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The Peronist Left, 1955-1975Author(s): Daniel JamesSource: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Nov., 1976), pp. 273-296Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/156528

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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 8, 2, 273-296 Printed in Great Britain 273

The Peronist Left, 1955-I975by DANIEL JAMES*

The ' PeronistLeft' has becomeone of the chief actors n the oftenviolentdramaof Argentinepolitics oday.It is the objectof this article o placetheeventsof themorerecentpast,at leastsince thereturnof Peronism o powerin 1973,within the frameworkof the development f the 'PeronistLeft'sincethe fall of Peron n I955.Obviously he articlemakesno claimto be acomprehensivereatment f the subject.Such a treatment ouldonlybe partof a much more extensivestudy of the Argentineworkingclass and thePeronistmovement.In particular,he articleconcentratesn an analysisofthe political ideology of the different currents that have made up the' PeronistLeft' sincei955,whilstrecognizinghat thisideologymustultima-telybe seen in the farwider contextof thesocialandeconomicdevelopmentof Argentinesociety.The firstpartwill highlightthe main featuresof thisLeft in the I955-73 periodand analyzethe main currentswithinit. In thesecondpart of the paperthe eventsof the last two to threeyearswill belookedatwithinthiscontext.I955-I973Severalmain featuresneedemphasizingn thisperiod f we areto arriveat a validcharacterizationf the ' PeronistLeft'. Firstly, n a veryrealsensea 'left' currentonly emergedwithin Peronismas a 'reflex' action,whentherewasa growingacceptanceyothersectorsof the movementof a modusvivendi with a system that excluded Peronism from political power andwhichcontinually ttackedhegainsof theworkingclass.A 'left' emergedwithin thiscontextas the defenderof theworkingclass,anti-capitalisttrainof Peronism,ookingbackto theeuphoria f October1945and theorganiza-tion andadvances f theworkingclass n thefirstPeronistgovernment atherthan to the Per6nof I954-5. It drew constantlyon the moralcapital,thesymbolismof the yearsof the Resistance,1ts arrests,ts martyrs,he experi-

* The authorwishes to thank the Foreign Area Fellowships Programmeand the Social ScienceResearch Council for financial assistance which made possible his research.The Resistanceis the name generally given by Peronists to the opposition to the militarygovernment that followed the overthrow of Peron in I955. The forms of resistancevaried,


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274 Daniel Jamesence of 'those who struggled'. It was when the dominant forces within thePeronist leadership,particularlythe tradeunion bureaucracy,moved towardsagreementwith the ' status quo', with governments and with employersandbetrayedwhat the Left considered to be the true essence of Peronism that astrongly definable 'left' current emerged. In 1959-6o with the growingagreement with Frondizi, and the attraction of integracionismo2 for largesectors of the movement therewas the developmentof the linea dura 3 centredon the militant trade unions who demanded absolute intransigence vis-a-visFrondizi, no participation in elections, and no compromise on the labourfront. Again in 1965-6, with the consolidation of the growing vandorista4domination of Peronism and the threat to turn Peronism into a union-basedpartywithin the traditionalsystem, the Left emerged from relative obscurityto join in a rival Peronist union organisation, the 62 Organizacionesde Piejunto a Peron 5 to oppose the domination of Vandor. In I968-9, with the

ranging from individual terrorism,through organised opposition in the unions, to attemp-ted military risings. It continued throughout the government of Frondizi, although it be-came increasinglycentred on youth and student sectors as the large union battalionsreachedagreementon a miodus vivendi with Frondizi. For those who participatedactively in theResistance- and they were mainly rank and file workers - it was a time of repression,imprisonment and torture, and throughout the following decade and even now, almost 20years after, it has continued to be a dominant referencepoint in Peronistpolitical culture.2 Integracionisnmo as the dominant concept behind the political strategy of Frondizi. It re-ferred to the hope of integrating the Peronist working class, mainly through its tradeunions, into the social and political structureof the country through a judicious policy ofconcessions and promises. Specifically it was aimed at the union leaders who, in returnfor concessionssuch as the Law of ProfessionalAssociation, would play their part by hold-ing the workers in line and gradually, but surely, loosen the ties with Peron. It was con-sideredby some sectors of that dominantpolitical group to be a far more subtle and modernstrategy for dealing with Peronism than the outright repression of the Aramburugovernment.3 The linea dura was the name given to those unions which completely rejected Frondizi'sovertures. It was centred mainly on the Textile Workers Union, the Telephone Workers,Health Workers and RubberWorkers, and many of the union branches in the interior. Itsleading figure was the Textile Workers'leader, Andr6sFramini.4 Augusto Vandor was the leader of the MetalworkersUnion and the dominant Peronistunion figure throughout the I96os. His growing power and his contacts and negotiationswith governmentsand army were considereda real threat to Per6n's control of his move-ment. He was killed in July I969.5 The 62 Organisationswas the name given to the organisation of Peronist unions withinthe General Confederation of Labour. They were the original number of unions underPeronist control after the failed CGT congress of 1957. The number no longer bore anyrelevanceto the actual number of Peronist unions. When Peron moved against the powerof Vandor in I965, those unions loyal to him set up a rival organisation 62 de pie junto aPeron, leaving the original set-up in Vandor's hands. It was an extremely heterogeneousorganisationwith little other than loyalty to Peron and opposition to Vandor to sustain it.It took in the extremeright of Peronistunionism, led by Jose Alonso, and the old linea duraunions, as well as a sizeable middle sector, who were not preparedto appear to challengePeron. The fact that in the linea dura unions, the left re-emergedto unite with the right


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The Peronist Left, I955-I975 275capitulation of an important sector of the union leadershipinto participationwith the government of General Ongania, the Left once more came intoprominence to lead a separateunion central, the ConfederacionGeneral delTrabajo de los Agentinos, based on total opposition to the military govern-ment. It is only from this period onward that the Left managed to maintain,to varying degrees, a relatively separateexistence and importance within themovement independent of the need to react to the domination of the Right.

Secondly, if the existence of a Left as a clearly defined tendency withinPeronism depended on the development of a growing Right so it equallydepended on Per6n and his tactical manoeuvrings. The Left in this periodusually appeared in the space provided

for it by Per6n's decision to moveagainst a dominant currentthat was threateninghis control of the movement- it was traditionally Per6n's weapon against potential usurpers. It was,therefore, n general,asstrongand clearlydefinedasPer6n needed and wantedit to be, and when there was relative harmony between the leadership inArgentina and Per6n in exile the Left was marginalised as an importantand distinctive current within the movement and confined to a few smallgroupings and unions.

Thirdly, and arising from the first two points - the importantthing to noteabout the emergence of this reflex leftism is that politically it developed verylittle alternativeideology, very little separateexistence. Politically, it remainedfirmly rooted within the Per6n-anti-Per6n dichotomy that was the chiefdefining characteristicof Argentine politics in this period. This meant thatthe distinguishing characteristicof the Left, the duros, could only be definedobjectively as loyalty to Per6n and his orders. As their chief slogan said,Peron o Muerte - and this was more than a conventional emotional slogan,though it was that too. It also expressedpreciselythe effect in political termsof the continuing dichotomyPer6n-anti-Per6non the possibilitiesfor develop-ing coherent, independent left-wing politics within Peronism.To explain the point better, the following factorsshould be noted. In theeighteen years from I955 to 1973,Argentina experiencedmilitary rule, i955-8, indirect military rule, 1962-3, and direct intervention again, I966-73;military interventions in the first period to overthrow Per6n and to preparethe way for an acceptablenon-Peronist government and in the second twocases interventionspreciselyto prevent the possibilityof a return of Peronismto power. All this was against the background of fairly consistent proscrip-

purely and simply on the basis of loyalty to Per6n emphasizes my description of them asan essentially ' reflex ' tendency. The 62 Organisacionesde pie disappearedafter the mili-tary coup of June 1966 and after Peron's quarrel with Vandor had been patched up. Theright under Alonso were to be leading figures in the collaborationistwing of Peronistunionsunderthe governmentof Ongania.


