payments for grassland ecosystem services: a comparison ...sourcedb.igsnrr.cas.cn/zw/lw/201104/p...a...

J. Resour. Ecol. 2010 1(4) 319-330

DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1674-764x.2010.04.004

www.jorae.cn

Dec., 2010 Journal of Resources and Ecology

Received: 2010-11-02 Accepted: 2010-11-28Foundation: National Key Project for basic research (973) (2009CB421106); Key Program of Knowledge Innovation of CAS (KZCX2-EW-306), China-EU Corporation Program of Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) of China (0813).* Corresponding author: ZHEN Lin. Email: [email protected].

Vol.1 No.4

Article

1 IntroductionGrass-dominated ecosystems cover approximately 25% of the Earth’s surface (Jacobs et al. 1999). Humans use these lands as grazing lands and have transformed many of them into croplands depending on water availability and monetary incentives for agriculture. The threats for grassland eco-systems are different across the world: In many parts of the world, the degradation of grass-dominated ecosystems has become a serious problem, particularly in poorer arid or semi-arid areas as several studies have shown (e.g. Li et al. 2007). Grassland degradation in upstream catchment areas, for example, increases the risk for floods (Zheng et al. 2002) and

contributes to wind erosion and sand storms (Shi et al. 2005). Grassland abandonment, particularly in marginal areas, has become a widely spread phenomenon in Europe (Agnoletti 2007). Grassland abandonment is, for example, a main cause of avian and mammal diversity decline (Preiss et al. 1997; Stoate et al. 2009) and increased soil erosion and landslides in mountainous areas (Koulouri & Giourga 2007).

These land use changes have significant impacts on the provision of grassland related eco-system services. Major grassland ecosystem services include, for example, agricultural production, since grassland ecosystems are an important resource for livestock production and rural employment, but also climate regulation, genetic

Payments for Grassland Ecosystem Services: A Comparison of Two Examples in China and Germany

Sandra UTHES1, LI Fen2, ZHEN Lin3 * and CAO Xiaochang3,4

1 Leibniz-Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research (ZALF), Eberswalder Strasse 84, 15374 Müncheberg, Germany;2 Beijing R&D Centre, Shenzhen Institute of Building Research Co. Ltd., Beijing 100044, China;3 Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, CAS, Beijing 100101, China;4 Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China

Abstract: The degradation of grass-dominated ecosystems and grassland abandonment have become widely

spread phenomena across the world. Payments for environmental services (PES) are seen as an innovative

approach to stop these trends by making payments to land users in return for adopting practices that

secure ecosystem conservation and restoration. Designing efficient PES requires that possible challenges

are effectively managed, such as the lack in linearity and immediacy of environmental effects, unexpected

monitoring and enforcement costs and possible socio-economic objectives (adequate compensation,

equity). The aim of this article is to compare government-financed PES for grassland ecosystem services

in two contrasting regions (Xilingol League, China and Brandenburg, Germany) in order to facilitate

knowledge exchange on PES design and implementation and the transfer of best practices. Our particular

interest is in how different PES mechanisms work, which actors are involved and what characterizes

success and failure cases. The comparison shows that both PES programs are not very effective in

providing environmental services due to lack of participation of affected farmers (both regions), insufficient

monitoring and control (Xilingol) and inappropriate management prescriptions (Brandenburg), which should

be improved in future programs.

Key words: grassland ecosystem services; payments for environmental services; eco-compensation; land

degradation; agri-environmental measures

Journal of Resources and Ecology Vol.1 No.4, 2010320

biodiversity, and soil conservation. Research on grassland ecosystems is therefore not only essential because of the relevance of grassland ecosystems for agriculture but also for their management and conservation and because of their importance for the wider rural context and viability.

Figure 1 illustrates the environmental problems of grassland overuse and abandonment using the DPSIR approach (Driving forces, Pressures, State, Impacts and Responses) (EEA 1995).

Several attempts (=response) have been made around the world to restore and maintain grassland ecosystems. This has often resulted in the development of government-financed programs that have the goal to alter unsustainable land use practices and compensate land users for occurring financial losses as a result of these programs.

This aim of this article is to compare government-financed payments for environmental services (PES) for grassland ecosystem services in two very different regions in China and Germany in order to facilitate knowledge exchange on PES design and implementation and the transfer of best practices. Our particular interest is in how different PES mechanisms work, which actors are involved and what characterizes success and failure cases. To this end, we focus on the “Fencing Grassland, Mover Users” (FGMU) in the Xilingol League, China and “grassland extensification”, a so-called agri-environmental measure, in Germany. China and Germany have been chosen for this comparison because grassland conservation is one of the major issues addressed by government-financed PES measures in the two countries in terms of enrolled area and program budget. For example, the FGMU covers 54% of the total grassland area in Xilingol while grassland-extensification covers 35% of the grassland area in

Brandenburg. Both programs take considerable financial resources and therefore cost-effectiveness of them becomes of increasing interest in the two countries.

