R . K . P A Y N E

T H E T H E O R Y OF M E A N I N G IN B U D D H I S T

L O G I C I A N S : T H E H I S T O R I C A L A N D I N T E L L E C T U A L

C O N T E X T OF A P O H A

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The idea of apoha is one which kept Buddhist, 1Wllmfirns~ and Nyfiya- Vaigesika thinkers busy for several hufidred years. The Buddhists in explaining and defending, the M-Lmfirnsa and Nyfiya-Vaigesika in attacking and criticizing, if not also purposefully misunderstanding. However, the idea of apoha is one which is easily misunderstood, particularly when reduced to summary formulae such as: Apoha is the '"theory that a word indicates an object merely through the exclusion of other objects." 2 Although apparently simple enough, such a descrip- tion quickly leads to a mass of philosophic problems.

The Buddhist thinkers for whom apoha was an important concept are known as the Buddhist logicians. To me it seems unfortunate that they came to be known by that name. The expression "logician" connotes a limitation of inquiry, at least by analogy to the work of Western logicians qua logicians. Quite to the contrary, the Buddhist logicians display an expansion rather than a limitation of inquiry. Their inquiry includes the full range of previous Buddhist thought -- epistemology, metaphysics and, most importantly, soteriology -- but adds to it inquiry into systematic argumentation and logic. It is in the work of Maitreya and Asanga that such skills attain respectable status as an important part of the Bodhisattva's attainments. 3 From then on logic per se plays an important role in Indian Buddhist thought. While falling on infertile soil in China, logic continued to be an active part of Buddhism in Tibet fight up into the present century?

H I S T O R I C A L B A C K G R O U N D

In relation to the idea of apoha, the single most important historical figure is Dignaga. He is pivotal. While Buddhist use of logic preceded

Journal of lndian Philosophy 15 (1987) 261--284. O 1987 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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him by many centuries, he is the first Buddhist thinker to develop a formal logic. 5 Systematic forms of argumentation had, for example, been used at least as early as the Katthavatthu 6, and Dignaga's teacher Vasubandhu wrote works entirely devoted to the subject of proper argumentation. 7 However, up until the time of Dignaga, discussions of logic and argumentation were mostly limited to listing specific examples of acceptable and unacceptable arguments. Asahga and Vasubandhu already knew that a reason (Tibetan and Sanskrit expressions for technical terms are given in the Glossary) given for a thesis must meet all of three conditions: the reason must be a property of the subject of the thesis, it must exist in some or all of the homogenous examples, and it must not exist in any of the heterogenous examples. 8 However, Dignaga was able to abstract from these general conditions to argument forms. This is explained in his work Hetucakradhamaruh. 9 This is an intellectual achievement fully equal to Aristotle's formulation of the rules of syllogistic logic 10, and makes Dignaga one of the most important figures in the whole history of Indian logic . 11

Following Dignaga there came a long line of Buddhist thinkers who developed his ideas further. The most important of these for the Tibetan tradition is Dharmakirti, who was the student of |svarasena, who was himself one of Dignaga's students. 12 Dharmakirti's major work was the Pramdnav~rttika, originally written as a commentary on Dignaga's major work, the Pramdnasamuccaya. la It was Dharmakirti's work, however, which became the root-text for the study of logic in Tibet. Other important figures following Dignaga include Devendrabodhi, Subhagupta, SS_ntaraksita, Kaly~. a Raksita, Dharmottara, Ratnakirti, Jfi~masri, SafikarS_nanda and MoksLkaragupta (further information on each of these can be found in the Appendix).

During the whole of this time, the schools which opposed the Buddhist logicians were the Ny~ya-Vai~esika and NYLrnSms~ schools. These were realistic schools of thought, largely based on common sense notions of the way things are. 14 The dialogue which continued between these three schools was very important for all three of them. 15

The ~Vlm~'as~ school is usually classed together with the VedS.nta, just as the Ny~ya and Vai~esika are grouped with one another. The

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M-lmfirns~ were mostly concerned with liturgy and ritual aspects of the Vedas, both in the sense of the proper conduct of them and in the sense of the philosophic justification of them. TM One of the theories maintained by the Mimarnsa, one which is relevant to our study of apoha, was that the meaning of xvords is inherent in the sound of the words themselves. 16 This idea, so at odds with our own contemporary understanding of the function of sound in the communication of meaning, was also at odds with Buddhist conceptions. 17 This argument is still taught today, and in its contemporary form is as follows: the basic nature of things is vibratory; Sanskrit, the holy language of the Vedas, expresses the same vibratory qualities in its sounds as those of the things themselves; for example, a chair has a certain vibratory quality as its essential nature, the Sanskrit word for chair has the same vibratory qualityJ 8 It is this ontological identity which makes for the effectiveness of the Vedic hymns and mantras, and further for the effectiveness of the rituals of which they are the central point.

Jaimini in the Mimfimsfi Sfitra meets six objections to this theoryfl 9

For example there is the objection that a word is seen to follow from effort, i.e., it is a product of human action and therefore not eternal. However, Jaimini, and his commentator Sabara, respond that the word is manifested rather than produced, i.e., that it is eternal and is only made apparent through effort. 2°

The Mimfimsfi thinkers, then, were concerned with maintaining the validity of the Vedas and the Vedic rituals. This was done by their theory concerning the eternality of words and that the meaning of words is naturally inherent in the eternal sounding of words. Since the effectiveness of the Vedic rituals was thought to depend on this unity of eternal sound and meaning, the M-unfirnsfi were naturally the opponents of any theory, like the Buddhist, which separated words from meanings.

