perestroika – the nazarbayev way · 2016. 8. 11. · therefore, the perestroika initiated by...
TRANSCRIPT
58
Aleksandra Jarosiewicz
Perestroika – the Nazarbayev way crisis And reforms in KAzAKhstAn
NUMBER 58WARSAWJUNE 2016
Perestroika – the Nazarbayev way cRiSiS ANd REfoRMS iN KAzAKhStAN
Aleksandra Jarosiewicz
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Contents
MAiN PoiNtS /5
I. ANAlySiS of thE chAllENGES – thE PRocESSES tAKiNG PlAcE iN ANd ARoUNd KAzAKhStAN /8
1. Nazarbayev – the strength and the weakness of the political system /8
2. Society – the numerous divides /133. The economic model that boosts social aspirations /214. The challenges on the international arena /26
II. thE coUNtERActioNS /29
1. Reinforcing the state institutions /302. Consolidation of society /373. The economic liberalisation /444. Institutionalisation of co-operation with the West as a response
to Russian and Chinese pressure /47
III. coNclUSioNS ANd PoSSiBlE dEvEloPMENtS /51
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Main points
• WhencomparedtootherCIScountries,Kazakhstanisapar-adigm of success in terms of citizens’ living standards, thecountry’sprestigeontheinternationalarena,orofhowtoef-fectivelydealwithdomestictension.Ithasareputationofbe-ingthebestdevelopedandthemoststablecountryinCentralAsia,but its stability is fragile since it reliesononeperson,PresidentNursultanNazarbayev. Ithasbecomeincreasinglyapparentoverthepastfewyearsthattheexisting,relativelysuccessfulmodelofthestate’sdevelopmentwhichhasbeeninplaceforthemorethantwodecadessinceindependence,hasbeenwearingevermorethin.
• At present, Kazakhstan is heading towards a multifacetedcrisis:social,economicandpolitical.Thecrisishasbeenad-ditionallyacceleratedbyexternalfactorsindependentofthegovernment. These include the slump on the oil market –crudeoilbeingthemainsourceofthecountry’srevenue–andRussia’saggressivepolicy,whichhasbeenmademanifest inUkraineandwhich,inthecaseofKazakhstan,includestak-ingtheformofincreasingpressureforintegrationintheEur-asianEconomicUnion.Thegovernmentcanseethesymptomsofacrisisdrawingnearer(includinggrowingpublicdissatis-faction).Oneproofofthisisthefactthatithasmadeanumberofnon-standardmoves.
• Unlessthecrisisavoidedoratleastthedescentintoitissloweddown, the present system of state operation will be under-mined.Intheextremeversion,thecrisismayleadtoKazakh-stanlosingeverythingithasachievedsofarandtoacollapseofthestate.Therearemanynegativescenarios:frominternaldestabilisation triggered by socio-economic factors, throughinfighting among the elite for Nazarbayev’s legacy (he is 75yearsold)todisintegrationofthestateduetoethnicorclan-re-gionaldivides.Thus,intheshorterterm,Kazakhstan’sinternal
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stabilityisatstake,whileinstrategicterms,thegameisaboutsurvivalofthestateafterNazarbayevrelinquishespower.
• Themainweaknessesofthestateinclude:insufficientconsoli-dationofsocietyandtherulingelite,inefficiencyofthestateapparatusandthedilapidatedpoliticalsystemwhichreliesonNazarbayev.To counteract this, a reconstructionof the sys-tem, a kind of perestroika initiated by Nazarbayev himself,has been launched. This includes: the professionalisation ofpublicservantsand,inabroadersense,ofstateinstitutions,greateropennessoftheeconomyandareductionofthestate’sroleintheeconomy,aswellasactionstoconsolidatethepublicaroundthestate(andnational)idea.Thesechangesareaimedatstrengtheningthestatebymodernisingit,whichwillboildowntoaselectivecopyingoftheWesternsolutionswithoutbasicallyaffectingtheauthoritariancharacteroftheregime(however,someadjustmentswillbeadmissible).
• The socio-political orderwhichNazarbayev has himself co-createdinKazakhstanwillimpedetheimplementationofhisintentions.Reformswillbehamperedbyboththebureaucrat-icapparatusandthepublicsector,whichare inherentlyop-posedtoanychanges.Therewillalsoberesistancefromotherformalandinformalplayers,i.e.politicalandbusinessgroupswhoopposeanyincrease incompetitionwithintheauthori-tariansystemattheirexpense.Theprocesswillalsobesloweddownduetothepassivenessandatomisationofsociety,grow-ing frustration among the public, distrust towards the gov-ernmentaswell as thepost-colonialmentalityof individualsocialgroups.ThechangeswillalsobeadverselyaffectedbythedeterioratinginternationalsituationaroundKazakhstan:conflictbetweenRussiaandtheWest,Moscow’spressureonAstana,andeconomicproblemsinChina.Whatwillcontrib-utetothechanges,may,paradoxically,beeconomicproblemsinKazakhstan itself and adesire sharedby a sectionof theelitetomodernisethesystem.
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• Implementingthereformscarriesasmuchriskasabandon-ing them. If thereformsarecarriedout, thiswillbreak thearrangements existing inside the government elite andwillaffect themutualrelationsbetweenthegovernmentandso-ciety.Thismayprovoke internalchaos,butrespect forNaz-arbayevandhispresenceinthepoliticalsystemmayrestrainthefallouttoacertainextent.Thereformswillthusincreasethe risk of destabilisation inKazakhstan in the short term.On the otherhand, if they are implemented, theywill offerthepublicbetteraccesstothefunctioningofthestateinthebroadersenseandwill improvethestate’sabilitytocushiontheinternalshocks(becausemostofthepublicare interest-ed in thesystem’ssurvival)generatedby thereforms them-selves. Therefore, the perestroika initiated by Nazarbayev isa risky way to actually benefit from the circle of ever-newchallengeswhichtheauthoritariansystemisunabletocopewith.ReformsareKazakhstan’swayofprotectingitselffromplungingintothezoneofMoscow’scivilisational,politicalandeconomicinfluence,fromeconomicstagnationandthefeudalsocio-politicalorderseeninAzerbaijan.
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i. analysis of the challenges – the processes taking place in and around kazakhstan
Kazakhstanhasattainedsuccesses,botheconomicandonthein-ternationalarena,butitisstillastatewheretheprocessoftrans-formationandtheformationandsolidificationofstatestructureshas not been finalised. Intensive internal transformation cansometimesbeinspiredbythegovernment,butit isalsoaneffectofobjectiveprocessestakingplaceinsociety.Thesocialtransfor-mationwhichgainedmomentumwhentheSovietUnioncollapsedwastakingplacebothunderthepressureoftheeconomicallytough1990sandasaconsequenceoftheseriesofeconomicandpoliticalsuccessesseenoverthepreviousfifteenyears.ThewayresidentsofKazakhstanperceive theirstateandthemselveshasbeenchang-ing.Theirattitudetotheirhistoryandtradition,whicharegainingsignificanceintheprocessofstrengtheningofthestateandthefor-mationofamodernnation,hasalsobeenevolving.Theprocessofstatehoodconsolidationistakingplaceinadifficultinternationalsituation,overshadowedbyRussiaandChina,whichseeKazakh-stanasanaturalareaforpoliticalandeconomicexpansion.
The challenges Kazakhstan is facing are nothing new, but theneedtoresolvethemisbecomingurgentduetounfavourableex-ternalfactorsandthegrowingriskofdestabilisationlinkedtotheeconomicdownturn in thecountry.Weakpoints in thepresentmodelofthestate’soperation,defectsinthepolicywhichshapessociety and the limitations of the economic transformation arebecomingobvious.Challengeslinkedtothecountry’sgeopoliticalsituationaregainingsignificance.
1. Nazarbayev – the strength and the weakness of the political system
Kazakhstan, throughout the 25 years of its independence, hasbuiltandreinforcedtheauthoritarianregimebuthasbeenunable
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togetridoftheSovietUnion’sinstitutionalandmentallegacy.Thedevelopment of authoritarianismwas both an effect of the po-liticalambitionsofPresidentNursultanNazarbayev,whoisnow75yearsold,andaresultoffearsconcerningtheintegrityoftheyoungstatehoodinthefirstyearsofindependence.
Ineffect,itisNazarbayevhimselfwhoplaysthekeyroleinboththe formal (constitutional) and informal system of exercisingpowerinKazakhstan.Itishewhopersonallytakesthekeydeci-sionsconcerningthecountry’spolitical,economicandsociallife.Heisthefigureonwhompoliticalandbusinessgroupsarecen-tred(thesecanberegionalorclangroupsorsimplygroupsunitedbyatacticalcommunityofbusinessandpoliticalinterests).Thesegroupsarenotautonomous–eitherpoliticallyoreconomically–andarecompletelydependentonthepresident1.Nazarbayevactsasanarbiterbetweenthem,preventingmajorconflictsandkeep-ingtheirinfluencebalanced.Furthermore,thereisnorealpoliti-caloppositioninthecountry2,andthepublicispassiveandmost-
1 Allmajorbusinessmeneitherhavecloselinkswiththegovernment(Naz-arbayevhimself)orarepoliticiansthemselves.Forexample,thepeoplewhooccupiedthetoppositionsinForbes’rankinginKazakhstanin2015were:BolatUtemuratov(presidentialadvisor,specialenvoytoKyrgyzstanduringthecoupin2010),AlijanIbragimov(thefounderofENRC,acompanywhoseassetsheboughtasaresultoftheprivatisationinthe1990s),TimurandDi-naraKulibayev(Nazarbayev’sson-in-lawanddaughter;TimurKulibayevisalsotheheadofAtameken,theNationalChamberofEntrepreneurs,andoftheassociationKazenergy–bothoftheseorganisationsareactiveeco-nomicplayersandhaveinfluenceonpoliticaldecisions)andVladimirKim(co-ownerofKazakhmys,acompanyinwhichNazarbayevalsoreportedlyhasastake).Othergroupsarelinkedto,forexample,PrimeMinisterKarimMasimovortheDefenceMinisterImangaliTasmagambetov(hisson-in-law,KenesRakishevownsseveralbanksandcompaniesintheenergysector).
2 MukhtarAblyazov,abankerandoligarch,whowantstobeviewedasNaz-arbayev’spoliticalopponent,hashimselfbeenpartofthesystemforyears.HespentafewmonthsinprisonafterhisfirstpoliticalmovetargetedagainstNazarbayev,onlytoreturntothepeakofhiscareerinthecountry–hewastheheadandtheownerofthelargestbank.Hisactivity(supportinginde-pendentmedia)hasbeentoleratedforyearsasasafetyvalveandasourceofknowledgeaboutsocialprocesses.However,inpractice,publicsupportforAblyazovisnegligible,whichispartlyduetotheconvictionthathehimselfispartoftheestablishment,evenifheisatoddswithit.
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lyinterestedinmaintainingthestatus quoratherthandevelopingpoliticalcompetition.
Suchastrongcentralisationofstategovernanceontheonehandsimplifiesthedecision-makingprocessbutontheotherreducesthequantityofgrassrootsstimulitoprotectthesystemfrompos-sibleupheaval (the symptomsof a crisis appearing on the locallevel are unobservable fromAstana’s perspective). In turn, theunresolvedissueofNazarbayev’ssuccessor3iscausingindividualplayersonthepoliticalscenetobeafraidtodisplayanypoliticalactivitysoasnottobesuspectedofthedesiretotakepowerafterhim4.Nazarbayev’spresenceallowsthegroupssurroundinghimtorefrainfromrespondingtoanystrategicchallengesbecauseitishewhosetsthetone,andtheroleoftherestofthegovernmenteliteistoimplementthestrategiesputforwardbythepresident.Inpractice, thesystemfunctions thisway:Nazarbayevsets thepriorities in his annual address to the nation or in the reformplan,andthesemustthenbeimplemented(andtoacertainex-tent are) by all state institutions5. This deal limits the system’seffectiveness,becauseitdoesnotenvisageanydiscussionontheplanbeingimplemented–thesystemdoesnotallowanycriticismofactionsordirectionssetbythepresident6,butitisadmissibletoevaluatetheeffectivenessof theoperationof individualstate
3 ThestrongestpoliticalupheavalinKazakhstanwascausedbytheambitionsofRakhatAliyev,Nazarbayev’sson-in-law,toreplacehimaspresident.WhenAliyevrevealedhispoliticalambitions,hewasforcedtoemigrateanddivorceNazarbayev’sdaughter in absentia.Thegovernmentalsomadechargesin-cludingtreasonagainsthim(2007).
4 Forexample,KarimMasimovbecameverypopularduringhisfirstterminofficeasprimeminister.Asaresult,whenhetookthisfunctionanothertime,heshunnedallpublicityandappearancesinthemediasoastoavoidbeingviewedasapotentialsuccessortoNazarbayev.
5 Theinformationthatthepresidentialaddresswasanalysedinkindergartenno.48becameasymboldemonstratingtheabsurdityofthesystemandthepublicsector’sservility,http://rus.azattyq.org/content/promotion-poslani-yu-prezidenta-nursultana-nazarbaeva/25249118.html
6 GrigoriMarchenko,whocameintoconflictwithNazarbayevoverthepen-sionsystemreform,finallyresignedasheadofthecentralbank.
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institutions(forexample,onemaycriticiseactionstakenbythecentralbankorthegovernment).
