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Peace, Security, and Governancein the Great Lakes Region

International Peace Academy

Office of the Special Representative of the United NationsSecretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management andDevelopment Issues

Centre for Conflict Resolution

Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation

UN Sub-regional Centre for Democracy and Human Rightsin Central Africa

Rapporteur: Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe

DECEMBER 2003 ■ DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA

Acknowledgements

International Peace Academy’s (IPA) Africa Program gratefully acknowledges the support of the governments ofCanada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; and the RockefellerF o u n d a t i o n .

About IPA’s Africa Program

The seminar on peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region, jointly organized by IPA and theOffice of the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for the Great LakesRegion (Kenya), in partnership with the African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and DevelopmentIssues (Tanzania), the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (Tanzania), the UN Sub-regional Centre for HumanRights and Democracy in Central Africa (Cameroon), and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (South Africa),took place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003. The meeting involved nearly sixtydiplomats, high-ranking military officers, academics, and civil society actors, drawn largely from the GreatLakes region, and was the fourth in a series of seminars to address ways in which Africa’s sub-regionalorganizations could increase their capacity to manage local conflicts. The seminar served as a majorcomponent of the Africa Program’s current three-year project (2003–2006) on strengthening Africa’ssecurity mechanisms and actors.

The policy seminar on the Great Lakes region emerged out of IPA’s partnership with the Organization ofAfrican Unity and sub-regional organizations engaged in enhancing their capacities for conflict manage-ment and strengthening Africa’s security mechanisms.

The Africa Program of IPA works with partner institutions:• To serve as a useful guide to Africa’s regional organizations and actors in assessing their strengths and

weaknesses in the area of conflict prevention, management, and resolution;• To identify the key factors required to maximize the potential of Africa’s fledgling security mechanisms

and to provide tangible support for the efforts of regional organizations at strengthening their politicaland military institutions;

• To share comparative experiences between, and learn policy lessons from, the African Union, the NewPartnership for Africa’s Development, and sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Communityof West African States, the Southern African Development Community, the Intergovernmental Authorityon Development, the East African Community, and the Economic Community of Central African States;

• To encourage the involvement of civil society actors in developing and shaping Africa’s regional securitymechanisms and to facilitate the development of civil society networking within Africa;

• To serve as a valuable resource for external actors and donors involved in assisting the development ofAfrica’s security mechanisms;

• To create networks of knowledgeable and interested Africans to influence developments on theircontinent through interaction among themselves; and

• To provide a resource for scholars and students of conflict management in Africa, particularly sincethere exists a paucity of knowledge on the continent’s institutions and actors engaged in the field ofconflict management.

About the Rapporteur

Dr. Dorina A. Bekoe is an associate in the Africa Program.

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2. Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

3. Domestic Bases of Regional Instability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

4. Trans-National Conflict Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

5. The Role of External Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

6. Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Annex I: Keynote Address “Reflections on the Burundi Peace Process,”Mr. Joseph S. Warioba, Former Vice Presidentand Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Annex II: Opening Address “Tanzania: Peacemaker and Proponent of Good Governance,”Mr. Phillemon Sarungi, (MP), Minister for Defenceand National Service of the United Republic of Tanzania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Annex III: Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Annex IV: Seminar Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

PEACE, SECURITY, AND GOVERNANCE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

Table of Contents

Contents

Executive Summary

The seminar, “Peace, Security, and Governance, in theGreat Lakes region,”1 the first in the third phase of theInternational Peace Academy’s (IPA) Africa Program,jointly organized with the Office of the SpecialRepresentative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region (Kenya), took placein Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December2003. Other partners in the convening of the policyseminar included: the African Dialogue Centre forConflict Management and Development Issues( Tanzania), the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation(Tanzania), the UN Sub-regional Centre for HumanRights and Democracy in Central Africa (Cameroon),and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (South Africa).Approximately sixty participants – diplomats, high-ranking military officers, academics, and civil societyactors – drawn largely from the Great Lakes region,attended the conference. Notable participants included:Mr. Joseph S. Warioba, former prime minister of theUnited Republic of Tanzania; Mr. Phillemon Sarungi,(MP), Minister for Defence and National Service of theUnited Republic of Tanzania; and Dr. Salim AhmedSalim, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of theMwalimu Nyerere Foundation and former secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity.

The primary objective of the seminar was to assess theprospects for durable peace and security and toidentify the challenges to democratization in the GreatLakes region. The policy seminar proved particularlytimely as the main countries in conflict in the region –Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of theCongo (DRC) – stand at varying degrees of transitionand harbor the potential for renewed violence. Rwandahas conducted two elections since the 1994 genocide,but the credibility of the electoral processes has beendisputed and elements of structural violence have notcompletely disappeared. In Burundi, while the mainHutu insurgent group has acceded to the peaceagreement, the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu– Forces nationales de libération (PALIPEHUTU-FNL)have not. Furthermore, plans for the demobilization of

former combatants and reintegration of refugees fromthe 1993 political violence are yet to be effectivelyimplemented. Finally, in the DRC, the active presenceof Rwandan militias in the Kivu provinces is causingthe Rwandan army to deploy into the DRC, thusviolating the Pretoria Agreement between the twocountries. It highlights the need to resolve domesticsecurity concerns in Rwanda in tandem with the sub-regional peace process underway in the DRC.

Prospects for the consolidation of peace in the regionwill depend on an empowered civil society, stronglyinstitutionalized and efficient sub-regional organiza-tions, and strategic intervention by the internationalcommunity. In this regard, IPA’s partnership with theOffice of the Special Representative of the UNSecretary-General (SRSG) for the Great Lakes Regiongave participants an opportunity to providerecommendations for increasing the impact of theupcoming International Conference on the Great LakesRegion on peace, security, and governance in the sub-region. The international conference, to be organizedas a series of summits by the Office of the SRSGstarting in November 2004, will also provide the sub-region’s civil society, women’s groups, and youthorganizations the opportunity to participate in theplanning of a blueprint for engendering economic andsocial development in the Great Lakes region.

Equally important, conflict resolution in the sub-region’s core countries of Rwanda, Burundi, and theDRC was discussed as a function of how well thesecountries successfully address domestic and regionalissues. To this end, participants emphasized suchmeasures as building strong democratic and economicinstitutions, eliminating poverty and underdevelop-ment, curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS, stemming theillicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SALWs),and designing durable solutions for addressing issuesof concern to refugees and internally displaced people(IDPs). Furthermore, participants underscored thatpartnerships with the international community, thestrengthening of regional economic communities, andincreased economic integration were critical toresolving these issues.


Executive Summary 1

1 The Great Lakes region includes: Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya.


Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward

The participants developed a number of policyrecommendations to outline the way forward for civilsociety organizations, national governments, regionalinstitutions, and international bodies to address thepeace and security issues of the Great Lakes region.Specifically participants emphasized the need to: ensurethat the International Conference on the Great Lake sR e g i o n should succeed in addressing the root causes ofthe conflict in the Great Lakes from regional anddomestic perspectives; include civil society and women’sgroups in peacebuilding processes; stem spillover effectssuch as the illicit trade of SA LWs, the spread ofHIV/AIDS, the deepening of poverty, and forced popula-tion movements (refugees and IDPs); rationalize andstrengthen regional economic communities; and moreeffectively engage the international community.

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

Participants viewed the upcoming I n t e r n a t i o n a lConference on the Great Lakes Region, set to commencewith a series of summits in November 2004, as animportant component for solving the regionalization ofconflicts in the Great Lakes. In order to ensure theeffectiveness of the conference and the comprehen-siveness of the process, participants emphasized thatthe Office of the SRSG should include women’s groups,civil society organizations, and youth associations.Furthermore, to enable the conference to establishinstitutional linkages for growth and conflict resolu-tion, the Office of the SRSG was urged to identifyspecific socio-economic or democratization projectsthat would benefit the region, thereby beginning theprocess of creating institutions to achieve commongoals.

Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation

The core countries of the Great Lakes region shoulddevelop mechanisms to balance the needs of justiceand reconciliation in the pursuit of sustainable peace.Many participants noted that in Burundi, to fosterreconciliation, the government should design affirma-tive action programs and create legal instruments thatensure the rights of minority citizens. The government

should also implement a sustainable repatriationproject for the refugees resulting from the expulsionsof 1972 that is accompanied with strong economicdevelopment programs. In Rwanda, the internationalcommunity was urged to address the irregularities inthe two elections, while not discounting ethnictensions that still linger in the aftermath of the 1994genocide. Moreover, Rwanda’s security fears must beadequately addressed in order to facilitate the completewithdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC. Finally,in the DRC, illicit exploitation of natural resourcesshould cease, and the groups that are not signatories tothe Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition inthe Democratic Republic of the Congo should beacknowledged and included in the transitional institu-tional arrangements.

Participation of Civil Society and Women’s Groups inPeacebuilding and Reconciliation

Civil society organizations, in particular women’sgroups, have played a significant role in peacebuildingand reconciliation; however, they have not beenadequately represented in the peace processes.Moreover, these groups are weakly institutionalized.While national, regional, and international processesmust include civil society organizations and a gendersensitive approach to peacebuilding, these non-governmental groups must also undertake improve-ments of their own. In particular, participants urgedcivil society organizations to increase the strengths oftheir institutions, design long-range financingstructures, and connect their missions more closely tothe populations they serve.

Solutions to Regionalized Conflicts

Given the regionalization of conflict in the Great Lakesregion, solutions should address the sources of politicaland social instability of neighboring states. The sub-region’s states and the international community shouldfocus on stemming the proliferation of refugees andIDPs, the illicit trade of SA LWs, the spread ofHIV/AIDS, and the endemic poverty of the region.Concurrently, they must also resolve domestic politicaland economic catalysts for violence such as poorgovernance, the absence of democratic institutions, ill-

2 Executive Summary


conceived economic policies, and poorly institutional-ized regional economic communities.

• Managing the flow of refugees and IDPs willrequire designing solutions that address bothimmediate and root causes of forced displacement.Solving immediate causes entails ending armedconflicts. However, more durable solutions shouldfocus on root causes of displacement, such asinadequate economic and social conditions, andquestions of citizenship and identity. Equallyimportant, solutions must provide support to therefugee-receiving country – for example, toimprove opportunities for the displaced and facili-tate citizenship procedures – as well as to therefugee-generating country – such as bolsteringtheir capacity to absorb repatriated refugees and tocreate sustainable reconciliation programs.

• The illicit trade in SALWs can be curbed with theassistance of regional and internationalmechanisms. Short-term solutions recommendedby participants include adequately funding andmonitoring disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration (DDR) programs following conflicts.In the long-term, states in the Great Lakes shouldprovide political and economic support toconcerted regional agreements, engage in mutualmonitoring, and cooperate on border security.

• The states in the region, in cooperation with theinternational community, can forestall the securitythreat posed by the high incidence of HIV/AIDS by,among other measures, including public health asa critical component of economic and governancepolicies and post-conflict reconstruction programs.Importantly, the devastating economic and socialconsequences of the disease must be adequatelyaddressed.

• The rationalization of regional economiccommunities (RECs) can help curb the effects of

poverty on regionalized instability. Presently, theregion’s states have multiple memberships in theRECs, causing divided loyalties, weak commitmentto goals of individual RECs, and subsequently poorinstitutionalization. However, states in the GreatLakes region must resolve the debate on moreeffective construction of RECs. Pa r t i c i p a n t sdebated whether RECs should reflect formal orinformal market flows, natural boundaries, orm a r ket complementarities and synergies.Furthermore, national policies should reflect moreeffective use and public investment of revenuesfrom natural resources. Properly managing naturalresources is especially important given that eightcountries in the region – Angola, Cameroon, Chad,the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republicof Congo, and São Tomé and Principe – produceoil.

Effective Engagement of the International Community

The institutions in the Great Lakes region and theinternational community must work together to resolvedomestic political and economic catalysts for violence,such as poor economic and political governance. Theinternational community should facilitate economicreforms and democratic transitions through theprovision of financial, diplomatic, and institutionalsupport to national governments and regional organi-zations. More to the point, the UN should work closelywith Africa’s sub-regional organizations – namely theAfrican Union, the Economic Community of CentralAfrican States, the Intergovernmental Authority onDevelopment, and the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity – to provide the legitimacy affordedthrough the UN’s perceived neutrality and the logisticalsupport needed for effective operationalization of asecurity mechanism. Similarly, the US, France, andBelgium – historically the most influential northerndemocracies in the Great Lakes region – should supportwork with various ministerial representatives, not justat the foreign ministry.

