perspectives on morality

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478 From Socrates to Cinema

7. Discuss the following passage from the

Koran: "0 Prophet! urge the believers towar;

if there are twenty patient ones of you they

shall overcometwo hundred, and if there are

a hundred of you they shall overcome a

thousand of those who disbelieve, because

they are a people who do not understand"

(8.65).

ARISTOTLE

HAPPINESS AND VIRTUE

ristotle claims that the virtues are those characteristics that enable human beings to

live well in communities. Virtue is the ability tobe reasonable in our actions, desires,

and emotions. Anyone who manages their skills and their opportunities well is

considered virtuous. According to Aristotle, all human beings seek happiness, and being

virtuous makes us happy-it enables us to achieve ast~te of well-being (eudaimonia) .

Eudaimonia refers to the objective character of one's life rather than to a particular

psychological state. Aristotle believed that as human beings we are happy ifwe perform our

human "function" well and that our function~s to act in accordance with reason.,Furthermore,

it is reason that controls our emotions and-other nonrational indicators like the desire for

pleasure, so that we avoid both eXCe~~'and"deficiency,and thus act virtuously. In addition,, < - . , ' I

individual eudaimonia requires prop~tsocial institutions as well as good character.

~"Consequently,ethics, for Aristotle, is taken to be a branch of politics. However, unlike Jeremy

Bentham (1748~1832),who famously equates happiness solely with "pleasure and the absence

of pain," Aristotle does not equate happiness with pleasure, nor with honor or wealth. Rather,

happiness is an activity of the soul in accordancewith virtue. Right habits are acquired by living

well, and these habits are, in fact, virtues. These virtues are the best guarantee ofa happy life.

Aristotle distinguishes between two types of virtues: moral and intellectual. Intellectual

virtues may be taught, whereas moral virtues must be lived in order tobe learned. Moral virtue

comes from habit and generally isa state of character that represents a mean between the vices

of excess and deficiency. This concept of moderation, or the Golden Mean, is at the heart of

Aristotle's virtue theory. Courage, for example, is presented as a virtue that represents a mean

between the extremes of rashness (an excess) and cowardice (a deficiency). While the moral

virtues are important to the achievement of a state of well-being, it is the intellectual virtues

found in the activity of contemplation or reason that produce the most perfect happiness.

Nevertheless, while the contemplative life is the ultimate happy life, Aristotle says that it does

not hurt tohave friends, money, and good looks.

Aristotle's virtue ethics (aswell asConfucius's) emphasizes the whole person rather than

individual actions. Critics of virtue ethics argue that people turn to ethics to answer questions

about the morality of action. When people are facedwith a concrete moral problem, they want

to know what to do, not what kind of character they should cultivate over a lifetime. Virtue

ethics does not answer common moral questions such as "What should I do now in this

situation?" One might respond to this criticism of virtue ethics by saying that this is the wrong

question to ask. "What would a virtuous or decent person do now in this situation?" is the

right question. Ifone asks the question in thisway, then virtue ethics can provide a response.

Aristotle (384-322 B.CE.) is one of the most influential philosophers from Greek

antiquity. Born in Stagyra, Macedonia, he is often called the "Sagirite." He was the son of



'come a

because

erstand"

Of Morality and Art

Nicomachus, a physician to the king, At age eighteen, he entered Plato's Academy; where

studied for nearly twenty years. After Plato's death, when a rival was selected to head

Academy, Aristotle leftAthens for the island of Lesbos. Around 343, he became the tutor of

young Alexander the Great, son ofKing Philip ofMacedon, a position he held for three years

In335, Artistotle returned to Athens to found his own school, the Lyceum, which w

often called the Peripatetic School because Aristotle was in the habit of walking around

courtyard of the school when he lectured. Upon Alexander's death in 323 B.C.E., an

....Macedonian feelings were on the rise in Athens, so Aristotle chose to leave Athens so tAthenians might not "sin twice against philosophy" (the first "sin" being the trial of Socrate

It is often said that Aristotle "knew everything," and the wide range of his writings seem

confirm this. His works investigate many topics including logic, astronomy, biology, politi

ethics, rhetoric, drama, the soul, God, and physics. The following selection is from

Nichomachean Ethics, a work in which he summarizes the ethics of fourth-century B.C

Athenians and puts forth his own ethical theory.

~ingsto

desires,

well is

L being

rticular

rmour

ermore,

sire for

idition,

araeter.

Jeremy

ibsence

Rather,

{living

life.

illectual

lvirtue

levices

teart of

a mean

~moral

virtues

piness.

it does

. ~Our discussion will be adequate if ite has as rmich

clearness as the subject-matter admits of,· for

precision is not to be sought fq/· a . l i k t i ~·fualldiscussions, any more than in all the products of

the crafts. Now fine and just actions, which

political science investigates, admit of much

variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they

may be thought to exist only by convention, and

not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar

fluctuation because they bring harm to many

people; for before now men have been undone by

reason of their wealth, and others by reason of

their courage. We must be content, then, in

speaking of such subjects and with such premises

toindicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in

speaking about things which are only for the most

part true and with premises of the same kind toreach conclusions that are no better. In the same

spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be

received; for it is the mark of an educated man to

look for precision in each class of things just so far

as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently

equally foolishto accept probable reasoning froma

mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician

scientificproofs.

Now each man judges well the things he

knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so

the man who has been educated ina subject is a

good judge of that subject, and the man who has

received an all-round education is a good judge in

general. Hence a yOllilg man is not a proper

er than

estions

want

Virtue

in this

wrong

, is the

mse,

Greek

son of

hearer of lectures on political science; for he

inexperienced in the actions that occur inlife,

its discussions start from these and are ab

these; and, further, since he tends to follow

passions, his study will be vain and unprofitab

because the end aimed at is not knowledge

action. And it makes no difference whether he

young inyears oryouthful in character; the def

does not depend on time, but on his living, a

pursuing each successive object, as pass

directs. For to such persons, as to the incontine

knowledge brings no profit; but to those w

desire and act in accordance with a ratio

principle knowledge about such matters will be

great benefit.

These remarks about the student, the sort

treatment to be expected, and the purpose ofinquiry, may be taken as our preface.

Let us resume our inquiry and state, inview

the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit a

at some good, what it is that we say politi

science aims at and what is the highest of

goods achievable by action. Verbally there is v

general agreement; for both the general run

men and people of superior refinement say tha

is happiness, and identify living well and do

well with being happy; but with regard to w

happiness is they differ, and the many do not g

the same account as the wise. For the former th

it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasu

wealth, or honour; they differ, however, from




another-and often even the same man identifies

itwith different things, with health when he is ill,

with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of

their ignorance, they admire those who proclaim

some great ideal that is above their compre-

hension. Now some thought that apart from these

many goods there is another which is self-

subsistent and causes the goodness of all these as

well. Toexamine all the opinions that have been

held were perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to

examine those that are most prevalent or that

seemtobe arguable....

Letus, however, resume our discussionfromthe

point at which we digressed. Tojudge from the

lives thatmen lead,most men, and men ofthemost

vulgar type, seem (not without some ground) to

identify the good, or happiness, v,;ith pleasure;

which is the reason, why they love the life of

enjoyment. For there are, we .may say, three ~

prominent types of life-that just menti(~n~d,the~

political, and thirdly the contemplative . li fe, Now.'

the mass ofmankind are evidently quite:slaxi~hitt

their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts,'

"but they get some ground for their view from the

fact that many of those in high places share

the tastes of Sardanapallus. A consideration of the

prominent types of life shows that, people of

superior refinement and of active disposition

identify happiness with honour; for this is,

roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But

it seems too superficial to be what we are looking

for, since it is thought to depend on those who

bestowhonour rather than onhimwho receivesit,

but the good we divine tobe something proper to

a man and not easily taken from him. Further,

men seem to pursue honour in order that theymay be assured of their goodness; at least it is by

men of practical wisdom that they seek to be

honoured, and among those who know them, and

on the ground of their virtue; clearly, then,

according to them, at any rate, virtue is better.

And perhaps one might even suppose this to be,

rather than honour, the end of the political life.

But even this appears somewhat incomplete; for

possession of virtue seems actually compatible

with being asleep, or with life-long inactivity,and,

further, with the greatest sufferings and

misfortunes; but a man who was living so no one

would call happy, unless he were maintaining a

thesis at all costs. But enough of this; for the

subject has been sufficiently treated even in the

current discussions. Third comes the contem-

plative life,which weshall consider later.

The life of money-making is one undertaken

under compulsion, and wealth isevidently not the

good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and

for the sake of something else. And so one might

rather take the afore-named objects to be ends; for

they are loved for themselves. But it is evident

that not even these are ends; yet many arguments

havebeen thrown away in support of them....

Let us again return to the good we are seeking,

and ask what it can be. It seems different in

different actionsand arts; it is differentin medicine,

in strategy, and in the other arts likewise. What

then is the goodofeach?Surelythat forwhose sake

everytlling else is done. Inmedicine this is health,

in strategy victory, in architecture a house, in any

other sphere something else, and inevery action

and pursuit the end; for it is for the sake of this

that all men do whatever else they do. Therefore,

if there is an end for all that we do, thiswill be the

good achievable by action, and if there are more

than one, these will be the goods achievable

by action.

So the argument has by a different course

reached the same point; but we must try to state

this even more clearly. Since there are evidently

more than one end, and we choose some of these

(e.g., wealth, flutes, and in general instruments)

for the sake ofsomething else, clearly not all ends

are final ends; but the chief good is evidently

something finaL Therefore, if there is only one

final end, this will be what we are seeking, and if

there are more than one, the most final of these

will be what we are seeking. Now we call thatwhich is in itself worthy of pursuit more final

than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake

of something else, and that which is never

desirable for the sake ofsomething elsemore final

than the things that are desirable both in

themselves and for the sake of that other thing,

and therefore we call final without qualification

that which is always desirable in itself and never

for the sake ofsomething else.

Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is

held to be; for this we choose always for itself and

never for the sake of something else, but honour,

pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose

indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted



en in the

contem-

from them we should still choose each of them),

but we choose them also for the sake of happiness,

judging that by means of them we shall be happy.

Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for

the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything

other than itself ....

Presumably, however, to say that happiness is

the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer

account of what it is, is still desired. This might

perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the

function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a

sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all

things that have a function or activity, the good

and the "well" is thought to reside in the function,

so would it seem to be for man, if he has a

function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner

certain functions or activities, and has man none?

Is he born without a function? rOr as eye, hand,

foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has

a function, may one lay 'it down -that rAan

similarly has a function apart from a!.tt~ese? What

then can this be? Life seems to be COl_Il'hjtii{.eveno

plants, but we are seeking what is peculian to

man. Let us exclude, therefore, the life of nutrition

and growth. Next there would be a life of

perception, but it also seems to be common even

to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There

remains, then, an active life of the element that

has a rational principle; of this, one part has such

a principle in the sense of being obedient to one,

the other in the sense of possessing one and

exercising thought. And, as "life of the rational

element" also has two meanings, we must state

that life in the sense of activity is what we mean;

for this seems to be the more proper sense of the

term. Now if the function of man is an activity of

soul which follows or implies a rational principle,

and if we say "a so-and-so" and "a good so-and-

so" have a function which is the same in kind,

e.g., a lyre-player and a good lyre-player, and so

without qualification in all cases, eminence in

respect of goodness being added to the name of

the function (for the function of a lyre-player is to

play the lyre, and that of a good lyre-player is to

do so well): if this is the case, [and we state the

function of man to be a certain kind of life, and

this to be an activity or actions of the soul

implying a rational principle, and the function of

a good man to be the good and noble performance

of these, and if any action is well performed when

dertaken

y not the

.eful and

ne might

ends; for

; evident

'guments

en . .. .

seeking,

ferent in

nedicine,

se. What

iose sake

is health,

e, in any

ry action

:e of this

herefore,

illbe the

lie more

hievable

t course

, to state

vidently

of these

.urnents)

all ends

vidently

mlyone

g, and ifof these

call that

or e final

the sake

s never

ore final

oth in

er thing,

fication

id never

1else, is

tself and

honour,

choose

resulted

O f M orality an d A rt 4

it is performed in accordance with the appropriat

excellence: if this is the case.] human good tur

out to be activity of soul in accordance wi

virtue, and if there are more than one virtue,

accordance with the best and most complete.

But we must add "in a complete life." For o

swallow does not make a summer, nor does o

day; and so too one day, or a short time, does n

make a man blessed and happy ....

We must consider it, however, in the light n

only of our conclusion and our premises, but al

of what is commonly said about it; for with a tr

view all the data harmonize, but with a false o

the facts soon clash. Now goods have be

divided into three classes, and some are describe

as external, others as relating to soul or to bod

we-call those that relate to soul most properly a

truly goods, and psychical actions and activiti

we class as relating to soul. Therefore our accou

must be sound, at least according to th

view, which is an old one and agreed on

. philosophers, It is correct also inthat we identi

the end with certain actions and activities; for th

it falls among goods of the soul and not amon

external goods. Another belief which harmonize

with our account is that the happy man lives w

and does well; for we have practically define

happiness as a sort of good life and good actio

The characteristics that are looked for

happiness seem also, all of them, to belong

what we have defined happiness as bein

For some identify happiness with virtue, som

with practical wisdom, others with a kind

philosophic wisdom, others with these, or one

these, accompanied by pleasure or not withou

pleasure; while others include also extern

prosperity. Now some of these views have be

held by many men and men of old, others by

few eminent persons; and it is not probable th

either of these should be entirely mistaken, b

rather that they should be right in at least som

one respect or even in most respects.

With those who identify happiness with virtu

or some one virtue our account is in harmony; f

to virtue belongs virtuous activity. But it make

perhaps, no small difference whether we place t

chief good in possession or in use, in state of min

or in activity. For the state of mind may ex

without producing any good result, as in a m

who is asleep or insome other way quite inactiv



482 FromSocratesto Cinema

but the activity cannot; for one who has the For this reason also the question is asked,

activity will of necessity be acting, and acting whether happiness is to be acquired by learning

well. And as ill the Olympic Games it is not the or by habituation or some other sort of training, or

most beautiful and the strongest that are crowned comes in virtue of some divine providence or

but thosewho compete (forit is some ofthese that again by chance. Now if there is any gift of the

are victorious), so those who act win, and rightly gods to men, it is reasonable that happiness

will, thenoble and good things ill life. should be god-given, and most surely god-given

Their life is also ill itself pleasant. For pleasure of allhuman things inasmuch as it is the best. But

is a state'of soul, and to each man that which he is this question would perhaps be more appropriate

said to be a lover of is pleasant; e.g.,not only is a to another inquiry: happiness seems, however,

horse pleasant to the lover of horses, and a even if it is not god-sent but comes as a result of

spectacleto the lover of sights,but alsoill the same virtue and someprocess oflearning or training, to

way just acts are pleasant to the lover of justice be among the most god-like things; for that which

and ill general virtuous acts to the lover of virtue. is the prize and end of virtue seems to be the best

Now for most men their pleasures are ill conflict thing in the world, and something god-like and

with one another because these are not by nature blessed.

pleasant, but the lovers of what is noble find It will also on this view be very generally. r

pleasant the things that are 9 Y nature pleasant; and shared; for all who are not maimed as regards

virtuous actionsare such, so that thesea~epleasant the~irpotentiality for virtue maywill it bya certain

for such men aswell as ill their own nature. Their' kind of study and care. But if it is better to be

life, therefore,has no further need ofpleasure a; C l, happy thus than by chance, it is reasonable that

sort of adventitious charm, but has its pleasun;Ci:r('~;th'e facts should be so, since everything that

itself. For, besides what we have said, the man' -, depends on the action of nature is by nature as

who cfoesnot rejoiceill noble actions is not even good as it can be, and similarly everything that

good; sinceno one would call a man just who did depends on art or any rational cause, and

not enjoy acting justly, nor any man liberal who especiallyif itdepends on the best ofall causes.To

did not enjoy liberal actions; and similarly ill all entrust to chancewhat is greatest and most noble

other cases.If this is50, virtuous actionsmust be ill would be a very defectivearrangement.

themselves pleasant. But they are also g o o d and The answer to the question we are asking is

noble, and have each of these attributes in the plain also from the definition of happiness; for it

highest degree, since the good man judges well has been said tobe a virtuous activityofsoul, of a

about these attributes; hisjudgment is such as we certain kind, Of the remaining goods, some must

have described. Happiness then is the best, necessarily pre-exist as conditions of happiness,

noblest, andmost pleasant thing intheworld. . . . and others are naturally co-operatjve and useful

Yetevidently, as we said, it needs the external as instruments. And this will be found to agree

goods as well; for it is impossible, or not easy,to with what we said at the outset; for we stated the

do noble acts without the proper equipment. In end of political science to be the best end, and

many actions we use friends and riches and political science spends most of its pains on

political power as instruments; and thereare some making the citizens to be of a certain character,

things the lack of which takes the lustre from viz. good and capableofnoble acts.

happiness, as good birth, goodly children, beauty; It is natural, then, that we call neither ox nor

for the manwho isvery ugly in appearance or ill- horse nor any other of the animalshappy; fornone

born or solitary and childless is not very likely to of them is capable of sharing ill such activity.For

be happy, and perhaps a man would be still less this reasonalsoa boyis not happy; for heisnot yet

likely ifhe had thoroughly bad children or friends capable of such acts, owing to his age; and boys

or had lost good children or friends by death. As who are called happy are being congratulated by

we said, then, happiness seems toneed this sort of reason of the hopes we have for them. For there is

prosperity ill addition; for which reason some required, as we said, not only complete virtue but

identify happiness with good fortune, though also a complete life, since many changes occur ill

others identify it with virtue. life, and all manner of chances, and the most



sked,

:ning

19 , or

:e or

f the

iness

;iven

:.But

iriateever,

lit of

19 , to

rhich

best

and

Tally

ards

dain

:0 be

that

that

re as

that

and

~s.To

table

19 is

for it

, ofa

must

ness,

seful

1 9 r e e

ithe

and

: nor

none

: For

it yet

boys

d by

e re IS

~but

u r i n

most

prosperous may fall into great misfortunes in old

age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan Cycle; and

one who has experienced such chances and has

ended wretchedly no one callshappy....

Since happiness is an activity of soul in

accordance with perfect virtue, we must consider

the nl'l-tureof virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see

better the nature ofhappiness ....

"Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual

and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes

both its birth and its growth to teaching (for

which reason it requires experience and time),

while moral virtue comes about as a result of

habit.... From this it is also plain that none of the

moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing

that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to

its nature. For instance the stone which by nature

moves downwards cannot be habituated tomove

upwards, not evert if one tries to train it by

throwing it up ten thousand times; nor call.fire b~

habituated tomove downwards, nor cari anything

else that by nature behaves in one waY:-:J.J~'U;ained

to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor

e " contrary tonature do the virtues arise in us; rather

we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are

made perfect by habit. ...

Wemust, however, not only describe virtue as

a state of character, but also say what sort of state

it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue or

excellence both brings into good condition the

thing ofwhich it is the excellence and makes the

work ofthat thing be donewen; e.g., the excellence

of the eye makes both the eye and its work good;

for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see

well. Similarly the excellenceofthe horse makes a

horse both good in itself and good at running and

at carrying its rider and at awaiting the attack of

the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every case,

the virtue ofman alsowill be the state ofcharacter

which makes a man good and which makes him

do his own work well.

How this is to happen we have stated already,

but it will be made plain also by the following

consideration of the specific nature of virtue. In

everything that is continuous and divisible it is

possible to take more, less, or an equal amount,

and that either in terms of the thing itself or

relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate

between excess and defect. By the intermediate in

the object I mean that which is equidistant from

Of Morality and Art 483

each of the extremes, which is one and the same

for all men; by the intermediate relatively to

us that which is neither too much nor too little-

and this is not one, nor the same for all. For

instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the

intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for

it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount;

this is intermediate according to arithmetical

proportion. But the intermediate relatively to us is

not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for

a particular person to eat and two too little, it does

not follow that the trainer will order six pounds;

for this also is perhaps too much for the person

who is to take it, or too little-too little for Milo,

too much for the beginner in athletic exercises.

The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus a

master of any art avoids excess and defect, but

seeks the intermediate and chooses this-the

intermediate not in the objectbut relatively to us.

