pension reform presentation to pa house

Upload: commonwealth-foundation

Post on 05-Apr-2018

219 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    1/13

    A Comprehensive Proposal for

    Reforming PennsylvaniasUnsustainable RetirementSystems

    Richard C. DreyfussBusiness Consultant and Actuary

    Senior Fellow - The Commonwealth Foundation

    Senior Fellow - The Manhattan Institute

    PA House State Government & PA House FinanceCommittees

    August 14, 2012

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    2/13

    Managing Pension Liabilities

    2

    The Public Pension CrisisAugust 18, 2006; Page A14

    the fundamental problem is that publicpensions are inherently political institutions.

    the current public pension system simplyisn't sustainable in the long run.

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    3/13

    Three Factors Drive the PoliticalInstitution of Public Pensions

    1) Poor Benchmarking

    2) Poor Liability Management

    3) Politics

    3

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    4/13

    #1 Poor Benchmarking

    Pennsylvania public pay and benefits aretypically only benchmarked against publicsector practices in other states versusconsidering market practices in thePennsylvania private sector.

    Market trends in the private sector are

    directly relevant to the public sector.

    4

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    5/13

    2012 Hewitt/Aon Survey:Retirement Benefits

    5

    PACompanies

    USCompanies

    Number of companies in survey 35 738

    Number with Defined Benefit plans 9 or 26% 197 or 27%

    Number of DB plans where benefits are

    based upon highest average pay

    1 74

    Number with 401(k) plans 35 738

    Average employee contribution

    matched percentage in 401(k) plan

    5.2% 5.4%

    Average employer matching rate $.80 $.81

    Average employer cost

    (Basic savings plan match to maximum

    often discretionary)

    4.13% to

    6.58%

    4.17% to

    6.14%

    Number of companies offering some

    retiree medical insurance coverage

    18 or 51% 390 or 53%

    Number of companies where retiree

    pays all

    9 or 50% 206 or 53%

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    6/13

    Towers Watson Survey

    Average DC Employer Cost 4.77% to 7.67%http://www.towerswatson.com/assets/pdf/mailings/TW-21621_July-Insider.pdf

    6

    1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

    Traditional DB Plans 64 59 58 53 47 40 37 36 33 29 22 20 17 13

    Hybrid DB Plans 8 13 14 18 23 29 29 28 24 21 23 20 20 17

    DC Plans 28 28 28 29 30 31 34 36 43 50 55 60 63 70

    0%

    10%

    20%

    30%

    40%

    50%

    60%

    70%

    80%

    90%

    100%

    Fortune 100 Companies - Trends in Retirement Plans

    Traditional DB Plans

    Hybrid DB Plans

    DC Plans

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    7/13

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    8/13

    #3 Politics

    Pensions as political capital

    Pension Fund Surplus = Political Capital & BenefitImprovements for Participants and/or Retirees

    Pension Fund Deficits = Underfunding by Taxpayers

    Maintaining or Improving Benefits = High PoliticalRate of Return

    Reforming and Properly Funding Plans = LowPolitical Rate of Return

    8

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    9/13

    True Pension Reform Must Satisfy Three BasicPrinciplesUsing Realistic Funding Assumptions

    1. Funding must be current. Benefits should be funded as they are earned and paid-

    up in the aggregate at retirement. Achieving a 100%funded ratio.

    Significant private sector pension funding reforms occurredin 2006. (Lower investment assumptions ~ 6%, fundingperiods

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    10/13

    Five Step Statewide Pension Reform Plan

    1. Establish a single statewide Defined Contribution plan for all new

    state, school and local government employees with an annualemployer cost of 4% to 7% of pay.

    No unfunded liabilities

    Eliminates long-term taxpayer commitments

    Removes politics from pensions

    2. Prohibit pension obligation bonds or other post-employment benefit(OPEB) bonds on a statewide basis. This concept would alsopreclude other borrowing to finance benefit plans.

    Prevents generational theft deferment of liabilities

    3. Adopt statewide funding reforms consistent with GASB 67 & 68. Shorter amortization periods, use of market value of assets

    Goal is an annual employer cost of 4% to 7% of payroll

    Prohibit benefit improvements if this would result in a funded ratiobelow 90%

    New GASB requirement requires unfunded liabilities to appear onbalance sheets 10

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    11/13

    Five Step Pension Reform Plan

    4. Modifying unearned pension benefits (as legally permitted) This includes increasing member contributions, reducing formula

    benefits, increasing the normal retirement age, curtailing earlyretirement subsidies

    Eliminating pension COLAs

    Revising Other Post-employment Benefits (OPEB) Statewide ban on Deferred Retirement Option Programs (DROPs)

    5. Consider funding reforms only after prior steps are achieved

    Challenge is to do this without increasing taxes or through newborrowing

    Omitting any steps comprehensive pension reform

    11

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    12/13

  • 7/31/2019 Pension Reform Presentation to PA House

    13/13

    13

    A Half-Truth : The nature of transition costsin converting from DB to DC plans

    GASB (the accounting requirement) currently stipulates that aclosed DB plan needs to amortize unfunded liabilities on a leveldollar basis and is silent on the duration. This higher near-termrecognition of costs is referred to as thetransitioncost.

    Some DB plan apologists claim this required accounting treatmentconstitutes a funding mandate which should preclude considerationof major reform initiatives such as adopting a DC plan for newhires.

    Consider the mandate of funding the transition cost versus a

    frequently observed practice of otherwise not contributing theAnnual Recommended Contribution.

    For additional information:http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensions

    http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensionshttp://www.arnoldfoundation.org/news/foundation-debunks-myths-about-fixing-public-pensions