Executive Summary 3


4 Introduction

1. Introduction

The seminar, “Peace, Security, and Governance in theGreat Lakes region,” jointly organized by theInternational Peace Academy (IPA) and the Office ofthe Special Representative of the United Nations (UN)Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region (Kenya),took place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17December 2003. In convening this major policyseminar, IPA partnered with Africa-based national andregional organizations: these were the AfricanDialogue Centre for Conflict Management andDevelopment Issues (Tanzania), the Mwalimu NyerereFoundation (Tanzania), the UN Sub-regional Centre forHuman Rights and Democracy in Central Africa(Cameroon), and the Centre for Conflict Resolution(South Africa). There were nearly sixty participants –diplomats, high-ranking military officers, academics,and civil society actors – drawn largely from the GreatLakes region. Notable participants included Mr. JosephS. Warioba, former prime minister of the UnitedRepublic of Tanzania; Mr. Phillemon Sarungi, (MP),Minister for Defence and National Service of theUnited Republic of Tanzania; and Dr. Salim AhmedSalim, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of theMwalimu Nyerere Foundation and former secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity.

The primary objective of the seminar was to assess theprospects for durable peace and security and to identifythe challenges to democratization in the region. Theseminar devoted particular attention to the cycles ofviolence, which have hampered local, regional, andinternational efforts to secure peace, ensure stability,and establish legitimate foundations for democracy inRwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of theCongo (DRC). Equally important, the seminar evaluated

the roles of civil society; regional and internationalactors; and the trans-national issues of poverty,underdevelopment, refugees and internally displacedpeople (IDPs), and HIV/AIDS.

The seminar also served as a platform for the Office ofthe Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General(SRSG) for the Great Lakes Region to present itsproposal for an International Conference on the GreatLakes Region. The International Conference on theGreat Lakes Region, which is planned to commence inNovember 2004, holds great potential to createopportunities for civil society groups to enter intodialogue with national and regional actors involved inpeace, development, and reconciliation processes,thereby engendering regional stability.

The meeting in Dar es Salaam marked the first policyseminar organized by IPA under its project onStrengthening Africa’s Security Mechanisms andActors – a project of the third phase of the AfricaProgram (2003–2006). It follows and builds on thethree-year project on Developing Regional and Sub-regional Security Mechanisms in Africa (2000–2003).2

Through the project on Strengthening Africa’s SecurityMechanisms and Actors, the Africa Program endeavorsto provide policy-makers with relevant recommenda-tions from civil society groups, scholars, and Africanregional and sub-regional organizations that will helpto strengthen the ability of Africa’s sub-regionalorganizations and actors to prevent, manage, andresolve conflict.

Brief Overview of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region

Regionalized conflicts are characterized by a complexinteraction between localized rebellion, a clash ofinterests among countries of the region, and a

2 Reports of the seminars and task forces meetings during the project on Developing Regional and Sub-regional Security Mechanismsin Africa are the following: IPA, the African Renaissance Institute, the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies, andthe Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture:Problems and Prospects, December 2000, Gaborone, Botswana; IPA and the Economic Community of West African States, Toward aPax West Africana: Building Peace in a Troubled Sub-region, September 2001, Abuja, Nigeria; IPA and the Centre for Africa’sInternational Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Role and Potential of the SouthernAfrican Development Community (SADC), March 2002, Johannesburg, South Africa; IPA and the Economic Community of WestAfrican States, Operationalizing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, andSecurity, August 2002, Dakar, Senegal; and IPA, Makerere University, and the Africa Peace Forum, Building Peace in Eastern Africa,December 2002, Entebbe, Uganda.


Introduction 5

w e a kened capacity or will of international actors toavert humanitarian crises – as transpired in the 1990sin the Great Lakes region, culminating with the war inthe DRC.3 The decade of violence in the Great Lake sregion began with the 1993 civil war in Burundi, whichwas followed by the 1994 Rwandan genocide of Tutsisand moderate Hutus. Both conflicts resulted in largenumbers of refugee flows into neighboring Zaire (nowthe DRC). The conflict then spread into Zaire, as bothTutsis and Hutus reside there in significant numbers.Rwanda, citing the need not only to protect its owncitizens from Hutus, but also to protect Tutsi-Congolese,launched incursions into eastern DRC in 1996.

In the beginning of the war in the DRC (1996), Rwandaand Uganda formed an alliance with the Congolesegovernment. However, this Kampala-Kinshasa-Kigalialliance soon unraveled, amid the number of securityconcerns cited by Uganda and Rwanda. Ugandamaintained that it needed to stop insurgents (the Lord’sResistance Army and the Allied Democratic Forces)from attacking through southern Sudan and easternDRC – in the process, drawing Sudanese troops on tothe DRC’s territory. Rwanda’s governments invoked theright to “self-defense” against cross-border incursionsinto its territory by DRC-based Hutu militias. Inreaction to the growing hostilities, Angola, Namibia,and Zimbabwe stated that they intervened militarily topreserve the unity of a Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) member state. Chad also provideda small number of troops at the DRC government’srequest and Libya allegedly provided some funding.4

Political and security justifications for their interven-tion notwithstanding, the opportunity to exploit the

DRC’s lucrative natural resources also provided animpetus for the military intervention of some states ofthe region.5

The rationale for intervention by the neighboringstates became self-enforcing and the localized conflictsbecame regional. As such, the conflicts within andbetween the countries of the Great Lakes will requireregionally-based and targeted solutions, along with thecooperation of relevant neighboring states. Whilepeace may be negotiated between local and nationalactors, it is insufficient for peace in the region. Despitethe existence of peace agreements between the DRC,Rwanda, and Uganda, instability in the regioncontinues – the Rwandan military has not completelywithdrawn its personnel from the eastern part of theDRC.6

In sum, the DRC war has demonstrated that despite theformal termination of war and renunciation of violenceby national actors, a durable peace between localantagonists and neighboring states may remain elusiveuntil regional and international incentives encourage acomplete withdrawal of the foreign forces from theDRC. Notably, any agreement must resolve theunderlying issue Rwanda has cited for its involvement– continued presence of Hutu g e n o c i d a i r e s.7

Furthermore, the absence of robust institutions of goodgovernance and rule of law, exacerbated by rulingelites’ refusal to acknowledge past acts of genocide –such as occurred in Burundi in 1972 and eastern DRCin 1998 – all contribute to a lack of trust betweenarmed opposition groups and incumbent regimes andfoment political violence.

3 For more on regionalized conflicts see IPA, The Regionalization of Conflict and Intervention, 5-9 May 2003, New York, pp. 2–3.4 This background was summarized from Mwesiga Baregu, “The DRC and the Great Lakes Conflict Formation: Problems, Options, andDilemmas,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003. See also InternationalCrisis Group, Africa’s Seven Nation War, ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report No. 4, 21 May 1999 (electronic version). 5 To investigate the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC, the UN established an expert panel in 2000. The panel published anumber of reports. See for example: UN Security Council, “Letter dated 16 January 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to thePresident of the Security Council,” (S/2001/49), 16 January 2001, Annex (electronic version); “Letter dated 15 October 2002 from theSecretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,” (S/2002/1146), 16 October 2002 (electronic version); “Letterdated 23 October 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,” (S/2003/1027), 23 October2003 (electronic version).6 UN Security Council, “Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo,” (S/2003/1098), 17 November 2003 (electronic version), paragraph 65.7 “Kigali appoints ambassador to Kinshasa,” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 4 March 2004, IRINEWS.org(available from http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=39851 16 March 2004).

Crafting a Regional Approach: InternationalConference on the Great Lakes Region

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region,which will be organized by the SRSG for the GreatL a kes Region, in partnership with the African Union(AU), is intended to coordinate peacemaking processes,development assistance, and investment, for the DRC,Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya.8 T h emain objective of the International Conference on theGreat Lakes Region is to create a S t a b i l i t y, Security, andDevelopment Pa c t (SSDP). The pact will address four ke yareas – regional peace and security; democracy andgood governance; economic development; and regionalintegration – in order to effectively address social andhumanitarian crises.9 In the search for regionalsolutions, participants considered the I n t e r n a t i o n a lConference on the Great Lakes Region, a hopefulsolution to the stalemate in the region. These optimisticviews were nevertheless tempered by calls to the specialrepresentative to provide concrete proposals to meet theneeds of the sub-region’s inhabitants.

This proposed regional pact underscores theimportance that should be given to the processnecessary for the achievement of its stated goals. As astart, a preparatory summit of heads of states would beheld in November 2004 to set the priorities for theInternational Conference on the Great Lakes Region.Smaller meetings at the national and local levels wouldthen follow, in order to enable governmental and non-governmental bodies to craft policies to implement theprinciples set at the first preparatory meeting. Second,a meeting of representatives of the ministries of foreignaffairs of the participanting countries will take place tocoordinate national and regional policies striving forpeace, security, and development. Third, the

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region willorganize a summit of foreign affairs ministers. Finally,a second summit of heads of states will take place toformally adopt the SSDP.10

To enable the International Conference on the GreatL a kes Region to adequately capture the dynamics of theregion and produce relevant policy recommendations,participants emphasized the importance of carefullyselecting civil society representatives and includingwomen at all levels. To this end, participants wereencouraged that civil society representatives, nominatedby both government and independent sources, wouldinclude trade unions, parliamentarians, academics, andreligious groups in order to create a people-orientedconference. A special regional meeting on women’s rolesin peacebuilding would take place, to ascertain consid-eration of gender issues in all of the conference’s work.11

H o w e v e r, a number of the participants noted that theabsence of the rule-of-law and good governance

8 According to the Office of the SRSG, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, and Zambia may be included in the framework, although thereare no specific details about their roles. 9 UN Security Council, “Report of the Secretary-General on preparations for an international conference on the Great Lakes Region,”(S/2003/1099), 17 November 2003 (electronic version), paragraphs 8–9.10 Ibid.11 The importance of considering a gender perspective in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and ensuring the inclusionof diverse members of civil society organizations were highlighted in the papers by Rose Kadende-Kaiser, “Gender, Conflict andPeacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region,” and Angela Ndinga Muvumba, “The Great Experiment: Civil Society, Democracy, andGovernance in Uganda and the Great Lakes,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17December 2003.


6 Introduction

Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-Generalfor the Great Lakes Region.

practices in the region make it difficult for groups ofcivil society to be given access to the process envisagedby the proposed framework of the conference. While theorganization of the International Conference on theGreat Lakes Region reflected consensus on the need forregional solutions to the chronic problem of insecurityand violence in the Great Lakes, some participants calledfor more specific projects for the conference that wouldbe relevant to both the governments and people of theregion. By focusing on concrete projects, participantsargued that institutions that engender developmentcould emerge more easily and be of greater relevance tothe region.

Plan of the Report

The overriding message from the participantsunderscored that in order to devise durable, region-ally-based solutions to the conflicts in the GreatL a kes region, the security concerns of individualcountries must be integrated into a coherent regionalframework. This report reflects that outcome bylooking first at individual countries’ securityconcerns, then examining the relevant regionalframework by which they may be addressed. The nextsection of the report assesses the peace and securityenvironments in the three core countries of the GreatL a kes – Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC. Section threehighlights domestic bases of regional instability, suchas inadequate democratic reform and poor economicp o l i c y. In section four, the report illustrates themechanisms by which domestic problems havebecome trans-national security concerns – causingrefugee flows, exporting poverty, spreadingHIV/AIDS, and facilitating the illicit trade of smallarms and light weapons (SA LWs). External actors –the UN, the US, France, and Belgium – may help aswell as hinder the resolution of conflicts in the GreatL a kes Region, as is elaborated in section five. Thereport concludes in section six with policyrecommendations on bringing stability and develop-ment to the Great Lakes region.


Introduction 7

From left to right: Mr. Mark Chingono, Centre for Conflict Resolution;Dr. Ruth Iyob, Director, Africa Program, IPA; Ms. Lindiwe Zulu,Vodacom.

