pay and performance in major league baseball gerald w. scully the american economic review, vol. 64,...
TRANSCRIPT
Pay and Performance in Major League BaseballGERALD W SCULLY
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW VOL 64 ISSUE 6 DEC 1974
BackgroundBaseball bringing in substantial revenue Salaries are the main part of contract negotiations and the reserve clause gives considerable power to teams
First playersrsquo strike over pension fund1972
Threat of strike lockout from issues of minimum salaries salary cuts benefits and the reserve clause 1973 Reserve clause retained a playerrsquos rights to his team after contractrsquos
expiration Abolished in 1975
Reserve clause system ruled the game It dictated how and where players moved between teams Owner say clause is ldquonecessary for equalization of playing strength among teamsrdquo and insist that player salary demands are unrealistically high Scully disputes these contentions
ldquoPurpose of this paper is to crudely measure the economic loss to the players due to restrictions of the reserve clause Relationships between player performance and salary will be estimated and the predicted salary compared to predicted player marginal revenue productrdquo
Scully p 915
ApproachldquoAside from providing insights into the operation of a particular labor market the approach differs from other studies of the wage determination process in the following ways 1) the individual player is the unit of observation 2) salary functions are estimated within the framework of a labor market characterized by extensive bargaining 3) marginal revenue products of the factors of production are estimated explicitly and 4) rates of monopsonistic exploitation are found by comp-aring salary and marginal revenue product over various performance levels and career lengths
ldquoFirst the institutional characteristics of the base-ball players labor market are briefly outlined Next with this institutional framework in mind a model of marginal revenue product and salary determin-ation is formulated Then the results of the empirical investigation into marginal revenue product and salary determination are presented Finally the rate of monopsonistic exploitation is calculated and policy implications discussedrdquo
Scully p 915
The individual player is the unit of observation Players have various performance levels and career lengths
Salary functions are estimated within a monosponistic labor market characterized by extensive bargaining
Marginal revenue factors are estimated explicitly
Exploitation found by comparing salary and MRP
1) Outline characteristics of the labor market2) Formulate an empirical marginal revenue
product and salary determination model3) Present results 4) Calculate monopsonistic exploitation 5) Discuss policy implications
Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about the reserve clause and MRP)
Player is a free agent until a one year contract is signed Contract is exclusively renewable for the owner (reserve clause)
Owner may renew sell or terminate the contract
Player make accept the terms or negotiate
After ownerrsquos ldquofinal offerrdquo player must accept or withdraw from professional baseball
MRP is ldquothe ability or performance he contributes to the team and the effect of that performance on the gate receipts The effect of a player performance on revenue may be direct or indirectrdquo ldquoAbility contributes to team performance and victories raise gate receiptsmdashand
broadcast revenues this is the substantial effect of the individualrsquos performancerdquo
ldquoSome players may attract fans over and above their contribution through the teamrdquo
Scully p 916
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League BaseballThe MRP and salary determination model should consider 1) revenues are related to individual performance through their effect on team standing 2) the reserve clause reduces player salaries below player MRP
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
W = W ( A1 A2hellip An I1 I2hellipIm)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Teams derive revenue from gate receipts and broadcast rights which are directly related to the teamrsquos percent wins and population in the area
R = Team revenue p = Ticket price T = Number of tickets sold W = Team performance Pi = Potential broadcast households
B = Broadcast revenues
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
R = p T [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pa ] + B [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pb ]
i = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Costs are determined by the level of skill and nonplayer inputs Because of the monopsonistic labor market costs are related to the level of skill
C = Team costs
Si (Ai ) = Player supply functions
rj = Nonplayer factor remunerations
C = sum Ai Si (Ai ) + sum rj Iji = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Standard profit model
= Profit R = Team revenue C = Team costs
= R - C
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
First-order conditions for a maximum profit are obtained by differentiating with respect to Ai (player skills) and Ii (nonplayer inputs)
ldquoConditions reveal that teams maximize profits by selecting a level of player skills and nonplayer inputs such that players receive a salary equal to their MRP less monopsony rents (Ai Srsquoi )rdquo
Scully p 917
Player MRP Equation1
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