2 The case study regions2.1. Xilingol League, Inner Mongolia, ChinaThe Xilingol grassland area in Inner Mongolia is an autonomous region (classified as one of the provincial-level division), located in the northern region of China. It is the third-largest subdivision of China spanning about 1 200 000 km² or 12% of China’s total land area. Inner Mongolia is divided into 12 prefecture-level divisions (see Fig. 2). Most of the land surface in Inner Mongolia is covered by native grassland, which is the main part of Euro-Asian Continent rangeland and steppe. The total area of rangeland and steppe is 78.8 million ha (the pasture available for gazing is 63.33 million ha), accounting for 67% of the total area of Inner Mongolia. It accounts for 22% of the total rangeland and steppe area of China. Inner Mongolian rangeland is the largest one in acreage in China, which is one of the important livestock production base in China. The rest of this area consists of numerous deserts, sands, salt and alkali lakes and scattered highlands. The area belongs to arid and semi-arid area, annual rainfall varies from 100 mm in the west to more than 400 mm near the ecotone in forest zone in the east. The majority (70%) of the annual precipitation falls during a relatively short summer rainy season.

Between 1985 and 2000, parts of the region were turned into a biosphere reserve (Bijoor et al. 2006). The most common human activity is livestock herding, with pastoral livestock income accounting for more than 85% of all agricultural products in Inner Mongolia. The major animals

Fig. 1 The phenomena of grassland overuse and abandonment structured according to the DPSIR framework.

Sandra UTHES, et al.: Payments for Grassland Ecosystem Services: A Comparison of Two Examples in China and Germany 321

include sheep, goats, horses, and cattle. In recent years, there has been a rapid increase in the number of goats due to a high demand and increasing prices for cashmere. The population density is low throughout the region (typically <20 people per km2), except near more intense agricultural activities area raising the density to 50 people per km2.

2.2 Federal State of Brandenburg, GermanyThe German case study area is the federal state of Brandenburg, located in northeastern Germany. Brandenburg was founded as a federal state in 1990 with fourteen rural counties and surrounds Germany’s capital Berlin without including it (see Fig. 2). Before 1990, Brandenburg was part of the socialist German Democratic Republic. Brandenburg is located in the north German lowlands with a typical flat topography and there are more than 3000 natural lakes and numerous ponds. The low annual precipitation of 520 mm provides and the dominating sandy soils provide rather disadvantageous conditions for crop production. The utilized agricultural area (UAA) is 1.27 million hectares, of which 280.000 ha are grassland. There are around 6200 farms with an average farm size of 210 ha. A large number of small-scale farms (often part time or hobby farms) coexist with large farms (former cooperatives) with often more than 1000 ha. The majority of the farms are grazing livestock farms (51%), followed by arable farms (39%) and other farm types, such as horticultural farms, mixed farms or farms specialized in granivores.

There is persistent migration from the rural areas in Brandenburg, in particular by the age group 18 to 29, unemployment is higher, wages are lower, real estate is cheaper, and average labor productivity is lower, while education levels are similar or higher (Uhlig 2008). Depopulation of the countryside, associate with a decline in services and infrastructure and loss of cultural heritage,

is therefore a serious threat in this region.

3 PES comparisonFollowing Engel et al. (2008), who provided an

overview of the relevant issues in the field of PES, we will analyze following issues in particular (for an overview, see Table 1): (i) services covered and actors involved, (ii) program evolution, spatial and temporal scale, (iii) additionality and baseline establishment, (iv) permanence, accounting and leakage, (v) payment structure, targeting, transaction costs, (vi) distributional effects, and (vii) future plans and challenges.

3.1. Xilingol League of Inner Mongolia3.1.1 Services covered and actors involvedThe FGMU program in Xilingol involves several immediate and long-term actions such as grazing restrictions, out-migration of herders and support for vocational trainings, promotion of high-yield agriculture to compensate for forage losses and the introduction of high value-added livestock. All these actions are mandatory for the farmers and herders in the targeted areas following a ‘command and control’ approach (Bijoor et al. 2006). However, the affected farmers and herders receive some financial compensation and are given incentives to change their profession (loans, vocational trainings). The environmental objectives of FGMU are to allow vegetation recovery in degraded areas and to preserve agricultural land against desertification. Another objective particularly linked to the increasing urban population in China is to reduce the occurrence of sand storms.

