CHAPTER 1 - EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

(Arts 1-18)

Honasan vs The Panel Of Investigating Prosecutor Of The Department Of Justice

Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons)

Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code

Facts:

• August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:

o July 27, 2003: crime of coup d’ etat was committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan, II

o On or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in a house located in San Juan, Metro Manila

o Early morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their lives to achieve the National Recovery Agenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.

• Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:

o June 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan arrived with Capt.Turinga to hold the NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to achieve the vision of NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the new government. They had a blood compact and that he only participated due to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he said “Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.”

o July 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having a press conference about their occupation of the

Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood compact wound.

• August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan

• Senator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rulesof Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation

Issues:

Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the Ombudsman should deputize the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.

Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not published

Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit

1. No.

Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsmancase may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in

their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.

circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ

The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Ruleson Criminal Procedure, All recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against public officers and employees.

The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.

2. No.

• In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.

• In the case of Taňada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:

o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so called letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in performance of their duties.

OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

3. No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will not

resolve the present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

Gatbonton V. NLRC And Mapua (2006)

Lessons Applicable: Publication must be in full, Preventive suspension, damages

Laws Applicable: Art. 2 Civil Code, Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code

FACTS:

• November 1998: A civil engineering student of respondent Mapua Institute ofTechnology (MIT) filed a letter-complaint against Renato S. Gatbonton, an associate professor of the Faculty of Civil Engineering for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician.

• Pending investigating, MIT, through its committee on Decorum and Investigation placed him under a 30-day preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999.

o The committee believed that his continued stay during the investigation will affect his performance as a faculty member, as well as the student’s learning and that the suspension will allow petitioner to “prepare himself for the investigation and will prevent his influence to other members of the community.

• He filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal suspension, damages and attorney’s fees

• He questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the RTC in a petition for certiorari but was terminated since MIT agreed to publish in the schoolorgan the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877)and disregard the previous administrative proceedings

• Labor Arbiter: 30-day preventive suspension is illegal and directed MIT to payhis wages during the said period

• NLRC: set aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision

• CA on special civil action for certiorari: affirming the NLRC

Issues:

Whether Mapua’s Rules and Regulations is effective as of January 11, 1999 when it was published only on February 23, 1999 (persons)

W/N there is a valid justification for the 30-day preventive suspension under the Labor Code (labor)

Whether damages should be awarded

Held: Petition is partially granted. CA, NLRC set aside and Labors Arbiter reinstated

1. NO

• R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to "promulgate rules and regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of sexual harassment cases and theadministrative sanctions therefor

• Taňada vs. Tuvera:

o all statutes, including those of local application and private laws shall be published as a condition for their effectivity is fixed by the legislative.(especially penal laws)

o Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

• publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws

• Mapua Rules is one of those issuances that should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement R.A. No. 7877, which is a

law of general application

o Mapua Rules Section 3 Rule IV (Administrative Provisions) states that it shall takeeffect 15 days after publication by the committee.

2. NO.

• Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the company’s property pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. The employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers. However, when it is determined that there is no sufficient basis to justify an employee’s preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of preventive suspension

• Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Ominibus Rules, there is no valid justification

o does not show that evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong and that the school head is morally convinced that petitioner’s continued stay during the period of investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution; or that petitioner poses a risk or danger to the life or property of the other members ofthe educational community

3. No.

• While petitioner’s preventive suspension may have been unjustified, this does not automatically mean that he is entitled to moral or other damages

• No showing of bad faith or in a wanton or fraudulent manner in preventively suspending petitioner

Persons Case Digest: Marcos V. Judge Fernando Vil. Pamintuan (2011)

Lessons Applicable: Ignorance of the Law

FACTS:

• Judge Reyes in an order on May 30, 1996 dismissed Civil Case No. 3383-R due to forum shopping and ordered that that the Buddha statuette in the custody ofthis Court be immediately released to the children of the late Rogelio Roxas in trust for the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas

• RTC: Denied the separate motions for reconsideration by the parties

• Judge Pamintuan in an order dated May 9, 2006 set the case for hearing on June 29, 2006 purportedly to formally and finally release the Golden Buddha to its rightful owner.

o Marcos was one of the subpoenaed parties, being a person with interest in the case

o Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica is awarded to the estate of Rogelio Roxas. However, the Buddha Statuette or Buddha replica shall be under custodia legis until the final settlement of the estate of the late Rogelio Roxas, or upon the appointmentof his estate’s administrator

o Also ruled that the Golden Buddha in its custody is a fake one

• November 15, 2006: Marcos filed a complaint-affidavit charging Judge Pamintuan with Gross Ignorance of the Law for reversing motu proprio the final and executory order of then Acting Presiding Judge Antonio Reyes in Civil Case No. 3383-R, entitled “Albert D. Umali, in his capacity as the exclusive administrator and as President of the Treasure Hunters Association of the Philippines v. Jose D. Roxas, et al.

o Pamintuan Commented that Marcos should have filed a motion for reconsideration instead of filing an administrative complaint.

o Marcos, in her Reply-Affidavit, cited Section 1 of Rule 37 which provides that only the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within the period for taking an appeal

• Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that Judge Pamintuan be dismissed from the service with the additional penalty of forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service, including government owned or controlled corporations, for Gross Ignorance of the Law and for violation of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

o A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. Should judgment of lower courts – which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals – become final and executory before, or without exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they too become inviolable, impervious to modification.

• Judge Pamintuan was placed under preventive suspension pending resolutionof the administrative case to stop him from committing further damage to the judiciary.

• Judge Pamintuan moved for reconsideration and eventually filed a Motion for Early Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration and to Submit the Case for Decision.

• Judge Pamintuan then sent a letter requesting for his backpay and benefits covering the period of his preventive suspension - denied for being premature and for lack of merit

ISSUE: W/N Judge Pamintuan is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law

HELD: Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 3, is DISMISSED from the service

• Judge Pamintuan should have realized that the trial court did not rule on that point that the Golden Buddha is fake in its May 30, 1996 Order (even in its September 2, 1996 Order)

• Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:

o SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

• The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose, to wit:

to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business

to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.

• Notably, this is NOT Judge Pamintuan’s first and sole administrative case. Judge Pamintuan was charged with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused, Arrogance and Violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and was suspended for 1 year. Having been previously warned and punished for various infractions, Judge Pamintuan now deserves the ultimate administrative penalty − dismissal from service

People of the Philippines vs. Quiachon, G.R. No. 170236 , August 31, 2006

Facts:

Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape. On or

about May 12, 2001, the accused, by means of force and intimidation had sexual

intercourse with one Rowena Quiachon, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute minor.

Rowel recounted that on the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his

sister Rowena and they were covered by a blanket or "kumot." His father's buttocks

were moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena crying. He could not do anything

because he was afraid of their father. Rowel remained in the room but the following

morning, he told his aunt, Carmelita Mateo about what he had witnessed. Together,

Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to report what had transpired.

