People vs. Larrañaga

G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellants: Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, Davidson Rusia, James Anthony Uy, James Andrew Uy

Per curiam decision

FACTS:

On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to come home on the expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court:

1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told him to ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly.

2) That after stopping by a safe house, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal.

3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline.

4) That Josman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine.

The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalties of two (2) reclusion perpetua. The appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was conspiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes were committed.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.

2) Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.

3) Whether or not the trial court erred imposing the correct penalty.

HELD:

1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint design and community of interest. The appellants’ actions showed that they had the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the appellants indeed conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.

2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting crime will change from complex crime to special complex crime. In the present case, the victims were raped and subjected to dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case of Jacqueline.

3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the imposable penalty to the offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was only 16 years old when the crimes were committed. As penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With regard to the rest of the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above should be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in merely imposing “two (2) reclusion perpetua”.

People vs Cupino

GR No. 125688

Facts:

On August 16, 1989, at more or less 9:45 in the evening, Gromyko Valiente had an altercation with accused Galos and a fist fight ensued when appellant Cupino and Dejoras arrived. Outnumbered, Valiente ran and was pursued. The deceased was stabbed twice by Galos when his attention was diverted. The bolo left embedded in Valiente's stomach was pulled out by Cupino. Appellant Dejoras tried to grab the bolo but unfortunately took hold of the blade cutting his hand. He then let go andrun. Thereafter, Cupino stabbed the wounded victim. No witness for the prosecution testified as to the participation of Dejoras in the assault except thatDejoras joined Galos and Cupino when they approached the victim and he later tried to prevent Cupino from stabbing the victim. Nonetheless, the trial court rendered judgment finding all the accused, who acted in conspiracy, guilty of murder.

Issue:

Whether or not there was conspiracy in the case?

Held:

It is axiomatic that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. Conspiracy is not a harmless sinnuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances. As such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. The quantum of evidence to be satisfied is, we repeat, beyond reasonable doubt. The above testimony clearly demonstrates the conspiracy between Ramon Galos and Appellant Ignacio Cupino. Clearly, by the consonance of their deeds, both assailants conspired to kill Valliente.

People vs. Factao

G.R. No. 125966. January 13, 2004

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellants: Juan Factao alias “Boyet”, Francis Labroda alias “Abet,” and Tirso Servidad

Ponente: J. Tinga

FACTS:

Appellants Juan Factao, Albert Labroda, and Tirso Servidad were found guilty of murder for killing Fernando Sardoma by inflicting gunshot wound on the vital part of the his body. Evidence for the prosecution presented the following:

1) In the evening of August 23, 1991, Vicente Manolos, who was then in a kamalig near the seashore with Eduardo Sardoma, Rolando Nierves, Noel Serrano, and Fernando Sardoma, felt the urge to defecate. As he relieved himself outside beside the boat, he saw Factao, armed with a garand rifle, and Labroda approach the hut. Factao then aimed his gun at a hole in the hut’s bamboo wall and fired.

2) That same night, Jose Manuel Sermona saw Factao, Labroda, and Servidad walking towards the kamalig of the victim and witnessed the shooting.

3) Eduardo Sardoma, upon hearing the explosion immediately went outside, met Servidad and espied Factao and Labroda running from the scene.

Factao and Labrado claimed that at the time of the incident they were celebrating the latter’s birthday and learned about the tragedy only the following day. On the other hand, Servidad claimed that he was with Barangay Captain Faustino Nierves that evening, who then instructed him to investigate when they heard an explosion from the direction of the seashore.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was conspiracy.

HELD:

Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. There was no direct evidence to show that Factao and Labroda agreed to commit the crime. Nonetheless, their acts immediately before and after the shooting evince a commonality in design sufficient to make them co-principals to the killing. The testimonies of the witnesses adequately established conspiracy between Factao and Labroda.

However, the Servidad’s participation in the crime was not established. The mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a co-conspirator. The prosecution failed to offer evidence that Servidad performed any act from which his conspiracy to the crime may be deduced. Thus, he was acquitted.

People of the Philippines vs. Quindoy and Ventura

People of the Philippines, appellee vs.

Felix Ventura y Quindoy and Arante Flores y Ventura, appellants

G.R. Nos. 148145-46

July 5, 2004

FACTS:

This case is filed as a petition of the trial court’s decision in convicting herein appellants, Felix Ventura and Arante Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 and Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20693.

On February 23, 2000, around 2:00am, while the victims were all asleep in their room, appellants stealthily gained entry through the kitchen door. The two then went to the victims’ unlocked room and there killed Aileen Bocateja in defense of his husband, and seriously wounded Jaime Bocateja using the bladed weapon Arante was carrying. Ventura, on the other hand, was armed with a .38 Caliber Homemade Revolver. The two then fled from the victims’ house but was later on apprehended by the Philippine National Police.