The principle idea to achieve these objectives is to combine immediate to provide immediate pressure production on the grassland ecosystems in Xilingol with long-term structural changes from an agriculture-based to a more diversified economy with a greater share of

Fig. 2 Location of the Xilingol League, Inner Mongolia, China and Brandenburg, Germany.


population working in non-agricultural sectors and living in non-agricultural areas. Livestock are forbidden to graze on designated lands either seasonally or year-round since the spring of 2002 to allow for recovery of vegetation. Herders affected by these restrictions have to pen-raise livestock either only during the spring or throughout the year, or they have to carry out rotational grazing in fenced areas (paddocks) based on the stage of water resources, growth of forage and on the objectives of the grazing system. The altered management systems often imply the buying of more feed from nearby agricultural areas or depleting winter supplies of grass from harvest grasslands. Pen-raising also requires expensive labor and greater transportation costs due to grass harvesting and most breeds are suitable for pen-raising (Bijoor et al. 2006). Long-term measures fostered by the government to combat overstocking are out-migration and the transition to new occupations. This involves moving land users, as the region’s scarce resources and fragile ecosystem make it unsuitable for industry or urbanization. The moved herders given incentives (e.g. subsidized house prices) to move to cow-raising villages or urban areas (Li et al. 2007).

The central government, the local governments and the responsible authority are the relevant decision-makers in this process, whereas farmers and herders are usually excluded from the decision-making processes, which is on of the reasons why the farmers and herders often perceive the program as unfair (Bijoor et al. 2006). 3.1.2 Program evolution, spatial and temporal scaleThe initiation of PES mechanisms in China has been particularly fostered since the early 1990s (Li et al. 2006). Typical examples are the Sloping Land Conversion Program (Xu et al. 2006; Bennett 2008), the Natural Forest Protection Program and the Forest Ecological Benefit Compensation Fund (Zhen et al. 2006). The core of these programs is to improve and conserve the ecological environment by changing non-sustainable resource use patterns, particularly in ecologically vulnerable areas, and to compensate the directly affected stakeholders such as farmers and herdsmen for altered management practices.

The FGMU program, which is the focus of this article, was initiated in 2002 to restore the grassland in highly degraded grassland areas, such as in the Xilingol League. The grassland degradation in Xilingol is characterized by a decline in biological productivity, loss of biodiversity and native species, and soil erosion and is a serious threat of undergoing desertification (Kölbl et al. 2010). These developments are the result of a change in traditional land use systems. For thousands of years, nomadic pastoralism was practiced on the Inner Mongolian grassland and remained a stable grassland ecosystem (Zhen et al. 2010). In the 1950s, this traditional land-use pattern was changed, when Han Chinese began to move to Inner Mongolia in large numbers, urged by the central government to expand

cultivation as part of the “Great Leap Forward” (Bijoor et al. 2006). Livestock breeding was and is still the primary economic activity in Xilingol, while the human population has increased as a result of this in-migration. Between 1980 and 2000, the population increased by 19% from 764 000 to 909 000 inhabitants while livestock almost doubled (from 12.6 to 24.2 million animals, mainly sheep). The available grassland per sheep unit decreased from 6.8 ha in 1950 to 1.27 ha in 2000. The population pressure led to overstocking because each herder had a smaller area of land to raise the amount of sheep needed to obtain income. Thus the rise in population accompanied by the continued emphasis on livestock breeding has contributed to grassland degradation (Kawamura et al. 2005). Since the 1990s, people pay more attention to the grassland desertification and degradation in Xilingol (Li et al. 2007).

In response, the central government of China launched special funds over the next ten years to mitigate grassland degradation (Bijoor et al. 2006). The implementation of the FGMU between 2002 and 2004 was the first phase of three by the central government. The FGMU Administration was established in December 2001, with the task of monitoring program success and applying penalties in case of program violation. The FGMU covers 10 351 000 ha and accounts for 54% of the total grassland in Xilingol League. The project has a budget of 239.04 thousand US$ (period 2002 to 2007) and covers 56 towns and 582 villages with 56 228 households. 3.1.3 Additionality and baseline establishmentThe FGMU has changed the way of how the farmers and herders earn their living, reflected in a change in the local income structure. Comparing the income structure before and after the implementation of the program, it was found that the herders mainly depend on livestock husbandry (more than 90% to total family income). After the project implementation, total livestock numbers had decreased as a result of the reduction in available grassland. The proportion of income from livestock husbandry dropped down to 70.6%, while the proportion of off-land income jumped up from US$ 22.07 per household in 1997 to US$ 488.25 in 2007 (1% to 13.9% in total income, respectively). Program compensation payments amounted to US$ 399.00 per household on average (11.4% of total family income).

The management concepts, tending behavior and pattern have been changed by the program. Interviews among farmers in a village in Xilingol indicated, that after the FGMU, there were three grassland management patterns: (i) Renting pasture. About 10 of the 95 families in the village had migrated out of the region for off-land work, and had rented their pasture to other herders in the village. (ii) Renting grassland and livestock. In the village, there were three families with a similar situation, that is, young labor going out for off-land work, and the staying people


were mostly the old and weak ones, which hardly continue grazing. Such households rent grassland and livestock to neighbors to avoid the high costs of breeding and for aging reasons. and (iii) Planting silage. About 22 households had started planting silage forage to compensate forage losses as a result of the grazing prohibition.