The Regional Trial Court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of qualified rape defined and penalized under Articles 266-A and B of the

Revised Penal Code. The court imposed death penalty against the accused. The defense

argued that the benefits of RA 9346 should be extended to the accused.

Issue: Whether the appellant can benefit from R.A. 9346 which abolished the death

penalty law.

Held: Yes. In view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 on June 24, 2006

prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant

is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the

nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the

nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. The aforequoted provisionof

R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal law,

favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to

accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of

the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows: Retroactive effect of penal laws.

— Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons

guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5

of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a

final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346

provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or

whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not

be eligible for parole."

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 164435 : June 29, 2010]

VICTORIA S. JARILLO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

R E S O L U T I O N

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration[1] dated November 11, 2009 and respondent's Comment[2] thereto dated March 5, 2010.

In the Decision dated September 29, 2009, the Court affirmed petitioner's conviction for bigamy. Petitioner is moving for reconsideration of the Decision, arguing that since petitioner's marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent marriage.

Petitioner's argument lacks merit.

As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr.,[3] the Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus:

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive applicationof procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.[4]

In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[5] the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:

In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy. x x x [6]

The foregoing scenario is what petitioner seeks to obtain in her case, and this, the Court shall never sanction. Clearly, therefore, petitioner's asseveration, that Article 40 of the Family Code should not be applied to her case, cannot be upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated November 11, 2009 is DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Guy v. CA

502 SCRA 151

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts:

1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei

(a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they

are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The

minors were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the

issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City.

2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse,

filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence,

his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other

heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum

shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.

3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a

Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational

assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate

of the decedent from any and all liabilities.

4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental

motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors

hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the

petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of

Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards

RULING:

No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians

must necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the

court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been

authorized by the court, the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the

private-respondents could not have waived their supposed right as they have yet to

prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent

to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter

do not have.

As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs

The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the

claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters

administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the

settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship included. As held in

previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one complaint, one

a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance. (Briz v. Briz)

Llorente vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 124371, November23, 2000

Facts: On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married before a parish priest in Nabua, Camarines Sur.

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her . He then returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.

Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and on January 16, 1958 married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children.

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate but before the proceedings could be terminated , Lorenzo died.

Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’sestate in her favor contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, that such properties were acquired during their marriage and that Lorenzo’s will would encroach her legitime.

Alicia filed in the testate proceeding , a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition.

The Regional Trial Court found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

“Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente.

Issue: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

Held: The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz,

with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death,is duly established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. “

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

“However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.”

But the hasty disregard of both the RTC and CA of Lorenzo’s Will by calling to the fore the RENVOI doctrine, claiming that American law follows domiciliary rule is unjustified. There is no such thing as American law for the whole nation of the US, for the country comprises of a group of States, each State having its own applicable law, enforceable only within that state.

As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence reiterates that once it is

proven that an individual is no longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce abroad, its effects shall be recognized in the Philippines.

The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will wasexecuted in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is reversed. Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proofof foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

CHAPTER 2 - HUMAN RELATIONS

(Arts 19-35)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ, Petitioners,

vs.

SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution2 dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The assailed decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984; while the assailed resolution denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Michelle Ybañez (Ybañez).

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department Store (Robinson’s) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt5 issued by the store.6

While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and Mercury Drug Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached

and informed her that she failed to pay the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the receipt issued in her favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met the Guess employees as agreed upon.8

When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans.9 They supposedly even searched her walletto check how much money she had, followed by another argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.10

On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not concern the office and the same took place while respondent was off duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter again refused to receive it.12 Respondent also claimed that the Human Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished said letter and the latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes ofcanceling respondent’s Robinson’s credit card. Respondent further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging letter.13 With the above experience, respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social humiliation.14 She thus filed the Complaint for Damages15 before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon) and Ybañez. She demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.16

In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the issuance of the receipt of payment. They claimed, however, that instead of the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer (Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there was miscommunication between the employees at that time because prior to the issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the latter replied " Ok na ," which the former believed to mean that the item has already been paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to look for respondent and when he saw the latter, he invited her to go back to the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not payment was indeed made. Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested that they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo,

Hawayon and Ybañez thus went to the agreed venue where they talked to respondent.19 They pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that respondent could not recall whom she gave the payment.20 They emphasized that they were gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was arrogant in answering their questions.21 As counterclaim, petitioners and the other defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.22

On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the complaint and counterclaim of the parties. From the evidence presented, the trial court concluded that the petitioners and the other defendants believed in good faith that respondentfailed to make payment. Considering that no motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the court held that when they demanded payment from respondent, they merely exercised a right under the honest belief that no payment was made. The RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself who put herself in that situation by choosing the venue for discussion. As to the letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against the Guess employees, because they merely asked for assistance and not to embarrass or humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC found no evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant the award of damages.23

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for: Damages) is herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle Ybañez and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Shirley G. Quiñones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and attorney’s fees in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

SO ORDERED.24

While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good faith when they confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about the alleged

non-payment, the CA, however, found preponderance of evidence showing that theyacted in bad faith in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer. It found respondent’s possession of both the official receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment.25 Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed to Cebu Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s employer not merely to ask for assistance for the collection of the disputed payment but to subject her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury such that she would be pressured to pay.26 Considering that Guess already started its investigation on the incident, there was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged respondent’s employer who was not privy to the transaction. This is especially true in this case since the purported letter contained not only a narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent in trying to evade payment.27 The appellate court thus held that petitioners are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made liable for its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in thehiring and selection of its employees; while Ybañez’s liability stemmed from her act of signing the demand letter sent to respondent’s employer. In view of Hawayon andVillagonzalo’s good faith, however, they were exonerated from liability.28

Ybañez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the same was denied in the assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution.

Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE LETTER SENT TOTHE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT HEREIN RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.30

The petition is without merit.

Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of abuse of rights provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from respondent whethershe indeed made payment if they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code. The Court’s pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte31 is noteworthy:

In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into ourcivil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which aredesigned to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscienceand which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith."x x x32 The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.33

In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed to make such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from respondent whether she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the question now is whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against them.

Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if heinstead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another.34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulousadvantage of another.35 Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.36

Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent whether she paid or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the item purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by substantial evidencein the proper forum.

It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard andtried to force respondent to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to respondent’s employer not only informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.1âwphi1 Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also accused respondent that she was not completely being honest when she was asked about the circumstances of payment, thus:

x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x x

When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank expression and told me, "I can’t remember." Then I asked her how much money she gave, she answered, "P2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how much change and if she received change from the cashier, she then answered, "I don’t remember." After asking these simple

questions, I am very certain that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we invited her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she vehemently refused saying that she’s in a hurry and very busy.37

Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, respondent was not in a rush in leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they realized the supposed non-payment.