If is thus, then, that every art does its work

well-by looking to the intermediate and judging

its works by this standard (so that we often say of

good works of art that it is not possible either to

take away or to add anything, implying that

excess and defect destroy the goodness of the

works of art, while the mean preserves it; and

good artists, as we say, look to this in their work),

and if, further, virtue is more exactand better than

any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have

the quality of aiming at the intermediate. Imean

moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with

passions and actions, and in these there is excess,

defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both

fear and confidence and appetite and anger and

pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt

both too much and too little, and inboth cases not

well; but to feel them at the right times, with

reference to the right objects, towards the right

people, with the right motive, and in the right

way, is what is both intermediate and best,

and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with

regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and

the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with

passions and actions, in which excess is a form

of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate

is praised and is a form of success; and being

praised and being successful are both charac-

teristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of

mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is

intermediate.



Wemust, however, not only make this general

statement, but also apply it to the individual facts.

For among statements about conduct those which

are general apply more widely, but those which

are particular aremore genuine, sinceconduct has

to do with individual cases, and our statements

must harmonize with the facts in these cases.We

may take these cases from our table.With regard

to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the

mean; of the people who exceed,he who exceeds

Virtue,then, is a state of character concernedwith in fearlessness has no name (many of the states

choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to have no name), while the man who exceeds in

us, this being determined by a rational principle, confidenceis rash, and hewho exceedsin fearand

and by that principle by which the man of falls short in confidenceis a coward. With regard

practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a to pleasures and pains~not all of them, and not

mean between two vices, that which depends on so much with regard to the pains=-the mean is

excess and that which depends on defect; and temperance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons

again it is a mean because the vices respectively deficientwith regard to the pleasures arenot often

fall short of or exceed what "is right in both found; hence such persons also have received no

passions and actions, while virtue both 'finds and' nailie. Butlet us call them "insensible." •

chooses that which is intermediate."Hence _ i n , Withregard to givingand taking ofmoney the

respect of its substance and the definitionwhti;:1y".·~;rnean is liberality,theexcess and the defectprodi-

states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard r o ' , . galny and meanness. In these actions people

what is'best and right an extreme. exceedand fall short incontraryways; theprodigal

But not every action nor every passion admits exceedsin spending and fallsshort in taking,while

of a mean; for some have names that already the mean man exceedsin taking and falls short in

imply badness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy, spending.... Withregard tomoney there arealso

and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; other dispositions-c.amean, magnificence(for the

for all of these and suchlike things imply by their magnificentman differsfrom the liberalman; the

names that they are themselves bad, and not the former dealswith large sums, the latter with small

excessesor deficienciesof them. It is not possible, ones),and excess,tastelessness,and vulgarity,and

then, ever to be right with regard to them; one a deficiency,niggardliness; these differ from the

must always be wrong. Nor does goodness or statesopposed toliberality...

badness with regard to such things depend on Thatmoral virtue is a mean, then, and in what

committing adultery with the right woman, at the sense it is so, and that it is a mean between two

right time, and in the right way, but simply to do vices, the one involving excess, the other defi-

any of them is to go wrong. Itwould be equally ciency;and that it is such because its character is

absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly; to aim at what is intermediate in passions and in

and voluptuous action there should be amean, an actions, has been sufficientlystated. Hence also it

excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is

would be a mean of excess and of deficiency,an no easy task to find the middle, e.g., to find the

excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency. middle of a circleis not for everyone but for him

But as there is no excess and deficiency of who knows; so,too, anyone canget angry~that is

temperance and courage because what is inter- easy~or give or spend money; but to do this to

mediate is in a sense an extreme, so too of the the right person, to the right extent, at the right

actions we have mentioned there is no mean nor time, with the right motive, and in the right way,

any excess and deficiency;but however they are that is not for everyone, nor is it easy; wherefore

done they are wrong; for in general there is goodness isboth rare and laudable and noble....

neither a mean of excess and deficiency, nor If happiness is activity in accordance with

excessand deficiencyof amean. virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in


Again, it ispossibleto failinmanyways(forevil

belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the

Pythagoreansconjectured,and good to that of the

limited), while to succeed is possible only in one

way (forwhichreasonalsoone iseasyand theother

difficult-i-to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult);

for these reasons also, then, excessand defect are

characteristicofvice,and themeanofvirtue;

.. .

For men are good inbutone way, but bad inmany.



ral

ts.

ch

ch

accordance with the highest virtue; and this will

be that of the best thing ill us. Whether it be

reason or something else that is this element

which is thought tobe our natural ruler and guide

and to take thought of things noble and divine,

whether it be itself also divine or only the most

divine .element in us, the activity of this in

accordance with its proper virtue will be perfect

happiness. That this activity is contemplative we

have already said.

Now this would seem to be in agreement both

with what we said before and with the truth. For,

firstly, this activity is the best (since not only is

reason the best thing in us, but the objects of

reason are the best of knowable objects); and,

secondly; it is the most continuous, since we can

contemplate truth more continuously than we

can do anything. An1 we think happilless has

pleasure mingled with it, but the activity of

philosophic wisdom is admittedly the pleasantest

of virtuous activities; at all events the pursclJofit "

is thought to offer pleasures ma rv e ll ou sf or " £ :q e if,(

purity and their enduringness, and it is t o ' be I

e'xpectedthat those who knowwill pass their time

more pleasantly than those who inquire. And the

self-sufficiency that is spoken of must belong

most to the contemplative activity: For while a

philosopher, as well as a just man or one

possessing any other virtue, needs the necessaries

of life, when they are sufficiently equipped with

things of that sort the just man needs people

towards whom and with whom he shall act justly;

and the temperate man, the brave man, and

each of the others is in the same case, but the

philosopher, even when by himself, can

contemplate truth, and the better the wiser he is;he can perhaps do so better if he has fellow-

workers, but still he is the most self-sufficient.

And this activity alone would seem to be loved

for its own sake; for nothing arises from it apart

from the contemplating, while from practical

activities we gain more or less apart from the

action. And happiness is thought to depend on

leisure; for we arebusy that we may have leisure,

and makewar that we may live in peace. Now the

activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in

political or military affairs, but the actions

concerned with these seem to be unleisurely.

Warlike actions are completely so (for no one

chooses to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake

ra s

its

life

rd

he

ds

:es

in

Cld

rd

lot

is

ns

en

ClO

he

li-

le

;al

ile

ill

so

he

he

ill

1d

I : t e

.at

>" 0

fi-

is

in

it

is

fte

m

is

to

ht

L Y ,

re

th

in

Of Moralit y and Art 485

of being at war; anyone would seem absolutely

murderous if he were to make enemies of his

friends ill order to bring about battle and

slaughter); but the action of the statesman is also

unleisurely, and-apart from the political action

itself-aims at despotic power and honours, or at

all events happiness, for him and his fellow

citizen-a happiness different from political

action, and evidently sought asbeing different. So

if among virtuous actions political and military

actions are distinguished by nobility and

greatness, and these are unleisurely and aim at an

end and are not desirable for their own sake, but

the activity of reason, which is contemplative,

seems both to be superior in serious worth and to

aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its

pleasure proper to itself (and this augments the

activity), and the self-sufficiency; leisureliness,

unweariedness (so far as this is possible for man),

and all the other attributes ascsibed to the

supremely happy man are evidently those

connected with this activity; it follows that this

will be the complete happiness of man, if to be

allowed a complete term of life (for none of the

attributes ofhappiness is incomplete).

But such a lifewould be too high for man; for it

is not ill so far as he is man that he will live so, but

ill so far as something divine is present ill him;

and by so much as this is superior to our

composite nature is its activity superior to that

which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue. If

reason is divine, then in comparison with man,

the life according to it is divine in comparison

with human life. But we must not follow those

who advise us, being men, to think of human

things, and, being mortal, of mortal things, butmust, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal,

and strain every nerve to live in accordance with

the best thing in us; for even if itbe small in bulk,

much more does it ill power and worth surpass

everything. This would seem, too, tobe each man

himself, since it is the authoritative and better part

of him. Itwould be strange, then, if he were to

choose not the lifeofhis selfbut that ofsomething

else. And what we said before will apply now;

that which is proper to each thing is by nature

best and most pleasant for each thing; for man,

therefore, the life according to reason is best and

pleasantest, since reason more than anything else

isman. This lifetherefore is also the happiest.




But in a secondary degree the life in inso far ashe is a man and liveswith anumber of

accordancewith the other kind ofvirtue ishappy; people, he chooses to do virtuous acts; he will

for the activitiesin accordancewith this befit our thereforeneed suchaids to living a human life.

human estate. Just and brave acts, and other But that perfect happiness is a contemplative

virtuous acts, we do in relation to each other, activity will appear from the following

observing our respective duties with regard to consideration as well. We assume the gods to be

contracts and services and all manner of actions above all other beings blessed and happy; but

and with regard topassions; and allofthese seem' what sort ofactionsmust we assignto them?Acts

tobe typicallyhuman. Someofthem seemevento of justice?Willnot the gods seem absurd if they

arise from the body, and virtue of character tobe make contracts and return deposits, and so on?

in many ways bound up with the passions. Acts of a brave man, then, confronting dangers

Practical wisdom, too, is linked to virtue of and running risksbecause it isnoble to do so? Or

character, and this to practical wisdom, since the liberal acts? Towhom will they give? It will be

principles of practical wisdom are in accordance strange if they are really to have money or

with the moral virtues and rightness in morals is anything 'Of the kind. And what would their

in accordance with practical wisdom. Being temperate acts be? Is not such praise tasteless,

connected with the passions also., the moral since they have no bad appetites? If we were to

virtues must belong ta t our,compositenature; and run through them all, the circumstancesof action

the virtues ofour compositenature arehuman; so, ~ would be found trivial and unworthy of gods.

therefore, are the life and the happiness. which ~ Still, everyone supposes that they live and

correspond to these. The excellenceof the p;;<!~o_n.,therefore that they are active;we cannot suppose

is a thing apart; we must be content to , s · a y - .t)liis··k them to sleep like Endymion, Now if you takemuch about it, for to describe it preciselyis a task I away from a living being action, and still more

§7eaterthan our purpose requires. Itwould seem, production, what is left but contemplation?

however, also to need external equipment but Therefore the activity of God, which surpasses

little, or less than moral virtue does. Grant that all others in blessedness, must be contemplative;

both need the necessaries;and do so equally,even and of human activities, therefore, that which is

if the statesman's work is the more concerned most akin to this must be most of the nature of

with the body and things of that sort; for there happiness,

will be little difference there; but in what they Thisisindicated, too,by the fact that the other

need for the exerciseof their activities there will animals have no share in happiness, being

be much difference. The liberal man will need completely deprived of such activity. For while

money for the doing of his liberal deeds, and the the whole life of the gods is blessed, and that of

just man too will need it for the returning of men too in so far as somelikenessofsuch activity

services (forwishes are hard to discern, and even belongs to them, none of the other animals is

people who are not just pretend to wish to act happy, since they in no way share in contem-justly);and thebravemanwill needpower ifhe is plation. Happiness extends, then, just so far as

to accomplish any of the acts that correspond to contemplation does, and those to whom contem-

his virtue, and the temperate man will need plation more fully belongs are more truly happy,

opportunity; forhow elseiseither he or any of the not as a mere concomitant but in virtue of the

others to be recognized? It is debated, too, contemplation; for this is in itself precious.

whether the will or the deed is more essential to Happiness, therefore, must be some form of

virtue, which is assumed to involve both; it is contemplation.

surely clear that its perfection involves both; but But, being a man, one will also need external

for deeds many things areneeded, and more, the prosperity; for our nature is not self-sufficientfor

greater and nobler the deeds are, But the man the purpose of contemplation, but our body also

who is contemplating the truth needs no such must be healthy and must have food and other

thing, at least with a view to the exercise of his attention. Still, we must not think that the man

activity; indeed they are, one may say, even who is tobehappy willneedmany things or great

hindrances, at all events tohis contemplation;but things, merely because he cannot be supremely



lumber of

I; he will

.n life.

smplative

following

cds to be

Ippy; but

iem? Acts

rd if they

.d so on?

; dangers

Io so? Or

[t will be

lOney or

uld their

tasteless,

~were to

of action

of gods.

live and

: suppose

you take

;till more

nplation? e '

surpasses

mplative;

which is

nature of

the other

;S , being

~orwhile

id that of

h activity

nimals is

contem-

so far as

L contem-

ly happy,

ue of the

precious.

form of

Lexternal

ficient for

oody also

md other

the man

;sor great

upremely

happy without external goods; for self-sufficiency

and action do not involve excess, and we can do

noble acts without ruling earth and sea; for even

with moderate advantages one can act virtuously

(this is manifest enough; for private persons are

thought to do worthy acts no less than despots-

indeed even more); and itis enough thatwe should

have somuch as that; for the life of the man who is

active in accordance with virtue will be happy. ...

D ISCUSS ION QUE ST IONS

1. According toAristotle, what ishappiness? Do

you agree with him? Explain.

2. What is the connection between virtue and

happiness according to frlstotle? Would


Confucius agree with this? Why

why not? What is the difference between th

views?

3. Aristotle says that a life of pleasure is suita

for beasts. Why does he believe this? Wha

wrong with a life ofpleasure?

4. Aristotle asserts that the philosopher will

happier than anyone else. Do you agree whim? Why or why not?

5. Is Aristotle's moral theory compatible w

human nature? Why or why not?

6. In what sense does equality play a r

in Aristotle's ethics? It is possible

-everyone to be happy? Or only some peop

Is this a strength or weakness of Aristotl

~ position?

IMMANUEL KANT ,_; , .~ . - ' : .. _ . .e

THE CATEGORICAL' IMPERATIVE

or Immanuel Kant, a human will governed by reason is a good will, and the good w

is the only thing that is good without qualification. The human will experiences t

laws of reason as commands issued by reason to act in various ways. Kant calls the

commands "imperatives." There are two general kinds of imperatives: hypothetical a

categorical. If an action iscommanded asbeing necessary for bringing about some further en

the imperative is hypothetical. If an action is commanded as being good without qualificatio

the imperative is categorical. Categorical imperatives are unconditional; our obedience

them is unqualified. Kant formulates the categorical imperative as follows: act only accordi

to that rule by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. F

Kant, you should perform only those actions that conform to rules that you could will to

adopted universally. If you were to lie, for example, you would be following the rule "It

permissible to lie." This rule could not be adopted universally because it would be se

defeating: People would stop believing one another, and then itwould do no good to l

Therefore,you should not lie.

Kant also distinguishes several types of duties. P er fe ct d utie s consist of actions who

maxims can consistently be neither conceived nor willed by us to be universal laws of natur

Impe rf ec t d ut ie s consist of actionswhose maxims could become universal laws of nature, but i

impossible for us to will that their maxims should be universal laws of nature since such a w

would be in conflict with itself.Togetherwith a distinction between duties to oneself and tho

to others, this yields four fundamental duties. The first is perfect duty to oneself=fhis type

duty would preclude suicide. The second is perfect duty to othera=-this type of duty wou

preclude insincere promises. The third is imperfect duty to oneself-e-this type of du

precludes not developing one's natural potential. The fourth is imperfect duty to others=-th

type of duty precludes refusing help to those inneed.




At its core, Kant's moral theory contains three basic ideas: (1) Humans are rational beings,

capable of thinking about the choices they face and selecting among them on the basis of reasons;

(2) humans have an infinite worth or dignity-vthat is, humans are "ends-in-themselvesv=-and

this sets them above all merely conditionally valuable things in the world; and (3) humans, as

rational ends-in-themselves, are the authors of the moral law, so that their obedience to duty is

not an act of submission but an act of autonomy. These three ideas are more apparent in another

of Kant's.formulations of the categorical imperative: act so that you treat humanity, whether in

your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.Kantian ethics is a nonconsequent ia l i s t (or deontological) moral theory in that it maintains

that the morality of an action depends on factors other than consequences. One of the major

flaws in Kant's ethical theory is' that it fails to provide guidance when duties conflict. Another

is that acts that Kant condemns as universally wrong, such as lying, seem justified~perhaps

even morally requlred=-in some situations (for example, lying to protect individuals from

capture by evil people who will hurt or even kill them). The following selection is from

F un dam en ta l P rin cip le s of the Metaphysics o f Mora ls , whi0 was first published in 1785.

A biographical sketch of Immanuel Kant appears inchapter 2.

Nothing canpossiblybe conceivedin theworld,"~;~;.: ~d does not permit us to regard them aseven out of it, which can be called good, without' absolutely good. Moderation in the affectionsand

qualification,except a GoodWill.Intelligence,wit, passions, self-control,and calmdeliberation arenot

judgment, and the other talents of the mind, only good in many respects but even seem to

however they may be named, or courage, constitute part of the intrinsicworth ofthe person;

resolution, perseverance, as qualities of but they are far from deserving to be called good

temperament, are undoubtedly good and desirable without qualification,although they have been so

in many respects; but these gifts of nature may unconditionally praised by the ancients. For

also become extremelybad and mischievous if the without the principles of a good will, they may

will which is to make use of them, and which, becomeextremelybad; and the coolnessofa villain

therefore,constituteswhat is calledcharacter, is not not only makes him far more dangerous; but also

good. It is the samewith the g if ts o f f or tun e. Power, directly makes him more abominable inour eyes

riches, honour, even health, and the general well- than hewouldhave beenwithout it.

being and contentment with one's conditionwhich A good will is good not because of what it

is called happiness, inspire pride, and often perform or effects, not by its aptness for thepresumption, if there is not a good will to correct attainment of some proposed end, but simply by

the influence of these on the mind, and with this virtue of the volition, that is, it is good in itself,

also to rectify the whole principle of acting, and and considered by itself is to be esteemed much

adapt it to its end. The sight of a being who is not higher than all that can be brought about by it in

adorned with a single feature of a pure and good favour of any inclination, may, even of the sum-

will, enjoying unbroken prosperity, can never give total of all inclinations. Even if it should happen

pleasure to an impartial rational spectator.Thus a that, owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the

good will appears to constitute the indispensable niggardly provision of a step-motherly nature,

condition even ofbeing worthy ofhappiness. this will should wholly lack power to accomplish

There are even some qualities which are of its purpose, ifwith its greatest effortsit should yet

serviceto this goodwill itself,and may facilitateits achievenothing, and there should remain only the

action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the

value, but always presuppose a good will, and this summoning of allmeans in our power), then, like

qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them, a jewel, it would still shine by its own light, as a



ieings,

asons:

'-and

ms, as

luty is

[lother

ther in

ntains

major

nother

erhaps

i from

i from

1785.

em as

TIS and

are not

sem to

oerson:

:l good

ieen so

s. For

y may

villain

ut also

rr eyes

vhat it

or the

ply by

l itself,

. much

)y it in

e sum-

tappen

or the

nature,

mplish

uldyet

nly the

JUt the

en . Iike

ttl as a

thing which has its whole value in itself Its

usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to nor

take away anything from this value.

Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie

in the effect expected from it, nor in any principle

of action which requires to borrow its motive from

this expected effect For all these effects-

agreeableness of one's condition, and even the

.promotion of the happiness of others---could have

been also brought about by other causes, so that for

this there would have been no need of the will of a

rational being; whereas it is in this alone that the

supreme and unconditional good can be found.

The pre-eminent good which we call moral can

therefore consist in nothing else than t h e c once p ti on

o f law in itself, wh i ch . c e rt ai n ly is only possib le in a

r a ti ona l b e ing , in so far as this conception, and not

the expected effect determines the will. This is a

good which is alreadypresent in the person who

acts accordingly, and we have not to wait for it fo

appear first in the result _ ~

But what sort of law can that be, th~~e~Ii.~eptwn

of which must determine the will, even without

paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in

order that this will may be called good absolutely

and without qualification? As Ihave deprived the

will of every impulse which could arise to it from

obedience to any law, there remains nothing but

the universal conformity of its actions to law in

general, which alone is to serve the will as a

principle, i.e., Iam never to act otherwise than so

that I ould a lso w ill tha t m y m axim should b ecom e a

universal law. Here, now, it is the simple

conformity to law in general, without assuming

any particular law applicable to certain actions,

that serves the will as its principle, and must so

serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a

chimerical notion. The common reason of men in

its practical judgments perfectly coincides with

this and always has in view the principle here

suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I

when in distress make a promise with the

intention not to keep it? Ireadily distinguish here

between the two significations which the question

may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is

right, to make a false promise? The former may

undoubtedly often be the case. I see clearly indeed

that it is not enough to extricate myself from a

present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but

itmust be well considered whether there may not


hereafter spring from this lie much greater

inconvenience than that from which I now free

myself, and as, with all my supposed cunning, th

consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that

credit once lost may be much more injurious to

me than any mischief which Iseek to avoid a

present, it should be considered whether itwould

not be more pruden t to act herein according to

universal maxim, and to make it a habit to

promise nothing except with the intention o

keeping it. But it is soon dear to me that such

maxim will still only be based on the fear o

consequences. Now it is a wholly different thing

to be truthful from duty, and to be so from

apprehension of injurious consequences. In the

first case, the very notion of the action already

implies a law for me; illthe second case, Imust

first look about elsewhere to see what results may

be combined with it which would affect myself.