The tending behavior and management pattern of the farmers/herders had also changed as a result of the program. These changes could mediate the grassland degradation. Without the program, the grassland degradation would continue unhindered. The ecological effectiveness, however, is relatively low, as a result of prohibitively high cost for monitoring and rule enforcement by the authorities (Bijoor et al. 2006). Program success is infrequently monitored as no formalized evaluation procedures exist. The program area is large and not everywhere easy to access and incomplete information about the total number of herders and livestock exist. Although the farmers/herders were given some subsidies for forgone cultivation and grazing, the compensation level is not high enough to ensure a sustainable livelihood of the farmers/herders. The financial losses due to the program also increase the likelihood of program violation. The envisaged structural changes will take a longer transition period, therefore the immediate consequences for the farmers can be severe. The farmers/herders are at risk of slipping into poverty once the subsidies are terminated. Cultivation and grazing would no longer be possible at the same level as before the program, which would increase the trend of labor migration. Due to the low educational level of most farmers and thus lacking skills for off-farm employment, their chances to find long-term, well-paid employment are very low. Therefore, more than half of the farmers/herders would prefer to keep the traditional living style and management pattern. 3.1.4 Permanence, accounting and leakage The program is not designed as a long term project. Once environmental relief is achieved, it will be stopped. Many herders and government officials expressed concern about the financial losses associated with grazing restrictions. In addition, the current breeds of sheep found in the reserve, fat-tail or fine-wool, are not suited for pen-raising. Sheep feel hot and uncomfortable in pens, particularly in spring, and herders are worried about the greater chance of an epidemic. Herders affected by the year-round restriction must pen-raise sheep year-round or change their profession. Because year-round pen-raising is not an option for most herders due to its high cost, many herders are attempting to change their profession. 3.1.5 Payment structure and targeting, transaction costs The compensation includes a mix of measures; partially direct compensation for losses. These payments, however, are not guaranteed because it is project-based and therefore not a reliable source of income to farmers. An estimation

of private and public transaction costs has not been carried out so far. However, from the arrangement of the program it can be concluded that transactions costs are mainly public and include the resource intensive activities of monitoring and rule enforcement.3.1.6 Distributional effectsThe program mostly affects farmers and herders, which are economically less viable due to less suitable production conditions. They are located in low productive areas, in which livestock breeding is usually the only option, while farmers in areas suitable for crop production are not affected very much by the program. The income gap between crop farmers and herders is therefore increasing. But differences exist also among the herders. Richer herders often own vehicles, so that it is easier for them to circumvent the program rules, e.g. by transporting livestock to areas outside of the designated areas when controls are expected (Bijoor et al. 2006). 3.1.7 Future plans and challengesThe future goals are to solve the challenge related to sustainable livelihood of aging rural population and non-sustainable traditional farming. Most of the people who remain in the villages are elderly people and children, while the younger population leaves the rural areas for off-farm employment in the hope of improving their income. For example, the average age of the elderly people who remain is about 51 years, accounting for 23% of the whole population in the study area. As for young people, their average age is only 10.3 years, accounting for 12.7%. As a result of the grassland restoration, the total pastoral employment has decreased. Non-agricultural industries that could provide new employment have not yet been developed. Rising surplus labor rates have therefore become a severe problem. The conditions for an independent development of follow-up industries are not strong. The key issue of the ecological compensation mechanism for grassland restoration is to establish alternative economic activities for specialized grazing livestock farms. Under the support of a certain amount of government funding, the local government should train the farmers and herdsmen to enhance their subsidy-independent development capacity, so thatin the future, they will be able to explore alternative economic activities such as livestock husbandry and also change from small-scale to larger scale production. At the same time, more guidance and support for manpower training and forage product processing technology is needed to enhance the development potential of the local people and ensure their long-term livelihood.

