pertolium industries spills by tanker

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Some technical aspects of spills in the transportation of petroleum materials

by tankers

Zubaidah Ismail a,⇑, Ramlee Karim b

a University of Malaya, Lembah Pantai, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysiab Petmel Resources Private Limited, 53 Persiaran Zaaba, Taman Tun Dr Ismail, 60000 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:

Received 30 June 2011

Received in revised form 13 May 2012

Accepted 28 June 2012

Available online 31 July 2012

Keywords:

Accident cycle

Tanker

Cleanup cost

Fatality

Spill

a b s t r a c t

Thepetroleum industry is most concerned about safety and onewhich hasan effectivesafety culture. This

study analyzed the accident cycle in the sea transportation activities of the industry. The analysis was

based on published data over the past 44 years involving spills of 1000 tonnes and above. Total spill vol-

ume was 4.27 mil tonnes with a mean of 64,000 tonnes and a standard deviation of 86,6000 tonnes. Total

cleanup cost was estimatedto be 17.8546 bilInt$, with a mean of 955.075 milInt$, a standard deviation of

698.376 mil Int$. It was observed over thestudyperiod there seemed to be a cycle of about10 years. There

was a decreasing trend of spill volume. Crude represented 99% and the rest involved final products. About

65%of thetankers finally broke up andabout 35%was associated with fire and explosion. Navigation error

caused42.5%of theaccidents, storms andhurricanes caused31.8%of theaccidents, mechanical andmain-

tenance related factors caused 18.2% of the accidents, engine failure represented 4.5% and other causes

with about 3%. The highest number of deaths was recorded from the Independenta with 43.

2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

There are two main types of accidents – routine accidents and

surprises. An accident could be of a routine nature or it could be

a unique event; a precursor event; or a superlative event. While

there are lessons to learn from the experience of routine accidents

since the impacts are somewhat similar, a once-off accident or a

surprise event is more difficult to manage. Sensible responses to

routine accidents can be developed, reviewed every now and again

and further improved. These could include accident warning sys-

tems, emergency management schemes, and accident recovery

programs. For a surprise event there is not much to draw from

experience and the preparedness to face such an occurrence is usu-

ally lacking. There are not many references to be made on similar

previous events as pointed out by Michell (1996). Each industryand each stakeholder in the industry has, associated with it, what

can be termed as a safety culture and an SMS for that industry or

that particular organization. A good safety culture results in a good

safety record and a bad safety culture results in a poor safety re-

cord. The key to a good safety culture lies from a demonstrated

management commitment that treats safety as having equal prior-

ity to other organizational goals. Some are guided by the statement

of ‘Safety First’. Employees are involved in, and know that they

have the ownership of, the safety process. Realistic and achievable

safety targets are set for all work groups to achieve. Employees are

adequately trained in safety skills. Incident investigations are car-

ried out not so much as to apportion blame but to minimize and

prevent future occurrences. Positive steps are taken to improve

employee behaviors, attitudes and values. These include employee

involvement and ownership of the safety process. It involves devel-

oping teamwork and supporting leadership within workgroups. It

recognizes and values individual contributions to safety. It fosters

an environment where employees genuinely care about the safety

of their co-workers (Ahern, 2007). Monitoring techniques could be

introduced to assist in assessing the general safety conditions of

the organization. In order to reduce risks associated with opera-

tional activities, one approach is to provide real time and risk-based accident forecasting mechanisms and tools that could enable

the early understanding of any deviations and link with possible

accident scenarios. A forecasting algorithm could be developed to

identify and estimate safety measures for each operation step

and process model element and validated with process conditions

as proposed by Gabbar (2010).

A high degree of safety performance can be achieved through

the establishment of a good safety culture. The safety management

system has to be aware and know the business hazard, and there-

fore be proactive to it. The attitudes throughout the organization

on the application of the safety management systems must be hon-

est and sincere as shown by the commitment of senior managers

0925-7535/$ - see front matter 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2012.06.024

⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Department of Civil Engineering, University of

Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Tel.: +60 379675284; fax: +60 379675318.

E-mail addresses: [email protected] (Z. Ismail), [email protected]

(R. Karim).