Thismeans that the stategovernancesystem is in fact reminis-cent of a pyramid based on the patron-client deal. Nazarbayevstandsatthetopofthispyramidasanelementnecessaryforitssurvival.Thesystem,bynature,promotessuchfeaturesasloyaltyandobediencetothepresidentandotherpoliticalpatronsratherthanactionsthatarebelievedtoservetheinterestsofthestateoreventhegoverningpro-presidentialpartyNurOtan(forexample,independent thinking is a strongly undesirable feature). In thissystem,theparliamentandlocalgovernmentbodiesplayamerelydecorativerole,becausethepresidentaloneappointsthepeopleinchargeofexecutiveauthoritybodies,suchasministers,theheadofthecentralbanksandalsoakims7oftheregions,andhastherighttodismiss themsummarily.Suchastrongcentralisationresultsfromthefearthatthisyoungstatecouldbecomedisintegrated,butitsnegative consequences include the exemptionof governmentrepresentativesfromaccountabilitytothepublic(theyonlyreporttoNazarbayev).Asaresult,theeffectivenessofstateinstitutionsis limited. At the level of local administration, this tendency ismanifestedinthemannerinwhichtheakims governtheregions:theyaremorefocusedonimplementingthepresidentialstrategyinasimulatedandineffectivewayratherthanontheactualde-velopmentoftheregions8.Theyalsobenefitfinanciallyfromtheirfunctionsthroughcreatingormaintainingdealsbasedoncorrup-tion.At the same time, the clientelisticmodel applicable amongtheseniorgovernmentauthoritiesiscopiedintheregions,where
7 Thewordakimmeans‘boss,head’.Akims areheadsofthelocalstateadmin-istrationoneverylevel,fromtheregiontothevillage.
8 Inpractice,thisworksinthefollowingway:akims oftheregionsimplementinfrastructuralprojectsbecausethesearethemostvisibleandallowthemtobenefitfromthe‘civilservantpension’,i.e.incomefromcorruption,withouttakingcareofthestructuralorsocialissuesintheregion.Thisisalsoaneffectpartlyoftheignoranceandlackofknowledgeofthetoolsthatmightcontributetothesustainabledevelopmentofagivenareaandresolvingitssocialissues.
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theakims playtheroleofpoliticalpatrons.Thismodelaswellastheomnipresentcorruptionandnepotism9,restrictstheeffective-nessofthestateadministration’soperationandposestheriskthatanyreformsofthecurrentlyfunctioningsystemwillfail.
One consequence ofNazarbayev’s dominant role in the state asregardsthesocialdimensionisthefactthathehimselfplaystheroleoftheonewhobindsthepublictogether.Mostcitizensgenu-inelyappreciatethepresident’smeritsandsupportNazarbayevastheheadofstate10,partlyduetothelackofanyotheralternative–Nazarbayevhassuccessfullyridhimselfofpoliticalopponents.Itishepersonally,andnotstateinstitutions,whoisviewedastheguarantorofinternalstabilityandalsoofpeacebetweenthevari-ousethnicgroupsinthecountry;hencethehighersupportlevelsforNazarbayev among non-Kazakh ethnic groups11. The fear ofNazarbayevleavingiscurrentlythemainelementthatunitesthepublicandthepoliticalelite.Atthesametime,Kazakhstanhasnocoherentideologythatwouldbeconsistentlyputintopracticeandwhichwouldunite thepublicwith thepolitical systemand theelite (as is the casewithTurkmenistan).Thismeans thatwhenNazarbayev (the binding link) relinquishes power, elements ofthepoliticalandsocialsystem,andtosomeextentalsotheinsti-tutionalorder,willcollapse.ThisislinkedtotheenormousroleplayedbytheinformaldependenciesandNazarbayev’sesteeminthefunctioningofinstitutions.Possiblescenariosincludeethnicriotsor the refusalofakims tosubordinatethemselvestoanewpresident,whose achievements and authoritywill be unable tomatchthoseofNazarbayev.
9 http://www.ktk.kz/ru/news/video/2013/05/29/22850, http://www.nur.kz/966822-syn-akima-akmolinskoy-oblasti-naznach.html
10 Indirectproofofthisisfound,forexample,inthe74%supportforgrantingNazarbayevthetitleofthenation’sleader(20%ofrespondentswereneutrallydisposedtothis),whichtherespondentssawas“astepcontributingtoin-ternalpoliticalstabilisationandthedevelopmentofsocialconsolidation”,cf.http://www.nomad.su/?a=3-201008170032
11 AninterviewwitharepresentativeofasociologicalagencyinAstana.
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Inthissituation,NazarbayevisboththemostpreciousassetandtheheaviestburdenforKazakhstan.Ontheonehand,hispositionisstrongenoughtocausethepresentmodelofthestate’soperationtobeadjusted.Ontheother,thepresentsystemwillmostlikelybeunabletosurvivewithoutNazarbayev.Forexample,theRussianpresidentVladimirPutinusedthisargumenttoputpressureonKazakhstanatthetimeoftheyouthforumbyLakeSeligerinAu-gust2014bysayingthatitisNazarbayevwhosetupthestateofKazakhstan12.ThegovernmentinAstanaunderstoodthesewordsasathreattothestate’sfunctioninginitspresentformandwithitspresentdegreeofindependencefromRussiawhenNazarbayevisnolongerinpower.
2. society – the numerous divides
Kazakhstan’ssocial situationhasbeenundergoinga transforma-tion(inmostcasesunfinished)typicaloftheformerSovietrepub-lics.Theprocessofsocialformationhasbeenaffectedbyobjectivedemographicprocesses,geographic(distances)andhistoriccondi-tions(forexample,Sovietlegacyborders),aswellasmigrationpro-cesses.Thesocialexperienceof theeconomicslumpin the 1990sandtherapideconomicdevelopmentthatfollowedthisperiodalsohaveagreatsignificance.Otherfactorsaffectingthesocialprocess-esinclude:Kazakhstan’schanginginternationalcontext(forexam-ple,theRussianaggressiononUkraine),thefactthatKazakhstaniswithintheareaofinfluenceoftheRussianmedia,andthecontinu-ingwidespreadknowledgeanduseoftheRussianlanguage13.
12 http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan-putin-history-reaction-na-tion/26565141.html
13 KnowledgeofRussianinKazakhstanisthehighestofalltheCentralAsiancountries.84%ofitsresidentsdeclaretheyspeakRussian.Tocompare:49%inKyrgyzstan,41%inUzbekistan,33%inTajikistanand18%inTurkmeni-stan.Theproportionofpeoplewhoactivelyknowthelanguage,i.e.whocannotonlyspeakit,butalsowriteandreadinthislanguage,issmaller:72%inKazakhstan,36%inKyrgyzstanand14%inUzbekistan.Datatakenfrom:http://www.ritmeurasia.org/news--2015-11-21--na-juge-sng-russkij-mir-stanovitsja-aziatskim-20653
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Themostimportantdivisionlinesandprocessestakingplaceinsocietyarepresentontheethnic, linguisticandregional levels,betweenurbanandruralresidents,aswellasonthelevelofat-titudetowardstheUSSR.Whathelpsthempersistarethe largegeographicaldistancesandthelackofwell-developedinfrastruc-turalconnections.ThesedividesareaneffectofboththeSovietlegacy,suchascertainboundariesandethniccompositions,andthe changeswhich have taken place inKazakhstan since it re-gainedindependence.
Changesinthecountry’sethniccompositionareamongthemostimportantprocesses thathavehadan impacton the conditionofsociety.Over thepast twentyfiveyears, theshareofethnicKazakhsinthecountry’spopulationhasincreasedfrom40%14in1989to63.1%in2009,andinabsolutenumbers:from6.5millionto10million.Thisincreasehasbeenaneffectof:thestatepolicyaimed at repatriating ethnic Kazakhs from the neighbouringcountries,so-calledoralman15,thehigherbirthrateamongethnicKazakhfamilies,andnon-Kazakhs leaving thecountry.At thesametime,theshareofethnicRussianshasbeenreducedfrom37.6%in1989to23.7%in2009(from6milliontolessthan4mil-lionpeople),aswithotherethnicgroups(mainlyGermans:fromaround1millionto0.2millionandUkrainians:from0.9millionto0.3million)whohadbeenexiledandmigratedtoKazakhstanduringtheSovietera.Theirdeparturewastriggeredaboveallby the economic hardships in the 1990s (64% of those leavingdeclaredthatunemploymentwasthereasontheywereleaving
14 Unlessotherwisestated,alldatainthischapteristakenfromthepopulationcensuscarriedoutin2009.Theresultsareavailablehere:http://www.stat.gov.kz/faces/wcnav_externalId/p_perepis?_afrLoop=27247942884727437#%40%3F_afrLoop%3D27247942884727437%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D29gmhq4tr_87
15 Asaconsequenceofthispolicy,around1millionpeoplewenttoKazakh-stan,mainlyfromUzbekistan(30.7%),China(20.3%),Turkmenistan(14.9%)andMongolia(12.1%).Datafrom:GazizTelebayev,Problemysotsialnoiin-tegratsiioralmanov,vkonteksteyazykovoisituatsiivKazakhstane,fromthecollectionoftextstitledSotsialnyi portret sovremennogo kazakhstanskogo obshchestva,Astana-Almaty2015.
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ofKazakhstan16)andaninabilitytoadaptthemselvestotheKa-zakhisationpolicy17,i.e.promotingethnicKazakhsandtheKa-zakhlanguageinallareasofthecountry’slife.Forexample,16%ofthoseleavingindicatedthelanguagepolicyasthemainreasonwhytheymovedawayfromKazakhstanin199818.Therepatria-tion policies of the stateswhich the emigrants had originatedfrom, for example, Germany,was a further factorwhich trig-geredemigration.TheRussianminoritywas the largestgroupamongthosewholeftKazakhstan(althoughtheshareofethnicGermansreducedmostofall:from5.8%in1989to1.1%in2009).EthnicRussiansalsomigratedwithinKazakhstan,movingfromitssouthernregions,wheretheyformedaminority,tothenorth-ernpart,wheretheywerepredominant.ThepredominanceofethnicRussiansinthecountry’snorthernregions(especiallyinthe cities) hasmade theKazakh government concerned abouttheriskofseparatismsincethebeginningofthecountry’sinde-pendence19.
16 http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Mes/pdf/51_06.pdf17 Themanifestationsofthispolicyincluderemovingrepresentativesofethnic
minoritiesfromthestateadministration.Forexample,atthebeginningof2016,allakims oftheregionsinKazakhstanwereethnicKazakhs,andonlytworepresentativesofethnicminoritieswerepresentinthegovernment:theministerforoilandgas,VladimirShkolnik(Russian)andPrimeMinis-terKarimMasimov(Uyghur).AnotherexampleofthispolicywastheuseoftheKazakhlanguagebytheakims ofthenorthernregions–theresidents,predominantlyethnicRussians,couldnotunderstandthislanguage.ThispracticehaschangedsincethedevelopmentsinUkraineandafteranin-terventionbyNazarbayev.OthermanifestationsofKazakhisationincludereplacingthenamesofthecities,streets,etc.withKazakhones(forexample,UstKamenogorskhasbeenrenamedOskemen)andpropagatingKazakhpo-ets,traditions,etc.Generally,KazakhisationcanbedefinedasgivingspecialattentiontowhatisKazakhandpromotingtheinfluenceofethnicKazakhsinallareasofthestate’slife.KazakhisationisviewedascompensationforthediscriminationintheSovieteraandisoftendoneattheexpenseofotherethnicgroupslivinginKazakhstan.
18 http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Mes/pdf/51_06.pdf19 In1999,morethantwentypeoplewerearrestedinUstKamenogorskoncharg-
esofstagingacoupanddevisingaplantoinciteaRussianuprising,cf.http://rus.azattyq.org/content/kazakhstan_kazimirchuk_cossack/1910599.html
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Ethnicdifferencesarea reflectionof thevariousperceptionsoftheindependentKazakhstan.EthnicKazakhsviewedthesettingupofKazakhstanasanopportunitytolaunchtheKazakhisationpolicyattheexpenseofotherethnicminoritiesandakindofcom-pensationfordiscriminationintheSovietera.Kazakhsoftenseetheir role in the countryas that of ‘first amongst equals’,whileethnic Russians (and other Slavonic minorities) feel marginal-ised20 andmention that it is their ancestors who defended theUSSRandKazakhstan(duringWorldWarII,whichiscalledtheGreatPatrioticWarinthepost-Sovietarea)andwhobuiltit.Thefear of intensifying nationalism in Kazakhstanmakes that theethnicminoritiesusuallyostentatiouslyemphasisetheirsatisfac-tionwiththesituationinKazakhstanandsupportNazarbayevastheguarantorofthestatus quo,i.e.inter-ethnicpeace.