3.2 Brandenburg3.2.1 Services covered and actors involvedThe grassland extensification program in Brandenburg involves reducing fertilizer inputs, usage intensity and


Criterion

Content of the PES

Environmental services (ES) covered and actors involved

Program evolution, spatial and temporal scale, transaction costs

Additionality and baseline establishment

Permanence, accounting

Payment structure and targeting

Distributional effects

Future plans and challenges

Xilingol League, China

Fencing Grassland and Moving Users (FGMU), includes grazing prohibition, seasonal gazing, land resting and rotational grazing., incentives are given to move users to other regions

ES: grassland maintenance, anti-sand stormTo mediate grassland degradation by stopping non-sustainable use,Actors: Farmers, central and local governments, research institutes

Since 2002, around 10,351,000 hectares covered. About 60% farmers/herders satisfied with the project, control difficult (occasional violation against regulations, e.g. night-grazing)

Overuse is stopped thus potential recovery of grassland ecosystems Reference: before-after comparison, farm surveys

Mandatory, managed through the ecological instruction office in the local government

US$ 11.05/hectare/yearAnnual budget: around 476.58 thousand US$Funding from two sources: Central government, local governmentsEligible area: badly degraded areas

The coverage rate of grass increased from 45% to 70%. Payment rate too low to compensate losses from the decrease in pasture-based activities

Program causes dependency on subsidies (low efficiency). The key issue is to develop alternative income sources for specialized grazing livestock farms

Brandenburg, Germany

Grassland extensification, includes prohibition of synthetical N-fertilizers, reduction of livestock density and minimum of one use per year required (to prevent natural succession)

ES: N-pollution reduction, increase in diversity and quality of the landscape through open space created, support of extensive grazing livestock farms Actors: Farmers and Farmers’ Union, agricultural authorities and agencies at regional, national and EU level, research institutes

Since 1992, around 125,000 hectares enrolled; 1250 farmers (= 35% of the entire grassland area, 45% of eligible farmers)High acceptance of farmers, low administration effort, management prescriptions easy to monitor, 5% of all farms controlled every year

Many farms meet the program conditions anyway (low additional effects), possible farm exits without the measure difficult to estimateReference: before-after comparison, simulation models, farm surveys

Five-year contracts (voluntary), monitored through the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS), on-farm controls by authority personnel in 5% of all beneficiaries per year

US$ 170/hectare/yearAnnual budget: around 20.9 million US$Funding from three sources: EU, Germany (national), Brandenburg (regional) Eligible area: entire grassland area

Grazing livestock farms receive additional support, which are usually less competitive than other farm types.

Spatial targeting of N-pollution vulnerable areasMediate socio-economic and environmental objectivesBringing the measure in line with the EU water framework directive

Table 1 Overview of the criteria analyzed in this article.


stocking rates. The program is restricted to grazing-livestock farms that have a livestock density between 0.3 to 1.4 livestock units per hectare forage area. The livestock density index provides the number of livestock units per area and allows for the aggregation of livestock from various species and ages. The program prohibits the use of chemical-synthetic fertilizers and pesticides, and requires at least one usage per year (either mowing, grazing or mulching). Reduced inputs can contribute to improved water quality. Further benefits of grassland extensification involve the creation and preservation of habitats, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions through reduced livestock density, and an increase in diversity and quality of the landscape through open space created (COM 2005).

The program has been developed in a complex legal framework with contextual guidance by European Union (EU), and concrete regulations are worked out at the level of the Member States or – as in Germany – the federal states (Länder) (Prager & Freese 2009). The process is characterized by increasing anonymity, and a low level of transparency (Arzt et al. 2003). Multiple actors at multiple scales are involved in the decision-making process, including government personnel at EU, national and regional level, lobby groups from agricultural, environmental and other non-governmental institutions, and research institutes (Egdell 2000).

Farmers are often contesting the prescriptions of grassland extensification and advice from authority personnel, particularly if they feel that these prescriptions are not appropriate. Possible changes in the program require several meetings and consultations in which the responsible authorities, representatives from the farmers’ union as well as from independent research institutes are present. Direct participation of farmers in the decision-making process is still the exception. As a possible approach to decentralize agri-environmental measures, increase their flexibility but also to solve conflicts between actors, the development of innovative co-ordination mechanisms and co-operative structures, such as agri-environmental-forums as a suitable approach for determining regional environmental objectives and appropriate measures has been tested in Brandenburg but did not become regular practice (Arzt et al. 2003). 3.2.2 Program evolution, spatial and temporal scaleAgri-environmental policy in the EU started in the 1980s (Hodge & Reader 2010). The MacSharry reforms of the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992 introduced AEMs as ‘accompanying measures’ to the existing CAP instruments. In 1999, the implementation of agri-environmental measures became mandatory for all EU member states. While the first-phase of measures mainly focused on restraining intensification and mitigating environmental harm resulting from intensification, later AEMs have shifted towards explicitly

promoting environmental enhancement (Hodge & Reader 2010). Current AEMs are based on the European Council Regulations 1257/1999 and 1698/2005 and account for around 20% of the rural development budget (148 billion in the period 2007–2013, EU and national contribution). Germany has introduced AEMs in the late 1980s. In Brandenburg, around 125 000 ha are currently enrolled under the grassland extensification program by a total number of 1 250 farmers (= 35% of the entire grassland area, 45% of eligible farmers).3.2.3 Additionality and baseline establishmentThe evaluation of grassland extensification in Brandenburg is usually dominated by before-after comparisons (COM 2000) and, since particularly ecological effects are difficult to prove, mainly judged on so-called output indicators, such as enrolled area or uptake. To avoid potential biases, the program is evaluated by independent research institutes and not by the responsible authorities themselves. Grassland extensification often aims to improve more than one aspect of ecosystem structure (e.g. plant diversity) and/or function (e.g., soil stabilization, nutrient mitigation) (Baer et al. 2009). In practice, designing measures for achievement of often multiple objectives, whatever they are, is a challenging task for the authorities due to often unclear, uncertain or contradicting relationships between agricultural management and environmental outcomes (Prager & Nagel 2008).