The Nyfiya-Vai~esika is actually the two schools, Nyfiya and Vai~esika. However, their concerns and methods are alike enough that they are generally classed together. Both of these schools are analytic 2~ and realist schools, i.e., they " . . . treat the data of waking conscious- ness from the point of view of waking consciousness itself..."22 They share a fundamental metaphysics of atomic realism 23, which was the

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contribution of the physical and metaphysical concerns of the Vai~esika. The Nyfiya contributed a concern with logic and episte- mology as the means to true knowledge and liberation. 24

The Nyfiya maintained that the meaning of a word is a complex of three parts:

The meaning of a word is, according to us, the genus, form and individual. An individual is that which has a definite form and is the abode of particular qualities. The form is that which (indicates or) is called the token of the genus. The 'universal' is the cause (or basis) of comprehensive cognition. 25

From this it is clear that for the Nyfiya the meaning of a word is an external referent, which was held to be of three parts. This position is clearly in disagreement with the Buddhist positions which held that meaning is essentially an internal process.

The Nyfiya were mostly interested in questions of logic and rea- soning, while the Vai~esika contributed cosmological and metaphysical theories, a6 Apparently accepting and using the Ny~ya position on word and meaning, the Vai~esika developed another theory important to the understanding of apoha -- that of exclusion (Skt.: vi~esa), The importance of this idea of exclusion as highlighting by contrast the meaning of apoha is discussed more fully below.

In contrast to these positions, the Buddhists held what has been identified as a nominalist position, 26a and which might also be called a conventionalist position regarding meaning. The Buddha himself said that " . . . one should not cling to dialectical usage nor go beyond the limits of convention. ''27 A referent can be indicated by different words. There are definite limits to the universality of what are in fact only conventionally meaningful usages. This is pointed out by the fact that changes take place in what a thing is called, e.g., the name of a mountain may change from one historical period to another. If the ~VlmS.rnsfi theory were correct, then the hill would have to change as well. Another indication of the traditional Buddhist view concerning the meaning of words is to be found in the apparent contention that it is a statement as a whole that is to be considered as fundamental in understanding its meaning, rather than the individual words which go to make up the statement. 28

Similarly, Paramfirtha, a contemporary of Dignaga's 29, held a

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position regarding the relation of words and meanings which has been restated as:

Names are arbitrarily assigned to objects by convent ion and are based upon nei ther meaning nor the propert ies of an object. The process of reference is therefore an arbitrary one, not one indicating a necessary relationship between name and referent, If there were a strictly necessary relationship between name and object, the name would be the only medium through which one could unders tand the nature of an object. If the name were the only medium through which one could unders tand the object, one would be unable to unders tand the object without hearing the name. Names, however, are assigned to objects arbitrarily and are not based upon either meaning or the propert ies of an object. Consequently, one can unders tand the object (either through its sense or through the propert ies upon which the sense is based) without knowing the name. Therefore, names do not signify the nature of an object and names are not the only medium through which one can unders tand an object. 3°

In brief then, we can say that prior to Dignaga the Buddhists had long held a nominalist view which he was able to bring into focus with his idea of apoha. The Buddhist position had been held in contrast with the MimS_msfi and Nyfiya-Vai~esika positions. The M-Lrnfimsfi held that meaning is inherent in sound which itself is eternal. The Nyfiya-Vaigesika on the other hand held that meaning is a matter of the external referent, its form as identifying it, and its universal by which it is fully cognized. Dignaga's formulation of the idea of apoha as explaining meaning and its relation to words is in direct opposition to both of these latter views.

S U P P O R T I N G C O N C E P T S

There are certain key ideas which when understood provide us access to the context of apoha. These key ideas are: the two sources of truth, perception and inference; the difference between the particular and the general, particularly as it applies to the epistemology and meta- physics of perception; the complex nature of negation; and the Ny~ya- Val~esika notion of exclusion. Without these ideas to support the concept of apoha, it appears either as absurdly contradictory to common experience or as trivially true.

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T H E T W O S O U R C E S OF T R U T H

Dignaga and those who follow him take as their primary concern the question of valid sources of knowledge, i.e., his philosophy is primarily epistemological in nature. 31 His intention was to establish a firm basis for the practice of Buddhism which is seen as a movement toward a direct experiential knowing of truth, i.e., the real. For example, Dharmakirti opens his Nyayabindu with the statement, "All successful human action is preceded by right knowledge." 32 As valid sources of knowledge, Dignaga holds that there are only two -- perception and inference. 33

Prior to Dignaga, the Yogacara position held that there are three means of knowing reality. In the Bodhisattva-Bhhmi Asanga says that knowledge of reality can arise in ordinary beings by the three valid sources of knowledge: "direct perception, inference, and the testimony of trustworthy persons." 34

This last, the testimony of trustworthy persons, is almost unique to the strict adherents to the system of Maitreya and Asanga. 35 Dignaga does not accept it as a separate and independent source of knowledge. Indeed, it is dependent upon the fact that it does not contradict direct perception and inference for its asserted validity. The qualifier "trustworthy" is an important clue to this since presumably the criterion for trustworthiness is accordance with direct perception and inference. Dignaga, then, eliminates testimony as an independent valid source of cognition, limiting himself and his followers to direct per- ception and inference alone.

