peter hilger [email protected] interdisciplinary center of social research, hannover; university of...

Interdisciplinary Center of Social Research, Hannover;

University of Helsinki

Peter [email protected]

Competition vs. Competition vs. CooperationCooperation

Patterns, Perceptions and Problems of RTD in European

Integration6cp: Crossing borders, 29.10.2003

Hilger: competition vs. cooperation

Asymmetrical relationship

• adaptation of rules of the game• decision-making• science push and demand pull • participation in FP: formal/effective• disparities and cohesion


Competition

• ERA rationale: compete world-wide• within EU, amongst CEEC• peer competition in negotiations did speed up

process• catching-up as objective• winners and loosers belong to the game


Catching-up

• disparities within EU15 / amongst CEEC / between EU-CEEC

• generation and transfer of knowledge• economic growth through RTD needs

absorption capabilities• FP complementary to structural funds: skills

and infrastructure (Sharp 1998)• ‘laggers-behind’ lack absorptive capacity

(Clarysee/Muldur 2001)


105

58 54

210199

97

37

79

255

95

53,6

4,26,69,610,018,019,521,022,5

41,452,5

SI EE LV HU CZ SK LT BG PL RO EUcontracts signed 2001 contracts per mio capita

Performance 1


23,0

10,0

2,5

7,3 8,3

4,82,2 1,3 2,4

0,7

27,4

44,0

35,7

18,316,7

19,6

12,4

7,8 7,75,4

2,9

53,452,5

41,4

22,521,0

18,0

10,0 9,6

53,6

4,26,6

19,5

SI EE LV HU CZ SK LT BG PL RO EU15

contracts per mio capita signed 1999 2000 2001

Performance 2


Patterns of FP participation

• 17% of FP5-contracts with CEE-partnership

• performance below EU average• Commission introduced special measures• peer orientation up to one fourth• rarely coordinators from CEEC• entering consortia by invitation


Cooperation

• reasons to cooperate: – access to complementarity

– risk sharing and critical mass

– application of results

– recruitment of staff

– strategic and subjective preferences

• incremental definition of common goal• norm of reciprocity among equals


5,3

21,1

31,6

35,5

46,1

52,6

53,9

60,5

67,1

personal motives

market entry

legal/geografical environment

equipment

enlargement of existing coop.

support for partner

strategic decision

theoret. knowledge

method. knowledge

Results 1: choice of partner


26,2

37,7

39,3

54,1

67,2

83,6

86,9

88,5

13,8

24,1

20,7

27,6

48,3

72,4

67,2

79,3

business contact

improvement of product

development of product

development oftechnology

problem solving

extension of knowledge

new cooperations

maintainance ofcompetence

significancerealisation

Results 2: goals


Results 3: roles and benefits

• almost 2/3 equal actors• Lower-Saxony:

contacts, publications, financing• CEE-partners:

financing, knowledge/skills, administration, subjective stabilisation and recognition


Results 4: experiences

• methodological and theoretical level about equal - equipment worse

• ‘no difference to EU-15’: 58%• ‘cooperate again’: 86%• ‘wished mobility’:

incoming CEEC 78% - outgoing CEEC 58%


Problems on micro-level

• payment, infrastructure, costs• careers, recognition, disrupted hierarchies • administrative and managerial experience• tacit knowledge• personal and organisational goals


Problems on macro-level

• environment of RTD: industrial demand• knowledge- and brain-drain• GERD hardly rising• shrinking legitimization for special treatment


Conclusions: Where to influence?

• objective of researchers is not macro-political: provide for visibility

• encounters are crucial• don’t forget bilateral cooperation• be present at Brussels• excellence-dilemma:

selected islands of excellence

peter hilger [email protected] interdisciplinary center of social research, hannover; university of...

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