It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to respondent’s employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondent’s reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.38

The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights.

Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles 20 and 2 of the Civil Code which read:40

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damageto another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner thatis contrary to morals or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney s fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogousto those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.41 Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.42 They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone.43 We find that the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA is reasonable under the circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to litigate to protect her interest, attorney s fees in the amount of ofP20,000.00 is likewise just and proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated November 14,2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

Ardiente vs. Javier, et al

[Civil Law: human relations; principle of abuse of rights; Article 19 of the Civil Code]

Every person must, in the exercise of his right, and in the performance of his duties,act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. (Art. 19. New Ciivil Code of the Philippines)

Joyce V. Ardiente, Petitioner, vs. Sps. Javier and Ma. Theresa Pastorfide, Cagayan de Oro Water District and Gaspar Gonzales, Jr., Respondents

G.R. No. 161921; July 17, 2013

Facts: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seekingto set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the then decision of the RTC regarding its judgment sums of money for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The decision being contested sprouted from the cutting off of water supply of Pastorfide by the Cagayan de Oro Water District as requested by Ardiente. In this case, Ardiente owned a piece of property, which was subsequently sold and conveyed to Pastorfide, however, the connection of water supply as well as other utilities remained in the name of Ardiente which was never questioned, until such time that Pastorfide became delinquent in paying the water bill.

Issue: Whether or not it was proper for Ardiente together with Cagayan De Oro Water district to cut off the water supply of Pastorfide owing to the fact that Ardiente has already conveyed ownership of property to Pastorfide.

Ruling: No, it was not proper. Petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. The principle of abuse of Rights in the enshrined Article 19 of the civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. It recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized orgranted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,

vs.

ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 o’clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for

which she replied: "of course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the celebrant.9 At thepenthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.17

Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that shewas the Hotel’s Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotel’s former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka’s party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.20 The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka’s wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the groupof Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity.30 However, as Mr. Reyes was

already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.331awphi1.nét

Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not tothe penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.40

After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:

Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation ofsome right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed himto join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:

In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and to leave the place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs.43

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:

Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart’s invitation, appellant could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.

. . .

The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44

Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the

amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered."46

Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in –

I.

… NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER

II.

… HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILART’S INVITATION"

III.

… DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THECIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA

IV.

… IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD

V.

… IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANT’S BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIALPROCEEDINGS

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury"47 ) refers to self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.

Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited bythe celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.

As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The

appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.

The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?

From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s findings of fact.

First, let us put things in the proper perspective.

We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrant’s instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove thatindeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:

Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at thebuffet table? How close was she when she approached you?

A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.

Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?

A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."

Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?

. . .

A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55

In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that –

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the requestthat must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .

Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.56

Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses – Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.57

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which hewas not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.58

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nét

Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does notconform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.61 These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for damagesis proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.66

A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.68

As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms.Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each otherpersonally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.

Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with goodintentions, cannot amount to bad faith.

Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim andHotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held –

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter’s lowly station in life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and toavert further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed uponappellees.73

The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with thevery facts of the case and the evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines."74 During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that hehad income75 and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr.Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. AND ALLAN CHOACHUY, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

“The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for [one’s] personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and [non]-interference demands respect.”1

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails theJuly 10, 2007 Decision3 and the September 11, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473.

Factual Antecedents

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28,against respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that respondents are the owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a caseagainst petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary

Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8 that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to petitioners’ property;9 that the court, in that case, denied Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-upand installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property;11 that respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-going construction;12 and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners’ right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.14

In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras,16 nor did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioners’ construction.17 They also clarified that they are not the owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Order19 granting the application for a TRO. The dispositive portion of the said Order reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the application for a [T]emporary [R]estraining [O]rder or a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction is granted. Upon the filing and approval of a bond by [petitioners], which the Court sets at P50,000.00, let a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction issue against the [respondents] Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy. They are hereby directed to immediately remove the revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their building overlooking the side of [petitioners’] lot and to transfer and operate it elsewhere at the back where [petitioners’] property can no longer be viewed within a distance of about 2-3 meters from the left corner of Aldo Servitec, facing the road.

IT IS SO ORDERED.20

Respondents moved for a reconsideration21 but the RTC denied the same in its

Order22 dated February 6, 2006.23 Thus:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Issue a [W]rit of [P]reliminary [I]njunction in consonance with the Order dated 18 October 2005.

IT IS SO ORDERED.24nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decision26 granting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence.28 The CA also said that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.31 The fallo reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the petition filed in this case. The assailed orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 2006 issued by the respondent judge are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.32nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

Issues

Hence, this recourse by petitioners arguing that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

I.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDERS OF THE [RTC] DATED 18 OCTOBER 2005 AND 6 FEBRUARY 2006 HOLDING THAT THEY WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER SPOUSES HING ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ON THE GROUND THAT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL RIGHT TO PRIVACY DESPITE THE FACTUAL FINDINGS [OF] THE RTC, WHICH RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY FAILED TO REFUTE, THAT THE ILLEGALLY INSTALLED SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS OF RESPONDENTS CHOACH[U]Y WOULD CAPTURE THE PRIVATE ACTIVITIES OF PETITIONER SPOUSES HING, THEIR CHILDREN AND EMPLOYEES.

III.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT SINCE THE OWNER OF THE BUILDING IS ALDO DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES, INC. THEN TO SUE RESPONDENTS CHOACHUY CONSTITUTE[S] A PURPORTEDLY UNWARRANTED PIERCING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL.

IV.

THE X X X [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT IGNORED THE SERIOUS FORMAL DEFICIENCIES OF BOTH THE PETITION AND THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 15 MARCH 2006 OF RESPONDENT[S] CHOACH[U]Y AND

GAVE X X X THEM DUE COURSE AND CONSIDERATION.33

Essentially, the issues boil down to (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy, and (2) whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners insist that they are entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction because respondents’ installation of a stationary camera directly facing petitioners’ property and a revolving camera covering a significant portion of the same property constitutes a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy.34 Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the private lives of others.35 Although the said provision pertains to the privacy of another’s residence, petitioners opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor Arturo M. Tolentino.36 Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ property is used for business, it is still covered by the said provision.37

As to whether respondents are the proper parties to implead in this case, petitionersclaim that respondents and Aldo are one and the same, and that respondents only want to hide behind Aldo’s corporate fiction.38 They point out that if respondents are not the real owners of the building, where the video surveillance cameras were installed, then they had no business consenting to the ocular inspection conducted by the court.39

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, echo the ruling of the CA that petitioners cannot invoke their right to privacy since the property involved is not used as a residence.40 Respondents maintain that they had nothing to do with the installationof the video surveillance cameras as these were installed by Aldo, the registered owner of the building,41 as additional security for its building. 42 Hence, they were wrongfully impleaded in this case.43

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and in our laws. It is defined as “the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.”45 It is the right of an individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.”46 Simply put, the right to privacy is “the right to be let alone.”47

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy and protects them againstthe State’s abuse of power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except “in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards,” can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.48

The right to privacy under Article 26(1)

of the Civil Code covers business offices

where the public are excluded therefrom

and only certain individuals are allowed

to enter.

