Pearl Harbor and Modern Mythmaking.

The usefulness of disasters in furthering political agendas by conspiracy theorists.

MYTH : The US carriers were hustled out of port just before the attack, to "save" them for a war that FDR already knew would be dominated by

the flattop.

FACT: The two carriers then operating from Pearl Harbor, Enterprise and Lexington, were on

missions to deliver additional fighters to Wake and Midway. See the document. These

assignments sent the carriers west, toward Japan and the IJN, widely separated and lightly

escorted.

MYTH : Pearl Harbor was not sent an urgent message on the morning of Dec. 7th so as to

prevent the fleet from being alerted. Variations include using commercial telegraph instead of military radio to transmit the message so as to

delay arrival of the message.

FACT: Atmospheric conditions prevented radio communications between D.C. and Pearl Harbor.

The choice of commercial telegram, while possibly not the best means of communication,

was chosen for reasons given to the investigations.

MYTH : The U.S.N. thought that the harbor at Pearl Harbor was too

shallow to allow a torpedo attack.

FACT: The document shown is a message from the Chief Of Naval Operations which states that no harbor is to

be considered safe from torpedo attack. The consideration at Pearl Harbor, however, was that the

fleet should be ready to sortie on short notice and removing anti-torpedo netting would slow the units'

exit from the harbor

MYTH : The "Fourteen-part message", which the Japanese ambassador was supposed to deliver to the U.S. Secretary of

State 1/2 hour before the attack on Pearl Harbor began, was a declaration of war, or at least a breaking off of diplomatic

relations which would have signaled war.

FACT: The message is not a declaration of war, and did not even break off diplomatic relations. Beyond a

recapitulation of Japanese grievances against the U.S., and the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, there

doesn't seem to be any real point to the message at all.

MYTH : The Captain of USS WARD, on anti-submarine patrol outside the entrance to Pearl Harbor, sent a

message that he had sunk a submarine over an hour before the aerial attack began.

FACT: See the file for WARD's actual report to the ComFOURTEENTH message center. Captain Outerbridge

reports attacking a sub, but not sinking it.

MYTH : The Opana Point Radar reported the Japanese attack 1 hour before the planes arrived over the harbor,

but Adm. Kimmel refused to do anything about it.

FACT: Pvts. Eliot and Lockard were manning the radar at Opana Point. They noticed a large blip on the scope and

call in to the as-yet not fully functional Fighter Information Center. Pvt. McDonald took the call and

located the sole officer at the Center and asked him to call the operators back. Lt. Kermit Tyler.

“We have wakened a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible resolve.”

Toshiro Mifune, NOT Yamamoto Isoruku.

Finally, we enter the realm of “Magic”.

• From: Washington • To: Tokyo 1 December 1941 • (Purple) #1227• Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations

even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

• We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.