Safety Science 51 (2013) 202–208

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Safety Science

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w . e l s e v i e r . c o m / l o c a t e / s s c i

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2012.06.024

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(Ismail et al., 2011), and that the actions taken are not just because

of the threats of legal action but also to achieve an overall satisfied

workforce (Dawal et al., 2009). The handling of commercial pres-

sure must demonstrate knowledge of what is the overall business

priority, which is safety. The state of being informed and ready is

also important to ensure that incidents do not escalate into worse

accidents; and accident investigation and analysis do uncover the

underlying factors and any managerial failings that might have

led to the accidents as commented by Hudson (2003). Human fac-

tors play an important role in the completion of emergency proce-

dures. Human factors analysis is rooted in the concept that humans

make errors, and the frequency and consequences of these errors

are related to work environment, work culture, and procedures

as observed by Deacon et al. (2010).

The petroleum industry involves activities like exploration, pro-

duction, transportation, processing and refining, storage and prod-

uct distribution. Each activity is different from another with

different general degree of risks involved (Ismail et al., 2012a,b).

There are distinct differences even within one type of activity like

transportation between land and water transportation or between

use of tankers or pipelines. In the current study focus is put on

transportation using tankers. The main concern of transportation

using tankers is the possibility of spills which will cause environ-

mental disasters. An environmental disaster is a disaster to the nat-

ural environment due to human activity. It can include the deaths

of animals and plants, or severe disruption of human life. Environ-

mental disasters can have an effect on agriculture, biodiversity, the

economy and human health. The causes include pollution, deple-

tion of natural resources, industrial activity or agriculture. Some

scientists argue that the ecosystem has recovered when all parts

are functioning again while others argue that the impacts will last

for decades (Pierce, 2002).

Coinciding with the collapse of the government in Somalia there

have since been escalating incidents of hijackings of petroleum

tankers in the waters offshore of the country. Although there have

been alleged threats of blowing-up the tankers there have so far

been no such incidents whichwould cause massive spills. Theagen-da seems to be ransom money which the owners and insurance

companies have this far paid amounting to billions of dollars per

year. The current concern is the expanding area of operation which

has reached much further south into the Indian Ocean then just off-

shore Somalia. This has been possible by the support of ‘mother-

ships’ (Bright, 2011; Saul and Maltezou, 2011). Will there come a

time when idle threats become real environmental disasters.

DeCola and Fletcher (2006) stated that human factors – either

individual errors or organizational failures – have been reported

to cause as much as 80% of oil spills and marine accidents. Impact

of spills is difficult to quantify due viscosities, specific gravity, light,

medium or heavy crudes or finished products which behave differ-

ently upon exposure to the open sea. Ambient conditions of atmo-

spheric pressure, temperature, wind conditions, waves andcurrents all have an effect of the spread of the oil on the water sur-

face. Training and emergency preparedness, safety equipment,

evacuation procedures, availability and effectiveness of rescue par-

ties all have an influence on the overall impact of spills. O’Brien

(2003) proposed a strategy in the approach to cleaning-up of spills.

Attempt have been made to assess the direct and indirect,

immediate and long-term casualty of spills including the economic

and environmental aspects but this kind of study is difficult to con-

duct due to the above-mentioned complexity of parameters in-

volved. Damage to the ecosystem, birds and animals as a result

of the Exxon Valdez accident, for instance, were enormous (Lea-

cock, 2005). This massive 987-foot tanker has left a lingering,

long-term effect on the natural habitat that surrounds these pris-

tine waters, along with an enormous socio-economic effect thathas left many people wondering when and where the next oil spill

will be (Wells et al., 1995). Etkin (2000) gave a comprehensive

worldwide analysis of the factors affecting the cost of spill cleanup.

Liu and Wirtz (2009) proposed the relationship between direct and

indirect impact of oil spills as a function of spill size. White (2003)

and White and Molloy (2003) analyzed the factors affecting the

cost of oil spills including type of oil, size and rate of spillage, char-

acteristics of the spill location including physical, biological and

economic conditions, sea and weather conditions, time of the year

and effectiveness of clean-up operation. Hooke (1997) gave a com-

prehensive account of maritime casualties for the period 1963–

1996. The long-term health effects of oil spills (Walsh, 2010) and

the impact on the environment (Kingston, 2002; Guarino and

Spotts, 2010) and wildlife habitat (USFWS, 2004) including salt

marshes and mangrove swamps have been discussed.

The objectives of this study are:

To analyze the details of spills in accidents involving the trans-

portation of crude oil and products by tankers.

To determine the most critical basic cause of the accidents.

To get a general feel of the consequences of cleanup cost and

general impact based on the parameters involved in the

accident.

To help reduce the impact by proposing appropriate steps and

procedures to mitigate the anticipated problems.