Moksakaragupta explains these two as follows:

This (valid cognition) is twofold: indeterminate (pratyaksa, i.e., perception or direct knowledge) and determinate cognition (anumfina, i.e., inference or indirect knowl- edge). Pratyaksa is (a compound which can be analysed into) aksatia pratigata, i.e., "connected with or depending on the sense-organ", aksa here standing for indriya (sense-organs) called eyes, ears, nose, tongue and skin. Knowledge brought about by them is named indeterminate cognition (or direct perception). 36

By m~tna (of anum~tna) is meant that an object is measured by this means. The (prefix) anu- is in the sense of "later". That is to say, "after" having grasped a logical mark and having remembered the connection between the mark and that which possesses the mark, we get, regarding the concerned locus such as a mountain, knowledge which refers to an object not directly perceived. This knowledge is meant by the term "inference. "37

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This is in direct conflict with the positions held by the Ny~ya and ~ma~_rnsh thinkers. The Nyfiya hold that there are four valid sources of knowledge -- perception, inference, testimony, and analogy. 38 the Vaigesika agree only with the first two, rejecting analogy and sub- suming testimony under inference. 39 The MimS.msfi maintain that there are five valid sources of knowledge -- inference, analogy, implication, testimony, and non-perception. 4° Without going into the details of each of these, we can briefly say that of the Ny~ya sources Dignaga would probably subsume both analogy and testimony under inference. Of the Mimfunsfi sources he would probably subsume analogy, impli- cation and testimony all under inference and either reject non-percep- tion altogether or subsume it under perception.

Dharmakirti explains perception as being direct knowledge, i.e., knowledge which is free of both illusion and cognitive constructs. 41 Dharmottara in his commentary to this explains that the cognitive constructs referred to by Dharmakirti are mental acts which either are or could be accompanied by a verbal expression. By including the group of potentially verbally accompanied mental acts, the mental acts of the very young and the mute are included in the definition of cognitive constructs. 42 As for illusions, Dharmakirti gives an interesting set of examples of the causes of illusions: color-blindness, rapid motion, travelling on board a ship, and sickness. 43

Moks~karagupta in discussing the point makes it clear that the criterion involved in the designation of a thing as illusory is that of its effectiveness. An illusory experience is one which does not correspond to something which is really effective, e.g., an illusory flame cannot burn. However, a non-illusory perception is one which does corre- spond to something which is effective "in time, space and fOITfl. ''44

Dharmakirti then explains that there are four kinds of direct knovcledge. 45 These are: sensations per se, the mental awareness directly following on the sensation, self-awareness and yogic intuition in deep meditation. 46 This last is the key to all Buddhist practice since it is what allows for direct and full understanding and experience of the Four Noble Truths. 47

Moks~karagupta stresses this point when he says:

Meditation practice means to imagine (an object) repeatedly in the mind. The

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knowledge which is produced on the termination of the intensive meditation on the truth is devoid of determining factors (i.e., cognitive constructs) and non-erroneous (i.e., non-illusory). The true object is the four-fold noble truth named pain, the causes (of pain), the extinction (of pain), and the way to the extinction? 8

P A R T I C U L A R AND G E N E R A L

For the logicians the real is m o m e n t a r y and effective. 49 It is ut ter ly unique and is the basis of percept ion . T h e real is the object of direct

knowledge, and concern ing it Dharmak i r t i says that:

(Concerning direct knowledge) its object is the (extreme) particular. That alone (i.e., the extreme particular) represents ultimate reality. Because the essence of reality is just efficiency. Different from it is the universal character. It (i.e., the universal character) is the province of indirect knowledge (i.e., inference). 5°

Moks~ka ragup t a explains at grea ter length:

It is to be known that the fourfold indeterminate knowledge has as its object the particular. The particular here means the unique characteristic of a reality which is determined in space, time and form. The following is meant by this statement: (To take the example of) a jar, its particular characteristics may be described as follows: it is capable of containing water, etc.; is manifested before us as particularly determined in space, time and form; is free from ideas, impermanence and others; and as object of our purposive action, is distinct from things both of the same and of a different class.51

Since what is real is the base of percept ion , there can be no false percept ions . 52 Howeve r , these pe rcep t ions of the real are prelinguistic

and preconcep tua l . 53 T h e m o m e n t a r y and effective reals are ut ter ly

unique and individual, and, therefore , canno t be general ized about .

T h e y are no t the universals which are the basis of language and concept . 54 Linguistic thinking being based on concep ts and names is entirely separa te f r o m pe rcep t ion which is based on the m o m e n t a r y and effective real individuals. 55 These two, the universal linguistic

concep ts and the specific inexpressible percepts , are the only two

sources of knowledge accep ted by Dignaga and his followers, and once we under s t and this sharp and comple te distinction be tween the real par t icular and the linguistic universal we are in a posi t ion to see that the idea of a p o h a only appl ies to the concep tua l realm. Concep t s have nothing to do direct ly with the real rea lm of the m o m e n t a r y

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particulars, and therefore our ordinary notion of meaning as being the reference of a word to a real objective entity is not appropriate to our attempt to understand apoha.

When then does a word refer to? For Dignaga it does not in any literal sense refer, but rather exists in a mutually supporting relation with a conceptual construct. Dignaga states, "Speech is born out of conceptual construction and conceptual construction is born out of speech. T M This latter conceptual construct is what claims to have the misleading qualities of permanence, identity and objective external reality. Dignaga identifies five kinds of conceptual constructs: proper names, class concepts, quality concepts, action concepts, and sub- stance concepts27 A proper name such as "Half Dome" distinguishes the thing so identified on the basis of the name itself. A class concept such as automobile distinguishes the thing so identified on the basis of the class identified. "White" distinguishes the thing identified by means of a quality. A cook is identified by the actions a cook undertakes, i.e., cooking. A substance, e.g., a ring, identifies a thing in terms of that substance, e.g., a ringbearer.