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276 Daniel Jamestion and repressionof Peronist militants. Peronism, then, was truly the hechomaldito of the Argentine ruling class. The resistance and repression thatfollowed I955 and continued until 1962 thus pre-empted,at least for the vastmajorityof the ' Peronist Left', the need to develop anything like a critique,an analysis of what Peronism had been, what it was, what forces there werewithin it - in a word the development of anything like a distinctively leftistPeronist ideology. Peronism, within the Per6n-anti-Per6n dichotomy thatdominated the political and social context, was per se leftist, anti-establish-ment, and revolutionary, and loyalty to the exiled and vilified leader wasenough of a definition of a political strategy. This continued to be the caseafter 1962 and in many ways the military government after 1966 reinforcedthis feature: hence, the consistencyof the terminologyin which the PeronistLeft defined its enemies, defined its own distinctiveness since I955 - itspolitical vocabularywas essentially a moral one. The Right were those who'betrayed' the hard struggle against anti-Peronistgovernments, those whowere corrupted and betrayed the essence of Peronism - ultimately in factthose who betrayedPer6n. Concepts like leales, traidores,duros, fe, lealtadhave been the traditionalstuff of the terminology of the ' Peronist Left'.

Fourthly, it needs to be pointed out that the picture presented up to thispoint is inevitably one-sided. Dario Cant6n has described the left wing ofthe Radical Party as left only in so far as it opposed the right and that it wasmore properly the centre.6The same is not true of Peronism for what alsoneeds to be emphasized is the ambiguity of the development of the PeronistLeft. It was not simply a tool of Peron, nor merely a 'reflex' reactionto theRight. Programmatically left wing Peronism enunciated a series of pro-grammes of a radical anti-imperialist nature. The first of these, the Pro-gramme of Huerta Grande put forward by the 62 Organisationsin 1962, setout a list of ten demands calling for such things as the nationalization of thebanks, state control of foreign commerce, protectivetariffs, expropriationoflarge landowners without compensationand the nationalization of key areasof the economy. In addition state planning of production through the fixingof production priorities was demanded.7 Subsequent programmes such asthe Declaration of Tucuman, 19668 and that issued by the CGT de losArgentinos in I968 differed little in content. In the last years of the military

6 Dario Canton, Elecciones y partidos politicos en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, Siglo Veintiuno,I973), P- 237.

7 For a full statement of the programmeof Huerto Grande and for much else of interest onleft Peronism see 'Peronism: El Exilio (1955-1973)', Cuadernos de Marcha, No. 71,Montevideo, I973.8 The Declarationof Tucuman was drawn up by the founding conferenceof the 62 Organi-zaciones de pie junto a Peron. For text see Cuadernosde Marcha, op. cit.


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The Peronist Left, I955-I975 277government the Left started to define such programmes as being blueprintsforSocialismo Nacional.9

Nevertheless, these radicalnationalistprogrammesput forwardas a responseto the attacks on working class conditions, as a response to economic crisisand as a general responseto military government repressionof Peronist mili-tants, contained virtually no concretepolitical strategyof any sort that woulddistinguish them from other sectorsof Peronism. In fact, the Programme ofHuerta Grande contained no specifically political demands. In general, thepolitical demands of other programmesof the Peronist Left were limited tovague calls for respectof the popular will in free elections and the return ofPer6n. Yet this was logical since if Peronism was per se revolutionaryandits leader was the quintessential expression of this revolution, then all thatwas needed was his return to power for the programmes put forward to beimplemented.A survey of the main divisions within the PeronistLeft up to I973 will givea better idea of the ambiguity mentioned above and give a more genuinepicture of the processinvolved. There have been essentially three main divi-sions, (i) the Combative Unions, (ii) RevolutionaryPeronism; (iii) the Youthsection of the movement and the guerrilla groups.(i) The Combative UnionsIn many ways this is the most traditional 'left' current within Peronismwith its roots in the linea dura unions of the Frondizi period. It had been themajority section of the union sector (and by extension of the movement ingeneral) during the Resistanceperiod and for most of the Frondizi govern-ment. In response to the political proscription of Peronism and attacks ontrade union organization and workers' living standards, the need for adetailed strategy and political programme was hardly felt. The return ofPeron, the regaining of the unions for Peronism through free elections werethe essential aims to be achieved through the maintenance of what theyvaguely called intransigenciain the labour and political arenas.It was not until 1962and the Programme of Huerta Grande that anything9 The literal translationis, of course, national socialism, but it would give totally the wrongimpression to the English speaking reader with its explicit Nazi connotations. Socialismonacional represents for the Peronist left an adaptation of the international principles ofsocialism to the national peculiaritiesof Argentina. It has an evident connectionwith Peron'sconcept of the Third Position between U.S. capitalism and Soviet Communism, althoughmost of the Peronist left, apart from the most traditionalsectors, criticize this concept andsimply regard their socialismas an independent Argentine applicationof traditionalsocialist

principles. The national emphasis also stems from their conception of the first stage of thetransformationprocessof Argentine society being the anti-imperialist,national liberation ofthe country, which will lay the basis for a future socialism.L.A.S.-7


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278 Daniel Jameslike a detailed set of demands was systematized. With its leading figuresformed in the Resistance and its chief hall-markbeing oppositionto the unionbureaucracyand unquestioning loyalty to Peron, this sector most closelyapproximatesto the 'reflex' leftism described above. With the eclipse of theResistancein the early i96os, the strength of this tendency came to lie essen-tially in a few small unions such as the Telephone Workers, the Naval Con-struction Union and the Printworkers. In addition, from the late I96os,combativos10came to dominate many of the union branches in the interiorof the country and to control the majorityof regional CGTs. It was they whoformed the basis for Peron's challenge to Vandor in i965-6 and formed therival 62 Organizacionesde Pie junto a Peron, they again who responded toPer6n's move against the participationists n 1968and went into the CGT delos Argentinos and who followed Peron's instructionsto retirefrom that bodyin 1969 and unify the movement.ll When the CGT was handed back to analliance of Vandor'sheirs and participationistsn 1970, the CombativeUnionsrespected Per6n's plea to stay within such a body and later to give theirbacking to the electoral frontformedin 1972.Since they were the sector who had most clearly stuck to loyalty andobedience to Per6n as their defining characteristicand who most clearlyequated the return of Per6n with the solution to the economic and socialproblemsof the working class, they had the least problemsin adapting to thesuccessive changes of direction forced on them by Per6n's decision to acceptthe electoralopening offeredby President Lanussein 1972.