2. Peace and Security in theGreat Lakes Region

The Great Lakes region has made some progress inovercoming instability, but several threats remain. Overthe past five years, the progress made by Rwanda,Burundi, and the DRC, the core states of the region, owesmuch to concerted multilateral and regional diplomaticefforts. While the UN and other international organiza-tions forged many of the entries into the mediationprocesses, “on the ground” knowledge of regionalorganizations and political actors, such as Ta n z a n i a ’ sJulius Nyerere and his successor, Nelson Mandela, inBurundi, were critical to their interventions.

By virtue of its proximity, the security environment ofCentral Africa, which shares the states of Rwanda, theDRC, and Burundi, impacts the Great Lakes region, andvice versa. Just as the potential of political violence inthe Republic of Congo (ROC), Chad, and the CentralAfrican Republic may affect the Great Lakes region, thestability in Rwanda, the DRC, and Burundi remaincentral to peace in Central Africa. Stability in the GreatLakes region will curb conflict generating factors suchas refugee flows, the illicit trade of SALWs, persistentpoverty, and the spread of HIV/AIDS. 12

Many participants urged the creation of regional peaceprocesses to bring stability to the region. However, effortsto construct a truly regional process have been hamperedby the relative weakness of the East African Community( E AC), the Economic Community of Central AfricanStates (ECCAS), and the Communauté economique despays des grands lacs (CEPGL), the main sub-regionalorganizations in the Great Lakes. In particular, ECCAS,which has established a regional security mechanism, theConseil de paix et de securité de l’Afrique centrale( C O PAX), suffers from a lack of trust between itsmembers, which impedes the development of institu-tional measures to resolve conflict.1 3 C o n s e q u e n t l y,

efforts by the region’s mediators to resolve conflict haverelied on moral suasion and the diplomatic efforts ofother regional and international actors.1 4

In Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, the most conflict-prone countries in both the Great Lakes and CentralAfrica regions, different stages of transition and “post-conflict” reconstruction prevail. As such, many partici-pants underscored the need for an approach that wouldbe sensitive to the particular challenges of theindividual conflicts, while also contributing to acomprehensive regional peace. Despite the existence ofpeace agreements among the different contendingparties, these processes are far from self-sustaining. Thethreat of re-ignition of violence and insecurity remainshigh. While domestic efforts to ensure peace agreementimplementation are primary, there is a need for comple-mentary efforts by regional and other external actors.

Rwanda

In April 2004, Rwanda marked ten years since thegenocide of approximately 800,000 Rwandans (mostlyfrom the Tutsi community) orchestrated by Hutu


8 Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region

12 Musifiky Mwanasali, “Security Dynamics in Central Africa,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,from 15–17 December 2003.13 Ibid. 14 Gilbert Khadiagala, “Security Dynamics in the Great Lakes,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,from 15–17 December 2003.

From left to right: Dr. Khoti Kamanga, University of Dar es Salaam; Ms.Amy Smythe, UNMission in the Congo; Ms. Angela Muvumba, IPA.

extremists.15 Peacebuilding in Rwanda has emphasizedreconciliation and building democratic institutions. Inmany respects, Rwanda holds important lessons forsuccessfully emerging from the trauma of intensepolitical violence to a functioning state. While muchprogress has occurred, the current government ofRwanda has also been criticized for not adequatelynurturing political liberalization. Moreover, someparticipants noted, Rwanda’s support of the insurgentRassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD)-Goma in the DRC continues to impede the regionalpeace process.

In the years following the genocide, institutions forreconciliation have been established – such as thetraditional gacaca courts, in Rwanda, and the UN-established International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda(ICTR), which is based in Arusha, Tanzania. The ICTR,which has been the most prominent institution toemerge from the genocide, has been criticized frommany angles. One of the most frequently citedcriticisms is its perceived sluggishness. Sinceoperations began in 1995, the ICTR has completed 13trials; currently 56 people are in custody and 20 peopleare on trial. Much of the slow processes of the ICTRmay be due to the judges’ preoccupation withrespecting the rights of the accused and carefullyavoiding the appearance of automatic bias against theextremist Hutus. The intent of the ICTR is also unclear;charged with punishing those responsible for thegenocide, it is difficult to determine how far up thechain of command to prosecute. Finally, the Rwandangovernment has proved reluctant to place members ofthe Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) on trial for warcrimes – a tactic some fear will leave the reconciliationprocess incomplete.16 Some participants noted thatpreventing the RPF to stand trial also cast a shadow onthe accountability of the Kagame government and

reinforced perceptions that the Rwandan governmentcontinues to treat ethnic groups unequally.Furthermore, it highlights the tension of choosing theright balance between justice and peace – which wouldentail allowing both RPF members and Hutus to standtrial – and stability.

Democratic institutions also have developedi n c o m p l e t e l y. While post-genocide Rwanda hasconducted two national elections – the local electionsof March 2001 and the presidential elections of May2003 – these exercises have been faulted for massiveelectoral flaws. Most recently, in the 2003 presidentialelections, opposition groups were banned and harassedby the government. Moreover, in the last few years,civil society has been subjected to continued coercion,as evidenced by the closure of a number ofindependent newspapers and the defection of officialscritical about government.17

While some called for patience with Rwanda’sdemocratic transition and reconciliation efforts, othersquestioned the extent of its achievements following thegenocide. Indeed, while Rwanda holds regular electionsand adopts institutions associated with democratictransition, it simultaneously pursues policies that maylead to structural violence. Because of widespreadelectoral fraud and restrictions on civil society, partic-ipants challenged Rwanda’s progress on democracyand worried that the international community had notadequately addressed serious deficits in governance bythe post-genocide regime. Several participants felt thatthe Rwandan government’s undemocratic practices,restrictions on the ICTR, as well as the allegedcontinued support for insurgents in neighboring DRC,posed threats to peace and security. Some even fearedthat Rwanda may experience another round of ethnicviolence.


Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region 9

15 For accounts of the Rwandan genocide see: Bruce Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure (Boulder, CO: LynneRienner Publishers, 2001); Fergal Keane, Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey (New York: Penguin Books, 1996); and MahmoodMamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 2001). 16 Kingsley Moghalu, “The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Problems and Prospects,” presented at the seminar organizedby IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003.17 Filip Reyntjens, “Rwanda: Ten Years After the Genocide,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,from 15–17 December 2003. See also Human Rights Watch, Preparing for Elections: Tightening Control in the Name of Unity, HumanRights Watch Briefing Paper, May 2003 (electronic version).

If a robust transition was to occur in Rwanda, manyparticipants emphasized that the internationalcommunity could not choose to remain neutral on thedevelopment of its electoral institutions and reconcili-ation efforts in exchange for avoiding confrontationwith the Rwandan government. Such behavior on thepart of the international community, participants felt,had developed – and Kagame seemed willing to exploitit – in the aftermath of their collective sense of guiltover the gross mismanagement and silence during thegenocide. Urgently, some warned that the internationalcommunity should take decisive steps to avoid a returnto ethnic violence in Rwanda. Deciding to activelyevaluate the progress in Rwanda presents the interna-tional community with a dilemma: should the interna-tional community praise Rwanda’s steps towarddemocratization or call attention to democratictransgressions? How should the internationalcommunity react to the Rwandan government’s failureto cooperate with the work of the ICTR? In the end,many felt that the international community should bemore willing to criticize Rwanda.

Burundi

After nearly a decade of war, Burundi now stands at acritical moment in its peace-building efforts. Followingseveral faltering steps in the peace process, the latestaccords, the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence andSecurity Power Sharing in Burundi, signed in October2003 and the Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Issues,signed in November 2003, provide hope that peacemay be attained in Burundi. The Pretoria Protocolsreaffirm the Arusha Agreement signed in 2002 and callfor a cease-fire between the government and theMouvement conseil national pour la defense de la

democratie-forces pour la defense de la democratie( C N D D - F D D ) .1 8 This agreement is of significancebecause it indicates a shift in the CNDD-FDD, thelargest Hutu armed insurgency, whose constituency ofarmed insurgent groups had previously been unable toreach a working agreement on inclusion in the transi-tional government.19

Yet, despite this breakthrough, participantsunderscored the fragility of the peace process. Firstly,many cited the continued exclusion of a ke ycomponent of Burundian society, the Parti pour lalibération du peuple hutu – Forces nationales del i b é r a t i o n ( PALIPEHUTU-FNL). Secondly, post-conflictreconciliation, in turn, is threatened by the failure ofthe Burundi government (and the internationalcommunity in general) to acknowledge the 1972genocide of Hutus and by inadequate planning for therepatriation of refugees. Even today, it is an eventthat some ruling Tutsi elites deny, therebydiminishing the prospects of true reconciliation. Tworecommendations to facilitate the Burundian peaceprocess emerged. The first recommendation was theimportance of acknowledging the impact of the 1972genocide in Burundi. The second recommendationwas the importance of addressing the flow andrepatriation of Burundian refugees throughout theregion.

Repatriation and Reintegration of Refugees to Burundi

At present, it is estimated that in Tanzania there areapproximately 540,000 refugees from Burundi.20 Theirimpending repatriation to Burundi raises concernslocally and regionally that violence may return toBurundi as only minimal economic opportunities have


10 Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region

18 The Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi, 8 October 2003 (available fromhttp://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Burundi/burundiprot.pdf 29 April 2004); The Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defence, andSecurity Power Sharing Issues in Burundi, 2 November 2003 (available from http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Burundi/ptaprot.pdf 29April 2004); Accord Global de Cessez-le-feu Entre le Gouvernement de Transition du Burundi et le Mouvement Conseil National Pourla Defense de la Democratie-Forces pour la Defense de la Democratie (CNDD-FDD), Dar es Salaam, 16 November 2003 (available fromhttp://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Burundi/ceasefirefr.pdf 29 April 2004). 19 Henri Boshoff, “Burundi: The African Union’s First Mission,” African Security Analysis Program, Institute for Security Studies,Situation Report, 10 June 2003 (electronic version); Jan van Eck, “Burundi Update – October 2003: A brief overview of currentdevelopments within the Burundian peace process,” Institute for Security Studies Seminar: Burundi: A Piecemeal Peace, 28 October2003 (electronic version); René Lemarchand, “Burundi at the Cross Roads,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar esSalaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003.20 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Report 2002 (Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR, June 2003),(electronic version), p. 142.

been devised for the returning refugees. In fact, partic-ipants noted, one reason for the intransigence andpopularity of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL are the continuingdire economic conditions in rural areas, where govern-ment services are either very minimal or absent. Assuch, it was recommended that the government investsignificant resources in economic development andpolitical reform in rural areas. Still, some participantscautioned, economic investment alone, thoughincreasing the number of private enterprise opportuni-ties, will not solve the problem of ethnic tension orfacilitate reconciliation. To resolve inter-ethnicviolence, participants recommended the institution of asystem of affirmative action and a guarantee ofminority rights.

Addressing Past Genocide

The continuing presence and support of thePALIPEHUTU-FNL not only reflects the dearth ofeconomic opportunity, but also the still-unacknowl-edged genocide of Hutus by Tutsis that took place inBurundi in 1972. The denial by the government of thetragic events of 1972 that resulted in a massive influxof Hutu refugees into neighboring countries,underscores the absence of a political will to buildtrust and obtain reconciliation. According to manyparticipants, in order to move the peace processforward in Burundi, it is imperative to recognize thegenocide of Hutus. The past looms large in Burundi,highlighting the need to address questions of impunityalong with the threat of political instability.Navigating between acknowledgement and justice forpast crimes will require dialogue and mediationbetween state actors and members of civil society inorder to facilitate reconciliation. The role of regionalactors and the international community in assistingthe ongoing Burundian peace process was deemednecessary at this juncture, where peacekeeping effortsrequire both international support and domesticc o o p e r a t i o n .

