This article was downloaded by: [University of Winnipeg]On: 15 September 2014, At: 14:13Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

International PeacekeepingPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/finp20

Peacekeeping in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo: Waging Peaceand Fighting WarDenis M. TullPublished online: 27 Apr 2009.

To cite this article: Denis M. Tull (2009) Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic ofCongo: Waging Peace and Fighting War, International Peacekeeping, 16:2, 215-230, DOI:10.1080/13533310802685729

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533310802685729

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, orsuitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressedin this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content shouldnot be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly

forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic ofCongo: Waging Peace and Fighting War

DENIS M. TULL

The UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has beenderided as one of the world’s least effective peacekeeping forces. This article assesses itsperformance by using two indicators: mandate implementation and the reduction ofhuman suffering. The analysis shows that effective peacekeeping in the Democratic Repub-lic of Congo (DRC) has been hampered by two major problems. First, MONUC has had astruggle with, and inconsistent approach to, the vague concept of ‘robust peacekeeping’.During key moments of the peace process, it tried to wage peace when it should haveused force. Second it failed to adapt to a dynamic conflict environment. Both problemswere underpinned by flawed assumptions about the peace process, the behaviour oflocal actors and the presumed benefits of ‘post-conflict’ elections.

Following more than a decade of violence which cost the lives of five millionCongolese, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) edged towards peace in2006 when ‘post-conflict’ elections were completed in a generally peacefulmanner. The first free elections for over four decades in the country, they werea major political achievement, not only for the DRC’s citizens, but also for theinternational community which had invested heavily in the peace process sincethe second war had broken out in 1998.

The UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) has been the centrepieceof international engagement, the UN’s second peacekeeping mission after its inter-vention in 1960–64.1 Initially established as a small military liaison team in 1999,MONUC was turned incrementally into a multidimensional peacekeeping missionwith a broad mandate. Comprehensive assessments of it have been rare.2 This issurprising because MONUC – with 18,434 uniformed personnel in 2008 – isone of the biggest and most expensive missions ever deployed by the UN. More-over, although general criticism of UN peacekeeping is not unusual, condemnationof MONUC’s performance has been exceptionally fierce. For example,The Economist has asked ‘Is this the world’s least effective peacekeeping force?’,while Congolese citizens repeatedly assaulted peacekeepers to vent their anger atthe mission and its alleged failures.3 An internal UN report even observed thatthe mission was tainted by a perception of ‘impotence and cowardice’.4

It is time for a more scholarly assessment of MONUC’s role in the peaceprocess. The first part of the article provides a brief overview of the conflict, asummary of MONUC’s phases of deployment and the evolution of its mandateand troop levels. The second part assesses MONUC’s performance against thecriteria of mandate achievement and reduction of human suffering. The final

International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No.2, April 2009, pp.215–230ISSN 1353-3312 print/1743-906X onlineDOI:10.1080/13533310802685729 # 2009 Taylor & Francis

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

part explains MONUC’s performance by analysing three sets of factors: exogen-ous factors such as the mandate, means and resources; problems of multidimen-sional peacekeeping based on Chapter VII; and endogenous factors such asstrategic assessments and strategies. It will be argued that MONUC’s mixed per-formance cannot be fully explained by resource constraints and the DRC’s diffi-cult environment. Equally important were problems in interpreting andimplementing the vague concept of robust peacekeeping and flaws in adaptingstrategies to a quickly changing situation.

The Congo Wars

The DRC’s two wars (1996–97 and 1998–2003) were a concoction of inter-twined conflicts. At the regional level, the DRC was the battleground for conflictsspilling out from Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola. Nationally, it wasfought over control of the derelict state left behind by President Mobutu SeseSeko. Finally, a mix of local conflicts over power and resources, often withethnic connotations, wreaked havoc in the DRC’s eastern provinces. The DRC,then Zaire, became the centre of a regional war in 1996 when an insurgencyunder the leadership of Laurent Kabila invaded from the east.5 Helped byZaire’s eastern neighbours, the rebellion toppled the Mobutu regime in 1997.The biggest stakeholder of the rebellion was the new government formed bythe Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Kigali which had overthrown the genocidalgovernment in 1994. Having fled into eastern Zaire, the former regime stagedcross-border attacks to destabilize the RPF government. This security threatwas the main cause of the invasion into Zaire, but it failed to eliminate the geno-cidaires. In August 1998, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi launched a new war,claiming that Kabila, now president of the renamed DRC, was unwilling toaddress their security concerns. As in 1996, they supported Congolese rebelgroups, including the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD)and the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC). The war stalledwhen Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe rallied to Kabila. In July 1999 a ceasefirewas signed in Lusaka (Zambia). It called on the UN to deploy a Chapter VIIpeacekeeping force to help implement the ceasefire, to oversee the withdrawalof foreign armies and disarm Congolese and foreign rebels. It also called fornational negotiations and the organization of elections. By 2001 the ceasefirelargely held along the official demarcation line, but armed conflict shifted to itseastern regions.6

Implementation of the Lusaka accord was stalled until 2001, when PresidentKabila was murdered. His successor and son, Joseph, adopted a more flexible atti-tude towards conflict resolution. Partly as a result, most of Uganda’s 10,000 sol-diers and all of the 23,000 Rwandan soldiers left in late 2002. This paved the wayfor the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in December 2002 in Pretoria, where a transi-tional government was agreed upon. Kabila remained president, flanked byfour vice-presidents, including the two rebel leaders Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC)and Azarias Ruberwa (RCD). National and provincial elections terminated thetransition in 2006. The presidential run-off election gave Kabila victory over

216 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

Bemba.7 However, violent clashes erupted repeatedly in Kinshasa and the pro-vince of Bas Congo. In the eastern DRC, violence erupted between the armyand the forces of former RCD rebel commander Laurent Nkunda. By late2008, heavy fighting in North Kivu and political unrest and human rightsabuses elsewhere in the country threatened the consolidation of peace.8

Four Phases of UN Peacekeeping

The involvement of MONUC in the DRC conflict over the past decade can bedivided into four broad phases.