The apparent referring quality of words is, then, only a reference to one of these five kinds of conceptual constructs. Words can never refer to reals since words are basically class names which are unable to identify a unique particular. Also, the real supposedly referred to has long ago disappeared, since it is momentary. Thus in Dignaga's epistemology there are three main players. There is the momentary real which is the basis of perception, the conceptual construct pur- porting to be an object, and the word or concept which refers to the supposed object.

The importance then of the division between particular and general for apoha is that it is the negative quality of apoha which provides for what meaning there is in the relation between word and particular. For Dignaga this cannot be an affirmative relation alone, but must also include a negative one of excluding inappropriate associations between words and other particulars.

N E G A T I O N

For the Buddhist logicians statements are of three kinds. The first kind

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are simple affirmative statements, e.g., "This book is blue." The second are simple negative statements, e.g., 'q'his book is not red." The third kind are statements which are negative by implication, e.g., "If this book is blue, then it is not red."

It is this last conception of negation as negation by implication that is the key to understanding the assertion that the meaning of a word is the negation of the opposite. Negation by implication links a simple affirmation and a simple negation into a necessarily linked pair. To say "this" is a "book" simultaneously means that it is not anything else, it is not anything which would fall into the category "not a book." What is important here is that the meaning of the affirmative and negative statements are mutually dependent one upon the other, and that the word differentiates everything in the world into two categories, e.g., book and non-book. This differentiation, based on the underlying connection between affirmations and negations as revealed by negation by implication, is the differentiation meant by Dignaga in his statement that the meaning of a word is the negation of the opposite. 58

EXCLUSION

The last concept that needs to be understood is one which appears to be quite similar to apoha, and was propounded by the Nyfiya- Vaigesika school. Within their realist's notion of the universal the Ny~ya-Vaigesika could readily explain the perception of common-ness as being the inherence of a quality in an object. From this position, however, it is difficult to explain the perception of differences. Since they were dependent upon a realist conception of things, the basis for differences also had to be a quality subsisting in an object. The difficulty lies in the fact that qualities were understood as being universals, i.e., common to many or all things. In order to explain differences, then, exclusion was theorized to be an actual universally present quality, which by being present in all things made them all different from one another. This quality of exclusion could easily be misunderstood as being much the same as apoha since they both work to distinguish things from each other. Yet this similarity is only superficial. 59

The difference between the two ideas lies in the different meta-

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physical systems which underlie them. Exclusion is a material quality inhering in a real abiding external object. It is perceived by the subject as the distinction between objects which are otherwise similar, e.g., two bottles cast from the same mold. Apoha, on the other hand, is a description of the way in which concepts mean. Apoha is subjective and related to the way in which thought works, while exclusion is objective and related to the qualities of external objects. What is thought to be a real abiding externally present material object by the Ny~ya-Vaigesika is explained as only being a conceptual construct by the Buddhists.

SUMMARY

These supporting concepts enable us to much more adequately understand the meaning of apoha. First, a sharp distinction is drawn between the real and the conceptual; the real is particular, unique, momentary and the basis of perception, while the conceptual is universal, general, only supposedly objective and the basis of language. Second, the complex nature of negation discloses the kind of negation meant by apoha. Negation by implication is seen as disclosing the necessary relation between simple affirmations and simple negations. It is in this sense that Dignaga asserts that the meaning of words lies in the negation of the opposite. Third, the idea of apoha as the differen- tiation of concepts is to be distinguished from the Ny~ya-Vai~esika notion of exclusion as a materially present quality in objects.

Ratnakirti, and Moksflkaragupta following him, use the idea of negation by implication to explain apoha as the simultaneity of and logical relation between a positive assertion concerning an episte- mological object and a negative assertion concerning all things which are not that epistemological object. For example, Ratnakirti in accordance with the theory of apoha explains that the term cow "harbors" the negation of non-cow in the same way that blue is harbored in the term blue lotus. The exclusion of the other, i.e., the negation of the non-cow, is held by Ratnakirti to be an actually apprehended attribute of the cow cognized (as distinct from the cow in itself). He says " . . . discrimination of non-cow inevitably arises simultaneously with the perception of the cow, for (the negation of

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non-cow) is the qualifier (of the individual). ''6° This interaction between the positive and the negation of the other, i.e., the relation of negation by implication, as a simultaneous interaction is necessary lest when, e.g., asked to tie up a cow one ties up a horse instead.