Estimated with team data for 1968 and 1968
= Team percent wins 1000
TSA = Team slugging average
TSW = Team strikeout-to-walk ratio
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
CONT = Dummy variable 1 = divisional winners and their closest competitors at the end of the season if competition was five or fewer games out
OUT = Dummy variable 1 = teams which at the end of the season were twenty or more games out of placing
PCTWINt = 3724 + 92 TSAt + 90 TSWt - 3857 NL + 4348 CONTt - 7564 OUTt
(39) (437) (562) (403)
(377) (617)
R2 = 88 DF = 38 t = team
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
BackgroundBaseball bringing in substantial revenue Salaries are the main part of contract negotiations and the reserve clause gives considerable power to teams
First playersrsquo strike over pension fund1972
Threat of strike lockout from issues of minimum salaries salary cuts benefits and the reserve clause 1973 Reserve clause retained a playerrsquos rights to his team after contractrsquos
expiration Abolished in 1975
Reserve clause system ruled the game It dictated how and where players moved between teams Owner say clause is ldquonecessary for equalization of playing strength among teamsrdquo and insist that player salary demands are unrealistically high Scully disputes these contentions
ldquoPurpose of this paper is to crudely measure the economic loss to the players due to restrictions of the reserve clause Relationships between player performance and salary will be estimated and the predicted salary compared to predicted player marginal revenue productrdquo
Scully p 915
ApproachldquoAside from providing insights into the operation of a particular labor market the approach differs from other studies of the wage determination process in the following ways 1) the individual player is the unit of observation 2) salary functions are estimated within the framework of a labor market characterized by extensive bargaining 3) marginal revenue products of the factors of production are estimated explicitly and 4) rates of monopsonistic exploitation are found by comp-aring salary and marginal revenue product over various performance levels and career lengths
ldquoFirst the institutional characteristics of the base-ball players labor market are briefly outlined Next with this institutional framework in mind a model of marginal revenue product and salary determin-ation is formulated Then the results of the empirical investigation into marginal revenue product and salary determination are presented Finally the rate of monopsonistic exploitation is calculated and policy implications discussedrdquo
Scully p 915
The individual player is the unit of observation Players have various performance levels and career lengths
Salary functions are estimated within a monosponistic labor market characterized by extensive bargaining
Marginal revenue factors are estimated explicitly
Exploitation found by comparing salary and MRP
1) Outline characteristics of the labor market2) Formulate an empirical marginal revenue
product and salary determination model3) Present results 4) Calculate monopsonistic exploitation 5) Discuss policy implications
Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about the reserve clause and MRP)
Player is a free agent until a one year contract is signed Contract is exclusively renewable for the owner (reserve clause)
Owner may renew sell or terminate the contract
Player make accept the terms or negotiate
After ownerrsquos ldquofinal offerrdquo player must accept or withdraw from professional baseball
MRP is ldquothe ability or performance he contributes to the team and the effect of that performance on the gate receipts The effect of a player performance on revenue may be direct or indirectrdquo ldquoAbility contributes to team performance and victories raise gate receiptsmdashand
broadcast revenues this is the substantial effect of the individualrsquos performancerdquo
ldquoSome players may attract fans over and above their contribution through the teamrdquo
Scully p 916
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League BaseballThe MRP and salary determination model should consider 1) revenues are related to individual performance through their effect on team standing 2) the reserve clause reduces player salaries below player MRP
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
W = W ( A1 A2hellip An I1 I2hellipIm)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Teams derive revenue from gate receipts and broadcast rights which are directly related to the teamrsquos percent wins and population in the area
R = Team revenue p = Ticket price T = Number of tickets sold W = Team performance Pi = Potential broadcast households
B = Broadcast revenues
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
R = p T [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pa ] + B [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pb ]
i = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Costs are determined by the level of skill and nonplayer inputs Because of the monopsonistic labor market costs are related to the level of skill
C = Team costs
Si (Ai ) = Player supply functions
rj = Nonplayer factor remunerations
C = sum Ai Si (Ai ) + sum rj Iji = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Standard profit model
= Profit R = Team revenue C = Team costs
= R - C
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
First-order conditions for a maximum profit are obtained by differentiating with respect to Ai (player skills) and Ii (nonplayer inputs)