The first phase began with the creation of MONUC in 1999 and ended withthe Pretoria accord on the formation of a government of national unity in late2002. Shortly after the signing of the 1999 Lusaka accord, the UN SecurityCouncil authorized the deployment of 90 military personnel to establish liaisonwith the signatories.9 In late 1999 the mission was formally renamed MONUCand was subsequently expanded to 500 observers and a protection force of5,037 soldiers to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.10

Following agreements between the DRC and Rwanda and Uganda, respectively,on the withdrawal of their forces from the DRC, MONUC’s troop ceiling wasboosted to 8,700 soldiers in late 2002. The mission was mandated to support,‘on a voluntary basis’, the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, resettle-ment and repatriation (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups.11 During its firstthree years, MONUC’s role was limited but effective. Its thinly spread personnel,455 military observers and 3,595 soldiers (as of October 2002), verified ceasefireviolations and the eventual withdrawal of foreign armies.

The second phase of MONUC’s deployment (2003–04) began in the wake ofthe Pretoria accord in 2002. During this period the mission’s efforts were to begeared towards supporting the transition and the government of national unityin Kinshasa.12 The transitional government moved to the centre of political atten-tion because it was to become the backbone of the implementation of the peaceagreements that had been concluded in Lusaka and Pretoria. Key to MONUC’sconcept for this phase was the provision of security for the members of the transi-tional government. To this effect, the UN Security Council authorized MONUCto deploy nearly 10 per cent of its troops (some 1,000 blue helmets) to thecapital.13 It also chaired the International Committee in Support of the Transition(CIAT), a body of international representatives that was to accompany the tran-sition. Hence, this phase was described by William Swing, the head of MONUC,as the ‘Kinshasa phase’, where the transitional government was expected to leadthe peace process.14

However, the most disrupting events during this phase occurred in the DRC’seastern parts. The first major crisis occurred in Bunia (Ituri district) in May 2003,when ethnic militias fought over the control of the city after the withdrawal of theUgandan army. The 700 blue helmets in Bunia were bystanders to the massacresof 400 civilians. The crisis triggered the deployment of a 1,400 strong InterimEmergency Multinational Force (Operation Artemis) by the European Union.15

Equipped with a Chapter VII mandate, the force stayed for three months and

PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 217

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

re-established basic order in Bunia. Subsequently, the Security Council increasedMONUC’s troop numbers to 10,800 and provided it with a Chapter VII mandatefor Ituri and the two Kivu provinces.16 Barely a year later, another crisis eruptedin Bukavu, when forces led by renegade commander Laurent Nkunda, a formerRCD general occupied the provincial capital of South Kivu. Again MONUCfailed to prevent killings and human rights abuses.17 The Bukavu crisis in particu-lar was a major blow to MONUC’s credibility. In response, the Security Councilexpanded MONUC’s Chapter VII mandate to include the entire Congolese terri-tory and authorized the deployment of additional 5,900 peacekeepers, less thanhalf the number that the mission had requested.18

The third phase, from October 2004 to December 2006, mainly revolvedaround the organization of presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections.19

As in other war-torn countries, the UN regarded the elections in the DRC as ‘a keyelement in the transition from a post-conflict to a truly democratic, unified andstable State’.20 MONUC organized a large logistical operation to prepare theregistration of voters and the organization of a constitutional referendum andthe elections. It also trained Congolese police officers to provide security forthe elections. During the polls, MONUC was backed by an EU interim force(EUFOR DRC) of 1,500 troops.21 The mission was deployed after the SecurityCouncil had declined a request by the Secretary-General for an additional2,590 troops to enable MONUC to deal with security contingencies duringthe polls.

MONUC’s fourth phase started in the wake of the 2006 elections.22 Daunt-ing core tasks remained to be completed. These included the creation of a stablesecurity environment, the planning of security sector reform, strengthening therule of law and protecting civilians.23 MONUC was also mandated to provideassistance to the Congolese government in the preparation of local elections.24

Recurrent violence attested to the precarious post-election environment,especially in North Kivu, where renewed fighting between rebels and thearmy displaced tens of thousands of civilians. Insecurity was widespread asthousands of Congolese combatants remained outside of the disarmament,demobilisation and reintegration process (DDR) for nationals. The formationof the security sector remained insignificant.25 MONUC reported physical vio-lence against civilians and serious human rights abuses ‘wherever the army[was] deployed’.26

Assessing Success and Failure

The literature on peacekeeping missions offers a variety of determinants ofsuccess and failure, ranging from mandate implementation to more demandingcriteria (whether a self-sustaining peace exists after peacekeepers withdraw) toeven more exacting standards (whether root causes of conflict have been resolvedand whether institution building has been successful).27 These ambitious stan-dards reflect unrealistic expectations about the impact that a mission can havewithin a limited time. This is especially true in countries that present a very diffi-cult environment. In the DRC, MONUC is also an ongoing mission, and it is thus

218 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

impossible to determine the long-term viability of peace. Therefore two relativelymodest criteria are used here: whether the mission mandate has beenimplemented and whether human suffering has been reduced.