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, a vast nationwith immense natural resources, has twice served as atheater of war in the 20th century. The most recent war,in 1998, brought the regional cleavages and domestictensions into sharp relief. Like its neighbors in theGreat Lakes region, the DRC’s peace remains precar-ious. In August 2003, after the Global and InclusiveAgreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo, which allowed the Lusaka Agreement of1999 to proceed, the DRC established a transitionalgovernment, which is mandated to oversee thedemobilization, disarmament, and reintegration ofarmed groups and to prepare for forthcomingdemocratic elections. However, the intertwined legacyof the past links the previous governments of the DRCto its former allies/rivals, whose military and economicinterventions continue to hamper the process of peace-building. In addition, regional and internationalcommercial interests in the DRC, known for its gold,diamonds, coltan, copper, and timber, further compli-cate the peacemaking process. Indeed, the wholesalepredation of the DRC’s natural resource wealth hascontinued despite the peace accords, which includedfew meaningful provisions for the creation of atransparent legal framework for resource exploitation.

The complex causes of conflict in the DRC point to theneed for an integrated approach to conflict resolution –an approach that considers not only the interests ofrelevant political actors, but also the economic, socio-cultural, and environmental factors that have contributedto and sustained hostilities. To be successful, it wasrecommended that the hidden interests in the DRC bemade visible. Thus, in addition to the need for dialogueamong Congolese civil society and members of govern-ment, the impact of spillover of conflicts fromneighboring Rwanda and Burundi must be addressed – inp a r t i c u l a r, allegations of the ongoing illicit exploitationof the DRC’s natural resources by neighboring actors.


Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region 11

21 Ceasefire Agreement, August 1999 (available from http://www.usip.org/library/pa/drc/drc_07101999.html 4 February 2004).

3. Domestic Bases of RegionalInstability

The contemporary political and humanitarian crises inthe Great Lakes have domestic roots.22 The domesticconflicts spiraled into regional crises, created refugeeflows, and spawned the growth of many armed opposi-tion groups – each of which drew support from aneighboring country. Subsequently, political andeconomic reform, legitimate leadership, and anaccountable government emerged as major prerequi-sites for the establishment of an enduring peace in thisregion.

Democratic Reform and Conflict Management

The weak institutions of the Great Lakes states directlyimpact their ability to manage conflicts. As weakstates, they cannot adequately protect minority groupsor vulnerable ethnic groups or reconcile rival groups;manage democratic institutions effectively; providechecks and balances in their governing systems; orestablish transparent governing procedures. As aresult, participation and trust by the polity ingovernance is diminished.2 3 Thus, although the ke ystates in the Great Lakes region – Rwanda, Burundi,and the DRC – are at various states of post-conflicttransition to democratic states, conflict between ethnicgroups will most likely be resolved outside the state’ssystems, increasing the chances of violence. Hence,many emphasized, political reform becomesparamount to ensure the success of the proposeddemocratic transitions in these countries with legaciesof inter-communal violence, institutionalizedi n e q u a l i t y, and privatization of state resources by theelite. In the absence of reconciliation betweencommunities that have undergone cycles of violence inRwanda and Burundi, the fear of a resurgence ofconflict needs to be addressed urgently. In bothcountries, participants asserted, the reconciliationprocess could be facilitated through ensuring the equalrights and representation of minorities. Repatriation

and reintegration of refugees into Burundi requires notonly economic, but political will as well. In the case ofBurundi, many suggested that a form of affirmativeaction to enable refugees to access economic resourcesand political power might provide the impetusnecessary to keep the peace process on track.

Civil society organizations and the internationalcommunity can play a significant role in facilitatingthe consolidation of peace. Historically, civil societyorganizations have pressed governments fordemocratic reforms, monitored and advocated forhuman rights, and demanded new leadership, asoccurred in Uganda. Yet, civil society organizationssuffer from their own weak institutions, tenuousconnections to local populations, inadequate fundingstrategies, and poor networks.24 However, by takingownership of the process of peacebuilding and workingin partnership with international actors to prevent theescalation of conflicts, some of these constraints maybe overcome. In fact, some participants conceded, thefinancial and diplomatic resources of the international


12 Domestic Bases of Regional Instability

22 Khadiagala.23 See Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” The Washington Quarterly , Summer 2002 (electronic version),pp. 85–90.24 Muvumba.

From left to right: Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Chairman of the Board ofTrustees, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation; Mr. Joseph W. Butiku,E xecutive Director, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation; Mr. Joseph S.Warioba, Former Vice President and Prime Minister of the UnitedRepublic of Tanzania; Prof. Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director,African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies.

community will prove critical to enabling national andregional actors to design mechanisms to ensure peaceand security.

Economic Policy Reform and Conflict Management

The states of the Great Lakes region have sought toameliorate their dire economic conditions through thecreation of regional economic communities (RECs). TheRECs in turn form economic institutions that arecharged with integrating the sub-region’s economies.Currently, the Great Lakes region hosts a number ofregional institutions with overlapping memberships:ECCAS, CEPGL, the EAC, the Common Market forEastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and thePreferential Trade Area (PTA). For a variety of reasons,the RECs have not succeeded in fostering economicintegration or in generating economic growth. Thisfailure is compounded in light of the rich naturalresources of the DRC and the discovery of oil in eightof eleven states in Central Africa – Angola, Cameroon,Chad, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republicof Congo, and São Tomé and Principe.25

Many participants felt that stronger efforts towardeconomic integration would not only end the region’seconomic stagnation, but that such economic relation-ships may help to repair political problems as well.However, the major existing institutions for economicintegration, ECCAS, EAC, and CEPGL, are neitherefficiently nor satisfactorily defined, nor adequately

institutionalized. Further exacerbating the weaknessesof the RECs, many states belong to more than one sub-regional organization. Such divided loyalties tonumerous regional economic communities hasconsequences: while national economies falter, ethnicrivalries and conflict inter-linkages drain depletedresources and further weaken efforts to link economicreforms to conflict management.

In considering means by which to strengthen the RECsand increase their effectiveness, participants debatedwhether the establishment of new, larger sub-regionalorganizations would meet regional economicchallenges or whether existing organizations could bes t r e n g t h e n e d .2 6 Participants identified several difficul-ties in changing the current structure of RECs. Mosts i g n i f i c a n t l y, some participants noted that memberstates may have vested interests in maintaining thestatus quo. Moreover, it may be difficult to establishagreement among the region’s states on what a biggeror more efficient REC may entail: with many states’overlapping regional affiliation, deciding which statesshould be represented by which REC could proveproblematic. Furthermore, deciding how to determinethe boundaries of an REC – whether through naturalboundaries or established formal or informal marke troutes – could prove contentious. Finally, not all partic-ipants agreed on the need for a new REC. Instead theyadvocated that countries should be paired by formingtrade agreements based on their synergies and comple-mentarities to engender economic development.


Domestic Bases of Regional Instability 13

25 Mwanasali; See also the Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy (available from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/cabsaf.html 29 March 2004).26 David Francis, “Regional Economic Integration and Development in the Great Lakes: Emerging Research Issues and PolicyChallenges,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003.

4. Trans-National Conflict Issues

In addition to the pressing matters of nationalgovernance and economic self-sufficiency facing thecountries of the Great Lakes, trans-national issues suchas the widespread flows of refugees and large numbersof internally displaced people; impoverishment; theHIV/AIDS pandemic; and the proliferation of the illicittrade of SALWs, all present challenges that require acoordination of regional and international efforts toensure peace and security.

Solutions to trans-national problems may be foundboth regionally and domestically. From a regionalperspective, participants stressed that the role ofnational leaders in putting aside rivalries to addresscommon objectives was crucial to finding the balancebetween respecting the rights of sovereign states andensuring regional consensus on addressing regionalconflicts. Internally, addressing the issues of citizen-ship and institutionalizing constitutional arrangementswere also factors that would enable national actors toimplement reforms to stem the tide of population flowsand transmission of diseases. 27

Refugees and Internally Displaced People

In one of the world’s largest regional concentrations ofpeople displaced by war, refugees and IDPs totalingalmost 900,000 are distributed throughout the sixGreat Lakes states.28 Refugees and internally displacedpeople often have been seen only as an enduringproblem – that is, as an economic burden and securitythreat to those states that host them. Local prejudicesto the contrary, refugee communities are not aprincipal locus of criminal activity, despite thehardships of refugee life.29 Nonetheless, the range ofoptions for dealing with refugees and IDPs are limitedto repatriation or resettlement – both of which, as some

participants noted, are short-sighted and ill-suitedmeasures to the realities of long-term displacement. Inthe view of many participants, a more effectiveapproach would acknowledge the long-term, socio-economic and juridical reality of displacement andregard refugees as potential agents of regional cooper-ation and recovery.

In order to devise relevant and durable solutions forreducing the number of refugees and IDPs, as well asimproving their living conditions, it is imperative todistinguish between immediate causes of displace-ment – namely, armed conflict – and root causes –such as unmet basic social and economic needs andthe denial of identity and autonomy.3 0 In the shortterm, refugees must be placed in locations thatprovide adequate resources to meet their basic needs.The search for solutions for easing the hardship ofdisplacement must be inclusive – comprising therefugees, the refugee-generating countries, and the


14 Trans-National Conflict Issues

27 Khadiagala; Mwanasali. Only Tanzania does not have a population of IDPs.28 The actual figure may be higher, as these represent the official numbers only (Khoti Kamanga, “Refugees and Internally DisplacedPeoples in the Great Lakes Region: A Continuing Challenge,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,from 15–17 December 2003). See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Appeal 2004 (Geneva, Switzerland:UNHCR, December 2003), (electronic version).29 Kamanga.30 Ibid.

From left to right: Amb. David M. Malone, President, IPA; Amb. JohnHirsch, Senior Fellow, IPA; Mr. Joseph W. Butiku, Executive Director,Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation; Amb. Felix G. N. Mosha, ExecutiveD i r e c t o r, African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management andDevelopment Issues.

refugee-hosting countries. A particularly effectivep o l i c y, it was noted, could be to target developmentassistance that benefits both the refugees and thecommunities in which they live. Integration ofdisplaced people into local communities is often theleast examined option. However, in many instances,participants noted, where refugee communities arelongstanding and where their “home” countries arestill too fragile to repatriate them, greater considera-tion should be given by host countries to improvingtheir status and opportunities by developing partial orfull forms of national and regional citizenship. In thisregard, Tanzania is a noteworthy example of a pan-African nation – one of the few African countries thathas granted citizenship to incoming refugee popula-tions. For this option to be more broadly feasible,there is a need for greater recognition of efforts tooffset the socio-economic and political costs by hostcountries as long-term refugees are assimilated intocountries for asylum.31

Poverty

Poverty is one of the root causes, as well as a result of,the region’s political violence.3 2 In the DRC forexample, the looting committed by the neighboringstates that intervened on both the government andrebel sides exacerbated the economic devastation ofthe civil war.33 Outside of war, in large part, theeconomies of the Great Lakes region have remainedunderdeveloped due to the state-centric policiespursued in the post-colonial period, the tendency forpoliticians to use the state as a means of personalenrichment, and lack of appropriate investment in

human capacity development and other factors thatwill spur economic development. Specifically, privati-zation of state resources by ruling elites, the persist-ence of shadow markets, and the erosion of socialservices have stunted national and regional economies.Weak national economies, in turn, lack the dynamismnecessary to provide the resources to be channeledtoward resolving regional conflict.34

The poverty in some of the states of the Great Lake sregion is even more paradoxical given the richendowment of natural resources. As noted previously,eight of the eleven countries in the overlapping CentralAfrica region produce oil.3 5 The poverty of a number ofthe oil-producing countries is due to mismanagementand non-transparent accounting of the oil-revenue. Forthe most part, many governments in the oil-producingcountries, in cooperation with international oilcompanies, have exclusively controlled the oil revenueof these countries.3 6 While the gross national product ofmany of these countries is positive because of the largeamount of revenues from oil,3 7 their ranking on theUnited Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP)Human Development Index remains low. Indeed, ten ofthe fourteen countries comprising the Great Lakes andCentral Africa regions fall in the “low human develop-ment” category, and never rise above 116 (EquatorialGuinea’s rating) out of 175.3 8

Recommendations for alleviating poverty comprisedimproving economic governance and the engagementof the international community to employ moreeffective monitoring. In particular, economicgovernance should focus on the elimination of


Trans-National Conflict Issues 15

31 Ibid.32 Adebayo Adedeji, “The Constitution of Order in the Great Lakes Through Human Security,” presented at the seminar organized byIPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003; and Gérard Prunier, “Economic Dimensions of Conflict in the GreatLakes Region,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003.33 Prunier.34 Ibid; Francis.35 Mwanasali. See also Global Witness, Time for Transparency: Coming clean on oil, mining and gas revenues, March 2004 (electronicversion).36 See Global Witness, Time for Transparency.37 See, Ibid; International Monetary Fund, “Central African Economic and Monetary Community: Recent Developments and RegionalPolicy Issues,” IMF Country Report No. 03/398, December 2003 (electronic version).38 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2003, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003),(electronic version), pp. 241-244.

bribery and other forms of corruption. For its part, theinternational community may use a number of toolsat its disposal such as monitoring resource flows anduses of development assistance funds.3 9 O t h e rrecommendations emphasized the acceleration of theregion’s economic integration (see the section aboveon Economic Policy Reform and Conflict Manage-m e n t) .

