perceptual certainty and higher-order awareness: comments on hakwan lau

Perceptual Perceptual Certainty and Certainty and Higher-order Higher-order Awareness:Awareness:

Comments on Hakwan Comments on Hakwan LauLau

David RosenthalDavid Rosenthal NYU/CNRS Workshop: NYU/CNRS Workshop: PerceptionPerception CUNY Graduate CenterCUNY Graduate Center Action, and the Self, Action, and the Self, 10/31/0910/31/09

Philosophy andPhilosophy and Cognitive Cognitive Science Science

http://davidrosenthal1.googlepages.com/http://davidrosenthal1.googlepages.com/

IntroductoryIntroductory 22

I. IntroductoryI. IntroductoryThere is much I agree with in Hakwan’s There is much I agree with in Hakwan’s

talk—and much I welcome in support of talk—and much I welcome in support of a higher-order theory of consciousness, a higher-order theory of consciousness, and as evidence against any first-order and as evidence against any first-order theory.theory.

Thus: Applying Thus: Applying TMSTMS to to PFC PFC lowers lowers perceptual certainty but not visual perceptual certainty but not visual performance,performance, and and fMRI in performance-matched conditions fMRI in performance-matched conditions shows variation in awareness to shows variation in awareness to correspond with variation in PFC—correspond with variation in PFC— all all along with the robust character of the along with the robust character of the cognitive unconscious. cognitive unconscious.

NYU/CRNS Workshop on Perception, Action, and the NYU/CRNS Workshop on Perception, Action, and the SelfSelf

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IntroductoryIntroductory

These findings all support a higher-These findings all support a higher-order- theory—on which a state is order- theory—on which a state is conscious if, but only if, one has a conscious if, but only if, one has a suitable suitable higher-order awarenesshigher-order awareness (HOA)(HOA) of that state.of that state.

Visual performance and perceptual Visual performance and perceptual certainty are certainty are independentindependent:: And And visual performancevisual performance reflects a subject’s reflects a subject’s first-order visual states,first-order visual states, whereas whereas perceptual certaintyperceptual certainty is is arguably a measure of an individual’s arguably a measure of an individual’s HOAHOA of those first-order states. of those first-order states.

In addition, the In addition, the reportabilityreportability of of conscious states is reason to posit conscious states is reason to posit higher-order thoughtshigher-order thoughts (HOTs)(HOTs) to explain to explain that that HOAHOA..NYU/CRNS Workshop on Perception, Action, and NYU/CRNS Workshop on Perception, Action, and

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Verbal reports express thoughtsVerbal reports express thoughts about about

the items reported; so reports of mental the items reported; so reports of mental states express states express thoughts about those thoughts about those statesstates..

As Hakwan notes, the conceptual content As Hakwan notes, the conceptual content of of HOTsHOTs can be cognitively undemanding. can be cognitively undemanding. And since And since HOTsHOTs are seldom conscious, are seldom conscious, we’ll seldom be aware of them: We we’ll seldom be aware of them: We should see them as should see them as theoretical positstheoretical posits..Still, for today’s purposes, any form of Still, for today’s purposes, any form of higher-order awareness higher-order awareness (HOA)(HOA) will do. will do.

Hakwan argues for his Hakwan argues for his hierarchical modelhierarchical model

and against a and against a dual-channel modeldual-channel model,, and and suggests that Ned may in effect be suggests that Ned may in effect be operating with a dual-channel model.operating with a dual-channel model.

NYU/CRNS Workshop on Perception, Action, and NYU/CRNS Workshop on Perception, Action, and the Selfthe Self

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The contrast between hierarchical and The contrast between hierarchical and

dual-channel models matches pretty dual-channel models matches pretty closely that between higher- and first-closely that between higher- and first-order theories of consciousness.order theories of consciousness.

On a On a higher-order theoryhigher-order theory,, mental states mental states are not in themselves conscious; their are not in themselves conscious; their being conscious depends on something being conscious depends on something distinct. That’s the hierarchical model.distinct. That’s the hierarchical model.

On a On a first-order theoryfirst-order theory,, by contrast, some by contrast, some mental states are conscious in mental states are conscious in themselves, independent of any added themselves, independent of any added occurrence. occurrence. Ned’s phenomenal consciousness is a Ned’s phenomenal consciousness is a first-order notion: first-order notion: Phenomenal Phenomenal consciousness is intrinsic to any state that consciousness is intrinsic to any state that has it at allhas it at all..


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A Possible ProblemA Possible Problem 66

II. A Possible ProblemII. A Possible ProblemA first-order theory is the main challenge A first-order theory is the main challenge

to any higher-order theory.to any higher-order theory. So I want to add a bit to Hakwan’s So I want to add a bit to Hakwan’s discussion by saying something about discussion by saying something about Ned’s notion of phenomenality.Ned’s notion of phenomenality.