Mandate implementation is the most widely used criterion to assess successand failure. It is also the most equitable one because it examines standards thatthe UN has set itself.28 It is also the politically most relevant one since decisionsof the UN Security Council about ongoing peacekeeping missions take intoaccount the extent to which mandates are being implemented. The second yard-stick is used because it directly relates to the reduction of large-scale violencewhich is the overall goal of every peacekeeping mission. But because violenceis difficult to measure in civil wars, this article refers to human suffering as aconsequence of violence, which can be roughly assessed by considering thelevel of internal displacement.

Mandate Implementation

In the following paragraphs I examine whether MONUC succeeded in imple-menting the core tasks of its mandate.29

Facilitating the DDRRR of Foreign CombatantsThe presence of foreign armed groups in the eastern DRC has been central to theregional dimension of the war. Of particular concern was the security threatsposed by the continued presence of the Forces Democratiques pour la Liberationdu Rwanda (FDLR), an offshoot of the forces responsible for the Rwandangenocide in 1994. To address this issue, MONUC was mandated to facilitatethe DDRRR of foreign combatants.30

Repatriation of the insurgents was agonizingly slow. In 2007, it was esti-mated that 6,000 rebels remained in the DRC. The Rwandan government didnot play a constructive role as it did not publish a list of the FDLR members itsought on charges of genocide, a clarification which may have encouragedlesser members of the movement to return home. Moreover, FDLR leadersheld their fighters hostage, killing those who attempted to defect. But the mostimportant reason for the slowness was that MONUC’s mandate rested on theprinciple of voluntary repatriation. As early as 2004, MONUC had warnedthat ‘the continued pursuit of its voluntary repatriation would not succeed inresolving the problem within an acceptable time’. 31 The Security Councilnever seriously considered a mandate to forcefully repatriate the FDLR. Thisleft the mission with few other means than seeking to persuade foreign fightersto return to their countries.32 In late 2005 and since 2006, MONUC also gavelogistical support to Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo(FARDC) operations against the FDLR. Considering the mandate, the slow repa-triation was the best result that MONUC could realistically achieve. It fulfilled itsmandate but was unable to sufficiently speed up the return of the FDLR fighters.

Congo DDR and SSRMONUC contributed to the Congolese DDR programme by providing security atreception centres, collecting weapons and providing transport, helping the DRC’s

PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 219

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

national DDR agency CONADER to process over 165,000 former combatants.33

But by late 2007, some 80,000 combatants were still awaiting registration forparticipation in DDR. This was partly a result of the suspension of the demobili-zation process in 2006 by donors, who claimed that CONADER was marred bymismanagement. In tune with its mandate MONUC played a rather limited rolein DDR as other agencies, notably the World Bank, were in the lead.

In security sector reform (SSR), MONUC’s principal role was to co-chair theJoint Commission on Security Sector Reform which was to draw up plans for theformation of the new national army and the police.34 This met three obstacles.First, Congolese commitment to a comprehensive and well-coordinated approachto DDR and SSR was largely absent.35 The transitional government was deeplydysfunctional and political elites focused on the upcoming elections and appro-priating public resources. In 2005, for example, several million dollars earmarkedfor military pay disappeared each month on the way to intended recipients.36 Inthe absence of a national political commitment to make the formation of effectivesecurity forces a priority, the SSR activities of MONUC and bilateral donorsamounted to quick-fix ‘low-level capacity building’.37 Second, various donorsassisted SSR by implementing their own projects, often on an ad hoc basis, thatdid little to overcome the structural pathologies of the security sector. Thisplayed into the hands of the Congolese government which favoured bilateralagreements to maximize financial support.38 Third, the importance that politicalelites and external actors placed on elections came at the expense of attention toSSR. Rather than stressing it as a long-term challenge to peace and security, theinternationals emphasized army and police reform as a means to other ends,notably the organization of elections, the key objective of the transitionalprocess.39 The completion of the polls in 2006 did not provide new momentumfor SSR. Roundtables on SSR with foreign partners were either postponed bythe government or it failed to outline a vision that external partners couldsupport. A working group of foreign representatives and the DRC’s army chiefeventually prepared a joint framework for SSR, but the plan was unceremo-niously shelved by the Minister of Defence.40 DDR and SSR have been a dramaticdisappointment. But in the absence of Congolese and international will to committo a long-term reform of the security sector, it would be unreasonable to attributethis failure to MONUC alone.