If objectives are unclear, sound evaluation is hardly possible. Theoretically, measuring effects of grassland restoration and extensification measures requires assessing the differences between two states: the state with the program and the state without it, the so-called counterfactual (Hodge & McNally 1998). Practically, the state without policy is difficult to identify, e.g. due to missing control groups and measurement problems (Primdahl et al. 2003).

A farm model-based study (Uthes et al. 2010b) indicated that the ecological effectiveness of grassland extensification in Brandenburg is relatively low in terms of N-pollution reduction. The low effectiveness combined with low on-farm compliance costs in large parts of the region indicates that the program is not well targeted. The soft program design results from an attempt to achieve environmental (N-pollution reduction) and rural development objectives (labor support to avoid further out-migration) with only one program. Improving the program would require designing separate instruments for the two distinct objectives. Program effects regarding the objective of keeping the landscape open are uncertain as it is difficult to estimate how many farms would have stopped livestock keeping without the payment. 3.2.4 Permanence, accounting and leakage Grassland extensification in Brandenburg is designed as a continuous program. However, the voluntary nature


implies that there is no guarantee that farmers will enroll land and continuity in the provision of the environmental services is therefore uncertain. Once the contract has expired, there can be no guarantee that the conservation assets will continue to be maintained (Whitby 2000). Other factors that contribute to the uncertainty in the provision of environmental services are lack of spatial targeting, inappropriate management prescription and budget shortages (Matzdorf et al. 2008, Uthes et al. 2010a). The limiting budget factor is usually the regional budget (depending on the annual tax volume), while the EU and the national contributions are guaranteed. The authorities prefer to stay with established measures instead of making experiments with design and implementation of a measure (path-dependency). This is less costly and also avoids the risk of loosing budget in future periods in case of low uptake in the current period. New measures also bear the risk of a potential violation of EU regulations and thus also a considerable financial risk since regional authorities have to pay back funds in such a case (Prager & Freese 2009).

Accounting liabilities concern both farmers and the regional authorities. Expenditure, output, result and impact indicators (supported area, number of beneficiaries) have to be reported annually to the EU commission. Farmers apply for the program using either electronic or written application forms. Information on land use and ownership is monitored through the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS). IACS monitors all agricultural parcels of farm holdings that receive EU subsidies and compensation payments (including grassland extensification). Data is collected directly from farmers, who are required to indicate the boundaries of all parcels they cultivate on the aerial photographs used for the LPIS and to specify the type of land use. These maps are digitized and used to monitor farmer area declarations.

Studies that focused on spillover and leakage effects of grassland extensification in Brandenburg have not been carried out so far but the results from other studies are likely to be transferable to Brandenburg. A possible unintended effect of the measure is the slippage effect, which describes the phenomenon that farmers tend to enter less productive areas in measures, while at the same time intensifying management of high potential areas (Evans & Morris 1997). Studies in the UK, for example, found that, it is also likely that the grassland extensification program enrolls primary already relatively extensive grassland areas, as due to lower opportunity costs, peripheral, marginal and difficult-to-farm areas are first entered in such measures (Evans & Morris 1997). On the other hand, several authors explicitly recommend the targeting of extensive areas (Aviron et al. 2005, Dahms et al. 2010). Conservation benefits in such landscapes are usually higher, as species richness and nutrients loads have historically always been lower. Maintenance of this

state is easier to achieve due to better starting conditions. In intensive regions with often large parcels, landscapes elements removed, lacking connectivity between habitats (fragmentation), soils contaminated, and seed banks impoverished, the goal is improvement of environmental conditions. With these less favorable starting conditions, environmental effects are more difficult to achieve and at higher costs than in extensive regions. 3.2.5 Payment structure and targeting, transaction costs Grassland extensification in Brandenburg is implemented in the form of management agreements (Matzdorf et al. 2008). Farmers commit themselves, for a five-year minimum period, to alter grassland management and livestock density. In return, they receive payments that compensate for additional costs and loss of income. The compensation payment is € 120–130 per hectare and year. The program can be applied to the entire grassland area, no specific areas within the grassland area are targeted. The annual budget in Brandenburg for grassland extensification is 20.9 million US$ per year.