2. Materials and methods

Details on spills were retrieved mainly from the Internet and re-

ports dating back to 1964 involving 66 spills of about 1000 tonnes

and above. Loss of human life or economic and environmental im-

pact or spill volumemay be used as a measure of the severity of the

accident and an indication of its overall impact. What is certain is

that not one factor like size or frequency could completely assess

the impact on its own. This study is limited by the analysis of chro-

nology of events, spill quantum distribution, cumulative amounts,

location of spills, return period and some other relevant statistics

of each accident including a crude risk analysis of the accident.

The values for the mean, standard deviation, percentage probabil-

ity and coefficient of variability were calculated and the probable

causes were also recorded and analyzed. Then spills were grouped

into five categories: 50 K tonnes and less, 5–100 K tonnes, 101–

150 K tonnes, 151–200 K tonnes, and 201 K tonnes and above.

The basic events were categorized under navigation error, storm,

mechanical and maintenance related, engine failure and others.

These could result in collision, running aground or fire and colli-

sion. The top events were categorized under structural damage

(broke) and fire and explosion. An application program was used

to calculate the probability for each scenario. The probability fig-

ures were ranked to determine the relative criticality of each sce-

nario. An estimate of total cost of cleanup per spill in Int$ was

also developed relating to each country’s GDP.

3. Results and discussion

3.1. Details of spills

Table 1 gives a summary of the 66 spills observed giving dates,

tanker names, spill sizes, location, overall relative probabilities and

pertinent remarks about each incident.

Fig. 1a shows the occurrence of events through the study period.

Steep slopes indicatea longer time lapse before the nextevent.There

appeared to be a cycle of about 10 years. The lapse of timebetween

two neighboring events had a maximum of 154 weeks between the

Nakhodka which happenedon 2 January 1997and the Erika accidentwhich happened on 12 December 1999. This was followed with

Z. Ismail, R. Karim / Safety Science 51 (2013) 202–208 203



124 weeks betweenthe Nova whichhappened on 6 December1985

and the Athenian Venture which happened on 22 April 1988. There

were a few accidents which happened within about a week of each

other. These were between the Gunvor Maersk which happened

on 27 October 1979 and the Burmah Agate which happened on 1

November 1979, between the Jacob Maersk which happened on 29 January 1975 and the Corinthos which happened on 31 January

1975, andbetween theAndros Petrawhich happened on 31 Decem-

ber1978 andthe Betelgeuse which happened on 8 January1979. The

average period was 35.5 weeks with a standard deviation of

30.5 weeks.

Fig. 1b shows total spill volume by region in thousand tones

(K MT) with Europe recording the highest with 1.457 K MT andSouth America recording 241 K MT. The chart shows that the spill

Table 1

Summary of spills.

Date Tanker Spill (K MT) Location Incident details/remarks

9/8/1964 Metula 47.7 Chile Aground, navig error, current

18/3/1967 Toray Canyon 120 UK Broke, aground, navig error

28/2/1968 Mandoil II 42 Oregon Collision with Suwaharu Maru

13/6/1968 World Glory 45.5 S Africa Broke in bad weather, 24 crew lost

11/2/1969 J. Schindler 8.2 Azores Unknown (storm?)

20/3/1970 Othello 50 Sweden Broke, collision, navig error1/6/1970 Ennerdale 46.5 Seychelles Aground, unmarked rock

27/2/1971 Wafra 33 South Africa Aground, towed and sank

7/12/1971 Texaco Den. 105 Belgium Unknown (storm?)

19/2/1972 Sea Star 118 Iran Fire, collision, navig error

10/6/1973 Napier 35.3 Chile Aground, destroyed by Airforce

9/11/1974 Yuyo Maru 10 68 Tokyo Bay Collision with Pacific Ares, 34 fatality

10/1/1975 Br. Ambas. 40 North Pacific Engine failure, towed and sank

29/1/1975 Jacob Mearsk 86.5 Portugal Aground entering port, fire/expl, 6 fatality

31/1/1975 Corinthos 36 Pennsylvania Collision, fire/expl 26 fatality

4/2/1976 St Peter 38 Colombia Engine room fire, sank

12/5/1976 Urquiola 99 Spain Fire, aground, navig error

15/12/1976 Argo Merchant 27 US Broke, aground, navig error

23/2/1977 Hawaii. Patriot 99 Hawaii Crack, leak, fire

16/3/1978 Cardiz 225 France Broke, aground/rudder broke, storm

7/12/1978 Tadotsu 40 Sumatra Unknown (storm?)