Military TasksDeterring Violence and Protecting Civilians. MONUC was authorized to use all‘necessary means’ to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions andto discourage violence and ‘spoilers’.41 Regarding this element of its mandate,MONUC’s record has sometimes been one of dramatic failure. It performed abys-mally during the crises in Bunia and Bukavu and not much better during otheremergencies.42 The resumption of fighting in North Kivu since November2006, which escalated in late 2008 and triggered massive civilian displacement,did not galvanize a determined response by MONUC. The same was trueduring earlier episodes of fighting in Kinshasa in 2006 and 2007, which resultedin the deaths of some 400 people. MONUC’s inaction in preventing violence has

220 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

been accompanied by a poor record in protecting civilians, a notable failure in thelight of the Security Council’s emphasis on this task.43 Although MONUCreceived ‘the most assertive mandate yet regarding the protection of civilians’,protecting civilians largely remained a ‘written ambition’.44

Organizing the Constitutional Referendum and the ElectionsThe organization of the constitutional referendum in 2005 and of national andprovincial elections in 2006 was MONUC’s most obvious achievement. It orga-nized a large-scale logistical operation to make possible the registration of 25million citizens out of an estimated electorate of 28 million for a constitutionalreferendum and elections at 50,000 polling stations. Highlighting the logisticalchallenges, Ross Mountain, the deputy special representative of the UNSecretary-General and previously in charge of the elections in Iraq, observed,‘Compared to the DRC, Iraq’s elections were a walk in the park’.45 Variousinstances of election-related violence notwithstanding, the polls were a success.Given the outstanding logistical and political support it had provided, theelections were a celebrated moment for MONUC.

Reducing Human SufferingThe second yardstick to assess MONUC – reduction of human suffering – waschosen for methodological reasons over other criteria. Examining alternativeindicators, for example, whether large-scale violence was brought to an end,raises significant challenges in terms of the availability and quality of data, par-ticularly in war-torn countries like the DRC. Therefore I use the number of intern-ally displaced persons (IDPs) over time as a proxy to assess human suffering.46 Ifthe number of IDPs is decreasing in the course of a peacekeeping mission, it can beexpected that violence and human suffering have declined. The evolution ofinternal displacement in the DRC between 1999 and (June) 2008 can be tracedin Figure 1.

The onset of the war in 1998 resulted in 1.7 million IDPs, a level that remainedrelatively stable over the next four years. In 2003 internal displacement jumped to3.4 million before it steadily decreased to 1.1 million in 2006. The resumption offighting in North Kivu led to a new surge in 2007.

The statistics require disaggregation. First, the figures show that the number ofIDPs only started to decline in late 2003, six years after the conflict had startedand more than two years after it had officially ended. Paradoxically, thenumber of IDPs rose by 662,000 to 3.4 million in the first 12 months followingthe Pretoria peace agreement.47 A stunning increase of 22 per cent over the pre-vious year, the surge was largely the result of the withdrawal of Ugandan andRwandan forces from the DRC. Their pull-out created a void in the easternDRC which the overstretched MONUC was ill equipped to fill.48 Second, theaggregate figures conceal significant differences across the country. While securityimproved steadily in much of the DRC since 2002, the eastern parts remainedinsecure. For example, the surge of IDPs in 2003 was primarily caused by fightingin Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu. Similarly, heavy clashes in 2007 produced500,000 newly displaced persons in North Kivu alone, a surge that is not fully

PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 221

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

reflected by the aggregate numbers because IDPs returned to their homes else-where in the country.49

Overall, internal displacement has significantly diminished from 2003 to2006. This may be somewhat surprising. Given the often appalling performanceof MONUC in terms of deterring violence and protecting civilians, it seemstenuous to attribute the reduction of human suffering to MONUC. Yet, thatlink is not entirely implausible. The build-up of MONUC’s military strengthfrom 3,800 blue helmets in 2002 to 9,900 in 2003 and 15,800 in 2004may have had a positive impact on security. The same holds for the gradual, ifslow transfer of the mission’s military resources to the eastern DRC. In theabsence of robust peacekeeping, the mission’s direct impact on human securitymay have been small. But its steadily growing presence in the DRC’s war-torneastern parts may have enabled the peace process to move forward and mayhave resulted, despite pervasive insecurity, in less fighting overall and henceless human suffering. However, this view was thrown into serious doubt inview of MONUC’s passivity during the round of fighting, from 2007, inNorth Kivu.50

The balance sheet is decidedly mixed. In terms of mandate implementation,serial failures (civilian protection) contrast with outstanding successes (organiz-ing elections). Between these two extremes a wide range of mandated tasks

FIGURE 1

PATTERNS OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT AND MONUC TROOP NUMBERS

Source: MONUC troop numbers are based on the Reports of the Secretary-General (at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/

missions/monuc/monucDrp.htm); IDPs: to 2005, US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, annual World

Refugees Survey (at: www.refugees.org/countryreports.aspx?id¼2129), for 2006 to June 2008 from UN Office

for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, DRC, A

Profile of the Internal Displacement Situation, Geneva, 29 Nov. 2007, pp.64–5; OCHA Regional Office for

Central and East Africa, Displaced Populations Report, Jan.–June 2008, Nairobi, 2008.

222 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

were often only partially, sometimes reasonably well implemented by the mission.Concerning the reduction of human suffering, the evidence is inconclusive. Whilethe day-to-day peacekeeping activities of MONUC soldiers have probably donelittle to alleviate insecurity in the eastern DRC, their presence may have preventedeven more atrocities. The build-up of the mission over time has contributed tothe implementation of the peace accords which made the successful conclusionof the transition process in 2006 possible.

Explaining MONUC’s Performance

Three sets of factors may explain MONUC’s mixed record. The first relates tofactors that were exogenous to the mission; that is, an extremely difficult politicalenvironment in the DRC and the mission’s mandate and means. A second cat-egory concerns the fundamental conceptual and operational problem ofmandate interpretation. Third, the effectiveness of MONUC was also determinedendogenously in terms of a lack of strategic adaptation to a rapidly evolvingenvironment and the resulting assessments made by the mission’s leadership.