Despite the fact that they, like other sectors of the Left, had originallydenounced the Gran Acuerdo,Nacional 12 of Lanusse as 'just anothertrick ',by late I97I Julio Guillan, the leaderof the Telephone Workers, was justify-ing participationby combativos in the electoral front by saying 'Per6n has10 Combativos was the name given to those unions who consistently opposed the mili-tary governmentsbetween I966 and I973.11 Evidently the problem of specifying why certain Peronist unions adopted 'combative'stances and why others opted for compromiseand greatermoderation becomesrelevanthere.To deal with the question adequatelywould be far beyond the scope of this paper. Sufficeit to say that there is no simple correlationbetween, for example, the economic fortunes ofan economic sector a particularunion operated in and the political attitudes which thatunion adopted. Thus, to take one example, the attempt to explain the moderate, concilia-tionist attitudeadopted by some Peronist unions by their position in the most advanced, high

salaryareasof industry- a type of ' aristocracyof labour' theory in fact - is not bolrneoutby empirical investigation. Conversely,there were many unions representingthe more crisis-ridden sections of the Argentine economy that were not to be found amongst the Peronistleft. Factors such as the ideology of particularunion leaders have to be taken into accountThis questionwill be the subjectof a future article.12 The Gran Acuerdo Nacional was the name given to the rapprochementbetween the politicalparties, including Peronism, and the armed forces which formed the basis of the processleading to free electionsin I973.


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The Peronist Left, I955-1975 279convoked this National Liberation Front in which we the Peronist workershave to fight for the triumph of the ideas of socialismo nacional '.1

In other words, they were now seeing the electoral front as a balance offorces where the Left had to fight for their position - which, of course, wasassumed to be Peron's too. A variantof this rationale was to be found in thestatement of Peronismo Combativo in March 1972 on the occasion of theofficial formation of the JusticialistLiberation Front (FREJULI). They wereentering the Front, they said: 'to put those who are disloyal, as Per6n says,in a position where it is no longer convenient for them to be disloyal so thatthe unity, solidarity and organization ordered by our leader can fulfil theirtacticalpurposeof gaining power '.4After this limited objectivehad been achieved, unity with the Right, thetrade union bureaucracy, would be discarded and the path of socialismonacional embarked on. The implementation of the programe of socialismonacional was premised entirely on 'the fundamental condition which cannotbe renounced: the return of JuanDomingo Peron .15Revolutionary PeronismThis tendency largely took its inspiration from John William Cooke whohad been Per6n's chief representative n Argentina in the 1955-9 period. Itdrew its chief support from many who, like Cooke, had lived through theexperience of the Resistance, the failure of the linea dura opposition toFrondizi and the gradual demise of the movement into conciliation with thestatus quo on the union and political plane. Out of this they began to reassessthe nature of Peronism, to analyze the contradictions within it and to lookfor the reasons for the dead end arrived at after so much heroism.

Cooke in his letters to Peron very clearly denounced what he called thefetishism of el lider 16 -- the substituting of hard concrete analysis by what hecalled ' tribal fanaticisms '.1 In one of his lettershe said:Insteadof concretepositions n the face of an equallyconcreterealitywe aregivengeneral ormulas we all want to be free,sovereignandthatthereshouldbe social13 Interviewin Panorama,28 MarchI972.14 Quotedin AvanzadaSocialista,I March1972.15 El programade los gremios combativos,Jan. 1972. See El Combativo, No. I, Nov. I972.16 Peron-Cooke Correspondencia, n (Buenos Aires, June 1973), I89. Cooke himself had beenP6ron's chief personalrepresentativen Argentinafrom 1956 until I959, after which he livedin exile from Argentina, spending much of the early i96os in Cuba, where he fought in theCuban militia at the Bay of Pigs. He returned to Argentina in the mid-I96os and died in

I968. His correspondencewith Peron is an invaluable source for any study of post-I955Peronism, though it also accuratelycharts the growing isolation of the extreme left of themovement from the early I96os onwards. Per6n's letters becomeincreasingly ess informativeas Cooke moves furtherto the left.17 Ibid., p. I89.


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280 Daniel Jamesjustice but this is pure rhetoric if it is not translated nto concretestrategicproposals.18Cooke, too, was one of the first to attempt a real analysis of the political-union bureaucracy that dominated Peronism - to move away from themoralism of traidoresand leales and to recognisethat the roots of the bureau-cracy lay in the very nature of Peronism as a polyclass alliance and that itneeded to be fought politically and ideologically. This could only be done,he maintained, not by a retreatinto a reassertion of the traditionalvalues ofPeronism, nor into the rhetoricof loyalty, but by actually changing a hetero-geneous movement into a revolutionaryparty. Cooke thus very directly con-fronted the problem of the seizure of political power. In an article written inI966, he developed this point:While Peronismdoes not structure tself on the linesof a politicalparty i.e. witha revolutionary oliticsunderstood s theunityof theory,actionandorganisationalmethod- it will continuebeing subjectto spontaneism, o the juxtapositionoftactics hat are not integratednto a strategy,nto dead-ends hatsuccessive ureau-crats lead it into; leaderswho can conceiveof no other solution save electoralfrontsor armycoups.Yet bothgolpismoandelectoral rontsimplyrenouncing heseizureof power.1'Thus the problem of the bureaucracywas a political one, not a moral one.Cooke defined the task of RevolutionaryPeronism as the creation of a van-guard that sought to reconcile the politics of Peronism with the role thatobjectively the confrontation of social forces in the everyday life of workersgave to it. As he expressed t: ' Peronism, as a mass movement, is and alwayshas been superiorto Peronism as a structurefor these masses; for this reasonspontaneismhas always dominated the planned action of the masses .0 Andthis was the core of Cooke's analysis.Peronism for him was by its very socialcomposition revolutionaryin essence - it was the expression of the integralcrisis of the Argentine bourgeois regime. As such, any meaningful institu-tionalizationof a democraticbourgeoisregime was ruled out - since Peronismwould win elections and gain power and this by the very nature of Peronismwould not be tolerablefor the ruling class.Proscription,the antinomy Peron-anti-Per6n were manifestations of the 'irreducible incompatibility betweenthe regime and Peronism '.2 Given the impossibilityof any peacefulaccessionto power of Peronism, Cooke's concretestrategyfor the seizure of power by a18 Ibid., p. I90.19 See Cristianismo y Revolucion (Buenos Aires, Nos. 2-3, Oct.-Nov. I966), pp. 14-15. Also tobe found in Cuadernosde Marcha,loc. cit., pp. I8-20.20 See letter of Cooke's A los companerosrevolucionariosde la carne, Agrupacion 'Blanca y

Negra ' de Rosario (I965), in mimeo. Pamphlet in the author's files.21 Cristianismoy Revolucion,loc. cit., p. I5.


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The Peronist Left, 1955-1975 28IPeronism constructed as a revolutionary party was guerrilla warfare -focismo.22

Revolutionary Peronism remained throughout the g960s onfined to smallmarginalised groups such as the Revolutionary Peronist Youth led byGustavoRearte,the RevolutionaryPeronistMovement, and the RevolutionaryPeronist Action group of Cooke himself. After the Cordobazo 23 of I969 andthe radicalisation process of the early I970S, more opportunities presentedthemselves for Revolutionary Peronism to insert itself into the rank and fileof the Peronist movement, and groups like Peronismo de Base, formed in thepost-Cordobazo period, gained a not inconsiderable influence, particularly inthe interior. The differences between them and the Combative Unions wereclearly evidenced in this period - especially in I97I when, at the Plenario ofCombative Unions and Groups held in Cordoba, Peronismo de Base sidedwith the clasista 24 groups in calling for the enunciation of a revolutionarypolitical programme and the formation of a revolutionary party. The Comba-tive Unions maintained that the Peronist movement as it existed was suffi-cient, its ideology revolutionary, and that what was mainly needed was thereturn of Per6n.