Having argued for the independence of Having argued for the independence of perceptual certainty perceptual certainty (HOA)(HOA) from visual from visual performance performance (first-order visual states)(first-order visual states), , Hakwan raises a Hakwan raises a challengechallenge to higher-to higher-order theories: Though we don’torder theories: Though we don’t

consciously see the gorilla, consciously see the gorilla, still it’s tempting think that there is still it’s tempting think that there is

gorilla phenomenality—which gorilla phenomenality—which outstrips outstrips accessaccess..


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A Possible ProblemA Possible Problem

And as Hakwan also observes, we hear And as Hakwan also observes, we hear

more notes in a symphony than we can more notes in a symphony than we can report. So phenomenality again report. So phenomenality again overflows reportability—and hence overflows reportability—and hence access.access.

Ned appeals Ned appeals ((BBSBBS 2007) 2007) to work in the spirit to work in the spirit of Sperling of Sperling (1960)(1960): We can’t report the : We can’t report the identity of all the Sperling alphanumeric identity of all the Sperling alphanumeric characters, but still characters, but still we do see them allwe do see them all— — so we have phenomenality for them all. so we have phenomenality for them all.

As Hakwan notes, visibility has greater As Hakwan notes, visibility has greater capacity than attention. So equating capacity than attention. So equating phenomenality with visibility and access phenomenality with visibility and access with attention might in such cases explain with attention might in such cases explain why phenomenality overflows access.why phenomenality overflows access.


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But Hakwan sees a higher-order theory as But Hakwan sees a higher-order theory as

possibly having trouble with the gorilla and possibly having trouble with the gorilla and symphony cases symphony cases (and presumably Sperling)(and presumably Sperling)..

On a higher-order theory, phenomenology On a higher-order theory, phenomenology goes with some goes with some HOAHOA,, since since blindsight and subliminal perception both blindsight and subliminal perception both occur when there’s no occur when there’s no HOAHOA..But first-order bandwidth doubtless exceeds But first-order bandwidth doubtless exceeds higher-order bandwidth.higher-order bandwidth. How then How then can a higher-order theory explain why can a higher-order theory explain why phenomenality overflows access?phenomenality overflows access?

If phenomenality is the intuitively conscious If phenomenality is the intuitively conscious phenomenology we can report, how could phenomenology we can report, how could phenomenality seem to overflow access?phenomenality seem to overflow access?


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The apparent problem:The apparent problem:

≠ ≠

since phenomenality occurs in since phenomenality occurs in blindsight blindsight and subliminal vision.and subliminal vision.

So So = =

ButBut outstripsoutstrips

So how could phenomenality seem to So how could phenomenality seem to overflow access?overflow access?


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PhenomenaliPhenomenalityty

VisibilityVisibility

HOAHOAPhenomenalityPhenomenality

HOAHOAVisibilityVisibility


Hakwan suggests that there may be Hakwan suggests that there may be

“fake” phenomenology—perceptual “fake” phenomenology—perceptual certainty unwarranted by any first-order certainty unwarranted by any first-order states.states.

But that doesn’t square with the But that doesn’t square with the examples:examples:When we hear a symphony, there are When we hear a symphony, there are robust first-order states for notes beyond robust first-order states for notes beyond those we can report;those we can report; Sperling Sperling subjects presumably have first-order subjects presumably have first-order states for all the letters; states for all the letters; and and there’s a first-order state for the gorilla.there’s a first-order state for the gorilla.

We have We have no phenomenologyno phenomenology in these in these cases of seeing and hearing more than we cases of seeing and hearing more than we actually do; rather, we actually do; rather, we inferinfer that we see that we see and hear more than we’re aware of doing.and hear more than we’re aware of doing.


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What Is Phenomenality?What Is Phenomenality? 1111

III. What Is III. What Is Phenomenality? Phenomenality?

These considerations warrant a closer These considerations warrant a closer look at look at just what this phenomenality just what this phenomenality consists inconsists in—— i.e., the phenomenality that i.e., the phenomenality that seems in these cases to overflow access.seems in these cases to overflow access.as well as what that apparent overflow as well as what that apparent overflow itself consists in.itself consists in.

Phenomenality Phenomenality seemsseems to overflow to overflow access; i.e., it seems to be there access; i.e., it seems to be there even even when we can’t report itwhen we can’t report it..

So it’s natural to see So it’s natural to see phenomenality, with Hakwan, as the phenomenality, with Hakwan, as the conscious phenomenology that we’re conscious phenomenology that we’re aware of in a higher-order wayaware of in a higher-order way..


1111

What Is Phenomenality?What Is Phenomenality?

But if so, why can’t we report it? But if so, why can’t we report it? Ned’s answer is that it Ned’s answer is that it overflows the overflows the reporting systemreporting system:: Its content is more Its content is more than the reporting system can handle.than the reporting system can handle.