Exogenous Factors

First, implementing peace has been a challenge in terms of the ‘situational diffi-culty’ in the DRC. Because some environments are less favourable to theimplementation of peace than others, the political context in a country partlydetermines success.51 It is even more relevant if the means and resources availableto a mission are inadequate. The DRC displays nearly all indicators associatedwith a difficult political environment.52 These include the high number ofwarring parties, combatants and spoilers, weak state institutions, the absenceof a genuine peace to keep, notably in Ituri and the Kivu provinces, the avail-ability of disposable natural resources which allowed warring factions tofinance their war, and hostile neighbouring states (Rwanda, Uganda) that con-tinuously and covertly intervened in the DRC. Finally, the unresolved FDLRissue undermined prospects for peace.53

Second, the mission was given a long list of responsibilities, but without thecommensurate means to implement them. In absolute terms, MONUC is one ofthe biggest missions ever deployed by the UN, but in relative terms it has beenone of the smallest, be it in relation to the size of the DRC (one peacekeeperper 139 sq km), or its population (one soldier per 3,500 Congolese).54 Moreover,MONUC reached the peak of its troop levels of some 19,000 soldiers only in2006, seven years after its inception. The strategic mismatch between mandatedtasks and means reflected what the Brahimi Report described as ‘best-case plan-ning assumptions’ which may be justifiable only in relatively undemandingenvironments.55 The resolutions passed by the Security Council were signs ofunwarranted optimism.

Third, the Security Council’s resolutions revealed the limited interests of itsfive permanent members in solving the conflict, a major constraint on themission effectiveness.56 Three years into the war, for instance, no more than2,400 peacekeepers were deployed in the DRC.57 Despite the incremental build

PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 223

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

up of the mission, the Security Council showed an extreme reluctance to committo an effective peacekeeping mission. It repeatedly ignored requests by the Sec-retary-General for more soldiers.58 Nearly every time it approved additionaltroops, the decision followed severe crises in the DRC which only confirmedthe validity of earlier calls for more peacekeepers. Lack of interest was alsovisible outside of UN deliberations. No major power played a consistent andactive diplomatic or military role in the DRC.59

A Conceptual and Operational Flaw: Mandate Interpretation

A second impediment to effective peacekeeping is associated with the vague con-cepts ‘use of force’ or ‘robust peacekeeping.’ For example, Resolution 1565 auth-orized MONUC ‘to use all necessary means, within its capacity and in the areaswhere its armed units are deployed’ to carry out (nearly) all the tasks mentioned inthat resolution.60 Did this imply that the mission should use force ‘to seize orcollect arms’, ‘to assist in the promotion and protection of human rights’ and‘to ensure the protection of civilians’? Did the phrase ‘all means necessary’ indi-cate that MONUC should conduct joint military combat operations with theCongolese army ‘to disarm foreign combatants’, a reading that paragraphs 5cand 6 might suggest? The behaviour of the mission indicated that it did not con-strue the mandate in such an extensive way. The mission provided significantlogistical support for the FARDC against the FDLR and the Nkunda rebellionbut it stopped short of engaging in joint combat operations. However, becausethe mandate’s wording did not exclude this interpretation, MONUC repeatedlyfailed to live up to Congolese and international expectations and has thus beensubjected to fierce criticism by the government, stone-throwing mobs and evenrebels: ‘The rebels accuse MONUC of fighting against them, the Congolesearmy accuses it of not fighting enough with it, and the people accuse it of nolonger protecting them’.61

One example illustrates the ambiguities of MONUC’s Chapter VII mandate.In 2005, MONUC launched attacks on armed groups in north-eastern Ituridistrict, its most robust military operations to date. Coming on the heels ofone such military operation, in the course of which UN peacekeepers killedsome 60 militiamen, a senior official of the UN’s Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) stressed the evolution of peacekeeping from traditionalapproaches to robust action, including military operations.62 Conscious of theblurred distinction between waging war and waging peace, the official alsoobserved that MONUC was ‘not engaged in war. We are engaged in trying tocreate a peace’. Similarly MONUC force commander Babacar Gaye observedon the same episode: ‘It may look like war but it’s peacekeeping’.63

The elusiveness of the concept of ‘robust’ peacekeeping and the attendant oper-ational questions it raises are hardly unique to the case of the DRC. A UN reportechoed these problems more widely. Pointing to the ‘enormous ambiguity anduncertainty surrounding the most basic precepts of peacekeeping’, the report asks:

What do we mean by terms such as ‘robust peacekeeping’, and what doesthis mean for a police officer or soldier serving in a United Nations

224 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

mission? . . . What are the conditions under which we adopt particularapproaches to the protection of civilians? What is involved in tasks suchas support for the extension of State authority, and what guidance can acivilian peacekeeper rely on?

Then the report comes to the heart of the matter:

The mandates . . . do not provide the sort of detailed guidance that personnelneed in the field . . . Do we agree that ‘peace operations’ is a term thatdescribes multidimensional operations with wide mandates that includecapacity for robust response in support of political, humanitarian anddevelopment actions to secure a sustainable peace? And are we agreedthat this description is a more accurate reflection of the functions ofUnited Nations peacekeeping today?64

MONUC would have deflected much criticism had it pursued a more even-handed approach. Using violent means in some cases but not in others, its militaryactions appeared incoherent. Contrary to Ituri it had no intention to conduct orstomach for robust operations in the Kivus and in Kinshasa. One possible expla-nation may be that robust peacekeeping was encouraged by the particular situ-ation that prevailed in Ituri. Not only were the Ituri militias militarily weak, allof them also remained outside of the national peace process. MONUC’s leader-ship may have reckoned that robust action did not involve the risk of a politicalbacklash in regard to the impartiality of the mission.