For to deviate from the principle of duty i

beyond all doubt wicked; but to be unfaithful to

my maxim of prudence may often be very

advantageous to me, although to abide by it i

certainly safer. The shortest way, however, and an

unerring one, to discover the answer to this

question whether a lying promise is consistent

with duty, is to ask myself, Should Ibe content

that my maxim (to extricate myself from difficulty

by a false promise) should hold good as a

universal law, for myself as well as for others?

And should Ibe able to say to myself, "Everyone

may make a deceitful promise when he finds

himself in a difficulty from which he cannot

otherwise extricate himself"? Then Ipresently

become aware that while Ican will the lie, Ican by

no means win that lying should be a universal

law. For with such a law there would be no

promises at all, since it would be in vain to allege

my intention in regard to my future actions to

those who would not believe this allegation, or if

they over-hastily did so, would pay me back in

my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as i

should be made a universal law, would

necessarily destroy itself.

I do not, therefore, need any far-reaching

penetration to discern what Ihave to do in order

that my will be morally good. Inexperienced in

the course of the world, incapable of being

prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask

myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim




should be a universal law? If not, then itmust be something else that iswilled (orat least which one

rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage might possibly will). The categorical imperative

accruing from it to myself or even to others, but would be that which represented an action as

because it cannot enter as a principle into a necessary of itself without reference to another

possible universal legislation, and reason extorts end, i.e.as objectivelynecessary.

fromme immediate respect for such legislation.I Since every practical law represents a possible

donot indeed asyet discern onwhat this respect is action as good, and on this account, for a subject

based (this the philosopher may inquire), but at who is practically determinable by reason,

least Itlnderstand this, that it is an estimation of necessary,all imperativesareformulaedetermining

the worth which far outweighs allworth of what an action which is necessary according to the

is recommended by inclination, and that the principle of a will good in some respects. If now

necessity of acting from pure respect for the the action is good only as a means to s om e th in g

practical law is what constitutes duty, to which else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is

every other motive must give place, because it is conceived as good in its elf and consequently as

the condition ofawill being good i n i ts el f, and the being necessarily the principle of a will which of

worth ofsuch awill is above everything. . .. itselfconforms to reason, then it is ca t egor ica l. . ..

. . . Everything in nature works according to When Ivconceive a hypothetical imperative, in

laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of general Ido not know beforehand what it will

acting according to th e C on ce ptio n of laws, that is contain-untilIamgiven the condition. Butwhen I

according to principles, i.e., have a tuill. Sincethe ~onceivea categorical imperative, Iknow at once

deduction of actions from principles requires what it contains. For as the imperative contains

reason, the will is nothing but practical rea~6n:"If"';kbesides the law only the necessity that the maxims

reason infallibly determines the will, then the shall conform to this law, while the law contains

actions of such a being which are recognized as no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing

objectively necessary are subjectively necessary but the general statement that the maxim of the

also, i.e., the will is a faculty to choose that action should conform to a universal law, and it is

only which reason independent on inclination this conformity alone that the imperative properly

recognizesaspracticallynecessary,i.e.,as good.But represents asnecessary.

if reason of itself does not sufficiently determine There is ... but one categorical imperative,

the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective namely, this; Act only on that m axim w hereb y tho u

conditions (particular impulses) which do not canst at the same time will tha t it should b ecam e a

always coincidewith the objectiveconditions; in a u n iv er sa l l aw .

word, if the will doesnot i n i ts el f completelyaccord Now if a11imperatives of duty can be deduced

with reason (which is actually the casewith men), from this one imperative as from their principle,

then the actions which objectivelyare recognized then, although it should remain undecided

as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the whether what is called duty is not merely a vain

determination of such awill according toobjective notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what

laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the we understand by itand what thisnotionmeans.

objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly Since the universality of the law according to

good is conceived as the determination of the will which effects are produced constitutes what is

of a rational being by principles of reason, but properly called nature in the most general sense

which the will from its nature does not of (asto form), that is the existenceofthings sofar as

necessity follow, it is determined by general laws, the imperative

The conception of an objectiveprinciple, in so of duty may be expressed thus; Act as if t he ma xi m

far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a of thy a ctio n w ere to b ecom e b y th y w ill a u nio ersa l laio

command (of reason), and the formula of the o f na tu r e.

command is calledan Imperative. . . . Wewill now enumerate a few duties, adopting

Now all imperatives command either hypo- the usual division ofthem into duties to ourselves

thetically or categorically. The former represent the and to others, and into perfect and imperfect

practical necessity of a possible action asmeans to duties.



ich one

)erative

tion as

other

ossible

subject

reason,

miningto the

If now

mething

if it is

ntly as

hich of

II....

tive, in

it will

when I

at once

ontains

naxims

ontains

iothing

of the

nd it is

roperly

erative,

b y thou

tco me a

educed

inciple,

lecided

a vain

IV what

leans.

ling to

vhat is

L sense

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erative

maxim

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opting

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erfect

1. A man reduced to despair by a series of

misfortunes feels wearied of life, but is still so

far in possession of his reason that he can ask

himself whether itwould not be contrary to

his duty to himself to take his own life. Now

he inquires whether the maxim of his action

could become a universal law of nature. His

"maxim is: From self-love I adopt it as a

principle to shorten my life when its longer

duration is likely to bring more evil than

satisfaction. It is asked then simply whether

this principle founded on self-love can

become a universal law of nature. Now we

see at once that a system of nature of which it

should be a law to destroy life by means of

the very feeling whose special nature it is to

impel to the improvement of life would

contradict itself, and therefore" could not exist

as a system b f nature; hence that maxim

cannot possibly exist as a universal law d f

nature, and consequently would 4Jewholfy

inconsistent with the supreme ffu1Ciple·-of

all duty.

r' 2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to

borrow money. He knows that he will not be

able to repay it, but sees also that nothing will

be lent to him, unless he promises stoutly to

repay it in a definite time. He desires to make

this promise, but he has still so much

conscience as to ask himself: Is it not

unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get

out of a difficulty in this way? Suppose,

however, that he resolves to do so, then the

maxim of his action would be expressed thus:

When Ihink myself in want of money, Iwill

borrow money and promise to repay it,although Iknow that Inever can do so. Now

this principle of self-love or of one's own

advantage may perhaps be consistent with

my whole future welfare; but the question

now is: Is it right? I change then the sugges-

tion of self-love into a universal law, and state

the question thus: How would it be if my

maxim were a universal law? Then I see at

once that it could never hold as a universal

law of nature, but would necessarily contra-

dict itself. For supposing it to be a universal

law that everyone when he thinks himself in

a difficulty should be able to promise


whatever he pleases, with the purpose of no

keeping his promise, the promise itself would

become impossible, as well as the end that

one might have in view in it, since no one

would consider that anything was promised

to him, but would ridicule all such statements

as vain pretences.

3. A third finds in himself a talent which with

the help of some culture might make him a

useful man in many respects. But he finds

himself in comfortable circumstances, and

prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to

take pains in enlarging and improving his

happy natural capacities. He asks, however,

whether his maxim of neglect of his natural

gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to

indulgence, agrees also with what is called

duty. He sees then that a system of nature

" could indeed subsist with such a universal

law although men (like -the South Sea

islanders) should let their talents rest, and

resolve . to devote their lives merely to

idleness, amusement, and propagation o

their species-in a word, to enjoyment; but he

cannot possibly will that this should be a

universal law of nature, or be implanted in us

as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational

being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be

developed, since they serve him, and have

been given him, for all sorts of possible

purposes.

4. A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees

that others have to contend, with great

wretchedness and that he could help them,

thinks: What concern is it of mine? Let

everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, oas he can make himself; Iwill take nothing

from him nor even envy him, only Ido not

wish to contribute anything to his welfare or

to his assistance in distress! Now no doubt if

such a mode of thinking were a universal law

the human race might very well subsist, and

doubtless even better than in a state in which

everyone talks of sympathy and good-will, or

even takes care occasionally to put it into

practice, but, on the other side, also cheats

when he can, betrays the rights of men, or

otherwise violates them. But although it is

possible that a universal law of nature might




exist in accordance with that maxim, it is

impossible to will that such a principle should

have the universal validity of a law ofnature.

For a will which resolved this would contra-

dict itself, inasmuch as many cases might

occur in which one would have need of the

love and sympathy of others, and in which,

by such a law of nature, sprung from his own

will, he would deprive himself of all hope ofthe aid he desires....

We have thus established at least this much,

that if duty is a conception which is to have any

import and real legislative authority for our

actions, itcan onlybe expressed in categorical, and

not at all in hypothetical, imperatives. We have

also, which is of great importance, exhibited

dearly and definitely for every practical app'li-

cation the content of the categorical imperative,

which must contain the principle of all dirty if

there is such a thing at all. We have not yet,

however, advanced so far as to prove il priori that

there actually is such an imperative, that there is a

practical lawwhich commands absolutely of itself,

and without any other impulse, and that the

following ofthis law isduty....

Now Isay: man and generally any rational

being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a

means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will,

but in all his actions, whether they concern

himself or other rational beings, must be always

regarded at the same time as an end. All objectsof

the inclinations have only a conditional worth; for

if the inclinations and the wants founded on them

did not exist, then their object would be without

value. But the inclinations themselves being

sources ofwant are sofar fromhaving an absolute

worth for which they should be desired, that on

the contrary, it must be the universal wish of

every rational being to be wholly free from them.

Thus the worth of any object which is to b e

acquired by our action is always conditional.

Beings whose existence depends not on our will

but on nature's, have nevertheless, if they are non-

rational beings, only a relative value as means,

and are therefore called things; rational beings, on

the contrary, are called persons, because their very

nature points them out as ends in themselves, that

is as something which must not be used merely as

means, and 50 far therefore restricts freedom of

action (and is an object of respect). These,

therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose

existence has a worth fo r us as an effort of our

action, but objective ends , that is things whose

existence is an end in itself: an end moreover for

which no other can be substituted, which they

should subserve merely as means, for otherwise

nothing whatever would possess a bs olu te w orth ;

but if all worth were conditioned and thereforecontingent, then there would be no supreme

practical principle of reason whatever.

If then there is a supreme practical principle or,

in respect of the human will, a categorical

imperative, it must be one which, being drawn

from the conception of that which is necessarily

an end for everyone because it is an a n e nd in itse lf,

constitutes an objective principle of will, and can

therefore serve as a universal practical law. The

foundation of this principle is: rational nature exis ts

es an dd in itself. Man necessarily conceives.his

• L own eXistenceas being 59: So far then this is a

: · ·"S!iVjecffue principle of human actions. But every

other rational being regards its existence similarly,

just on the same rational principle, that holds for

me: so that it is at the same time an objective

principle, from which as a supreme practical law

all laws of the will must be capable of being

deduced. Accordingly the practical imperative

will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity ,

whether in thine ow n person or in th at o f any other, in

every case as an end w ith al, never as m ea ns o nly ....

The conception of every rational being as one

whichmust consider itselfas giving all the maxims

of its will universal laws, so as to judge itselfand

its actions from this point of view-this conception

leads to another which depends on it and is very

fruitful,namely, that ofa k in gd om o f e nd s.

Bya kingdom Iunderstand the union ofdifferent

rational beings in a systemby common laws. Now

since it is by laws that ends are determined as

regards their universal validity; hence, if we

abstract from the personal differences of rational

beings, and likewise from all the content of their

private ends, we shall be able to conceiveall ends

combined in a systematic whole (including both

rational beings as ends in themselves, and also

the special ends which each may propose of

himself), that is to sa>"we can conceivea kingdom

of ends, which on the preceding principles is

possible.



se,

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ve

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For all rational beings come under the law that

each of them must treat itself and all others never

merely as means, but in every case at the same time

as ends in themselves. Hence results a systematic

union of rational beings by common objective

laws, i.e., a kingdom which may be called a

kingdolYl,of ends ....

3. Kant believes that animals have no moral

rights because they are not ends-in-themselves.

Why aren't animals ends-in-themselves? Do

you agree with Kant's position? Discuss.

4. The Golden Rule says that you should do

unto others as you would have them do unto

you. What is the difference between the

Golden Rule and the categorical imperative?

Explain.

5. What is the major benefit of Kant's moral

theory? What is its major weakness? Inwhat

sense would you call your own moral beliefs

Kantian? Where do your views differ from

Kant's?

D ISC USSIO N Q UE ST IO NS

1. What does it mean to treat people as "ends in

themselves"? What does it mean to treat others

"merely as a means"? Explain the difference.

2. Why does Kant believe that the good will is

the only thing that is good without qualifica-

tion? Do you agree with him? Can you think

of anything else that might. be good without

qualification? How might Kant respond to

your choice?

~6. Compare and contrast the approach to

morality found in the Bible with Kant's

approach. What are their similarities and

differences?

Stingo (PeterMact- l i co l l . rnoves to New YorkCity shortly after World War II in hopes of achieving suc-

cess as a writer. Ata Brooklyn boardinghouse, he meets Sophie Zawistowska (Meryl Streep), a Polish-

Catholic immigrant and Holocaust survivor, and Nathan (Kevin Kline), her Jewish lover. Stingo

befriends the couple and enters into their erratic world, where he witnesses Nathan's maniacal mood

swings and verbal abuse of Sophie. Later, Stingo receives a call from Nathan's brother, Larry Lawndale

(Stephen D. Newman), who reveals that Nathan is not really the successful Pfizer research biologist he

claims to be; instead, he holds a minor position in Pfizer's library and suffers from paranoid schizophrenia.

Sophie is unaware of Nathan's lies or his illness, and it soon becomes apparent to Stingo that Sophie has

some secrets of her own. As Nathan's illness progresses, he becomes frighteningly unpredictable, and

Stingo, who has fallen in love with Sophie, attempts to rescue her by taking her out of town.

On their brief trip, Stingo learns about the choice that Sophie had to make on the night the Nazis sent

her to Auschwitz with her children. Sophie reveals that she was ordered by an SSdoctor (Karlheinz Hackl)

to select one of her children to live and the other one to die. He said that ifshe did not choose one of them,

he would send both to the gas chambers. Sophie pleaded with him to no avail, and at the last moment she

tearfully told the Nazis to take her youngest child, her littlegirl, away to die. After revealing her terrible se-

cret to Stingo, Sophie and Stingo make love, but he awakens in the morning to find a note from her saying

that she has gone back to Nathan. The movie ends when Stingo returns to the boardinghouse in hopes of

finding Sophie. Instead, he discovers that she and Nathan have committed suicide together.




The movie is based on the best-sell ing autobiographical novel by Will iam Styron. Meryl Streep won an

Oscar for her performance asSophie.


1. If you wereSophie, would you choose one of your children to live and another to die if the only

other alternative was having both die? On what basis would you morally justify your response?f

2. If presented with a choice like Sophie's, what would a Kantian do? Why?

3. Would proponents of the Koran and the Bible handle Sophie's choice in the same way?Why or why not?

4. Consider the following dialogue between Sophie and an SSDoctor:

SSDOCTOR "You may keep one of your children."

SOPHIE "I beg your pardon!"

SSDOCTOR "You may keep one of your children. The other one must go."

( -

SOPHIE "You mean, I have to choose?'~ . ~55 DOCTOR "You're a Polack, not a Yid. That gives you a-privilege, a choice."

SOPHIE "I can't choose! I can't choose!"

-. ,"'_·1;'-

SSDOCTOR "Be quiet! Choose! Or I'll send them both over there! Make a choice!"

SOPHIE "Don't make me choose! ] can't!"

SSDOCTOR "]'11send them both over there. Shut up! Enough! I told you to shut up! Make a choice!"

SOPHIE "Don't make me choose! ] can't!"

SSDOCTOR "Take both children away!"

SOPHIE "Take my little girl! Take my baby! Take my little girl !"

The SSdoctor sayschoosing is a "privilege." Is he right? Why or why not?

5. Some might argue that choosing between her children places some moral responsibility uponSophie for the death of her little girl , whereas not having a choice places no moral responsibil ity for

the death of her children upon her. Evaluate this claim. How would a Kantian respond to i t?

6. Consider the following exchange between Wanda (Katharina Thalach), a leader in the Resistance,

and Sophie:

WANDA "All we ask of you is to translate some stolen Gestapo documents."

SOPHIE "I can't. I cannot endanger my children."

WANDA "Your children could be next."

SOPHIE "No. No. I do not want to get involved."

If you were Sophie, would you translate the documents? How would you morally justify your response?

Compare your response to those of a Kantian and proponents of the Bible and the Koran.



ly

t?

.e,

;e?


7. Consider the following dialogue between Sophie and a fellow prisoner in the shower (Eugeniusz

Priwieziencew):

PRISONER "Will you help the Resistance?"

SOPHIE "But what can I do?"

PRtSbNER "Emmi Hoess has a radio. Her room. is under her father's office ... where you will work.

Myou could get the radio ... bring it down here, I could smuggle it out."

SOPHIE "Sure, sure. Igive you the radio ... you smuggle it out, and I get shot for stealing it."

PRISONER "That's why you' must make Hoess trust you."

SOPHIE "But how?"

PRISONER "He is a man ... and you are awoman ... "

SOPHIE "Of course! Bald, starvinq_,stinking of germicides. Wry impressive!"

PRISONER "You're wrong. You look German. You speakcultured German. You'll be working with

him alone ... and he's an unhappy man." •

~, - .

If you were Sophie, would you help th,i t'reslsti:fn;te by making Hoess a "happy" man? How would

you morally justify your response? Compareyour response to a Kantian response.

8. Consider this discussion between Dr. Lawndale and 5tingo:

DR. LAWNDALE "This, uh, ... biologist business is my brother's masquerade. He has no degree of

any kind. All that is a simple fabrication. The truth is he's quite mad."

STINGO /lChrist!"

DR. LAWNDALE "It's one of those conditions where weeks, months, even years go by without man-

ifestations, and then pow! Oh, he has a job at Pfizer in the company library, ... where he can do ...

without bothering anyone, and occasionally he does a I i ttle research for one of the legitimate biolo-

gists on the staff .... I'm not sure Nathan would forgive me if he knew that I told you. He made me

swear never to tell Sophie. She knows nothing."

STINGO "What can I do?/I

DR. LAWNDALE "If he could stay off the drugs, he might have a chance."

STINGO "The drugs ... what is he on?"

DR. LAWNDALE "Benzodrine-cocaine. You didn't know?"

STINGO "No, I did not."

DR. LAWNDALE /II don't want to sound like I'm asking you to spy, but if you could simply keep tabs

on him and report back to me by phone from time to time, letting me know how he's getting on. I'm

sorry to have to involve you this way./I

STINGO "I don't think you understand ... I love them both-they're friends of mine."




Could a Kantian morally justify Stingo's lying to Sophie about Nathan's medical condition and job

status? Why or why not? Compare the Kantian response with a response from a Confucian and a

proponent of the Koran. Which response do you prefer, and why?

9. Which of the following approaches to morality is closest to that practiced by Sophie during and after

the war: [udeo-Christianity (the Bible), Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam law (the Koran), virtue theory

(Aristotle), or Kantianism? Why?

JOHN STUART M ILL

UTILITARIANISM

ohn Stuart Mill explains morality in terms of the principle of utility, or the greatest-

happiness principle. According to the principle of utility, we should attempt to produce

the greatest balance of happiness qver unhappiness. However, in this selection, Mill

seeks to differentiate his brand of utilitarianism from that of his predecessor ana mentor,

Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the "fathel'~'e'0f.utilitarianism. ArouIld the age of fourteen, Mill

discovered the philosophy of Bentham,' WhOSE;works gave him "a creed, a doctrine, aphilosophy ... a religion."

One of the major differences between Bentham's utilitarianism and Mill's is that

Bentham's is based on considerations regarding the quantity of pleasure or pain (intensity,

duration, certainty, proximity, fecundity, purity, and extent), whereas Mill's is focused on the

quality of pleasure or pain, distinguishing the higher human pleasures from the lower human

pleasures. Whereas Bentham's utilitarianism made the criterion of ethics the production of the

greatest amount of pleasure and the least amount of pain, Mill makes a distinction between

"higher pleasures," which are of more value, and "lower pleasures," which are of lesser value.

Milt then, unlike Bentham, distinguishes between happiness and mere sensual pleasure. "It is

better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied," said Milt "better to be Socrates

dissatisfied than a fool satisfied." Whereas Bentham tells us to maximize the sum of pleasure,

Mill tells us to maximize the sum of higher pleasure. Consequently, Mill's utilitarianism is

sometimes called e ud aim on is tic u tilita ria nism (e ud aim on ia is Greek for "happiness") to

distinguish itfrom Bentham's h e do n is tic u til it ar ia n ism ( he do n e is Greek for "pleasure").

