peace: sri lanka's impossible dream?

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This article was downloaded by: [Karolinska Institutet, University Library] On: 10 October 2014, At: 01:00 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/csas20 Peace: Sri Lanka's impossible dream? Bernard Swan a a University of New England Published online: 08 May 2007. To cite this article: Bernard Swan (1997) Peace: Sri Lanka's impossible dream?, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 20:s1, 3-21, DOI: 10.1080/00856409708723302 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00856409708723302 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 1: Peace: Sri Lanka's impossible dream?

This article was downloaded by: [Karolinska Institutet, University Library]On: 10 October 2014, At: 01:00Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

South Asia: Journal of South Asian StudiesPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/csas20

Peace: Sri Lanka's impossible dream?Bernard Swan aa University of New EnglandPublished online: 08 May 2007.

To cite this article: Bernard Swan (1997) Peace: Sri Lanka's impossible dream?, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies,20:s1, 3-21, DOI: 10.1080/00856409708723302

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00856409708723302

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable forany losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use ofthe Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Peace: Sri Lanka's impossible dream?

South Asia, Vol. XX, Special Issue (1997), pp. 3-21

PEACE: SRI LANKA'S IMPOSSIBLE DREAM?

Bernard SwanUniversity of New England

SRI LANKA, THE RESPLENDENT ISLE, IS A LAND WHOSE PEOPLE ARE WARM,intelligent and hospitable, a country ennobled by four living religions. Itis also a nation that has been thwarted in its many attempts to rise above

its complex problems, of poverty and dependency,1 of ethnic and socialdivision, internal strife and war that have bedevilled it for decades.

The cry for peace

If asked what the country needs most today, the average Sri Lankan wouldsay, 'Peace!' 'An end to the war, and the opportunity for people to live theirlives without fear of violence!' How to achieve this is the question that hasmocked Sri Lankans over the years and that derides them today. For, fromhumble hawker, peasant and office worker to the president herself, tomorrowis a day that might not dawn. No one knows what violence there might be instore today. For the cannon fodder from the villages dressed in battle fatiguesand who comply with orders in return for their meagre pay, and for Tamilteenagers, taken at a tender age away from parents, given gun, grenade andcyanide capsule, who in their youthful idealism have been pressed intobecoming killing machines for the sake of leader, peace and freedom, themorrow is even more likely to deal death. Scarce resources are continuallydiverted from human needs to expenditure on weapons of destruction.

1 B. Swan, 'Sri Lanka: constraints and prospects in the pursuit of rural development', inD.A.M. Lea and D.P. Chaudhri (eds), Rural Development and the State: Contradictions andDilemmas in Developing Countries (London, Methuen, 1983), pp. 127-60 and 'Culturalpluralism and development: the case of Sri Lanka', in P.P. Courtenay (ed.), Geography &Development (Melbourne, Longman Cheshire, 1994), pp. 144-64.

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Meanwhile the foreign debt continues to mount. For the country as a wholethere is bitterness, hardship, numbness. Understandably, most people feel thatit is better to adapt to harsh reality, to make do with the crumbs of life thatcome their way, rather than to dare dream of peace; to dismiss the violencethat is not on their doorstep, to make believe that it is not taking place.Censorship helps generate a sense of tranquility.

The intention of this essay is to identify some of the salient factors thathave contributed to Sri Lanka's present dilemmas, though not to delve toodeeply into these matters as this has been done elsewhere. The main purposehere is to ask what might be done and what perhaps should be done if theisland is to know peace.

Profile of Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka has a population of over seventeen millions, roughly the size ofAustralia's, and an area smaller than that of Tasmania. The country consists ofextensive lowlands which surround a central mass of highlands. The southwestern quadrant receives rain throughout the year. This is the wet zone. Theremainder of the island, referred to as the dry zone, experiences water deficitsfor months at a time. From the highlands rivers radiate, bringing life to theplains around them. Most of the inhabitants live in the rainy southwestquadrant of the island, and in the Jaffna peninsula in the north. The latter,though located in the dry zone, has modest reserves of ground water, whichhistorically helped to sustain agriculture, and enable the land to feed its hard-working inhabitants. The remainder of the dry zone, which once supported athriving civilisation, underwent depopulation and decline in the middle ages,but has been re-opened for settlement by the land-hungry.2

Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon, is a pluricultural, third world democracy.The island's inhabitants belong to ethno-cultural groups which arepredominantly Indian in origin. There are the majority Sinhalese (seventy-fourper cent of the population) and two minority Tamil communities. Of the latter,one comprises Sri Lanka Tamils (twelve per cent), who settled in the islandfrom around eight hundred to well over two thousand years ago, and theIndian Tamils (six per cent) who were brought in during the last century andearly in the present, to work the commercial plantations of the wet zone. Thereare also the Moors, an Indo-Arab Islamic community (seven per cent), whichincludes some long-absorbed converts from the other two communities. There

2 See also B.L.C. Johnson and M. Le M. Scrivenor, Sri Lanka: Land People and Economy(London, Heinemann, 1981). B. Swan, Sri Lankan Mosaic: environment, man, continuityand change, Colombo, Marga Institute of Development Studies (1987). B. Swan, 'Thedepopulation of the dry zone of Sri Lanka: a re-examination', Geography Bulletin , Vol. 20,no.2 (1988), pp. 21-30.