For a long time Revolutionary Peronism refused to admit the possibility ofa genuine electoral opening for the movement. One of their leaders explainedtheir point of view:the climax is therefore approaching where all known variants, including elections,have been tried . . the regime cannot allow an electoral solution because one oftwo things will happen - either Peronism will win with a huge majority or theywill have to resort to proscription which will make a farce of the elections.2522 The influence of Cooke's Cuban experiences s evident here. After an initial hostility to theCuban Revolution, due mainly to their identification of it with the anti-Peronist left in

Argentina, and also to the lack of. definition of the Cubans themselves in the early years,the Peronist left was to become increasinglyinfluencedby the Cuban experience- thanks inno small measure to Cooke himself. Indeed, it was under Cooke's overall guidance that thesetting up of the first Peronist joco was attemptedin I960 - the Uturuncu guerrilla in thefar north of the country. See Peron-Cooke Correspondencia,II, 372-3. It would appearthat contact between Cuba and the extremeleft of Peronismcontinued throughoutthe I96osand that the Cubans provided training for some of the guerrilla groups that sprang up inthe early I970s.

23 The Cordobazorefers to the general strike and near insurrectionin the city of C6rdobainI969. It marked a decisive turning point for the military government and the beginning ofthe returnto traditionalpolitics.24 The clasista groups were those non-Peronist Marxist groups that appearedin the wake ofthe Cordobazo,rejectingwhat they consideredthe bourgeoisnationalistemphasis of Peronismand emphasisingthe primacyof the class struggle in the factories. Their strongestbase wasin the SITRAM-SITRACUnions in the Fiat plants in C6rdoba.25 Interview with RaimundoOngaro, Extra, Feb. 1970, No. 55. Ongaro was the leader of theBuenos Aires printworkersand head of the CGT de los Argentinos. Although not strictlywithin the RevolutionaryPeronist current, he was far closer to them than to tiheconbati-


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282 Daniel JamesPeronism by its social composition was revolutionary, inassimilable withinthe traditional system as Cooke had said. Therefore, the ultimate politicalsolution could only be an armed one - for this, RevolutionaryPeronism con-sidered it essential to prepare. The basis for the revolutionary party whichwould lead this armed struggle had to be prepared n the basesof the unions,in the working class neighbourhoods,and in the shanty towns. The structurefor the armed partyhad to be formed in this way - attemptsto take over thestructure of Peronism institutionally were useless since in the coming civilwar such a structurewould be irrelevant.The Peronist Youth and Guerrilla Groups

With the radicalization of large sections of middle class youth during themilitary government and in particularafter I969, there was a rapid influx ofnew recruits into the different youth and student organizations of Peronism.In fact, many were created for the first time during this period. The youthsector of Peronism had always been very weakly organized and, until thevariousfactions that had sprung up in the early 70s united into one body, theJuventud Peronista, in I972, there was really little co-ordination betweenthem. At about the same time the Juventud Universitaria Peronist wascreated. The largest group prior to 1972- based almost entirely on the uni-versities- was the Juventud Argentina por la Emancipacion Nacional. Theleader of JAEN, Rodolfo Galimberti, was to become the leader of the unitedJP in 1972, the feted guest of Per6n in Madridand the bete noire of the anti-Peronist forces in the lead-up to the elections of March 1973. It was, in fact,the JPwho created most of the mobilisationin the Peronistelection campaign.

Parallel with this development there was the growth of a number ofguerrilla groups. Such groups were not new to Peronism: during the earlyi96os several bands had tried to secure a base in the far north of the country.With the general radicalisationprocessof the late I96os,a whole new impetuswas given to the formation of such groups. A number were formed andoperatedto varying degrees of effectiveness- the Fuerzas Armadas Revolu-cionarias, Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas, and the Montoneros.2 The most

vos as witness his continuedmobilizationof his union on wage issuesduring tIe governmentsof both General Peron and his widow. He was, until very recently, in prison for preciselythis. Certainlythe view expressedin this interview was that of RevolutionaryPeronism.25 One should distinguish between the groups in that they came from different backgrounds.The FAR were mainly composed originally of independent marxists who had split fromvarious traditional left parties in the early, mid-9I60s and moved towards Peronism. TheFAP were very closely tied to RevolutionaryPeronism and can basicallybe consideredas thearmed expressionof Peronismo de Base. The Montoneros came largely from a third worldCatholicbackground- some even from the far right of catholic nationalism. The FAR andMontonerosunited in one organizationafterMarch 1973.


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The Peronist Left, 1955-1975 283importantof these groups in terms of size and influence was the Montoneros,and for our purposeshere we will concentrateon them.

To all intents and purposes, the political thought of the Montoneroscoincided with that of the Juventud Peronista. They had their origins in thesame processand their members had similar backgrounds. Many had enteredthe ambit of Peronism through the student struggles centred around theCGT de los Argentinos against the repression and crudity of the militarygovernment of Ongania. The point emphasized previously about the anti-Peronist left is most clearlyevidencedby analysingthe JP and the Montonerosdevelopment of an independent, coherent left wing politics within thePeronist left is most clearlyevidencedby analyzing the JP and the Montonerosin the pre-I973 stage. Having no previousexperienceor historyin the Peronistmovement, they had an idealised vision of the Peronistpast, of the movementand, of course,of Per6n himself.

They were ignorant of the experience of many of those who had beenthrough the Resistanceand had attemptedto draw lessons from it. Althoughthey claimed Cooke as one of their heroes in a pantheon of figures stretchingfrom Guevara and Mao to Per6n and Nasser, they in fact ignored the reallysignificant aspects of his thought and took merely his tactical conclusions astheir guidelines - his focismo. As one of their number has since written:'the reality of a dictatorshipagainst which a responsewas desperatelysoughtfacilitated the development of focista conceptions .7 And, one may add, italso prevented the development of a really coherent analysis of Peronism.Three featuresof the ideology of theJP and 'theMontonerosneed emphasis:(i) Ignoring Cooke's insistence on a political/ideological understanding ofthe union bureaucracy,they revertedto the moralizing level of traidores andlealtad. From this they developed a crucial underestimation of the natureand strength of the trade union bureaucracy.While Cooke had maintainedthat the fight against the right wing of the movement and particularlytheunion leadership was basically a class struggle reflecting the polyclass originof Peronism, the JP and the Montoneros tended to translate this into agenerational conflict. The bureaucracy represented for them a previousgeneration that through personal corruption had betrayed the ideals ofPeronism; it could either be eliminated physically through assassination ormore generally it would be surpassed by what Per6n called trasvasamientogeneracional.28Taking Per6n's assurancesthat the youth would inherit themovement at face value, they assumed in this period that the bureaucracywould either wither away or would be discardedby Per6n once it had served27 En lucha, Organodel Movimiento Revolucionario17 de Octubre,No. 13, Dec. 1973.28 Literally meaning generational transference/transfusion,the concept implied the injectionof new blood into the movement which would mature into the future leadership.