During the interview conducted, it was learned that, according to Ventura, on February 17, 2000, her wife, Johanna, confessed that she and Jaime Bocateja were having an affair. Five days later, when Ventura’s nephew, Flores, came to visit his uncle, appellant Ventura asked Flores to go with him to Bocateja’s residence so he could confront Jaime about his affair with Johanna. The two then went to the said house and arrived there at 11pm but was not able to get in until 2:00 am.

In its decision, the trial court found both Ventura and Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder as alleged in Criminal Information No. 00-20693 with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling, nighttime and the breaking of door to gain entrance to the house and with no mitigating circumstance, and for the crime of Murder as alleged in Criminal Information No. 00-20692 qualified by abuse of superior strength. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and by the breaking of a door are present in the commission of the crime. There is no mitigating circumstance.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not superior strength be considered as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20892.

2. Whether or not evident premeditation be considered as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20893.

3. Whether or not breaking of door and nocturnity be considered as aggravating circumstances in both cases.

4. Whether or not Death be the penalty in Criminal Case No. 00-20893.

RULINGS:

1. This Court in a very long line of cases has consistently held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. By deliberately

employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, appellant Flores clearly took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim.

2. The trial court, did not consider evident premeditation as having aggravated the killing of Aileen since she was not the intended victim of appellants' conspiracy. Upon further scrutiny, however, this Court finds that this aggravating circumstance should have been appreciated in connection with Aileen's murder. Jurisprudence is to the effect that evident premeditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than the intended victim was killed, if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance.

3. In determining appellants' criminal liability, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and breaking of door in connection with both crimes. Dwelling is considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human abode. Thus, it has been said that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and produces greater alarm. Here, dwelling was correctly appreciated since the crimes were committed in the place of abode of the victims who had not given immediate provocation.

In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test, under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness facilitated the commission of the offense; and (2) the subjective test, under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness was purposely sought by the offender.90 Applying these tests to the established factual circumstances, this Court concludes that nocturnity was correctly appreciated in connection with both crimes.

4. It is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the Information, resulted in the imposition of the supreme penalty of death upon accused-appellant. The accused must thence be afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference between life and death in order for the Court to properly 'exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence. This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. Consequently, we hold that due to their non-allegation in the Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling cannot be considered in raising the penalty imposable upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to death

Li vs. People [G.R. No. 127962, April 14, 2004]

Facts:

One morning in April 1993, street brawl ensued between Christopher Arugay and his neighbor, Kingstone Li. Arugay sustained multiple stab wounds causing his death while Li sustained hack wounds on the head and contusions. Two different versions of the incident were presented. According to the first version, Arugay was watching the television with his sisters Cristy and Baby Jane and Tan, boyfriend of Baby Jane, when they heard a noise caused by Li and Sangalang who were then bathing naked outside their house. Enraged, Arugay went outside and confronted the two which eventually ended up with Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat on the head and later stabbing him with a knife. Sangalang was also seen stabbing the victim at least once with a knife. The second version, offered by Li however presented that Li was watching the television with a friend when Arugay and his girlfriend hurled objects and kicked the gate of his house. Upon seeing that Arugay has gotten himself two kitchen knives, Li armed himself with a baseball bat. Li managed to evade Arugay’s thrusts and successfully hit him with the bat on the shoulder with which Arugay ran back to his house and emerged carrying a bolo. Arugay tried to hit Li with the bolo but Li raised his right hand to protect himself but Arugay was able to hit him on his right temple, right wrist, and right shoulder. Li passed out. Sangalang was also present when the incident started. Arugay died of multiple stab wounds while Li was brought to the hospital.

RTC charged Li with homicide and ruled the existence of conspiracy although concluded that it was Sangalang, and not Li, who stabbed Arugay. Court of Appeals affirmed RTC’s decision but opined that since it has not been established which wound was inflicted by either one of them, they should both be held liable and each one is guilty of homicide, whether or not a conspiracy exists.

Issue: Whether or not there was conspiracy between Li and Sangalang. If there is not, what acts are imputable to Li.

Held: No, RTC erred in concluding an implied conspiracy. The facts that Li and Sangalang were in the same house at

the same time; and that they both armed themselves before going out to meet Arugay are not in themselves sufficient to establish conspiracy.

Sangalang stabbed Arugay only after petitioner had become unconscious. Before that point, even as Li struck Arugay with a baseball bat, it was not proven that Li had asked for, or received, any assistance from Sangalang. Based on these circumstances, Sangalang and Li had not acted in concert to commit the offense. After Arugay had struck hack wounds on Li and as Li lay incapacitated, possibly unconscious, it remained highly doubtful whether he had any further participation in the brawl. At that point, Sangalang, emerged and stabbed Arugay to death. In fact, thestabbing of Arugay could very well be construed as a spur-of-the-moment reaction by Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li was struck by Arugay. It cannot be assumed that Sangalang did what he did with the knowledge or assent of Li, much more in coordination with each other. It was also proved that Li, already weak and injured, could possibly inflict fatal stab wounds on Arugay.