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are small numbers of Malays (from Java), and Burghers who are wholly (veryfew) or partly (predominantly) European.

The principal religions are Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity.Almost all Buddhists are members of the Sinhalese community, and almost allHindus are Tamil. The Moors and Malays are Muslim. Christians are drawnmainly from the Sinhalese and Tamil communities, while members of thesmall Burgher community are also Christian. The island came under colonialinfluence since early in the sixteenth century. The first colonialists were thePortuguese, then the Dutch, and finally the British.

The island became a politically independent, parliamentary democracy in1948. At that time, communal relations were harmonious, there was a surplusbalance of trade, the mood of the country was euphoric and the future seemedbright. Following independence, access to medical treatment and to educationwas made free and none starved. There were marked increases in lifeexpectancy and in levels of literacy. Despite substantial increases in the size ofits population since independence, there was significant growth in the grossnational product per person and in agricultural productivity. The economy,which had been precariously dependent on a few export crops beforeindependence, was diversified, and by the mid-1980s, industrial exportsovertook agricultural ones.

Roads to ruin

During the British occupation, strong government and the impartial rule of lawenhanced a status quo that favoured the imperial power and the island's highlyinequitous socio-economic order.3 An ethic of tolerance grew, and culturaldifferentiation was respected, making civil and communal violenceunthinkable. People were urged to regard themselves as Ceylonese first,instead of identifying with any ethno-cultural label. This was the basis of PaxBritannica.

Pax Zeylanica was modelled on the British example, until the country fellvictim to global economics. A complacent multi-racial ruling party,committed to free enterprise and 'more of the same' did little to alter thehighly disparate socio-economic status quo or to redress the underlyingdisabilities and the suffering of the underprivileged and the disadvantaged.But the personal ambitions of several politicians and those aspiring to elitestatus, led many to articulate and magnify the grievances of those who mightserve to jockey them into positions of influence and power.

3 B. Swan, Peace and conflict in a poor country: Sri Lanka, Occasional Paper No. 3,Canberra, Australian Institute of International Affairs (1986).

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Because the island was a semi-feudal society, where caste stricturesremained binding, where there was a gulf between the haves and the have-nots, and because those who secured political power came predominantly fromthe upper echelons of society, rather than foment class struggle or urge radicalreform, preference was shown for strategies that would enable them to retaintheir wealth and privilege, to patronise the poor and to win their electoralsupport. In the guise of communal justice and patriotic and religious fervour,they alleged that the woes of one ethnic group were the outcome of theselfishness of another.4

Few proved as adept at this art as Solomon West RidgewayBandaranaike, the charismatic lawyer-politician, and one-time secretary of theOxford Union, who in his days at Oxford had written erudite essays on socialjustice with the wisdom and the passion of a Mahatma Gandhi. He had servedboth in the pre-independence State Council with a commitment tostrengthening local government, and later as Minister for Health within theruling United National Party. However, when his Prime-ministerial ambitionsseemed blocked, he resorted to means that belied his earlier rhetoric. Adoptinga strongly nationalistic stance, a quasi-socialistic economic program, a pro-Buddhist and a pro-Sinhala agenda, he calculatingly exploited religious andethno-cultural sentiment to inveigle himself into power. It is true that he didvery well to give the downtrodden a sense of self-respect and belonging, butwhatever his intentions to be fair by all concerned may possibly have been, heoverrated his ability to curb the chauvinism of too many of his supporters.

If Bandaranaike unleashed racial animosity and anti-Tamil feeling, whichfestered unchecked and untreated, culminated in the race riots of 1958, he laterhad regrets about what had happened, and strove to meet the just demands ofhis Tamil compatriots. Unfortunately, he did not live long enough to see thisthrough. Thereafter, no politicians, whether in government or in theopposition, were permitted, or themselves permitted others, to deal fairly anddispassionately with the so-called 'Tamil problem'. Instead, it was cynicallyused as a political football between the major Sinhalese-dominated parties,until the Tamil leadership in their despair opted for an independent TamilEelam state.

Tamil politicians were no angels either. Few did anything that mightjeopardise their own social position. After all, the Tamil electorates were alsodominated by the wealthy and/or the upper castes with their elitist preferences,while the Tamil poor and lowly were required to serve and comply. Nimbly,the former endeavoured to persuade their constituents that in supporting whatreally were elitist causes they were securing their own future. This, as inSinhalese areas, was not too difficult to do in a caste-ridden society, wherepatronage was a feature of everyday life. Tamil politicians, like their Sinhalese

4 Loc. cit.

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counterparts played to the local gallery. They continually interpreted thegovernment's programs and actions in communal terms, and thus appeared tochampion Tamil rights.

In such socio-political settings, opportunities for communalreconciliation and nation-building were continually missed. Duly, whenpolitical arrangement and ballot failed to deliver satisfaction and justice, boththe government and those arraigned against it opted for violence and thebullet. The government turned to violence in order to secure and enhance thestatus quo. The disaffected did so in order to alter or overthrow the existingorder which they had lost confidence in or to break loose from it.