Inpractice,riotscausedbyethnicconflictsarerarelyseeninKa-zakhstan(themostseriouswerethelocalriotswiththeinvolve-mentofChechensnearAlmatyin200721andtheconflictbetweenethnicTajiksandKazakhsinFebruary2015insouthernKazakh-stan)andareusuallyprovokedbyissues linkedto livingcondi-tions.Thisdoesnotchangethefactthatthegovernmentisatgreatpainstosuppressinformationofanyethnicmisunderstandings(forexample,aninformationblockadewasintroducedintheen-tireregionatthetimeoftheriotsinFebruary2015).Thisisasignofthefearthatsuchconflictsmightspreadwideracrossthecoun-tryandoftheconvictionthatafertilegroundexistsforsuchcon-flicts (this is well-grounded, because Kazakh nationalism has
20 Thismarginalisationtakesvariousforms,forexample,addressingethnicRussiansintheKazakhlanguage(byethnicKazakhswhospeakRussian),the‘glassceiling’inprofessionalcareers,multiplyingbureaucraticdifficulties.AnelderlypersonofGerman-PolishethnicbackgroundlivingnearPetropav-lovskexpresseditthisway:“Thoseslant-eyedonesfromthesouthwillcome,anditwillbeimpossibletohaveanyformalitieshandled.”
21 Threepeoplewerekilledintheriotsin2007andonein2015.Kazakhstan,unlikeitsneighbourKyrgyzstan,hasneverexperiencedanyseriousriotsonitsterritory–forexample,hundredsofpeoplewerekilledintheriotsbetweenethnicKyrgyzandUzbeksinOsh,Kyrgyzstanin2010.
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been intensifying, and there are informal Kazakh andRussianneighbourhoods in somecities).Asa consequence,ethnicprob-lemsarecoveredupusingtheSoviet-stylenarrativeofaccord,co-operation,peace,etc.existingbetweenthevariousethnicgroups;thesymbolofthepolicybeingthedecorativeinstitution,theAs-semblyofthePeopleofKazakhstan22.Intheauthoritariansystem,given the strongly centralised power held by Nazarbayev, thistactichasprovenrelativelysuccessful–Kazakhstanhasbeenabletoavoidseriousethnicunrest,unlikeitsneighbour,Kyrgyzstan.However,thedownsideofthispolicyisthefactthatethnicminor-itiesfearthatwhenNazarbayevisnolongerinpower,theexistingguaranteeofpeacemaydisappearandtriggerethnicconflictsandpressurefromKazakhnationalism23.
Oneconsequence,andlateralsothecauseforchangesinthecoun-try’sethniccomposition(migration)wastheincreasingshareofthe Kazakh-speaking population24 – in 2009, 74% of populationdeclaredtheyunderstoodKazakh,and62%werefluentusersofthis language.The evermorewidespreadknowledge of theKa-zakhlanguagehasbeenfurtheredbythegovernmentonvariouslevels–frommakingrelevantchangestotheeducationpolicy(forexample,in2011,twothirdsofpupilsattendedschoolswithKa-zakhasthelanguageofinstruction)25throughfree-of-chargeKa-zakhlanguagecoursesforadultsandtherequirementtobroad-cast TV programmes in this language (over 53% of TV contentmustbeinKazakh)uptosymbolicelements,forexample,using
22 Ethnicminorities inKazakhstanhavenoguaranteedrepresentatives inotherinstitutionsexcepttheAssembly.Inturn,theAssemblyelectsninemembersofthelowerhouseofparliament.
23 For example, https://meduza.io/news/2014/10/20/ust-kamenogorskaya-narodnaya-respublika
24 The government has taken numerousmeasures to improve the level ofknowledgeoftheKazakhlanguage,cf.http://inform.kz/rus/article/2842902
25 TheOECDreportontheeducationsysteminKazakhstan:http://www.kee-peek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/education/reviews-of-national-policies-for-education-secondary-education-in-kazakhstan/overview-of-the-education-system-of-kazakhstan_9789264205208-4-en#page5
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Kazakhduringprestigiousinternationalconferences26andinsist-ingthatforeigndelegationsshouldhaveinterpreterswhospeakthislanguage27.ThereisagrowingconvictioninKazakhstanthattheKazakhlanguageplaystheroleofsocialleverage28.SomeonewhoisnotanethnicKazakhmustlearnthenationallanguagetoexpect social advancement (analternativeway is tomarry intoaKazakhfamilyandusethefamilybondswhenlookingforajob).
TheincreasinglywidespreadknowledgeoftheKazakhlanguageisnotaccompaniedbyaprocessofaproportionalreductionoftherole played by the Russian language,which formally (constitu-tionally)hasthestatusofalanguagewhichcanbeusedonequaltermswiththeKazakhlanguageinthestateinstitutionsandinlocaladministration.FluentcommandofRussianwasdeclaredin2009by85%ofthepopulation(80%ofethnicKazakhs).Ontheonehand,thisistoleratedbythegovernment–Russianisawindowtotheworldforalargegroupofthecountry’spopulation.Ontheotherhand, thewidespreadknowledgeofRussiancoupledwiththeweaknessoftheKazakhmediaandtheomnipresenceofRus-siantelevisionmeansthatpeopleinKazakhstanareunderahugeinfluenceofRussianpropagandaandsupportRussianforeignpol-icy,forexample,towardsUkraine29.
Thesocialdynamicsandtheexistingdividesmakeitproblematictodeterminetherolesplayedby individualsocialgroups inthe
26 NazarbayevcauseddismaywhenheusedtheKazakhlanguageforthefirsttimeattheUNforuminSeptember2015,becausetheUNhadnointerpreterofthislanguage.
27 AfilminwhichoneoftheregionalakimsreprimandsaninterpreteroftheChinesedelegationforhernotspeakingKazakhwasextremelypopularontheKazakhInternetinJanuary2016(thefilm:https://www.facebook.com/syrym.abdrakhmanov/videos/827130164075788/?pnref=story).
28 GoodcommandoftheKazakhlanguageisleverageforsocialadvancementforethnicKazakhsandalsorepresentativesofotherethnicgroups,cf.http://www.nomad.su/?a=10-201506260028
29 AccordingtotheGalluppoll,itwassupportedby72%ofKazakhstan’sresi-dentsinsummer2015,http://rus.azattyk.org/content/article/27076844.html
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countryandgiverisetoconflictsovervalues(forexample,Rus-siansandKazakhshaveadifferentviewonhistory30).
Anotherdivideiscausedbythedifferencesandmutualanimosi-ties existing among ethnic Kazakhs. These are regional differ-ences: for example, the north versus the south of the country,andbetweentheoilandgas-richwesternpartandtherest.TheprocessofurbanisationoftheKazakhpopulationcontributestosuchdifferencesbeingunearthed31.Forexample,thecapitalofthecountrywhichhasbeenmovedfromthesouthtothenorthisanarena formutualdiscordbetweenKazakhs from the southandthose from thenorth.This is evenmoreparadoxical, given thefactthatmovingthecapitaltoAstanawasintendedtostimulateintegrationofthenorthernandsouthernregionsandtopreventseparatisttendenciesinthenorth.Inturn,thewesternregionsofKazakhstanbelievethattheyarethecountry’scashcow,becauseoftheoil,andthereforedeservespecialtreatment.
InthesearchofaKazakhidentity,historyandtradition,thezhuz issues have re-gained significance32. The re-traditionalisationprocesshinderstheformationofamodernnationandleadstothepreservationoflocalcommunities,forexample,inthemoretra-ditionalsouthernKazakhstan,andtothedominanceofthelocal
30 Thisisreflected,forexample,bytheanalysisofthecontentsofKazakh-lan-guagewebsites,especiallythosethatarenotcontrolledbythegovernment,cf.TheStrategyCenterreport,http://www.nomad.su/i2013/0710.pdf.Theis-sueslinkedtotheSovietperiodthataremostfrequentlyraisedintheKazakhmediaconcerntheAlashOrdaindependencemovementandthehungerandrepressionsinthe1920sand1930s.
31 ThenumberofKazakhslivinginlargeurbanareasincreasedfrom2.5mil-lionin1989toalmost5millionin2009.Thoselivinginruralareasrosefrom4millionto5.2millionoverthesametimeframe.
32 Thezhuz ishistoricallythehighestformofKazakhself-organisation(anequivalentoforda).Thezhuz lostsignificancetoagreatextentintheSovietera.Atpresent,theyhaveamoderateimpactonthepoliticalcontractinthecountrybecausetheyhavebeenoustedbygroupsofinterest.Traditionally,thethreemostimportantzhuz aredistinguishedinKazakhstan:theolder(south),themedium(north)andtheyounger(west).Sometimes,informally,ethnicRussianslivinginKazakhstanarereferredtoasthefourthzhuz.
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identity,andthusmaybolsterseparatisttendenciesshouldstateinstitutionsbecomeweaker33.
The urbanisation and the growing strength of nationalist ten-denciesalsogivesrisetoconflictsbetweenRussian-speakingandKazakh-speakingethnicKazakhs.Onemanifestationoftheseisthepejorativewordshala-KazakhmeaninganethnicKazakhwhocannot speak the Kazakh language (unlike nagyz-Kazakh whoknowshisnative language).Theconflictover languageissues iscoupledwith thecityversusvillagedivide (the formerareusu-allyRussianspeakersandthelatterareKazakhspeakers)andtheprocessofsocialatomisation.Uprooting fromthemulti-genera-tionfamilysystemaffectsaboveallethnicKazakhswhomigratetocities,bringingatthesametimetheKazakhlanguageandthemoretraditionalmodelstotheurbanareas.Thedividesalsotaketheformofanincreasinggapbetweentheyoungerandtheoldergenerationsaswellastheconflictbetweentheelites:thenewelitewho have been brought up in an independentKazakhstan ver-sus the representativesof theSoviet school.Thedifferinggoalsof the regional elites complicates the situation further. Add tothisthegovernment’sfearofethnicconflicts,Islamicradicalism,disintegrationofthestateandseparatism.However,inpractice,Nazarbayev’s regime has been quite successful at dealing withthese issues, neutralising Islamic radicalism, soothing ethnicconflictsandavoidinganyseriousmanifestationsofseparatism.ThishasbeenachievedowingtothestrengthoftheregimeandNazarbayev’spersonalesteem.However,itisunclearwhetherthestateinstitutionswillbestrongenoughtocopewiththesechal-lenges ifNazarbayev isnot there, since theZhanaozen incident(thisissueisdiscussedbelow)laidbarethesystem’sindolenceinhandlingsocialissues.
33 Thezhuzissues,duetorespondents’unwillingnesstoanswerquestions,havenotbeensufficientlyresearchedinKazakhstan.Nevertheless,expertsagreethattheirsignificancemaygrowasthecentralgovernmentweakensinthestate,cf.http://www.nomad.su/?a=3-201412020022,http://www.nur.kz/242087.html,http://www.nur.kz/217863.html
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Theprojectofcreatingacommonidentitybasedonthesenseofbeingcitizensandidentifyingwith‘Kazakhstan-ness’hasbeenunsuccessful, and divides amongKazakhs themselves and be-tweentheotherethnicgroupsaredeepening.ThewaycitizensofKazakhstanviewthemselvesisstronglyaffectedbysuchfac-torsasthelanguage,ethnicity,andthefactthatoneoriginatesfrom a given region. At the same time, citizens aremore andmoreattachedtotheideaofKazakhstan’sstatehood,butitdoesnotplaytheconsolidatingfunctionatpresentbecauseitssignifi-cancehasbeenovershadowedby ever strongerdivides amongtheKazakhpublic(forexample,anethnicKazakhwhoiscriti-calofthegovernment’sactivitymayaccuseanethnicRussianofcriticisingstateauthoritiesintheRussianlanguageandoffail-ingtolearnKazakhsofar34).TheprocessofsocietyandmodernpoliticalnationforminginKazakhstanisthereforestillaworkinprogress.
At thesametime,Kazakhstan, in theopinionofagreatsectionoftheKazakhpublic,hasbenefitedfromthecollapseoftheUSSR–45%35ofrespondentsbelievedsoin2013(bycomparison,37%inGeorgia).Only25%oftherespondentswereoftheopinionthatthecollapseoftheUSSRwasdisadvantageoustotheircountry(33%inGeorgiaand56% inUkraine).Kazakhstan’seconomicsuccessisthereasonwhyalmosthalfoftheKazakhpublicgenerallyhaveapositiveopinionaboutthecollapseoftheUSSR.
3. The economic model that boosts social aspirations
TheeconomicmodeladoptedbyNazarbayevenvisagesapartialliberalisationoftheeconomyandopeningthecountryuptofor-eign investments. This has made it possible to skilfully utilise
34 Cf.FacebookdiscussionsbetweenMukhtarTaizhanandSergeyDuvanov.35 Datafrom:http://www.gallup.com/poll/166538/former-soviet-countries-harm-
breakup.aspx?g_source=kazakhstan&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles
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thecountry’srichdepositsofmineralrawmaterials36(unlikeitsneighbour,Turkmenistan)and toachievesuccess.Themeasureofthissuccesswastheimpressiveeconomicgrowthanannualofaverage7.2%between2004and2014(in1990-1995,Kazakhstan’seconomyhadcontractedby36%),averageincomeper capitagrewfromUS$94 toUS$346 (averagemonthlywages fromUS$208 toUS$675)37.Atthesametime,theproportionofthepopulationliv-ingbelowthepoverty linedecreased from46.7% in2001 to lessthan3%in201438.Themiddleclassgrewfromlessthan5%in2002toover65%in201339.
Despitethesedoubtlesssuccesses,Kazakhstanremainsdepend-entonexternalfactors,aboveallthepricesofmineralrawmate-rials(theoilandgassectorgenerates30%ofGDPandtwothirdsofincomefromexports),andgeopoliticalfactors–transportroutestoandfromthecountryrunmainlythroughRussiaandChina.