31/12/1978 Andros Patria 50 Bay of Biscay Crack, fire/expl. 30 capsized in escape boat

8/1/1979 Betelgeuse 40 Cape Town Unloading, explosion, 49 fatality19/7/1979 Atl/Empress 280 Tobago Broke, collision, storm

27/10/1979 Gunv. Maersk 16.5 Brazil Aground, fire/expl

1/11/1979 Burmah Agate 20.5 Galveston Bay Collision with Mimosa, fire/expl

15/11/1979 Independenta 64 Turkey Collision, fire/expl, 43 fatality

22/2/1980 Iren. Serenade 101 Greece Fire, bunkering, mech/mtce

7/3/1980 Tanio 17 Brittany Broke in bad weather

6/12/1980 Sinclair Petrol. 55 Brazil Unknown (storm?)

28/12/1980 Juan Lavalleja 35 Algeria Aground, unmoored during storm

7/1/1983 Assimi 51.6 Oman Engine room fire/expl, no pollution

6/8/1983 Castillo 254 SA Fire, mech/mtce

9/12/1983 Pericles GC 43 Persian Gulf Engine room fire/expl, sank

30/7/1984 M/V Alvenus 8.9 Louisiana Aground

6/12/1985 Nova 70 Gulf of Iran Collision with Magnum

22/4/1988 Ath. Venture 34.3 Newfoundland Explosion, broke up, 29 fatality

10/11/1988 Odyssey 132 US Fire, broke, storm

24/3/1989 Valdez 38 US Broke, aground, navigat error

19/12/1989 Khark-5 70 Spain Explosion, storm

8/6/1990 Mega Borg 15 US Fire/expl, product transfer

25/1/1991 Gulf War 550 Kuwait Fire/expln, act of war

11/4/1991 M/T Haven 144 Italy Fire/explosion, mech/mtce.

28/5/1991 ABT Summer 260 Angola Fire/expl, mech/mtce

21/7/1991 Kirki 17.3 Australia Broke, storm

17/4/1992 Katina P 72 Mozambique Deliberate ramming, damage, storm

3/12/1992 Aegean Sea 70 Spain Aground in bad weather, fire

5/1/1993 Braer 85 UK Broke, aground/engine fail, storm

10/8/1993 Balsa, etc. 1.1 Florida Broke, barge collision, navig error

21/10/1994 Thanassis A 35.4 S China Sea Broke in bad weather

15/2/1996 Sea Empress 72.4 UK Broke, aground, navig error

2/1/1997 Nakhodka 18 Sea of Japan Broke in bad weather

12/12/1999 Erika 24 Bay of Biscay Broke in bad weather

28/11/2000 Westchester 1.8 US Broke, aground, engine fail

9/5/2001 Jessica 0.6 Equador Broke, towing, aground, navig error

13/11/2002 Prestige 65 Spain Broke, storm

28/7/2003 Tasman Spirit 28.5 Pakistan broke, aground, navig error

7/12/2004 Selendang Ayu 1.1 US Broke, aground, engine fail11/8/2006 Solar 1 1 Philippines Sank in bad weather, 2 crew lost

11/11/2007 Volgoneft-139 1.2 Ukraine Broke in bad weather

7/12/2007 Hebei Spirit 10 S Korea Broke, collusion, navig error

25/8/2008 Ship/barge 1 US Collision, navig error

11/3/2009 Pac. Adventur. 0.2 Australia Broke, aground, storm

23/1/2010 Eagle Otome 1.5 US broke, collision, navig error

25/5/2010 Bunga Kelana 2 Singapore Collision

16/3/2011 MS Olivia 1.4 SouthAtlantic Cargo ship, aground

204 Z. Ismail, R. Karim / Safety Science 51 (2013) 202–208



volumes were large at the beginning but became smaller with the

passage of time. This was to be expected since operators should

learn from past incidents.

Fig. 1c shows the cumulative volume of spills recorded over the

study period. The decreasing trend of spill size is clearly shown by

the plateauing of the graph.

Fig. 1d shows the frequency of certain ranges of spill size occur-ring. The highest frequency was recorded as 39 with spill sizes of

less than 50 K MT.