ldquoConditions reveal that teams maximize profits by selecting a level of player skills and nonplayer inputs such that players receive a salary equal to their MRP less monopsony rents (Ai Srsquoi )rdquo
Scully p 917
Player MRP Equation1
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
Estimated with team data for 1968 and 1968
= Team percent wins 1000
TSA = Team slugging average
TSW = Team strikeout-to-walk ratio
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
CONT = Dummy variable 1 = divisional winners and their closest competitors at the end of the season if competition was five or fewer games out
OUT = Dummy variable 1 = teams which at the end of the season were twenty or more games out of placing
PCTWINt = 3724 + 92 TSAt + 90 TSWt - 3857 NL + 4348 CONTt - 7564 OUTt
(39) (437) (562) (403)
(377) (617)
R2 = 88 DF = 38 t = team
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
ldquoPurpose of this paper is to crudely measure the economic loss to the players due to restrictions of the reserve clause Relationships between player performance and salary will be estimated and the predicted salary compared to predicted player marginal revenue productrdquo
Scully p 915
ApproachldquoAside from providing insights into the operation of a particular labor market the approach differs from other studies of the wage determination process in the following ways 1) the individual player is the unit of observation 2) salary functions are estimated within the framework of a labor market characterized by extensive bargaining 3) marginal revenue products of the factors of production are estimated explicitly and 4) rates of monopsonistic exploitation are found by comp-aring salary and marginal revenue product over various performance levels and career lengths
ldquoFirst the institutional characteristics of the base-ball players labor market are briefly outlined Next with this institutional framework in mind a model of marginal revenue product and salary determin-ation is formulated Then the results of the empirical investigation into marginal revenue product and salary determination are presented Finally the rate of monopsonistic exploitation is calculated and policy implications discussedrdquo
Scully p 915
The individual player is the unit of observation Players have various performance levels and career lengths
Salary functions are estimated within a monosponistic labor market characterized by extensive bargaining
Marginal revenue factors are estimated explicitly
Exploitation found by comparing salary and MRP
1) Outline characteristics of the labor market2) Formulate an empirical marginal revenue
product and salary determination model3) Present results 4) Calculate monopsonistic exploitation 5) Discuss policy implications
Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about the reserve clause and MRP)
Player is a free agent until a one year contract is signed Contract is exclusively renewable for the owner (reserve clause)
Owner may renew sell or terminate the contract
Player make accept the terms or negotiate
After ownerrsquos ldquofinal offerrdquo player must accept or withdraw from professional baseball
MRP is ldquothe ability or performance he contributes to the team and the effect of that performance on the gate receipts The effect of a player performance on revenue may be direct or indirectrdquo ldquoAbility contributes to team performance and victories raise gate receiptsmdashand
broadcast revenues this is the substantial effect of the individualrsquos performancerdquo
ldquoSome players may attract fans over and above their contribution through the teamrdquo
Scully p 916
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League BaseballThe MRP and salary determination model should consider 1) revenues are related to individual performance through their effect on team standing 2) the reserve clause reduces player salaries below player MRP
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
W = W ( A1 A2hellip An I1 I2hellipIm)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Teams derive revenue from gate receipts and broadcast rights which are directly related to the teamrsquos percent wins and population in the area
R = Team revenue p = Ticket price T = Number of tickets sold W = Team performance Pi = Potential broadcast households
B = Broadcast revenues
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
R = p T [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pa ] + B [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pb ]
i = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Costs are determined by the level of skill and nonplayer inputs Because of the monopsonistic labor market costs are related to the level of skill
C = Team costs
Si (Ai ) = Player supply functions
rj = Nonplayer factor remunerations
C = sum Ai Si (Ai ) + sum rj Iji = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Standard profit model
= Profit R = Team revenue C = Team costs
= R - C
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
First-order conditions for a maximum profit are obtained by differentiating with respect to Ai (player skills) and Ii (nonplayer inputs)
ldquoConditions reveal that teams maximize profits by selecting a level of player skills and nonplayer inputs such that players receive a salary equal to their MRP less monopsony rents (Ai Srsquoi )rdquo
Scully p 917
Player MRP Equation1
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