Thesuccessfulmanagementofthevastdepositsofmineralrawma-terialsandtheboomontheoilmarket(andmorebroadly,ontherawmaterialsmarket) impeded the diversification of the econo-my,successfullyweakeningthestimulithatmightencouragethe
36 Kazakhstanhas,forexample,theworld’stwelfthlargestoildeposits(30billionbarrels)andistheworld’slargesturaniumproducer(in2013,itac-countedfor38%oftheglobalproductionofuranium).Datafrom:https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Ka-zakhstan/kazakhstan.pdf, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Kazakhstan/
37 DataquotedfromtheNationalStatisticalCommitteeofKazakhstan:http://www.stat.gov.kz/faces/wcnav_externalId/homeDinamika.pokazateli?_afrLoop=21816240197846206#%40%3F_afrLoop%3D21816240197846206%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dutd375z0p_50
38 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kazakhstan/overview39 Themiddleclassisdefinedhereasagroupofpeoplewhocanspendbetween
US$10andUS$100daily(accordingtopurchasingpowerparity).Formorein-formation,see:Multi-dimensional review of Kazakhstan,OECD,p.53.Availablehere:http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/develop-ment/multi-dimensional-review-of-kazakhstan_9789264246768-en#page55
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governmenttotakerealactiontodiversifytheeconomy–revenuesweresohighthatKazakhstanhadabudgetsurpluseveryyear.
Asregardspolitics, theconcentrationofeconomicinfluenceinthehandsofthestateandofsmallgroupsofbusinessmenlinkedtothegovernmenthasbeenaproblem.Business-politicalgroupstendtoexpandtheirinfluencebeyondtheinitialareasoftheiroperation (for example, rawmaterials) and create conglomer-atesofacertainkind(forexample,byexpandingtheir invest-mentstobanks).Thisadverselyaffectsthedevelopmentofcom-petitionandhasanegativeimpactonsmallandmedium-sizedbusinesses.Nordoesthegreatrolewhichstate-controlledfirmsplay in theeconomycontribute todevelopingcompetitiveness.Furthermore, thestatealsoappliesapricecontrolmechanismandresortstomarketinterventions,whichhampersthedevel-opmentofcompetitionandisbeneficialtocertainbusiness-po-liticalgroups.
DiversificationwasalsohinderedbythehighlevelofdollarisationofthebankingsectoranditspoorconditionsincethescandalwithBTABankwhichisownedbyMukhtarAblyazov,anoligarchwhowastoleratedbythegovernmentforyears.ThecaseofBTABankisagoodillustrationofthedegreetowhichbusinessisdependentonNazarbayev–afterAblyazovfledKazakhstan, thebankwasnationalisedandAblyazovhimselfwasaccusedofsiphoningoffaroundUS$6billionfromthebank.Thiscaseclearlyshowsthatabsoluteloyaltytothepresidentistheconditionnecessaryfordo-ingbusinessinKazakhstan.
The development of a competitive economy has also been heldbackbytheomnipresentcorruption,thelowqualityoftheruleoflaw,theinefficiencyofthestateadministrationandthepoororinadequatequalificationsofemployees.
Asregardsthesocio-politicalsector,thefactorthathasimpededany thorough state reforms has been the social contract under
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which thegovernmentguaranteesprosperityandstability, andthepublicofferssupportinreturn(aswasthecaseinRussiadur-ingVladimirPutin’sfirsttwotermsaspresident).
The consequences of this policy include people’s growing eco-nomicaspirationsandtheirincreasingpoliticalindifference.Thenewmiddleclasshasbeeninterestedinkeepingthestatus quoinpolitics(Nazarbayev’srule)andineconomictermshasaimedatmaintainingconsumptionatleastonthesamelevelasatpresent40.Thegovernment’soperationhasbeenbasedontheconvictionthatsocialandpoliticalstabilitycanonlybeguaranteedbyeconomicstabilityandsatisfyingthepublic’sfinancialneeds.Thisconvic-tionhasbecomeevenstronger41sincetheZhanaozencrisiswhichhadaviolentendinginDecember2011.
zhanaozen
Employees of Uzenmunaigaz (a company operating on theZhanaozenfield in thewestern part of the country close totheborderwithTurkmenistan)controlledbythestate-ownedholding Samruk-Kazyna went on strike in 2011. The strikelasted from spring toDecember 2011 and ended in a violentpacification during which 15 people were killed. Riots alsospilled over to other places in the region; for example, onemorepersonwaskilled inShetpe.Zhanaozen isan illustra-tionofKazakhstan’smostseriousproblems:
– the public’s demanding attitude: the workers went onstrike because theywanted a pay rise, guarantees of the
40 SociologistGulmira Ileuovadefines thisgroupas the ‘bourgeois’,http://www.nomad.su/?a=10-201411100016
41 OneeffectoftheZhanaozenmassacrewasaquicksettlingofthestrikeinZhezkazganatthebeginningof2012,wheretheworkers’demandsweresat-isfiedimmediatelyduetothefearofmoreseriousprotests(ZhezkazganisalsoaplacewhereagreatdealofKazakhfightersinSyriaarerecruitedfrom),http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39357&cHash=05bd3e39714752981dd845afbaf3844d#.Vk4VVHYvfcs
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samerightstolocalandforeignemployees,andrestrictionsontheoperationsoftradeunionstobelifted;
– theatomisationofsociety:theworkersonstrikewerecon-demned, forexample, in thenearbycityofAktau,whoseresidents believed that the workers already earned goodmoneyandweredemanding toomuch; after the tragedy,families of the victims and others harmed by the eventscompetedfordamagesfromthestate,notstoppingshortofmutualaccusations;
– problems with the adaptation of the Kazakh immigrantpopulation: residents ofZhanaozenwere ethnicKazakhswhohad come, for example, fromTurkmenistan andUz-bekistan (the oralman). The city’s population doubled be-tween2000and2010.The returneeswere treatedby theresidentsoftheregionasimmigrants,aliens;
– the authoritarian regime ineffectively dealt with localproblems:theentirestateapparatusfailed,beginningfromlocalgovernmentofalllevels(whichdisregardedtheprob-lem,playingontimeandtryingtoputtheresponsibilityfordealingwithitonthestate-ownedcompany),tothecentralgovernment(i.e.thepresident),whoeitherunderestimatedtheweightoftheproblemorwasmisinformed.Theconse-quences of the developments in Zhanaozen included thedismissal of TimurKulibayev, the president’s son-in-law,fromthepositionofSamruk-Kazynaholding’sCEO,andthepoliticaldownfallofAslanMusin,whocamefromwesternKazakhstanandservedastheheadofthepresidentialad-ministrationatthetimeofthemassacre;
– the ineffectiveness of the law enforcement agencies: themethodsusedwereinadequatetothethreatandledtoun-necessarykillings.ThegovernmenthadtouseaircraftofthecommercialairlineAirAstanatotransportitstroopsto
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Zhanaozen,becausetheinternaltroopshadnoequipmentoftheirown.
TheZhanaozenmassacrelaidbarethedownsidesofthegov-ernmentbutitalsorevealeditswillingnesstoimplementre-forms. Since the pacification, theMinistry for Regional De-velopmenthasbeenestablishedandaspecialagendaforthedevelopmentofmono-cities, i.e.urbancentresdependentonasingleindustrialplant(around1.5millionpeopleliveinsuchcities inKazakhstan),hasbeendeveloped.Lawenforcementagencieshavebeenreformedandmodernised;theirabilitytorespondtosimilarthreatshasbeenimproved.Zhanaozenwasthefirstinasequenceofseriousimpulsestoreformthestate.
4. The challenges on the international arena
The ever more complicated international environment is a re-sultofthechangingglobalbalanceofforcesandalsoaffectsthesituation inCentralAsia andKazakhstan itself. It provides thebackdropforacrisisloomingonthehorizon.FromAstana’spointof view, the country’s geopolitical situation leaves it no otherchoicebuttoco-operatewithRussiaandChina,Kazakhstan’stwostrongestandclosestneighbours. Inturn,askilfulbalancingofinfluencebetweenthemmayopenupafieldforco-operationwithotherimportantpartners,suchastheWest(theUSAandtheEU),thecountriesinSouth-EasternAsiaandthePersianGulf,Turkey,etc.Astana’spolicyischaracterisedbyavoidingconflictsandbyan ostentatious openness to co-operationwith allwilling part-ners42. President Nazarbayev has for years formulated foreignpolicyguidelinesof thiskind,even thoughRussiahasbeen themostimportantpointofreferenceinKazakhstan’sforeignpolicy.Thisisaneffectofclosebondsexistingintheareaofsecurityand
42 Manifestationsofthisincludethepresidentdeclaringinonebreathopen-nesstoco-operationwithRussia,ChinaandtheWestinhisannualspeeches,andhismediationinitiativesconcerningNagorno-Karabakh,Iran,Ukraine,Syriaandotherconflictareas.
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the economy– for example,Kazakhstan relies on the transit ofgoods(includingoil)viaRussianterritory.
ThefactthattheEurasianEconomicUnionisturningintoapo-liticalinstrumentusedbyMoscowtoregainitsinfluenceinthepost-Sovietarea43isseenasathreattomaintainingtheinterna-tionalpolicylinesexistingsofar,asaretheconflictwhichRussiaprovokedwithUkraineandtheKremlin’sincreasinglyconfronta-tionalpolicy(forexample,indealingwiththeWestandTurkey).Russia’saggressivepolicyhasforcedAstanatomanoeuvreinsuchwaysastoremainasautonomousaspossiblefromMoscow,how-ever,withoutriskingaconflictwithit.Astana’sstanceonRussia’sannexationofCrimeaisagoodillustrationofthisapproach.TheMinistryofForeignAffairsofKazakhstanrecognisedtherefer-enduminCrimea,viewingitasamanifestationof itsresidents’free choice. However, officially, Kazakhstan has never directlyrecognisedtheannexationofCrimeabyRussia44,andabstainedfromthevoteattheUNforumontheresolutioncondemningRus-sia’smovesinCrimea.KazakhstanhasalsomadeeffortstoshowRussiathebenefitsofitsmaintaininggoodrelationswiththeWestandTurkey(forexample,byofferingitselfasamediator,whichinpracticewouldmeanactingasanintermediaryintheUkrainianortheTurkish-Russianconflicts–however,suchoffershavebeenconsistentlyignoredbyRussia).Officially,Astanainvariablyde-claresitsdesireforstrategicco-operationwithMoscowandhasjoinedintegrationprojectswhichareessentialforMoscow,suchastheEurasianEconomicUnion.However,Kazakhstanhasmadeefforts todefend its interests in casesof less significance,oftensuccessfully,butneveraffectingMoscow’sprestigeontheinter-nationalarena.
43 ThebreakthroughmomentcamewhenRussiaforcedArmeniatowithdrawfromsigningtheAssociationAgreementwiththeEU(September2013)andjointheEurasianEconomicUnioninstead.
44 WhentheUkrainianembassyprotestedinautumn2015toCrimeabeingpre-sentedasapartofRussiainaKazakhtextbook,theministryofeducationpromiseditwould“seetothismatter”andthenithusheduptheproblem.
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Russia’s increasingly aggressive policy is making maintainingthestatus quo inforeignpolicyevermoredifficult.Putin’sstate-mentduringtheSeligerforuminAugust2014becameasymbolofRussianpressureandawarningtoKazakhstan.HesaidthenthatKazakhshadnothadastateoftheirownbeforeNazarbayevandpraisedthepresidentofKazakhstanforhisfriendlypolicyto-wardsRussia.ThiswasunderstoodbyNazarbayevasawarningthatKazakhstanmightloseitsstatehoodifitstoppedrespectingtheinterestsofRussia’sneo-imperialpolicy45,i.e.ifitopposedbe-comingmoreandmoredependentonRussiaattheexpenseofitssovereignty.ThisaggressivepolicyofRussia’sandtheperceivedthreatofseparatismordestabilisationbeingplottedinthenorth-ernpartofKazakhstan(andsuchsentimentshavebeenskilfullystokedbyRussianpoliticians)46,isoneofthemainenginesdrivinginternalpolicy.WhileitcanbedisputedwhetherRussiawouldbeabletogenerateseparatisminnorthernpartsofKazakhstan(theregions: Northern Kazakhstan, Pavlodar and Eastern Kazakh-stan),thereisnodoubtthatRussiawouldbeabletocausedesta-bilisationinindividualregionsofKazakhstan,especiallyduringthesuccessionprocess.Forthesereasons,RussiaanditspolicyarethemostseriousfactorsaffectingKazakhstan’sdomesticpolicy.
45 Itissymptomaticthat,apartfromoneKazakhMP,noonehasmadeanofficialcommentonPutin’sstatement.
46 StatementsbyVladimirZhirinovsky,thedeputyspeakeroftheStateDuma,thelowerhouseoftheRussianparliament,whohassuggestedthatCentralAsiabetransformedintoanentityoftheRussianFederation;thestatementbyEduardLimonov,whoislinkedtoTheOtherRussiaparty,whohassug-gestedthatnorthernregionsofKazakhstanbeincludedinRussia.AstanasentanoteofprotestinresponsetoZhirinovsky’ssuggestion.Inturn,itwasdebatedinpublicwhetherLimonovshouldbesuedforwhathehadsaid.AnotherexamplewasthedemonstrationorganisedbyTheOtherRussiainfrontofKazakhstan’sconsulateinSt.PetersburgindefenceofethnicRus-siansconvictedforseparatisminKazakhstan.Thedemonstrationwasheldon25December2015,onthe25thanniversaryofKazakhstanregaininginde-pendence.