Moksftkaragupta denies three possible interpretations of apoha before putting forth his own definition. The first is that when an external object is conceptualized this is done as "the other (the dissimilar) is discriminated from this. ''61 The second is much the same, only it is in terms of the mental image, i.e., the epistemological object rather than the ontological object as in the first. The third is that apoha means the negation of an assertion, i.e., the simple absence of the other. All three of these interpretations are unaccept- able to MoksS.karagupta. He defines apoha as "the affirmation (of a positive entity) qualified by discrimination (of it from all other entities)." 62

MoksS_karagupta goes on to explain this simultaneity more fully:

• . . those who stress affirmation think that after we have known the cow, we con- sequently determine the discrimination of the essence of the cow from that of the non-cow; those who stress the negative function of apoha are of the opinion that we first know the discrimination of the dissimilar thing and then consequently confirm the thing which is discriminated from others, viz., the cow. Thus (both interpretations) are wrong• For at the time of judgment we do not experience an order of comprehension in which (negation or affirmation) occurs first. In fact, it is not the case that one, having understood the affirmation, later confirms the negation by implication, or that one having understood the negation later confirms what is discriminated (from the dissimilar). Therefore, we say that the very understanding of the cow is the same as the understanding of what is discriminated from the dissimilar. 63

We can see from this that for Ratnakirti and MoksS.karagupta apoha meant the simultaneous affirmation of and negation of the dissimilar from the (epistemological) object. Moksftkaragupta's concern with the "time of judgment" also shows that the idea of apoha was understood by them as being psychologically descriptive. In the process of identifying an epistemological object as some particular thing, neither the negative nor the positive function have priority but are, rather, complementary one to the other. This simultaneity and complementarity are supported by the examination of mind "at the time of judgment," i.e., it is a psychological description of the process of identification of an epistemological object as some particular thing.

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It is this fact of apoha describing the process of identification which, as described above, places apoha in the inference category of sources of truth. Apoha is clearly, therefore, involved with words and concepts rather than being on the perception side where it would have to be a metaphysical concept describing the real or absolute.

Putting the idea of apoha into contemporary terms we can say that it is a psychological descriptor for the bipolar relation of concepts. Dignaga and the other Buddhist logicians are then to be understood here as being involved in producing a phenomenological description of linguistic thought processes. More broadly, as in the discussion of perception, they are involved in the phenomenological description of consciousness, a favorite Buddhist undertaking. As such, the work of the Buddhist logicians fits into the larger soteriological intention of all Buddhist thinkers, since enlightenment is understood to follow from insight into the nature of consciousness as productive of suffering.

Some authors have criticized the logicians as being overly con- cerned with the un-Buddhist occupation of arguing. 64 However, when their work is seen as expanding our understanding of the nature and working of consciousness, the logicians are certainly worthy of our respect.

APPENDICES: COMPARISON WITH THE THOUGHT OF SARTRE

Although the comparison of Buddhist ideas with those of Western must always be carefully done, it can at times add to our under- standing. While facile or glib comparisons all too often suppress real differences, if the contexts of ideas are taken into account and simi- larities beyond purely superficial ones are still found, then we have a firm ground for making assertions about the identitity of the ideas being compared.

The idea from Western thought which most closely approaches Dignaga's apoha is Sartre's nrgatit~s. In his major work on existential philosophy Being and Nothingness, Sartre is attempting to work out the ontological relation between Being and nothingness. In this inquiry he finds nothingness present in Being: "Nothingness lies coiled in the

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heart of being -- like a worm. ''65 The presence of nothingness in Being is experienced as what Sartre refers to as negations.

The function of negation varies according to the nature of the object considered. Between wholly positive realities (which however retain negation as the condition of the sharpness of their outlines, as that which fixes them as what they are) and those in which the positivity is only an appearance concealing a hole of nothingness, all gradations are possible. In any case it is impossible to throw these negations back into an extra-mundane nothingness since they are dispersed in being, are supported by being, and are conditions of reality. Nothingness beyond the world accounts for absolute negation; but we have just discovered a swarm of ultramundane beings which possess as much reality and efficacy as other beings, but which inclose within them- selves non-being. 66

In relation to human being negations are called by Sartre

"nrgatitrs." "There is an infinite number of realities which are not only objects of judgment, but which are experienced, opposed, feared, etc., by the human being and which in their inner structure are inhabited by negation, as by a necessary condition of their existence. We shall call them n~gatit~s." 67 The strongest parallel with Dignaga's apoha

comes when Sartre explains that human beings: " . . . u se nrgatitrs to isolate and determine existents - - i.e., to think t h e m . . . - 6 8 Nrgatit~s

are not only then the basis for purely negative judgments but also establish for " . . . wholly positive r ea l i t i e s . . , the sharpness of their outlines.. . , ,69 The origin of negation is human consciousness itself. 7° The ability to create nrgatitrs is that which discriminates human consciousness from the continuity of Being. This ability to negate Being is what disengages human being from its past, thereby establish- ing human being irrevocably in freedom. 71

It seems then that apoha could be extended to include the way in which human consciousness is able to create freedom from karma. The binding nature of karma is similar to the causal continuity of Being for Sartre. Where Sartre finds the reality of freedom to lie in the ability of human consciousness to negate Being through negatites, the Buddhist thinkers might have seen in apoha (as the integral relation of positive and negative elements within meaning) a key to breaking out of the causal chain of karma.

Dharmakirti indeed developed a similar thought. Since ignorance is the basic factor in binding one to karma, once the mind is freed of

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ignorance and has direct insight into reality then one has achieved enlightenment, i.e., freedom. 72 The thought constructions of the mind are similar to the realities of the world in the sense that the reality as defined as a not-non-A is similar to the thought construction A. E.g., the collection of utterly unique realities which we call (as thought constructions) tables are each in reality not a non-table. This " . . . similarity is an unreal relation, to be sure, and yet, its destruction constitutes freedom in a meaningful sense, since by breaking the unreal relation between mind and its constructions, one is able to destroy the conceptualizing faculty of mind, and to achieve direct insight into the things-in-themselves which constitute the flux of reality." 73

The major difference between Sartre and the Buddhist logicians lies in the latters' soteriological concern. Although a soteriological orienta- tion has been developed by some of the existentialists (particularly the existential psychologists and theologians) around the ideas of authenticity, and good and bad faith, Sartre has no such concern himself. His notion of freedom while like enlightenment avoided by most people through the distractions of daily life 74, is not something which should be worked toward. In other words Sartre's analysis of human being is a descriptive one while that of the Buddhists is normative.