Estimated with team data for 1968 and 1968
= Team percent wins 1000
TSA = Team slugging average
TSW = Team strikeout-to-walk ratio
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
CONT = Dummy variable 1 = divisional winners and their closest competitors at the end of the season if competition was five or fewer games out
OUT = Dummy variable 1 = teams which at the end of the season were twenty or more games out of placing
PCTWINt = 3724 + 92 TSAt + 90 TSWt - 3857 NL + 4348 CONTt - 7564 OUTt
(39) (437) (562) (403)
(377) (617)
R2 = 88 DF = 38 t = team
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
ApproachldquoAside from providing insights into the operation of a particular labor market the approach differs from other studies of the wage determination process in the following ways 1) the individual player is the unit of observation 2) salary functions are estimated within the framework of a labor market characterized by extensive bargaining 3) marginal revenue products of the factors of production are estimated explicitly and 4) rates of monopsonistic exploitation are found by comp-aring salary and marginal revenue product over various performance levels and career lengths
ldquoFirst the institutional characteristics of the base-ball players labor market are briefly outlined Next with this institutional framework in mind a model of marginal revenue product and salary determin-ation is formulated Then the results of the empirical investigation into marginal revenue product and salary determination are presented Finally the rate of monopsonistic exploitation is calculated and policy implications discussedrdquo
Scully p 915
The individual player is the unit of observation Players have various performance levels and career lengths
Salary functions are estimated within a monosponistic labor market characterized by extensive bargaining
Marginal revenue factors are estimated explicitly
Exploitation found by comparing salary and MRP
1) Outline characteristics of the labor market2) Formulate an empirical marginal revenue
product and salary determination model3) Present results 4) Calculate monopsonistic exploitation 5) Discuss policy implications
Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about the reserve clause and MRP)
Player is a free agent until a one year contract is signed Contract is exclusively renewable for the owner (reserve clause)
Owner may renew sell or terminate the contract
Player make accept the terms or negotiate
After ownerrsquos ldquofinal offerrdquo player must accept or withdraw from professional baseball
MRP is ldquothe ability or performance he contributes to the team and the effect of that performance on the gate receipts The effect of a player performance on revenue may be direct or indirectrdquo ldquoAbility contributes to team performance and victories raise gate receiptsmdashand
broadcast revenues this is the substantial effect of the individualrsquos performancerdquo
ldquoSome players may attract fans over and above their contribution through the teamrdquo
Scully p 916
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League BaseballThe MRP and salary determination model should consider 1) revenues are related to individual performance through their effect on team standing 2) the reserve clause reduces player salaries below player MRP
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
W = W ( A1 A2hellip An I1 I2hellipIm)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Teams derive revenue from gate receipts and broadcast rights which are directly related to the teamrsquos percent wins and population in the area
R = Team revenue p = Ticket price T = Number of tickets sold W = Team performance Pi = Potential broadcast households
B = Broadcast revenues
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
R = p T [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pa ] + B [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pb ]
i = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Costs are determined by the level of skill and nonplayer inputs Because of the monopsonistic labor market costs are related to the level of skill
C = Team costs
Si (Ai ) = Player supply functions
rj = Nonplayer factor remunerations
C = sum Ai Si (Ai ) + sum rj Iji = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Standard profit model
= Profit R = Team revenue C = Team costs
= R - C
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
First-order conditions for a maximum profit are obtained by differentiating with respect to Ai (player skills) and Ii (nonplayer inputs)
ldquoConditions reveal that teams maximize profits by selecting a level of player skills and nonplayer inputs such that players receive a salary equal to their MRP less monopsony rents (Ai Srsquoi )rdquo
Scully p 917
Player MRP Equation1
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
Estimated with team data for 1968 and 1968
= Team percent wins 1000
TSA = Team slugging average
TSW = Team strikeout-to-walk ratio
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
CONT = Dummy variable 1 = divisional winners and their closest competitors at the end of the season if competition was five or fewer games out
OUT = Dummy variable 1 = teams which at the end of the season were twenty or more games out of placing
PCTWINt = 3724 + 92 TSAt + 90 TSWt - 3857 NL + 4348 CONTt - 7564 OUTt
(39) (437) (562) (403)
(377) (617)
R2 = 88 DF = 38 t = team
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about the reserve clause and MRP)