In contrast, election related violence in Kinshasa and the situation inthe Kivus posed a far bigger challenge. Armed actors in these theatres, includingthe FDLR, Nkunda and the military outfits of Bemba and Kabila were capableof derailing the peace process and the elections. Consider, for example,MONUC’s passivity in the face of Nkunda’s assault on Bukavu in 2004.Some observers have argued that the main reason for MONUC’s inaction wasits fear that attacks on the advancing rebels could have provoked Nkunda’srebel group, the RCD, to leave the transitional government.65 In this andother instances, attempts at damage limitation prevailed over military action.For example, it has been alleged that the mission struck tacit truces withNkunda’s armed group and other militias in the Kivus, including the FDLR,with the understanding that these groups would abstain from disturbing thepolls.66 MONUC has not pursued a consistently robust approach to implementits mandate.

Endogenous Factors

Finally, a lack of strategic adaptation to conflict dynamics explains MONUC’smixed record.67 The initial purpose of the mission was to observe the 1999ceasefire agreement, a classical peacekeeping task which MONUC performedreasonably well. While the disengagement accords were largely respected alongthe official frontline in 2001, the two Kivu provinces and Ituri turned into theatresof endemic violence where myriad armed groups confronted each other. To someextent, this was a proxy war between the government in Kinshasa and its eastern

PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 225

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

neighbours. It was also a conflict over the control over local power and resourcesby the local forces. Moreover, the presence of valuable mineral resources led tothe emergence of a war economy which overshadowed the initial political andsecurity interests of the warring factions. These dynamics were utterly ignoredby MONUC and the international community. From their perspective, the‘peace to keep’ was exclusively framed by the Lusaka ceasefire agreement, laterfollowed by the accord for a national transition process. Conflict in the easternDRC was not a major concern until the crises in Bunia in 2003 and Bukavu2004 were ‘a stark reminder that the political transition agreed in May 2003[was] not synonymous with peace’.68 Belatedly recognizing that volatility in theeast threatened the entire peace process, MONUC re-assessed the Kivus andIturi as ‘key strategic areas’ and shifted some of its focus to the eastern DRC.69

The transfer of military resources to the east was only completed in early 2008when the mission had moved 92 per cent of its troops to the area.70 But eventhen MONUC lacked the resolve to take robust action, as renewed conflict inNorth Kivu demonstrated.

Finally, successful peacekeeping was also undermined by a lack of coordi-nation for strategic funding of DDR and SSR to promote sustainable outcomesduring the post-conflict period. The consecutive defeats of the Congolese armyagainst Nkunda’s rebels attest to this. Although an integrated mission,MONUC was unable to ensure UN wide coherence, let alone to harmonize theefforts of myriad bilateral and multinational agencies that undertook DDR-and SSR-related programmes.

Conclusion

MONUC will not enter history as a remarkable success story. But there isalso little evidence that MONUC has performed much worse than peacekeepingmissions elsewhere, especially in the light of the DRC’s difficult political environ-ment and the scarce resources the mission had at its disposal. The lack of consist-ent political commitment to resolve the conflict by major powers did not helpMONUC either. Still it performed at least some of its mandated tasks reasonablywell, notably during the first phase of its deployment and in relation to theelections.

Yet it would be mistaken to explain success and failure simply as a functionof resources. As important, and analytically more interesting, are determinantsover which a peacekeeping mission has some leverage. In the DRC, mandateinterpretation and strategy development were two outstanding issues that hada negative impact on MONUC’s performance. The mission failed to adapt itsbehaviour to its evolving mandate, which moved from classical peacekeeping tomultidimensional and robust peacekeeping. Its inability to come to terms withthe precise meaning of robust peacekeeping, in particular to protect civiliansand deter violence, has been a major weakness. No amount of additionaltroops or international political support would have been sufficient to remedythese shortcomings.

226 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

A second major flaw of peacekeeping has been its political thrust. The principalstrategy was to implement a narrowly defined peace agreement that centred onbelligerents-cum-political elites in Kinshasa. Thus the ‘peace to keep’ was exclu-sively defined in terms of first the Lusaka agreement of 1999 and second the Pretoriaaccord of 2002. By supporting a power-sharing arrangement and the organizationof post-conflict elections, MONUC followed the blueprint of international inter-ventions in war-torn countries. In the DRC the narrow focus on an elite-based tran-sition process ignored the dynamics of war. Violent conflict shifted to the east wherearmed groups became entrenched in the shadow of what looked increasingly like avirtual peace process. As in Rwanda or in Angola, the worst level of violenceoccurred not before but in the wake of the peace agreement. For far too long,MONUC considered the conflict in the east as an inconsequential problem thatwould somehow evaporate if the transition in Kinshasa were successfullycompleted. As a consequence, the mission remains bogged down in the easternDRC, where armed groups engaged in a new war with national ramifications.