In the Sinhalese south, there emerged in the 1960s, the Janata VimukthiPeramuna (JVP), disillusioned with the government's inability to createsufficient employment for Sinhala-educated youth, despite policies offavouritism towards Sinhalese. In 1971, they attempted to overthrow thegovernment of the day, but failed. They re-emerged, phoenix-like, in the mid-1980s, when the Indian army, through an agreement between the PrimeMinisters of India and Sri Lanka, occupied the north, to act as buffer andintermediary between Tamil secessionists and government forces, and to helpkeep a peace accord between the two. The JVP were implacable in theirdetermination that the Indian army should pull-out, and that the secessionistsof the north be shown no special consideration by the government. Theyvehemently objected to moves being made by the government to give Tamils ameasure of autonomy and control over the northern and eastern provinces. Acurious blend of radical socialism and ethno-cultural narrowness, they usedthreat and force against the government and its supporters, in a bid tooverthrow these. The violence of the failed insurgency of 1971 paled intoinsignificance when compared with the blood-letting fratricide of the late1980s.

It was also no real surprise that in the Jaffna Tamil hearth, when politicalovertures failed to see the redress of Tamil grievances, the 'boys' appeared,using force against government agencies up there. For, they were convincedthat violence was the measure of last resort that had to be employed against agovernment which they alleged was tardy and insincere in its responses toTamil pleas for justice. But before long, the 'boys' became 'tigers' whodefied and threatened their own political leadership. They began to rule thenorth by terror, killing without compunction any who would parley with or beconciliatory towards the government. In-fighting broke out among thesecessionists, because of disagreements over goals and methods, culminatingin the ascendancy of Prabhakran, leader of the Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam, the LTTE, who pursues his campaign single-mindedly, using thesuicide bomber and martyr to the cause with devastating efficiency.

Throughout, the armed forces remained faithful to the state, andresponded as the military usually do to both Tamil and Sinhalese opponents of

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the government. Adding terror to the situation, were death-squads, recruitedby the powerful, anxious for their personal safety, wanting to further their owninterests and to settle scores. The killing fields of Sri Lanka attracted littlecommitted international attention, because there was a significant strategic andeconomic difference between petroleum reserves, which the island lacked, andcoconut oil, rubber and tea, which it produced in plenty.

Hope flickered for a while, with the election of the former Prime MinisterBandaranaike's daughter to power in 1994, who had pledged to bring peace tothe troubled island. Highly qualified, honest and sincere, ChandrikaKumaratunga had, from her childhood, witnessed the folly of hatred andinternecine strife. She knew grief through personal bereavement: both herfather in 1959 and her husband in the 1980s had fallen victim to assassins,who were not Tamils but members of her own Sinhalese community. She setin motion a peace process which appeared to satisfy the Tamils, including theLTTE, although not many of her fellow Sinhalese were prepared to permit anyterritorial concessions being made to the Tamils. But what was to have beenthe final ceasefire was violated by the LTTE, who used that respite to regroupand to attack the government forces, inflicting heavy casualties upon thosewho manned their outposts.

Needless to say, the island's inhabitants were dismayed, including mostof the Tamil community. And so it was back to a process which onlydeepened a night already devoid of stars. The wounds of division have nothealed, although in hearts across the island the anguished sob is for peace!Yet, as everyone knows, the ultimate settlement has to be a political one. Thequestion, then, is what sort of settlement should there be?

Political options

Some argue that there may be merit in having an enlightened dictatorship inone guise or another, where the electorate is uncompromising overfundamentals. A Confucian system, where a group of enlightened and honestgentlemen dedicate themselves to the well-being of the people, may workwhere there is a commitment to integrity and service of the nation. The nearestsuch example in the world today where such a group of honest gentlemengoverns a country is Singapore. However, the track record of mostauthoritarian regimes is rarely consistent with respect for human rights andfundamental freedoms. That absolute power, whether concentrated in thehands of one person or in a junta, tends to corrupt absolutely, as the truismgoes, is the bitter lesson all too widely learned from dictatorships.

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PEACE: SRI LANKA'S IMPOSSIBLE DREAM? 9

The Eelam option

Insistence on a sovereign Tamil state of Eelam, first by the Tamil UnitedLiberation Front and then by Tamil Tiger leadership, and the government'srefusal to the partition of the island, is the proximate reason for thecontinuance of the war in Sri Lanka. Most, though not all, of the earliergrievances of the Tamils had been resolved, at least to some degree, since thelater 1970s.

Initially, Eelam, to most Tamils who clamoured for it, was but a Utopianideal, a dream for justice and a song of empowerment, rather than a territorialentity and an implacable commitment to secession. When nothing positive andsubstantial seemed to be forthcoming from the government, many Tamils lostconfidence in the political process and the more desperate among them optedfor violence. The government tried promises, entreaty, patience and moderatedresponse, until finally it called in the armed forces.