3.2. Basic cause of accidents

Fig. 2a shows that over the study period navigation error had

the highest frequency of 28. In practice awareness, retraining, re-

pair and refurbishment, campaigns, competitions, awards, audits,

hazard and operability studies (Hazop), hazard analyses (Hazan),

reporting of near misses and similar efforts usually follow an acci-

dent. It would easily take 5 years of progressive efforts to achieve a

situation of comfortable safety. It would then take another about

5 years of decline and increasing near misses and for conditionsto return to the unsafe mode; and suddenly there appeared to be

an accident cycle of 10 years. Perhaps people are just not willing

to learn from experience (Swuste, 2010).

Fig. 2b indicates that the highest frequency of intermediate

events was running aground. The Napier was deliberately de-

stroyed by the Chilean air force and the crippled Katina P was

deliberately rammed-up by the Captain. The Kuwait spills were re-

sults of deliberate acts of war. Crude represented 99% and the restinvolved final products. The highest number of fatalities of 43 was

recorded from the Independenta because of the subsequent fire. A

sample set of results from a scenario analysis conducted is shown

in Appendix A.

An observation could be made that in some cases victims are

placed in what canbe referred to as getting ‘fromthe fryingpan into

the fire’ or entrapment. People were trapped between a raging fire

and the icy cold waters. They jumped several hundred meters into

the waters and perished or the oil on the water surface catches fire.

In other cases peopleseek shelterin dangerous spaces. There aresev-

eral cases of breakdownin support infrastructure, inadequate logis-

tics and supplies of essentials. Several cases of human errors in

judgment were encountered, systems weaknesses, management

failings, lack of workers training and involvement in safety matters,and unanticipated hindrances during rescue operations.

Fig. 1. Details on spills: (a) Chronology of events. (b) Total spills by region. (c) Cumulative spill. (d) Frequency of spill size.




3.3. Clean-up costs

It is accepted that there are several factors including physical

and chemical properties of the oil, the locations of the accidents

and the socio-economic status of the community and other fac-

tors which influence the cost of spill cleanup. Liu and Wirtz

(2009) suggested a power-law relationship between spill size

and direct and indirect costs of cleanup. Etkin (2000) had made

a world-wide study and proposed the cost of spill cleanup forseveral countries and some regional average costs. In the current

study an attempt is made to find a relationship between cost of

spill cleanup and a quantifiable and sensible socio-economic

factor.

Fig. 2c shows a plot of cleanup cost in Int$ per metric ton of

spillage against national income per capita for the countries in-

volved. The linear, exponential, polynomial, natural log and the

power-law relationships were tried and the power-law relation-

ship was found to best fit the data. This relationship can serve as

a rough guide to prepare for a clean-up project.

Fig. 2d shows the total cost of cleanup for each of the spill stud-

ied. Again the curve-fitting was best using the power-law relation-

ship. The cases involving the United States show a large variance.

This was due the stringent standards imposed on cleanup resultsand the general high cost of wages and other cost factors. On the

other extreme the case for Kuwait spills were much lower than ex-

pected. This was due to generally lower costs of inputs and the lack

of commitment to the cleanup process because the spills were

deliberately started in the first place.

3.4. Remedial measures

The figures for the relative probabilities in Table 1 show that

most probable scenarios were those involving navigation errorsand storms as the basic events and ending with structural damage

or fires and explosions as top events.

Navigation errors can be minimized by adequate navigational

instruments and quality leadership. There is not much that can

be done about storms and hurricanes except to avoid them when-

ever possible as long as there are no threats of getting lost and hit-

ting something worse. Captains need to be properly recruited and

trained and have the necessary crisis leadership qualities. Simula-

tor training could help.

Fires and explosions result from ignition of flammable and

explosive mixtures. Since sources of ignition cannot be entirely

eliminated, the way to avoid fires and explosions is to avoid the

creation of the said mixtures. Corrosion, leaking joints and flanges,

faulty controllers and unusual stresses are examples of matters tobe corrected.

Fig. 2. Statistics on spills: (a) Frequency of basic events. (b) Frequency of intermediate events. (c) Cleanup cost per MT. (d) Total cleanup cost per spill.




Impact due to collision and running aground can be softened by

structural design. Double hulled vessels have been regarded by

some as a possible answer to such problems. Whilst it is acknowl-

edged that double hulled vessels have some advantage over single

hulled vessels, both designs will be inadequate if poorly main-

tained and operated. Double hulled tankers are potentially more

susceptible to problems of poor maintenance and operation be-

cause of their complex design and structure.