In general, utilitarianism is a form of consequentialist (or teleological) moral theory in that

it attempts to locate the morality of actions in their nonmoral consequences. In addition to

eudaimonistic and hedonistic utilitarianism, utilitarianism may be divided into act and rule

utilitarianism. Ac t u ti li ta r ia n ism judges the rightness or wrongness of an action on a case-by-

case basis according to the utilitarian principle. Rule u t il it a rian ism uses the utilitarian principle

to judge moral rules, not individual actions, by examining the effects on overall happiness of

rules. There are some problems with rule utilitarianism, not only because it is far from clear

how to apply the principle to rules but also because rules that allow for exceptions seem better

than those that do not, and making exceptions threatens to reduce rule utilitarianism to act

utilitarianism. The following is a selection from Mill's Utili tarianism (1863). A biographical

sketch of Mill appears in chapter 1.



an d job

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. . . The creed which accepts as the foundation of

morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle,

holds that actions are right in proportion as they

tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to

produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is

.intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by

unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To

give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the

theory, much more requires to be said; in particular,

what things it includes: in the ideas of pain and

pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open

question. But these supplementary explanations do

not affect the theory of life on which this theory of

morality is grounded-namely, that pleasure, and

freedom from pain, are the only thlngs desirable as

ends; and that allIdesirable things (which are as

numerous in the utilitarian as in any othen scheme)

are desirable either for the pleasure inherent l:n

themselves, or as a means to the promotion.eof

pleasure and the prevention ofpain. . " . I ,

,,' Now, such a theory of life excites inmany minds,

and among them illsome of the most estimable in

feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose

that life has (as they express it) no higher end than

pleasure---no better and nobler object of desire and

pursuit-they designate as utterly mean and

groveling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to

whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very

early period, contemptuously likened; and modern

holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the

subject of equally polite comparisons by its

German, French, and English assailants.

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always

answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who

represent human nature in a degrading light; since

the accusation supposes human beings to be

capable of no pleasures except those of which swine

are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge

could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer

an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were

precisely the same to human beings and to swine,

the rule of life which is good enough for the one

would be good enough for the other. The

comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is

felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's

pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conception

of happiness. Human beings have faculties more

elevated than the animal appetites, and when once

made conscious of them, do not regard anything a

happiness which does not include their

gratification. I do not, indeed; consider the

Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in

drawing out their scheme of consequences from theutilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient

manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements

require to be included. But there is no known

Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to

the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and

imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much

higher~ value as pleasures than to those of mere

sensation, It must be admitted, however, that

utilitarian writers ill general have placed the

superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly

in the greater permanency; safety, uncostliness, etc.

of the former-that is, in their circumstantial

advantages rather than illtheir intrinsic nature. And

on all these points utilitarians have fully proved

their case; but they might have taken the other, and,

as it may be called, higher ground, with entire

consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle

of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds o

pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than

others. Itwould be absurd that while, in estimating

all other things, quality is considered as well as

quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be

supposed to depend on quantity alone.

If Iam asked, what Imean by difference o

quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure

more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure,

except its being greater inamount, there is but one

possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one

which all or almost all who have experience o

both give a decided preference, irrespective of any

feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the

more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by

those who are competently acquainted with both,

placed so far above the other that they prefer it

even though knowing it to be attended with a

great amount of discontent, and would not resign

it for any quantity of the other pleasure which

their nature is capable of, we are justified in

ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority

ill quantity, so far out-weighing quantity as to

render it, in comparison, of small account.



498 From Socrateso Cinema

Nowit is anunquestionablefact that thosewho being whose capacitiesof enjoyment are low, has

are equally acquainted with, and equally capable the greatest chanceof having them fully satisfied;

ofappreciatingand enjoying,both, do give amost and a highly endowed being will always feelthat

marked preference to the manner of existence any happiness which he can look for,as the world

which employs their higher faculties.Fewhuman isconstituted, isimperfect.Buthecanlearn tobear

creatureswould consent tobe changedinto anyof its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and

the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest they will not make him envy the being who is

allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent - indeed unconscious of the imperfections,but only

human being would consent to be a fool, no because he feelsnot at all the good which those

instructed person would be an ignoramus, no imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human

person of feeling and consciencewould be selfish being dissatisfiedthan a pig satisfied;better to be

and base, even though they should be persuaded Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if

that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion,it is

satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. because they only know their own side of the

They would not resign what they possess more question. .The other party to the comparison

thanhefor themost completesatisfactionofall the knowsboth sides.

desires which they have in commonwith him. If Itmaybe objected,that many who are capable

they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of of the higher pleasures, occasionally,under the

unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it influence of temptation, postpone them to the. ~theywould exchangetheirlot for almostany other, lower. But this is quite compatible.with a full

however undesirablein their own eyes.Abelpg of ~ appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the

higher facultiesrequiresmore tomakehin;fhappy,--;;;higher. Men often, from infirmity of character,

is capable probably of more acute suffering, and I make their election for the nearer good, though

~ertainlyaccessibleto itatmorepoints, than oneof they know it to be the less valuable; and this no

an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities,he less when the choice is between two bodily

can never reallywish to sink intowhat he feels to pleasures, than when it is between bodily and

be a lower grade of existence.Wemay give what mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the

explanation we please of this unwillingness; we injury of health, though perfectly aware that

may attribute it to pride, a name which is given health is the greater good. It may be further

indiscriminatelyto some of the most and to some objected, that many who begin with youthful

of the least estimable feelings of which mankind enthusiasmfor everythingnoble, as they advance

are capable;we may refer it to the love of liberty in years sink into indolence and selfishness.But I

and personal independence, an appeal to which do not believe that those who undergo this very

waswith the Stoicsone ofthemost effectivemeans common change, voluntarily choose the lower

for the inculcationof it; to the love of power, or to description of pleasures in preference to the

the love of excitement, both of which do really higher. I believe that before they devoteenter into and contribute to it; but its most themselves exclusively to the one, they have

appropriate appellationisa senseofdignity,which already become incapable of the other. Capacity

all human beings possess in one form or another, for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very

and in some, though by no means in exact, tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile

proportionto theirhigherfaculties,and whichis so influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and

essentiala part ofthe happiness of those inwhom in the majority of young persons it speedily dies

it is strong, that nothing which conflictswith it away if the occupationsto which their position in

could be, otherwisethan momentarily,an objectof lifehas devoted them, and the societyinto which

desire to them. Whoever supposes that this it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping

preferencetakes placeat a sacrificeof happiness- that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their

that the superior being, in anything like equal high aspirations as they lose their intellectual

circumstances,is not happier than the inferior- tastes, because they have not time or opportunity

confounds the two very different ideas, of for indulging them; and they addict themselves to

happiness, and content. It is indisputable that the inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately



low, has

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feel that

e world

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. And if

.ion, it is

= of the

aparison

capable

ider the

l to the

h a full

r of the

haracter,

though

I this no

I bodily

lily and

s to the

ar e that

further

(outhful

advance

ss. ButI

his very

e lower

to the

devote

~y have

=apacity

, a very

hostile

tee: and

lily dies

sition in

a which

keeping

,se their

ellectual

ortunity

ielves to

berately

prefer them, but because they are either the only

ones to which they have access, or the only ones

which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It

may be questioned whether anyone who has

remained equally susceptible to both classes of

pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred

the)ower; though many, in all ages, have broken

down in an ineffectual attempt to combineboth.

. From thisverdict ofthe only competent judges,

Iapprehend there canbe no appeal. On a question

which is the best worth having of two pleasures,

or which of two modes of existence is the most

grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral

attributes and from its consequences, the

judgment of those who are qualified by

knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the

majority among them, must be admitted as final.

And there needs to be the lesshesitation to accept

this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures,

since there is no other tribunal to be referred \0even on the question of quantity. Whilt~eans <ire

there of determining which is the a<;utesf;of ¥ \ . v a

pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable

,.' sensations, except the general suffrage of those

who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor

pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always

heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to

decide whether a particular pleasure is worth

purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except

the feelings and judgment of the experienced?

When, therefore, those feelings and judgment

declare the pleasures derived from the higher

faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the

question ofintensity, to those ofwhich the animal

nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is

susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the

same regard.

Ihave dwelt on this point, asbeing a necessary

part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or

Happiness; considered as the directive rule of

human conduct. But it is by no means an

indispensable condition to the acceptance of the

utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the

agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest

amount of happiness altogether; and if it may

possibly be doubted whether a noble character is

always the happier for its nobleness, there can be

no doubt that it makes other people happier, and

that the world in general is immensely a gainerby

it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its

OfMorality and Art 49

end by the general cultivation of nobleness o

character, even if each individual were onl

benefited by the nobleness ofothers, and his own

so far as happiness is concerned, were a shee

deduction from the benefit. But the ba

enunciation of such an absurdity as this las

renders refutation superfluous.

According to the Greatest Happiness Principl

as above explained, the ultimate end, wit

reference to and for the sake of which all othe

things are desirable (whether we are considerin

our own good or that of other people), is a

existence exempt as far aspossible frompain, an

as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point o

quantity and quality; the test of quality, and th

rule for measuring it against quantity, being th

preference felt by thosewho in their opportunitie

ofexperience, towhich must be added their habi

of self-consciousness and self-observation, a

best furnished with the means of comparison

This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion

the end of human action, is necessarily also th

standard of morality; which may accordingly b

defined, the rules and precepts for huma

conduct, by the observance ofwhich an existenc

such as has been described might be, to th

greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind

and not to them only, but, so far as the nature o

things admits, to thewhole sentient creation....

The objectors to utilitarianism cannot alway

be charged with representing it in a discreditabl

light. On the contrary, those among them wh

entertain anything like a just idea of i

disinterested character, sometimes find fault wit

its standard as being too high for humanity. The

say it is exacting too much to require that peopl

shall always act from the inducement o

promoting the general interests of society.But th

is to mistake the very meaning of a standard o

morals, and confound the rule of action with th

motive of it. It is the business of ethics to tell u

what are our duties, or by what testwemay know

them; but no system of ethics requires that th

solemotive of all we do shall be a feelingof duty

on the contrary, ninety-nine hundredths of all ou

actions are done from other motives, and rightl

so done, if the rule of duty does not condem

them. It is the more unjust to utilitarianism tha

this particular misapprehension should bemade

ground of objection to it, inasmuch as utilitaria



500 FromSocrates to Cinema

moralists have gone beyond almost all others in It has already been remarked, that questions of

affirming that the motive has nothing to do with ultimate ends do not admit of proof, in the

the morality of the action, though much with the ordinary acceptation of the term. Tobe incapable

worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow- of proof by reasoning is common to all first

creature from drowning does what is morally principles; to the first premises of our knowledge,

right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of as well as to those of our conduct. But the former,

being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the being matters of fact,may be the subject of a direct

friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if appeal to the faculties which judge of fact~

his object be to serve another friend to whom he is namely, our senses, and our internal conscious-

under greater obligation. But to speak only of ness. Can an appeal be made to the same faculties

actions done from the motive of duty, and in direct on questions of practical ends? Or by what other

obedience to principle: it is a misapprehension of faculty iscognizance taken of them?

the utilitarian mode of thought, to conceive it as Questions about ends are, in other words,

implying that people should fix their minds upon questions about what things are desirable. The

so wide a generality as the world, or society at utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable,

large. The great majority of good actions are and the only thing desirable as an end; all other

intended not for the benefit of the world, but for things being oniy desirable as means to that end.

that of individuals, of which the good of the What ought to be required of this doctrine----what

world is made up; and the thoughts of the most conditions is,it to requisite that the doctrine should

virtuous man need not on these occasions travel • fulfil~to make good its claimtobebelieved?

beyond the particular persons concerned, except TEe only proof capable of being given that an

so far as is necessary to assure himself that irr" ~"~;Objetts visible, is that people actually see it. The

benefiting them he is not violating the rights, that 'onlyproof that a sound is audible, is that people

is, the legitimate and authorised expectations, of hear it: and so of the other sources of our

anyone else. The multiplication of happiness is, experience. Inlike manner, I apprehend, the sole

according to the utilitarian ethics, the object of evidence it is possible to produce that anything is

virtue: the occasions on which any person (except desirable, isthat people do actually desire itIfthe

one in a thousand) has it in his power to do this end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to

on an extended scale, in other words to be a itself were not, in theory and in practice,

public benefactor, are but exceptional; and on acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever

these occasions alone is he called on to consider convince any person that it was so. No reason can

public utility; in every other case, private utility, be given why the general happiness is desirable,

the interest or happiness of some few persons, is except that each person, so far as he believes it to

all he has to attend to. Those alone the influence be attainable, desires his own happiness. This,

of whose actions extends to society in general, however, being a fact, we have not only all the

need concern themselves habitually about solarge proof which the case admits of, but allwhich it is

an object. In the case of abstinences indeed-of possible to require, that happiness is a good: that

things which people forbear to do from moral each person's happiness is a good to that person,

considerations, though the consequences in the and the general happiness, therefore, a good to

particular case might be beneficial-it would be the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made

unworthy of an intelligent agent not to be out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and

consciously aware that the action is of a class consequently one of the criteria ofmorality.

which, if practiced generally, would be generally But ithas not, by this alone, proved itself to be

injurious, and that this is the ground of the the sole criterion. To do that, it would seem, by

obligation to abstain from it. The amount of the same rule, necessary to show, not only that

regard for the public interest implied in this people desire happiness, but that they never

recognition, is no greater than is demanded by desire anything else....

every system of morals, for they all enjoin to Wehave now then, an answer to the question,

abstain from whatever is manifestly pernicious to of what sort of proof the principle of utility is

society. . . . susceptible. If the opinion which I have now stated




, of

the

ble

irst

ge,

ier,

ect

t-

us-ies

:let

fact: that to think of an object as desirable (unless

for the sake of its consequences), and to think of it

as pleasant, are one and the same thing; and that

to desire anything, except in proportion as the

idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and

metaphysical impossibility.

ds,

neile,

aer

nd ,

hat

lid

is psychologically h·ue-if human nature is so

constituted as to desire nothing which is not either

a part of happiness or a means of happiness, we

can have no other proof, and we require no other,

that these are the only things desirable. If so,

happiness is the sale end of human action, and the

promotion of it the test by which to judge of all

humanrconduct: from whence it necessarily

follo,ws that it must be the criterion of morality;since a part is included illthe whole. 1. What is Mill's principle of utility? What does

And now to decide whether this is really so; he mean by "utility"? Does he mean the same

whether mankind do desire nothing for itself but thing as Bentham? Explain.

that which is a pleasure to them, or of which the 2. How does Mill explain the fact that some

absence is a pain; we have evidently arrived at a people choose lower pleasures over higher

question of fact and experience, dependent, like pleasures? Do you agree with his assessment?

all similar questions, upon evidence. It can only 3 How does Mill prove the princi 1 f utility?. peo .be determined by practiced self-consciousness D j. with hi f? E pl .o yuu agree 1 s proo. x am.and self-observation, assisted by obse-rvation ofothers. I believe that these" sources of evidence, 4. What are some objections that might be raised

impartially consulted, will declare that desiring a against Mill's eudaimonistic utilitarianism?

thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and ~ How might he respond to them? '

thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely _.,,; 5. Both Mill arid Aristotle utilize concepts of

inseparable, or rather two parts of the sin-rie "happiness" in their moral theories. What arephenomenon; in strictness of language, two their similarities and differences? Which do

different modes of naming the same psychological you prefer, and why?

D IS CU SS IO N QUE ST IO NS

an

.he

pIeur

ole

~isthe

to

Ic e ,

"er

ian

ile,

:to

lis,

the

tis

hat

Former University ofAustin philosophy professor David Gale (KevinSpacey) is sentenced to death for

the rape and murder of his leukemia-stricken colleague Constance Harraway (Laura Linney). Ironi-

cally, both David and Constance were also leading activists for Death Watch, a group opposed to

capital punishment inTexas.A week before his execution, David asks to speak with journalist BitseyBloom

(Kate Winslet) to tell his story. Bitsey and her intern, Zack Stemmons (Gabriel Mann), fly to Texas to cover

the story, and, as the interviews progress, Bitsey learns more than she bargained for. First,David reveals to

Bitsey that he thinks someone is framing him because the method of death that he mentioned once in an

article was used to kill Constance. Furthermore, the murderer left a tripod in the room with Constance's

body, which David feels was intended to taunt him since he knows that evidence of the real crime exists

somewhere. Later,Bitsey finds a mysterious "death tape" in her motel room that shows Constance dying by

the method that David had previously mentioned to her.

Afterfinding the tape, Bitsey and Zack go on a desperate search for the truth. Bitsey notes that the tape

shows Constance struggling only as she runs out of air; she does not struggle from the beginning as she

would if someone put her in this position against her will. Bitsey believes this means that Constance killed

on,

to

de

d

be

by

at

er

on,. is

ed




herself. Furthermore, Bitsey arrives at the conclusion that Dusty Wright (Matt Craven), a death penalty oppo-

nent and dose friend of Constance, was supposed to release a more complete version of the tape showing

that Constance killed herself, thus proving Death Watch's point that an innocent man can be sentenced to

death. Bitsey and lack believe that Dusty is a zealot who was supposed to release the tape soon after David's

sentencing but held onto it over the years because he believes that an innocent man being put to death is more

politically powerful than an innocent man almost being put to death. Bitsey and lack raid Dusty's house and

find the original tape that shows Constance putting the bag over her own head. Bitsey then races against time

to getthe video to the authorities before David is put to death. However, she is too late and arrives only tofind out that David has been executed via lethal injection. What Bitsey does not bargain for is subsequently

receiving an extended tape labeled "Off the Record." This version shows that David was aware of the cir-

cumstances surrounding Constance's death and that he even played a role in the plan himself.


1. How far would you be willing to go to support your beliefs or principles] Would you, like David and

Constance, sacrifice your life to prove that innocent persons.can be executed? Why or why not?

2. Would a utilitarian be able to justify Constance's actions? Why or why not?t

3. Would a utilitarian be able to justify David's actiqns? Why or why not?

4. Is it ever morally justifiable to sacrifice ¥o"ur own-life in an effort to save innocent persons"? Compare

Kantian and util itarian responses to th~s.,qtJefitioQ;Which do you prefer, and why?,,- . I

5. Consider the following dialogue between David and Bitsey:

DAVID "Constance was murdered by what is known as the Secure Tot Method. You're handcuffed,

forced to swallow the key; your mouth is taped, and a bag is sealed around your head, and you're left

there to suffocate. The Secure Tot did it to Romanians when they wouldn't inform or confess. Sometimes

the bag was ripped off your head at the last moment to give you a second chance; otherwise, you died

knowing that the key to yourfreedom was inside of you the entire time. It's a cheap but effective method.

The problem is I o nce mentioned it in an article that Iw rote. Prosecution never knew that."

BITSEY "Someone's framing you?"

DAVID "Oh, it's more than that. There was a tripod."

BITSEY "Right~facing her body. Back on the record?"

DAVID "Yes. The tripod had no fingerprints on it. That means that somebody brought it there, set itup, wiped it dean and left it. Why? It's as if they wanted me to know that somewhere out there is a

record of exactly what happened that afternoon. As if they wanted me to die knowing that the key to

my freedom is out there somewhere."

BITSEY "Maybe you're being paranoid."

DAVID "Ms. Bloom, I used to be the state's leading death penalty abolitionist, and now I'm on death

row. Doesn't that strike you as a little odd?"

BITSEY "Any idea who they are?"

DAVID "No, but I've got someone working on that=someone I'm relying on to prove my innocence."

BITSEY "Belyeu's hired a detective?"

DAVID "A journalist. She has to help me. You know I'm innocent."



oppo-

owing

:ed to

'avid's

more

e and

ttime

nly to

iently

e cir-

BITSEY "No, that's how she thought.Come 91\/hink about it! This Woman lived for Death Watch. If

she's gonna die anyway, why not die for it? 11)3t 's vyhythe tripod was here to record proof-undeniableproof! That's why we got the video!"

lACK "So a dead woman put the tape in your room?"

BITSEY "No, of course not. Imean, she needed help-someone to keep it, release it-someone ded-

icated to the cause-someone she could trust."


BITSEY "No-no, I don't."

What is the meaning of "innocent"? Do you think David is an "innocent" man? Why or why not? Is

the meaning of "innocence" in David's case the same as the meaning of "innocence" in the case of

a person falsely convicted of a murder and put to death for that crime? Discuss.