Absent any clear showing of conspiracy, Kingstone Li cannot answer for the crime of Eduardo Sangalang. Petitioner Kingstone Li is ACQUITTED of the charge of Homicide for lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. However, he is found GUILTY of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.

People vs. Hamton [G.R. Nos. 134823-25]

Facts: Teofilo Garcia and his wife Leonida were the sole distributors of Singer sewing machines registered under

“Garmer Industrial Sewing Machines” located at Shaw, Mandaluyong. On March 8, 1994, two armed men, later identified as Jun Notarte and Reynaldo Yambot, entered the office and announced a hold-up, taking with them P2,000.00 in cash along with Teofilo. In the car were two other men, later identified as herein appellant Arnold Lopez and Arthur Pangilinan. Teofilo was brought to a house where he was confined in a room with no windows chained to an iron grill. Three or four persons guarded him. Calls were made to Leonida in exchange of Teofilo of which, was agreed upon, through consequentnegotiations, a final value of 1.2 Million pesos. Arnold Lopez, identified as Adan Manalo, set up an arrangement for thetransaction. While husband was abducted, Antonio Hamton, with the knowledge of the situation, at the same time that appellant was negotiating with Leonida for the ransom money, was also calling up, pretending to be her husband's kidnapper and was able to extort 50,000 pesos from the latter. Leonida sought PACC’s help. Rendezvous with kidnappers was set and upon conformation with instructions fled with the money. PACC chased the kidnappers and was able to detain three of four of the accused while Notarte had escaped. Accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses of Kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Hamton, who was found guilty of robbery, filed an appeal but later withdrew the same. Pangilinan, Lopez, and Yambot submitted individual appeal briefs assailing RTC decision. They allege that the lower court should have imposed individual penalties upon them depending on their degree of participation in the crime.

Issue: Whether or not conspiracy existed between the herein respondents.

Held: In the case at bar, as the trial court correctly held, conspiracy may be deduced from the appellants' acts that

show concerted action and community of interest. If it can be proven that two (2) or more persons aimed their acts toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object — so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment — then conspiracy may be inferred, even though no actual meeting among them to concert means can be shown. Consequently, the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime, because in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. Undoubtedly, in perpetrating the kidnapping for ransom, conspiracy existed among herein accused-appellants. Viewed in its totality, the individualparticipation of each of them pointed to a joint purpose and criminal design. Notarte and Yambot snatched the victim from his office in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Pangilinan and Yambot sandwiched him in the car and transported him, together with the others, to a house where he was detained for ten days. Lopez negotiated with the victim's wife for the ransom payment. Further, all three appellants set out to the designated place of ransom payment. These acts were complementary to one another and were geared toward the attainment of a common ultimate objective. That objective was to extort a ransom of P10 million (which was later reduced to P1.2 million through bargaining by the victim's wife) in exchange for the victim's freedom.

Aradillos vs. CA [G.R. No. 135619, January 15, 2004]

Facts: At around 5:45 in the afternoon of February 3, 1992, Gloria rebuked herein petitioners Aradillos and Galabo

when she saw them in the act of cutting the bamboo bridge located on the property of her husband. Thereupon, petitioners chased her and they caught up with her near the house. Galabo then hit her several times with a piece of wood and his carpentry bag causing her to fall down. While Gloria was staggering face down, Aradillos hacked her twice with a carpentry ax, hitting her on the right side of the head and on the forehead. She asked for help from the Visto family, her neighbors, who brought her to the clinic of Dr. Alvarez in Matina, Davao. After Dr. Alvarez gave her first aid treatment, Gloria was advised to go to Davao Medical Center where she was confined in the ICU for four days.

The petitioners (accused) on the other hand contend that the injury of Gloria was sustained by mere accidental on the course of the struggle between the victim and Aradillos for the possession of the axe of the latter. As told by petitioner Aradillos, it was Gloria who went near Aradillos who was then cutting the roots of the “idyok” tree, and grabbed the ax, obviously with the intention of stopping Aradillos from cutting the tree. Not wanting to let go of the ax, Aradillos held on to it and the two then struggled for its possession. With both of their hands on the handle, the ax went swaying and swinging, which accidentally hit Gloria.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the intent to kill was sufficiently proven based on the evidence provided for in the case

(2) Whether or not the defense of accident can exempt the accused from criminal liability.

(3) Whether or not there is conspiracy in the commission of the crime

Held: (1) No. There was no sufficient medical evidence on record to prove that the nature of injuries inflicted by Aradillos showed any willful intent to kill Gloria.