HIV/AIDS

It is not an understatement to say that the HIV/AIDSpandemic constitutes the most lethal threat to socialand economic development in the region. By 2003,a p p r oximately 26.6 million people (an increase ofalmost 14 percent from 2002) in sub-Saharan Africawere infected with HIV, out of a global estimated totalof 40 million.4 0 In the Great Lakes region, theprevalence of HIV/AIDS among the adult population isas follows: Kenya: 14 percent; Rwanda: 11 percent;Burundi: 11 percent; Tanzania (excluding Zanzibar,which has 0.75 percent prevalence rate): 7 percent;Uganda: 5 percent; and the DRC: 5 percent.41

Combined with the excessive poverty and underdevel-opment of the majority of rural areas of the region, theeffect of infectious diseases on vulnerable sectors ofsociety needs to be addressed. HIV/AIDS becomes atrans-national problem especially during conflict. Inthe Great Lakes, where regionalized conflict hasexisted for nearly a decade, this risk is particularlyacute as armed groups travel across borders and userape and forced marriage as weapons of war. In thisregard, failure to include public health policy as anintegral part of post-conflict reconstruction will leadto devastating impacts on affected communities, aswell as the region.

The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Another area of continued vulnerability for the GreatLakes region is the untrammeled illicit proliferation ofsmall arms and light weapons. Though estimates varywidely, it is widely recognized that the Great Lakesregion is inundated with SA LWs – which allowconflicts to persist.42 In the DRC itself, an estimated onemillion SALWs are in private hands.43 This situationowes as much to the weakness of local governmentcapacities for law enforcement and border control as itdoes to the multiplicity of avenues for the illicit globalarms trade more broadly.

In the long-term, participants noted, controlling thetrade of SA LWs requires a concerted internationalsolution. In the short-term, greater attention andresources must be directed to the coordinated implemen-tation of the various disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration (DDR) programs in the region. As currentlystructured, DDR programs suffer from a host of ills,including inadequate funding, poor monitoring andcollection capacities, and the neglect of the provision oflong-term economic alternatives to ex-combatants.

Given that steady progress in DDR is essential to thesuccess of the next phases of peace implementation inthe DRC and Burundi, and given that the illicit armstrade is an inherently regional phenomenon, in thelong-term, participants allowed, a region-wideapproach offers a more durable solution. Specifically,national programs would be complemented by regionalagreements, mutual monitoring, and cooperativeborder security. The International Conference on theGreat Lakes Region provides a ready venue by whichregional approaches may be developed and by whichincreased donor assistance may be solicited.


16 Trans-National Conflict Issues

39 Prunier.40 The Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), AIDS Epidemic Update December 2003, (Geneva, Switzerland:UNAIDS, December 2003), (electronic version), pp. 3, 7.41 Adult population refers to ages 15-49. The statistics for the various countries are the most recent available: Kenya - 2000; Rwanda- 1999; Burundi - 1999; Tanzania - 2001 and Zanzibar - 2000; Uganda - 2001; and the DRC - 1999. The figures are obtained from the“National Response Brief” on the UNAIDS website (available from http://www.unaids.org/nationalresponse/search.asp 3 February, 2004).42 Mwanasali; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Great Lakes Region and Central Africa – Mid-year Review,May 2003 (electronic version), p. 7.43 Maria-Lovence Tusingwire, “With Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Millennium Development Goals are in Jeopardy,”SmallArmsNet.org: Arms Management in Africa (available from http:www.smallarmsnet.org/issues/themes/unmillgoals.htm 5 April2004).

5. The Role of External Actors

External actors – such as the United Nations, theUnited States, France, Belgium, and South Africa –have had a mixed impact on the resolution of conflictin the Great Lakes region. In many respects, theresponse by external actors has been inadequate. Ashas been widely chronicled, the lack of response by theUN and the US in the Rwandan genocide may haveexacerbated the scale of the tragedy, which left nearly800,000 – mostly Tutsis – murdered. Indeed, as oneparticipant stressed, the combined exploitation andneglect of the region by the major powers is a stain onthe moral conscience of the West and one that can onlybe redeemed by a determined commitment of influenceand resources to peace, security, and development inthe region.44

To fill the leadership vacuum left by the internationalcommunity, South Africa has taken the initiative inpeacemaking activities. Notably, in Burundi and in theDRC, South Africa facilitated a negotiated settlement tothe conflict. The resolution of the conflict in the DRCespecially, and the extension of democracy into thecountry, became a major goal of South Africa’s foreignpolicy. To this end, South Africa’s president, ThaboMbeki, not only mediated the conflict, but alsosupported the peacekeeping operations and includedthe DRC into the Southern African DevelopmentCommunity, in an effort to exert control over LaurentKabila, one participant asserted. In Burundi, SouthAfrica went beyond peacemaking to committing troopsto the peacekeeping forces under the auspices of theAfrican Union, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB).South Africa was also instrumental in facilitating aregional and international response to the crisis inBurundi. Jacob Zuma, the deputy president of SouthAfrica and the special representative in Burundi, inconjunction with Jean Francois Ndongou, the foreign

minister of Gabon, and others from Ta n z a n i aillustrated South Africa’s preference for an inclusiveapproach. South Africa lobbied for the involvement ofthe African Union and financial contributions from theUN and the EU (the latter addressed below).45

Nonetheless, South Africa faced limitations on thedegree of political leverage it could exert over theGreat Lakes region to seal negotiated settlements. Inthe DRC, South Africa was frequently accused of biasedmediation, as it negotiated with the insurgents whilecontinuing to have diplomatic ties with the othercountries that were intervening in the DRC – Angola,Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. SouthAfrica’s failure to denounce the support given byUganda and Rwanda to armed factions that staged arebellion against Laurent Kabila in 1998 was seen byKabila as a betrayal by South Africa – especially givenSouth Africa’s repeated interventions in Lesotho attimes of instability. Moreover, the inclusion of the DRCinto SADC had also backfired – resulting in accusa-tions that South Africa sought to impose its version ofdemocracy on the DRC. In Burundi, South Africa failedto broker a peace agreement that all parties – namelythe CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL – accepted.46

South Africa also came up against financialconstraints: the $110 million annual cost forsupporting the 1,600 troops it had committed as part ofAMIB could not continue for the three years SouthAfrica had promised – prompting it to propose theinvolvement of the EU and the UN. The EU eventuallyprovided $8 million for AMIB.47

South Africa’s difficulties illustrate the constraintsfaced by regional powers that seek to undertakeconflict resolution. On the one hand, South Africa’sintervention conferred legitimacy to the peacemakingprocess because, arguably, it had a vested interest infostering political stability in the region. However,regional goals can conflict with its foreign policy goals


The Role of External Actors 17

44 Peter Schraeder, “Indelible or Removable ‘Stain’ of the West? Evolution of American, Belgian, and French Contributons to Peaceand (In)security in the Great Lakes Region,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17December 2003.45 Summary from Chris Landsberg, “Pax Pretoriana? South Africa’s Policy Towards the Great Lakes Conflicts,” presented at theseminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003.46 Ibid.47 Ibid.

and national financial constraints.48 The challengesencountered by South Africa highlights a role foroutside entities such as the UN, the US, France, andBelgium.

Until recently, the conflicts in Africa have not elicitedsubstantial intervention by the West. In the event thatthe US, France, or Belgium did intervene, it was withlittle regard to the internal political consequences forthe African country – except to the extent that thoseconsequences affected their countries. As a result,authoritarian leaders like Mobuto Sese Seko remainedin power.49 These tendencies are slowly being reversed.The timing reflects a number of internal politicalchanges – such as Belgium’s election of a Liberal-Social government, the improvement of relationsbetween France and Rwanda, and the terrorist attackson 11 September 2001 in the US. Moreover, theconsequences of inaction – the genocide in Rwanda –have galvanized the international community to guardagainst a repeat of such events.50 Reflecting thesepolicy changes, France and Belgium have shown anincreasing willingness to intervene in conflict resolu-tion in the Great Lakes region: France deployed troopsin Ituri province in the DRC and Belgium sees itself asan honest broker for peacemaking efforts in the region.Furthermore, as a result of the US war on terrorism andthe fact that failed states can easily harbor terrorists,the US has increasingly supported and encouraged theinvolvement of France in Africa.51

In tandem with the foreign policy changes of the majornorthern democracies, the UN is also demonstrating awillingness to re-engage in the Great Lakes region, asdemonstrated by the appointment of a specialrepresentative for the Great Lakes region and theestablishment of the UN Mission in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo. In the past, the UN could not

muster sufficient political will among its members tointervene in difficult conflicts – reflecting the policiesof its most powerful member states to stay out ofrelatively politically unimportant countries, as theyperceived much of Africa to be.52 Nonetheless, the UN’sattention to the Great Lakes in particular, and Africa ingeneral, has been erratic and insufficient. Internationalintervention in conflict resolution must be coordinatedwith the region’s fledgling security mechanisms –combining legitimacy in intervention with resourcesfor effective operationalization. While some Africanstates, such as South Africa, and sub-regional organi-zations have undertaken intervention – with mixedoutcomes – the political inter-linkages in the regionmay weaken such initiatives. To counter theseoutcomes, the UN should work closely with the AU andrelevant sub-regional organizations, such as SADC,IGAD, and ECCAS.53 Moreover, for effective democrati-zation efforts, it was noted that northern democraciesshould develop confidence-building measures at levelsbesides that of the foreign ministry.54


18 The Role of External Actors

48 Ibid.49 Schraeder.50 Ibid.51 Ibid.52 Adekeye Adebajo, “‘No More Congos!’: UN Peacekeeping in Africa’s Great Lakes,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA inDar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003.53 Ibid. 54 Schraeder.

Participants at IPA's policy seminar, "Peace, Security, and Governancein the Great Lakes Region."

6. Policy Recommendations andthe Way Forward

The participants developed a number of policyrecommendations to outline the way forward for civilsociety organizations, national governments, regionalinstitutions, and international bodies to address thepeace and security issues of the Great Lakes region.Specifically participants emphasized the need to:ensure that the International Conference on the GreatLakes Region should succeed in addressing the rootcauses of the conflict in the Great Lakes from regionaland domestic perspectives; include civil society andwomen’s groups in peacebuilding processes; stemspillover effects such as the illicit trade of SALWs, thespread of HIV/AIDS, the deepening of poverty, andforced population movements (refugees and IDPs);rationalize and strengthen regional economiccommunities; and more effectively engage the interna-tional community.

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

Participants viewed the upcoming I n t e r n a t i o n a lConference on the Great Lakes Region, set to commencewith a series of summits in November 2004, as animportant component for solving the regionalization ofconflicts in the Great Lakes. In order to ensure theeffectiveness of the conference and the comprehen-siveness of the process, participants emphasized thatthe Office of the SRSG should include women’s groups,civil society organizations, and youth associations.Furthermore, to enable the conference to establishinstitutional linkages for growth and conflict resolu-tion, the Office of the SRSG was urged to identifyspecific socio-economic or democratization projectsthat would benefit the region, thereby beginning theprocess of creating institutions to achieve commongoals.

Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation

The core countries of the Great Lakes region shoulddevelop mechanisms to balance the needs of justiceand reconciliation in the pursuit of sustainable peace.Many participants noted that in Burundi, to foster

reconciliation, the government should design affirma-tive action programs and create legal instruments thatensure the rights of minority citizens. The governmentshould also implement a sustainable repatriationproject for the refugees resulting from the expulsionsof 1972 that is accompanied with strong economicdevelopment programs. In Rwanda, the internationalcommunity was urged to address the irregularities inthe two elections, while not discounting ethnictensions that still linger in the aftermath of the 1994genocide. Moreover, Rwanda’s security fears must beadequately addressed in order to facilitate thecomplete withdrawal of Rwandan troops from theDRC. Finally, in the DRC, illicit exploitation of naturalresources should cease, and the groups that are notsignatories to the Global and Inclusive Agreement onTransition in the Democratic Republic of the Congoshould be acknowledged and included in the transi-tional institutional arrangements.

Participation of Civil Society and Women’s Groups inPeacebuilding and Reconciliation

Civil society organizations, in particular women’sgroups, have played a significant role in peacebuildingand reconciliation; however, they have not beenadequately represented in the peace processes.Moreover, these groups are weakly institutionalized.While national, regional, and international processesmust include civil society organizations and a gendersensitive approach to peacebuilding, these non-governmental groups must also undertake improve-ments of their own. In particular, participants urgedcivil society organizations to increase the strengths oftheir institutions, design long-range financingstructures, and connect their missions more closely tothe populations they serve.

Solutions to Regionalized Conflicts

Given the regionalization of conflict in the Great Lakesregion, solutions should address the sources of politicaland social instability of neighboring states. The sub-region’s states and the international community shouldfocus on stemming the proliferation of refugees andIDPs, the illicit trade of SA LWs, the spread ofHIV/AIDS, and the endemic poverty of the region.


Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward 19

Concurrently, they must also resolve domestic politicaland economic catalysts for violence such as poorgovernance, the absence of democratic institutions, ill-conceived economic policies, and poorly institutional-ized regional economic communities.

• Managing the flow of refugees and IDPs willrequire designing solutions that address bothimmediate and root causes of forced displacement.Solving immediate causes entails ending armedconflicts. However, more durable solutions shouldfocus on root causes of displacement, such asinadequate economic and social conditions, andquestions of citizenship and identity. Equallyimportant, solutions must provide support to therefugee-receiving country – for example, toimprove opportunities for the displaced and facili-tate citizenship procedures – as well as to therefugee-generating country – such as bolsteringtheir capacity to absorb repatriated refugees and tocreate sustainable reconciliation programs.

• The illicit trade in SALWs can be curbed with theassistance of regional and internationalmechanisms. Short-term solutions recommendedby participants include adequately funding andmonitoring DDR programs following conflicts. Inthe long-term, states in the Great Lakes shouldprovide political and economic support toconcerted regional agreements, engage in mutualmonitoring, and cooperate on border security.

• The states in the region, in cooperation with theinternational community, can forestall the securitythreat posed by the high incidence of HIV/AIDS by,among other measures, including public health asa critical component of economic and governancepolicies and post-conflict reconstruction programs.Importantly, the devastating economic and socialconsequences of the disease must be adequatelyaddressed.

• The rationalization of regional economic communi-ties can help curb the effects of poverty on region-alized instability. Presently, the region’s states havemultiple memberships in the RECs, causing dividedloyalties, weak commitment to goals of individualRECs, and subsequently poor institutionalization.H o w e v e r, states in the Great Lakes region mustresolve the debate on more effective construction ofRECs. Participants debated whether RECs shouldreflect formal or informal market flows, naturalboundaries, or market complementarities andsynergies. Furthermore, national policies shouldreflect more effective use and public investment ofrevenues from natural resources. Properlymanaging natural resources is especially importantgiven that eight countries in the region – Angola,Cameroon, Chad, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea,Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and São Tomé andPrincipe – produce oil.

Effective Engagement of the International Community

The institutions in the Great Lakes region and theinternational community must work together toresolve domestic political and economic catalysts forviolence, such as poor economic and politicalgovernance. The international community shouldfacilitate economic reforms and democratic transitionsthrough the provision of financial, diplomatic, andinstitutional support to national governments andregional organizations. More to the point, the UNshould work closely with Africa’s sub-regional organi-zations – namely the AU, ECCAS, IGAD, and SADC –to provide the legitimacy afforded through the UN’sperceived neutrality and the logistical support neededfor effective operationalization of a securitymechanism. Similarly, the US, France, and Belgium –historically the most influential northern democraciesin the Great Lakes region – should support work withvarious ministerial representatives, not just at theforeign ministry.

20 Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward


Chairperson,Ladies and Gentlemen,

I wish to thank the organizers of this seminar forinviting me to make remarks at this luncheon. In theseremarks I will offer my personal reflections on theBurundi Peace Process, an issue which has consumedthe efforts of this country, the East Africa region,Africa and the international community for nearly adecade.

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement forBurundi was signed on the 28th of August 2000 byseventeen political parties, the Government and theNational Assembly of Burundi. The signing of theagreement was the culmination of a five-year,intensive, all-inclusive process of negotiations facili-tated first by the late President Julius Nyerere and laterby President Nelson Mandela.

The negotiations had evolved around five clusters ofissues: the nature of the conflict, democracy and goodgovernance, peace and security for all, reconstructionand development and lastly guarantees on theimplementation of the agreement. The agreement itselfis very short, consisting of only six articles, but theprotocols, annexes and appendices to the agreementprovide in detail the substance of what was agreed.Success of the peace process depends on the implemen-tation of the whole agreement.

The frank discussion that took place on the issue of thenature of the conflict and the resultant protocol hasprovided the political will to the Barundi to pursuepeace, reconciliation, democracy and development.Before that, the ethnic divide and mistrust preventedthe Barundi to deal objectively with their problems.The Hutu and Tutsi communities could not sit togetherand conduct a dialogue in good faith. Indeed it took

economic sanctions by the region to force the Burundiparties to assemble in Arusha.

It was clear that without dealing with the past first,from the colonial legacy to post-independenceproblems, the Barundi would not be able to sit togetheras a people and find solutions to their problems. I wasnot here yesterday when you discussed the presenta-tion on Burundi. The same or similar presentationshave been made in the past by the same author andothers about the causes of the conflict. All these andmany more were discussed frankly in the Committeeon the Nature of the Conflict. The understandingresulting from those discussions enabled the communi-ties to a large extent to think and act as Barundi ratherthan Hutu and Tusti.

The protocol on democracy and good governance is theroad map to the creation of a democratic society inBurundi. It has set out the guiding principles for ademocratic constitution and a timetable to achievedemocratic elections. It recognizes the right of themajority to be fully involved in the governance of thecountry while at the same time it provides adequatelyfor the protection of the minority. It has set a transi-tional period of three years, divided into two phases of18 months each, one phase under Tusti leadership andanother under Hutu leadership.

The success of the agreement in this respect has beenphenomenal. Many people were not convinced, evenafter Arusha, that the two major groups in Burundiwould work together in the transition. Even though thetransition government was installed later than hadbeen anticipated, it has done extremely well despite theformidable challenges it has faced. The transition fromPresident Buyoya to President Ndeyizeye was smooth,and the working relationship among the leadership hasbeen cooperative and focused.

Annex I: Keynote Address 21


ANNEX I: Keynote Address

“Reflections on the Burundi Peace Process”

Mr. Joseph S. Warioba,Former Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania

The Protocol on Peace and Security for All provided forthe organization of the defense and security forces,including the separation of the army, police,gendarmerie and intelligence service, missions of thevarious forces, structure, recruitment and training. Theintention was to create truly national institutions inplace of the existing, almost monoethnic, forces. Theprotocol could not, however, be completed because noagreement could be reached on the cessation of hostil-ities and ceasefire. The reason for this was the absenceof the armed groups in the negotiations.

Since Arusha, South African Deputy President, JacobZuma, has done commendable work to move theprocess. The Pretoria Protocols, which were formallysigned in Dar es Salaam last month, have immenselymoved the process towards a durable peace in Burundi.The inclusion of CNDD- FDD in the transition govern-ment will strengthen the processes towards achieving apermanent effective ceasefire and then movingtowards democratic elections.

The successes achieved so far are encouraging and area source of hope. The remaining challenges arehowever very serious. The establishment of a new armyfor Burundi in accordance with the Arusha Agreement,the resultant demobilization and resettlement, thereturn of the refugees and their resettlement togetherwith the internally displaced persons, are not simpleacts. If these are not handled carefully they may be asource of strain. For example, the new army is likely tobe small. If adequate provision is not made for smoothresettlement of those who will be demobilized, troublemight erupt again. Similarly, if the return of refugees isdelayed or if the refugees return en masse withoutadequate arrangements for smooth resettlement, therewill be serious strains. More than ten percent of theBarundi are refugees in other countries and when theinternally displaced persons are included, thepercentage approaches fifteen. Care needs to be takento deal with these issues.

Additionally there is the issue of inclusion of the restof the armed groups. Without reaching agreement withthese groups the ceasefire will not be complete.

Burundi is a small country but densely populated. It isvery thin on natural resources and the people are very

poor. For forty years, the country has not known realpeace. The reconstruction and development of thecountry is an enormous challenge. Lack of resourcesand extreme poverty are dangers to peace and security.The protocol on reconstruction and development wasintended to address this challenge. While efforts arebeing made to achieve peace and security in Burundi,it is equally important to forcefully address the issue ofresources needed for rehabilitation, reconstruction anddevelopment. The role of the international communityis crucial in this respect. But, so far, the protocol onthis issue remains largely on paper.

There is also a political and logistical challenge arisingfrom the transitional arrangements. The A r u s h aA g r e e m e n t provides for a transition of thirty-sixmonths. During that time, the transition governmentwould be established and would carry out certain tasksto prepare for elections. These tasks included theadoption of a new constitution and electoral law andthe establishment of various institutions.

The transition period started a year late, mainlybecause of problems that delayed reaching agreementon cessation of hostilities and a ceasefire. Had it goneaccording to plan, local government elections wouldhave already taken place and the national assemblyelections would be in preparation by now. It is nowclear that the timetable will be hard to meet.

The Arusha Agreement also provided for a two-phaseleadership of the transitional administration. The firstphase would be led by a Tutsi and the second phase bya Hutu. President Buyoya led the fist phase for eighteenmonths up to May 2003 and then handed over toPresident Ndeyizeye for the next eighteen months.

Time is needed for preparation for smooth elections atall levels from local to national. Soon, the question willbe asked whether the remaining time is adequate forthe purpose. Should the question of extension of thetransition arise, intense political heat will surface. Howlong will the extension last and who will lead duringthat time? This is an issue that is likely to reopen theethnic divide.

To reach agreement on the Pretoria Protocols, attentionwas mainly placed on power dispensation. What is

22 Annex I: Keynote Address


generally known is that CNDD-FDD has agreed on theimplementation of the Ceasefire Agreement o fDecember 2002 as a result of being accommodated inthe transitional government.

The main purpose of Arusha is however democraticgovernance. This will be achieved by the holding ofelections. President Ndayizeye is scheduled to vacateoffice by November 2004. The current efforts to bringinto the fold the remaining groups, includingPALIPEHUTU-FNL and the original CNDD,PALIPEHUTU and FROLINA, should go hand in handwith efforts to achieve elections as scheduled. Failureto do that will take Burundi back to Pre – Arusha.

In conclusion, we can say major achievements havebeen made in the Burundi Peace Process. A transitionalgovernment was established in accordance with theArusha Agreement and it has functioned relativelywell. There is understanding and political peace amongthe political parties and the ethnic divide and mistrusthas been tempered. The smooth transition from a Tustiphase to Hutu phase and the constructive relationshipbetween Hutu and Tusti leaders in government is atestimony to this.

H o w e v e r, we have to recognize that there are still issuesto be resolved. These include the complete cessation ofhostilities, achieving a permanent and effectiveceasefire, establishment of a new army, demobilization,return and resettlement of refugees and internallydisplaced persons and the preparation and holding ofelections. If the sprit that has lead to these achieve-ments to date persists, and I see no reason why it shouldnot, the remaining issues can be resolved.