6. Consider the following dialogue between lack and Bitsey:

ZACK "Why make it look like a murder?"

~. -.

BITSEY "I don't know. It's so calculated. She's handcuffed, taped at the mouth, the gloves, the tripod."

lACK "Why, Bitsey? Why fake your own murder? It doesn't make sense. The woman's a bleeding

heart abolitionist. Why frame an innocent man? Why send Gale to the chair, for what?"

BITSEY "What?"

and lACK "Well, she had to know some innocent jerk would take the fall."

BITSEY "Oh my God, lack. That's it. That's why-to prove it'lhappens. To have absolute proof that ther

system convicts inpocents."

lACK "Get outta here!"pare

ffed,

left

irnes

died

:hod.Do David and Constance succeed in absolutely proving their point that innocent persons are

executed? Why or why not?

7. Consider the following exchange between Bitsey and lack:

BITSEY "Dusty's a bullhorner, a zealot who's OD'd on too many good causes. You know, the original

plan was probably to release the tape after Gale's conviction; you know, after a year or so-It would

et it force him to dry out, give him back his dignity. So Dusty Wright is sitting on this tape, waiting, and he'sis a the only one who knows about it. So good 01 ' Dusty starts to think that an erroneous execution is a lot

y to more politically useful than a last-minute save."

lACK "Because a last-minute save would only prove the system works."

BITSEY "Almost martyrs don't count-Dusty's thinking: 'What's one murder if it stops thousands?'"

eathlACK "'So, I release the tape only after the execution.'"

BITSEY "Which means he must have the original somewhere."

If you were Dusty, would allow David to be executed, or would you step in at the last moment and

make him an "almost martyr"? Morally justify your response. Do you agree with the reasoning attrib-

uted to Dusty: "What's one murder if it stops thousands?"

ce."




J AMES RACHELS

EGOISM AND MORAL SKEPTICISM

ames Rachels distinguishes between two types of egoism: psychological and ethical.

P sy ch olo gic al e go is m is the view that all people are selfish in everything they do.

According to the psychological egoist, the only motive from which any of us ever acts is

s elf- in te re sj: .·E th ic al e go is m , unlike psychological egoism, is a normative view about howpeople ought to act. The ethical egoist believes that we have no obligation to do anything

except what is in our own self-interest. According to the ethical egoist, whatever we do in our

own self-interest, regardless of its effect on others, is morally justified. In this selection, Rachels

lays out a number of difficulties with both types of egoism.

James Rachels (1941~2003) was university professor at the University of Alabama,

Birmingham, where he had taught since 1977. He received his B.A. from Mercer College and

his PhD. from the University of North Carolina. He also taught at Duke University, the

University of Richmond, New York University, and the University of Miami. He is the author

of T he E nd o f L ife : E utha na sia an d M ora lity (1986), C reated from Anim als: The M oral Im plica tions o f

Darwinism (1991), C an E thics P rovide Answ ers? Al1 d O ther E ssays in M oral P hilosophy (1997) and

The E lements o f Moral P hilosophy (4th ed., 2(02). The following selection is from A New

In tr od uc tio n to P h il os op hy (ed. Steven M. Cahn, ~971~,'~;"

Our ordinary thinking about morality is full of

assumptions that we almost never question. We

assume, for example, that we have an obligation

to consider the welfare of other people when we

decide what actions to perform or what rules to

obey;we think that we must refrain fromactingin

ways harmful to others, and that we must respect

their rights and interests as well as our own. We

also assume that people are in fact capable of

being motivated by such considerations, that is,

that people are not wholly selfish and that they do

sometimes act in the interests of others.

Both of these assumptions have come under

attack by moral skeptics, as long ago as by

Glaucon in Book II of Plato's Republ ic . Glaucon

recalls the legend of Gyges, a shepherd who was

said to have found a magic ring in a fissure

opened by an earthquake. The ring would make

its wearer invisible and thus would enable him to

go anywhere and do anything undetected. Gyges

used the power of the ring to gain entry to the

Royal Palace where he seduced the Queen,

murdered the King, and subsequently seized the

throne. Now Glaucon asks us to imagine that

there are two such rings, one given to a man of

virtue and one given to a rogue. The rogue, of

course, will use his ring unscrupulously and do

anything necessary to .increase his own wealth

and power.Hewill recognizeno moral constraints

on his conduct, and, since the cloak of invisibility

will protect him from discovery, he can do

anything he pleases without fear of reprisal. So

therewill be no end to the mischief hewill do. But

how will the so-called virtuous man behave?

Glaucon suggests that he will behave no better

than the rogue: "No one, it is commonly believed,

would have such ironstrength ofmind as to stand

fast in doing right or keep his hands off other

men's goods, when he could go to the market-

place and fearlessly help himself to anything he

wanted, enter houses and sleep with any woman

he chose, set prisoners free and kill men at his

pleasure, and in a word go about among men

with the powers of a god. He would behave no

better than the other; both would take the same

course." Moreover, why shouldn't he? Once he is

freed from the fear of reprisal, why shouldn't a

man Simplydo what hepleases, orwhat he thinks

isbest forhimself?What reason is there forhim to



meal.

r do.

ICtsis

how

thing

IIour

chels

lama,

~and

" the

rthor

ms o]

land

New

an of

I e , of

id do

realth

mints

bility

tl do

tl . So

). But

lave?

Jetter

eved,stand

other

rrket-

19 he

rman

It his

men

re no

same

he is11't a

links

imto

continue being "moral" when it is clearly not to

his own advantage to do so?

These skeptical views suggested by Glaucon

have come to be known as p s yc ho log ic a l e go ism and

e th i ca l e go ism , respectively. Psychological egoism is

the view that all men are selfish in everything that

they do, that is, that the only motive from which

anyone ever acts is self-interest. On this view, even

wheiJ.men are acting in ways apparently calculatedto benefit others, they are actually motivated by

the belief that acting in this way is to their own

advantage, and if they did not believe this, they

would not be doing that action. Ethical egoism is,

by contrast, a normative view about how men

ought to act. It is the view that, regardless of how

men do in fact behave, they have no obligation to

do anything except what is in their own interests.

According to the ethical egoist, a person is always

justified in doing whatever is in his own interest,

regardless of the effect on others. ' t,

Clearly, if either of these views is correct, then "-

"the moral institution of life" (to use Butief.'gwell..;;'• . I

turned phrase) is very different than what we ,"normally think. The majority of mankind is

grossly deceived about what is, or ought to be, the

case, where morals are concerned.

II

Psychological egoism seems to fly in tile face of the

facts. We are tempted to say, "Of course people act

unselfishly all the time. For example, Smith gives up

a trip to the country, which he would have enjoyed

very much, in order to stay behind and help a friend

with his studies, which is a miserable way to pass

the time. This is a perfectly clear case of unselfish

behavior, and if the psychological egoist thinks that

such cases do not occur, then he is just mistaken."

Given such obvious instances of "unselfish

behavior," what reply can the egoist make? There

are two general arguments by which he might try to

show that allactions, including those such as the one

just outlined, are in fact motivated by self-interest.

Let us examine these in turn:

A. The first argument goes as follows. If we

describe one person's action as selfish, and

another person's action as unselfish, we are

overlooking the crucial fact that in both cases,

assuming that the action is done voluntarily, th e

agen t is m ere ly do ing what he m ost w ants to do . If

Smith stays behind to help his friend, that only


shows that he wanted to help his friend more than

he wanted to go to the country, And why should

he be praised for his "unselfishness" when he is

only doing what he most wants to do? So, since

Smith is only doing what he wants to do, he

cannot be said to be acting unselfishly.

This argument is so bad that it would not

deserve to be taken seriously except for the fact that

so many otherwise intelligent people have beentaken in by it. First, the argument rests on the

premise that people never voluntarily do anything

except what they want to do. But this is patently

false; there are at least two classes of actions that are

exceptions to this generalization. One is the set of

actions which we may not want to do, but which

we do anyway as a means to an end which we want

to achieve; for example, going to the dentist in order

to stop a toothache, or going to work every day in

order to be able to draw our pay at the end of the

month. These cases may be regarded as consistent

with the spirit of the egoist argument, however,

since the ends mentioned are wanted by the agent .

But the other set of actions are those which we do,not because we want to, nor even because there is

an end which we want to achieve, but because we

feel ourselves u nd er a n o blig atio n to do them. For

example, someone may do something because he

has promised to do it, and thus feels obligated, even

though he does not want to do it. It is sometimes

suggested that in such cases we do the action

because, after all, we want to keep our promises; so,

even here, we are doing what we want. However,

this dodge will not work: IfIhave promised to do

something, and if Ido not want to do it, then it is

simply false to say that Iwant to keep my promise.

Insuch cases we feel a conflict precisely because we

do not want to do what we feel obligated to do. Itis

reasonable to think that Smith's action falls roughly

into this second category: He might stay behind, not

because he wants to, but because he feels that his

friend needs help.

But suppose we were to concede, for the sake

of the argument, that all voluntary action is

motivated by the agent's wants, or at least that

Smith is so motivated. Even if these were granted,

itwould not follow that Smith is acting selfishly

or from self-interest. For if Smith wants to do

something that will help his friend, even when it

means forgoing his own enjoyments, that is

precisely what makes him unselfish. What else




could unselfishness be, if not waning to help unselfish man precisely the one who does derive

others? Another way to put the same point is to satisfaction from helping others, while the selfish

say that it is the object of a want that determines man does not? If Lincoln "got peace of mind"

whether it is selfish or not. Themere fact that I am from rescuing the piglets, does this show him to

acting on my wants does not mean that I am be selfish, or, on the contrary, doesn't it show him

acting selfishly; that depends on what it is that I to be compassionate and good-hearted? (If a man

want. If I want only my own good, and care were truly selfish, why should it bother his

nothing for others, then I am selfish; but if I also conscience that others suffer-much less pigs?)

want other people tobe well-offand happy, and if Similarly,it isnothing more than shabby sophistry

I act on that desire, then my action is not selfish. to say, because Smith takes satisfaction in helping

Somuch for this argument. his friend, that he is behaving selfishly: If we say

B. The second argument for psychological this rapidly, while thinking about something else,

egoism is this. Since so-called unselfish actions perhaps it will sound all right; but if we speak

always produce a sense of self-satisfaction in the slowly,and pay attention to what we aresaying, it

agent, and since this sense of satisfaction is a sounds plain silly.

pleasant state of consciousness.Jt follows that the Moreover, suppose we ask why Smith derives

point of the action is really to achieve a pleasant satisfactionfromhelping hisfriend. Theanswer will

state of consciousness, rather than to bring about be, it isbecauseSmithcares for him and wants him

any good for others. Therefore, the action is to succeed.If Smith did not have these concerns,

"unselfish" only at a superficial level of'analysis.. then~he would take no pleasure in assisting him;

Smith will feel much better with himself fat andthese concerns,as v,rehave already seen, are the

having stayed to help his friend-if he had go~e ~-";masks of unselfishness; not selfishness. Toput the

to the country, he would have felt terrible about . point more generally: If we have a positiveattitude

it=-and., that is the real point of the action. toward the attainment of some goal, then we may

According to a well-known story, this argument derive satisfactionfrom attaining that goal. But the

was onceexpressed byAbraham Lincoln: object ofour attitude is t he a tt a inment of t ha t g oa l; and

we must want to attain the goal before we can find

any satisfaction ill it. We do not, ill other words,

desiresomesortof "pleasurable consciousness"and

then try to figure out how to achieve it; rather, we

desire all sorts of different things-money, a new

fishing-boat, to be a better chess-player, to get a

promotion in our work, etc.-and because we

desire these things, we derive satisfaction from

attaining them. And so, if someone desires the

welfare and happiness of another person, he will

derivesatisfactionfromthat; but this doesnot mean

that this satisfaction is the object of his desire, or

thathe is inanyway selfishon accountofit.

It is a measure of the weakness of psycho-

logicalegoism that these insupportable arguments

are the ones most often advanced in its favor.

Why, then, should anyone ever have thought it a

true view? Perhaps because of a desire for

theoretical simplicity: In thinking about human

conduct, it would be nice if there were some

simple formula that would unite the diverse

phenomena of human behavior, under a single

explanatory principle, just as simple formulae in

physics bring together a great many apparently

Mr. Lincoln once remarked to a fellow-passenger on

an old-time mud-coach that all men were prompted

by selfishness in doing good. His fellow-passenger

was antagonizing this position when they were pass-

ing over a corduroy bridge that spanned a slough. As

they crossed this bridge they espied an old razor-

backed sow on the bank making a terrible noise be-

cause her pigs had got into the slough and were in

danger of drowning. As the old coach began to climb

the hill, Mr. Lincoln called out, "Driver, can't you stopjust a moment?" Then Mr. Lincoln jumped out, ran

back, and lifted the little pigs out of the mud and wa-

ter and placed them on the bank When he returned,

his companion remarked: "Now Abe, where does self-

ishness come in on this little episode?" "Why, bless

your soul, Ed, that was the very essence of selfishness,

Ishould have had no peace of mind all day had I gone

on and left that suffering old sow worrying over those

pigs. I did it to get peace of mind, don't you see?"

This argument suffers from defects similar to

the previous one. Why should we think that

merely because someone derives satisfaction from

helping others this makes him selfish? Isn't the



different phenomena. And since it is obvious that The last two paragraphs show (a ) that is it false

self-regard is an overwhelmingly important factor that an actions are selfish, and (b ) that it is false

in motivation, it is only natural to wonder that all actions are done out of self-interest. And it

whether all motivation might not be explained in should be noted that these two points can be

these terms. But the answer is clearly No; while a made, and were, without any appeal to putative

great many human actions are motivated entirely examples of altruism.

or in part by self-interest, only by a deliberate The third confusion is the common but false

distortiorr.'of the facts can we say that all conduct assumption that a concern for one's own welfare

is so motivated. This will be clear, I think, if we is incompatible with any genuine concern for thecorrect three confusions which are commonplace. welfare of others. Thus, since it is obvious that

The exposure of these confusions will remove the everyone (orvery nearly everyone) does desire his

last traces of plausibility from the psychological own well-being, it might be thought that no one

egoist thesis. can really be concerned with others. But again,

The first is the confusion of selfishness with this is false. There is no inconsistency in desiring

self-interest. The two are clearlynot the same. IfI that everyone, including oneself an d others, be

see a physician when Iam feeling poorly, Iam well-off and happy. Tobe sure, it may happen on

acting in my own interest but no one would think occasion that our own interests conflict with the

of calling me "selfish" on account of it.Similarly, interests or others, and in these caseswe will have

brushing my teeth, working hard at my job, and to make hard choices. But even in these cases we

obeying the law are all in my self-interest but ~might 'sometimes opt for the interests of others,

none ofthese areexamples ofselfish conduct This ~especiallywhen the others involved are our family

isbecause selfishbehavior isbehavior that ignores ..: or friends. But more importantly; not all cases are

the interests of others, in circumstances in:which -',< like this. Sometimes we are able to promote the

their interests ought not to be ignored. This ' welfare of others when our own interests are not

concept has a definite evaluative flavor; to call involved at all. In these cases not even the

someone "selfish" is not just to describe his action strongest self-regard need prevent us from acting

but to condemn it. Thus, you would not call me considerately toward others.

selfish for eating a normal meal in normal Once these confusions are cleared away, it

circumstances (although it may surely be inmy seems to me obvious enough that there is no

self-interest); but you would call me selfish for reason whatever to accept psychological egoism.

hoarding food while others about are starving. On the contrary, if we simply observe people's

The second confusion is the assumption that behavior with an open mind, we may find that a

every action is done either from self-interest or great deal of it is motivated by self-regard, but by

from other-regarding motives. Thus, the egoist no means all of it; and that there is no reason to

concludes that if there is no such thing as genuine deny that "the moral institution of life" can

altruism then all actions must be done from self- include a place for the virtue ofbeneficence.

interest. But this is certainly a false dichotomy.

Theman who continues to smoke cigarettes, even

after learning about the connection between

smoking and cancer, is surely not acting fromself-

interest, not even by his own standards-self-

interest would dictate that he quit smoking at

once-s-and he is not acting altruistically either. He

is, no doubt, smoking for the pleasure of it, but all

that this shows is that undisciplined pleasure-

seeking and acting from self-interest are very

different. This is what led Butler to remark that

"ThetlUngtobe lamented is, not that men have so

great regard to their own good or interest in the

present world; for they have not enough."

ve

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III

The ethical egoist would say at this point, "Of

course it is possible for people to act altruistically,

and perhaps many people do act that way-s-but

there isno reason why they should do so.Aperson

is under no obligation to do anything except what

is inhis own interests." This is really quite a

radical doctrine. Suppose Ihave an urge to set fire

to some public building (say, a department store)

just for the fascination ofwatching the spectacular

blaze:According to this view, the fact that several

people might be burned to death provides no

reason whatever why I should not do it. After all,



SO B From Socrates to Cinema

this only concerns their welfare, not my own, and among philosophical writers=-the argument that

according to the ethical egoist the only person I ethical egoismis at bottom inconsistent because it

need think of is myself. cannot be universalized. The argument goes like

Some might deny that ethical egoism has any this:

such monstrous consequences. They would point Tosay that any action or policy of action is right

out that it isreally to my own advantage not to set (or that it ought to be adopted) entails that it is

the fire-for, if Ldo that Imay be caught and put right for anyone in the same sort ofcircumstances.I

into prison (unlike Gyges, Ihave no magic ring cannot, for example, say that it is right forme to lie

for protectidn). Moreover, even if Icould avoid to you, and yet object when you lie to me

being caught it is still to my advantage to respect (provided, of course, that the circumstances are

the rights and interests of others, for it is to my the same).Icannot hold that it is all right for me

advantage to live in a society in which people's to drink your beer and then complain when you

rights and interests are respected. Only in such a drink mine. Thisisjust the requirement that we be

society can Ilive a happy and secure life; so, in consistent in om evaluations; it is a requirement

acting kindly toward others, Iwould merely be of logic. Now it is said that ethical egoismcannot

doing my part to create and maintain the sort of meet this requirement because, as we have

society which it is to my advantage to have. already seen, the-egoist would not want others to

Therefore, it is said, the egoist would not be such act in the same way that he acts. Moreover,

a bad man; he would be as kindly and considerate suppose he di d advocate the universal adoption of

as anyone else, because he would see that It is to .egoistlt: policies: he would be saying to Peter,

his own advantage tobe kindly and considerate. . L "Youought topmsue your own interests even ifit

Thisis a seductive line of thought, but it seems -'---~ean6 destroying Paul"; and he would be saying

to me mistaken. Certainly it is to everyone's' to Paul, "Youought to pursue yom own interestsadvantage (including the egoist's) to preserve a even if it means destroying Peter." The attitudes

stable society where people's interests are expressed in these two recommendations seem

generally protected. But there is no reason for the clearlyinconsistent---heis urging the advancement

egoist to think that merely because he will not of Peter's interest at one moment, and

honor the rules of the social game, decent society countenancing their defeat at the next. Therefore,

will collapse. For the vast majority of people are the argument goes, there is no way to maintain

not egoists, and there is no reason to think that the doctrine of ethical egoism as a consistent view

theywill be converted by his example-especially about how we ought to act. We will fall into

if he is discreet and does not unduly flaunt his inconsistencywhenever we t ry.

style of life. What this line of reasoning shows is What are we to make of this argument? Arewe

not that the egoist himself must act benevolently, to conclude that ethical egoism has been refuted?

but that he must encourage others to do so. He Sucha conclusion,Ihink, would be unwarranted;

must take care to conceal from public view his for Ithink that we can show, contrary to this

own self-centered method of decision-making, argument, how ethical egoism can be maintainedand urge others to act on precepts very different consistently, Weneed only to interpret the egoist's

from those onwhich he iswilling to act. position in a sympathetic way.Weshould say that

The rational egoist, then, cannot advocate that he has inmind a certain kind of world which he

egoism be universally adopted by everyone. For would prefer over all others; itwould be a world

he wants a world in which his own interests are in which his own interests were maximized,

maximized; and if other people adopted the regardless of the effects on other people. The

egoistic policy of pursuing their own interests to egoist's primary policy of action, then, would be

the exclusion of his interest, as he pursues his to act in such away as tobring about, asnearly as

interests to the exclusion of theirs, then such a possible, this sort ofworld. Regardless ofhowever

world would be impossible. Sohe himselfwill be morally reprehensible we might find it, there is

an egoist, but he will want others tobe altruists. nothing inconsistent in someone's adopting this as

This brings us to what is perhaps the most his ideal and acting in away calculated to bring it

popular "refutation" of ethical egoism current about. And if someone did adopt this as his ideal,



ment that

because it

goes like

then he would not advocate universal egoism; as

we have already seen, he would want other

people to be altruists. So if he advocates any

principles of conduct for the general public, they

will be altruistic principles. This would not be

inconsistent; on the contrary, itwould be perfectly

consistent with his goal of creating a world in

his own interests are maximized. To be

he would have to be deceitful; in order tosecure the good will of others, and a favorable

hearing for his exhortations to altruism, he would

have to pretend that he was himself prepared to

accept altruistic principles. But again, that would

be all right; from the egoist's point of view, this

would merely be a matter of adopting the

necessary means to the achievement of his goal-

and while we might not approve of this, there is

nothing inconsistent about it. Again, it might be

said, "He advocates one thing, but does another.