(2) No. The accused cannot invoke the defense of accident to escape the consequences of his act. Under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, a person, who while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by accident without fault or intention of causing it, is exempt from criminal liability. It cannot be said that Aradillos was performing a lawful act when he struggled with Gloria for the ax as the latter’s act of taking hold of the ax was equivocal, and it cannot be deduced therefrom that he was under the threat of an unlawful aggression from her.

(3) No. Conspiracy has not been proven due to absent competent proof thereof. Hence, Aradillos should be held liable only for less serious physical injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as the wounds sustained by Gloria required medical attendance of fourteen days and Galabo must be absolved from any liability as the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that he conspired with Aradillos in the commission of the crime.

Case of People of the R.P. vs. PugayNo. L-74324 17November1988

FACTS OF THE CASE:The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal responsibilities of the accused?

RULING:CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda.Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was committed by him.

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.

Criminal Responsibilities:PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD:JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.

People v. GenosaG.R. No. 135981, 29 September 2000

FACTS:

Marivic Genosa was convicted of Parricide for killing his legitimate husband Ben Genosa and with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, she was meted the penalty of death. The case was elevated to the SC for automatic review.

Appellant subsequently filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for her examination by expert psychologists and psychiatrist and the reception of latter's reports to prove her claim of self-defense on the theory of battered woman syndrome.

The SC remanded the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological/psychiatric opinion on the plea of battered woman syndrome.

Marivic Genosa was examined by Dra. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist, who testified that Marivic "fits the profile of a battered woman" and by Dr. Alfredo Parajillo, a psychiatrist, who "explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relieves the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually beaten at that time" and that at the time Marivic killed her husband, her "mental condition was that she was "re-experiencing the trauma.' That the "re-experiencing of the trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes x x x."

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not appelant acted in self-defense. 2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

HELD:

1) The SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit:

a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.

b) The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life.

c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable--not necessarily immediate and actual--grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.

2) The SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant's aggression.

People vs Francisco AbarcaG.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder. The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal. On 15 July 1984 in Tacloban City, the accused, Francisco Abarca with deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, shot several times Khingsley Paul Koh on the different parts of his body inflicting upon gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado on the different parts of their bodies which have caused the death of said spouses.

Issue:W/O accused-appellant is liable for the crime of complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder?

Held:

The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados. For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro).The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs

People vs. Catbagan(G.R. Nos. 149430-32. February 23, 2004)

Appellee: People of the PhilippinesAppelant: Carmelo Catbagan

Ponente: J. Panganiban

FACTS:After receiving complaints about the gunshots coming from the residence of Danilo Lapidante, who was then was celebrating his birthday, appellant Carmelo Catbagan, an investigator of the Criminal Investigation Service, Philippine National Police, went to the latter’s house to verify who among their group had been firing the Armalite rifle. Suddenly, a piece of stone was hurled from the direction of the celebrant’s house, hitting Catbagan. Irritated, he ordered his companion, Zosimo Pavabier, to look for the one who threw the stone. At that moment, Sgt. Celso Suico of the Philippine Air Force and of the Presidential Security Group, the one responsible for firing the shots, approached and extended his hand towards Catbagan as he introduced himself. Completely ignoring the gesture of the latter, Catbagan drew out his .9mm automatic pistol and fired successively at Suico. Ernesto Lacaden, companion of Suico, who was abruptly awakened as the shots were fired, disembarked from the parked owner-type jeep where he was sleeping. Unexpectedly, two shots were also fired at him by Catbagan. Almost simultaneously, Catbagan directed his attention to Lapidante who was then inside their compound and running towards the main door of their house upon the prompting of his wife to evade the assailant. But before he could reach the safety of their abode, two rapid shots were fired by Catbagan, one of which hit him in the upper part of his body. As a consequence of the injuries they sustained, Suico and Lapidante died, whereas Lacaden had to be treated and confined in the hospital.

In his defense, Catbagan argued that he was justified in shooting the victims, as he was merely defending himself and fulfilling his sworn duties. He claimed that the victims were rushing and encircling him, Lacaden toting an ice-pick while Suico drew a gun from his waist and aimed the pistol at him. Simultaneously, he heard Lapidante shouting, which he believed was asking for a long gun. Threatened of his safety, he drew his own gun fired at the aggressors. He then surrendered himself and his firearms to his superior officer at the CIDG Office. The lower court, nonetheless, convicted him with the crime of homicide, murder, and frustrated murder.

ISSUE:1) Whether or not the appellant was justified in shooting the victims as a direct result of his fulfillment of a duty.2) Whether or not the appellant was entitled to a justifying circumstance of self-defense.3) Whether or not the appellant was entitled to a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.4) Whether or not the characterization of the crimes charged by the trial court was correct.