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed againsthim by other individuals. It states:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for

damages, prevention and other relief:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

x x x x

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent ofthe latter.”49 The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” however,does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Our Code specifically mentions “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” This does not mean, however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, becausethe law covers also “similar acts.” A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,” therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. TheCA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.

The “reasonable expectation of privacy”

test is used to determine whether there

is a violation of the right to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the

“reasonable expectation of privacy” test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we enunciated that “the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.” Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which isa crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The operation by [respondents] of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of [petitioners], who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on [respondents’] property or the roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of [the] land of [petitioners].

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why [petitioner] Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitorthe on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of [Aldo]. If the purpose of [respondents] in setting up a camera at the back is to secure the building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back. [Respondents’] camera cannot be made to extend the view to [petitioners’] lot. To allow the [respondents] to do that over the objection of the [petitioners] would violate the right of

[petitioners] as property owners. “The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.”55

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their property, whether they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case andshould not be interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.56 Here, there is no indication of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

A real party defendant is one who has a

correlative legal obligation to redress

a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason

of the defendant's act or omission which

had violated the legal right of the former.

Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails ofthe suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

A real party defendant is “one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.”57

In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they could not have installed the video surveillance cameras.58 Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that respondents are not the registered owners of the building does not automatically mean that they did not cause the installation of the video surveillance cameras.

In their Complaint, petitioners claimed that respondents installed the video surveillance cameras in order to fish for evidence, which could be used against petitioners in another case.59 During the hearing of the application for Preliminary Injunction, petitioner Bill testified that when respondents installed the video surveillance cameras, he immediately broached his concerns but they did not seem to care,60 and thus, he reported the matter to the barangay for mediation, and eventually, filed a Complaint against respondents before the RTC.61 He also admitted that as early as 1998 there has already been a dispute between his family and the Choachuy family concerning the boundaries of their respective properties.62 With these factual circumstances in mind, we believe that respondents are the proper parties to be impleaded.

Moreover, although Aldo has a juridical personality separate and distinct from its stockholders, records show that it is a family-owned corporation managed by the Choachuy family.63

Also quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding their claim that they are not owners of the building, allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo andconduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.65 Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of respondents and Aldo seem to merge.

All these taken together lead us to the inevitable conclusion that respondents are merely using the corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated July 10, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01473 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 18, 2005 and February 6, 200[6] of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-5223 are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS (G.R. No. 102007)

Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof.Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to the civil liability of Bayotas arising from his commission of the offense charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishhis civil liability.

HELD:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by death of the convict personal liabilities are extinguished, as to pecuniary penalties liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

Thus the court made a ruling as follows:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon;

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Aricle 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: Law, Contracts, Quasi-contracts, Delicts…,Quasi-delicts;

3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by way of separate civil action and may be enforced either againstthe executor/administrator of the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation aside from delicts;

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

In the case at bar, the death of Bayotas extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act of rape. Hence, his civil liability also extinguished together with his criminal liability upon his death.

Silahis International Hotel, Inc vs Soluta

G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, Petitioners,

vs.

ROGELIO S. SOLUTA, JOSELITO SANTOS, EDNA BERNATE, VICENTA DELOLA, FLORENTINO MATILLA, and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIS UNION CHAPTER, Respondents.

FACTS: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding

sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn.

Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched alocksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.

As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights.

RULING: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x

In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one.

The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure.

Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused tothe aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

DECISION: Denied.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145823. March 31, 2005]

OSCAR MACCAY and ADELAIDA POTENCIANO, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES PRUDENCIO NOBELA and SERLINA NOBELA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This petition for review[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 25 September 2000 and its Resolution dated 7 November 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 49822. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 (“trial court”), dated 26 January 1995, dismissing the case for Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents filed by petitioner Oscar Maccay (“Maccay”) against respondent spouses Prudencio Nobela (“Prudencio”) and Serlina Nobela (“Serlina”) in Criminal Case No. 85961.

Antecedent Facts

The facts, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, are as follows:

In the first week of May, 1990, Adelaida E. Potenciano went to the public market of Pasig, Metro Manila, to look for a prospective buyer or mortgagee of a parcel of landbelonging to Oscar Maccay. She was introduced by a vendor, Lydia Reyes, to the spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela who were engaged in lending money to market vendors on a daily basis.

Potenciano introduced herself as Angelita N. Barba, wife of Oscar Maccay, who desired to sell or mortgage any of his two parcels of land, one in Guadalupe and onein Antipolo. She went to the Nobelas’ at 145 Buayang Bato at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. She brought with her many titles. She became friendly with the spouses. Potenciano went on to brag about her connections, that she is related to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos; and that the PCGG is after her so she has to dispose of her properties.

After two (2) days, she called Oscar Maccay, who came. They comported themselves as husband and wife. Maccay was in uniform. He is a police colonel who had jurisdiction over Mandaluyong, according to Potenciano. The Nobelas wereimpressed. They were pleased when the couple became very close to them. They confided their family problems. They even went to the office of Maccay in Fort Bonifacio.

In this setting, the relationship flourished. Potenciano persuaded the spouses that they should be the ones to buy the property because it will only cost P300,000.00.

They would be able to make a profit because the current price was P1,500.00 per square meter.

Potenciano used to call Maccay to join her in the Nobela residence. They partook of the hospitality of the accused spouses almost two to three times a week. Potenciano was treated like a queen. She was fanned and massaged. She was served her meals in the sala.

After pooling together their savings, the Nobelas decided to purchase the property. They advised Maccay and Potenciano that they were ready to buy the property.

On May 17, 1990, Potenciano with Serlina went to Barba’s lawyer, Atty. Alfonso Jimenez, at Las Piñas where she had the Deed of Sale (Exh. “1”) prepared and notarized. She signed it there. They were riding in the jeep of the Nobelas and passed by the office of Maccay ar (sic) Fort Bonifacio. Potenciano went alone to his office and returned with him. They then proceeded to the house of both accused at Buayang Bato, Mandaluyong. Serlina paid the P300,000.00 to the couple and in turn she was given the Deed of Sale, TCT No. 473584, the tax declaration, the tax receipt and other documents. When she offered to take them, they declined sayingthey were going home to their Magallanes house.