Surely that's inconsistent." But itis not; for.what h€

advocates and what he does are both calculated as

means to an end (the same end, we ro.ight.~ote);

and as such, he is doing what is rationally requiredin each case. Therefore, contrary to the previous

argument, there is nothing inconsistent in the

ethical egoist's view. He cannot be refuted by the

claim that he contradicts himself.

Is there, then, no way to refute the ethical

egoist? If by "refute" we mean show that he has

made some logical error, the answer is that there is

not. However, there is something more that can be

said. The egoist challenge to our ordinary moral

convictions amounts to a demand for an

explanation of why we should adopt certain

policies of action, namely, policies in which the

good of others is given importance. We can give

an answer to this demand, albeit an indirect one.

The reason one ought not to do actions that would

hurt other people is: Other people would be hurt.

The reason one ought to do actions that would

benefit other people is: Other people would be

benefited. This may at first seem like a piece of

philosophical sleight-of-hand, but it is not. The

point is that the welfare of human beings is

something that most of us value for its own sake,

and not merely for the sake of something else.

Therefore, when further reasons are demanded for

valuing the welfare of human beings, we cannot

point to anything further to satisfy this demand. It

is not that we have no reason for pursuing these

on is r ight

that it is

istances. I

r me to lie

ie to meances are

ht for me

'{hen you

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[uirement

m cannot

we have

others to

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loption of

to Peter,

even if it

be saying

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ms seem

ancement

mt, and

.herefore,

maintain

tent view

fall into

t?Are we

refuted?

arranted;

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aintainede egoist's

[say that

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pIe. The

vould be

nearly as

however

there is

Lgthis as

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his ideal,


policies; but that our reason is that these policies

are for the good of human beings.

So if we are asked, "Why shouldn't I set fire to

this department store?" one answer would be,

"Because if you do, people may be burned to

death." This is a complete, sufficient reason which

does not require qualification or supplementation

of any sort. If someone seriously wants to know

why this action shouldn't be done, that's thereason; If we are pressed further and asked the

skeptical question, "But why shouldn't I do

actions that will harm others?" we may not know

what to say-but this is because the questioner

has included in his question the very answer we

would like to give; "Why shouldn't you do

actions that will harm others? Because doing

those.actions would harm others."

The egoist, no doubt, will not be happy with

this, He will protest that we may accept this as a

reason, but he does not. And here the argument

stops; There are limits to' what can be

accomplished by argument, and if the egoist really

doesn't care about other people---if he honestlydoesn't care whether they are helped or hurt by

his actions-then we have reached those limits. If

we want to persuade him to act decently toward

his fellow humans, we will have to make our

appeal to such other attitudes as he does possess,

by threats, bribes, or other cajolery. That is all that

we,can do.

Though some may find this situation dis-

tressing (we would like to be able to show that the

egoist is just wrong); it holds no embarrassment for

common morality. What we have come up against

is simply a fundamental requirement of rational

action; namely, that the existence of reasons for

action always depends on the prior existence of

certain attitudes in the agent. For example, the

fact that a certain course of action would make the

agent a lot of money is a reason for doing itonly if

the agent wants to make money; the fact that

practicing at chess makes one a better player is a

reason for practicing only if one wants to be a

better player; and so on. Similarly, the fact that a

certain action would help the agent is a reason for

doing the action only if the agent cares about his

own welfare, and the fact that an action would

help others is a reason for doing it only if the

agent cares about others. In this respect ethical

egoism and what we might call ethical altruism




are in exactly the same fix: Both require that the

agent care about himself, or about other people,

before they canget started.

So a nonegoist will accept "It would harm

another person" as a reason not to do an action

simply because he cares about what happens to

that other person. When the egoist says that he

does no : accept that as a reason, he is saying.

sOI]1€thingquite extraordinary. He is saying thathehas no affection for friends or family, that he

never feels pity or compassion, that he is the sort

of person who can look on. scenes of human

miserywith complete indifference,so long ashe is

not the one suffering. Genuine egoists, people

who really don't care at all about anyone [other]

than themselves, are rare. It is important to keep

this in mind when thinking about ethical egoism;

it is easy to forget just how fundamental tohuman

psychological makeup the feelingof sympathy is.

Indeed, aman without any sympathy at all~ould ~

scarcely be recognizable as a man; and -that is ., 3.

what makes ethical egoism such a diStu'rbiJ;tg.;;,

doctrine in the first place. !.

IV

Thereare, ofcourse,many differentways inwhich

the skeptic might challenge the assumptions

underlying our moral practice. In this essayI have

discussed only two of them, the two put forward

byGlaucon in the passage that I cited fromPlato's

Republ ic . It is important that the assumptions

underlying our moral practice should not be

confused with particular judgments made within

that practice. Todefend one is not to defend the

other. We may assume-quite properly, if my

analysis has been correct-that the virtue of

beneficence does, and indeed should, occupy an

important place in "the moral institution of life";

and yet we may make constant and miserable

errorswhen it comes tojudging when and inwhat

ways this virtue is tobe exercised.Evenworse, we

may often be able to make accurate moral

judgments, and know what we ought to do,

but not do it. For these ills, philosophy alone is

not the cure.

D ISC U SSIO N QUEST IO N S

1. What exactly is the differencebetween ethical

egoism and psychological egoism? Why is

thisdistinction important?

Whf does Rachels believe that "selfishness"

is not the same as "self-interest"? How does

be use this distinction to refute psychological

egoism?

How convinced are you by Rachels's

argument against the notion that every action

is done either fromself-interestor from other-

regarding motives? Can you think of a

counterargument?

What is Rachels's best argument against

ethical egoism?Why is it a strong argument?

Defend your position.

Some say that egoism undermines the moral

point of view, that is, the impartial attitude of

one who attempts to see all sides of an issue

without being committed to the interests ofa

particular individual or group. Do you agree

with this claim? Why or why not? Is it an

important lineofcriticism?Discuss.

2.

4.

5.

Gordon Gekko (Michael Douglas) is a Wall Street trader

with great wealth and power. He spends his days bend-

ing and breaking the law in order to increase his hold-

ings. Gekko manipulates small investors in order to make a



ccupyan

1of life";

riiserable

d in what

erse, we

te moral

It to do,

. alone is

en ethical

Why is

fishness"

[ow does

hological

Rachels's

ry action

im other-

nk of a

against

:gument?

he moral

ttitude of

an issue

rests of a

'au agree

Is it an

4.

~. 5 .

6.

7.

B .

9.

------ . -- --------


financial profit. He thinks little about taking companies away from their stockholders through ruthless and

sometimes il legal means. Gekko acts as a mentor to a young stockbroker, Bud Fox (Charlie Sheen), who is

hungry for success. To impress Gekko, Fox passes along some inside information from his father, which puts

his father's company in jeopardy. Eventually, Fox comes to believe that Gekko's trading techniques are im-

moral as well as illegal.

Whi Ie Oliver Stone clearly believes that Gekko's actions and much of the capitalist trading mentality of

Wall Street are immoral, Gekko justifies his actions with statements like "Nobody gets hurt," "Everybody's

doing it," "Who knows except us?" and "There's something in this deal for everybody" Gekko's credo is

"Greed is good," and he builds an entire system of values around it. Stone's target in Wall Street is less the

bending and breaking of laws by Wall Street insiders and more a system of values based on greed. Michael

Douglas won an Oscar for his portrayal of Gordon Gekko.

D ISC USSIO N Q UEST IO NS

1.

2.

3.

Is Wall Street a criticism of egoism or a defense of egoism""?Defend your view.

Are Gekko's actions "selfish" or "self-interested"? Both? -Neither? Defend your view.

Ge.kko. morally justifies his adions in the film by saying t~ing~ like, "Nobody gets hurt," "Everybody's

doing It,/I "who knows except us?" and "T~ere's something In this deal for everybody." Are any of

these good reasons to do what he c;joes? ~

Is it wrong to use "Nobody will know . eX.c;:~ptus" as a justification for immoral activities? Why or

why not? . "

Can greed ever be good as Gekko says? Can it be the center of a theory of morality? Or is greed

always immoral? Defend your view.

Could a utilitarian justify Gekko's actions? A Kantian? Explain your view.

Why, according to Aristotle, is greed not a virtue? Do you agree with him?

What would Confucius say about greed and the actions of Gekko?

Imagine you are faced with greedy corporate executives like Gekko. Assume for the sake of

argument that you believe greed is not good. How would you persuade them of this? Would you

ultimately be able to convince them? Why or why not?

CAROL GILLIGAN

IN A DIFFERENT VOICE

arol Gilligan argues that women have a moral voice or perspective that is distinc

from that of men. A woman's moral perspective is by nature more personal an

contextual than the natural moral perspective of a man. Whereas men are motivate

more by impartial and abstract principles regarding duty, women are motivated more by

sense offeeling, caret and responsibility.

Gilligan contends that women's moral development and their mature approach to mora

questions can be at times quite different from those of men. Gilligan criticizes Lawrenc

Kohlberg's theory of moral development. According to Kohlberg, a person's moral abilitie

develop in stages. In the first stage, the preconoeni ional stage, we follow authority to avoi



512 From Socrates toCinema

punishment. In the second stage, the conventional stage, we desire acceptance by a group and

follow conventional moral standards. Inthe third and final, stage, the p o st co n ve n ti on a l s ta g e, we

question conventional standards and base our ideas of morality on universal moral principles

of human welfare, justice, and rights. When Kohlberg's theory is applied to women, it turns

out that women are, on average, lessmorally developed than men. While many men continue

tomove up to the postconventionallevel of impartial principles, women aremore likely to stay

at the lower conventional level ofpersonal attachments and loyalties.

Gilligan proposes an alternative model of moral development that reflects women'sdistinctive moral perspective. Women alsodevelop in three stages for Gilligan. The first stage is

caring for self only, the second is caring for others only, and the third is a balance between

caring for self and others=-recognition that caring for others depends on caring for self.

According to Gilligan, women develop by discovering better ways of caring for themselves and

others. Women faced with moral decisions focus on relationships and viewmorality in terms of

taking care of these relationships. Men faced with moral decisions focus on following moral

rules and principles. Consequently, the ideals of caring and responsibility play a more central

role in the moral orientations ofwomen, while the "rights" perspective plays amore central roler

in the moral orientation? ofmen. Gilligan concludes that existing moral theories embody amale

bias and fail to take specific aCCQlU1tf women's mora1 orientation. According to Gilligan,

women's morality is not inferior to that cfmen. The virtues of caring and responsibility are

needed to ensure that society does not become.a..collection of isolated individuals who guard

their individual rights and justice but who are lonely, unattached, and uncaring .•"Carol Gilligan (1936-) taught at Harvard University for over thirty years and in 1997

became Harvard's first professor of gender studies. In 2002, she became university professor at

New York University. She received an A.B. in English from Swarthmore College in 1958, an

M.A. in clinical psychology from Radcliffe College in 1960, and a Ph.D. in social psychology

from Harvard University in 1964.In1967,she began teaching atHarvard with the psychologist

Erik Erikson, and in 1970,she became a research assistant for Lawrence Kohlberg, whose views

on moral development she would go on to criticize. She is the author of In a D ifferen t V oice :

P syc ho lo gic al T he or y a nd W om en 's D ev elo pm e nt (1982), M app ing th e M ora l D om ain (1988t Making

Connec t ions (1990),Wom en , C irls , a nd P sych oth era py: R efra min g R esista nce (1991),M eeting a t the

C ro ssro ad s: W om en 's P syc ho lo gy a nd G irls' D evelo pm en t (1992), Betw een V oice a nd S ilen ce : W om en

a nd G ir ls , R ac e a nd R ela tio ns hip s (1995),and T he B irth o f P le asu re (2002 ). The following selection

is from her most famous book, In a D iffe re nt V oice .

Inthe second act of T he C he rr y O rc ha rd , Lopahin, a

young merchant, describes his lifeofhard work and

success.Failing to convinceMadame Ranevskaya to

cut down the cherry orchard to save her estate, he

will go on inthe next act to buy ithimself. He is the

self-made man who, inpurchasing the estatewhere

his father and grandfather were slaves, seeks to

eradicate the "awkward, unhappy life" of the past,

replacing the cherry orchard with summer cottages

where coming generations "will see a new life." In

elaborating this developmental vision, he reveals

the image of man that underlies and supports his

activity: "At times when I can't go to sleep, I think:

Lord, thou gavest us immense forests, unbounded

fields and the widest horizons, and living in the

midst of them we should indeed be giants"-at

which point, Madame Ranevskaya interrupts him,

saying, "You feel the need for giants-They are

good only in fairy tales, anywhere else they only

frightenus."

Conceptions of the human life cycle represent

attempts to order and make coherent the



roup and

' s tage , we

Jrinciples

1, it turns

continue

!lyto stay

women's

5tstage is

between

for self.

elves and

terms of

ng moral

re central

mtral role

iya male

Gilligan,

bility are

ho guard

i in 1997

ofessor at

1958, an

ychology

chologist

ise views

e nt V oic e:

) , M a ki ng

ing a t the

e: Women

selection

pports his

!p , Ihink:

nbounded

ing in the

ants"-at

:upts him,

-They are

they only

represent

srent the

unfolding experiences and perceptions, the

changing wishes and realities of everyday life. But

the nature of such conceptions depends in part on

the position of the observer. The brief excerpt from

Chekhov's play suggests that when the observer is

a woman, the perspective may be of a different sort.

Different judgments of the image of man as giant

imply different ideas about human development,

different ways of imagining the human condition,different notions ofwhat is of value in life.

At a time when efforts are being made to

eradicate discrimination between the sexes in the

search for social equality and justice, the differences

between the sexes are being rediscovered in the

social sciences. This discovery occurs when theories

formerly considered. to be sexually neutral in their

scientific objectivity are found instead to reflect a

consistent observational and evaluative bias. Then

the presumed neutrality of science, like that of

language itself, gives way to the recognition that'the

categories of knowledge are human constructions.

The fascination with point of vlew'·-{1)at;;,has

informed the fiction of the twentieth century and" the corresponding recognition of the relativity of

judgment infuse our scientific understanding as

well when we begin to notice how accustomed we

have become to seeing life through men's eyes.

A recent discovery of this sort pertains to the

apparently innocent classic The Elements of Style, by

William Strunk and E. B . White. The Supreme

Court ruling on the subject of discrimination in

classroom texts led one teacher of English to

notice that the elementary rules of English usage

were being taught through examples which

counterposed the birth of Napoleon, the writings of

Coleridge, and statements such as "He was an

interesting talker. A man who had traveled all overthe world and lived in half a dozen countries,"

with "Well, Susan, this is a fine mess you are in" or,

less drastically, "He saw a woman, accompanied by

two children, walking slowly down the road."

Psychological theorists have fallen as innocently

as Strunk and While into the same observational

bias. Implicitly adopting the male life as the norm,

they have tried to fashion women out of a masculine

cloth. Itall goes back, of course, to Adam and Eve--

a story which shows, among other things, that if you

make woman out of a man, you are bound to get

into trouble. In the life cycle, as in the Garden of

Eden, the woman has been the deviant.


The penchant of developmental theorists

project a masculine image, and one that appea

frightening to women, goes back at least to Freu

who built his theory of psychosexual developme

around the experiences of the male child th

culminate in the Oedipus complex. In the 192

Freud struggled to resolve the contradictions pos

for his theory by the differences in female anatom

and the different configuration of the young giearly family relationships. After trying to fit wom

into his masculine conception, seeing them

envying that which they missed, he carne instead

acknowledge, in the strength and persistence

women's pre-Oedipal attachments to their mothers

developmental difference. He considered t

difference inwomen's development to be responsib

for.what he saw aswomen's developmental failure

Having tied the formation of the superego

.conscience to castration anxiety, Freud consider

women to be deprived by nature of the impetus

a clear-cut Oedipal resoluti~n. Consequentl

women's superego-the heir to the Oedip

complex-was compromised: it was never "inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of

emotional origins as we require it to be in men

From this observation of difference, that "for wom

the level of what is ethically normal is different fro

what it is in men," Freud concluded that wom

"show less sense of justice than men, that they a

less ready to submit to the great exigencies of li

that they are more often influenced in th

judgments by feelings of affection or hostility."

Thus a problem in theory became cast as

problem in women's development, and t

problem in women's development was located

their experience of relationships. Nancy Chodoro

attempting to account for "the reproduction witheach generation of certain general and near

universal differences that characterize masculi

and feminine personality and roles," attribut

these differences between the sexes not to anatom

but rather to "the fact that women, universally, a

largely responsible for early child care." Becau

this early social environment differs for and

experienced differently by male and fema

children, basic sex differences recur in personali

development. As a result, "in any given socie

feminine personality comes to define itself

relation and connection to other people more th

masculine personality does."




Inher analysis, Chodorow relies primarily on experience themselves as less differentiated than

Robert Stoller's studies, which indicate that boys, as more continuous with and related to the

gender identity, the unchanging core of external object-world, and as differently oriented

personality formation, is "with rare exception totheirinner object-worldaswell."

firmly and irreversibly established for both sexes Consequently; relationships, and particularly

by the time a child is around three." Giventhat for issues of dependency, are experienced differently

both sexes the primary caretaker in the first three by women and men. For boys and men,

years of lifejs typically female, the interpersonal separation and individuation are criticallytied to

dvnamicsj.-of gender identity formation are gender identity since separation from the motherdifferent for boys and girls. Female identity is essential for the development of masculinity.

formation takes place in a context of ongoing For girls and women, issues of femininity or

relationship since "mothers tend to, experience feminine identity do not depend on the

their daughters as more like, and continuous achievement of separation from the mother or on

with, themselves." Correspondingly, girls, in the progress of individuation. Sincemasculinity is

identifying themselves as female, experience defined through~separation while femininity is

themselves as like their mothers, thus fusing the defined through attachment,male gender identity

experience of attachment with the process of is threatened b.y intimacy while female gender

identity formation. In contrast, "mothers expe- identity is threatened by separation. Thus

riencetheir sons as a male opposite," and boys, in males tend to have difficulty with relationships,

defining themselves as masculine, separate their • while females tend to have problems, with

mothers from themselves, thus curtailing "their' individuation. The quality of embeddedness in

primary love and sense of empathic tie." Cons~--'""-~;soeMlnteraction and personal relationships

quently, male development entails a "more 'that .characterizes women's lives in contrast to

emphatic individuation and a more defensive men's, however, becomes not only a descriptive

firming of experiencedegoboundaries." For boys, differencebut alsoa developmental liabilitywhen

but not girls,"issues ofdifferentiationhavebecome the milestones of childhood and adolescent

intertwinedwith sexualissues." development in the psychological literature are

markers of increasingseparation. Women's failure

to separate thenbecomesby definition a failure to

develop.

The sex differences in personality formation

that Chodorow describes in early childhood

appear during the middle childhood years in

studies of children's games. Children's games are

considered by George Herbert Mead and Jean

Piaget as the crucible of social development

during the school years. In games, children learn

to take the role of the other and come to see

themselvesthrough another's eyes.Ingames,they

learnrespect for rules and cometo understand the

ways rules canbemade and changed.

Janet Lever, considering the peer group to be

the agent of socialization during the elementary

school years and play to be a major activity of

socialization at that time, set out to discover

whether there are sex differences in the games

that children play.Studying 181fifth-grade,white,

middle-class children, ages ten and eleven, she

observed the organization and structure of their

playtime activities. She watched the children as

Writing against the masculine bias of

psychoanalytic theory, Chodorow argues that the

existence of sex differences in the early

experiences of individuation and relationship

"does not mean that women have 'weaker' ego

boundaries than men or are more prone to

psychosis." It means instead that "girls emerge

from this period with a basis for 'empathy' built

into their primary definition of selfin a way that

boys do not." Chodorow thus replaces Freud's

negative and derivative description of female

psychologywith a positive and direct account of

her own: "Girls emerge with a stronger basis for

experiencing another's needs or feelings as one's

own (or of thinking that one is so experiencing

another's needs and feelings). Furthermore, girls

donot define themselves in terms ofthe denial of

preoedipal relational modes to the same extent as

do boys. Therefore, regression to these modes

tends not tofeelasmuch abasic threat totheir ego.