Player is a free agent until a one year contract is signed Contract is exclusively renewable for the owner (reserve clause)
Owner may renew sell or terminate the contract
Player make accept the terms or negotiate
After ownerrsquos ldquofinal offerrdquo player must accept or withdraw from professional baseball
MRP is ldquothe ability or performance he contributes to the team and the effect of that performance on the gate receipts The effect of a player performance on revenue may be direct or indirectrdquo ldquoAbility contributes to team performance and victories raise gate receiptsmdashand
broadcast revenues this is the substantial effect of the individualrsquos performancerdquo
ldquoSome players may attract fans over and above their contribution through the teamrdquo
Scully p 916
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League BaseballThe MRP and salary determination model should consider 1) revenues are related to individual performance through their effect on team standing 2) the reserve clause reduces player salaries below player MRP
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
W = W ( A1 A2hellip An I1 I2hellipIm)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Teams derive revenue from gate receipts and broadcast rights which are directly related to the teamrsquos percent wins and population in the area
R = Team revenue p = Ticket price T = Number of tickets sold W = Team performance Pi = Potential broadcast households
B = Broadcast revenues
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
R = p T [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pa ] + B [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pb ]
i = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Costs are determined by the level of skill and nonplayer inputs Because of the monopsonistic labor market costs are related to the level of skill
C = Team costs
Si (Ai ) = Player supply functions
rj = Nonplayer factor remunerations
C = sum Ai Si (Ai ) + sum rj Iji = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Standard profit model
= Profit R = Team revenue C = Team costs
= R - C
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
First-order conditions for a maximum profit are obtained by differentiating with respect to Ai (player skills) and Ii (nonplayer inputs)
ldquoConditions reveal that teams maximize profits by selecting a level of player skills and nonplayer inputs such that players receive a salary equal to their MRP less monopsony rents (Ai Srsquoi )rdquo
Scully p 917
Player MRP Equation1
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
Estimated with team data for 1968 and 1968
= Team percent wins 1000
TSA = Team slugging average
TSW = Team strikeout-to-walk ratio
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
CONT = Dummy variable 1 = divisional winners and their closest competitors at the end of the season if competition was five or fewer games out
OUT = Dummy variable 1 = teams which at the end of the season were twenty or more games out of placing
PCTWINt = 3724 + 92 TSAt + 90 TSWt - 3857 NL + 4348 CONTt - 7564 OUTt
(39) (437) (562) (403)
(377) (617)
R2 = 88 DF = 38 t = team
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League BaseballThe MRP and salary determination model should consider 1) revenues are related to individual performance through their effect on team standing 2) the reserve clause reduces player salaries below player MRP
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
W = W ( A1 A2hellip An I1 I2hellipIm)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Teams derive revenue from gate receipts and broadcast rights which are directly related to the teamrsquos percent wins and population in the area
R = Team revenue p = Ticket price T = Number of tickets sold W = Team performance Pi = Potential broadcast households
B = Broadcast revenues
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
R = p T [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pa ] + B [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pb ]
i = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Costs are determined by the level of skill and nonplayer inputs Because of the monopsonistic labor market costs are related to the level of skill
C = Team costs
Si (Ai ) = Player supply functions
rj = Nonplayer factor remunerations
C = sum Ai Si (Ai ) + sum rj Iji = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Standard profit model
= Profit R = Team revenue C = Team costs
= R - C
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
First-order conditions for a maximum profit are obtained by differentiating with respect to Ai (player skills) and Ii (nonplayer inputs)
ldquoConditions reveal that teams maximize profits by selecting a level of player skills and nonplayer inputs such that players receive a salary equal to their MRP less monopsony rents (Ai Srsquoi )rdquo
Scully p 917
Player MRP Equation1
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
Estimated with team data for 1968 and 1968
= Team percent wins 1000
TSA = Team slugging average
TSW = Team strikeout-to-walk ratio
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
CONT = Dummy variable 1 = divisional winners and their closest competitors at the end of the season if competition was five or fewer games out
OUT = Dummy variable 1 = teams which at the end of the season were twenty or more games out of placing
PCTWINt = 3724 + 92 TSAt + 90 TSWt - 3857 NL + 4348 CONTt - 7564 OUTt
(39) (437) (562) (403)
(377) (617)