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284 Daniel Jamesits tactical use to him. (ii) The emphasis of RevolutionaryPeronism on theneed to give Peronism a revolutionary party structure was totally missing.In its stead was substituted an idealised Peronist movement virtually as itexisted already- only minus the superfluousstrataof bureaucrats.The vitalrelationshipLeader-Masses would find its political expressionin themselves,the Montoneros and IP. This not only involved the assumption that theirpolitical and social goals were those of Peron; it also on the practical levelinvolved the ignoring of the Peronist working class. Whereas for all theirtactical focismo, Cooke and Peronismo Revolucionario had firmly rootedtheir idea of armed struggle in the need to organize in the working class, tocreatethe structure of the armed party through the everydaystruggles of theworkers, for the Montoneros and the JP the working class remained arhetoricalexpression. Once the bureaucraticcastewas discarded,the existingstructureand ideology of the Peronist movement and working classwould bequite sufficient to re-establishthe necessary link between the revolutionaryleader and the masses and thus form the basis for the seizure of powerthrough 'Revolutionary Warfare'. Thus it was not until April 1973, afterthe election victory, that they considered it necessaryto set up a distinctiveworking class organization to compete inside the unions with the unionleaderships.The organization created was the Juventud TrabajadoraPeron-ista. (iii) They assumed an identity between their objectives and those ofPer6n. Starting, as they did, from the a priori assumption that the workingclass was the dominant force within Peronism, that, therefore,it was intrinsi-cally revolutionary,it was logical that Per6n as the sole leader and head ofthat movement should be considered the sole and authentic leader of therevolution. Per6n himself encouraged this and it must again be stressedthatin the situation of militarydictatorship t hardlyseemed necessaryto challengethe assumption. Nor indeed should one underestimate the degree to whichthe JP and Montonerosprovided a mobilising force that badly frightened themilitary and the traditional anti-Peronist forces. Programmatically, theychampioned a radical nationalism that they defined as socialism - practicallythey developed a high level of efficiency in guerrilla actions and a highcapacityfor mass mobilizations. Indeed, the situation since I973is inexplicableif one does not take into account the depth of the convictions held by the JPand Montoneros, the radicalnature of those convictionsand the fact that theyfound a certain echo in the population. The point that needs to be madehowever - perhapsto labour the point - is that with the institutional break-down of the Argentine traditional democratic system, with the seeminglyinevitable incompatibilitybetween Peronism and the status quo, the constantmilitary repressionand the constant militant response, anything seemed pos-


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The Peronist Left, I955-1975 285sible. The need was for action, resistance,militancy against the all too obviousenemy. The need for detailed analysisor questioned assumptionswas hardlyfelt; the contradictions, the mystifications of their ideology were certainlyneither very noticeablenor crucial, though they were certainlythere.The Montoneros and JP, for example, like other left tendencies, dismissedthe possibility of Peronism taking part in elections. Popular RevolutionaryWarfare with themselves as the vanguard was their chosen strategy. Theyassumed that at the most the electoral front was a tactical manoeuvre ofPer6n's.29Per6n, while never contradicting this outright, had at least im-plicitly modified it by his concept of the Montonerosas a ' special formation'within Peronism. But this was only implicit and certainlyPer6n's own wordsand the situation in Argentina together with the pride of place given to theJP in the organization of the election campaign of Campora30 did not givecause for them to question the ultimate goal of Peronism and of Peron - thecreationof a socialistArgentina.I973-I975

The developments of two and a half years since the election of HectorCampora as President represent, taken as a whole, a series of cumulativeblows for the ' Peronist Left'; the shattering of illusions, the running upagainst contradictions inherent in their development and ideology. Beforegoing on to chart the reaction of the Left to this process, a brief chronologyof the main events on this road to disenchantmentneeds to be outlined.

(i) June I973. The massacre at Ezeiza Airport. A massive crowd, gatheredto welcome Per6n back to Argentina, was fired upon by those surroundingthe main platform where Per6n was due to speak. The event was neverclarified, but most of the evidence points to it being a warning given to!theLeft by the union bureaucracy.In his speech afterwardsPeron attacked theinfiltrados: 'We Peronists have to win back the leadership of our ownmovement.' 3(ii) July I973. Any doubts as to whom Per6n considered the infiltradoswho had taken over the movement were soon dispelled. After repeatedpress

29 See, for instance, the letters exchanged between Per6n and the montoneros after they hadkilled Aramburu in Feb. I97I, published in La Causa Peronista, No. 9, 3 Sept. I974. Inreply to their affirmationthat the electoralstruggle could be no more than a tactic to harassthe enemy, Peron stated, ' Concerningthe electoral option, I don't believe in it either '.30 Most observersof the Peronist election campaign of March i973 commented on the weightand importance of the youth sectors of the movement in mobilising support for HectorCsmpora. Both in terms of mass rallies and in terms of the general tone and emphasis ofthe campaign, they seemed to have a greaterinfluence within the movement than the unionleadership- who had in any case opposedthe original choice of Camporaas candidate.31 La Nacion, 25 June 1973.


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286 Daniel Jamesreports of his dissatisfaction with Campora for allowing his government todrift too far to the left, the formula Peron Presidente was put forward by acombination of the union bureaucracyand the party right wing.32 Later inthe same month the candidature for the vice-presidency of Per6n's wife,Maria Estella, 'Isabelita', was announced. The JP had supported Camporafor thisposition.

(iii) August 1973. Per6n began a series of lectures to union leaders in theCGT generally praising their conduct. He confirmed a series of changes inthe JusticialistParty hierarchygiving almost total control to the right wing.(iv) September 1973. Jose Rucci, head of the CGT, was killed. Almost

immediatelythe existenceof a' reserveddocument' was made known. Drawnup by the Superior Council of the JusticialistParty and approvedby Per6n,it called for 'ideological purificationagainst marxist infiltration'."(v) January 1974. Per6n summoned a meeting of all factions of the youthsector,both right and left. The JP refused to attend. At the meeting, attended

solely by the extremeright wing groups, Peron attackedthe JP.(vi) January 1974. The attack by the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo

(ERP) 34 on the army base at Azul in the province of Buenos Aires was usedas the pretext to depose the governor of the province, Oscar Bidegain, whowas consideredto be on the left of Peronism and whom the JP considered anally. Per6n in a speechimmediately afterthe attackimplied that Bidegain waspartly responsible.He was replaced by Victorio Calabr6,a leading figure inthe tradeunion bureaucracy.

(vii) March I974. Police rebelled against the left Peronist governor andvice-governor of C6rdoba, Obregon Cano and Attilio Lopez. Peron con-firmed the action and blamed the Left for troubles in the province.

(viii) May I974. At a May Day rally in the Plaza de Mayo, Per6n, angered32 Despite the Peronist left's claim that the handing over of the presidencyto Peron represen-ted the fulfilment of the natural wishes of the people and that the process was only spoiled

by the ' ambition of four madmen ' (El Descamisado, No. 9, 17 July I973), in fact, the re-placement of Camporahad all the hallmarks of a well-timed coup by the Peronist right.However, it should also be noted that despite the undoubted liberalisationin matters ofhuman rights that took place during Campora's presidency, there was nothing in his pastrecordto justify the faith placed in him by the Montonerosand JP, and the euphoria thatsurrounded his brief stay in office and his transformation n left Peronist language into elTio had a distinct air of unrealityabout it. What he did have in common with the Peronistleft was an absolutepersonal oyalty to Peron.33 For the full text, see La Opinion, 2 Oct. 1973.34 ERP, Ejercito Revolucionariodel Pueblo, a guerrilla group of Trotskyist origin who hadrefused to lay down their arms with the accession of Peronismto the government. They hadmaintained that the new government was just a continuation of the old system under adifferentguise. The attack against the army at the Azul barrackswas their first major actionagainst the Peronistgovernment.


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The Peronist Left, I955-I975 287at the IP and Montoneros marching under their own banners calling forsocialism, launched a violent attack on them. They turned and marched outof the squareashe continued.

(ix) July I974. Peron died and Isabelita became president. The extremeright of the movement was now in completecontrolcentredaround the figureof Jose L6pez Rega, Minister of Social Welfare and Peron's former privatesecretary.

(x) September I974. The Montoneros announced a total break with thegovernment and resumed guerrilla activities.