Fromvery early;then, because they are parented

by a person of the same gender . . . girls come to



d than

to the

riented

cularly

erently

men,

tied to

notherulinity,

iity or

n the

. or on

inityis

nity is

lentity

~ender

Thus

iships,

with

.ess in

nships

.ast to

riptive

.when

.escent

re are

failure

lure to

nation

dhood

ars in

Lesare

IJean

pment

Llearn

to see

5, they

nd the

to be

entary

rity of

scover

games

hite,

n , she

f their

ren as

they played at school during recess and in

physical education class, and in addition kept

diaries of their accounts as tohow they spent their

out-of-school time. From this study, Lever reports

sex differences: boys play out of doors more often

than girls do; boys play more often in large and

age-heterogeneous groups; they play competitive

games more often, and their games last longer

than girls' games. The last is in some ways the.most interesting finding. Boys' games appeared to

last longer not only because they required a

higher level of skill and were thus less likely to

become boring, but also because, when disputes

arose in the course of a game, boys were able to

resolve the disputes more effectively than girls:

"During the course of this study, boys were seen

quarrelling all the time, but not once was a game

terminated because of a quarrel ana no game was

interrupted for more than seven minutes. In the

gravest debates, the final word was always, to~

'repeat the play,' generally followed by achorus or

'cheater's proof.?" In fact, it seemed th~t'thi!;boys

enjoyed the legal debates as much as they did the,

• game itself, and even marginal players of lesser

size or skill participated equally illthese recurrent

squabbles. In contrast, the eruption of disputes

among girls tended to end the game.

Thus Lever extends and corroborates the

observations of Piaget in his study of the rules of

the game, where he finds boys becoming through

childhood increasingly fascinated with the legal

elaboration of rules and the development of fair

procedures for adjudicating conflicts, a fascination

that, he notes, does not hold for girls. Girls, Piaget

observes, have a more "pragmatic" attitude

toward rules, "regarding a rule as good as long as

the game repaid it."

Girls are more tolerant in their attitudes

toward rules, more willing to make exceptions,

and more easily reconciled to innovations. As a

result, the legal sense, which Piaget considers

essential to moral development, "is far less

developed in little girls than inboys."

The bias that leads Piaget to equate male

development with child development also colors

Lever's work. The assumption that shapes her

discussion of results is that the male model is the

better one since it fits the requirements for

modern corporate success. In contrast, the

sensitivity and care for the feelings of others that


girls develop through their play have little market

value and can even impede professional success.

Lever implies that, given the realities of adult life,

if a girl does not want to be left dependent on

men, she will have to learn toplay like a boy.

To Piaget's argument that children learn the

respect for rules necessary for moral development

by playing rule-bound games, Lawrence Kohlberg

adds that these lessons are most effectivelylearned through the opportunities for role-taking

that arise in the course of resolving disputes.

Consequently, the moral lessons inherent in girls'

play appear to be fewer than in boys.' Traditional

girls' games like jump rope and hopscotch are

turn-takjng games, where competition is indirect

since one person's success does not necessarily

signify another's failure. Consequently, disputes

requiring adjudication are less likely to occur. In

fact, most of the girls whom Lever interviewed

claimed that when a quarrel broke out, they

ended the game. Rather than elaborating a system

of rules for resolving disputes, girls subordinated

the continuation of the game to the continuation

of relationships .

Lever concludes that from the games they play,

boys learn both the independence and the

organizational skills necessary for coordinating

the activities of large and diverse groups of

people. By participating illcontrolled and socially

approved competitive situations, they learn to

deal with competition in a relatively forthright

manner-to play with their enemies and to

compete with their friends-all in accordance

with the rules of the game. Incontrast, girls' play

tends to occur in smaller, more intimate groups,

often the best-friend dyad, and in private places.

This play replicates the social pattern of primary

human relationships in that its organization is

more cooperative. Thus, it points less, in Mead's

terms, toward learning to take the role of "the

generalized other," less toward the abstraction of

human relationships. But it fosters the devel-

opment of the empathy and sensitivity necessary

for taking the role of "the particular other" and

points more toward knowing the other as

different from the self.

The sex differences illpersonality formation in

early childhood that Chodorow derives from her

analysis of the mother-child relationship are

thus extended by Lever's observations of sex



51 (j. From Socrates to Ci nema

men, men have, in their theories of psychological

development, as in their economic arrangements,

tended to assume or devalue that care. When

the focus on individuation and individual

achievementextends into adulthood andmaturity

is equated with personal autonomy, concernwith

"It is obvious," VirginiaWoolfsays, "that the relationships appears as a weakness of women

values ofwomen differveryoftenfromthe values rather than asa human strength.

which havebeen made by the other sex."Yet,she The discrepancy between womanhood and

adds, "itis themasculinevalues that prevail."As a adulthood is nowhere more evident than in the

result, women come to question the normality of studies on sex-role stereotypes reported by

their feelings and to alter their judgments in Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, and

deference to the opinion of others. In the Rosenkrantz. The repeated finding of these

nineteenth-century novels written by women, studies is that the qualities deemed necessary for

Woolf sees at work "a mind which was slightly adulthood-the - capacity for autonomous

pulled fromthe straight and made to alter its clear thinking, clear decision-making, and responsible

vision in deference to external authority" rThe action-are those associatedwith masculinity and

same deference to the valm(s and opinions of considered undesirable as attributes of the

others can be seen in the judgments of twentieth- fe~e self: The stereotypes suggest a splitting

century women. The difficultywomen experience•• of love and work that relegates expressive

infinding or speakingpublicly in their ownvoices, > capaCitiesto women while placing instrumental

emerges repeatedly in the form of qualification- ~'-frbili'fiesn the masculine domain. Yet looked at

and self-doubt,but alsoin intimationsofa divided '£rom'a different perspective, these stereotypes

judgmeht, a public assessment and private reflecta conception of adulthood that is itself out

assessmentwhicharefundamentallyatodds. of balance, favoring the separateness of the

Yet the deference and confusion that Woolf individual self over connection to others, and

criticizes in women derive from the values she leaning more toward an autonomous life ofwork

sees as their strength. Women's deference is than toward theindependence oflove and care.

rooted not only in their social subordination but The discovery now being celebrated by men

also in the substance of their moral concern. in mid-life of the importance of intimacy,

Sensitivity to the needs of others and the relationships, and care is something that women

assumption of responsibility for taking care lead have known from the beginning. However,

women to attend to voices other than their own because that knowledge in women has been

and to include in their judgment other points of considered "intuitive" or "instinctive," a function

view. Women's moral weakness, manifest in an of anatomy coupled with destiny, psychologists

apparent diffusion and confusion ofjudgment, is haveneglectedtodescribeits development. Inmy

thus inseparable fromwomen's moral strength, an research, I have found that women's moral

overriding concern with relationships and development centers on the elaboration of that

responsibilities.The reluctanceto judge may itself knowledge and thus delineates a critical line of

be indicative of the care and concern for others psychologicaldevelopment in the lives of both of

that infuse the psychology of women's the sexes. The subject of moral development not

development and are responsible for what is only provides the final illustration of the

generallyseenasproblematic in itsnature. reiterative pattern in the observation and

Thus women not only define themselves in a assessment of sex differencesin the literature on

contextofhuman relationshipbut alsojudge them" human development, but also indicates more

selves in terms of their ability to care. Women's particularly why the nature and significance of

place in man's life cyclehas been that of nurturer, women's development has been for so long

caretaker, and helpmate, the weaver of those obscured and shrouded inmystery.

networks of relationships on which she in turn The criticism that Freud makes of women's

relies. But while women have thus taken care of sense of justice, seeing it as compromised in its

differences in the play activities of middle

childhood. Together these accounts suggest that

boys and girls arrive at puberty with a different

interpersonal orientation and a different range of

socialexperiences.



;ical

ents,

!hen

dual

rrity

with

refusal ofblind impartiality;. reappears not only in

the work of Piaget but also in that of Kohlberg.

While in Piaget's account of the moral judgment

of the child, girls are an aside, a curiosity towhom

he devotes four brief entries in an index that omits

"boys" altogether because "the child" is assumed

to be male, in the research from which Kohlberg

derives' his theory, females simply do not

exist. Kohlberg's six stages that describe thedevelopment of moral judgment from childhood

to adulthood are based empirically on a study of

eighty-four boys whose development Kohlberg

has followed for a period of over twenty years.

Although Kohlberg claims universality for his

stage sequence, those groups not included in his

original sample rarely reach his higher stages.

Prominent among those who thus appear tobe

deficient in moral development when measured

by Kohlberg's scale are women, whose judgments

seem to exemplify the third stage of his six-stage l;

sequence. At this stage morality is conceived in ~

interpersonal terms and goodness is equated-with;

helping and pleasing others. This conception of ,~goodness is considered by Kohlberg and Kramer

to be functional in the lives of mature women

insofar as their lives take place in the home.

Kohlberg and Kramer imply that only if women

enter the traditional arena of male activity will

they recognize the inadequacy of this moral

perspective and progress like men toward higher

stages where relationships are subordinated to

rules (stage four) and rules to universal principles

ofjustice (stages five and six).

Yetherein lies a paradox, for the very traits that

traditionally have defined the 1/goodness" of

women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs

of others, are those that mark them as deficient inmoral development. In this version of moral

development, however, the conception ofmaturity

is derived from the study of men's lives and

reflects the importance of individuation in their

development. Piaget, challenging the common

impression that a developmental theory is built

like a pyramid from its base in infancy, points out

that a conception of development instead hangs

fromits vertex ofmaturity, the point toward which

progress is traced. Thus, a change in the definition

ofmaturity does not simply alter the description of

the highest stage but recasts the understanding of

development, changing the entire account.

and

l the

by

and

these

y for

nous

LSible

rand

the

itting

ssive

rental

ed at

typesI f out

[ the

. and

work

re o

men

macy,

omen

vever,

been

action

ogists

Inmy

moral,f that

ine of

oth of

nt not

f the

and

lie on

more

nce of

I long

imen's

. in its

OfMoralityand Art

~en one begins with the study ofwomen and

derives developmental constructs from their lives,

the outline of a moral conception different from

that describedby Freud, Piaget, orKohlbergbegins

to emerge and informs a different description of

development. In this conception, the moral

problem arises from conflicting responsibilities

rather than fromcompeting rights and requires for

its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextualand narrative rather than formal and abstract. This

conception of morality as concerned with the

activity of care centers moral development

around the understancling of responsibility and

relationships, just as the conception of morality

as fairness ties moral development to the

understanding ofrights and rules.

This,differentconstruction of themoral problem

by women may be seen as the critical reason for

their failure to develop within the constraints of

Kohlberg's system. Regarding all constructions of

responsibility as evidence of a conventional moral

understanding.Kohlberg defines the highest stages

ofmoral development as deriving froma reflectiveunderstanding of human rights. That the morality

of rights differs from the morality of responsibility

in its emphasis on separation rather than

connection, in its consideration of the individual

rather than the relationship as primary, is

illustrated by two responses to interview questions

about the nature ofmorality. The first comes froma

twenty-five-year-old man, one of the participants

in Kohlberg's study:

[W hat d oes th e w ord m ora lih j m ean to you ?] Nobody in

the world knows the answer. I think it is recognizing

the right ofthe individual, the rights ofother individ-

uals, not interfering with those rights. Act as fairly asyou would have them treat you. I think it is basically

to preserve the human being's right to existence. I

think that is the most important. Secondly, the human

being's right to do as he pleases, again without inter-

feringwith somebody else's rights.

[H ow h ao e yo ur view s 011 m ora lity c ha ng ed s in ce th e

las t i n te rv iew?] I think I ammore aware of an individ-

ual's rights now. I used tobe looking at it strictly from

my point of view, just for me. Now I think I ammore

aware ofwhat the individual has a right to.

Kohlberg cites this man's response as illustrative

of the principled conception of human rights that



518 FromSocratesto Cinema

exemplifies his fifth and sixth stages. Commenting

on the response, Kohlberg says, "Moving to a

perspective outside of that of his society, he

identifies morality with justice (fairness, rights, the

Golden Rule), with recognition of the rights of

others as these are defined naturally or

intrinsically. The human being's right to do as he

pleases without interfering with somebody else's

rights.is' a formula defining rights prior to social

legislation. "

The second response comes from a woman

who participated in the rights and responsibilities

study. She also was twenty-five and, at the time, a

third-year law student:

[W hat led you to change, do you think?] Just seeing

moreoflife,just recognizingthat there arean awful lot

of things that are common among people. There are

certain things that you come to learn promote abetter

lifeand better relationships and more personal fulfill-

ment than other things that in general tend to do the

opposite, and the things that promote these things,

you would callmorally right.

This response also represents a personal recon-

struction of morality following a period of

questioning and doubt, but the reconstruction of

moral understanding is based not on the primacy

and universality of individual rights, but rather

on what she describes as a "very strong sense of

[ Is t h er e r ea llu s om e c or re ct s ol uti on t o m or al p ro bl em s, o r being responsible to the world." Within this

is e ve ry bo dy 's o pi nio n e qu al ly r ig ht ?] No, I don't think construction, the moral dilemma changes from

everybody's opinion is equally right. I think that in how to exercise one's rights without interfering

some situations there maybe opinions that are with the rights of others to how "to lead a moral

equally valid, and one could conscientiously adopt IHe which includes obligations to myself and my

one of several courses of action. But there are other family and people in general." The problem then

situations inwhich I think there are right and w. ro n g · . : -.;becomes one of limiting responsibilities without

answers, that sort ofinhere inthenature of existence;' abandoning moral concern. When asked to

\If all individuals here who need to live with each describe herself, this woman says that she values

other to live. Weneed to depend on each other, and "having other people that I am tied to, and also

hopefully it is not only aphysical need but a need of having people that I am responsible to. I have a

fulfillment in ourselves, that a person's life is en- very strong sense of being responsible to the

riched by cooperating with other people and striving world, that I can't just live for my enjoyment, but

to live in harmony with everybody else, and to that just the fact of being in the world gives me an

end, there are right and wrong, there are things obligation to do what I can to make the world a

which promote that end and that move away from it, better place to live in, no matter how small a scale

and in that way it is possible to choose in certain that may be on." Thus while Kohlberg's subject

cases among different courses of action that obvi- worries about people interfering with each other's

ously promote or harm that goal. rights, this woman worries about "the possibility

[I s there a tim e in the past tohen you would have of omission, of your not helping others when you

t ho u gh t a b ou t t he se t hi ng s d if fe re fl tl y? ] Oh,yeah, I think could help them."

that I went through a timewhen I thought that things The issue that this woman raises is addressed

were pretty relative, that I can't tell you what to do by Jane Loevinger's fifth "autonomous" stage of

and you can't tell me what to do, because you've got ego development, where autonomy, placed in the

your conscience and I've gotmine. context of relationships, is defined as modulating

[When was that?] Whenlwasinhighschool.Iguess an excessive sense of responsibility through the

that it just sort of dawned on me that my own ideas recognition that other people have responsibility

changed, and because my own judgment changed. for their own destiny. The autonomous stage in

I felt I couldn't judge another person's judgment. But Loevinger's account witnesses a relinquishing of

now I think even when it is only the person himself moral dichotomies and their replacement with "a

who is goingtobeaffected,I say it iswrong to the ex- feeling for the complexity and multifaceted

tent it doesn't coherewith what I know about human character of real people and real situations."

nature andwhatI know about you, andjust fromwhat Whereas the rights conception of morality that

I think is hue about the operation of the universe, I informs Kohlberg's principled level (stages five

could say I think youaremaking amistake. and six) is geared to arriving at an objectively fair



st seeing

awful lot

lhere are

e a better

lal fulfill-

to do the

things,

I recon-

dod of

etion of

rimacy

rather

ense of

n this

from

rfering

moral

dmy

rn then

ithout

ed to

values

nd also

have a

to the

n t, but

me an

orld a

a scale

subject

other's

sibility

en you

ressed

age of

in the

lating

gh the

sibility

age in

ing of

ith "a

aceted

tions."

that

s five

ly fair

or just resolution to moral dilemmas upon which

all rational persons could agree, the responsibility

conception focuses instead on the limitations of

any particular resolution and describes the

conflicts that remain.

Thus itbecomes clear why a morality of rights

and noninterference may appear frightening to

women in its potential justification of indifference

m id unconcern. At the same time, it becomes clear.why, from a male perspective, a morality of

responsibility appears inconclusive and diffuse,

given its insistent contextual relativism. Women's

moral judgments thus elucidate the pattern

observed in the description of the developmental

differences between the sexes, but they also

provide an alternative. conception of maturity by

which these differences can be assessed and their

implications traced. The psychology of women

that has consistently been described as distinctive

in its greater orientation toward relationships and

interdependence implies a more contextual mode

ofjudgment and a different moral understanding.

Given the differences in women's conceptions of

• self and morality, women bring to the life cycle a

different point of view and order human

experience interms ofdifferent priorities.

The myth of Demeter and Persephone, which

McClelland cites as exemplifying the feminine

attitude toward power, was associated with the

Eleusinian Mysteries celebrated in ancient Greece

for over two thousand years. As told in the

Homeric Hymn to Demeter, the story ofPersephone

indicates the strengths of interdependence,

building up resources and giving, that McClelland

found in his research on power motivation to

characterize the mature feminine style. Although,

McClelland says, "it is fashionable to conclude

that no one knows what went on in the Mysteries,

it is known that they were probably the most

important religious ceremonies, even partly on the

historical record, which were organized by and

for women, especially at the onset before men by

means of the cult of Dionysus began to take them

over." Thus McClelland regards the myth as "a

special presentation of femine psychology." It is,

aswell, a life-cyclestory par excellence.

Persephone, the daughter of Demeter, while

playing in a meadow with her girlfriends, sees a

beautiful narcissus which she runs to pick. As she

does so, the earth opens and she is snatched away


by Hades, who takes her to his underworld

kingdom. Demeter, goddess of the earth, so

mourns the loss of her daughter that she refuses

to allow anything to grow. The crops that sustain

life on earth shrivel up, killing men and animals

alike, until Zeus takes pity on man's suffering and

persuades his brother to return Persephone to her

mother. But before she leaves, Persephone eats

some pomegranate seeds, which ensures that shewill spend part of every year with Hades in the

underworld.

The elusive mystery of women's development

lies in its recognition of the continuing importance

of attachment in the human life cycle. Woman's

place ! n man's life cycle is to protect this

recognition while the developmental litany

intones the celebration of separation, autonomy,

individuation, and natural rights. The myth of

Persephone speaks directly to the distortion in

this view by reminding us that nilfcissism leads to

death, that the fertility of the earth is in some

mysterious Way tied to the continuation of

the mother-daughter relationship, and that the life

cycle itself arises from an alternation between the

world ofwomen and that of men. Only when life-

cycle theorists divide their attention and begin to

live with women as they have lived with men will

their vision encompass the experience of both

sexes and their theories become correspondingly

more fertile.

D ISC USSIO N QUEST IO N S

1. What is the difference between "amorality of

rights" and "a morality of responsibility"?

What is the significance of this distinction for

Gilligan?

2. Why does Gilligan find the male ethic inade-

quate? Do you agree with her? Can the same

inadequacies be found in the female ethic?

Defend your view.

3. Gilligan compares the moral development of

male and female children. What is her

position? What difficulties does she have

with Freud's notion of moral development?

Why does she find Chodorow's view more

compelling? Doyou agree?

4. To what extent should moral development

playa role inmoral theory? What role would



you suppose that moral development has ill

the ethical positions of Confucius, Aristotle,

Kant, and Mill?

5. To what extent are the moral theories of

Kant, Aristotle, and Mill moralities of

"rights"? Towhat extent are they moralities

of "responsibility"? What do you think

Gilliganwould say?

6. Is there a natural connection between one's

moral outlook and one's sex? Defend your

view. Respond to possible criticisms by

Gilligan.


T

ono Brtko (lozef Kroner) works as a carpeqter in assmall Slovakian town during the Second World

War. His nagging wife (Hana Sllvkova) thinks he should be improving their position in the world, and

her fascist brother (Frantisek Zvarfk) agreesjadvlsing Tono to join forces with the occupying troops.

To appease his wife and brother-in-law, Tono takes a!job as the "Aryan comptroller" for a Jewish-owned but-

tor-shop on Main Street. To his dismay, he finds that the owner, Rosalie Lautmann (Ida Karninska), a deaf

elderly woman, has gone bankrupt. Tone's dreams of prestige are quickly dashed, and his frustration is com-

pounded by Rosalie's deafness. Communicating with her is virtually impossible, and Rosalie remains in a

dream world, unaware of the gravity of the war.