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ii. the counteractions
Withall itsweaknesses,Kazakhstanhasrespondedtoalltheis-suespresentedabovebyspeedingupreforms.Thewaythegovern-menthasreactedisanextensionoftheprevioustrends–Kazakh-stanhasbeenundergoingreformsendlesslyandhasactivelyusedinternationalsupportintheprocessofmodernisationofsomeele-mentsofthestatesincetheonsetofitsindependence.TheabilitytoadjustthepreviouspolicytoreduceproblemsiswhatmakesKa-zakhstandistinctfromallotherpost-Sovietcountrieswhereau-thoritariansystemsapply–inKazakhstan,anycrisisusuallyleadstoreshuffleswithintheeliteandincreasessurveillancetypical,forexample,ofAzerbaijan)butalsotriggersmodificationsinthewaythe country is governed. Examples of this include the violentlysuppressedstrikeinZhanaozenortheproblemswithlocalIslamicradicalism,whichisbeingresolvednotbyintensifyingrepressionbutratherusingacombinationofinstrumentsofsurveillanceandsoftmethodsaimedatmakingradicalIslamseemlessappealing47.ThefactthatanotherZhanaozenhasnotyettakenplaceisproofoftherelativeeffectivenessofthemethodsapplied.
The set of reforms being implemented at present is viewed asaresponsetothecrisisandisreminiscentofthereformsinthe1990s,duetotheirscale.Thedomesticpolicyisbeingadjustedandthestateisbeingmodernisedatthesametime.Thecommonde-nominatorofallthesemovesisthedesiretobuildastrongstatethroughreinforcingitsinstitutionsandalsothroughtheconsoli-dationoftheKazakhpublicbasedonthesenseofnationalpride,a common historical legacy, and shared pro-state values. ThusKazakhstan’s actions are at variance with the new doctrine ofRussiandominanceinthepost-Sovietarea48,intendedatlimiting
47 Cf.MaciejFalkowski,JózefLang,HomoJiihadicus,OSW Report,September2015,http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/homojihadicus.pdf
48 Formoreonthisissuesee:MarekMenkiszak,ThePutindoctrine:Thefor-mationofaconceptualframeworkforRussiandominanceinthepost-Sovietarea,OSW Commentary, 27March2014,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
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thesovereigntyofpost-Sovietcountries(forexample,byprevent-ingthemfromparticipatinginanyintegrationprojectsthatarealternativetotheRussianones,andmaintainingthepost-Sovietmodelofdevelopment).Meanwhile,Kazakhstanhastakenpainstospeeduptheprocessesofforminganewpoliticalnation,andiscopyingthesolutionsadoptedintheWestorEasternAsiainitspolicyofmodernisingandstrengtheningthestate.Ithasbeenim-plementingallthesesolutionstop-down,inamannertypicalofauthoritarianism.Paradoxically,KazakhstanisviewedasoneofRussia’smostfaithfulallies,butitdoesnotdrawontheRussianexperiencebutinsteadsearchesforguidelinesforitsfurtherde-velopment in theWest (forexample, throughco-operationwiththeOECDandtheEU)asEasternAsianstateshavedonebeforethem. In fact, the strategybeingcurrently implementedbyKa-zakhstan envisages breaking themental bondswith the SovieteraandputsitatriskofconflictwithRussia.
1. Reinforcing the state institutions
Improvingtheoperationofstateinstitutionsisatthecoreofthereforms currentlybeing implemented.Three out of thefive so-called‘institutionalreforms’49announcedinMarchthisyearandimplemented in co-operation mainly with the OECD50 directlyraisetheissueofimprovingtheefficiencyofexistinginstitutions.Thedeclaredgoalistocreateaneffectiveadministrativeandbu-reaucraticapparatus,introducingtheruleoflawandincreasingthe state’s responsibility towards its citizens.Anotherobjectiveis to build strong institutions, free from nepotism, which will
likacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-27/putin-doctrine-formation-a-concep-tual-framework-russian
49 Theplanofconcretelegislativechanges,theso-called‘Onehundredconcretesteps’,wasannouncedbyNazarbayevinMay2015.Itscontentisavailable,forexample,here:http://www.mid.gov.kz/en/kategorii/100-konkretnyh-shagov-0
50 Kazakhstansignedaco-operationagreementwiththeOECDtothiseffectinJanuary2015.
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operate efficiently regardless of who governs the country andhow. Streamlining the operation of institutions is expected tobe achievedwithout theneed to introduce any thoroughpoliti-calchanges;insteaditwillbedonebygettingridofthecorruptbureaucraticmentality.Aneffectiveandefficientadministrationhasbeenidentifiedasanecessaryconditionformakingfurtherchangesinthestateandasthegovernment’spriority.Inthiscon-text,thereformsinKazakhstanareanAsian-styleimplementa-tion of legislative solutions recommended byWestern interna-tional organisations as long as it doesnot directly threaten theauthoritarian regime. In this context, Kazakhstan’s moves arereminiscentofthesituationinSouthKoreain1960-1980.
Thechangesenvisageintroducing:anewmulti-stagesystemforrecruiting public servants, a precisely determined path of pro-motiondependentonprofessionalism,thesystemforevaluatingpublic servantsandremunerating themdependingonworkre-sults,therequirementtoguaranteeadequateaccommodationtopublicservants(butnotownership,whichisexpectedtocontrib-utetotheirloyaltytothestate),theopportunitiestoimproveone’scompetences(therequirementtoattendqualificationupgradingcoursesatleastonceeverythreeyears),thepossibilitytoemployforeignspecialistsinthestateadministrationandanewcodeofconductforpublicservants.Oneofthewaystoputanendtothesystembasedonloyaltytopoliticalpatronsistorestrictthepos-sibilityofstaffrotationinthecivilservice–apersonmovingtoanother managerial position can take only one employee withthem.ApublicadministrationunitistobecreatedattheAgencyforCivil ServiceAffairs andFightingCorruption established in2014inordertocurbcorruptionmorestrongly.
Thereformsalsoenvisageadecentralisationofthedecision-mak-ingprocess–individualgovernmentofficeswillbegivenfreedomtodecidedhowtoimplementthetasksentrustedtothemandwillbemadeaccountablefortheeffectsof theirworkannually(andforprogrammeimplementationonceinthreeyears).Thenumber
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ofgovernmentprogrammestobeimplementedwillbereducedtoimprovethecohesionandeffectivenessoftheirimplementation.
Thechangeswill alsocover the judiciary.These include the in-troductionofasimplifiedthree-instancejudiciaryprocedure(inplaceofthepresentfive-instanceprocedure),strictercriteriaforappointingjudges,acodeofconduct,compulsoryaudio-visualre-cordingofcourtsessions,anincreasedroleforthejuryandare-ducedrole for thepublicprosecutor incivilcases.Special focuswillbeputoneconomiccourtswhichconsidercasesconcerninginvestors. A specialist economic court attached to the SupremeCourtistobeestablished,andacourtofarbitration,modelledonthe institutionoperating inDubai,will functionat the Interna-tionalFinancialCentreinAstanastartingfrom2017.
Thereformsareexpectedtoalsocoverthepolicethroughadopt-ingastricterprocedureforrecruitingpoliceworkersandintro-ducing a system for the evaluation of active police officers, es-tablishingamunicipalpoliceforcewhichwillreporttothelocalgovernment,andpubliccouncilswhichwillconsidercomplaintsagainstthemunicipalpolice.
ThechangesinthejudiciaryandthepoliceshowthatKazakhstandoes not intend to disassemble the institutions completely andbuildthemanew(aswasthecasewiththepolicereforminGeor-gia),butwantstostreamlinetheiroperationthroughevolution-arychangesandagradualreplacementofstaff.Thissolutionhasbeenchosenoutoffearofdestabilisingthesystem,butitwillad-verselyaffecttheeffectivenessofthereforms(cf.theunsuccess-fuljudiciaryreforminGeorgia51).
The reforms also provide for developing the local governmentsystemthroughthe introductionof independentbudgetsonthe
51 http://silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2015-popjanevs-ki-retribution-and-the-rule-of-law-the-politics-of-justice-in-georgia.pdf
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lowestlevelsoflocaladministration(regionaltownsandvillages)andallowingresidentstoparticipateinworkonthis.Citizenswillreceive better access to information, public councilswill be es-tablishedattheakimats(cityhalls,regionaloffices,etc.)andwillperformaconsultativefunction.Finally,allstateserviceswillbeofferedbyasinglecitizenservicecentre(named‘Thegovernmentfor citizens’) tobebuilt on thebasis of resident service centreswhichhavebeenoperatingforseveralyearsandhavebeenevalu-atedverywell,owing towhichcorruptionhasbeenreducedonthelowestlevelsofadministration.
Thereformssatisfytheaspirationsoftheyoungmembersoftheelite and create space for the competences of the so-called ‘Bo-lashakgraduates’52tobetakenadvantageof.Theterm‘Bolashakgraduates’refers toKazakhswhohavebenefitedfromtheBola-shakScholarshipProgrammeandwhoseeducationatforeignuni-versities(mainlyintheUSAandtheUnitedKingdom)hasbeenfundedbypublicmoney;theydefinitelysupportreform,andarerepresentativesof theyounggenerationwhowereborn inNaz-arbayev’s Kazakhstan. Proofs of the great hopes pinned on Bo-lashakgraduates include theappointmentofBaurzhanBaybek,oneoftheprogramme’sgraduates,asakim ofAlmaty,andthefactthattheAgencyforCivilServiceAffairsandFightingCorruptionandtheMinistryofForeignAffairspresentthenumberofBolas-hakgraduatesemployedasanindicatoroftheirefficiency.FromNazarbayev’spointofview,Bolashakgraduatesareanimportantbaseforimplementingreforms.However,theyhavesofaractedasdeputies.ThenominationofBaybekformayorofAlmatyisin-tendedtocheck(andtodemonstratetothescepticalpost-Sovietelite)whetherBolashakgraduates aremature enough to acceptgreaterresponsibilityforgoverningthecountry.
52 Atotalofalmost12,000citizensofKazakhstanhavebeengrantedtheschol-arshipsincethelaunchoftheBolashakProgramme.Theprogrammehasevolvedovertime.Atpresent,itimposestheobligationtoworkforfiveyearsinstateadministrationstructuresaftergraduation.
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Nazarbayevhimselftreatsthereformsasawayofovercomingtheinternalcrisisandalsoawaytoremaininpowerandmaintainstability.Thespeedofthechangesintroducedinstateinstitutionsand thepresident’s rhetoricemphasising the joint effort (whichsomehavecalled‘psychotherapy’53)areintendedtodistractpub-licattentionfromthedeterioratingeconomicsituationandtoputtheblameforitonexternalfactors.Holdingsnapparliamentaryand local electionson20Marchwasaway to channelgrowingdissatisfaction.Theelectionshavealsobecomepartoftheprocessofreplacingthepoliticalelitewithayoungerone54andpromotingpluralisminthesysteminordertomobilisepublicsupportfortheongoingmodernisation.
Asuccessfulimplementationofthereformswouldbealargesteptowardsactivatingandstrengtheningtheroleoftheformalstateinstitutions,andwouldalsomakeitpossibletostopandresolveminorconflictson the lower levels, thusprotecting thegovern-mentandpreventingcrises fromeruptingHowever, thiswouldalso lead to at least some sections of societybeingmade active,whichpotentiallyposestheriskofdestabilisation55.
53 Cf.aninterviewwithAidosSarym:https://www.facebook.com/ratel.kz/posts/487619861410324:0
54 Cf.AleksandraJarosiewicz,Kazakhstan:anti-crisisparliamentaryelections,OSW Analyses,27January2016,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/anal-yses/2016-01-27/kazakhstan-anti-crisis-parliamentary-elections
55 InlateApril/earlyMay2016protestsprovokedbychangesintheLandCoderolledthroughKazakhstan.Thegovernmentusepersuasiontostampouttheprotests(governmentrepresentativesmetwithcitizensinAtyrau,Ak-tobe,Semey,UralskandKyzylorda)andprincipallyshunnedviolentmethods(aharmlessfracastookplace,forexample,inKyzylorda).TheprotestswereprovokedbythefearofChineseexpansion,butinthebroadercontext,theywerearesultandasymptomofthesocio-economiccrisisabouttoexplode.Atthesametime,theprotestswereasideeffectofthereformprocesswhichhasmademoreroomforthegovernment’sactionstobecriticised,hasallowedpeacefuldemonstrationsandhasinfactcontributedtothedevelopmentofKazakhnationalism.Finally,theprotestswerestoppedbyNazarbayev’sde-cisiontointroduceamoratoriumonthechangesinthecode,whichwasac-companiedbythedismissalsoftwoministers.