Maccay and Potenciano continued to frequent the house of the accused spouses where they were given VIP treatment. Potenciano slept, bathed and was allowed to use the phone for her transactions and to drive the couple’s jeep.

x x x

On June 19, 1990, the taxes to the purchased property had to be paid. The title hadnot been transferred to the names of the Nobelas. Serlina and Potenciano with the latter driving, rode the Nobela jeep to Antipolo. On the way to town, the jeep broke down. The engine fell off. Potenciano volunteered to go to Antipolo herself, pay thetaxes and bring a mechanic to repair the jeep. The taxes had been paid.

The good relationship continued until June 30, 1990, Prudencio Nobela suffered a

stroke. He was brought to the Polymedic Hospital. That same afternoon, Potenciano called and talked to Prudencio’s doctor. She had Prudencio transferred to a suite and confided to Serlina that she is also known as Adelaida Potenciano; that the owners of the hospital are her mother and father. Serlina need not worry about the bill. Potenciano started sleeping in the hospital.

After one week, Prudencio was to be discharged, Potenciano went to the accounting department. She tried to pay with her dollars and yens but the hospital would not accept. She asked Serlina to go with her to a money changer at Kalentong to change the money to pesos but the foreign exchange dealer refused saying the foreign currency was fake.

Serlina had to go back to the house to borrow from the son of her husband by his first marriage. Maccay drove the sick man and two women home in the Nobela jeep.

At this time, the trust and confidence on the Maccay couple by the Nobelas was beginning to slip off. The Polymedic Hospital incident was a letdown. It was then that Potenciano, who has boasted of being not only wealthy but also influential, invited Serlina to engage in the buy and sell of appliances which she claimed were brought by her nephew from Japan. To Serlina’s dismay, she was only brought to a store in the pier where she had to pay for the appliances herself. She had receipts from De Lara Merchandising (Exhs. “15” to “15-C”) showing her payments. The lastreceipt is dated July 29, 1990. Serlina brought the appliances home. Naturally, when Potenciano saw Serlina selling the appliances herself, her pretensions having been exposed, the relationship began to sour.

Before the last purchase of appliances, without the knowledge of the accused couple, Potenciano executed an Affidavit of Loss (Exh. “3-B”). She related that when she went to Antipolo on June 19, 1990 in her stainless steel jeep, the jeep broke down. She got a mechanic and when she returned the jeep was gone or carnapped.

In the meantime, Serlina was beginning to doubt Potenciano. She heard that Potenciano was trying to sell their jeep. She inquired at the NBI and was told that Potenciano had a string of cases against her.

On July 30, 1993, Potenciano went to the Eastern Police District Headquarters and executed an affidavit-complaint (Exh. 4) against the accused spouses before P/Lt. Col. Nestor E. Cruz relating that she was fooled by Prudencio and Serlina Nobela on July 14, 1990. She related how the accused spouses cheated her by stealing TCT No. 473584 and her appliances. Her affidavit related how she was prayed over and mesmerized by Serlina. She stated that ‘ginawa panloloko sa akin at pagnanakaw ng Transfer Certificate of [T]itle’ (par. 12, p. 1, Exh. 4) and the TCT ho ay maaring nawala noong pecha 25 ng Hunyo, 1990 natuklasan ko nawala ito noong 27 ng Hunyo, nang itong nasabing TCT, ay aking ipa-seserox’ (par. 16, p. 1. Exh. 4).

x x x

In the meantime, Prudencio and Serlina, who had not been able to register the sale to them because of the ailment of Prudencio asked a real estate agent, Anita de la Vega, to help them in the registration of Deed of Sale (Exh. 1, Exh. B.). They knew de la Vega as she used to frequent a real estate agent living in their place. When they were told that for the P300,000.00 consideration, they would need around P20,000.00 to include capital gains taxes, she gave P21,000.00. The mother of de la Vega was supposed to know many people in the Register of Deeds. The new title (Exh. “C”) was delivered on August 10, 1990 to Serlina. She had to give an additional “2,000.00 to de la Vega for other expenses.

Prudencio and Serlina Nobela were surprised to receive an invitation from Col. Nestor E. Cruz (Exh. “5”) on August 17, 1990, to go to his office regarding the complaint of Potenciano for Estafa and Theft.

When they went to Col. Cruz nothing happened but they were shocked to receive a subpoena from the Fiscal’s Office. Maccay was not there and Prudencio was quite sick.

Serlina went to the Register of Deeds of Marikina to find out why they were accused and she was astonished to discover (Exh. “6”) as the Deed of Sale registered by de la Vega under the name of Linda Cruz. She also found the payments of the capital gains tax as only P1,000.00 plus. Then she realized the reason for the alleged falsification charge of Potenciano alias Angelita Barba and Oscar Maccay. The deed

of sale given to them (Exh. “1”) for P300,000.00 which they paid the Maccays was not the one registered but one which obviously was forged by de la Vega and her mother Juanita Magcaling in order to make more money from the registration transaction. They filed a complaint against de la Vega and Juanita Magcaling which is still pending in court at Judge Alfredo Flores’ sala.[2]

Petitioner Maccay filed the criminal complaint against respondent spouses for Estafathrough Falsification of Public Document before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. The Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed the Information for Estafawith the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85961.

After trial, the trial court found respondent spouses innocent and ordered petitionersto reimburse respondent spouses P300,000 and to pay damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioners appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the trial court’s Decision. The appellate court also denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

The Rulings of the Trial and Appellate Courts

The trial court acquitted respondent spouses and found that petitioners swindled respondent spouses. The trial court declared that petitioner Maccay filed the Estafa charge against respondent spouses to turn the tables on respondent spouses, the victims of the swindling. The trial court ordered petitioners to pay respondent spouses P390,000 as damages, to wit:

In view of the foregoing, this court finds that the prosecution has not proven the Accused Prudencio Nobela and Serlina Nobela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime charged and hereby acquits them. The complainants Oscar Maccay and Adelaida E. Potenciano are hereby ordered to reimburse Prudencio Nobela and Serlina Nobela the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) paid to them by the accused spouses in the sale of the litigated property. Further the complainants Oscar Maccay and Adelaida Potenciano are hereby ordered to pay P50,000.00 to Prudencio Nobela and Serlina Nobela as moral damages and

P40,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court reasoned that the award of damages was justified because it was “in the nature of acounterclaim and as the very defense put up by the accused [respondents] in the criminal proceedings x x x.”[4]

The Issues

Petitioners seek a reversal and raise the following issues for resolution:

1. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT MAY RULE ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF COMPLAINANTIN A CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE CIVIL ACTION WAS NOT RESERVED OR FILED SEPARATELY;

2. WHETHER A WITNESS, WHO IS NOT A PARTY TO THE CASE, MAY BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES.

The third issue raised by the petitioners, assailing the appellate court’s affirmation of the trial court’s factual findings, deserves no consideration. A Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law.[5] Findings of fact are not reviewable, except in clearly meritorious instances.[6] This Court is not a trier of facts.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The

task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper,to determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainant’s civil liability, if any.