In the final analysis the record of peacekeeping in the DRC is a ‘mixed bag’.Although the situational difficulty in the country has been a daunting challenge,an arguably more important impediment to peace implementation was rooted infundamental conceptual and operational problems that relate to the use of forcein robust peacekeeping operations. For decades, the use of force only for self-defence has been a cornerstone of peacekeeping. Doing away with thisprinciple in the name of robust peacekeeping requires more than rhetorical acro-batics by UN officials to the effect that modern peacekeeping may look like theconduct of warfare, but that in effect it amounts to waging peace. Such viewstry to reconcile long-established principles (impartiality, use of force only forself-defence) with modern-day requirements of peacekeeping in often hostileenvironments. Peacekeepers require precise rules of engagement that cover alarge and probably infinite number of scenarios that provide clear guidance inthe field. Therefore finding solutions to the vagueness of the concept ‘robustpeacekeeping’ should not be discharged to missions in the field. Efforts by theDPKO, the UN Secretariat, troop contributing countries, the UN SecurityCouncil and other members of the UN are needed to give peacekeepers unambigu-ous mandates and rules of engagement. In addition, the overall approach of theinternational community to stabilize war-torn countries needs to be reconsidered.A self-sustaining peace requires more than elite-centred peace and transitionarrangements (plus elections) that result in a negative peace. This means thatthe international community needs to pay more attention to conflict dynamicsand the shifting interests of local actors, especially if efforts to bring peacestretch over many years, as is so often the case. More effective peacekeepingalso requires a well-defined strategy that does not treat crucial challenges likeDDR and peacebuilding as residual challenges.

NOTES

1. John Terrence O’Neill and Nicholas Reese, United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold WarEra, Abingdon: Routledge, 2005, ch.3.

PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 227

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

2. Philip Roessler and John Prendergast, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo’, in William J. Durch (ed.),Twenty-First Century Peace Operations, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace andthe Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006, pp.229–318; Mark Malan and Joao Gomes Porto (eds),Challenges of Peace Implementation: The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo,Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2004.

3. ‘Is this the World’s Least Effective Peacekeeping Force?’, The Economist, 4 Dec. 2005, pp.43ff.;‘Congo President Chides UN Forces over Eastern Violence’, Reuters, 25 June 2007; FrancoisGrignon and Daniela Kroslak, ‘The Problem with Peacekeeping’, Current History, Vol.107,No.708, 2008, pp.186–7.

4. ‘UN Report Accuses Peacekeepers of Failing the Congolese People’, Financial Times (London),23 March 2005, p.3.

5. Rene Lemarchand, The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Collapse to Potential Reconstruc-tion, occasional paper, Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies, 2001, pp. 17–31.

6. Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality, London: Zed Books, 2007;Michael Nest, with Francois Grignon and Emizet F. Kisangani, The Democratic Republic ofCongo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.

7. Electoral abuses occurred on both sides, but were not of a decisive scale. See Mission d’obser-vation electorale de l’Union Europeenne en RDC, Elections 2006, Rapport Final, Kinshasa, 23Feb. 2007, p.57.

8. Pole Institute, ‘Nord-Kivu: Les guerres derriere la guerre’ [North Kivu: wars behind the war],Goma, 26 Sept. 2008 (at: www.pole-institute.org/documents/dossier%20pole%2026908.pdf?08.pdf).

9. Security Council Res. 1258, 6 Aug. 1999.10. Security Council Res. 1279, 30 Nov. 1999 and 1291, 24 Feb. 2000.11. Security Council Res. 1355, 15 June 2001, para.32.12. Security Council Res. 1493, 28 July 2003, paras 1–6.13. Second Special Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC, UN doc. S/2003/566, 27 May

2003, paras 35–8.14. Cited in Emeric Rogier, ‘MONUC and the Challenges of Peace Implementation in the DRC’, in

Malan and Gomes Porto (see n.2 above), p.255.15. Stale Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay and Catriona Mace, ‘Operation Artemis: The Shape of Things

to Come?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.11, No.3, 2004, pp.508–25.16. Security Council Res. 1493 (see n.12 above), para.26.17. Security Council Res. 1291 (see n.10 above), para.8.18. Security Council Res. 1565, 1 Oct. 2004.19. Ibid.20. ‘Special Report of the Secretary-General on Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’,

UN doc. S/2005/320, 26 May 2005, para.3.21. Security Council Res. 1671, 25 April 2006.22. See Security Council Res. 1756, 15 May 2007.23. ‘Twenty-Third Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC’, UN doc. S/2007/156, 20 Mar.

2007, paras 43ff.; Security Council Res. 1756 (see n.22 above).24. Security Council Res. 1797, 30 Jan. 2008.25. Refugees International, DR Congo: Transition Without Military Transformation, Washington,

DC, 13 Dec. 2007.26. MONUC Human Rights Division, ‘The Human Rights Situation in the DR Congo, January to

June 2006’, Kinshasa, 27 July 2006, para.42.27. For overviews of these criteria see Lise Morje Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cam-

bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.6–8; William J. Durch with Tobias C. Berkman,‘Restoring and Maintaining Peace. What We Know So Far’, in: Durch (ed.), Twenty-FirstCentury Peace Operations, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace and the HenryL. Stimson Center, 2006, pp.15–16. See also Page Fortna, ‘Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War’, International StudiesQuarterly, Vol.48, No.2, 2004, pp.269–92 and references therein.