(xi) November I974. A State of Siege was declared,giving the Army andPolice Forcegreater powers to deal with the Left.These events have been accompaniedby a series of legislative measures ofan equally right wing nature; these included a new Law of ProfessionalAssociations which gives the union hierarchycarteblanchefor strengtheningtheir control over the unions, a new security law which was in many waystougher than that in being under the military government, and a wage freezewhich was accompanied by the virtual outlawing of strikes. All of this hasbeen within the context of a mounting series of attacks by police and para-police groups on JP and JTP offices and a growing list of murdered andimprisoned militants. The response to this move away from the sort ofmeasures and the kind of emphasis that the ' Peronist Left' considered tobe the true programme of Peronism has varied in the three main groupsdiscussedearlier.Combative Unions

In these unions the response has been very muted. They have seen theirmain task as explaining the control on wage increases to their members. Asthey had developed very little critique of the nature of Peronism and hadalways defined themselves by their absolute loyalty to Per6n, this was to beexpected. Former duros, now deputies in Congress, loyally voted for the newLaw of Professional Associations which was to strengthenimmeasurablytheunion bureaucracy hey had spent their lives fighting.In addition to obeying Per6n, there was, of course, the additional factorthat any overt opposition to government measures would bring down thewrath of the all-powerful Minister of Labour and the CGT apparatus,andlose the Combative Unions what precarious power bases they still had. Infact, the caution of many combativo leaders availed them little, since manywere displaced by the CGT, armed with the powers granted it in the newLaw of ProfessionalAssociations.


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288 Daniel JamesRevolutionary Peronism

Since they had always considered the elections a mere diversion before thecoming war and as they had a more realistic and coherent analysis of thepower of the union bureaucracy in Peronism and the contradictions withinthe movement, they were better prepared for the denouenent when it came.They considered it vital to use the breathing space given by Per6n and thereconstruction of a bourgeois democratic system to work in the bases, tocreate groupings of militants and form cadres. They aimed to begin the taskof forging an authentic, independent working class ideology and organisationto act as the basis for the future armed party that would fight the civil war.They felt that it was useless to try and defend positions gained within thestructure of Peronism or try to dislodge the bureaucracy of the structure ofthe movement. This they dubbed movimientismo and they attacked theJP and Montoneros for it. Peronism as a meaningful anti-capitalist, work-ing class movement - the peronismo de abajo as they called it - existed inthe barrios, the shanty towns and the factories, and it was there that it hadto be won for a revolutionary party not in an ultimately meaningless bureau-cratic structure.

In this context they were far less loth to criticize Per6n. After the forcedresignation of Obreg6n Cano from C6rdoba, Peronismo de Base issued astatement criticising those behind the action, including Per6n:It is not a case of General Per6n being hemmed in or prevented from doing whathe would really like, here it is simply a case that we are seeing that Per6n is farfrom being what we thought we were voting for in September ... not evenPeron can say who should be our representatives and who not; only we have theright to say if they stay or not.35

By May I974, in an Assembly to celebrate May Day, Peronismo de Basewas in a sense ready for a definitive break and for a drawing up of accounts.One militant who spoke summed up his experience from the Resistance untilthat time in these words:Faith was one of our biggest mistakes. When we were bearing the brunt of thestruggle, when we were striking, when the working class was paying with torturewe had faith in our leaders. What faith can we have now? After it has been abusedon II March and 23 September ... that was the vital point of departure and fromthere we started to realize that the only faith we could have was in the workingclass, the faith of the exploited... we have to understand that we must turn ourstruggles into our own independent organisation.3635 El Mundo, 3 March, I974.36 En Lucha, No. i6, June 1974.


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The Peronist Left, I955-I975 289Peronist Youth and Montoneros

The JP and the Montoneroswere the most disillusioned by the processandthey responded by a series of ideological improvisations, tactical manoeuvresthat often seemed to defy any co.herentanalysis. However, it can be shownthat there was a certain rationale behind their actions since I973. The bestway to approachthis is to analysebrieflythe changesin their political thoughtsince I973 as they appeared n a talk given by a leader of the Montoneros tocadres of the /P,37 and to highlight the essentials of their modified concep-tions.

Three main features of this modification can be discerned. (i) First, anautocritique. Peron, they now said, understood far better than they the needfor a front of classesopposed to imperialism, the possibilityof this coming topower by electionsand carryingout an anti-imperialistprogramme.They hadremained until the elections convinced that guerrilla war was the only wayof winning power. Per6n rightly saw that the principal contradiction inArgentine society was that between imperialism and national sovereignty,and that this took precedence over the contradictionbetween capitalist andworker. The logical political conclusion to draw from this was, therefore,the need to create an anti-imperialist,multi-class front, such as FREJULI.This they called Peron's strategic project,which, they said, they fully shared.(ii) However, the contradictionbetween Per6n and themselves was now seenas coming essentially on the ideological level. What for Per6n was the ulti-mate goal of this anti-imperialistfront - the Organized Community, a sortof beneficent state capitalism - for them was the mere transitional stagetowards a proper socialism. Therefore, while there was a political strategiccoincidence between them, there was also an ideological contradiction.Andwhat had happened was that Peron has opted for emphasising the ideologicalcontradiction; hence his attacks for deviating ideologically on the JP andMontoneros. (iii) The political strategyto be drawn from all this was, in thewords of Mario Firmenich, the leader of the Montoneros, the following:We have an ideologicalcontradictionwith Per6n, but we also have a strategiccoincidence.Per6n is objectivelyan anti-imperialist evolutionaryeader. It isstupidfor us to fight with Peron over ideology.We will fight to the utmostforour conceptionsbut if we lose we are not going to leave Peronism it wouldn'thavethe least sense sincewe sharethe strategicprojectof Per6n.38Therefore, according to the JP and Montoneros, what had to be done was todefend the space they had won within the movement. This, according toFirmenich, could be done by 'negotiating frontiers'3 with the main enemy"' The talk, given by MarioFirmenich, and transcribed, s in mimeo form.38 Ibid., p. I7.39 Ibid., p. I6. The whole document is extremely interestingas an example of the militariza-


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290 Daniel Jameswithin the movement - the union bureaucracywhich Per6n was using toattack them at the ideological level. It was important to maintain the holdgained within the movement's structurebecauseultimately Peron would findthat the Union bureaucracy,being totally opportunistic, did not share hisstrategicaim of an anti-imperialist,worker-based national state. In fact, whenthe crunch came it would prove to be totally useless to him.And it was at this stage of the scenario that the Mo,ntonerosand JP wouldenter, from the left. Per6n, it was maintained, would find it impossible tostop the anti-imperialistproject at the stage where, ideologically, he wouldlike to, because, practically, t would inevitablylead to socialism.But until thishappened they must stay within the movement at all costs.When Per6nsayson a concretessue,' I will do this ', we will alsosay'Well we'lldo that then ', althoughreallywe disagree.Becausewhat really nterestsus is theinternal transformationof Peronism through the displacementof the unionbureaucracy."1

In the light of this analysis, the reasons why the JP and the Montonerosreacted as they did to the consistent blows they suffered becomes clear. Tostay in the movement was the important thing and, therefore, almost anyamount of abuse and attack could be absorbed.The zig-zags and contradic-tions inherent in this strategywere numerous and bewildering - but under-standable in the light of their analysis.The whole issue of ' verticality , i.e.,the unquestioning respect for the ordersissuing from Per6n and going downthrough the vertical chain of command of the JusticialistMovement to therank and file militants at the bottom, which became dominant after thereserved document of September 1973, was seen by them in the context ofthis strategy.Unlike RevolutionaryPeronism which rejectedthe conceptout-right, the Montoneros and JP considered respect for Per6n's orders vital toenable them to stayin the movement.The Juventud TrabajadoraPeronista found itself beset by the same contra-dictions as its parentbody. Although it saw its main purposeas attacking theunion bureaucracy,this often had to be subordinated to the tactical restric-tions implicit in the dominant analysis of the JP and the Montoneros. Thismeant that despite a considerablefollowing, with thirty-seven agrupacionesrepresentedat the founding conference, the practical implementation of itspledge to defend wages and attack the union bureaucracywas hindered bythe over-riding need to stay in the movement, maintain the leader-masses

tion of political concepts and shows the deep influence a guerrilla training has on theguerrilla leader turned politician. Firmenich, for example, quotes with approval Clause-witz: ' Nobody can have a political ambition that is greaterthan their military power'.40 Ibid., p. x8.