HELD:1) No. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability, provided that the following requisites must concur: 1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary consequence of such lawful exercise. In the instant case, the above mentioned requisites were absent. The appellant was not performing his duties at the time of the shooting as there was no proof that he had personal knowledge on who had been firing the Armalite, nor he was there to effect an arrest. The fatal injuries that he inflicted on the victims were not a necessary consequence of the performance of his duty as a police officer.

2) No. Article 11 of the RPC provides that anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights do not incur criminal liability, provided that the following circumstances concur: 1) unlawful aggression; 2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and 3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In the circumstances surrounding the shooting of Suico, only a majority of the elements of self-defense were present. However, he may still be credited with a mitigating circumstance in accordance with Article 13 of the RPC. With regard

to the circumstances surrounding the shooting of Lapidante and Lacaden, no unlawful aggression was shown. Thus, the justifying circumstance of self-defense will not apply.

3) Yes. In order for voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. It is sufficient that that act be spontaneous and clearly indicative of the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally. At the time of his surrender, appellant had not actually been arrested. He surrendered himself and his firearm to a person in authority, the chief of the Assistant Directorate for Intelligence of the Philippine National Police. Finally, the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous; it thus showed intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities. Thus, he was credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

4) No. The crimes were not properly characterized except with the case of Suico. Treachery was alleged in the case, thus qualifying the shooting of Lapidante and Lacaden as murder and frustrated murder respectively. In order to establish treachery, the following must be proven: 1) the employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and 2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. With regard to the shooting of Lapidante and Lacaden, the Court held that even if the positions of the victims were vulnerable, there was still no treachery, as the appellant did not deliberately adopt such mode of attack. His decision to shoot them was clearly sudden. Thus, in the case of Lapidante, the Court modified the crime from murder to homicide; while in the case of Lacaden, the crime was modified from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries.

People vs. Abella, et.al.

Facts: It all started with an altercation during a basketball game. 3 days later, the 5 victims’ bodies were found in the Pasig River. Victims were Marlon and Joseph Ronquillo, Erwin and Andres Lojero and Felix Tamayo.

Marlon’s hands were tied at the back with an electric cord, he had wounds and died from a gunshot to the head. Andres’ hands were also bound at the back with a rope, his genitals were cut off and had wounds in his body as well, cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation. Joseph’s hands were tied at the back with a basketball t-shirt, had wounds and died of strangulation as well. Erwin’s and Felix’s body had abrasions and burns, there were cord impressions on his wrists, a fracture in his skull and died by drowning.

The accused are Abella, Granada, De Guzman, Valencia (all surnames), for MURDER, qualified by treachery and evident premeditation. There were other accused but their names were dropped from the information later on.

March 1992, the victims Ronquillo brothers were played 3 rounds of basketball in Sta. Mesa Manila against the team of Joey de los Santos. The Ronquillos brothers won the first 2 rounds but the 3rd one ended in a brawl. Later that afternoon, Joey went back to the place carrying 2 pillboxes but were apprehended. So, Joey and his brother just threw stones at the Ronquillos’ house. The neighbors saw this and ran after them and mauled them.

That night, the victims were in front of the Ronquillos’ house. Suddenly, a white Ford Fiera without a plate number stopped in front of the group. There were 10-13 people on board, including Joey and his brother. The passengers in the Fiera alighted, faces covered with handkerchiefs and they were armed. The victims tried to run but a shot was fired and Felix (victim) was shot. They were boxed, kicked and hit and dragged into the van. They were brought to a basement in a compound where witness Elena saw them being mauled, whipped with a gun, beaten with steel tubes and lead pipes. They also had a blowtorch and the victims’ hands were tied. The victims begged for mercy. Afterwards, they were herded back to the car, seeming almost dead. 2 days later, their bodies were found in the Pasig river.

Accused’ defense was an alibi, that they are INC members and were attending a panata that night. According to them, when they read their names in the newspapers as the perpetrators of the crime, they consulted the INC Central Office and were then accompanied by a lawyer to go to the police station to “clear their names,” They were later on identified in a police line-up. The RTC convicted all of them for MURDER, with a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not the accused are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Held: No. First of all, the witnesses were able to fully establish and prove and connect the appellants-accused to the crime. The SC is sufficiently satisfied that their guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The killing was characterized by treachery. Though treachery should normally attend at the inception of the aggression, the facts show that the victims were first seized and bound and then slain, hence treachery is present. In this case, it is enough to point out that the victims’ hands were tied at the back when their bodies were found floating in Pasig River. This fact clearly shows that the victims were rendered defenseless and helpless, thereby allowing the appellants to commit the crime without risk at all to their persons. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed in treachery.