The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution witness Potenciano, as part of the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse the P300,000 and pay damages to the accused respondent spouses. This Court ruled inCabaero v. Hon. Cantos[7] that a court trying a criminal case should limit itself to the criminal and civil liability of the accused, thus:

[Thus,] the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or third-party complaint, if any) should be set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time.

The Court recently reiterated this ruling in Casupanan v. Laroya[8] and Republic v. Court of Appeals.[9]

The appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s award of damages by justifying it as a counterclaim. Nothing in the records shows that respondent spouses filed or attempted to file a counterclaim. The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure prohibit counterclaims in criminal cases. Section 1 of Rule 111 provides:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —

(a) x x x

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused inthe criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

This paragraph addresses the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero on the “absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution of impliedly instituted civil action and the

necessary consequences and implications thereof.” In the present case, the civil liability of petitioners for swindling respondent spouses and for maliciously filing a baseless suit must be litigated in a separate proceeding.

The trial court also erred in holding prosecution witness petitioner Potenciano, together with complainant petitioner Maccay, liable for damages to respondent spouses. A judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action.[10] A decision of a court cannot operate to divest the rights of a person who is not a partyto the case.[11] The records clearly show that petitioner Potenciano is not a party tothis case. The Information filed by the prosecutor had only petitioner Maccay as its complainant.[12] The Verification attached to the Information had only petitioner Maccay signing as complainant. Nothing in the records shows that petitioner Potenciano played a role other than being a witness for the prosecution. To rule otherwise would violate petitioner Potenciano’s constitutional right to due process.

Petitioners admit that title to the lot is now in the name of respondent spouses. Petitioners admit the validity of the cancellation of TCT No. 473584 and the issuanceof TCT No. 188289 in favor of respondent spouses. Petitioners argue that since respondent spouses already acquired the lot in exchange for P300,000, there is no basis for the order requiring petitioners to reimburse respondent spouses the P300,000.[13]

However, petitioners also argue that respondent spouses acquired their title through fraud. Petitioners must decide which version they want to advance. Petitioners cannot argue that the title of respondent spouses is valid to avoid reimbursing respondent spouses, at the same time claim that respondent spouses acquired their title through fraud to turn the tables on respondent spouses who might sue petitioners for swindling. Petitioners’ inconsistent arguments reveal their dishonesty even to the courts. Petitioners should not forget that the trial and appellate courts found that petitioners perpetrated a vicious scam on respondent spouses who are clearly the hapless victims here.

Respondent spouses have suffered enough. Respondent Prudencio died while tryingto defend their property. Respondent Serlina is ailing and suffering from severe complications due to the strain of litigation. While this Court is constrained to grant the instant petition due to the trial court’s procedural error, we stress that the trial court adjudicated correctly the substantive matter of the case. Petitioners unconscionably used their intelligence and position to swindle the respondent

spouses of their life savings, abusing their hospitality and kindness in the process. Petitioners have the temerity to turn the tables on the poor couple by abusing the legal processes. This Court will not allow the legal processes to serve as tool for swindlers. We promulgate this Decision without prejudice to the filing by respondent Serlina of a claim for damages against petitioners.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 70 dated 26 January 1995 in Criminal Case No. 85961 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. The order to reimburse the P300,000 to respondent spouses Prudencio and Serlina Nobela is deleted;

2. The award of P50,000 as moral damages and the award of P40,000 as attorney’s fees are likewise deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (ART 36)

FIRST DIVISION

KRIZIA KATRINA TY-DE ZUZUARREGUI,

Petitioner,

- versus -

THE HON. JOSELITO C. VILLAROSA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 66 of the RTC of Makati City, and FANNIE TORRES-TY,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 183788

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

April 5, 2010

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DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions dated August 23, 2007[2] and July 14, 2008[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner seeking the reversal of the November 16, 2006 and March 9, 2007 Orders[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 66, which found that there was no prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal actions against petitioner.

The following facts are established:

Sometime in August 2000, Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi (Rosemary), the sister of petitioner’s late father Alexander Torres Ty, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of her mother, Bella Torres (Bella), before the RTC of Pasig City.[5] Petitioner initially opposed[6] Rosemary’s petition, but they eventually reached an amicable settlement and entered into a compromise agreement which they submitted to the RTC for approval.[7] In a Decision[8] dated November 19, 2002, the RTC approved the compromise agreement.

Subsequently, two (2) of Rosemary’s alleged siblings, Peter Torres Ty (Peter) and Catherine Torres Ty-Chavez (Catherine), filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul Judgment Approving Compromise Agreement, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87222.[9] Peter and Catherine claimed that they are also biological children of the late Bella, and are entitled to participate in the settlement of the latter’s estate. Later, private respondent Fannie Torres-Ty (Fannie), who likewise claimed to be a biological child of the late Bella and therefore also entitled to inherit from her, filed a petition-in-intervention in the action for annulment of judgment.[10]

Peter, Catherine, and Fannie alleged that upon the death of Bella, they held a number of discussions pertaining to the settlement of the latter’s estate. Rosemary,their elder sister, promised to take care of the processing of papers so that the estate may be divided among them in the manner provided by law. However, in subsequent discussions, Rosemary made known to them her intention to get a disproportionately larger share of the estate, but they did not agree. No agreement was reached and as far as they know, no progress was made towards the settlement of Bella’s estate. They were not aware that Rosemary had filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and that a judgment by compromise agreement was rendered by the RTC of Pasig City. Rosemary had falsely averred that aside from herself, petitioner, who was her niece, was the only other heir of Bella. In petitioner’s opposition, it was likewise averred that petitioner and Rosemary were the only heirs of Bella. The subsequent compromise agreementcontained similar averments, and it was not disclosed that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were also Bella’s heirs. It was only sometime in June 2004 that they came toknow of the decision by compromise agreement of the Pasig City RTC.

Petitioner and Rosemary filed their answers[11] to the petition for annulment of judgment and the petition-in-intervention. They raised similar defenses. They denied that Peter, Catherine, and Fannie were heirs of Bella for, as far as they knew,the three (3) were literally purchased from third persons who represented to Bella and the latter’s common-law husband, Alejandro Ty, that they were abandoned children. Bella and Alejandro took pity on the three (3) and brought them up as their own. This was known within the family circle, but was not disclosed to Peter, Catherine, and Fannie in order to protect them from the stigma of knowing they were unwanted children. However, Alejandro and Bella did not legally adopt them; hence, they were never conferred the rights of legitimate children.