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The Peronist Left, I955-1975 29Irelationship.It found itself, for example, in the position of admitting that theSocial Pact, signed by employers and unions in I973 and which instituteda wage freeze in returnfor promised price control, was an anti-working classmeasure,but opposing any explicit attackon it as such. To demand an increasein wages was legitimate - to demand this and explicitly repudiate the SocialPact was not, since it involved an attack on Peron. The nearest they cameto open criticism of Per6n was to describethe wages policy of the governmentas a' mistake '.41

Ultimately they were able to justify anything - sometimes by denying thatwhat had happened had really happened.42Sometimes they did so by intro-ducing the fiction of the evil advisers who were cutting Peron off from hispeople.43As a last resort, they had to say that on certain issues Peron waswrong.44

If we look at the three basic assumptions of their position as describedabove, it is interesting to see how they survived basically intact, thoughmodified in some aspects, in the I973-5 period.First, they underestimated the strength of the union bureaucracy.Whilethey had to recognise its logistical strength, its powerful apparatus, they stillhad no real analysis of its ideological or political basis. It was still for theman unnatural growth on the basically healthy body of Peronism. Theyassumed that it had no project of its own, that what it did have had verylittle coherence and certainly nothing to do with Peronism, and that Peron41 La Justa, Organode la juventud TrabajadoraPeronista, No. i, Feb. 1974.42 This occurred with the 'reserved document' which despite all signs to the contrary ElDescamisado refused to believe existed. See El Descamisado, No. 21, 9 Oct. I973.43 The fantasyabout el cerco that was cutting Peron off from his people first surfaced after theevents of Ezeiza; see El Descamisado, No. 6, 26 June I973. In Firmenich's talk op. cit. hedenouncesthe infantilism of this analysis, but as late as April I974 it reappears n the semi-

official organ of the IP and montonerosas an explanationfor the consistent failure of themuch-hoped-fordialogue between Leader and people to take place, El Peronista, 19 April1974.44 It should, of course, be borne in mind that the acceptanceof the need to stay in the move-ment at any cost and the resultantcost of this in terms of swallowing unpalatablemeasureswas an extremely contradictoryprocesswhich became progressivelymore difficult to accom-plish. At times the strain was evident publicly. After Peron's speech of February1974, ad-vising all those who advocatedsocialismo nacional to get out of Peronism and join a socia-list party, Dardo Cabo, the editor of El Descamisado respondedwith what was the nearestthing to a direct attack on Per6n from within the movement. ' Why didn't they tell usbefore when we were fighting Lanusse that we ought to join another party? Nobody hasthe right to throw us out, nobody can now just bid us farewell! ' El Descamisado, No. 39,12 Feb. I974. However, to appreciatethe near schizophrenia involved, it should also beborne in mind that this was the same Dardo Cabo who six months earlier had been tellinghis readersthat although they might disagreewith some of Per6n's tactics, they must alwaysaccept them since at the end of the day Aqui manda Peron, El Descamisado, No. 26, 13Nov. I973.


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292 Daniel Jamesbacked this bureaucracybecause it was easier to control than the IP andMontoneros.That Per6n might find more in common with the union leader-ship's aims was never considered. The bureaucracyremained something itwas necessary o bargainwith militarily.45

Secondly, the identity of Per6n's aims with theirs. Obviously this assump-tion had had to be modified. But by creating the concept of the ideologicalconflict and the political, strategicagreement, and confining their differencewith Per6n to the former, they preserved the essentials of this assumption.Peron remained in essence the revolutionary leader of the masses and assuch it was necessaryto maintain contactwith him at all costs.Thirdly, the predominant attitude to the working class basically persisted.The working class remained for them an idealized concept - the passive

spectator of much of the Montoneros' and JP's thought and action whilethey struggled with the union bureaucracyover its fate.The traithad gone back a long way - consistently' left' Peronismin generalhad failed to analyze precisely the real level of consciousness of the workingclass. Its struggles against military governments and against employers,particularlyin the I955-62 period, were taken as proof of its revolutionaryconsciousness.What were not taken into account were its defeats,its demobil-isation for most of the i96os - a demobilisationon which the union leadershiphas concretely built its power. Some sections, particularlyof RevolutionaryPeronism, did take some account of this fact - but the Youth and guerrillasections coming into Peronism, mostly for the first time, in the early Ig70stook the fact of fifteen yearsof anti-Peronistgovernments, and the high pointsof working class response to this and created the a priori assumption of therevolutionariness of the workers, and by extension of Peronism.

This is intimately connected with their analysis, or rather lack of one, ofthe union bureaucracy. For, having assumed that the working class hadconsistentlyhad a revolutionaryconsciousness,then the only explanation forthe hold of the bureaucracymust be in terms of its physicallyimposing itselfon the workers. It could have no real basis in the consciousness of the work-ing class, nor any real right to exist in Peronism. Conversely the unionbureaucracybecame a convenient way of avoiding looking at the actual stateof the consciousnessof the Peronist workers a deus ex machina that allowedthe avoidance of facing unpleasantreality. The ' masses' were revolutionaryand all that really needed to be decided was who was to lead them.45 Exactly how military this could be can be seen from Firmenich's reply to a questionerwhoasked him what they could offer the union bureaucracyby way of a bargain 'We can

promise not to kill them '. Firmenich, op. cit., p. 2I.


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The Peronist Left, 1955-1975 293ConcludingRemarks

The characterisationf the PeronistLeft so far in this paperhas largelyemphasisedcontradictory, egativefeatures- the 'reflex' nature of thePeronist eft, its dependence n Peron, ts failure n general n the I955-73periodto developcoherent, ndependent eft-wingpolitics.And yet whatwere the alternatives? havealready mphasisedhe effect of the continuedenforceddichotomyPeron-anti-Per6nn the development f the 'PeronistLeft'. There wereevidentlyalsootherfactorsat work whichwouldrequiredetailedstudy n themselves.The wholequestion, orexample,of the tacticsandstrategyof Per6nhimself,how he viewed the natureof the movement,hadagreat nfluence n theoptionsopen othe eftwing.