The funding comes from three different sources: the majority from the EU (between 50% to 75%), a small contribution from the national governments, and the remainder from regional governments. This financing structure provides incentives to regional governments to design programs that receive a high share of funding from other sources than their own budgets (Kirschke et al. 2007). The budget planning requires information on expected uptake of measures, and private and public costs of the measures. The reversibility of participation in the program implies that observed enrolment or expenditure is a poor guide to future participation. There is therefore always considerable uncertainty in estimating program uptake and budget, which can lead to budget overhang or shortages in some years. Transaction costs of the program are usually not reported. Total program costs are significantly under-estimated if they are equated to compensation costs only. Under-estimation for example, is typically by around 20%–30%, but can also approximate to 100% in some cases (Falconer & Whitby 1999). 3.2.6 Distributional effects Although the program is now more than 25 years in place, long-enough for impacts to be felt, a reliable analysis of impacts and distributional effects is still not possible. It can be speculated that the program, as a safe source of income, contributed to the slowing down of structural change. On the other hand, eastern Germany in which Brandenburg is located, faced a strong post-communist structural change during the 1990th in order to become competitive within the reunified Germany. This trend was much more severe than the possible stabilizing effect of any kind of payment and it has only lately slowed down. Another distributional effect, the selectivity effect, refers to the fact, that such programs have a bias towards bigger farms, who “can


afford the luxury” of enrolling land in AEMs (Evans & Morris 1997, supported by recent analyses of Hodge & Reader 2010) due to economies of scale and comparatively lower transaction costs (Falconer 2000). Farmers on smaller holdings are often older and less likely to have a successor (which is both associated with lower rates of take up), less well-educated and informed about measures and, owing to financial constraints, less responsive to measures (Hodge & Reader 2010). Large farms cover a large area, so that environmental impacts are more likely than in small farms. In addition, only few contracts are required, which is less costly for the administration. 3.2.7 Future plans and challengesThe difficulty in measuring and proofing results make it difficult to assess the cost-effectiveness of the grassland extensification program in Brandenburg. Therefore, further efforts in improving existing monitoring systems are required. Since 2007, a newly developed Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF), distinguishing input, output, result, impact and baseline indicators, serves as a basis for indicator development in the EU member states (COM 2006). Although the CMEF is an advancement to former guidelines, it is still dominated by performance indicators (inputs = expenditures, outputs = number of participants or supported area), while result and impact indicators are not yet sufficiently quantifiable. Therefore, further improvements in the field of monitoring and evaluation are planned. Other challenges arise from ongoing changes in the EU agricultural policy (e.g. reduced budgetary resources due to the enlargement of the EU) and the implementation of several environmental commitments and legislations, such as the Water Framework Directive. These changes have to be put into practice and require decision support related to funding strategy and the designation of target areas for grassland extensification (Uthes et al. 2010a). Experiences with management agreements showed that enrollment in agri-

environmental measures appears not to have affected the attitudes of farmers (Wilson 1997; Dobbs & Pretty 2001). Burton et al. (2008) also found that they fail to allow farmers to develop or demonstrate skilled role performance. This has led to attempts to change the contractual design of grassland extensification in order to improve the ecological effectiveness, e.g. by replacing the current management agreements by a payments-by-results approach, where farmers receive compensation based on the occurrence of specific grassland indicator species on their grassland parcels (Matzdorf et al. 2008).

4 Concluding remarksThe comparison of the two PES programs showed that there were fundamental differences which can be explained by geo-physical, socioeconomic and political differences and also differences in the economic development status in the two regions. Yet the chosen mechanism – government-financed payments – was the same in both regions and the design of PES in both regions includes the same similar phases: namely design, planning, implementation and evaluation, which are illustrated in Figure 3.

In both regions stood at the beginning of the PES program an environmental problem resulting from direct human intervention, changes in natural resources as a result of e.g. climate change, or a combination of both. With increasing severity, the problem consequences were increasingly felt by the public, became the focus of scientific studies, and started shaping the public discourse and emphasized the need for intervention. In response to this changed discourse, policy makers in both countries together with regional experts defined in a first conceptual design phase the objectives of the program (e.g. the protection of species, support of smallholder farms). The design phase was followed by a concrete planning phase including the estimation of the likely affected number of farmers or herders, the planning of the program budget, the

Fig 3 The programming process of government-financed PES.


definition of possible indicators and expected outcomes. When design and planning phase had been successfully passed, the implementation phase began. This phase included the actual contract management, the control of compliance as well as the financial reporting and accounting. The final phase in the programming process was the evaluation phase. Program evaluation was either performed once or became a regular activity, depending on the time horizon of the program. The goal of evaluation was to identify whether the programs were effective and efficient in achieving the goals defined in the design phase and whether unintended side-effects occurred.