On the Jaffna peninsula the contest degenerated into an abuse of militarymight and into terrorism, with innocent civilians as the principal victims.Soon, the Tigers extended their hit and run war into territory south of thepeninsula, inflicting heavy casualties upon government forces. The sight oftheir dead being brought back for burial or cremation sparked off feelingamong the Sinhalese, and fomented by agents provocateur, the race riots of1983 broke out. These raged across the island and were the worst the countryhad experienced. Thereafter, for many Tamils it was only in an Eelam statethat they could hope to be secure and be assured that their rights would berespected. Thousands were displaced and thousands sought asylum in otherlands. A question, yet to be satisfactorily answered by proponents of Eelam,is whether a separate state would really provide Tamils with the solutions theyseek.

At the geopolitical level, problems exist regarding the territorial extent ofEelam. There are varying views on the subject among Tamils. The northernprovince alone, where Tamils are predominant, would not be economicallyviable. For a viable Eelam, extensive tracts of the east and northwest, whichinclude irrigable paddy lands, as well as the magnificent harbour ofTrincomalee, once part of the ancient Kandyan Sinhalese kingdom, wouldhave to be included. This is something which few Sinhalese would be willingto countenance. However, some say that the harbour is big enough to beshared although this option has not been considered by either group.

Separation would require the creation of boundaries which would have tobe policed, to prevent smuggling and illegal entry: an extremely costly anddifficult exercise, and doubly so because such boundaries would have to bemainly artificial rather than natural. They would cut across watersheds. In aregion where irrigated agriculture is a must, this would surely generate futureproblems and conflicts over land-use, forest and soil conservation, water-use

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and management. The free movement of goods would be interrupted shouldtariffs be imposed.

A separate state is not politically or emotionally acceptable to themajority of the island's inhabitants, including many Tamils, particularly thosewho live in 'Sinhalese' areas. To most, the very thought is anathema. Even ifEelam is achieved through force or negotiation, would what happened whenIndia and Pakistan were formed through the partition of greater India, andmore recently in Bosnia, following its secession from Yugoslavia, not happenin Sri Lanka? Why should people not fear that there would be forcedmigrations, ethnic cleansing and the massive displacement of people, with allthe concomitant suffering? Those who stay on in the territory of anotherethno-cultural group, after division, could well expect second class status, andbecome objects of suspicion, derision, discrimination and targets for attack intimes of economic hardship and crisis, and especially if tensions developbetween the states which would share the island.

Whereas much of the area sought for Eelam would be predominantlyTamil, in the east and northwest there would be substantial numbers of Moorsand Sinhalese as well. How would a Tamil homeland be affected by theirpresence? What would become of them and their cultural rights? Furthermore,the areas under Sinhalese control would include large numbers of Tamils, whoare settled there and have no wish to go elsewhere. What would their fate be?Are they to remain where there are or would they have to relocate? What dothe proponents of Eelam expect? Do they envisage a kind of apartheid forEelam, and multi-culturalism for the remainder of the Sri Lanka? Are themajority of Tamils who live and work in areas outside Eelam, as so many do,likely to experience problems? What guarantees of safety and cultural equalitywould there be for all the inhabitants of the island?

If it eventuates as the fruit of violence and terrorism, the question wouldsurely arise as to who would rule Eelam? Would the LTTE relinquish thepower they wield and permit the people of Eelam to choose the sort ofgovernment they would prefer, or would they impose an authoritarian regimewhere they entrench themselves, and demand the compliance of their subjects?This is indeed a matter that vexes most Tamils, and more so members of othercommunities, who live in the territory claimed for Eelam. Would Eelam reallyproduce acceptable long-term solutions?

The federal option

An early proposal for safeguarding Tamil rights was that made by Mr S.J.V.Chelvanayakam, when he founded the Federal Party, urging that the unitarystate be replaced by a federal one. There was some sound thinking behind theidea. It was based on the fact that from about the fourteenth or fifteenthcentury until the advent of the British, Sri Lanka consisted of a Sinhalese

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Buddhist realm, divided into two or three kingdoms, and the Tamil Hindurealm, the kingdom of Jaffna. These culturally contrasting realms weregeographically separated by a virtually unpopulated tract of malarious forestand jungle. When the Portuguese and the Dutch gained control of the maritimeregions of the island, they administered the Sinhalese and the Tamil areasseparately. On the eve of independence, some parts of the island werepredominantly Tamil-speaking and some Sinhalese-speaking. It was only afterthe British brought the island under a single central government that Tamilsfrom the Tamil realm and from India entered and settled down in hithertoSinhalese areas.

The federal proposition was that if the preponderantly Tamil-speakingareas of the north and east were made a state and given a significant measureof internal autonomy, Tamil cultural needs could be protected. It would afforda place where those not in agreement with pro-Sinhala policies elsewhere inthe country might prefer to live. The risk of one culture or ethnic group beingswamped by a numerically larger one would be minimised. Amity couldprevail. In practical terms, the Tamil federal state was to include the northernand eastern provinces of old.