28. Howard (see n.27 above), p.7.29. I omit the monitoring of the arms embargo; it was inconsequential because MONUC did not have

the mandate to enforce it.30. Security Council Res. 1355 (see n.11 above), para.32.31. ‘Twenty-third Special Report of the Secretary-General’ (see n.23 above), para.74.32. For a revealing example see ‘Second Special Report of the Secretary-General’ (see n.13 above),

para.21.

228 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

33. Security Council Res. 1493 (see n.12 above), para.17.34. Security Council Res. 1493 (see n.12 above) and 1565 (see n.18 above).35. Renner Onana and Hannah Taylor, ‘MONUC and SSR in the Democratic Republic of Congo’,

International Peacekeeping, Vol.15, No.4, 2008, pp.509, 514.36. Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull, ‘Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa. Flawed Ideas About

Failed States’, International Security, Vol.32, No.4, 2008, p.124.37. Refugees International (see n.25 above).38. Onana and Taylor (see n.35 above), p.509.39. Ibid., pp.514ff.40. Author’s interviews with Western diplomats and senior MONUC staff, Kinshasa and Goma,

Sept. 2008.41. For example, Security Council Res. 1565 (see n.18 above), para.6.42. On Bukavu, see Turner (n.6 above), pp.96–105; on Bunia, see Ulriksen et al. (n.15 above).43. See Katarina Mansson, ‘Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo’,

International Peacekeeping, Vol.12, No.4, 2005, p.504.44. Victoria K. Holt and Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the

Responsibility to Protect, and Modern Peace Operations, Washington, DC: Henry L. StimsonCenter, 2006, p.91; Mansson (see n.43 above), p.516; Grignon and Kroslak (see n.3 above),pp.186–7.

45. ‘Congo, With Iraq in Mind, Faces Voting and Threats’, The New York Times, 26 Mar. 2006.Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/26/international/26congo.html.

46. Sexual violence against girls and women, which is a considerable a problem in eastern DRC,could be an alternative measure to assess human suffering. However, the reliability of data onsexual violence is riddled with many problems and a great number of acts of sexual violenceare probably not reported and registered. See Amnesty International, North Kivu: No End toWar on Women and Children, London, 2008.

47. ‘Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC’, 17 Nov. 2003, UN doc. S/2003/1098,para.47.

48. ‘Thirteenth Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC’, 21 Feb. 2003, UN doc. S/2003/211,para.14.

49. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘DR Congo: New Displacements in theCongo Overshadow Returns’, New York, 15 Jan. 2008.

50. Refugees International, ‘DR Congo: Give Peacekeepers Political Support and AchievableMandate’, Bulletin, Washington, DC, 6 Nov. 2008.

51. Howard (see n.27 above); George Downs and Stephen John Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues inPeace Implementation’, in Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens (eds),Ending Civil Wars. The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2002, pp.55–7.

52. See Downs and Stedman (n.51 above), pp.55–7.53. On the FDLR, see Security Council Res. 1804, 13 Mar. 2008.54. For a comparison with other cases, see the figures in Englebert and Tull (n.36 above), p.131.55. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), UN doc. A/55/305-S/

2000/809, 21 Aug. 2000, para.51.56. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno, in an interview,

Le Figaro (Paris), 2 May 2008; Downs and Stedman (see n.51 above), p.58. Available from:http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2008/05/03/01003-20080503ARTFIG00024-le-maintien-dela-paix-a-besoin-des-europeens.php.

57. ‘Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on MONUC’, UN doc. S/2001/970, 16 Oct. 2001,Annex, pp.15–16.

58. See, for example, ‘US Rejects Call for More Troops in Congo’, Financial Times (London), 30Sept. 2005. Available from: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0892bf72-314e-11da-ac1-b-00000e2511c8.html; ‘More International Backing for UN Force, But Not Troops’, SouthScan(Washington, DC), 20 Sept. 2002 pp.3–4.

59. Both South Africa and the EU have more or less consistently sought to contribute to the resolutionof the conflict, but they present at best medium powers.

60. Security Council Res. 1565 (see n.18 above), para.6.61. ‘Lack of Troops, “Schizophrenic” Mandate Hamper UN in DR Congo’, Reuters, 12 Nov. 2008.

See also Refugees International (see n.51 above) and the references in n.3 and n.4 above.62. ‘UN Defends Mission in Congo’, Reuters, 4 Mar. 2005.63. ‘U.N. Forces Using Tougher Tactics to Secure Peace’, The New York Times, 22 May 2005.

Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/23/international/africa/23congo.html.

PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 229

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14

64. ‘Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on PeacekeepingOperations’, Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/60/640, 29 Dec. 2005, para.33.

65. International Crisis Group (ICG), The Congo’s Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, Nairobi/Brussels, 30 Mar. 2005, p.24.

66. Interview with NGO worker, Berlin, May 2008.67. Gross misbehaviour by mission personnel also tarnished the mission, including instances of

sexual exploitation and involvement in the trade of arms and mineral resources. On sexualexploitation see Nicola Dahrendorf, ‘Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Lessons Learned Study.Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in MONUC’, New York: DPKO, Best PracticesUnit, March 2006.

68. International Crisis Group (ICG), Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo, Nairobi/Brussels,7 July 2004, p.1.

69. Second Special Report of the Secretary-General (see n.13 above), para.42.70. Alan Doss, Head of Mission, press conference, New York, 15 April 2008.

230 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f W

inni

peg]

at 1

4:13

15

Sept

embe

r 20

14