The Barundi have shown a determination to stay thecourse, but they still need assistance. The region, Africaand the international community should understandthis and continue to assist the parties diplomatically sothat they can resolve the remaining issues, and equallyimportant, to enable Burundi to obtain resources forreconciliation, rehabilitation, reconstruction anddevelopment, which is in the real sense the basis onwhich the country can attain and maintain peace,security and democracy. In doing this, all concerned,particularly the major powers involved, should focusmore on the interest of the Barundi rather than on theiron national interests – particularly the major powersinvolved.

Thank you.

Annex I: Keynote Address 23



Ladies and Gentlemen, Distinguished guests, Ambassador David Malone, Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Ambassador Ibrahima Fall, Distinguished members of the diplomatic corps:

It is an honor to welcome all of you today, to a countryliving in a very challenging geographical area inAfrica. Tanzania has had to live with neighbors caughtbetween a tragic past that they inherited and perpetu-ated, and the challenge to create a new beginning fortheir collective survival and stability.

Our president, His Excellency, Mr. Benjamin WilliamMkapa, who as you may have gathered is unavoidablyout of the country, has been at the forefront, in cooper-ation with his colleagues in the region in search forpeace. I convey to you his warmest wishes for thesuccess of your meeting here.

Over the last forty years, Tanzania has had a stronghistory of acting as a peacemaker in Africa. It istherefore entirely appropriate that this seminar onpeace, security and governance in the Great Lakesregion be held in Tanzania. Most people, when asked todefine Tanzania’s role in peace and security in theGreat Lakes region, often think of Arusha, Tanzania, atown that has hosted summits and negotiations relatedto the Burundi peace process and the Rwanda peaceaccords. Arusha also hosts the United Nations’ (UN)International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda. ButTanzania’s role has a much longer history and a greaterscope. We were at the forefront of the southern Africanliberation movement and we were catalysts forregional economic integration through the establish-ment of the Southern African Development Co-ordina-tion Conference (SADCC), the forerunner of SADC in

1980. We have hosted refugees from Eastern, Central,and Southern Africa’s conflicts. Finally, distinguishedparticipants, Tanzania has committed itself to see thisregion’s conflicts permanently resolved and hastherefore committed itself to post-conflict reconstruc-tion and reconciliation. In the capacity of PresidentMkapa as the current SADC Chair, Tanzania has hadthe honor of continuing to play an importantpeacemaking role in the region. This is a role that hasalready been carried out very effectively by hispredecessors and Tanzania’s task is to further thattradition. Because my ministry is directly involved inthe SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and SecurityCooperation, I consider it a special honor to be able totake part in this seminar, which is dealing with relatedissues.

In my brief remarks this morning, I want to highlightTanzania’s historical and contemporary efforts tonurture peace and security in the Great Lakes regionand Africa. I will speak to you today about our past,present, and future commitments to strengtheningAfrican responses to conflict in order to build durablepeace.

Decolonization and Liberation

In order to fully grasp the nature and scope ofTanzania’s involvement in peacemaking in Africa, onemust reflect on the critical role this country played inthe liberation of southern African countries fromminority rule and racist regimes. Beginning in the1960s, Tanzania actively engaged in the liberation anddecolonization struggles. Tanzania hosted the seat ofthe Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) LiberationCommittee, founded in 1963 under the leadership ofMwalimu Julius Nyerere. In addition to serving as theofficial headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee,

24 Annex II: Opening Address

ANNEX II: Opening Address

“Tanzania: Peacemaker and Proponent of Good Governance,”

Mr. Phillemon Sarungi, (MP)Minister for Defense and National Service, the United Republic of Tanzania


Tanzania, hosted several liberation movements fightingfor Africa’s freedom. The OAU Liberation Committeewas based in Dar es Salaam, and its main objective wasto achieve liberation for the rest of the continent. Ourbest tool for achieving this goal was in cooperationwith other countries and through the Committee’stireless efforts to provide political, material, and moralsupport for many of southern Africa’s liberationmovements. Tanzania was also the major catalyst forcreating the Front Line States in 1974 in order toestablish a common front for security against, and tolessen economic dependence on, apartheid SouthAfrica. Our achievements are striking, yet easily takenfor granted today. Because of the OAU LiberationCommittee, together with other initiatives, independ-ence and majority rule were achieved in Mozambiqueand Angola in 1975, Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in1990; and finally, South Africa in 1994.

Tanzania and the UN Special Committee onDecolonization

In 1961, the UN General Assembly created a 17-member Committee on Decolonization, charged withdevising the most efficient route to sovereignty andindependence for the world’s remaining colonies. In1962, the committee was expanded to 24 states. Thegenesis of the Special Committee lay in the Declarationon the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countriesand Peoples, which was adopted in 1961. Tanzania’sthen-Ambassador, John Malecela, and subsequentlySalim Ahmed Salim, served at the helm of the UNSpecial Committee on Decolonization for many years.In addition to its commitment to the liberation ofsouthern Africa and decolonization, Tanzania was afounding member of the Non-Aligned Movement andactively participated in the Group of 77 developingcountries at the UN.

The Impact of Instability on Tanzania

Tanzania’s unique role in peace and security is partly areflection of its experiences as a host country tohundreds of thousands of refugees from conflicts inneighboring countries. In fact, close to a millionrefugees from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the

Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, have found safe haven inTanzania. Many of these refugees have beenvoluntarily repatriated. We hope that those stillremaining in Tanzania will also be voluntarily repatri-ated and that the governments of their countries oforigin will create a conducive environment to permitthem to return and live in peace and freedom.

Tanzania as Peacemaker

Tanzania has served as the site for peace negotiation andreconciliation. During the Rwandan and the Burundipeacemaking processes, Arusha was the site for bothnegotiations. More importantly, Tanzania’s governmentacted as an “honest broker” during the peace processes.M w a l i m u Nyerere dedicated the last years of his life toseeking a durable solution to the Burundi problem.Inasmuch as we should be satisfied that our brothers andsisters in these countries have concluded peaceagreements, we are all sufficiently familiar to recognizethat this is the beginning of many challenges towardsustainable stability in these countries. We are awarethat the difficult aspects of demobilization and integra-tion of their armed forces have yet to take place. Inaddition, agreements in and of themselves do notchange attitudes; they merely provide a framework forimplementation of agreed and desired measures. Theparties that were in conflict in these countries now facethe challenge to foster a new attitude in their societies,which is necessary for lasting national reconciliation.

Resolving Internal Conflict

Now, I want to be frank and explain to you thatTanzania’s experiences in peacemaking have not allbeen focused on exporting peace, but also oncultivating it internally. You are all aware that theUnited Republic of Tanzania underwent its ownpolitical tensions when a dispute arose between theChama cha Mapindu (CCM) and the Civic United Front(CUF) on questions related to elections. But Tanzanialearned an extremely important lesson through itsefforts to resolve its own internal conflict. After ninemonths of negotiations, without outside involvement,the CCM and the CUF signed a reconciliationagreement in October 2001. The agreement also led to

Annex II: Opening Address 25


His Excellency, President Benjamin Mkapa’s appoint-ment of an additional CUF official to the UnionParliament. In May 2003, the Zanzibar ElectoralCommission conducted by-elections to fill vacant seatsin the parliament. Observers considered these by-elections, the first major test of the reconciliationagreement, to be free, fair, and peaceful.

I believe that this is an important lesson for Africa.With some foresight and determination, we are capableof finding solutions to our conflicts. We need notalways be dependent on mediators from outside Africa.This case was an interesting illustration of “Africansolutions to African problems.”

Economic Integration

Internationally, we in Africa must also acknowledgethat beyond our own internal challenges, we mustbegin to face the facts and realities of globalization.Information and technological forces driving theprocess of globalization have made the world, andAfrica’s place in it, more complex. This is directlyrelated to the major challenges which lie ahead for ourregion. There remain a number of conditions whichmust be met in countries emerging from conflict. Theseconditions revolve around addressing certain difficultissues such as demilitarization, demobilization, reinte-gration of combatants into societies, post-conflictreconciliation, and reconstruction. For example, westill have not recognized that demilitarization anddemobilization have not been completed in Burundi;that parts of the DRC face enormous challenges interms of building infrastructure and reconstructingcommunities that have been torn apart by war; that, infact, peace and security throughout the region aredirectly related to how we are able to integrate oureconomies and move toward economic liberation forall of our peoples. As we become more aware of theseproblems, African policymakers, academics, militarypersonnel, diplomats, government officials, and civilsociety actors must foster effective responses to thedifferent challenges we all face.

There is a saying that the absence of war does notsignify the presence of peace. This saying captures the

fundamental challenges which lie ahead for the GreatLakes region. The absence of war in Burundi, Rwanda,or the DRC does not mean that there will automaticallybe a lasting peace. The absence of war is an opportu-nity to build peace. That is why the purpose of thisseminar is so timely. I have noted that the organizerswrote in the concept paper that “as the search for adurable peace in the Great Lakes region continues,regional economic integration is increasingly viewedas a potential mechanism for conflict prevention,resolution and management in the Great Lakes region.”Only through regional unity can we face the challengesin this region with confidence and have a decentchance for success.

In addition to regional economic integrationpotentially offering a system of collective security,such integration has the advantage of creating largermarkets for goods and services and a stronger voice forregional actors in international trade negotiations.Regional economic integration can potentially providea mechanism to counter the negative effects of global-ization on weak and vulnerable economies in theregion. Such integration could also help to acceleratethe region’s development and help cement theconditions necessary for nurturing a durable peace.Regional integration could potentially help to reduceethnic divisions and increase regional cooperation. Weneed to devise strategies for the implementation ofshort and medium term regional integration projectsthat will have an impact that is more meaningful forbuilding peace. We hope that the international confer-ence on the Great Lakes—spearheaded by the AfricanUnion (AU) and the UN—can help this region achievethese noble goals.

Conclusion

Ladies and Gentlemen,Distinguished Guests,

Let me conclude by stating my deepest appreciation foryour commitment to the important issues of peace andsecurity in the Great Lakes region. In these briefremarks, I have attempted to outline some of the activi-ties of the United Republic of Tanzania in nurturing

26 Annex II: Opening Address


Annex II: Opening Address 27

peace and security in the Great Lakes region. Ourcommitment is, of course, based on a sense of enlight-ened self-interest. These interests are based on our ownhistorical engagement with the liberation of Africanpeoples from marginalization, inequality, and poverty.We wish to see people living in refugee camps inTanzania voluntarily repatriated to their homecountries; we would like to see post-conflictreconstruction efforts in Burundi, the DRC, andRwanda satisfactorily completed; we would hope that

peace and stability become realities for the millions ofcitizens in this region as we move from crises andconflicts to security and stability.

I thank the organizers of this event for honoring us bybringing this seminar to Tanzania and wish you everysuccess in your efforts to promote durable peace, goodgovernance, and regional integration in the GreatLakes region.

