phi351 final paper

7/29/2019 Phi351 Final Paper

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Jonathan Langseth

Phi351-Miller

Final Paper

12/17/06

The Place of Philosophy

In this paper I will be examining some arguments put forth by

Jacques Derrida, in his essay Platos Pharmacy, and Richard Rorty, in

Philosophy as a Kind of Writing, on the nature of philosophy and its

position in relation to other forms of writing. Throughout I will use the

mentioned texts of Derrida and Rorty to unfold an argument against

truth as representation. Beyond my own personal remarks in

response to Derrida and Rortys claims, I will establish a dialogue

between their ideas and a few ideas from other philosophers, in

particular later Wittgenstein, Austin and the Pragmatists. Through

such a dialogue of ideas I hope to reaffirm the persistence of the

question regarding adequate representation and show that in spite of

such a question philosophy does go beyond the text.

Rorty distinguishes between what he calls Kantian philosophy

and non-Kantian Philosophy. The commonality between all Kantian

philosophies is the idea of philosophy as mirroring nature, as Rorty

would say. Another way to put this is to say that Kantian philosophy

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strives to adequately represent reality, starting from the assumption

that there is a reality out there, or outside/independent of our

thoughts. Kant argued that such a reality existed, but that it was

unknowable except for a few inferential acceptances of possibilities

(the antinomies). What Rorty and Derrida want to argue is that

language (and most likely thought) does not mirror anything beyond

reflections of itself, and that therefore philosophy does not do

anything beyond what other kinds of writing can do. Derrida wants to

say that the signifier can only signify other signifiers. This is to say

that the context of the textual is the textual. Thus philosophy differs

only in that it claims to poke at a ghost that it can never touch (or

even determine the existence of). The language of philosophy is at

play with itself like all other uses of languages attempting to say

anything.

It is obvious that in philosophy, as with all forms of

communication, in order to communicate what is said must be heard,

and what is written must be read. The writing of texts and the

utterance of speeches are both in a sense translations/interpretations

of the world/experience into language. Likewise the reading of texts

or hearing of speeches depends on the reader or listeners

translation/interpretation of the textual presentation. Derrida says,

With this problem of translation we will thus be dealing with nothing

less than the problem of the very passage into philosophy, and also,

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If reading and writing are one, as is easily thought these days, if

reading is writing, this oneness designates neither undifferentiated

(con)fusion nor identity at perfect rest; the is that couples reading

with writing must rip apart. This poses the questions of whether or

not a text deemed as philosophy is distinct in its method of

interpretation, and of whether or not such a text is to be

interpreted in a pre-ordained, specific manner by a reader.

It is a question of knowing what is done and what is not done

(Derrida, Platos Pharmacy). How do we know exactly what it is that

we write? Faced with the fact that there are seemingly endless

interpretations and criticisms of texts ancient to modern, how are we

to suppose any determinate meaning to exist in the words we utter,

hear, write, and read? One thing we can know that is done in

philosophy is that what is said is said in response to what has been

said before. One thing we can know is not done in philosophy is the

presentation of a final word. There is no final word because every

assertion is received and through being received is re-written; every

reception of language is a response to what is presented.

If Derrida is correct in seeing philosophical texts as, like all other

texts, knowingly or unknowingly being at play with language and, if it is

true, as he thinks, that the error of the philosopher is to believe his or

her text somehow pierces reality, or goes beyond the text, then

philosophy is different than other texts only in its self-deception. This is

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what non-Kantian philosophy wants to say and through saying this, it

wants to correct Kantian philosophy by eliminating it and through such

elimination, allow non-Kantian philosophy to transcend the philosophical

heights and retire back into the slumber of literature.

Interestingly enough there is a strand of philosophy in line with

the Kantian tradition that shares many similarities with Derrida and

Rorty. Derridas idea that language is only at play with itself is similar to

Wittgensteins account of language games. The pragmatist and

Wittgensteinian conceptions of meaning as use and truth as what

language does for us practically can be placed in agreement with

Derridas opposition to the idea of language representing reality: it is

not a question concerning if language represents something other than

itself, but rather what language does that is important. In this respect

philosophy would be on par with literature, and all other forms of

communication for that matter, in that its value lies in its application to

existence. Yet the pragmatists and Wittgenstein recognize that even if

words do not reflect reality, they certainly help constitute it. A case in

point would be performative utterances, which are only happy, as

Austin puts it, if there is a real world situation in which a common

consensus is established. I think the pragmatists and Wittgenstein

would want to say that all language is in a way performative, being

distinct by how it affects the world.

Derridas argument that Kantian philosophy does not refer to

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anything outside of language would make it seems that Kantian

philosophy lacks any performative use because it mistakenly attempts

to touch reality directly as opposed to through its practicality. Yet if

Kantian philosophy had a use then it would, despite Derridas claim that

it does not, correspond with the reality it brings about through its use

and application. It may be the case that philosophy directly refers only

to itself and that there is nothing beyond the text that is mirrored by it,

but philosophy is still a genre of communication distinguishable by its

own methodologies (even if we cannot say it is by its subject matter or

correspondence to reality). Philosophy may only touch the world

outside itself by its practicality like all other language, but both

philosophys methodology and practicality are distinct. Methodically it

differs from other uses of language in its emphasis on rational thought.

The practicality of Kantian philosophy (or philosophies in that tradition)

can, I think, be seen in recent years. Philosophy of mind has replaced

philosophy of language as first philosophy and is applied in cognitive

studies. And philosophy of language itself, Derridas main focus of

attack, has helped us understand the nature and therefore use of

communication. Bio-ethics, philosophy of science, logic, political

philosophy, and other areas of Kantian philosophy have all sowed

practical use. If we follow the historical strand of Kantian philosophy to

the present day, we can see that the search for adequate

representation, if unable to in fact adequately represent (a question still

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needing further discussion), it is still able to be applied to the extra-

linguistic world.

Rorty said of philosophy that it is delimited, as is any literary genre,

not by form or matter, but by tradition. We must add to this stipulation

that philosophy is further delimited by what it does and that in this

distinction, at least, is found its connection with the world.

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