H I S T O R I C A L A N D B I B L I O G R A P H I C A P P E N D I X

The information which follows concerns the important Buddhist thinkers in India who wrote on apoha. The format used to present this information is: name in Sanskrit name in Tibetan

(dates, authority abbreviations given below) title of work on apoha in Sanskrit title in Tibetan

translator(s) name(s) (number in Peking catalog)

Abbreviations for dates are: V for Vidhybhusana, N for Nakamura (in Potter), B for Bhattacharya (in Potter), P for Potter, S for Sharma, and F for Frauwallner

276 R.K. PAYNE

In addition to the sources cited in the text, the following sources were used to compile this appendix:

Karl H. Potter The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 1, Bibliography Motilal Banarsidass, 1970

Erich Frauwallner "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic" Wiener Zeitschrifl fur die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens, Band V, 1961

Catalog to the Peking Edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka Suzuki Research Foundation

1. Dignaga Phyogs kyi glang po (V: c. 500AD, N: 400 to 480, F: 480 to 540, S: c. 400AD)

Pramfmasamuccaya Tshad ma kun las btus pa Tr: Gser gyi go cha, Dad pahi shes tab (P. 5700)

Pram~.nasamuccayav.rtti Tshad ma kun las btus pa hgrel pa

Tr: Gser gyi go cha, Dad pahi shes rab (P. 5702) Tr: Vasudhararaksita, Seng rgyal (P. 5701)

2. Dharmakirti Chos kyi grags pa (V: c. 635 to 650AD, F: 600 to 660, S: c. 550)

Pram~navfirttikakfirikfi Tshad ma rnam hgrel gyi tshig lehur bcas pa

Tr: Sabhfitisrisfmti, Dge bahi blo gros (P. 5709) Pramfmav~rttikavrtti Tshad ma rnam hgrel gyi hgrel pa

Tr: apparently unknown (P. 5717a)

3. Devendrabuddhi (Devendrabodhi) Lha dbang blo (V: c.650AD, F: 630 to 690)

PramS. av~rttikapafijik~ Tshad ma rnam hgrel gyi dkah hgrel

Tr: Subhfitisri, Dge bahi blo gros (P. 5717b)

4. Subhagupta apparently not translated (F: 720 to 780, N: 650 to 750)

Any~pohasiddhi

T H E H I S T O R I C A L C O N T E X T OF A P O H A 277

5. Santaraksita Shi ba htsho (V: 749AD, F: 725 to 788, N: 680 to 740, S: c. 700)

Tattvasarn. grahak~rikfi De kho na nyid bsdus pahi tshig lehur byas pa

Tr: Gunfikarasribhadra, Dpal lha btsan pa, Shi ba hod (P. 5764)

6. Kamalasfla (Tibetan name not identified) (V: c. 750, F: 740 to 795, N: 700 to 750, S: c. 725)

Tattvasaqa. grahapafijikfi De kho na nyid bsuds pahi dkah hgel

Tr: Devendrabhadra, Grags hbyor shes rab (P. 5765)

7. Kalyfinaraksita (V: c. 829AD, S: c. 829) Anyfipohavicfirakfirikfi

Dge srungs

Gshan sel brtag pahi tshi lehur byas pa

Tr: apparently unknown (P. 5744, not 5774 as given in Peking catalog index)

8. Dharmottara Chos mchog (V: c. 847AD, N: 730 to 800, F: 750 to 810, S: c.800) A(nyfi)pohanfimfiprakarana Gshan sel bashes bya bahi rab to

byed pa Tr: Skal ldan rgyal po, Blo ldan shes rab (P. 5748)

9. Karn.akagomin apparently not translated (S: c. 875)

Pramfinavfirttikasvavrttit~fi

10. PrajfiS_karagupta Shes rab hbyung gnas sbas pa (B: early 10th century, V: c. 940, S: c. 750)

Pramfinavfirttikfilamkfira Tshad ma rnam hgrel gyi rgyan Tr: Skal ldan rgyal po, Blo ldan rgyal po (P. 5719) translation revised by: Kumarasri, Hphags pa shen

11. Jfifinasrimitra (Tibetan name not identified) (B: 982 to 1055, S: 1025)

278 R .K . PAYNE

12.

13.

14.

Vajrayanakoti dvayapohanama Rdo rje theg pahi mthah gnyis sel bashes bya ba

Tr: apparently unknown (P. 4537) both Sharma and Potter give the author's work on apoha as Apohaprakaran. a, but this was not found in the Peking

Ratnakirti apparently not translated (V: c. 940 to 1000, P: early l l t h century, S: 1050)

Apohasiddhi

Sankarfinanda (Tibetan name not identified) (V: c. 1050AD, P. 1050)

Apohasiddhi Sel ba grub pa Tr: Manoratha, Blo ldan shes rab (P. 5754)

Moksfikaragupta Thar pahi hbyung gnas kyi sbas pa (V: c. l l00AD, P: 1100)

Tarkabhhs~ Rtog gehi skad Tr: Dpal ldan, Blo gros brtan pa (P. 5762)

GLOSSARY

This glossary gives the English, Sanskrit and Tibetan for technical terms used in the text. It is not intended to be a definitive statement of the best equivalents of terms, but rather a guide to the differing usages of the translators of the various works quoted in this paper.