The difficulty the government and many Sinhalese had with the proposalwas that the so-called Tamil zone, particularly in the eastern province,included lands on which land-hungry Sinhalese peasants from the nearbyhighlands could be and had been settled. The federal counter-argument wasthat there was far more such land available for future Sinhalese colonists inother parts of the island. It was also pointed out that some parts of the Tamilrealm were occupied not only by ethnic Tamils but also by Tamil-speakingMoors, who were Muslim, and not Hindu or Christian, and that the federaloption was not a vote for racial discrimination or for the re-location ofpopulation.

Although the central government had long refused to consider the idea, itwas not inconsistent with the suggestion Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike hadmade in the 1940s when he was responsible for local government as an electedmember of the pre-independence State Council, that a measure of devolutionof power from the centre to the regions would be beneficial to all concerned,and that democracy would be advanced.

Indeed, Mr Bandaranaike had accepted the principle that Tamil areasneeded to have their own rights, with regard to both the use of the Tamillanguage and land for colonisation by land-hungry Tamil peasants. He did thisin a pact he made with Mr. Chelvanayakam, so as to lessen the negativeimpact that his Sinhala Only policy was bound to have upon the Tamil-speaking. Although he abrogated the pact shortly after it was made in 1958,when his own supporters accused him of duplicity and of selling out to theTamils, it was one that he turned back to after the race riots of 1958.Nevertheless, the pact was never implemented by him, or his widow when she

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took over the reins of government in 1960, following his assassination, or byUNP whenever it was returned to power, although steps were taken over theyears to recognise and respect Tamil identity and rights, and to make Tamil anofficial language in the Constitution of 1978.

The essential premises of the federal notion have come to be widelyregarded as affording the best solution to an otherwise intractable andincreasingly bitter problem. A central government which looks after externaland 'national' interests, and regional governments or states as in India,Australia, Canada or the U.S.A., may well be the answer, one that is cheaperthan the cost of defence and security either in present Sri Lanka, where there isan ongoing war of attrition, or were two nations to share the same island andhave to maintain their own security forces. The sticking point is that theleadership of the Tamil Tigers continue to insist upon a sovereign state, whilemany Sinhalese refuse to allow any part of the island to be administered byany other than the majority community.

The unitary option

As interpreted hitherto, this is widely regarded as an option for the statusquo. As such, it is opposed by Tamil secessionists and federalists, as one thatwill harbour the seeds of future frustration and discrimination against theminority Tamil community of Sri Lanka. Yet, it is one, which if properlyexercised would be least threatening to the integrity of the island, and to thesecurity of the Sinhalese and of Buddhism, which are minorities in the TamilHindu dominated culture-space of southern South Asia. The centralgovernment favours it because of the power it bestows on the governmentover the regions and on those who run the affairs of state. The British wereconfident that the system would work in favour of all when the SoulburyConstitution for independence was drawn up. And, in the early years ofindependence the system did not seem likely to fail.

The weakness of single, centralised government lay principally in themyopia, moral poverty and the political immaturity of those who ran it. Itmay well be asked what went wrong? Some of these weaknesses are outlinedbelow.

Perversion of democracy

In seeking election, too many would-be representatives of electoratespromoted narrow concerns at the expense of national ones. Thumping thecommunal drum or chastising scapegoats yielded political dividends.

Democracy came to be regarded as the process by which the mostpowerful, vociferous and unscrupulous could secure advantages over thepolitically and numerically weak. Although there were honest politicians who

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were dedicated to good government and fairplay for all, too many made use oftheir position to feather their own nests, financially, status-wise and power-wise. They perverted the political process, subordinating it to personal orgroup self-interest, setting examples which kindred spirits emulated.

In addition, however worthy their causes may have been, religiousfundamentalists, were also partisan. Tunnel vision rendered many of themindifferent and insensitive to the possible negative consequences theirsuccesses might have for their compatriots.

Tokenism: pseudo-devolution of power

Realising that a prime reason behind the persistence of regional problems, aswith the Tamil problem, was an over-centralised administration, the UNPgovernment that held sway from 1977 to the early 1990s decided to allow theadministrative districts of the island, through elected District Ministers, ameasure of policy determination. What eventuated was little more thantokenism. The powers the districts were accorded were very limited and thefunding for policies that they might have drawn up was hopelessly inadequate.The central government was loth to relinquish its grip upon the regions, anddevolution and local self-determination remained no more than notional.

Problems with the constitution.

The Soulbury constitution, upon which the cabinet system of government wasfounded, introduced a bi-cameral legislature. Such was the confidence in theintegrity of the political leaders of the country at the time that thecommissioners made no provision for the representation of minority interests,as had been the case in the State Council that had resulted from theDonoughmore reforms of 1931. There were no constitutional guarantees of orexplicit means for safeguarding the rights of the island's diverse peoples,especially with reference to the use of their language and religion.

Using its numbers, the first Bandaranaike government abolished theSenate, giving supreme power to the lower house. There was no cooling-offtime or opportunity for hasty legislation to be reconsidered.

The constitutional reforms of 1978 attempted to rectify some of thesematters. But it saw the cabinet system of government replaced by a French-style presidential system. This weakened parliament and gave excessive powerto the president, who was directly elected by the people. The executivepresident could use that muscle to ride roughshod over those who dared tochallenge or differ from him.

