:30 AM – 8:45 AM

Welcome & IntroductionsJoshua Ederheimer, Director, PERF Center on Force & AccountabilityChuck Wexler, Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum

Dave Pressley, Acting Deputy Chief, Anne Arundel County Police Department

8:45 AM – 9:45 AM

International PerspectiveDavid Bilson, Chief Superintendent, Metropolitan Police Service, London

Michael Heidingsfield, President and CEO, Memphis Shelby Crime Commission (Iraq Police Advisor)

9:45 AM – 10:30 AM

Chiefs PerspectiveChief John Timoney, Miami Police DepartmentChief Thomas Robbins, Boston University Police

10:45 AM – 11:30 AM

Local PerspectiveRalph Morten, Detective Supervisor, Los Angeles Police Department

Jeffrey Herold, Captain, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department

11:30 AM – 12:15 PM

Federal PerspectiveMichael Bouchard, Assistant Director of Field Operations, ATF

Donald Van Duyn, Assistant Director of Counter Terrorism, FBIRobert Novy, Assistant to SAC, U.S. Secret Service

1:15 PM – 4:30 PM

Review Guidelines for Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat

A P P E N D I X 4

Critical Issues in Policing Series:Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb

Threat SummitBaltimore, MD n January 17–18, 2007

AGENDA

Thursday, January 18, 2007

8:30 AM – 8:45 AM

Review of Progress

8:45 AM – 12:30 PM

Review Guidelines for Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat (continued)

12:30 PM – 12:45 PM

Closing Remarks and Adjourn

36 — Appendix 4. Patrol-Level Response to a Suicide Bomb Threat Summit Agenda

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT

Experts agree that police in the United States needto prepare for a suicide bomber attack. More specif-ically, we need to prepare for our response to thethreat of a suicide bomber. How will dispatchershandle the calls of a detected or perceived threat?How will first responders handle the suspectedbomber and civilians that may be nearby? Once athreat is confirmed and in preparation of a detona-tion, what do we expect will happen and how willlaw enforcement respond? These split second deci-sions will most likely need to be made by patrolofficers who will arrive on the scene first.

Law enforcement can begin preparing aresponse to the threat of a suicide bomber by con-ducting immediate and comprehensive reviews ofcurrent policies and developing training for all offi-cers. We can better prepare all officers to respond tosuicide bomb threats with greater confidence in:(1) what decisions need to be made, (2) a firmunderstanding of how to assess the situation andmake those decisions, and (3) tactical solutions forhandling the situation, considering the multiplevariables that may exist.

In March PERF held a one-day forum inWashington, D.C. in which participants began todiscuss the multitude of issues surrounding policyand tactical decisions that may be necessary inaddressing this threat. Two specific issues emerged:(1) departments seem reluctant to talk about suicide

bombing and (2) there is a debate on whether it isnecessary to have specific policies regarding tacticsand training related to suicide bombing or if theseare incorporated (or should be) into existing use offorce policies.

TASKING

PERF plans to conduct a number of site visits overthe next six months to learn more about whatdepartments (nationally and internationally) aredoing to prepare patrol for the imminent threats ofsuicide bombers.

SITE VISIT GUIDE

General Language — Do you use languagesuch as suicide bomber in policies and training? Doyou use other language, i.e., suicide terrorist?Define the language you use. For instance, wouldthe 9/11 hijackers be called suicide bombers in yourvocabulary? If not, what would they be called?(Make sure you understand the language they areusing. Working definitions can be misunderstoodor assumed incorrectly.)

Scenario — A call comes in saying a suspi-cious person is in the city center yelling religiousideologies and wearing a large backpack. What hap-pens? How does the call get labeled and where doesit go? Who responds (if anyone)? Now, the suspi-cious person appears to be holding an object that is

Appendix 5. Site Visit and Interview Guide — 37

A P P E N D I X 5

Critical Issues 2006 Suicide Bomber Project

Site Visit and Interview Guide (Amended)This guide is meant to serve as a useful tool for interviews and site visits for the suicide bomber project.

connected underneath their clothing and theirbehavior continues to be erratic. They do notrespond to the police verbal commands. What doesthe responding officer do?

What are specific tactics that patrol are taughtto address threats of suicide bombers?

Historical Perspective — Identify the evolu-tion of related incidents in their jurisdiction (aswell as nationally recognized incidents—such as9/11) and overlay that information with the evolu-tion of their bomb oriented and counter-terrorismsquads and/ or protocols to address such threats(and related threats). When did they begin to starttalking about suicide bomber threats? What action-able items resulted from those talks and when? Doyou have an active shooter protocol? What is cur-rently on the table related to suicide bomber threats(discussions, disagreements, tactics, training,etc…)? Do you participate in Red Cell exercises?

Speaking to the front line — It is essential thatyou talk with patrol officers to gauge their under-standing of what to do if they get a call or observebehavior that could be a suicide bomber. Whatwould they do? Have they been given guidance?What sort of guidance have they been given and bywhom? What guidance would they like? (It mayhelp to deliver a scenario to get a more contextually

rich answer. If so, document the scenario or use theabove noted scenario.)

Bomb Squads — Quick overview of the squadand their work. Date of squad inception and signif-icant changes to squad, protocol, etc… Howquickly does the bomb squad assemble in a targetedplace? What working relationship does the bombsquad have with patrol? Is it assumed that the bombsquad would handle a call about a suspicious per-son who could be a suicide bomber? If this has hap-pened, get the details of how it was processed. Whatother agencies/departments does the bomb squadwork with to prepare for suicide bombers? Why?How often? In what capacity?

Counter-terrorism Units — Same questions asabove for Bomb Squad.

SOPS & Policies — The following areasshould be examined for guidance on policy recom-mendations and tactical decisions:

n Current use of force policies, procedures andtraining (including active shooter protocols);

n Bomb squad protocols and training; and

n Suicide bombing-specific policies, training andprotocols (if they exist).

(In all of these items—How do they relate toor guide patrol response? Remember that anabsence of something is a finding.)

38 — Appendix 5. Site Visit and Interview Guide

A P P E N D I X 6

U.S. Department of the Army,National Ground Intelligence Center,Intelligence and Security Command,

Estimates of Dangers Posed by Various Types of Explosives

Special thanks are due to our partners at Motorola, Inc.,for their support of the Critical Issues in Policing Series.

This report would not have been possible without their help.

Police Executive Research Forum1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930Washington, DC 20036202-466-7820202-466-7826 faxwww.PoliceForum.org

CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING SERIES

Challenge to Change: The 21st Century Policing Project

Exploring the Challenges of Police Use of Force

Police Management of Mass Demonstrations

A Gathering Storm—Violent Crime in America

Violent Crime in America: 24 Months of Alarming Trends

Police Planning for an Influenza Pandemic:Case Studies and Lessons from the Field

Strategies for Resolving Conflict and Minimizing Use of Force