It was not possible to establish definite or full Tibetan equivalents in all cases. Where I have constructed the Tibetan, this is indicated by placing it in parentheses and following it with a question mark. Where only a partial equivalent was possible this is indicated by placing both of the equated parts in parentheses.

In addition to the works cited in the body of the text, the following references were used for this glossary:

Takashi Hirano An Index to the Bodhicaryfivat~ra Pafijik~, Chapter IX Suzuki Research Foundation, 1966

Gadjin M. Nagao Index to the Mahgtyfina-Sfitrfilarhkfira Nippon Gakujutsu Shink6-kai, 1961

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 279

R. Sasaki, compiler Mah~vyutpatti, and Index Suzuki Research Foundation, Reprint Series, n.d.

analogy upamfina nye bar hjal ba

concerned locus dharmin (chos can?)

determining factors kalpanfipodha rtog pa dang bral ba

exclusion visesa khyad par, khyad par dang bcas pa

four fold noble truth caturfiryasatya hphags pahi bden pa bshi po

general sfimfinya spyi

heterogenous example vipakse sattvam (mi mthun pahi phyogs la yod pa?)

homogenous examples sapakse sattvam mthun pahi phyogs la yod pa

ideas dharma chos

imagine samfiropa sgro btags pa, sgro hdogs pa, hdogs pa

280 R.K. PAYNE

implication arthfipatti don gyi(s) go ba

inference anumfina rjes su dpag pa

logic pramfina tshad ma

logical mark (probans) linga rtags

meditation practice bhfivanfi sgom pa

momentariness ksanika skad cig ma (nyid)

(negation by) implication arthfipattital~. don ma yin par (h)byung ba

non-perception anupalabdhi mi dmigs pa

particular svalaksana

• •

rang gyi mtshan nyid

perception, direct perception pratyaksa mngon sum

purposive action pravrtti hjug pa, hbyung ba

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF APOHA 281

reason hetu rgyu, rgyu mtshan

space, time and form desak~lfik~raniyata (desakfila -- yul dang dus)

subject (of a thesis) dharmin (chos can?)

testimony sabda sgra

that which possesses the mark (probandum) lingin (rtags can?)

thesis paksadharmatva phyogs kyi chos

those who stress affirmation vidhiv~din (vidhi -- cho ga)

those who stress the negative function of apoha niv.rttyapohav~din (niv.rtti -- ldog (pa), ldog par bya (ba))

universal sfimfinyalaksana spyihi mtshan nyid

valid sources of knowledge pram~na tshad ma

NOTES AND REFERENCES

R. S. Y. Chi, Biddhist Formal Logic, p. 31. Luzac, 1969.

2 8 2 R . K . P A Y N E

2 Masaaki Hattori, Digndga, On Perception, p. 12. Harvard University Press, 1968. 3 G. Tucci, On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya(natha) and Asanga, p. 52. University of Calcutta, 1930, Reprinted by the Chinese Materials Center, Inc., San Francisco, 1975. 4 Douglas D. Daye, 'Buddhist Logic,' p. 127. In Charles Prebish, editor, Buddhism: A Modern Perspective, pp. 127 to 132. Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975. 5 I. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic, pp. 431,437. Translated and edited by Ivo Thomas. Chelsea Publishing Co., 1970. 6 S. C. Vidyabhusana, A History oflndian Logic, p. 235. Motilal Banarsidass, 1970, See also Daye (4), p. 127. 7 G. Tucci, Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, p. ix, Gaekwad's Oriental Series. No. XLIX, 1929. Reprinted by the Chinese Materials Center, Inc., San Francisco, 1976, see also Tucci (3), p. 70. s Hattori (2), p. 4; and Bochenski (5), pp. 435 to 437. 9 Vidyabhusana (6), p. 284 l0 Paul Edwards, Editor in Chief, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 4, p. 514. Macmillan Publishing Co. and The Free Press, 1972. 11 D. N. Shastri, Critique oflndian Realism, p. 1. Agra University, 1964, See also, Tarthang Tulku, "A History of the Buddhist Dharma," p. 59. In Crystal Mirror, vol. 5, pp. 3 to 330, Dharma Publishing, 1977. 12 Tfiranfitha, History of Buddhism in India, p. 229. Translated from the Tibetan by Lama Chimpa and A. Chattopadhyaya, and edited by D. Chattopadhyaya Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970. And, Bu-ston, History of Buddhism, part two, p. 152. Translated from the Tibetan by E. Obermiller, Materialen zur Kunde des Buddhismus, vol. 18, 1931. Reprinted by the Suzuki Research Foundation, n.d. 13 For Dignaga see: Bu-ston (12), pp. 150 to 151; T~ran~tha (12), pp. 182 to 184; and Tarthang Tulku (11), pp. 77 to 78. For Dharmakirti see: Bu-ston (12), pp. 154 to 155; Tfiranfitha (12), pp. 237 to 239; and Tarthang Tulku (11), p. 80. Summaries of each are also given by A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, pp. 454 to 468. Motilal Banarsidass, 1970. 14 S. Dasgupta, A History oflndian Philosophy, vol. 1, p. 310. Cambridge University Press, 1932, Reprinted by Motilal Banarsidass, 1975. is D. N. Shastri (11), pp. 6 to 7. Also, Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma", pp. 23 to 24. Royal Asiatic Society, 1923, Reprinted by Motilal Banarsidass, 1970. And, P. S. Jaini, "The Vaibh~sika Theory of Words and Meanings," pp. 95 to 96. In Bulletin of the School of oriental and African Studies, pp. 95 to 107, 1959. 15a S. Chatterjee and D. Datta, Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p. 315. University of Calcutta, 1960. 16 Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies oflndia, p. 607. Princeton University Press, 1967. 17 Diana Paul, "An Introductory Note to Param~rtha's Theory of Language," ms. p. 14. To appear in the Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 7, 1979. 18 This version of the idea was taught to me by an instructor in Sanskrit at an ashram in San Jose. The instructor was American rather than Indian and had received his own training somewhere in San Francisco. 19 S. Radhakrishnan and Chas. Moore, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy, pp. 488 to 489. Princeton University Press, 1957.