Whatever political changes are made in Sri Lanka in the name of nationalunity and ethno-cultural and social harmony, they would be safer if enshrined

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in the constitution, and not left to the mercy of politicians and their henchmen.There would also have to be a separation rather than a concentration ofpowers, including an independent judiciary. The constitution should be onethat cannot be amended too readily, but neither should it be immutable. Thereis merit in vesting legislative authority in a bi-cameral parliament, at leastuntil the electorate matures, rather than in a president (or a clique) who couldnullify the spirit of responsible democracy, and run the country as though itwere a personal estate, undermining and getting rid of possible checks andbalances that get in the way.

Despite all this, it is self-evident that an elegant and wisely-wordedconstitution alone is no guarantee of anything. What matters is respect for theconstitution and even more for its spirit, and to treat other causes of themalaise of unpeacefulness that afflicts and debilitates Sri Lanka.

The problem of development

From the dawn of independence, it was decided by the political leadership thatthrough economic development the future happiness and prosperity of theisland was to be assured. Over the years a range of strategies were tried out.Some were socialistic, and others were capitalistic. All ran into problems.5

What the country could not do much about was that developmentstrategies were undertaken within a global economic milieu in which rampantcapitalism predominated. The island occupied, as it does today, an inferiorposition within the world's marketing economy. It has suffered severely fromthe negative effects of its dependency within that economy, and veryparticularly from terms of trade that deteriorated continually sinceindependence. As a result balancing the national budget proved increasinglydifficult over the years, urgently needed social and economic development hadto be financed with borrowings, and the country sank deeply into debt, forwhich it pays dearly.

It was in such troubled economic straits and in the struggles fordevelopment that peace foundered. When it became apparent that there wasnot enough largesse to go around, squabbles broke out over who was going tohave access to what was available, and who was to have little or nothing.There were politicians in plenty who saw a successful future for themselves inoverseeing the allocation of resources. Unfortunately, few were statesman-like enough to advise caution, to exercise control and to provide examples ofintegrity, impartiality and wise judgement. Soon there was internaldissension, which culminated in race-riots, insurgencies and the ongoingseparatist war, with all the horror that these created. In the face of these crises

5 Swan, 'Sri Lanka: constraints and prospects in the pursuit of rural development', and SriLankan Mosaic: environment, man, continuity and change.

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(and contributing to them), the nation became divided and the gap between therich and the poor widened.

Today, the affluent continue their quest for prestige, power and greaterfinancial gain, and are busy protecting and extending their ventures andenjoying their profits. The remainder are either weighed down by the tediumof trying to keep alive, or distract themselves where possible with some of theconsumer tinsel and the hedonism that modernity offers and that areseductively advertised by the pervasive communications media. The key todevelopment is thought to lie in commanding information and competencewith the new technologies, and by these means to tap the benefits of globalneo-capitalism. But the higher values of the island's rich cultural and spiritualheritage have been eroded, compromised and pigeon-holed, and spiritualdebilitation constitutes the tap-root of the island's crises. Few recognise this.6

Peace and anti-peace

Sri Lanka is unlikely to ever discover peace, unless attention is paid tounderstanding more fully the dimensions of peace and its converse. There is areal need for promoting education for peace, both formally and informallyacross the social spectrum. If war and direct violence, which plague thecountry, are to be abolished, the quest for peace would have to be conductedmuch more sincerely and authentically, because war and other forms of directviolence are but the tip of the iceberg of dysfunctional relationships thatfrustrate and prevent the realisation of peace at all levels of societal being. Themere absence of war and direct violence inadequately defines or begets peace,because peace is far more than an absence. For these reasons it may beinstructive to ennumerate some of these other aspects of peace, which wouldrequire consideration.

Structural violence

Indirect forms of violence, which underlie direct and visible forms ofviolence, must also be treated. They are more subtle because the violence theyperpetrate is silent and invisible except for their effects. Indirect violenceincludes the violence inherent in societal organisation. Subtly, it discriminatesin favour of some and against others, resulting in the enhancement and theprotection of the privileges of some and the deprivation and exploitation ofother members of the community, and thus makes for the exacerbation ofsocio-economic inequity. Because it is institutionalised, and is intrinsic to thesocio-economic and political system, it is commonly referred to as structural

6 Mervyn Fernando, This Piece of Planet Earth: Sri Lanka fPiliyandala, Subodhi Institute ofIntegral Education, 1994).

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violence.7 Carried to extremes it denies the exploited and underprivileged theopportunity to extricate themselves from their positions of disadvantage, andpunishes them should they try.

Cultural violence

In addition to structural violence, there is a violence that resides in mostcultures.8 It is present wherever the prevailing social values and assumptionssanction, or promote, or create a climate favourable to other forms of violence,whether direct or indirect. It colours the perceptions of peoples, and renderother types of violence praiseworthy or justifiable in their eyes, or at leastethically neutral. It also serves to render unethical behaviour unrecognisable.

Moral violence

There is yet another category of indirect violence, which is partly subsumedinto the category of cultural violence, but which is more insidious, because itunderlies the others. This is moral violence, perpetrated both by individualsand by collectivities. It originates in the assumption that the human being is itsown point of reference and the sole arbiter and judge of what is right andwrong, thus reducing morality to personal, social or even ecologicalpreference and need. Moral principles are thus seen as relative, determinedaccording to the needs of the moment.