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Thelackofchangeinthepoliticalsystemwouldunderminetheeffect of the reforms, above all the continuing structural prob-lemofunresolvedsuccessionafterNazarbayev.Itseemsthatthepresident’sstatementssuggestingthattheroleoftheparliamentandgovernmentcouldbestrengthenedattheexpenseofhisownpowersareintendedtotesthowthissolutionwillbereceivedbytheeliteandthepublic.FromNazarbayev’spointofview,replac-ing thegovernmentsystemwithamorecollegialonemayhaveastabilisingeffectandreducetheriskofreversingthedirectionhesetsforthecountry’sdevelopment.Ifthisisthecase,Kazakh-stan’spoliticalsystemwouldheadtowardsauthoritarianism,witha strong strainof corporatism,where the strugglebetween thevariousinterestgroupswouldatleastpartlybemovedfromthepresidentialpalacetotheparliamentaryforum.Arenewedpar-liament,withthesystemof licensedpoliticalpartiespreserved,isasteptowardssuchasystem.ThelackofastructuralsolutiontotheissueofsuccessionwillcontributetodeepeninginstabilityafterNazarbayev’sdeathandwillreducetheroomformanoeuvreforsystemreforms.Thismeansthatthepresentseriesofreforms,given both its depth and the context of implementation (crisis)mayhaveadecisiveimpactonthecountry’sfuture.
Theimplementationofthereformsislikelytobehinderedbytheinstitutionsthemselvesaboveallduetothementalityofthebu-reaucraticapparatus,whichhasan inherentfearofanychangeor lossofposition.Changeswillalsobeblockedby theexistinglocal and clan deals56 and the post-Sovietmentality. This is the
56 OneexampleofdifficultiesinreformingthestateadministrationisprovidedbythecaseofArturNigmetov,whowasappointedspokesmaninJuly2015bythenewakim ofAlmaty,BaurzhanBaybek.Nigmetovresignedfromhispositionafterafewweeks,sayinghewasunwillingtobepartofthegamesplayedaspartofthe‘localdeal’(heannouncedandexplainedhisdecisiononhisFacebookprofile).Asaconsequence,Baybekdismissedallofhisdeputiesandmadechangesinthebureaucraticapparatus.ItissymptomaticthatbothBaybekandNigmetovreceivededucationintheWest(GermanyandFinland)andareexamplesofthenewpartofsocietywhosupportreforms,areabletoco-operatewiththestateapparatusandarewillingtobecomeengagedinreform.
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reasonwhy Nazarbayev has recommended amendments to thecivilserviceactthatwillforcethedismissalsofpublicservantsofpensionableage.The stateapparatus is likely toobstruct thechangesinordertomaintainforaslongaspossiblethebenefitsofthecorruptpracticesusedsofar.Thiswillbecounteractedbythe Agency for Civil Service Affairs and Fighting Corruption57,whichreportsdirectlytothepresident.Thecountry’sdifficultfi-nancialsituationwillgeneratetensionamongtheeliteandalsomake economising on expenses necessary, and public pressurewillcontributetothis58.
Itistooearlytomakeaconclusiveevaluationoftheeffectsofthereforms, above all because their implementation began in late2015andearly2016.However,thescaleofthechangesalonesigni-fiesthatthereformsareaneffectofNazarbayev’sbeliefthatthelackofseriousinstitutionalandpoliticalchanges,giventhedete-rioratingeconomicandgeopoliticalsituation,willleadtointernaldestabilisation,subordinationtoRussiaand,asaconsequence,toKazakhstanlosingwhatithasachievedsofar.Inhisnarrativetothepublicandtheelite,Nazarbayevemphasisestheneedtomakeajointeffort59andjointsacrifices.Healsowarnsthatthepresentsystemmaycollapse;thisinfactisaimedatmobilisingmembersof the elite to implement the reforms.Kazakhstan’s situation isquitedifficultbecause,giventhedemandingattituderepresented
57 Underapresidentialdecreeon11December2015itwastransformedintotheMinistryforCivilServiceAffairsandFightingCorruption.
58 Forexample,publishinginformationonsocialnetworkingservicesonoffi-cialsabusingpowerwhileusingstaffcars.Anotherexampleofpublicpres-surehasbeenseeninthecrusadeofaKaragandastudent,whohasbeensuccessfullystigmatisingpolicemen,forexample,forfailingtocomplywithroadtrafficrules,http://today.kz/news/zhizn/2015-11-01/701641-karagand-inskij-student-dobilsya-nakazaniya-100-politsejskih
59 Forexample,appealingtothepublictotakepartinprivatisationandtobusi-nesscirclestoinvestinKazakhstanandthuscontributetodiversifyingtheeconomy.However,thisdoesnotworkbecausethelegalisationofcapitalhascoveredUS$1billionsince2014,whileitisestimatedthatUS$167billionwassiphonedoffKazakhstanin2004-2013(http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/illicit-financial-flows-from-developing-countries-2004-2013/).
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bythepublicandtherulingclassalike,carryingoutthereformsisasriskyasabandoningthemandmayleadtointernalupheaval.However,Nazarbayev’spresenceinthesystem(playingtheroleofagoodkhan)provides theopportunity to reduce the scaleofpotentialdestabilisation.
Theimplementationofthereformswillalsodependonthedeter-minationofNazarbayevhimselfandonhisabilitytoactivateatleastpartoftheeliteandpublic interestedinchangingthesys-tem.Ontheotherhand,reformswillbehamperedduetoresist-ancefromtheadministration,theoldgovernmenteliteandbusi-nessandpoliticalgroups,aswellasNazarbayev’sfearofintensivepublicprotestsinasituationwherethefinancialwellbeingofthepeopleisdeclining.
2. Consolidation of society
TheoverridinggoalofKazakhstan’sinternalpolicyistoconsoli-datethepublicaroundtheonecommonidea,i.e.ofKazakhstanasaseparateandsovereignstate.Thisgoalisnotdirectlyformulat-edbythegovernment,butNazarbayev,theofficialnarrativeandalso so-called ‘national patriotic’ circles (Kazakh nationalists)60allemphasise thatKazakhstan isasovereigncountry61andthisistransformingitintothemainideabehindthegovernment’sac-
60 ‘Nationalpatriots’isthecollectivedefinitionofthecirclespropagatingKa-zakhnationalism.Itsmainclaimsare:traditionalism,increasingtheroleoftheKazakhlanguage,anti-colonialism,economicnationalism(notallow-inglandtobesoldtoforeigners)andecologicalnationalism(opposingtheoperationofBaikonur)andnotallowingKazakhstanloseitssovereigntyduetotherebirthofanewSovietUnion.Formoreonthissubjectsee:SerikBey-sembayev,FenomenKazakhskogonatsionalizmavkontekstesegodnyash-neipolitiki:ototritsaniyakponimaniyu.Availableonthewebsitehttp://ru.soros.kz/uploads/user_68/2015_23_09__03_46_44__219.pdf
61 Forexample,Nazarbayev’sstatementinAugust2014,whenhesaidthatKa-zakhstanmightleavetheEurasianEconomicUnion,ifthisputitssover-eigntyatstake.Also,themannerinwhichtheofficialmediareportedonKazakhstan’ssigningtheTreatyoftheEurasianEconomicUnion,emphasis-ingthestate’ssovereignty.
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tions.Thispolicyisnothingnew–Kazakhstanhasmadesimilarmoves since the beginning of its independence.What is new isits intensification inthefaceofRussia’sactions: theannexationofCrimeaandthecreationofseparatismineasternUkraine.Thenumerous statements from Russian politicians questioning themeaningofKazakhstan’sexistenceinitspresentformhavealsoactedasastimulant.Otherconceptsandnotionsusedbythegov-ernment are imprecise (e.g. ecology, tolerance, theKazakh lan-guage, family, hospitality, respect, patriotism62), but even theirimpreciselydeterminedcontentareaimedatbuildingasenseofprideintheachievementsofthestateandthenation,inthefactofbeingacitizenofKazakhstanoraKazakh.
Ineffect, thegovernment’s identitypolicyhasbeenbuiltonthepractical level in opposition to the Russian narrative (the anti-Chinesenarrative and stokinganti-Chinesephobias existing insocietyweremuchmoreimportantafewyearsago),eventhoughon the political level Kazakhstan has consistently emphasisedthat it isRussia’sstrategicpartner.Thesituation isadditionallycomplicatedbythefactthattheKazakhpublicremainswithintherangeofinfluenceofRussia’smediaandculture.Itisalsoprinci-pallypro-RussianandfearsChineseexpansion(thisfearhasbeenfomentedbytheRussianmediaforyears).InthecaseofKazakh-stanit is thegovernmentelite (especially itsyoungermembers,who have been educated in theWest)who aremore concernedthanthepublic(withtheexceptionofKazakhnationalistcircles)aboutthethreatposedbyRussia,namelyitscivilisationalandpo-liticaldominance.
Onthepracticallevel,theconceptuponwhichsocialconsolidationistobeconstructedistheratherimprecisenotionknownasMen-gilik El(literally,‘theeternalstate’).However,thecontentspropa-gatedaspartofMengilik Elwillvarydependingonwhetherthey
62 Cf.thecontentpromotedduringsocialcampaignsinKazakhstan,http://www.socreklama.kz/video/
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concernKazakhsornon-Kazakhs.Onthegenerallevel,Mengilik Eldrawsuponsovereignty,unity,peaceandagreementbetweenthevariousethnicgroups,spiritualvalues,andalsosecularism(cf.thepresidentialaddressonNurlyZholin2014)andshowsre-gardtoallcitizensofKazakhstan.Inturn,forKazakhs,theno-tionofMengilik El is stronglyassociatedwith theKazakhtradi-tionandvalues,andmeans,forexample,promotingknowledgeoftheKazakhlanguage,cultureandtradition63,anddoesnotneedtobesanctionedonthestatelevelbecauseitisalreadyinternalised.ThisambiguityfinallyforcedNazarbayevtocommissionworkatthebeginningof2016todevelopacoherentconceptofMengilik ElasanelementofbuildingthemodernKazakhnation.
Thestatestillconveysadual-trackmessagetotheKazakh-speak-ingandtheRussian-speakingpartsofsocietyaspartofitspresentpolicy64.ThenarrativeaddressedtoethnicKazakhsdrawsabovealluponKazakhtraditions,whiletheRussian-languagenarrativeemphasisesthesignificanceofpeacebetweenthevariousethnicgroupsandtolerance.However,itisalsodiscretelycommunicat-edthatKazakhstanisfirstofallthecountryofethnicKazakhs.Forexample,thesocialcampaignpromotingtheslogan‘Onestate,one nation, one destiny’ is reminiscent of the fact that nationsfromallovertheSovietUnionwereexiledtoKazakhstanintheSovieteraandmetwithhospitality65,andthatKazakhsfoughtonthe frontsofWorldWar II to thesameextentasRussiansdid66.One example of emphasising the roleplayedbyKazakhs in the
63 FormoreinformationonproblemswithdefiningthemeaningofMengilik Elsee:http://www.ofstrategy.kz/index.php/ru/research/politic-research/item/443-po-predvaritelnym-rezultatam-ekspertnykh-intervyu-u-pred-stavitelej-kazakhskoj-tvorcheskoj-intelligentsii-slozhilos-neodnoznachnoe-vospriyatie-dannoj-idei
64 ThiskindofapproachwasdirectlymanifestedbythePresidentialAdminis-tration,whenitopenedaFacebookprofileintheKazakhlanguageinadditiontoitsprofileintheRussianlanguage,anddeclaredopenlythatthecontentspublishedonthesetwoprofileswouldbedifferent.
65 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Md20xat38AM66 http://www.socreklama.kz/kazaxskaya-socialnaya-reklama/
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statehasbeenthepresident’sproposaltorenamethestateKazak Eli(literally‘TheStateofKazakhs’).Inturn,therequirementtopassaKazakhlanguageexaminationwhenapplyingfortheeliteBolashak scholarship proves that the intention exists to buildstateinstitutionsbasedonethnicKazakhsandpeoplewhofullyidentifythemselveswiththestate.Thesamelanguageexamina-tionrequirementappliestocandidatesforpresidentandprospec-tivepublicadministrationworkers67.
Intheofficialnarrative,Kazakhstandoesnotmentionthecivili-sationalprogressitmadeduetobeingpartoftheSovietUnion68(andtotheinfluxofaRussian-speakingpopulationtoitscities),butdoes,toalimitedextent,discussitscosts(i.e.thefamineinthe1920s,therepressionsinthe1930sandtheexterminationoftheKazakhelitearementioned,thoughassociatingthisinanobviousmannerwiththeSovietUnionisavoided)andopenlyemphasisestheecologicaltragedyofSemipalatinsk69(thisisalsoanoffshootofNazarbayev’sinitiativesfornucleardisarmament).Thepolicyofbuildingamodernnationisopen,whichmeansthatrepresent-ativesofethnicminoritieswhomaketheefforttoassimilatebylearningKazakhexperiencehardlyanydiscriminationandareacceptedbytheKazakhpublic.
The historical memory policy which has been activated overthe past fewyears also plays an important role in building thebond between theKazakh public and their state. It is intendedto emphasise its distinctness through the search for old rootsand propagating knowledge ofKazakhstan (the publications on
67 Thissystemisnotalwaysstrictlyobserved,partlyduetotheomnipresentnepotisminthestateadministration.
68 Kazakhstan’spolicyisalsoviewedthiswaybyRussiannationalists,forex-ample,http://sputnikipogrom.com/politics/47886/russian-land-of-kazakh-stan-3/#.Vmqx8rPSmDZ
69 HundredsofnuclearexplosionswerecarriedoutatthenucleartestsitenearSemipalatinsk(Semey),andtheconsequencesofthecontaminationisstillfeltinKazakhstan.