Rosalie's Jewish friends bribe Tono to pose as her new assistant instead of her boss. Tono agrees, and

slowly the two build a close friendship. Rosalie treats the carpenter with a kindness and respect he does

not find in his own family. But troubles arise when an edict is passed demanding the deportation of the

town's Jewish citizens. As the names are called off in the town square, Rosa Iie's name is mysteriously ab-

sent. Tono faces a moral dilemma. He must decide whether to protect his friend and risk arrest for harbor-

ing a Jew or obey the law and report her. As the Jews gather for deportation in front of the shop, Tono panics.

He tries to force Rosalie to join them, but she realizes what is happening and attempts to escape. In a mo-

ment of panic, Tono pushes his friend into a cupboard and locks it, waiting until the troops have passed.

When he opens the cupboard to release her, he finds that Rosalie has died. Tono then takes his own life

The Shop on Main Street was first shown in the United States at the New York Film Festival, where it re-

ceived a standing ovation. It won an Oscar for Best Foreign Film in 1965. The film is based on the short

novel by Ladislav Grosman.

D IS CU SSIO N QUE ST IO NS

1. Did Tono do the right thing? Should he have obeyed the law and reported Rosalie to the authorities?

Defend your response.

2. Compare and contrast what a Kantian, a utilitarian, and a virtue theorist would do in Tone's

situation. Which response do you prefer? Why? How do their responses compare to your own?

3. Gilligan presented us with a male ethic of duty and rights and contrasted it with a female ethic of

care and responsibility. Is Tone's situation one in which an ethic of abstract principles comes into



Of Morality andArt 5

ou think conflict with an ethic of care and compassion? Is the conflict presented as "genderless" in this

movie? If so, could i t be used as a criticism of Gilligan's position?

4. Why do you think that Tono killed himself? Out of guilt? Out of frustration with morality? What, if

anything, do we learn about morality through his suicide?

5. How do we balance our desire for care and compassion for others in peril with our obligations as

citizens of a state? Can you think of other stories or films that present situations similar to that of

Tono? How do they compare?

6. Give a Confucian analysis of the moral character of Tono. Would Confucius consider Tono a

superior man? Why or why not?

7. From the moral pointof view of the Bible and the Koran, did Tono do the right thing by lying to the

authorities in order to protect Rosalie? Why or why not?

een one's

efend your

ticisms by

URSULA K. LEGUIN

THE ONES WHo WALK AWAY FROM OMELAS

:ond World

'world, and

ring troops.

owned but-

ka) , a deaf

ion iscom-

rnains in a

, ~melas, a mythical civilization in.which its inhabitants bask in their seemingly perfe

lives, has a dark secret lur~g beneath its utopian facade. The happiness of t

inhabitants of Ornelas relies' on the misery and anguish of a single child. While macitizens ofOmelas visit the "being" in its small, damp cellar and appreciate its suffering, others a

horrified that a single person must suffer-even if this suffering is for the sake of an ent

civilization. Moreover, those who sympathize with the child realize that even if it were allowed

leave the cellar, any attempts to reintroduce it into society would be unsuccessful. The narrat

elaborates, "Even if the child were released, it would not get much good out of its freedom: a lit

vague pleasure of warmth and food, no doubt, but little more. It is too degraded and imbecile

know any real joy." Nevertheless, there are a few inhabitants who remain deeply disturbed by t

misery that this individual must suffer. Those people choose to leave the city and never return.

Ursula K. Le Guin (1929-) is best known for her science-fiction and fantasy tales, writin

that have been described as "philosophy disguised as science fiction." Born Ursula Kroeber, s

received a B.A. from Radcliffe College in literature, an M.A. from Columbia University; and

Fulbright Scholarship to study in France, where she met her husband, Charles Le Guin. ill197

she won the National Book Award for her children's book T he F ar th es t S h or e, the third volumeher Earthsea series. Le Guin has also contributed important essays on fantasy fiction, femini

issues, and other topics, some of which can be found in D ancing at the E dge of the W orld (1989), a

has written numerous collections of poetry. Her books include T he L eft H an d o f D a rk ness (1969\ T

D isp osse sse d: A n A mb ig uo us U to pia (1974), The Eye of the Heron (1978), The C om pa ss Rose (1 98

Alw ays C om ing H om e (1985), U nlo ckin g th e A ir a nd O th er S to rie s (1996), Th e O ther W ind (2001), a

Chan g in g P la n es ( 20 03 ) . "The Ones Who Walk Away from Ornelas" was published in 1973.

agrees, and

ect he does

arion of the

e ri ou sl y a b-

for harbor-

ana panics,

ie, In a mo-

ave passed.

i own life

where it re-

m the short

authorities?

) in Tone's

own?

ale ethic of

comes into

With a clamor of bells that set the swallows

soaring, the Festival of Summer came to the city.

Ornelas,bright-towered by the sea. The rigging of

the boats in harbor sparkled with flags. In the

streets between houses with red roofs and paint

walls, between old moss-grown gardens a

under avenues of trees, past great parks a

public buildings, processions moved. Some w




decorous: old people in long stiff robes of mauve the stock exchange, the advertisement, the secret

and grey, grave master workmen, quiet, merry police, and the bomb. YetI repeat that these were

women carrying their babies and chatting as they not simple folk, not dulcet shepherds, noble

walked. In other streets the music beat faster, a savages, bland utopians. They were not less

shimmering of gong and tambourine, and the complex than us. The trouble is that we

people went dancing, the procession was a dance. have a bad habit, encouraged by pedants and

Children dodged in and out, their high callsrising sophisticates, of considering happiness as

like theswallows' crossing flights over the music -something rather stupid. Onlypain is intellectual,

andff{~ singing. All the processions wound only evil interesting. This is the treason of the

towards the north side of the city,where on the artist: a refusal to admit the banality of evil and

great water-meadow called the Green Fields boys the terrible boredom ofpain. 1 £ you can't lick 'em,

and girls, naked in the bright air, with mud- join 'em. Ifit hurts, repeat it. But to praise despair

stained feet and ankles and long, lithe arms, is to condemn delight, to embrace violence is to

exercised their restive horses before the race. The losehold of everything else.Wehave almost lost

horsesworeno gear at all but a halter without bit. hold; we can-nolonger describe a happy man, nor

Their manes were braided with streamers of make any celebration of joy. How can I tell you

silver, gold, and green. They flared their nostrils about the p'eopleofOrnelas?Theywere not naive

and pranced and boast~d to one another; they and happy children-though their children were,

Were vastly excited, the horse being the only ip fact,-happy. They were mature, intelligent,

animal who has adopted our ceremonies as his passionate adults whose liveswere not.wretched.

own. Far off to the north and west the mountains 0 miracle! But I wish I could describe it better.I

stood up half encirclingOmelas on her bay.- ''T h e ' - --''WishI could convinceyou. Ornelas sounds in my

air of morning was so clear that the snow stili words like a city in a fairy tale, long ago and far

croWningthe EighteenPeaks burned with white- away, onceupon a time. Perhaps it would be best

gold fire across the miles of sunlit air, under the if you imagined it as your own fancy bids,

dark blue of the sky.Therewas just enough wind assuming itwill rise to the occasion,for certainly1

to make the banners that marked the racecourse cannot suit you all. For instance, how about

snap and flutter now and then. In the silence of technology?1think that therewould be no carsor

the broad green meadows one could hear the helicopters in and above the streets; this follows

music winding through the city streets, farther from the fact that the people of Ornelasare happy

and nearer and ever approaching, a cheerfulfaint people.Happinessisbasedona just discrimination

sweetness of the air that from time to time ofwhat is necessary,whatis neither necessarynor

trembled and gathered together and broke out destructive, and what isdestructive. Inthemiddle

into the great joyousclangingof thebells. category, however-that of the urmecessary

Joyous! How is one to tell about joy? How but undestructive, that of comfort, luxury,

describe the citizens ofOrnelas? exuberance, etc.-they could perfectly well haveThey were not simple folk, you see, though centralheating, subway trains,washing machines,

they were happy. Butwe do not say the words of and all kinds of marvelous devices not yet

cheer much any more. All smiles have become invented here, floating light-sources, fuelless

archaic.Givena description suchas this onetends power, a curefor the common cold. Or they could

tomake certain assumptions. Given a description have none ofthat: it doesn't matter.As you like it,

such as this one tends to look next for the King, I incline to think that people from towns up and

mounted on a splendid stallion and surrounded down the coast have been coming in to Ornelas

by his noble knights, or perhaps in a golden litter during the last days before the Festival on very

borne by great-muscled slaves. But there was no fast little trains and double-decked trams and that

king. They did not use swords, or keep slaves. the train station of Ornelas is actually the

Theywere not barbarians. I do not know the rules handsomest building in town, though plainer

and laws of their society,but I suspect that they than the magnificent Farmers' Market. But even

were singularly few. As they did without granted trains, I fear that Ornelas so far strikes

monarchy and slavery,so they also got onwithout some of you as goody-goody. Smiles, bells,



~secret

:ewere

noble

o t less

at we

.ts and

ss as

lectual,

of the

vil and

ck'em,

:lespair

:e is to

ost lost

an, nor

-u you

t naive

1were,

lligent,

etched.

letter. I

:inmy

md far

e best

r bids,

tainly I

about

cars or

follows

happy

illation

lry nor

middle

:essary

luxury,

1 1 have

chines,

ot yet

uelless

r could

like it,

JP and

)melas

n very

ad that

ly the

plainer

it even

strikes

bells,

parades, horses, bleh, If so, please add an orgy. If

an orgy would help, don't hesitate. Let us not,

however, have temples from which issue beautiful

nude priests and priestesses already half in

ecstasy and ready to copulate with any man or

woman, lover Of stranger, who desires union with

the deep godhead of the blood, although that was

my.first idea. But really itwould be better not to

have any temples in Ornelas-at least, not

manned temples. Religion yes, clergy no. Surely

the beautiful nudes can just wander about,

offering themselves like divine souffles to the

hunger of the needy and the rapture of the flesh.

Let them join the processions. Let tambourines be

struck above the copulations, and the glory of

desire be proclaimed upon the gongs, and (a not

unimportant point) let the offspring of these

delightful rituals be beloved and looked after by

all. One thing Iknow there is none of in Ornelas is

guilt But what else should there be? Ithought a tfirst there were no drugs, but that is puritanical:

For those who like it, the faint insistentsweetnei9"S

of drooz may perfume the ways of the city, !droozJ

,.. which first brings a great lightness and brilliance

to the mind and limbs, and then after some hours

a dreamy languor, and wonderful visions at last of

the very arcana and inmost secrets of the

Universe, as well as exciting the pleasure of sex

beyond all belief; and it is not habit-forming. For

more modest tastes Ihink there ought to be beer.

What else, what else belongs in the joyous city?

The sense of victory, surely, the celebration of

courage. But as we did without clergy, let us do

without soldiers. The joy built upon successful

slaughter is not the right kind of joy; it will not do;

it is fearful and it is trivial. A boundless and

generous contentment, a magnanimous triumph

felt not against some outer enemy but in

communion with the finest and fairest in the souls

of all men everywhere and the splendor of the

world's summer: this is what swells the hearts of

the people of Ornelas, and the victory they

celebrate is that of life. I really don't think many of

them need to take drooz.

Most of the processions have reached the

Green Fields by now. A marvelous smell of

cooking goes forth from the red and blue tents of

the provisioners. The faces of small children are

amiably sticky; in the benign grey beard of a man

a couple of crumbs of rich pastry are entangled.


The youths and girls have mounted their horses

and are beginning to group around the starting

line of the course. An old woman, small, fat, and

laughing, is passing out flowers from a basket,

and tall young men wear her flowers in their

shining hair. A child of nine or ten sits at the edge

of the crowd, alone, playing on a wooden flute.

People pause to listen, and they smile, but they do

not speak to him, for he never ceases playing and

never sees them, his dark eyes wholly rapt in the

sweet, thin magic of the tune.

He finishes, and slowly lowers his hands

holding the wooden flute.

As if that little private silence were the signal,

all at once a trumpet sounds from the pavilion

near the starting line: imperious, melancholy,

pierciag. The horses rear on their slender legs, and

some of them neigh in answer. Sober-faced, the

young riders stroke the horses' necks and soothe

them, whispering, "Quiet, quiet, there my beauty,

my hope .... tt They begin to form in rank along

the starting line. The crowds along the racecourse

are like a field of grass and flowers in the wind.

The Festival of Summer has begun.

Do you believe? Do you accept the festival, the

dty, the joy? No? Then let me describe one more

thing.

In a basement under one of the beautiful public

buildings of Ornelas, or perhaps in the cellar of

one of its spacious private homes, there is a room.

It has one locked door, and no window. A little

light seeps in dustily between cracks in the

boards, secondhand from a cob-webbed window

somewhere across the cellar. Inone corner of the

little room a couple of mops, with stiff, clotted,

foul-smelling heads, stand near a rusty bucket.

The floor is dirt, a little damp to the touch, as

cellar dirt usually is. The room is about three

paces long and two wide: a mere broom closet or

disused tool room. Inthe room a child is sitting. It

could be a boyar a girl. It looks about six, but

actually is nearly ten. It is feeble-minded. Perhaps

it was born defective, or perhaps it has become

imbecile through fear, malnutrition, and neglect. It

picks its nose and occasionally fumbles vaguely

with its toes or genitals, as it sits hunched in the

comer farthest from the bucket and the two mops.

It is afraid of the mops. It finds them horrible. It

shuts its eyes, but it knows the mops are still

standing there; and the door is locked; and




nobody will come.The door is always locked;and done, in that day and hour all the prosperity and

nobody ever comes, except that sometimes-the beauty and delight of Ornelas would wither and

child has no understanding of time or interval- be destroyed. Those are the terms. Toexchangeall

sometimes the door rattles terribly and opens, and the goodness and grace of every lifein Ornelas for

a person, or severalpeople, are there.One of them that single,small improvement: to throwaway the

may come in and kick the child tomake it stand happiness of thousands for the chance of the

up. The others.never come close,but peer in at it happiness of one: that would be to let guilt within

with frightened, disgusted eyes. The food bowl thewalls indeed.

and the water jug are hastily filled, the door is The terms are strict and absolute; there may

locked, the eyes disappear. The people at the door not evenbe a kind word spoken tothe child.

never say anything, but the child, who has not Often the young people go horne in tears, or in

always lived in the tool room, and can remember a tearless rage,when they have seen the child and

sunlight and its mother's voice, sometimes faced this terrible paradox. They may brood over

speaks. "I will be good," it says. "Please let me it for weeks or years. But as time goes on they

out. I will be good!"They never answer.The child begin to realize.that even if the child could be

used to scream for help at night, and cry a good released, it would not get much good of its

deal, but now it only makes a kind of whl,!Ung, freedom: a little vague pleasure of warmth and

"eh-haa, eh-haa," and it spea~s less and lessoften. food, no doubt, but littlemore. It is too degraded

It is so thin there are no calves to its legsjits belly and imbecile to know any real joy. It has beent

protrudes; it lives on a half-bowl of cornmeal and • afraid too long ever tobe free of fear.Its habits are

grease a day. It is naked. Its buttocks and thighs' > too ~uncouth for it to respond to humane

are a mass of festered sores, as it sits in its owri ~·";tre~i.tment.ndeed, after so long itwould probably

excrementcontinually. .be wretched without walls about it to protect it,

Thef all know it is there, all the people of and darkness for its eyes, and its own excrement

Ornelas. Some of themhave come to see it, others tosit in. Their tears at thebitter injustice dry when

are content merely to know it is there. They all they begin to perceive the terrible justice ofreality

know that it has to be there. Some of them and to accept it. Yetit is their tears and anger,the

understand why<and some do not, but they all trying of their generosity and the acceptance of

understand that their happiness, thebeauty of their their helplessness, which are perhaps the true

city,the tenderness of their friendships, the health source of the splendor of their lives. Theirs is no

of their children, the wisdom of their scholars, the vapid, irresponsible happiness. They know that

skill of their makers, even the abundance of their they, like the child, are not free. They know

harvest and the kindly weathers of their skies, compassion. It is the existence of the child, and

depend wholly on thischild's abominablemisery. their knowledge of its existence, that makes

This is usually explained when they are possible the nobility of their architecture, the

between eight and twelve, whenever they seem poignancy of their music, the profundity of their

capable of understanding; and most of those who science.It is because of the child that they are so

come to see the child are yOlmgpeople, though gentle with children. They know that if the

often enough an adult comes, or comes back, to wretched one were not there snivelling in the

see the child. Nomatter how well the matter has dark, the other one, the flute-player, could make

been explained to them, these young spectators no joyful music as the young riders line up in

are always shocked and sickened at the sight. their beauty for the race in the sunlight ofthe first

They feel disgust, which they had thought morning ofsummer.

themselves superior to. They feel anger, outrage, Now do you believe in them? Are they not

impotence, despite all the explanations. They more credible? But there is onemore thing to tell,

would like to do something for the child. But and this is quiteincredible.

there is nothing they can do. If the child were At times one of the adolescent girls or boys

brought up into the sunlight out of that vile place, who go to see the child does not go home to weep

if it were cleaned and fed and comforted, that or rage, does not, in fact, go home at all.

would be a good thing, indeed; but if it were Sometimesalso aman or woman much older falls



iperity and

ither and

(change all

Dmelas for

v away the

ice of the

uilt within

there mayild.

ears, or in

!child and

irood over

!s on they

I could be

iod of its

irmth and

,degraded

has been

habits are

I humane

iprobably

protect it,

excrement

dry when

~ofreality

anger, the

eptance of

i the true

teirs is no

mow that

ley know

child, and

at makes

cture, the

y of their

ley are so

rat if the

ng in the

ruld make

ine up in

ofthe first

they not

lngto tell,

s or boys

.eto weep

le at all.

older falls

silent for a day or two, and then leaves home.

These people go out into the street, and walk

down the street alone. They keep walking, and

walk straight out of the city of Ornelas, through

the beautiful gates. They keep walking across the

farmlands of Ornelas. Each one goes alone, youth

or girl, man or woman. Night falls; the traveler

.must pass down village streets, between the

. houses with yellow-lit windows, and on out into

the darkness of the fields. Each alone, they go

west or north, toward the mountains. They go on.

They leave Ornelas, they walk ahead into the

darkness, and they do not come back. The place

they go towards is a place even less imaginable to

most of us than the city of happiness. Icannot

describe it at all. Itis possible that itdoes not exist.

But they seem to know where they are going, the

oneswho walk away fromOmel"as.( .

D ISCUSSION QUEST IONSr- = _ ._ : . _ . 'I~~

1. If you were a citizen of Ornelas, would youstay or walk? Explain and justify your

decision.

2. Can the suffering of one child to ensure the

happiness of an entire society be morally


justified by a utilitarian? A Kantian?

Buddhist? If so, how? Ifnot, why not?

3. Does it make a moral difference that

child lives in the society that benefits fro

its suffering? What if the child lived halfw

across the world? Would the same numb

of people walk away from Ornelas? Wou

you feel the same about the conditions

which this society's happiness is founded

the child lived halfway around the worl

Explain.

4. Why do you think Le Guill adds

following to her story: "Even if the child we

released, it would not get much good out

Its freedom: a little vague pleasure ofwarm

and food, no doubt, but little more. It is t

degraded and imbecile to know any real jo

How does this affect the way you feel abo

Ornelas? Explain.

S. Le Guin tells us that the 2hilclren of Orne

are fully aware of the suffering of the chi

but she makes a point of saying that thowho stay in Ornelas do not feel guilty. Is

possible to constantly feel guilty about t

misery of others? Explain and g

examples.

4.3 WHAT IS THE NATURE ANDVALUE OF ART?

PLATO

ART, IMITATION, AND MORALITY

n TheRepublic , Plato presents his views on the intrinsic nature of art and the role of art in t

ideal state through dialogue between Socrates and a number of other characters. Pla

argues that art ought tohave a positive influenceonits audience, and when itdoes not ex

this type of influence, itmust be censored. For Plato, not even the great poets Homer and Hesi

are beyond censorship. Furthermore, art ismerely an imitation of an imitation--something w

much stronger ties to the world ofappearances than the world ofreality and truth.

In the selection from Book II, Plato explains why the censorship of art is especia

important for children, that is, those who are just forming their character and are much mo

amenable to taking in the "desired impression." Therefore, we should keep them away fro

stories that contain "ideas for the most part the very opposite of those which we should wi

them to have when they are grown up." Plato says that children "cannot judge what

perspectives on morality

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