The appellants’ move to “clear their names” cannot be accepted as voluntary surrender. For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because (1) he acknowledges his guilt or (2) he wishes to save the government the trouble and expense

necessarily included for his search and capture. When the accused goes to a police station merely to clear his name and not to give himself up, voluntary surrender may not be appreciated.

De vera vs De veraG.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 506

Facts: Rosario T. de Vera accused her spouse Geren A. de Vera (Geren) and Josephine F. Juliano(Josephine) of Bigamy. Geren pleaded "Guilty which was later on withdrawn and the court later on appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Judgment was rendered holding Geren guilty of bigamy. Rosario moved for MR for the modification of the court’s judgment of conviction against Geren, because of the allegedly mistaken application of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which was denied. Geren applied for probation which was granted. Rosario instituted a special civil action for certiorari before the CA which was dismissed, MR denied.

Issue: Whether the action of Rosario is procedurally tenable since it in effect seeks an increase in the penalty imposed.

Held:

Sec. 7, Rule 120, ROC. In judgments of conviction, errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto; or he, himself, moves for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision. Records show that after the promulgation of the judgment convicting Geren of bigamy, it was petitioner (as private complainant) who moved for the reconsideration14 of the RTC decision. This was timely opposed by Geren, invoking his right against double jeopardy. The requisite consent of the accused is intended to protect him from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked

Issue: Whether there was voluntary surrender

Held:

Yes. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. In this case, it appears that the Information was filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005. On March 1, 2005, the court issued an Order finding probable cause for the accused to stand trial for the crime of bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of the same day, Geren surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction of bail. After the accused posted bail, there was no more need for the court to issue the warrant of arrest. Mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender "involuntary."

RICARDO BACABAC v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 532 SCRA 557 (2007)

Bacabac’s failure to assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this

Court’s appreciation of community of design between him and his co-accused to harm

the victims. Following a heated argument in a dance hall which resulted in a brawl, Jose

Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel), herein referred to as Talanquines

brothers, proceeded to confront their enemies armed with guns. They

were accompanied by Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin (Jesus).

In the dance hall, they encountered Hernani Quidato and Eduardo Selibio. After a

physical confrontation, The Talanquines brothers shot Quidato and Selibio. Quidato and

Selibio later died from their wounds. The Talanquines brothers, together with Jonathan

Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfinwas charged and found guilty of

the crime of Murder. Ricardo Bacabac (Bacabac) appealed hisconviction, contending

that he cannot be deemed to be in conspiracy with the other accused because he was

not the one who pulled the trigger. He also alleged that even if he was convicted of

Murder, in gratis argumenti, the correctness of the pronouncement of guilt should

have been attended by the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave

offense, in the same manner as the other accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is conspiracy among Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and

JesusDelfin in the murder of the victims.

HELD:

Bacabac‘s failure to assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this

Court’s appreciation of community of design between him and his co-accused to harm

the victims. What is decisive in treachery is that “the attack was executed in such a

manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate.” In the case at bar,

petitioner, a policeman, and his co-accused were armed with two M-16 armalites and a

revolver. The victim and his companions were not armed. The attack was sudden and

unexpected, and the victim was already kneeling in surrender when he was shot the

second time. Clearly, the victim and his companion Eduardo had no chance to defend

themselves or retaliate. Conspiracy presupposes the existence of evident premeditation

does not necessarily imply that the converse ─ that evident premeditation presupposes

the existence of a conspiracy ─ is true. In any event, a link between conspiracy and

evident premeditation is presumed only where the conspiracy is directly established

and not where conspiracy is only implied, as in the present case.

People vs. Tubongbanua [G.R. No. 171271, 31 August 2006]

Facts:

The accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua – Kho. One Evening the accused drove Atty. Kho to her unit. After giving the bag to Marissa, the maid, the accused went straight to the kitchen. After playing with her daughter, Atty. Kho emerged from the bedroom to talk to the accused. Shortly thereafter, Marissa heard the employer screaming and she saw the accused stabbing her with a kitchen knife. She tried to stop him, but the accused continued to stab Atty. Kho. The latter was bought to the hospital by her father but was not revived. She sustained eighteen stab wounds some found in her chest which was considered to have caused her death. The accused fled the scene and was arrested in Mindoro while on his way to his home province. Prior to the commission of the crime, the accused confided to Marian Aquino, secretary of the law firm where the victim works, and Atty. Baguio, an associate of the firm, his grudges towards the victim and his plan to kill her.

Issue: Whether or not accused Tubongbanua is guilty of the crime of murder qualified by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling.