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Kazakhstan’s statehood tradition are onemanifestation of this)andhighlightingKazakhs’historicalachievements,forexample,bybuildingmausoleumsofKazakhheroes(thisconcernsheroesfromtheKazakhkhanateeraaswellasWorldWarIIheroes)andinfactpromotingthecultofprogenitorsofKazakhnationalismandAlashOrda70 (cf. the exhibitionat theNationalMuseum inKazakhstan).ThisisaccompaniedbytheremovalofmonumentscommemoratingtheSovietpast(statutesofLeninhavebeenre-movedinmostofthecitiesinKazakhstan).Thecelebrationsofthe550thanniversaryofKazakhstatehood in2015announced inre-sponsetoPutin’swordsattheSeligerforumin2014that“KazakhsdidnothaveastateoftheirownbeforeNazarbayev”(mentionedabove)werealsoaimedatpromotingthestate.
Thepro-state (patriotic)attitude isalsopropagatedon the levelofbusiness, forexample,bymeansofthe ‘MadeinKazakhstan’campaignannouncedinspring2015encouragingthepurchaseofKazakhproductssincethemarkethadbeenfloodedwithRussiangoods(ineffectofthesuddendevaluationoftheRussiancurren-cy,whiletheKazakhcurrencywasstillstrong)orthemostrecentideasof creatingKazakhstan’sown trademark ‘TheStateof theGreatSteppe’.
Thechangesinthesymbolicpolicy,forexample,thefactthatKa-zakhstansince2013celebratestheDefenderoftheFatherlandDayon7May(andnoton23February,asinRussia)todilutethesignif-icanceofRussia’smostimportantholiday,theVictoryDay(cele-bratedon9May).In2015,Kazakhstanalsoofficiallyintroduced,inadditiontotheRussianblack-and-orangeribbonofSaintGeorge,
70 AlashOrdawasapro-independencegroup;in1917itledtothesettingupofanautonomousKazakhstateinanareawhichhadbeenpartoftheRussianEmpire.TheautonomywasliquidatedbyBolsheviksin1920,andmembersofAlashOrdasufferedrepressions.TheyaregreatlyrespectedinKazakhstan.ThereisapaintingpresentingKazakhstan’s20thcenturyhistoryattheNa-tionalMuseuminAstana.TheleadersofAlashOrdaarethecentralelementofthispainting,andtheirexecutionsbyCommunistsarepresentedasoneofthesecondarymotifs.
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asymbolofitsown,ablue-and-yellowribbonwhichiswornontheoccasionofthe7and9Maycelebrations71.TheNationalSym-bolsAct,whichwasamendedinDecember2015,requiresthatKa-zakhstan’sflagmustalwaysbeplacednexttoaforeigncountry’sflagwheneveroneisdisplayedandintroducesanewholidaycel-ebratingthenationalsymbolson4June.Theactisanothersteptowardsbuildingpro-statesentimentsandreiteratesthefactthatKazakhstanisasovereigncountrywhichhasitsownsymbolsanddoesnotneedtousethesymbolsofotherstates(implicitly,Rus-sia)whencelebratingpublicholidays.Thepolicyofbuilding itsowntraditionandcustomsalsoconcernssuchsubtleelementsas,forexample,givingupthemannerofmarchingusedintheRus-sianarmy72.
Thegovernment’smigrationpolicyisalsointendedtocontributetopublicconsolidationandakindofKazakhisationofthecoun-try.Thisboilsdown toencouragingethnicKazakhs to settle inthenorthernpartofthecountry,forexampleaspartoftheSer-penprogramme,ascholarshipofferaddressedto theoverpopu-lated southern part of the country,where ethnic Kazakhs pre-dominate,allowingthemtostudyfreeofchargeatuniversitiesinnorthernKazakhstan,orthroughcreatingincentivesfortheoral-man tosettleintheseregions.AstanaalsodoesnothingtoimpedetheimplementationofRussia’srepatriationpolicytargetedateth-nicRussianslivinginKazakhstan(morethan90%ofemigrantsfromKazakhstanin2014leftforRussiaorBelarus73;ethnicRus-siansalsohaveanexceptionallyhighdesiretoemigrate–in2013,60%ofethnicRussiansdeclaredtheywouldbewillingtoleavethe
71 TheRussianorange-and-blackSaintGeorgeribbonwasremovedfromashop-pingcentreinShimkentin2015followinganinterventionfrom‘nationalpa-triot’circles.InAfterTurkeyshotdownaRussianaircrafton24November2015,aschoolinnorthernKazakhstancancelledacelebrationdevotedtothememoryofoneoftheRussianpilotswhohaddied(hehadbeenapupilofthisschool).
72 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/7720173 http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/26-tyisyach-reshili-uehat-kazah-
stana-2014-godu-269167/
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countryif,intheiropinion,thesituationdeteriorated,forexam-ple,duetointensifyingKazakhnationalismandachangeingov-ernment74). The government has not hindered Russia’s scholar-shippolicyinKazakhstan,butthisishappeningatacost,leading,for example, to the so-called ‘braindrain’,which also concernsethnicKazakhs.
Themeasures taken to limitRussia’s influence in themedia in-clude(sofarunsuccessful)attemptstoreducethepresenceoftheRussianmediainKazakhstan,oneoftheexamplesbeingtheAd-vertisementAct adopted in201575.AstanahasalsomadeeffortstobalanceRussia’scivilisationalappealbyfosteringthedevelop-mentofKazNetandalsobypropagatingtrilingualschooleduca-tionandtheknowledgeofEnglish76.
Finally,in2015thegovernmentdecidedtotakedecisivemeasuresagainstanysignsofseparatisminKazakhstan,sentencingatleastthreecitizens forsuchactivity (includingoneethnicKazakh)77.Stricterpenaltieshavebeenset for takingpart inmilitarycon-flictsoutsidethecountry,andat leastonepersonreceiveda jailsentenceforfightinginUkraine.TheseactionswereaimedaboveallatMoscow,andtheywereintendedatdemonstratingthatKa-zakhstan, unlike Ukraine governed by Yanukovych, is an effi-cientlyoperatingstate.
74 http://gazeta.caravan.kz/articles/kto-uezzhaet-iz-kazakhstana-arti-cleID94710.html
75 http://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/zapret-reklamyi-inostrannyih-kanalah-pozvolit-kazahstanskomu-285941/http://www.gazeta.ru/business/news/2015/12/17/n_8021957.shtml
76 ThereareplanstointroduceeducationinEnglishtoallsecond-degreeschoolsin2023/2024https://primeminister.kz/news/show/22/perehod-na-trehja-zychnoe-obrazovanie-v-shkolah-rk-planiruetsja-nachat-s-2023-goda-/25-11-2015?lang=en.Thispolicyisstronglycriticisedbytheteachers’commu-nity,whoarguethatthesystemisnotreadyforsuchrevolutionarychanges.NationalpatriotsarealsoamongthecriticsduetotheirbeliefthatthiswillleadtothefallofKazakhlanguage.
77 http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan-pro-russian-activist-jailed/27421352.html
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Were Moscow to make a decisive objection and, for example,stresstherightsofethnicRussianslivinginKazakhstanthenthiscouldputthecontinuationofthistrendindomesticpolicyatstakeand, inamoreextremescenario, coulddestabiliseKazakhstan.The trends described above are not new – the government hasbeenimplementingthemwithvariousdegreesofintensityoverthepastquarter-century.However,theyhavebeengainingmo-mentumrecently,andtheirpoliticalaspectasaninstrumentforstrengtheningthestateinthefaceofRussianpressurehasbeenincreasinglyvisible.
3. The economic liberalisation
Theeconomicproblemscausedbyfallingoilpriceshavegonefarbeyondtheworst-casescenariosdrawnupbythegovernmental-readyinspring2015andhaveforcedadeeprevisionof theeco-nomicpolicytheninplace.Theeconomicreforms(theirscaleandtempoof implementation)areaboveallaresponsetothecrisis,buttheystillfit inwiththestructuralguidelinesfortherecon-structionofthestate.Thepresenteconomiccrisisisthemostseri-oussincethe1990sandisgeneratingpowerfulstimuliandforcingthegovernmenttocarryoutthorougheconomicreforms78.
Themostimportantelementofthechangesintheeconomywasadoptingaflexibleexchangeratepolicyafewyearsearlierthanoriginallyplanned.Asaconsequenceofthis,thetengelostaround50percentofitsvalueagainsttheUSdollarthroughout2015.Thedevaluationof the tengeworsenedthefinancialsituationof theKazakhpublicandledtoawithdrawalfromthepreviouspolicyofminimisingthesocialcostsofthereforms(especially,aftertheZhanaozenmassacre). This policy had been adopted due to thefearofbreakingtheinformalsocialcontract,losingsupport,and
78 ThishasbeendirectlypointedoutbytheWorldBank:http://www-wds.world-bank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/05/04/090224b082e34ac4/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Kazakhstan000L0pportunity0to0reform.pdf
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protests. The devaluation was accompanied by the discontinu-ation of the success policy and admitting that the country hadfounditselfonthebrinkofcrisis.Asregardspolitics,thedevalu-ationwasalsoforcedbyRussianpolicy:Russia,referringtotheEurasianEconomicUnion,refusedtolimititsexportstoKazakh-stan,even thoughAstanaasked it todosobecause thiscreatedahighriskofbankruptcyforlocalmanufacturers.
Theannouncementofenhancedprivatisationofstate-ownedas-setsinDecember2015wasanotherimportantelementofchangesintheeconomy.Thiscoversassetsownedbythestate-controlledholdings:Samruk-Kazyna,BaitarekandKazAgro.Theassetstobesoldincludethelargestrefineries,energyfirms(KazMunayGas),airports, railways and awhole array of smaller companies, in-cluding localmedia. Itsgoal is toreducethestate’sshare in theeconomyand toboost competition.Theprivatisation is also ex-pectedtohelpbuildan internationalfinancialcentre inAstanamodelledonDubai: itsworking languagewill beEnglish and itwilloperateaccordingtoBritishlaw.
Solutionsliberalisingsomesectorswhichregulatethefunction-ingof theeconomyhavealsobeenadopted.Oneexample is thelabourlawofferingemployersmoreflexibletermsofhiringanddismissingemployees.Somesubsidieswhichsurvived fromSo-viet timeshavealsobeenwithdrawn,suchasbreadproductionsubsidies,energypriceallowances,etc.
These moves have been coupled with a new series of reformsaimedatimprovingtheinvestmentclimate,forexample,imple-mentingtheone-deskprinciple,establishingtheinstitutionofaninvestmentsombudsmanandaspecialisteconomiccourtaspartoftheSupremeCourt.Theythusfitinwiththebroaderchangestakingplaceinthestate.Furthermore,inFebruary2016attract-ing foreign investment in areas of the economy other than theprimarysectorwasrecognisedas themaingoalofoperationofKazakhdiplomaticmissions.
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At the same time, the governmenthas decided to apply the oldmechanisms for dealing with the crisis which were tested in2008-2009,i.e.afinancialinjectionwortharoundUS$5billiontobefinancedmainlyusingtheassetsofthepensionfund(thishasbeenwidelycriticisedbythepublic)andforeignloans.Thefundswillbeused,forexample,tostimulatelending,whichhaspracti-callyhasbeenfrozensincethedevaluationofthetenge(inpartduetodepositdollarisation).
Whatwillinturncontributetoimplementingthereformsisthecrisis on the rawmaterialsmarket because itwillmake invest-mentsinothersectorsmoreappealingthanthoseintheprimarysector.ItneedstobeaddedthatKazakhstan’sgoalisnottoover-comeitsdependencyonoilexports,butrathertobalancetheim-pactoftheoilsectorthroughthedevelopmentandmodernisationoftheeconomy.Themeasurestakentohelpachievethisgoalwillincludechangesintheeducationsystem,forexample,introducingfreeofchargeeducationattechnicalfacultiesbeginningfrom2017.
Kazakhstan’saccessiontotheWTO(December2015)willalsohavea positive impact on the implementation of the reforms. WTOmembershipwillboostcompetitionandwilldecreasetheimporttariffsonanumberofproductstoalevelthatappliedbeforethecountry joined theEurasianEconomicUnion.This in turnmayleadtoapricereduction.Theaccessionwillalsocausealiberalisa-tionoftheservicesmarket,andthefinancialandtelecommunica-tionsectors,andwillmakethelabourmarketmoreflexible.Atthesametime,WTOmembershipwillhaveanadverseeffectonlocalfirms,whichwillbeforcedtocompeteharder,especiallyconsid-eringthat therequirementcurrently imposedonforeigninves-torstobuyacertainpartofgoodsandservicesofKazakhoriginisgraduallylifted.Ontheotherhand,KazakhstanwillbenefitfromtheopportunitytousetheWTOdisputesettlingmechanism.
Itisstillunclearwhatfinalimpactthereformswillhaveontheeconomy. This is partly due to the government’s policy: even
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thougheconomicrelationshavebeenliberalised,thegovernmenthasstillappliedmeasuresaimedatamelioratingthesocialcon-sequences of the reforms, for example, temporarydiscounts onrailwayservicesandelectricityfortheprivatesector,three-yearmemoranda guaranteeing the purchase of products from state-ownedplantsorpricecontrolsonsociallysensitivegoodsoutoffear of people’s reaction to the deterioration of their financialsituation79 (in2016-2017). If thesearetemporarymeasures, theywillrelievethesocialconsequencesofasuddenliberalisationandopeningupoftheeconomy(sincetheaccessiontotheWTO,seebelow)andwillprovidetangiblesupporttofirmsinKazakhstan.However,ifsuchmeasuresareusedinthelongterm,theywillbeproofofthegovernment’sinabilitytocontinuereforms.Further-more,thegovernment’smoves,suchastheannouncedprivatisa-tion, aremedium-termandwill be implemented in the comingtwoyears, and their effects (or the lack thereof)will bevisibleonlyinthelongterm.Businessandpoliticalgroupswillmostlike-lyopposetheimplementationofthereformsatfullswingduetoadesiretomaintaintheireconomicandpolitical influence,andthepublicwouldrejectthemduetoanunwillingnesstoincurthecostsofthechangesandbecausetheywouldviewthempartofthereformsassociallyunjust80.