Moral violence consists in an ethic of ethical inconsistency, whichmanipulates and neutralises notions of right and wrong, or changes their moralcolour, as happens in the case of cultural violence. It occurs whenever apreferential 'Yes' is accorded the created (usually self, in either its personal orcollective guise) instead of the greater good, and ultimately, instead of theCreator, in what commonly seems to be an option exercised in the quest ofwhat is perceived to be 'right', appropriate or expedient. It may be the resultof pseudo-innocence or of the confusion and stunting caused by the humanrefusal to seek, to learn, to change and to grow.9

Moral violence permeates human organisation and most humanendeavour. At base, it is rooted in selfishness and pride, which results in thecry, 'I come first!' or 'We come first!'. Where condoned, by individual orcollectivity (cultural violence), it soon becomes the subterfuge which

7 Johan Galtung, 'A structural theory of imperialism', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 13, no.2(1971), pp. 81-94.

8 Johan Galtung, 'Cultural violence', Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 27, no. 3 (1990), pp.291-305.

9 B. Swan, 'Peace search: from the secular to the Christie', in M. Salla, W. Tonetto and E.Martinesz (eds), Essays on Peace: Paradigms for Global Order (Rockhampton, CentralUniv. of Queensland Press, 1995), pp. 34-48.

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substitutes, often in the name of expediency and even of good, the spurious forthe genuine, the inferior for the superior, the shadow for the substance, thecreature for the Creator. Moral violence confuses and culminates in societieswhere the blind lead the blind. By so doing, it militates against peace, for itmay infect and indeed poison nations, governments, societies, organisations,groups and individuals, whether secular or religious, and even those whowould speak for peace. The thought that T could engage or be immersed inmoral violence affronts the ego, and therefore is a matter rarely discussed inthe social and political sciences, or in polite circles. Although it shouldconcern those who take religion seriously, many who would use religion toserve self, prefer not to talk about it either.

For there to be peace, violence of all kinds has to be eschewed. If such aproject seems too overwhelming and futile to contemplate, it is one thattomorrow demands, and which must be commenced here and now, anddiligently persevered with.

If structural violence is to be reduced, minimised and perhaps finallyeliminated, peace would need to be seen as the fruit of justice and humanedevelopment. Justice in such a context is far more than the narrow legalisticdefinition of the concept that is so widely held. Notions of fair access, fairdistribution, greater social equity, tolerance, respect and ultimately forgivenessand mercy, enter.

Sri Lanka (and most other countries, for that matter) is wracked by alltypes of indirect violence. Rather than treat this malaise, governmentssubscribe to it, by ignoring it and/or by treating only its symptoms. Or elsethey exacerbate it through subordinating development to the dictates of'economic fundamentalism', where the market, the wealthy and the powerful,whether of the country or overseas, direct prices and production; where theprice mechanism is the prime arbiter of value, demand and use, and the notionthat 'the user pays' extends its cruel discriminant power, widening the gapbetween the living standards of the the 'haves' and the 'have nots'.

Re-thinking democracy

Sri Lanka has travelled too far down the road of democracy and has paid toohigh a price for freedom to consider compromising or replacing it withauthoritarianism. Instead of putting the clock back, it would be better to takepositive steps to mature as a nation of democratic people.

The adversarial model of government where the parliamentary oppositionopposes for the sake of opposing, and 'nit-picking', is both puerile andwasteful. It caters to parochialism and is open to cynicism and corruption. Apoor country or a developing country can ill-afford such waste of its talent. Asystem has to be devised that would permit constructive criticism and

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accountability. Such a system is best home-grown and not copied from someother country.

The electorate itself requires education in civic responsibility and in thetruth that freedom and responsibility are but two sides of the same coin. Legalcontrols may be worth putting in place to prevent the creation, exploitationand exacerbation of ethno-cultural disharmony, and more positively througheducation the principle of national commonality and communal equality mustcome to prevail over sectarian selfishness. Yet this has to be done in anatmosphere of tolerance and mutual respect, because ethnic identity wouldhave to be honoured and religious freedom assured.

Re-thinking development

Status quo thinking construes development as an economic process: improvedaccess to goods and services, and increased production and efficiency. Thatdevelopment has essential economic dimensions is undeniable. However, inSri Lanka, the benefits of development accrue primarily to those who havemuch, and secondarily to the needy whom the political leadership patroniseand placate.

Such perceptions and practices are not prescriptions for long-term socialstability and progress. For wherever development is defined primarily inquantitative, materialistic, technological, consumerist and temporal terms,wherever goods and services are offered as the substance of happiness andfreedom, human dignity is compromised and people are re-ified. Selfishvalues are set up as the ones which people should live by, even though manyof their compatriots are likely to be pushed aside or trodden underfoot inconsequence.