ANNEX III: Agenda

15 December 2003

9:00 am—10:15 am Welcome

Ambassador David M. Malone, President, International Peace Academy

Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-Generalfor the Great Lakes Region, Kenya

Dr. Felix G. N. Mosha, Executive Director, African Dialogue Centre for ConflictManagement and Development Issues, Tanzania

Mr. Joseph W. Butiku, Executive Director, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, Tanzania

Opening Address

Mr. Phillemon Sarungi, (MP), Minister for Defence and National Service,Tanzania, “Tanzania’s Security Role in the Great Lakes Region”

10:15 am—11:30 am Session I: Security Dynamics in Central Africa and the Great Lakes Region

Chair: Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-Generalfor the Great Lakes Region, Kenya

Dr. Musifiky Mwanasali, Regional Democracy Adviser, United Nations Sub-regionalCentre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa, Cameroon,“Security Dynamics in Central Africa”

Dr. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Associate Professor, The Johns Hopkins University,United States, “Security Dynamics in the Great Lakes”

Dr. Felix G. N. Mosha, Executive Director, African Dialogue Centre for ConflictManagement and Development Issues, Tanzania, “Mediation Efforts in theGreat Lakes”

11:45 am—1:30 pm Session II: The Tragic Triplets: The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda,and Burundi

Chair: Mr. Joseph W. Butiku, Executive Director, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation,Tanzania

Professor Mwesiga Baregu, Professor, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,“The Democratic Republic of the Congo”


28 Annex III: Agenda

Dr. Filip Reyntjens, Chair, Institute of Development Policy and Management,University of Antwerp, Belgium, “Rwanda”

Professor René Lemarchand, Professor Emeritus, University of Florida, United States,“Burundi”

2:30 pm—4:30 pm Session III: Economic Agendas, Regional Integration, and Development

Chair: Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director, African Centre forDevelopment and Strategic Studies (ACDESS), Nigeria

Professor Gérard Prunier, Researcher, French National Center for Scientific Research,France, “Economic Dimensions of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region”

Dr. David Francis, Lecturer, Bradford University, United Kingdom,“Regional Economic Integration and Development in the Great Lakes”

4:45 pm—6:00 pm Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-Generalfor the Great Lakes Region, Kenya, “The International Conference on theGreat Lakes Region”

16 December 2003

9:30 am—11:30 am Session IV: Governance, Gender, and Migration

Chair: Ms. Amy Smythe, Senior Gender Advisor, UN Mission in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo, The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Ms. Angela Ndinga Muvumba, Senior Program Officer, International PeaceAcademy, “The Role of Civil Society in Governance and Democratization”

Dr. Rose Kadende-Kaiser, Lecturer, University of Pennsylvania, United States,“Gender, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region”

Dr. Khoti Kamanga, Senior Lecturer and Coordinator, Centre for the Study ofForced Migration, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, “Refugees and InternallyDisplaced People in the Great Lakes Region”

11:45 am—1:30 pm Session V: The Role of Regional and External Actors

Chair: Ms. Lindiwe Zulu, Executive Head of Government Relations, Vodacom,South Africa

Dr. Chris Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa,“South Africa’s Role in the Great Lakes”


Annex III: Agenda 29

Professor Peter Schraeder, Professor, Loyola University, United States, “France,Belgium, and the United States in the Great Lakes”

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution,South Africa, “The United Nation’s Peacekeeping Role in the Great Lakes”

Mr. Kingsley Moghalu, Former Legal Adviser and Spokesman, United NationsInternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Tanzania, “The InternationalCriminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Problems and Prospects”

1:30 pm—2:45 pm Keynote Address

Introductory Remarks: Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Chairman of the Board of Trustees,Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, Tanzania, and Former Secretary-General,Organization of African Unity

Mr. Joseph S. Warioba, Former Vice President and Prime Minister of theUnited Republic of Tanzania, “Personal Reflections on the Burundian Peace Process”

2:45 pm—4:15 pm Session VI: Human Security in the Great Lakes Region

Chair: Ambassador John Hirsch, Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy

Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director, African Centre for Developmentand Strategic Studies (ACDESS), Nigeria, “The Constitution of Order in theGreat Lakes through Human Security”

Discussant: Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Chairman of the Board of Trustees,Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, Tanzania, and Former Secretary-General,Organization of African Unity

17 December 2003

9:30 am—10:45 am Rapporteur’s Report and Discussion


D r. Dorina Bekoe and Ms. Karen Ballentine, Associates, International Peace Ac a d e m y

11:00 am—1:00 pm The Way Forward


Dr. Ruth Iyob, Director, Africa Program, International Peace Academy

Dr. Musifiky Mwanasali, Regional Democracy Adviser, United Nations Sub-regionalCentre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa, Cameroon

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution,South Africa


30 Annex III: Agenda

1. Professor Adebayo AdedejiExecutive DirectorAfrican Centre for Development and StrategicStudies (ACDESS)Ijebu Ode, Nigeria

2. Mr. Nuwe Amanya-MushegaSecretary-GeneralEast African CommunityArusha, Tanzania

3. Ambassador Adonia AyebareThe Embassy of the Republic of UgandaKigali, Rwanda

4. Ambassador Mamadou BahSpecial Representative of the African UnionChairmanBujumbura, Burundi

5. Ms. Mary Balikungeri DirectorRwanda Women’s NetworkKigali, Rwanda

6. Professor Mwesiga BareguUniversity of Dar es SalaamDar es Salaam, Tanzania

7. Mr. Marc-André Brault Special EnvoyDepartment of Foreign Affairs and InternationalTradeOttawa, Canada

8. Mr. Batabiha BushokiCampaign pour la paixNairobi, Kenya

9. Mr. Arsène Mwaka Bwenge Centre d’Etudes PolitiquesUniversité de KinshasaKinshasa, DRC

10. Mr. Churchil Ewumbue-MononoEmbassy of CameroonAddis Ababa, Ethiopia

11. Catherine FlemmingDepartment of Foreign Affairs and InternationalTradeOttawa, Canada

12. Dr. David FrancisDirectorAfrica CenterBradford UniversityBradford, United Kingdom

13. Mr. David HamadziripiHigh Commissioner of Zimbabwe toMozambiqueMaputo, Mozambique

14. Ms. Nina Wodstrup JensenDanish Defence Staff Ministry of DefenseCopenhagen, Denmark

15. Mr. Morten JespersenDepartment for AfricaMinistry of Foreign AffairsCopenhagen, Denmark

16. Dr. Rose Kadende-Kaiser University of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania

17. Dr. Khoti Kamanga Centre for the Study of Forced MigrationFaculty of LawUniversity of Dar es SalaamDar es Salaam, Tanzania

18. Ms. Pascasie KanaOpération d’appui à l’auto-promotionBujumbura, Burundi


Annex IV: Seminar Participants 31

ANNEX IV: Seminar Participants

19. Professor Gilbert M. KhadiagalaPaul H. Nitze School of Advanced InternationalStudiesThe Johns Hopkins UniversityWashington D.C.

20. Mr. Jean-Paul KimonyoCenter for Conflict ManagementNational University of RwandaButare, Rwanda

21. Dr. Chris LandsbergDirector Centre for Policy StudiesDoornfontein, South Africa

22. Professor René LemarchandUniversity of FloridaGainesville, Florida

23. Mel McNultyDepartment for International Development Nairobi, Kenya

24. Ms. Aida Mebrate MengistuUnited Nations Development ProgrammeKhartoum, Sudan

25. Mr. Kingsley Moghalu Former Legal Adviser and SpokesmanUnited Nations International Criminal Tribunalfor RwandaArusha, Tanzania

26. Mr. David MonyaeCenter for Africa’s International RelationsUniversity of the WitwatersrandJohannesburg, South Africa

27. Ambassador James MugumeDirector International CooperationMinistry of Foreign AffairsKampala, Uganda

28. Betty MurungiDirectorUrgent Action Fund Life Ministry CentreNairobi, Kenya

29. Ms. Immaculée Birhaheka NamudumbiAppui aux initiatives des femmesBukavu, DRC

30. Mr. Eugene NindoreraMinistry of Foreign AffairsBujumbura, Burundi

31. Ms. Imelda NziroreraCentre de promotion des droits de la personnehumaine et de la prévention du genocideBujumbura, Burundi

32. Mr. Vicente Pinto de AndradeCatholic University of Angola Luanda, Angola

33. Professor Gérard Prunier French National Center for Scientific ResearchAddis Ababa, Ethiopia

34. David PulkolFormer Director-GeneralExternal Security OrganizationOffice of the President of UgandaKampala, Uganda

35. Dr. Filip Reyntjens Institute of Development and PolicyManagementUniversity of AntwerpAntwerp, Belgium

36. Ms. Helena RietzAfrica DepartmentMinistry of Foreign AffairsStockholm, Sweden

37. Captain C. H. RossSouth African Defence ForcesCenturion, South Africa

38. Mr. Phillemon Sarungi, (MP)Minister for Defence and National ServiceDar es Salaam, Tanzania

39. Professor Peter SchraederLoyola UniversityChicago, Illinois


32 Annex IV: Seminar Participants

40. Major-General Philippe SibandaZimbabwe Armed Forces Harare, Zimbabwe

41. Ms. Amy Smythe Gender OfficeUN Mission in the CongoKinshasa, DRC

42. Mr. Joseph S. WariobaFormer Vice President and Prime Ministerof the United Republic of TanzaniaDar es Salaam, Tanzania

43. Ms. Lindiwe ZuluVodacomMidrand, South Africa

Office of the Special Representative of the UNSecretary-General for the Great Lakes Region Nairobi, Kenya

44. Mr. Ibrahima Fall Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General

45. Mr. Cheick Lamine CondePolitical Affairs Officer

46. Mr. Khassim DiagnePolitical Affairs Officer

47. Mr. Abdel-Rahman GhandourSpecial Assistant

48. Ms. Pauline Kapongo-BPersonal Assistant

49. Mr. George Ola-DaviesPress Officer

50. Ms. Seraphine ToeLiaison OfficerUN Liaison Office with the African Union

African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Managementand Development IssuesArusha, Tanzania

51. Dr. Felix G. N. MoshaExecutive Director

Centre for Conflict Resolution Cape Town, South Africa

52. Dr. Adekeye AdebajoExecutive Director

53. Dr. Mark ChingonoSenior Manager, Research Project

54. Ms. Bulelwa Makalima NgewanaSenior Manager, Africa Project

55. Alison LazarusSenior Trainer

Mwalimu Nyerere FoundationDar es Salaam, Tanzania

56. Mr. Joseph W. ButikuExecutive Director

57. Dr. Salim Ahmed SalimChairman of the Board of Trustees

UN Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights andDemocracy in Central AfricaYaoundé, Cameroon

58. Dr. Musifiky MwanasaliRegional Democracy Adviser

International Peace Academy

59. Ambassador David M. MalonePresident

60. Dr. Necla TschirgiVice President


Annex IV: Seminar Participants 33

61. Dr. Ruth IyobDirector, Africa Program

62. Ambassador John HirschSenior Fellow

63. Mr. Arthur BainomugishaCivil Society Fellow

64. Ms. Karen Ballentine Senior Associate

65. Dr. Dorina BekoeAssociate

66. Mr. Mashood IssakaProgram Officer

67. Ms. Angela Ndinga MuvumbaSenior Program Officer


34 Annex IV: Seminar Participants

Partner Organizations

The Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for theGreat Lakes Region (Kenya)

The Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Great LakesRegion, based in Nairobi, Kenya, was established in 1996. Mr. Ibrahima Fall has served as the SpecialRepresentative since July 2002. The mandate of the office is to resolve the conflict in the Great Lakes region.To that end, its major activities include organizing an international conference to promote peace, security,and development in the region, and preventing the fragmentation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.Over the past year, Mr. Fall has laid the groundwork for the international conference by meeting withgovernment representatives and civil society actors. The first preparatory meeting for the internationalconference is scheduled for November 2004.

The African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues (Tanzania)

The African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues, based in Arusha, Tanzania,undertakes research and provides advice and training on methods to identify early warning signs and avoidviolent conflict. Through its network of non-governmental organizations in the continent, the AfricanDialogue Centre publishes material on good governance and conflict prevention, management, and resolu-tion in Africa, as well as papers on methods for sustainable peace in Africa.

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (South Africa)

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), affiliated with the University of Cape Town (UCT), in South Africa,has specialized experience in training, education, and research to reduce violence and engender peace inAfrica. CCR provides third-party mediation assistance, capacity training, and is engaged in the promotionof national and regional peace initiatives. The organization is working increasingly on a pan-continentalbasis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organizations, and is increasinglyfocusing on research on South Africa’s role in Africa; the UN’s role in Africa; AU/NEPAD relations; andHIV/AIDS and security.

The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (Tanzania)

The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, established in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1996, highlights theimportance of ensuring the human rights of Africans. To this end, the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundationendeavors to improve people’s capacity for self-reliance, as well as promote public policies that eliminatepoverty and establish democratic governance. In particular, the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation focuses onprograms that engender African unity, build institutional capacity, and guarantee justice for all.

The UN Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa (Cameroon)

The UN Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa, in Yaoundé, Cameroon,commenced operations in 2001. It is charged with promoting the respect for human rights and democraticdevelopment as a means to resolve conflict and engender sustainable economic development in CentralAfrica. Specifically the Centre disseminates information on international norms and laws that protecthuman rights and foster democracy.

International Peace Academy777 United Nations PlazaNew York, NY 10017-3521Tel: (212) 687-4300Fax: (212) 983-8246www.ipacademy.org

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