Held:

Yes. Accused Tubongbanua was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by evident premeditation and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling. It was established by the prosecution witnesses the appellant’s state of mind and predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by the victim. Both witnesses testified on appellant’s ill-plans against his employer the day prior to the crime. Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the criminal act. He killed Atty. Sua-Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder weapon into her body several times, despite her attempts to parry the blows. He could not have executed the dastardly act without employing physical superiority over the victim. There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed her elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification and sentenced the accused to Reclusion Perpetua without the possibility of parole.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NICOLAS GUZMANG.R. No. 169246 January 26, 2007

FACTS: 

After attending a worship service at the Iglesia ni Kristo church in his barangay, Michael proceeded home. While Michael was casually walking along the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, appellant and his two companions, who were drinking nearby, suddenly approached and surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the back of Michael while his two companions stood in front of Michael. In an instant, they grabbed the shoulders of Michael and overpowered the latter. One of the appellant's companions, whom the prosecution witnesses described as a male with long hair, drew out a knife and repeatedly stabbed Michael on the stomach. Unsatisfied, the appellant's other companion, whom the prosecution witnesses described as a male with flat top hair, took the knife and stabbed Michael on the stomach. As the finale, appellant went in front of Michael, took the knife and also stabbed Michael on the stomach. When Michael fell on the ground, appellant kicked him at the body. Upon noticing that the bloodied Michael was no longer moving, appellant and his two companions fled the scene. The appellant was convicted by the trial court with the crime of murder. On appeal, appellant contends that even if he were held liable for the death of Michael, there was no treachery which will qualify the killing as murder. According to him, there is no evidence to show that appellant and his two companions had deliberately and consciously adopted their mode of attack to ensure its execution without risk to themselves. The stabbing incident occurred in a place that was properly lighted. There were many people in the area then walking in different directions. He claims that if he and his two companions wanted to ensure that no risk would come to them, then they could have chosen another time and place to attack Michael. 

ISSUE: Can treachery be properly appreciated in the instant case? 

HELD: 

Yes. Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under the circumstances that renders the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. It is an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder. Article 14, paragraph (16) of the Revised Penal Code states the concept and essential elements of treachery as an aggravating circumstance. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, two essential elements/conditions are required in order that treachery may be appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; (2) deliberate or conscious choice of means, methods or manner of execution. Further, it must always be alleged in the information and proved in trial in order that it may be validly considered. 

In the instant case, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant. Moreover, all the essential elements/conditions of treachery were established and proven during the trial. The suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack of appellant and his two companions rendered Michael defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape. It appears that Michael was unarmed and alone at the time of the attack. Further, he was merely seventeen years of age then. In such a helpless situation, it was absolutely impossible for Michael to escape or to defend himself against the assault of appellant and his two companions. Being young and weak, Michael is certainly no match against adult persons like appellant and his two companions. Michael was also outnumbered since he had three assailants and was unarmed when he was stabbed to death. Appellant and his two companions took advantage of their size, number, and weapon in killing Michael. They also deliberately adopted means and methods in exacting the cruel death of Michael by first surrounding him, then grabbing his shoulders and overpowering him. Afterwards, each of them repeatedly stabbed Michael with a knife at the stomach until the latter fell lifeless to the ground. The stab wounds sustained by Michael proved to be fatal as they severely damaged the latter's large intestine. 

The fact that the place where the incident occurred was lighted and many people were walking then in different directions does not negate treachery. It should be made clear that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. This is even more true if the assailant is an adult and the victim is a minor. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists.

People vs. Lucas

G.R. No. 80102. January 22, 1990

Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

Accused-appellant: Jovencio Lucas

Ponente: J. Cortes

FACTS:

Mauricia Lucas was then thirteen years old and working as a housemaid in Sampaloc, Manila.

Sometime in September 1985, she was fetched by her father, herein accused Jovencio Lucas, from

her place of work. They boarded a jeepney and alighted in a place which Mauricia found

unfamiliar. She was thereafter brought to a dark room where the accused tied both her hands and

feet to a bed, undressed her, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette, kissed her, fondled her private

parts, pointed a knife at her neck, and laughed while consummating the sexual act. The physical and

genital examination supported the fact of defloration and further testified that the findings were

consonant to that of a woman who had several experience with sexual intercourse. Nonetheless, as

the examinations were conducted about six months after the alleged rape took place, evidence of

violence can no longer be established.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of cruelty in

the case.

2) Whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of relationship

in the case.

HELD:

1) Yes. The Court held that there is cruelty when the offender enjoys and delights in making his

victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the

offense. Moreover, the absence of any evidence of force does not negate a finding that forcible

sexual intercourse actually took place. The trial court, having had the opportunity of hearing the

witnesses of both prosecution and defense, gave weight to the sincerity and conviction of the victim.

The appellant tied the victim to a bed, burnt her face with a lighted cigarette, and laughed while

consummating the crime. Undeniably, cruelty is present in this case.

2) Yes. Article 15 of the Revised Penal code provides that, in the case of rape, the alternative

circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the victim is the descendant of

the offender. The Court found that in order for the appellant to carry out the crime to his advantage,

the filial trust reposed in him by his daughter was undeniable abused. He personally fetched his

daughter, at her place of work, took her to the scene of the crime, and forced himself sexually. The

aggravating circumstance of relationship in the case was correctly applied in the case.