The alternative is a development paradigm which accepts thatdevelopment is firstly something qualitative, that impels and enables people'to be more' rather than want 'to have more'; and that men and women need tomature in order to receive and make use of goods and services, if they are notto be overwhelmed by them, as so often happens. For this reason the problemof providing and distributing goods and services is secondary to the problemof preparing people for them, a matter which most purveyors of and expertson development are oblivious of.10

The paradigm for authentic development may be founded in the beliefthat there are three categories of human needs: essential subsistence needs(food, clothing, housing, health care); those related to comfort and to makinglife more easy (labour-saving devices, luxuries, extras) and enhancement

10 Louis-Joseph Lebret, in Denis Goulet, op.cit., Chap. 2. Swan, 'Cultural pluralism anddevelopment: the case of Sri Lanka'.

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'goods' that meet intangible needs related to human fulfillment ortranscendence (such as a deeper spiritual life, cultural improvement, enrichingfriendships, loving relationships, and so on).

The aim of development should be to ensure that all have their essentialsubsistence needs met, but this quest should not be to the detriment ofproviding enhancement goods of a spiritual and cultural order. The provisionof goods of the second category, which range from the relatively useful to theluxuriously wasteful, should be subordinated to the others, if not abandoned.

Theologies of liberation

The four living religions of Sri Lanka, which have inspired in the second halfof the twentieth century movements towards greater social justice andopenness to the benevolence and wisdom enshrined in them, have the capacityfor promoting spiritual renewal and humane development across the island.But this presupposes a re-discovery of and a practical commitment to religiousideals, ones very different from the narrow interpretations that all too oftencaricature most religions and sell them short. There would have to be workedout and clearly spelled out theologies of liberation, to enable liberation fromthe chains that hold mind, heart and emotions captive.

The sarvodaya movement

Among Buddhists, the quest for the re-discovery of the meaning of Buddhismcoincided with the approach of the 2500th anniversary celebrations of the birthof the Buddha in the 1950s. But political opportunists began whipping upethnic discord in the name of religious revival, and many in their desire for areturn to their religious heritage thought that political activism would be auseful bandwagon to clamber onto. At about this time there commencedanother type of religious renewal which was different.

The Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement was richly Buddhist, buta-political. It was directed to an awakening and a transformation of society,beginning at the village grass-roots level. Initiated in the mid 1950s by aBuddhist school teacher, it was inspired by its Gandhian counterpart in India.The Sri Lankan model sought the satisfaction of basic human needs in asociety which would be harmonious, moderate and contented. It was basedupon Buddhist philosophical principles and values, such as compassion,loving kindness and joy through service. Open to people of all faiths, it wasegalitarian and eminently humane. It called for self-giving, self-control, self-help and self-respect, not greed and acquisitiveness, and the amassing ofwealth through profit-making, discrimination and domination. It appealed to

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the inherent goodness in people, and spread across the island.11 Its values andemphases challenged the wisdom and the practice of governments, politicalparties and business interests. Governments wooed the movement, hoping towin its endorsement, and if possible, to patronise and control it, but withoutsuccess. And when the sarvodaya leadership insisted on maintaining theirintegrity and independent stance, the government in the latter 1980s waged acampaign in the press it controlled to discredit the movement and itsleadership.

Further examples

There are other non-governmental organisations and groups, also inspired byreligion, which serve and have served as beacons and catalysts in Sri Lanka.Many of these were begun by Christians, mainly Catholic priests, whosecatholicity was all-embracing, and who as in the case of the SarvodayaShramadana Movement sought not proselytisation but a sincere socialconversion to a new openness centred upon justice, liberation, co-operation,amity, loving kindness and peace. Among these were the Centre for Societyand Religion, the Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality, and theSubodhi Institute of Integral Education, to name a few.12

Individually and together they emphasise the necessity of a shift awayfrom a shallow, selfish, irresponsible and disintegrate society, disempoweredby false values and violence, to a society that is honest, tolerant, respectful ofthe other, non-violent, compassionate, sharing, forgiving, and magnanimousenough to put the past aside, and willing to risk being reconciled with formerenemies whether real or imaginary.

Conclusion

Such a paradigm shift does not occur overnight or easily. Nonetheless, realismfor the sake of the future demands it. Genuine religious belief and perseveringcommitment to ethical behaviour will help accomplish it. For, it is onlythrough the living out of the teachings of religion that national and communalhealing and a new beginning can be initiated and sustained.

As one millennium draws rapidly to an close, and another is about tobegin, this is indeed should be regarded as the appropriate time, that today is

11 A.T. Ariyaratne, Sarvodaya and Development (Moratuwa, Sarvodaya Development Institute,c. 1980) and Denis Goulet, Survival with Integrity: Sarvodaya at the Crossroads (Colombo,Marga Institute for Development Studies, 1981).

1 2 T. Balasuriya, The Development of the Poor through the Civilising of the Rich (Colombo,Centre for Society & Religion, 1972) and in Diana Santleben (ed.), Liberation of the Affluent(Sydney, Action for World Development, 1989). Fernando, op. cit.

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the kairos moment, when Sri Lanka stands at the cross-roads of its destiny.The time for humbug and vacillation is over. A decision of the spirit has to bemade, to slide backwards into the pit or to go forward in the name of peaceand new life.

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