The challenges and obstacles are therefore similar in both regions, such as the difficulty in measuring and monitoring outputs, in planning financial resources etc. However, while in Xilingol, pressures on grassland resources come from overpopulation and overstocking, threats in Brandenburg result from out-migration and abandonment of grassland areas. The out-migration is partially the result of the unfavorable economic conditions in Brandenburg but also the results of overall demographic change with lower birth rates and aging population, both typical for a post-industrialism society. Despite the general threat of grassland abandonment, there are also hotspots with high livestock densities, which can lead to contamination of ground and surface waters.

A general difference in both regions is the contractual design – in Xilingol a command-and-control approach, in Brandenburg an incentive-based voluntary approach. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages and there is no clear success or failure approach. Unfortunately, both approaches seem to be relatively ineffective in achieving the ecological outcomes they were aiming at. The actions undertaken in Xilingol have the potential to provide the envisaged environmental services of grassland recovery and erosion and sand storm control and they are also spatially targeted in that they are only applied to badly degraded areas. The problem, however, is that monitoring and control is too costly and farmers and herders have incentives to violate the program rules. Room for improvement in Xilingol concerns particularly the monitoring procedures in, e.g. by developing general guidelines for monitoring and evaluation and the development of computer-based monitoring systems. Currently, most monitoring data are still recorded in paper and not in computer systems. Program monitoring is too costly at the moment and program success therefore difficult to assess for the authorities. In the future, it is necessary to better check the options for developing other occupations prior to the start of a program to avoid severe immediate consequences for the affected farmers. Also, the calculation of an appropriate compensation level requires improvement.

In Brandenburg, the provision of environmental

services through the analyzed PES is also uncertain. Here the uncertainty comes not from insufficient monitoring practices but mainly from an inappropriate PES design (lack of spatial targeting, inappropriate management prescriptions). Our analysis showed that a uniform program with the goal of solving both environmental problems in hot spots while also ensuring the maintenance of the cultural landscape is difficult to achieve with a relatively untargeted approach and therefore likely to be not very effective. In the future, Brandenburg should pay particular attention to the design of the mechanism including perhaps improved spatial targeting or a refinement of the management prescriptions. Monitoring and control of the actions undertaken, on the other hand, are here less important, since farmer carry out the actions voluntarily. There is still the risk of cheating and the control rate of 5% (see Table 1) may be perceived as too low. However, agricultural and non-agricultural residents are in close contact in Brandenburg and the non-agricultural population is usually eager in reporting violations. The overall possibility to cheat in this environment is therefore smaller compared to a large area which is only partially accessed and a large number of farmers as in Xilingol. The risk of loosing financial compensation and of endangering the often good relationships to the authorities is daunting and prevents the majority of farmers from violation.

One criticism applies to both regions: the group directed affected by the PES program, was insufficiently involved in the decision-making processes behind it, which is likely to lower the acceptance of the programs and can even lead to adverse behavior (Baldock et al. 1990). It is therefore recommended, that in the future more efforts are undertaken to improve the possibilities of participation.

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草原生态系统生态补偿机制研究：中德案例研究比较

Sandra UTHES1, 李芬2, 甄霖3, 曹晓昌3,4

1 Leibniz-Centre for Agricultural Landscape Research (ZALF), Eberswalder Strasse 84, 15374 Müncheberg, Germany；

2 深圳市建筑科学研究院有限公司北京研创中心，北京 100044；

3 中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所，北京 100101；

4 中国科学院研究生院，北京 100049

摘要：目前，草地生态系统退化成为全球关注的问题。生态补偿机制（PES）是为了草地生态系统的恢复/保护，采取补贴或

支付费用的方式，改变使用者资源利用方式的制度安排。科学、合理的生态补偿制度需要全面地考虑可能出现的风险和挑战：如

环境效益的滞后性，不可预见的监督、管理成本和社会经济目标（足额补偿标准、公平）的实现。本文的目标是通过中德两国生

态补偿措施的对比（选取中国内蒙古锡林郭勒盟，德国勃兰登堡州为案例区域进行研究），为今后中德两国的生态补偿理论和实

践提供依据。研究着重以下四个方面进行分析：中德两国生态补偿的实施框架，目标人群，实施效果评估等。研究结果表明，由

于缺乏有效的激励机制，农户作为最基层的执行单位和实施者，其参与的主动性不够，中德两国生态补偿措施实施的成效有待提

高。基于研究结果，提出了今后生态补偿项目设计中，中国应侧重于项目实施的监控和管理制度；而德国应在空间目标规划和具

体管理措施和方式等方面进行完善。

关键词：生态系统服务；生态补偿；生态系统服务付费；土地退化；农业环境保护措施

payments for grassland ecosystem services: a comparison ...sourcedb.igsnrr.cas.cn/zw/lw/201104/p...a...

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