LICYAYO VS. PEOPLE- SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION AND INTOXICATION

G.R. NO. 169425, MARCH 4, 2008

FACTS:

Licyayo was charged of Homicide with the RTC when he stabbed Rufino in different parts of the body. The RTC

convicted Licyayo guilty of the crime Homicide there being no attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

The petitioner appealed contending that sufficient provocation and intoxication should be taken as mitigating

circumstances attendant in the case. He insisted that there is sufficient provocation because it was the deceased

who punched him first and when the incident ensued he was intoxicated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not sufficient provocation and intoxication should be considered as mitigating circumstances attendant in

the case.

HELD:

The records do not sufficiently establish who between Rufino and Aron started the brawl which resulted in the

stabbing of Rufino by petitioner. Granting arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, it is

obvious that immediately he became the underdog, literally even. He was easily overpowered by the bigger and

sober Aron Licyayo. Sufficient provocation therefore cannot be appreciated in favor of the petitioner.

As testified by the police officers, they said that petitioner indeed was drunk when the scuffle ensued. However,

these testimonies alone do not suffice as proof to appreciate intoxication as a mitigating circumstance. In the case at

bar, there is no plausible evidence showing that the quantity of liquor taken by petitioner was of such quantity as to

affect his mental faculties. On the contrary, the fact that petitioner could recall the details that transpired during and

after his drinking session with friends is the best proof that he knew what he was doing during the incident.

People vs. Ladjaalam

G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellant: Walpan Ladjaalam alias “Warpan”

Ponente: J. Panganiban

FACTS:

Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug

den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972);

2) illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as

amended by Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. The

following information was provided by the prosecution:

1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house

of appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire

coming from the second floor of the said house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the

M14 rifle towards them.

2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier

saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant jumped from the window to

the roof of a neighboring house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief

chase.

3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellant’s house. Also found was a

pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing methamphetamine

hydrochloride.

4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded positive for

gunpowder nitrates.

5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm and

ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.

ISSUE:

Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating

circumstance.

HELD:

No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any

firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, “unless no other crime was committed”. Furthermore, if

homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed

firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct

assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating

circumstance.

Agote vs. Lorenzo

G.R. No. 142675. July 22, 2005

Petitioner: Vicente Agote

Respondents: Hon. Manuel Lorenzo, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 43, Manila and People

of the Philippines

Ponente: J. Garcia

FACTS:

Petitioner Vicente Agote was charged to have violated Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal

Possession of Firearms) and COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 (Gun Ban) for having in possession one

(1) .38 cal. Rev. with four (4) live bullets in a public place during the election period without having

secured the necessary license and authority from the COMELEC. During the pendency of the

case, Republic Act No. 8294was approved into law. Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment of

conviction in both cases wherein separate penalties were imposed respectively. Petitioner moved for

reconsideration, claiming that the penalty for illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 had

already been reduced by the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, which the trial court

subsequently denied. He then filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-

G.R. SP No. 2991-UDK, but was likewise dismissed.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Republic Act No. 8294 should be applied retroactively.

2) Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as a special aggravating

circumstance.

HELD:

1) Yes. The rule is that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person

guilty of a felony. Republic Act No. 8294 lowers the penalty for illegal possession of firearms

depending on the class of firearm possessed. The lighter penalty may be imposed to a person who

shall unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition, “unless no other crime was committed”.

Moreover, the Court has already ruled in Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals that said law must be given

retroactive effect in favor of those accused under P.D. No. 1866. But as violation of COMELEC

Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban was also committed by the petitioner at the same time, the

Court cannot but set aside petitioner’s conviction for illegal possession of firearm.

2) No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any

firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, “unless no other crime was committed”. It further

provides that such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered only as an aggravating

circumstance in cases of homicide or murder. Since the crime committed was in violation of

COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an

aggravating circumstance.

CELINO v. CA, G.R. No. 170562 June 29, 2007

Brief Facts:       Two separate Information were filed against the petitioner, Angel Celino: one for violation of the Comelec gun ban; the other, for Illegal Possession of Firearm under R.A. 8294. After pleading not guilty to the former, he filed a Motion to Quash on the latter contending that he “cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x x x if he was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts x x x.”

Issue:      Whether the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm because of the provision of the law that "Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested."

Ruling:      Ruling against the petitioner, the High Court explained that he can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime wascommitted by the person arrested.  The word “committed” taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the

Constitutional presumption of innocence,necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission.      Citing the case of People v. Valdez (1999), the Supreme Court ruled that “all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x.”        In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coupd’etat. Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.