R2 = 88 DF = 38 t = team
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Teams derive revenue from gate receipts and broadcast rights which are directly related to the teamrsquos percent wins and population in the area
R = Team revenue p = Ticket price T = Number of tickets sold W = Team performance Pi = Potential broadcast households
B = Broadcast revenues
W = Percent wins
Ai = Player skills
Ii = Nonplayer inputs (managers coaches capital etc)
R = p T [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pa ] + B [ W ( Ai Ij ) Pb ]
i = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Costs are determined by the level of skill and nonplayer inputs Because of the monopsonistic labor market costs are related to the level of skill
C = Team costs
Si (Ai ) = Player supply functions
rj = Nonplayer factor remunerations
C = sum Ai Si (Ai ) + sum rj Iji = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Standard profit model
= Profit R = Team revenue C = Team costs
= R - C
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
First-order conditions for a maximum profit are obtained by differentiating with respect to Ai (player skills) and Ii (nonplayer inputs)
ldquoConditions reveal that teams maximize profits by selecting a level of player skills and nonplayer inputs such that players receive a salary equal to their MRP less monopsony rents (Ai Srsquoi )rdquo
Scully p 917
Player MRP Equation1
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
Estimated with team data for 1968 and 1968
= Team percent wins 1000
TSA = Team slugging average
TSW = Team strikeout-to-walk ratio
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
CONT = Dummy variable 1 = divisional winners and their closest competitors at the end of the season if competition was five or fewer games out
OUT = Dummy variable 1 = teams which at the end of the season were twenty or more games out of placing
PCTWINt = 3724 + 92 TSAt + 90 TSWt - 3857 NL + 4348 CONTt - 7564 OUTt
(39) (437) (562) (403)
(377) (617)
R2 = 88 DF = 38 t = team
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Costs are determined by the level of skill and nonplayer inputs Because of the monopsonistic labor market costs are related to the level of skill
C = Team costs
Si (Ai ) = Player supply functions
rj = Nonplayer factor remunerations
C = sum Ai Si (Ai ) + sum rj Iji = 1hellip n j = 1hellip m)
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Standard profit model
= Profit R = Team revenue C = Team costs
= R - C
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
First-order conditions for a maximum profit are obtained by differentiating with respect to Ai (player skills) and Ii (nonplayer inputs)
ldquoConditions reveal that teams maximize profits by selecting a level of player skills and nonplayer inputs such that players receive a salary equal to their MRP less monopsony rents (Ai Srsquoi )rdquo
Scully p 917
Player MRP Equation1
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
Estimated with team data for 1968 and 1968
= Team percent wins 1000
TSA = Team slugging average
TSW = Team strikeout-to-walk ratio
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
CONT = Dummy variable 1 = divisional winners and their closest competitors at the end of the season if competition was five or fewer games out
OUT = Dummy variable 1 = teams which at the end of the season were twenty or more games out of placing
PCTWINt = 3724 + 92 TSAt + 90 TSWt - 3857 NL + 4348 CONTt - 7564 OUTt
(39) (437) (562) (403)
(377) (617)
R2 = 88 DF = 38 t = team
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
Standard profit model
= Profit R = Team revenue C = Team costs
= R - C
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
First-order conditions for a maximum profit are obtained by differentiating with respect to Ai (player skills) and Ii (nonplayer inputs)
ldquoConditions reveal that teams maximize profits by selecting a level of player skills and nonplayer inputs such that players receive a salary equal to their MRP less monopsony rents (Ai Srsquoi )rdquo
Scully p 917
Player MRP Equation1
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
Estimated with team data for 1968 and 1968
= Team percent wins 1000
TSA = Team slugging average
TSW = Team strikeout-to-walk ratio
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
CONT = Dummy variable 1 = divisional winners and their closest competitors at the end of the season if competition was five or fewer games out
OUT = Dummy variable 1 = teams which at the end of the season were twenty or more games out of placing
PCTWINt = 3724 + 92 TSAt + 90 TSWt - 3857 NL + 4348 CONTt - 7564 OUTt
(39) (437) (562) (403)
(377) (617)
R2 = 88 DF = 38 t = team
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
First-order conditions for a maximum profit are obtained by differentiating with respect to Ai (player skills) and Ii (nonplayer inputs)
ldquoConditions reveal that teams maximize profits by selecting a level of player skills and nonplayer inputs such that players receive a salary equal to their MRP less monopsony rents (Ai Srsquoi )rdquo
Scully p 917
Player MRP Equation1
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
Estimated with team data for 1968 and 1968
= Team percent wins 1000
TSA = Team slugging average
TSW = Team strikeout-to-walk ratio
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
CONT = Dummy variable 1 = divisional winners and their closest competitors at the end of the season if competition was five or fewer games out