But Sperling subjects don’t see But Sperling subjects don’t see themselves as themselves as merely unable to reportmerely unable to report

the identities of most of the the identities of most of the alphanumeric characters; they see alphanumeric characters; they see themselves as also not being themselves as also not being conscious conscious ofof the identities they can’t report. Nor the identities they can’t report. Nor is there is there independentindependent reason to think reason to think that reportability is impaired here.that reportability is impaired here.

Similarly, we’re Similarly, we’re not consciously awarenot consciously aware of of the gorilla, or of all the notes we hear in the gorilla, or of all the notes we hear in a symphony; it’s not simply reportability.a symphony; it’s not simply reportability.


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So it’s better to identify the So it’s better to identify the

phenomenality that seems to outstrip phenomenality that seems to outstrip access as properties of first-order states access as properties of first-order states that aren’t conscious—properties of states that aren’t conscious—properties of states we’re not aware of in a distinctively we’re not aware of in a distinctively subjective, first-person way.subjective, first-person way.

But how can that be?But how can that be?Sperling subjects are Sperling subjects are consciously aware consciously aware of allof all the letters and numerals; they the letters and numerals; they just just can’t report the identitiescan’t report the identities of most of of most of them.them.

We can be aware of something We can be aware of something in one in one respect but not in anotherrespect but not in another—— e.g., aware of e.g., aware of something as an alphanumeric character something as an alphanumeric character but not as an ‘A’. That’s what happens in but not as an ‘A’. That’s what happens in the Sperling case and in the symphony.the Sperling case and in the symphony.


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First-order perceptual states occur that First-order perceptual states occur that

we’re aware of we’re aware of in respect of some, but in respect of some, but not all of their qualitative propertiesnot all of their qualitative properties..

One is One is aware of one’s perceptionaware of one’s perception of an of an ‘A’ as a perception of an alphanumeric ‘A’ as a perception of an alphanumeric character, but not as a perception of an character, but not as a perception of an ‘A’—‘A’— and and aware of many perceptions of notes as a aware of many perceptions of notes as a single perception of many notes, not as single perception of many notes, not as many perceptions of individual notes.many perceptions of individual notes.

The gorilla case is a bit different: The gorilla case is a bit different: Since one’s gorilla perception isn’t Since one’s gorilla perception isn’t conscious, phenomenality may not in conscious, phenomenality may not in this case even this case even seemseem to overflow access.to overflow access.


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In all these cases, it’s arguably best to In all these cases, it’s arguably best to think of the phenomenality that seems think of the phenomenality that seems to overflow access as to overflow access as first-order states first-order states that fail in some respect to be that fail in some respect to be consciousconscious..

The first-order state either fails The first-order state either fails altogether to be conscious—as with the altogether to be conscious—as with the gorilla—gorilla— or fails to be conscious in or fails to be conscious in respect of particular mental propertiesrespect of particular mental properties—as with Sperling and the symphony.—as with Sperling and the symphony.

Higher-order theories capture this Higher-order theories capture this perfectly: First-order information plainly perfectly: First-order information plainly outstrips higher-order awareness, outstrips higher-order awareness,

and just that’s what happens in the and just that’s what happens in the cases Hakwan raises as a possible cases Hakwan raises as a possible challenge.challenge.NYU/CRNS Workshop on Perception, Action, and NYU/CRNS Workshop on Perception, Action, and

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The gorilla perception isn’t conscious at The gorilla perception isn’t conscious at

all because there’s no HOA that targets all because there’s no HOA that targets that state; we remain unaware of the that state; we remain unaware of the state.state.

In the Sperling and symphony cases, In the Sperling and symphony cases, the first-order states are conscious in the first-order states are conscious in respect of some, but not all, of their respect of some, but not all, of their qualitative properties:qualitative properties: There’s a HOA of There’s a HOA of the state, but it describes that state in the state, but it describes that state in respect only of some, and not all, of its respect only of some, and not all, of its qualitative mental properties.qualitative mental properties.

A higher-order theory A higher-order theory preserves the preserves the match between a state’s being conscious match between a state’s being conscious and its being reportableand its being reportable,, and also and also explains the apparent—i.e., inferred—explains the apparent—i.e., inferred—overflowoverflow..


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SummarySummary 1717

SummarySummaryAs Hakwan convincingly argues, a As Hakwan convincingly argues, a

higher-order theory best fits the higher-order theory best fits the available neuropsychological data from available neuropsychological data from TMS and fMRI in matched-performance TMS and fMRI in matched-performance conditions, as well as robust conditions, as well as robust nonconscious processing.nonconscious processing.

The The apparent overflowapparent overflow by by phenomenality of access is also best phenomenality of access is also best explained by a higher-order theory,explained by a higher-order theory,

on which the first-order on which the first-order phenomenality that we infer is there is phenomenality that we infer is there is not conscious— or at least not not conscious— or at least not conscious in respect of all its mental conscious in respect of all its mental properties.properties.NYU/CRNS Workshop on Perception, Action, and the NYU/CRNS Workshop on Perception, Action, and the

SelfSelf1717

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Thank you for Thank you for your your

attention attention


1818The EndThe End

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