While the action for annulment of judgment was pending before the Court of Appeals, Fannie filed a complaint[12] for falsification and perjury against petitioner and Rosemary. Fannie alleged that petitioner and Rosemary falsely and maliciously stated in the pertinent pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City that the late Bellahad only two (2) heirs, namely the two (2) of them. Petitioner and Rosemary forthwith filed a joint motion to suspend the preliminary investigation on the groundof a pending prejudicial question before the Court of Appeals.[13] They argued that the issue of whether Peter, Catherine, and Fannie are related to Bella and therefore legal heirs of the latter was pending before the Court of Appeals. The investigating prosecutor denied the joint motion and found probable cause against petitioner and Rosemary for two (2) counts each of falsification of public documents.[14] The prosecutor held that the issue before the Court of Appeals is the validity of the compromise agreement which is not determinative of the criminal case which involves the liability of petitioner and Rosemary for falsification, allegedly for willfully making the false statements in the opposition to the petition for letters of administration and in the subsequent compromise agreement filed before the RTC ofPasig City.

On December 20, 2005, three (3) informations[15] against petitioner and Rosemary were thus filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 61.

Petitioner filed a petition for review[16] with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a motion to defer proceedings[17] before the MeTC on the ground of the pending appeal before the DOJ. Also, petitioner and Rosemary filed with the MeTC separate motions to suspend proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question.[18] However, petitioner’s appeal was dismissed by the DOJ,[19] while her motions before the MeTC were denied by the said court.[20] The MeTC agreed with the prosecutor that the issue before the Court of Appeals in the action for annulment of judgment is the validity of the compromise agreement while the criminal case involves their liability for falsification of public documents. The MeTC also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.[21]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition[22] with the

RTC of Makati City, Branch 66. In an Order[23] dated November 16, 2006, the RTC denied the petition on the ground that there was no prejudicial question; hence, the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings. The RTC held that there was no prejudicial question as the quantum of evidence in the civil action for annulment of judgment differs from the quantum of evidence required in the criminal action for falsification of public documents. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration[24] was also denied by the RTC in its Order[25] dated March 9, 2007.

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC’s orders. In its August 23, 2007 Resolution,[26] the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by petitioner’s counsel and not by petitioner herself. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in the July 14, 2008 Resolution[27] of the Court of Appeals.

Hence, the present recourse.

Petitioner alleges that:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONFOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING WAS SIGNED BY COUNSEL ALLEGEDLY IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 3, RULE 46, IN RELATION TO SEC. 1 RULE 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT NULLIFYING THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JOSELITO VILLAROSA ON THE GROUND THAT THE SAME WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.[28]

The petition is meritorious.

Under Rule 46, Section 3, paragraph 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, petitions for certiorari must be verified and accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.[29] The primary question that has to be resolved in this case is whether the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, erroneously signed by counsel, may be cured by subsequent compliance.[30]

Generally, subsequent compliance with the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping does not excuse a party from failure to comply in the first instance.[31] A certification of the plaintiff’s counsel will not suffice for the reason that it is the petitioner, and not the counsel, who is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or caused the filing of a petition.[32] A certification against forum shopping signed by counsel is a defective certification that is equivalent to non-compliance with the requirement and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.[33]

However, there are instances when we treated compliance with the rule with relative liberality, especially when there are circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.[34]

In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,[35] while we said that, strictly, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification, the verification, signed by petitioner’s counsel in said case, is substantial compliance inasmuch as it served the purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of another action or proceeding involving the same issues. We then explained that procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of justice which should be used to achieve such end and not to derail it.[36]

In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,[37] we categorically stated that while the petition was flawed as the certification of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, such procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.[38] Finally, the Court has also on occasion held that the party need not sign the verification; a party’s representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.[39]

Here, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioner’s counsel. Upon receipt of the resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing her petition for non-compliance with the rules, petitioner submitted, together with her motion for reconsideration, a verification and certification signed by her in compliance with the said rule.[40] We deem this to be sufficient compliance especially in view of the merits of the case, which may be considered asa special circumstance or a compelling reason that would justify tempering the hardconsequence of the procedural requirement on non-forum shopping.[41]

On the second assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioner’s prayer for a writ of certiorari and prohibition, we likewise find for petitioner.

Under Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, a criminal action may be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action, to wit:

SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial questionin a civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend a criminal action, it must appear not only that said civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[42] The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two (2) conflicting decisions.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause thesuspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, thefollowing requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.[43]

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or thereis no necessity “that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,” the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.[44] Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.[45]

As stated, the determination of whether the proceedings may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial question rests on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the civil case are so related with the issues raised in the criminal case such that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would also determine the judgment in the criminal case.

A perusal of the allegations in the petition to annul judgment shows that CA-G.R. SP No. 87222 pending before the Court of Appeals is principally for the determination of the validity of the compromise agreement which did not include Peter, Catherine, and Fannie as heirs of Bella. Peter, Catherine, and Fannie presented evidence to prove that they are also biological children of Bella and Alejandro. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the MeTC involve the determination of whether petitioner committed falsification of public documents in executing pleadings containing untruthful statements that she and Rosemary were the only legal heirs of Bella.

It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of

the petitioner in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents. The criminal cases arose out of the claim of Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they are also the legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that they are not biological children of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in her estate as heirs, there is no more basis to proceed with the criminal cases against petitioner who could not have committed falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City, the truth of her statements regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been judicially settled.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 23, 2007 and July 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98978 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The criminal proceedings against petitioner Krizia Katrina Ty-De Zuzuarregui in Criminal Case Nos. 343812 to 343814 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61 are hereby ordered SUSPENDED until the final resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 87222.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,*

ABAD, and

VILLARAMA, JR.,** JJ.

MARIA CHRYSANTINE

L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated:

OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents. September 13, 2010

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D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent)filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the

Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3] holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary

injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.

The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted

Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as perthe stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.[8] Respondent’s petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of thecriminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of theissue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[11]

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,[12] which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants,or his spouse.”[13] The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, theissue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue inthe criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide,the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will.[16] At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that “the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is

the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebrothat “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.”[18] In fact, the Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.”[19]

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolutionof the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

SO ORDERED.

epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6971 February 23, 2006

QUIRINO TOMLIN II, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. SALVADOR N. MOYA II, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On December 1, 2003, Quirino Tomlin II filed a complaint1 before the Commission

on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Salvador N. Moya II for allegedly reneging on his monetary obligations and for having issued bouncing checks; thereby violating the Code of Professional Responsibility2 and Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.3

Complainant averred that respondent borrowed from him P600,000.00 partially covered by seven postdated checks. However, when complainant tried to encash them on their respective due dates, the checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank, to wit:

Check No. Due Date Amount Reason for Dishonor

MOB 1011326 May 16, 2001 P13,500.00 RTCOCI

MOB 1011311 June 11, 2001 P30,000.00 RTCOCI

MOB 1011328 June 17, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011313 August 12, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011329 August 16, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011314 August 19, 2001 P50,000.00 Account Closed

MOB 1011330 September 18, 2001 P5,000.00 Account Closed

Complainant made several demands, the last being a formal letter4 sent on September 25, 2002;5 however, respondent still failed and refused to pay his debt without justifiable reason. Consequently, complainant instituted a case for seven counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.6 In addition, he filed the instant case for respondent’s disbarment.