Withoutgoing into the question n greatdetail, t wouldseem correct osaythatPer6n'svery conception f thetypeof movementPeronismoughttobe militatedagainst he development f any strong, ndependent,dominantleft-wing.He saw one of the movement's ssentialstrengthsasbeingits all-embracing,umbrellanature,and indeedhis often reiterateddefinitionof aPeronistas beingsimply anyonewho worked n the movementemphasisedthis heterogeneity.Evidently,any attempt o turn this heterogeneitynto aclass-basedpoliticalpartywouldbe to weakenwhathe considered o be oneof its strongestpoints.And this leadson toanotheraspect.Peronismwas neveraninstitutionalisedmovementn any meaningful ense n theperiodI955-73,far less aninstitu-tionalisedpartywithin whichleft andrightcouldfightfor domination n aformalisedpoliticalmanner over specificand concretepolitical ssuesandprogrammes.The movement, n fact, was essentiallyno more than a con-glomerationof differentgroups loyal to Peron. This enabledPer6n, ofcourse, o manipulate oth left andrightwhilstallowinga certainautonomyto each- ' I havea rightandlefthand,andI usethemboth' wasa favouritesaying.It also meant that in meaningful ermsthe whole paraphernaliafPeronistpolitical organisationaltructure,ComandosTacticos,ComandosSuperiores,RamasMasculinas, tc., were comparativelyrrelevant. n thisrespect, t is interesting o note that it was preciselywhen the 'left', theduros,dominatedheofficial tructure f Peronistunionism, he62Organisa-tions, under Frondizi (and, therefore,had a predominantweight in themovementas a whole), the series of retreatsand accommodationstheyconsideredbetrayalsookplace,despite heirformalcontrolof the apparatusof thedominant ectorof Peronism.Whiletheleft in general reatedhis lackof formalised,democraticpolitical tructure s a virtue,sinceit made easierthe maintenance f the essential ink betweenthe leaderand his people, twas, nevertheless,rue that it also helped preventa genuine independent


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294 Daniel Jamespolitical development and maintained the personalistic loyalty syndrome ofmuch of the Peronistleft.

There is also a further point arising from this which it is necessary tomention. From the beginning of the Peronist experiencein 1946,Peron hadensured that he himself should embody the political desires of Argentineworkers. With the crushing of the Partido Laboristain 1946, Per6n stampedon the possibilityof any incipient political organisationof the workers, whileat the same time ratifying their union organisation - thus reinforcing thefact that the politicalexpressionof the working class should pass throughhim.This not only meant that the political reflection of the social and economicgains of the workers should be embodied in himself, thus helping perpetuatethe paternalisticand personalisticnature of Peronism; it also meant that anyleft, potentially radical elements within Peronism were largely restrictedfrom the beginning to the union field. This, of course, was only reinforcedafter 1955 by the very nature of events - with the formal proscription ofpolitical Peronism, the union sector became unquestioningly the dominantpart of the movement. What this implied for the mainstream element of theunion leadershipin terms of the compromise forced on their political beliefshas often been emphasised.46Yet it also needs to be emphasised that itprofoundly affected the nature of the Peronist left.The fact that left Peronism was centred on the trade unions and had firmrootsin the union rank and file was, of course,in one sense a greatadvantage.It meant that the Peronist left, unlike the non-Peronist left, did not operatein a vacuum cut off from its natural constituency and degenerate into theultra-leftvanguardism of many left-wing sects. But it did have other effects.One was that 'leftism', a seemingly radical political stance, could be seenby some union leaders, particularlyin times of economic crisis, as more aresponseto a concreteunion problem than a reflectionof a coherent,indepen-dent political viewpoint.47To this, one should also add the fact that the leftPeronist trade unionist was also susceptible to the corrupting influence ofeveryday compromises with employers and government. Indeed, a combina-46 See RobertoCarri, Sindicatosy Poder (Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudestada, 1967) and MiguelGazzera, Nosotros los dirigentes, in Miguel Gazzera and Norberto Ceresole, Peronismo:Autocriticay PerspectivasBuenosAires, Descartes,I970).47 E. J. Hobsbawm has emphasised the effect of the ' practicalities inherent in day to daytrade union practice on the 'spontaneous ' labour militant in Britain. ' Trends in theBritish Labour Movement', LabouringMen (London, 1964), pp. 339 et seq. There is alsomuch else of interest in the essay by comparison with the Argentina case. For example,Hobsbawm's descriptionof the political-union itineraryof Ernest Bevin is very relevant foran understandingof the course taken by many former militant Peronist Labour leaders- intermnof the logic it represented,if not of the exact details of politicalallegiance.


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The Peronist Left, I955-I975 295tion of these factors was at the root of the ' phenomenon of numerous duros,leftistsof yesteryear,becoming the traidoresof today.

Moreover, even for the more consistent left the difficulties of leading acoherent left from within a union structure became increasingly obviousthroughout the I96os. It was dissatisfactionwith what they saw as a left thatcould never ultimately espouse more than a sort of militant sindicalism thatunderlay the attempts of those like Cooke to rethink the needs and strategyof the Peronist left. And it was a tension that existed increasingly within theleft and underlay the differences between Revolutionary Peronism and theCombative Unions and also the JP and Montoneros.

Yet, having said this, it also needs to be said that the Peronist left of I973-5was a very different creature from that of a decade earlier, with far morepotential for separate development. The very nature of the context withinwhich the left has operatedsince I973 has inevitablyled to greaterindependentdevelopment, on an organisational,practicallevel at least. The bypassing ofthe Per6n-anti-Peron dichotomy with the election victory of I973, the grow-ing disillusion with the post-I973 process, and, indeed, the fact of Per6n'sdeath itself and the consequent de facto splitting of the movement haveradicallyaltered the situation within which the Peronist left has had to work.Indeed, it is scarcelyrealistic any longer to talk of the left Peronists as theleft wing of a single movement; rather there are now two Peronisms - aright and a left.An obvious illustration of the effect of this radically changed situation wasthe fact that after Per6n's death most sections of ' Left Peronism' wereovertly at war with his chosen successor.The capacityof the Montoneros tofunction efficiently in their campaign against the government of MariaEstella Peron was evident. Needless to say, it is impossible to assess at thismoment in time the extent to which they can continue to operateas efficientlyunder the new military government. The JP's and JTP's continued effective-ness in the new situation is, of course, even more problematic, given thedifficulties of illegality and repression,and it is certainly impossible to ascer-tainfrom outside the country.

Nevertheless, for all its functional, organisational ndependence, I think itfair to say that there are clear indications that the nature of this left Peronismwill essentiallybe that of a revitalisedversion of a populist left with socialisttrimmings, ratherthan the development of a more coherent Marxist-orientedleft along the lines advocatedby RevolutionaryPeronism. The decisionof theMontonerosand JP to attackthe government of IsabelPer6n did not representa complete reappraisalof strategy.Indeed, it was never adequatelyexplainedwhy a government they had supported two months earlier should suddenly


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296 Daniel Jamesbecome so totally unacceptable.Except, of course, that it was no longer led byPeron himself. This was the crux of the matter for them. Per6n had been theguarantee of the anti-imperialist liberation project in spite of all their dis-agreements with him. With his death, and the official inheritance in thehands of the right, they saw their main task as the re-creationof Peron's'strategic project', the anti-imperialistfront as it had existed in I973. Onlythis time they would be betterpreparedmilitarily. In this, they coincided withthe mainstream 'combative' left - as witness of their joint support forPeronismo Autentico created in early 1975, which as its name implies, andits leading figures personify, is essentiallya reassertionof a traditional,' truePeronist essence.48It would seem that the growing repression and, at best,semi-clandestinity of much of the Peronist left has once again, as in the1955-73 period, had the effect of freezing political development whilstemphasising the urgency of a militant, and military, response to repression.The direct take over of the government by the armed forces on March 24,I976,can only reinforcethis trend.

48 The list of main figuresbehind Peronismno utenticoreadslike a Who's Who of the Peronistleft since 1955 - with the exception of the RevolutionaryPeronismcurrent. It also includesmany figures who have in the past been strongly criticisedby the left. The movement wasofficially proscribed n Jan. 1976.

peronist left james

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