OUT = Dummy variable 1 = teams which at the end of the season were twenty or more games out of placing
PCTWINt = 3724 + 92 TSAt + 90 TSWt - 3857 NL + 4348 CONTt - 7564 OUTt
(39) (437) (562) (403)
(377) (617)
R2 = 88 DF = 38 t = team
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
Player MRP Equation1
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
Estimated with team data for 1968 and 1968
= Team percent wins 1000
TSA = Team slugging average
TSW = Team strikeout-to-walk ratio
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
CONT = Dummy variable 1 = divisional winners and their closest competitors at the end of the season if competition was five or fewer games out
OUT = Dummy variable 1 = teams which at the end of the season were twenty or more games out of placing
PCTWINt = 3724 + 92 TSAt + 90 TSWt - 3857 NL + 4348 CONTt - 7564 OUTt
(39) (437) (562) (403)
(377) (617)
R2 = 88 DF = 38 t = team
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
Player MRP Equation 2
MRP shall be determined by 1) player performance on team wins and 2) the effect of wins on revenue
= Home attendance times average ticket price plus revenue from broadcasting rights
SMAS = Population size of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
MARGA = Team specific attendance
NL = Dummy variable 1 = the team is in the National League
STD = Dummy variable 1 = older stadiums in poor neighborhoods and with limited parking facilities
BBPCT = Percentage of black players on the team
REVENUEt = - 1735890 + 10330 PCTWINt + 494585 SMAS70 - 512 MARGA
(169) (664)
(461) (428)
+ 580913 NL CONTt - 762248 STDt - 58526 BBPCTt (184) (242)
(313)
R2 = 75 DF = 36 t = team
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
PCTWIN The coefficient of primary interest in PCTWIN A one pint increase
is estimate to raise REVENUE $10330 A one point increase in TSA (slugging avg) or TSW (strike-to-walk) raises PCTWIN by 92 and 90
However MRP may be overstated Omitted factors may include managerial quality entrepreneurial player drafting and trading abilities and stadium investment
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
Individual Playerrsquos MRP
ldquoTo obtain the individual player MRP assumptions have to be made about how individual performance affects team averagesrdquo
Scully p 921
Assume individual performance carries no externalities (team performance is simply the linear summation of individual performance)
Gross MRPs show that even mediocre players contribute $200000 to team revenue Star players easily have MRP double that amount
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
Salary Determination
Is offensive or defense more important
Hitting or pitching performance
Weight of contributions
Star players
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
Salary Determination (Hitters)
SA = Slugging average
M = Years experience in the majors
DBA = Dummy variable 1 = Players with below average lifetime Slugging averages but above average lifetime batting averages Controls for excellent hitter who have low slugging averages
AB = Total lifetime at bats number of years in the majors times 5500 (average season at bats for a major league team)
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
Salary Determination (Pitchers)
SW = Lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio
M = Years experience in the majors
IP = lifetime average percentage of inning pitched out of a total innings
SMSA MARGA and NL to control for monopoly
Salary sample is nonrandom and biased toward the upper tail of the salary distribution There are 148 observations from 1968 and 1969 Salary range is from $10000 to $125000
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Players Players are generally exploited and to a
large degree
Over a career length average players receive salaries equal to about 11 of their gross MRP and 20 of their net MRP
Star players receive about 15 of MRP
Some mediocre players have salaries in excess of their net MRP
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
Policy Implications
Place ball players under a contractual arrangement similar to pro football A player can play out his option and become a free agent Player-initiated transfers would still not exist
Long-term contracts Contracts for 5+ years followed by free agency
Completely free labor market will all contracts for a full season negotiated off-season Eliminate economic rents of players
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-
Questions
What is the reserve clause
What is a monopsony
In the win model what are the two independent variables
Player MRP is determined by 1) the effect of A on B and 2) the effect of B on C What are the variables
What two categories of players were evaluated for salary determination
Are professional baseball players exploited
- Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball
- Background
- Slide 3
- Approach
- Organization of the Baseball Players Labor Market (more about t
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination in Major League
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (2)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (3)
- A Simple Model of MRP and Salary Determination (cont) (4)
- Player MRP Equation1
- Player MRP Equation 2
- PCTWIN
- Individual Playerrsquos MRP
- Salary Determination
- Salary Determination (Hitters)
- Salary Determination (Pitchers)
- Degree of Monopsonisitic Exploitation of Professional Ball Play
- Policy Implications
- Questions
-