4. Institutionalisation of co-operation with the West as a response to Russian and Chinese pressure
Institutionalisationofco-operationwiththeWestisKazakhstan’sresponsetothechallengesontheinternationalarenaandthein-creasingpressurefromRussiaandalsoChina.FromKazakhstan’s
79 Ontheotherhand,itcanbeseenthattheSovietsystemofsubsidisingso-ciallysensitiveservicesisbeingrelinquished,examplesofwhichinclude:liftingthewidelyusedbreadproductionsubsidies(since2016)anddiscon-tinuingtheregulationofpricesonthemunicipalservicesmarket(startingfrom2017).Thisshowsthegovernment’sinconsistencyincarryingouttheguidelinesofthereformsoutoffearofreactionsfromtheKazakhpublic.
80 Aforetasteofthistendencywasthetradeunions’resistancetoamendingthelabourcodeexpressedinanopenletter(summer2015).
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pointofview,itisessentialtomaintainitspresentmultidimen-sionalforeignpolicyundergrowingpressurefromRussia(withwhomKazakhstanhasthestrongestandclosestpossiblebonds),aboveallintheareaofsecurity.Therefore,Astana’sgoalis,ontheonehand, toavoidconflictwithRussiaasregardsglobal issues,whichare essential forMoscow’s reputation81, andon theotherhandtorobustlyprotectitspoliticalinterests,whicharehowevercalled‘economic’(attheEurasianEconomicUnion’sforum)andtocontinueitsnarrativeofthestrategicnatureofmutualrelations82.
WhileAstanawants to dilute Russia’s influence in its domesticpolicybyplacingemphasisonKazakhstan’shistory,symbolsandthenation-buildingroleofthestate,itattemptstomaintainau-tonomyinforeignpolicyinrelationswithothercountries,eventhosewhich Russia is at conflictwith. Thismakes KazakhstanfeartheneedtotakeRussia’ssideintheconstantlyarisingdisput-ableissues,suchasRussia’sannexationofCrimeaortheRussian-TurkishconflictcausedbyTurkish forcesshootingdownaRus-sianbomberaircraft.
Kazakhstan’s traditional way to balance Russia’s influence hasbeentoopenuptotheotherlargeplayerpresentintheregion—China. Economic co-operation with China, Russia’s important
81 Cf.theunclear,albeitreceivedaspro-Russian,stanceadoptedbyKazakh-stan’sMinistryofForeignAffairsonthereferenduminCrimeaorafterTur-keyshotdowntheRussianbomberaircraftandNazarbayev’scommentsonthisinhisaddresstothenationon30November2015(onlyintheTVversion,theprintedversionoftheaddressdoesnotcontainthesecomments).
82 However,NazarbayevhasalsoresortedtostatementsthatKazakhstanmightleavetheEurasianEconomicUnionifthisorganisationputsitssovereigntyatrisk.Heusuallydoessoinhisspeechesfordomesticuse,addressedtotheKazakhpartofsociety(cf.thecommentsonhisdual-tracknarrative).Forexample,inAugust2014suchwordswereusedinaninterviewforKhabartelevisionintheKazakhlanguagewhichlastedaroundonehour.TheywerewidelypublicisedbytheUkrainianandRussianmedia,whichpresentedthemasaresponsetoPutin’swidelyknownstatementquestioningKazakh-stan’sstatehoodduringtheSeligerforum.However,inreality,theinterviewwaspublishedseveraldaysearlieranddidnotmeetwithmassiveattentionfromtheforeignmedia.
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economic partner, is intended tomitigateMoscow’s aspirationsin Central Asia but also to boost the country’s economic devel-opment.Ineffectoftheseassumptions,KazakhstanparticipatesbothintheEurasianEconomicUnionandinChina’sproject,theNewSilkRoadEconomicBelt–thetwoarecompetitiveprojectswhichRussiaandChinaintendtouseinordertobuildtheirowninfluenceintheregion.
Atfirst,participationintheseprojectswasviewedasawaytobal-ancetheinfluenceofRussiaandChina.Now,though,itappearsthattheintensificationandinstitutionalisationofrelations(withRussiaaspartoftheEurasianEconomicUnion)andthesenseofthreatfromMoscowhaveconvincedKazakhstantoacceleratetheinstitutionalisationandenhancementofco-operationwithotheractors.SignsofthispolicyincludetheaccessiontotheWTO(De-cember2015)orsigningtheenhancedPartnershipandCo-opera-tionAgreement(enhancedPCA)withtheEU(21December2015).
Theseagreementsformaliseco-operationwiththeWestandareintendedtohelpAstanaavoiditsforeignpolicybeinglimitedtoco-operationwithRussiaandChina(asisthecasewithitsneigh-bour,Mongolia).Strategically,theyareaimedatmaintainingtheopportunitytomodernisethestateinco-operationwiththeWestin the broader meaning of the term. Signing the co-operationagreementwiththeOECDinJanuary2015andtheambitiousgoalto join the world’s 30 best-developed nations were intended toservethesamegoal83.
Given the principle of avoiding provokingRussia, Kazakhstan’sforeign policy is focused on keeping losses to a minimum and
83 Theeffectsofco-operationwiththeOECDincludetheorganisationconduct-ingakindofauditofKazakhstan(Multi-dimensionalReviewofKazakhstan)anddevelopingcomprehensiverecommendationsconcerningthecountry’sdevelopment.ThefirstintheseriesofthreeOECDreportsonthiswaspub-lishedinJanuary2016.Itisavailablehere:http://www.oecd.org/dev/multi-dimensional-review-of-kazakhstan-9789264246768-en.htm
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maintaining its autonomous position where possible. For thisreasonitsadjustmentisbarelyvisibleatfirstsight–Kazakhstanitself has defined Russia as its strategic partner since the verybeginning of its independence.However, since the internation-al context aroundKazakhstanhas changed, the government inAstanahastocopewiththechallengeofcontinuingitspreviousmultidimensional foreign policy. Given the present geopoliticalconditions, the institutionalisation of its linkswith theWest isbothdangerousandnecessary.WhiletheWestisatconflictwithRussiaoverUkraine,Kazakhstan’slinkswiththeWestwillslowdowntheprocessofitenteringfurtherintoRussia’sshadowattheexpenseofitsownsovereignty.
ThecontinuationofthisstrategymaybeimpededbyincreasingpressurefromRussia,especiallyduringtheprocessofthesucces-siontoNazarbayev.Hispotentialsuccessorwilltakeoverthepre-sentpresidentialprerogativesandwillhave tobe supportedbyMoscow–ifonlytoavoidtheriskofthedestabilisationofthesitu-ationinsideKazakhstanbyRussia.FromMoscow’spointofview,themostconvenientscenariowouldbetomaintaintheexistingpolitical system in Kazakhstan, where Nazarbayev’s successorwillbeobjectivelyweakerthanthepresentpresident,lackinghisesteem,andwouldbeforcedtorelyonMoscowtomaintainacon-solidatedstateandtoavoidinternalchaos(forexample,ethnicri-ots).ThismeansthatRussiacouldtakeadvantageofNazarbayev’sdeparturetoregainitscustodyofKazakhstan.
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iii. conclusions and possible developMents
Kazakhstan isanexceptional caseamong thepost-Soviet coun-tries. Although it is an authoritarian state, it has been able todiagnose a systemic crisis and reach out to modern and riskymethods for overcoming it. This approach makes KazakhstanandNazarbayevhimselfdistinctfromtheothercountriesintheregionandtheir leaders.Atpresent,Kazakhstanisoneofthosefewpost-Sovietcountrieswhicharemakingconsistenteffortstomodernisethestate,andwhichviewmodernisationasthesolu-tion to its problems, rather than tightening the authoritariangrip.Paradoxically,thechangeshavebeenintroducedbywayofsoftauthoritarianmethods,whiletheirpossibleimplementationmayinthe longer termleadto thepoliticalsystemcurrently inplacebeingdismantled.
Thescaleoftheannouncedandalreadypartlyimplementedad-justmentstoKazakhstan’spolicymeansthatitispossibletoriskthestatementthatthecountryisonitswaytoathoroughrecon-struction of the elementswhich are of key significance for thefunctioning of the state. These changes have been designed byNazarbayev,and–giventheirambitiousgoals–theyarereminis-centofperestroika initiatedbyGorbachevintheUSSR.Theyalsocarryasimilarrisk.Kazakhstan isabletosearchforandreachout tonewmodels ofdevelopmentwhichdonot carry thebur-denof theSoviet legacy, in theWesternorEasternAsian style.Itissymbolicthatthisperestroika isbeingimplementedbyNaz-arbayev,whohasruledKazakhstanfromtheSovieteraandwhowasexpectedtotakeovertheSovietleadershipfromGorbachev.Nazarbayevknowsthecostsoftheperestroika initiatedatthetwi-lightof theSovietUnionbetter thananyoneelse.By launchingasimilarprojectinKazakhstan,heisbettingeverythingononecard,probablybecausehe isconvinced that thestate in itspre-sentshapeistooweaktowithstandRussianimperialismandthecreepingChinese expansion. FromNazarbayev’s viewpoint, thepresentmodelofthestateisinadequatetoguaranteeitsfurther
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developmentandmakeKazakhstanresistanttogeopoliticalanddomesticturbulence.
Thefutureofthestatemodernisationprojectwillbeaffectedbyinternalandexternallimitations.Themainobstaclewillbereluc-tancefromthepoliticalandbusinesselitewhoareinterestedinmaintainingtheirownpositioninthegovernmentandeconomicsystem.AnotherfactorishowlongNazarbayevwillremaininof-fice.Hispresenceinthesystemhelpstheimplementationofthechangesandreducestheriskofdomestictensionandpublicpro-tests.Ontheotherhand,theauthoritariansystembasedonhimwilllimittheeffectsofthechangesorwillbeadjusteditselfasare-sultofthechanges.Nazarbayev’sdeparturewillcertainlybringashocktoKazakhstan,butitwillalsobeatesttothegovernmentelite:towhatextentwillitbeabletocontinuethepresentlineofthecountry’sdevelopmentanditsforeignpolicy?Finally,reformswillbeobstructedbythelimitedabilityofthepublictotakepartin the modernisation processes while their financial conditionworsens,aswellasbythedividesexistinginsociety.
Asregards the internationalcontext,Russia’spolicywillbe themost important factor for Kazakhstan’s further development.Over the past few years this has become increasingly aggres-sive and unpredictable. Theway theKremlin sets its prioritiesaspartof itsreconquista of ‘Russian land’willdecideon the fu-tureofKazakhstan.TheriskofinterventionfromRussia(atthepoliticallevelorthroughprovocationsinsideKazakhstan)isin-creasing during the succession process. It cannot be ruled outthatNazarbayev’sdoublegameisviewedbyMoscow(andPutinhimself)asanobstacletodrawingKazakhstanclosertoRussia.Thismeans thathisdeparture from the systemwillbeusedasanopportunitytobringAstanaclosertoMoscow.EspeciallysinceKazakhstan’spotentialsuccesswouldbedangerousforRussia–itwouldshowthatacountrycanbereformedanddoesnothavetobeclearlypro-Western(andanti-Russian),unlikeGeorgiaunderMikheilSaakashvili’srule.
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Perestroika inKazakhstan is a risky solution. If someof thean-nounced changes are introduced, the existing mechanisms ofthe state’s operationmay collapse and cause internal chaos.Onthe other hand, strengthening the authoritarian regimewouldleadtoKazakhstanbeingmoreandmorestronglyovershadowedbyRussia’spoliticalandsocialinfluence,ashasbeenhappeningover the past fewyears inAzerbaijan. The authoritarianism inNazarbayev’s‘khan-like’versionalsoposestheriskofshockanddestabilisationofthestateafterherelinquishespower.
Ifthereformprocessisderailed(includingduetomovesmadebyRussia)andamultidimensionalcrisiscomes,theinternalchaoswillbringabouttheriskofdegenerationofthepoliticalandre-gionalelitesandadisintegrationofthestateinstitutionsand,asa consequence,Kazakhstan’swouldbe sucked intoRussia.ThiswillhelpRussiaregainitsinfluenceacrossCentralAsia.Thissce-nariocarriesanincreasedriskofsocio-politicalturbulence,espe-ciallyduringtheprocessofsuccessiontoNazarbayev.Thisputsatstakethefunctioningofthestatebecause,asshownbyUkraine’sexample,thereisagreatnumberofscenarios(andgreatpoten-tialforcreatingthem)inwhichRussiacanutilisechaosinastatetorebuilditsownposition.Nevertheless,theincreasinglystrongnationalist tendencies and themyth of Kazakhstan created byNazarbayevwillimpedetheprocessofdigestingKazakhstanandthereconquista ofCentralAsia.
aleksandra Jarosiewicz