payin it backward: migration and democratic diffusion in latin america david crow división de...
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Payin’ it Backward: Migration and Democratic Diffusion in Latin America
David CrowDivisión de Estudios Internacionales
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (Mexico City)[email protected]
Clarisa Pérez-ArmendárizPolitical Science Department
Bates [email protected]
Migration and Democratic Diffusion: Theory
Our Work on Mexico: - “Social remittances”
Transmission of values, attitudes, practices: here, migrants spread values from more democratic host countries to less democratic (Levitt, 1998)
- Democratic Diffusion democracy spreads across international borders (Brinks and Coppedge 2006, Przeworski et al. 2000, Starr 1991). BUT no theory of agency
- Policy Diffusion supplies theory of agency (functionaries, social elites, members of organized civil society, etc.) applied to policy change (Kapur and McHale 2005, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Tarrow 2005)
New Theoretical Element: - Interpersonal Communication
people are more receptive to and put more stock in ideas they receive from people they know (e.g., “two-step flow” in which “primary reference groups” and friends and family, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, Katz, 1944, 1955)
Migration and Democratic Diffusion: The Case of Mexico
- Three transmission “paths”• Return migration: Mexicans absorb values in host country
(U.S.) and retain them back home item: “Have you ever lived outside Mexico?”
• Cross-border communication: Mexicans abroad communicate values to friends and family back home item: “Do you have family members or friends who live outside Mexico?”
• Information networks in high-volume sending communities: item: CONAPO, Migration Intensity Index
- Data: Original survey, Desencanto Ciudadano , June, 2006 (N=650)
Attitudes and Behaviors
• Attitudes: – Satisfaction with Democracy– Government Respect for Rights– Composite Tolerance Indicator
(political, religious, sexual orientation)
• Behaviors: – Non-electoral individual participation
(contact authorities, handed out flyers, signed complaint, etc.)
– Organizational participation (parties, neighborhood associations, civic organizations, etc.)
– Protest
Findings• Migration increased democratic attitudes and
behaviors, but effects are differentiated– Return migration• Increased tolerance• Negative evaluations of government respect for rights
(“critical citizens”)
– Friends and Family Abroad• Less satisfied with democracy• More individual and organizational participation,
protest
– High-intensity migration community• More organizational participation
• No Effect for Remittances
Extending the Research to Latin America: Challenges
• Different migratory destinations: Central and South American migration is much more varied than Mexican migration (e.g. Peruvians go to Argentina, Chile, Spain, and U.S., Nicaraguans go to Costa Rica and U.S., etc.)
Do Nicaraguans in Costa Rica learn the same things as Peruvians in Spain and Mexicans in the U.S.? Probably not BUT, migration generally occurs from less to more democratic countries so, the general expectation is for some democratic learning
Extending the Research to Latin America: More Challenges
• Different reasons for migrating: Mexican migration has been almost exclusively economic and familial, but Central and South American migration has also been political and related to natural disasters
Do economic migrants, political migrants, family reunification migrants and refugees from natural disasters have the same predisposition toward political learning Again, probably not
Extending the Research to Latin America: Yet More Challenges!
• Different national contexts: Political institutions, histories, cultures, and economic development also influence political attitudes and behaviors
Study on Mexico holds constant not only sending country context, but (given 95% in U.S.) host country context
Ideally, the different national contexts could be measured and included in the model as variables (“turn proper names into variables”) easier said than done
Data: Latin American Public Opinion Project (2008)
LAPOP 2008: 22 Countries
Argentina Haiti
Belice Honduras
Bolivia Jamaica
Brasil Nicaragua
Chile Panamá
Colombia Perú
Costa Rica Paraguay
Ecuador República Dominicana
El Salvador Suriname
Guatemala Uruguay
Guyana Venezuela
LAPOP 2008: Data Limitations– Return migration: poor measure
• Time window for living abroad (5 yrs. ago) too narrow only 1.3% of Latin Americans (and 0.71% of Mexicans)
• No item on destination (i.e., host country)• Question only asked in 10 (of 22) countries
– Family members’ host countries: little information just coarse categorization (U.S. only, U.S. and other, other)
– Communication: frequency, not content
– Reasons for migrating: no information
– Remittances/Communication: does receiving remittances count as communication? measurement error for communication
LAPOP 2008: Dependent Variables
• Evaluations of Democracy- Satisfaction with Democracy (Mucho, Algo, Poco, Nada)- Political system’s protection of “basic rights” (7-pt. scale,
“Nada” to “Mucho”)
• Political engagement
- Convince others to vote for party or candidate (4-pt. “Never” to “Frequently”)- Meet with neighbors to solve community problem (4-pt. “Never” to
“Frequently”)- Protest in last 12 months (3-pt. “Never”, “Almost Never” and “A Few Times”
LAPOP 2008: Independent Variables – Migration
• Household members residing abroad– In U.S. only (binary)
– U.S. and Elsewhere (binary)
– Elsewhere (binary)
• Frequency of communication (5-pt. ordinal “Never”, “Rarely”, “Once or Twice a Month”, “Once or Twice a Week”, “Every Day”)
• Household receives remittances (binary)
Distribution of Family Members Living Abroad
US Only US & Other Other None0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
11.4%
4.7%
8.6%
75.3%
Frequency of Communication with Family Members Abroad
Never Rarely Once or Twice a Month Once or Twice a Week Every Day0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
6.5%
30.0% 30.0%
28.1%
5.4%
Countries by % of Households that Receive Remittances
Haiti
Jam
aica
Guya
na
El S
alva
dor
Nica
ragu
a
Hond
uras
Rep.