T H E H I S T O R I C A L C O N T E X T O F A P O H A 2 8 3

20 These arguments are a bit simpler to follow if one remembers that in Sanskrit every letter in a word is pronounced and therefore has a sound. 21 Radhakrishnan and Moore (19), p. 356. 22 H. Zimmer (16), p. 608. 23 Radhakrishnan and Moore (19), p. 356. 24 Chatterjee and Datta (15a), p. 163. 25 Radhakrishnan and Moore (19), p. 370, m.m. 26 H. Zimmer (16), p. 608. 26a Karl H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 2, p. 138. Princeton University Press, 1977. 27 K. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 313. George, Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1963. Quoted from the Maffhima Nikaya. 28 Jayatilleke (27), p. 313. 29 K. Ch'en, Buddhism in China, A Historical Survey, pp. 134 to 135. Princeton University Press, 1964. 30 Paul (17) ms. pp. 11 to 12. 31 Warder (13), p. 448. 32 Dharmakirti, Nydya-Bindu. Translated from the Sanskrit by Th. Stcherbatsky. In Buddhist Logic, vol. 2, p. 1. Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., c. 1930; published as parts I and II of Vol. XXVI of the "Bibliotheca Buddhica" Reprinted by Dover Publ. Inc., 1962. 33 Warder (13), p. 455. 34 C. Bendall and L. de la Vallee Poussin, "Bodhisattva-Bhfimi, A Text-Book of the Yogacara School, (Summary)," p. 221. Le Museon, vol. VI, 1905, pp. 38 to 52, and vol. VII, 1906, pp. 213 to 230. And, Janice Dean Willis, On Knowing Reality, the Tattvdrtha Chapter ofAsatiga's Bodhisattvabhumi, p. 74. Columbia University Press, 1979. 35 Tucci (3), pp. 68 to 69. 36 Moksfikaragupta, An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy (Tarkabhdsd), p. 29, m.m. Translated from the Sanskrit and Tibetan by Yuichi Kajiyama, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, 1966. 37 Moksfikaragupta (36), p. 30, m.m. 3s Dasgupta (14), pp. 332 to 355. 39 Dasgupta (14), pp. 354 to 355. 4o Dasgupta (14), pp. 387 to 399. 4~ Dharmakirti (32), p. 14. See also, Bimal K. Matilal. Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, pp. 38 to 39. Mouton and Co. N.V., Publ., The Hague, 1971. 42 Dharmakirti (32), pp. 19 to 20. 43 Dharmakirti (32), pp. 24. 44 Moksgtkaragupta (36), p. 43. 45 Dharmakirti (32), p. 25. And, Moks~karagupta (36), pp. 44 to 54. 46 Dharmakirti (32), pp. 25 to 33. 47 Charlene McDermott, "Yogic Direct Awareness as Means of Valid Cognition in Dharmakirti and Rgyal-tshab," p. 149. In Minoru Kiyota and Elvin W. Jones (eds.) Mahdy~ina Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, pp. 144 to 166 University Press of Hawaii, 1978.

2 8 4 R . K . P A Y N E

Moks§karagupta (36), p. 53, m.m. 49 Stcherbatsky (32), vol. 1, p. 184. 50 Dharmakirti (32), p. 33 to 38, m.m. 5~ Moksfikaragupta (36), p. 56, m.m. 52 Matilal (41), p. 39. 53 Shastri (15), p. 344. 54 Shastri (15), p. 345. 55 Matilal (41), p. 37. 56 Matilal (41), p. 40. 57 Matilal (41), p. 35 and p. 41. 58 D. Sharma, The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic, pp. 34 to 35. Mouton and Co. N.V., Publ., The Hague, 1969. 59 Shastri (15), pp. 314 to 318. 60 Ratnakirti, Apohasiddhi, p. 55. Translated by D. Sharma from the Sanskrit. In (58), pp. 47 to 101.

61 Moksfikaragupta (36), p. 122. 62 Moks,~karagupta (36), p. 123, m.m. 63 Moks~karagupta (36), pp. 123 to 124. 64 Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, p. 265. University of Michigan Press, 1962. 65 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 21. Translated from the French by H. E. Barnes. Philosophical Library, 1956. 66 Sartre (65), p. 21. 67 Sartre (65), p. 21. 68 Sartre (65), p. 27. 69 Sartre (65), p. 21. 70 Klaus Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology, p. 51. Northwestern University Press, 1966. 71 Hartmann (70), p. 52. 72 Karl H. Potter, Presuppositions oflndia's Philosophies, pp. 188 to 189. Prentice- Hall of India (Private) Ltd., 1965. Reprint of Prentice-HaU, Inc., U.S.A. edition, 1963 73 Potter (72), p. 189. 74 Sartre (65), p. 43.