On December 1, 2003, respondent was directed to file his answer but instead he filed several motions for extension of time to file a responsive pleading7 and a motion to dismiss complaint.8

Respondent alleged that the case should be dismissed outright for violation of the rule on non-forum shopping. He argued that complainant did not inform the IBP about the cases he filed for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.9 Respondent argued that thefiling of the administrative case despite the pendency of the criminal cases is a formof harassment which should not be allowed.

On April 28, 2004, the Commission on Bar Discipline denied10 the motion to dismissfor being a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 3 of its Rules of Procedure. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration11 was likewise denied on June 16, 2004.12

Thereafter, respondent filed several motions for extension of time to file an answer.13 His last motion for extension was however denied for lack of merit. Consequently, the Commission on Bar Discipline declared him in default.14

Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings on the ground of prescription15and omnibus motion to recall the default order.16

On January 3, 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submittheir respective verified position papers after which the case shall be considered submitted for resolution.17

Only the complainant submitted his position paper.18

In the Report and Recommendation dated March 31, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent failed to file an answer and/or position paper despite several requests for extension, in disregard of the orders of the IBP. Moreover, it was observed that the pending criminal action against respondent doesnot pose a prejudicial question to the resolution of the issues in the present administrative case. Hence, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year.

On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the Investigating Commissioner, but modified the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from one year to two years.

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing, the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.19 Lawyers may be disciplined– whether in their professional or in their private capacity – for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.20 Any gross misconduct of a lawyer in his profession or private capacity is a ground for the imposition of the penalty of suspension or disbarment because good character is an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of suchprivilege.21

In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complainant but offered no justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he acknowledged his financial obligations to the complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct.22 Respondent must be reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to

faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations.23

The contention that complainant violated the rule against forum shopping with the filing of this administrative complaint is bereft of merit. There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another24 or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition thatone or the other court would make a favorable disposition.25 Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.26 Moreover, Criminal Case Nos. 6-367-03 to 6-373-03 for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 refer to the respondent’s act of making or drawing and issuance of worthless checks; while the present administrative case seeks to discipline respondent as a lawyer for his dishonest act of failing to pay his debt in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.lavvph!1.net

Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of criminal cases. The burden of proof in a criminal case is guilt beyond reasonable doubt while in an administrative case, only preponderance of evidence is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.27

Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless from applying the rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal profession during the whole period that the criminal case ispending final disposition when the objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.28

Finally, we note that respondent failed to file his answer and verified position paper despite several opportunities given him by the IBP, that is, from the time he received on December 20, 200329 the Order30 of the IBP requiring him to file an answer until March 31, 2005 when the Investigating Commissioner submitted the Report and Recommendation. Instead, he filed several motions for extension of time, motion to dismiss the complaint, motion for reconsideration, manifestation with motion to terminate proceedings, and omnibus motion to recall the default order. Until the end, respondent offered no plausible explanation for his failure to pay his debts. Instead, he kept on insisting, on plainly unmeritorious grounds, the dismissal of the complaint. Verily, respondent’s failure to comply with the orders of the IBP without justifiable reason manifests his disrespect of judicial authorities.31 Respondent should be reminded that the IBP has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his membership therein.32

In view of the foregoing, we find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years as recommended by the IBP commensurate under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two years, effective immediately, with a warning that any further infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to all courts as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

BOOK 1 – PERSONS

TITLE 1. CIVIL PERSONALITY

CHAPTER 1. ARTS 37-39

CHAPTER 2. ARTS 40-43

geluz vs court of appeals 2 scra 801

July 20 1961

Fact of the Case:

Respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva who voluntarily procuredherabortion, filed an action to recover damages against petitioner Antonio Lazo

whocaused the same. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Lazo. When thecase reached the Court of Appeals but it sustained the award to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals and the Trial Court predicated the award of damages in the amount of P3,000upon the provision of Article 2206 of the Civil Code for the death of person.

Issue:

(1)Whether or not an action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unbornchild.(2)Whether or not the unborn child acquires civil personality.

Held:

No action for damages could be instituted on unborn child on account of injuriesit received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parent or heirs. Thelaws states that civil personality of the child commences at the time of its conception, provided that it be born alive or if it had an intrauterine life of less the seven months, thefoetus is not deemed born if it dies within twenty four hours after its complete deliveryfrom the maternal womb.

THIRD DIVISION

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTROSTEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-

SUPER),

Respondents.

G.R. No. 182836

Present:

CARPIO, J.,

Chairperson,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA, and

PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 13, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution[2] dated 9 May2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution[3] dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño (Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano (Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

x x x x

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE—The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the employee’s legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:

2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

x x x x

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

x x x x

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE—The Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:

x x x x

4.3 DEPENDENTS—Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]

The claim was based on the death of Hortillano’s unborn child. Hortillano’s wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano’s claims for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR).[9] In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11]

When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, [12] Replies,[13] and Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montaño.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependentshould have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employeeof Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.[15] Dugan’s child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano’s child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees’ unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano’s case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it neverneeded any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA – the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits – bound the Unionto the legally accepted definition of the latter term.

Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted “company practice.”

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties’ CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is “death”; (2) such death must be of employee’s “dependent”; and (3) such dependent must be “legitimate”.

On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance asprovided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties’ CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is “death”; (b) such death must be of employee’s “dependent”; (c) such dependent must be “legitimate”; and (d) proper legal document to be presented.[18]

Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee’s legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four

Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.

Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[19] under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano’s claims forbereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no death of an employee’s dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality. Continental Steel pointed out that itscontention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said child’s birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano’s entitlement to bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaño’s Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steel’s] exposition on the legal sense in which the term “death” is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a “death” as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term “death of a legitimate dependent” as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel’s] theory, there can be no experience of “death” to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than “loss of human life”,especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latter’s immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel’s] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this crucial point.[20]

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack ofmerit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].[21]

In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration[23] of Continental Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the

CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death shouldbe applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montaño identified, the elements for bereavement leave under ArticleX, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relationsof the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of adependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.

It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillano’s claim for bereavement leave and other death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms “death” and “dependent” as usedin the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is

inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the child’s parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,[25] that theState must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life,then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else.” Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.” (Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillano’s claims for the same should have been

granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.[29] In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,[30] we pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary ArbitratorAtty. Allan S. Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00),respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.