Undetected corrosion is a major cause of some of structural fail-

ures due to failure to maintain the integrity of protective coatings

in ballast tanks. A double hulled tanker has two to three times the

surface area of structure compared with a single hull. Leakage

arises from small fractures caused by unpredicted local stresses.

Poorly designed, constructed, maintained and operated double hull

tankers have as much if not more potential for disaster. Well main-

tained, diligently operated, high quality tankers whatever the con-

struction are the answer (AMSA, 2003; Brown and Savage, 1996;

DeCola, 2009; OCIMF, 2003).

There has been an improvement in the overall handling of spills.

The frequency is less and the size is decreasing. It is hoped that

people learn from history and that they have gained a better in-

sight into what could be anticipated on the characteristics of po-

tential spills. The aim is to achieve a better state of readiness and

preparedness to face accidents.

4. Conclusions

The analysis shows that Europe records the highest volume of

spills. Overall the volume of each spill is decreasing. The most fre-

quent volumes involved are 50 K MT and less. Ninety-nine percent

of spills involved crude. Navigational errors are the most common

cause of accidents. The situation is made worse by poor decisions

made by the leadership in times of crisis. There are several factors

including of the oil, spillage size, the weather conditions at the spill

locations of the accidents and the socio-economic status of thecommunity among others which influence the cost of spill cleanup.

It can go up to Int$ 1500 per million m3 of spill. While the short-

term impacts are difficult to assess the long-term effects on the

health of man and the environment have not been studied compre-

hensively. Captains with good leadership qualities during crises are

important assets.

Acknowledgement

The author wishes to thank Mr. Chew Kai Feng of Universiti Ke-

bangsaan Malaysia (National University of Malaysia) for his assis-

tance in analyzing the data.

Appendix A. Analysis

Recent analysis.

Most viewed.

Most discussed.

Tanker spill analysis.Posted May 13, 2012 by Admin in R Language.

A.1. Application

Top: [–||variableTop||erf,fire,aground,broke,erf,explosion, sank||–]

Intermediate: [–||variableInt||dr,aground,broke,collision,dr,fire,le

ak,ne,towed,unmoored||–] Basic: [–||variableBasic||ef,aow,aground,

brokeup,crack,curren t,ef,erf,hitrock,leak,mf,ne,storm,ua||–] Spill

Size: [–||variableSpill||a,b,c,d,e||–].

A.2. Result

> summary(Data)

Date Tanker Spill Location

1/10/

1975:1

ABT Summer:1 Min.:0.20 United

States:8

1/2/

1997:1

Aegean Sea:1 1st Qu.:17.07 Spain:4

1/5/

1993:1

Andros Patria:1 Median:40.00 United

Kingdom:3

1/7/

1983:1

Argo

Merchant:1

Mean:64.70 Australia:2

1/8/

1979:1

Assimi:1 3rd Qu.:71.50 Bay of Biscay:2

11/1/

1979:1

Athenian

Venture:1

Max.:550.00 Brazil:2

(Other):60 (Other):60 (Other):45

Top Intermediate Basic

Broke:33 :30 Nav error:22

Fire:16 Collision:14 Storm:22

Aground:6 Aground:13 Mech failure:4

Sank:5 Leak:2 Aground:3

Explosion:2 Towed:2 Engine failure:3

Fire:1 Broke:1 Leak:3

(Other):3 (Other):4 (Other):9

> b[,-5]

top.erf int.dr basic.ef spill.a[1,] 0 0 0 0 37.880

[2,] 0 0 0 1 54.550

[3,] 0 0 1 0 0.000

[4,] 0 0 1 1 4.545

[5,] 0 1 0 0 1.515

[6,] 0 1 0 1 0.000

[7,] 0 1 1 0 0.000

[8,] 0 1 1 1 0.000

[9,] 1 0 0 0 1.515

[10,] 1 0 0 1 0.000

[11,] 1 0 1 0 0.000

[12,] 1 0 1 1 0.000

[13,] 1 1 0 0 0.000

[14,] 1 1 0 1 0.000[15,] 1 1 1 0 0.000

[16,] 1 1 1 1 0.000

>nutshell(1)

For the combinations of erf, dr, ef and a, the probability is 0%.

>

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15390-7_44

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15390-7_44

http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/qhc.12.suppl_1.i7


http://library.thinkquest.org/C011401/exxonvaldez.htm

http://library.thinkquest.org/C011401/exxonvaldez.htm



http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15390-7_44

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15390-7_44

pertolium industries spills by tanker

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