Dom
inica
na
Guat
emal
a
Boliv
ia
Belic
e
Ecua
dor
Mex
ico
Peru
Colo
mbi
a
Cost
a Ri
ca
Para
guay
Urug
uay
Pana
má
Arge
ntina
Chile
Vene
zuel
a
Bras
il
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
49.2%
40.4%
34.8%
26.7%
22.0%20.2% 19.2%
10.9%10.8% 10.5% 10.3% 8.8% 7.8%5.5% 5.2%
3.6% 3.6% 3.5% 2.9% 1.6% 1.6% 0.7%
Countries by Dependence on Remittances Among Receiving Households
Hond
uras
Vene
zuel
a
Haiti
Para
guay
Nica
ragu
a
Rep.
Dom
inica
na
Jam
aica
Colo
mbi
a
Mex
ico
El S
alva
dor
Ecua
dor
Guya
na
Boliv
ia
Arge
ntina
Pana
ma
Guat
emal
a
Urug
uay
Chile
Peru
Bras
il
Belic
e
Cost
a Ri
ca
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90% 85.7%82.6%
71.3% 69.6% 69.3% 67.6%63.5%
58.0%56.9% 56.7% 56.5% 56.4% 56.3% 55.8% 54.7%
51.2% 50.4% 48.9%45.2%
40.0% 39.7%
33.3%
% of Households (Among Receptors) that Depend “A Lot” or “Somewhat” on Remittances for Monthly Income
LAPOP 2008: Controls
• Sociodemographic – Sex– Age– Income– Education– Employment
• Retrospective economic evaluations– Pocketbook– Sociotropic
Expectations• Having family members abroad will
– Make citizens more critical in their evaluations of their country’s democracy
– Increase different forms of civic engagement
• Differentiated effects among host country categories US > US + Other > Other
• Greater communication should also increase critical citizenship and civic engagement
• Remittances– Increase criticism– Decrease engagement (following Goodman and
Hiskey)remittances may substitute for goods capital, etc., one would normally get leveraging local networks, obviate need for community participation
Results: Attitudes
B p B pUS -0.038 0.057 -0.119 0.013US + Other -0.057 0.021 -0.256 0.000Other -0.027 0.180 -0.107 0.030Communication 0.018 0.032 0.032 0.104Remittances -0.020 0.173 -0.027 0.443
Satisfaction with Democracy Pol. System Protects Rights
Results: Engagement
B p B p B pUS 0.115 0.000 0.048 0.048 0.886 0.000US + Other 0.154 0.000 0.068 0.024 -0.079 0.767Other 0.125 0.000 0.037 0.144 -0.119 0.561Communication -0.032 0.003 0.027 0.007 -0.212 0.008Remittances 0.055 0.005 -0.054 0.003 -0.761 0.000
Electoral Persuasion Solve Community Problem Protest (Last 12 Mos.)
Findings• Household Members Abroad
– Makes citizens more critical, increases engagement– BUT, order different than predicted; in most cases having household
members in the U.S. and elsewhere has an effect of greater absolute magnitude
• Frequency of Communication– Some direct effects, but important as suppressor variable
i.e., effects of household members abroad become apparent (or sharper) only when comparing within each level of communication frequency.
B pUS -0.007 0.633US+Other -0.026 0.190Other 0.004 0.780Remittances -0.011 0.428
Satisfaction with Democracy
More Findings
• Remittances: – Insignificant for attitudes toward democracy– Positive for electoral persuasion– Negative for civic involvement and protest
Some evidence of remittance-induced alienation
Next Steps• What’s going on in the individual countries?
– Better statistical model: random effects model not good enough for exploring heterogeneity
between countries. 1) How do the effects of household members abroad, communication, etc., differ
across countries i.e., random slopes as well as intercepts
2) Explicitly include aggregate-level variables to account for differences in institutions, culture, history, etc.
– Case studies• Effects differentiated by host country
– Better theory: a more coherent account of why the the implantation of democratic values/behaviors should vary according to host country
– Auxiliary data: more precise idea of who’s going where, possibly imputing host countries
• Communication: frequency and content do people really talk about politics?
– Modify survey items– Qualitative interview data
• Return migrants: ???