Phil 10100

Introduction to Philosophy

Spring 2012

Part 4Professor Marian David

Friday Sections with TAs

1

Empiricism vs. Rationalism (reminder)

• Empiricism• Rationalism

– Radical Rationalism

• Nativism a.k.a. Innatism

– Not just the same as Rationalism: an additional thesis.

• Common Ground

– Cognitive faculties (including reasoning faculty) are innate or have innate base.

• Disagreements over

– innate information• first principles (axioms); basic knowledge

– the faculty of intellectual intuition

2

John Locke (1632-1704)

• Political Philosophy

• British Empiricism– Friend of Newton and Boyle

• Most important book: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding– Philosophy & Psychology– Doing for the mind what Newton and

Boyle did for matter

3

John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689)

• Locke’s Program of Empiricism

– Announced in Book 1, chap. II, sec. 1

• Negative Part:

– To argue against the thesis that there are innate principles and ideas.

– Book 1: chap II: sec. 2 to end of Book 1.

• Positive Part:

– To explain how we can attain knowledge “by the use of our natural faculties” without the help of innate principles or ideas.

– Not a direct argument for empiricism; instead:

– Empiricism as a research project → Psychology

– Books 2, 3, 4

4

Positive Part: Empiricism about Concepts

• Locke claims he can explain the origin of our ideas without resorting to innateness (B2, chap I, sec 1);– That is, he says he can explain how we can think the thoughts we can think without

resorting to innateness.

• Concept EmpiricismB:

– All ideas come from experience: from sensation or reflection.– B = Baby version; B2, chap I, sec. 2

• Experience divided into two forms!

– Sense Perception → ideas from sensation– Introspection (reflection) → ideas from reflection

• Concept Empiricism prior to Knowledge Empiricism!– Ideas (concepts) make up the contents of thoughts: the “materials of knowledge”.– Locke holds that knowledge empiricism presupposes concept empiricism.

5

• Concept EmpiricismB is ridiculously false!

– I can think about many things that I have never experienced.– Response: We need to make a division:

Ideas

Basic “simple” ideas Derived ideas

Complex ideas General ideas Relational ideas

• The non-basic/derived ideas “come from” experience, but only indirectly, they are generated from simple/basic ideas which come directly from experience.

• We have mental faculties (operations of the mind) that generate non-basic ideas from basic/simple ideas (B2, chap XI).

Concept Empiricism

6

Natural Faculties of the Understanding (the mind)

1. Experience

Sense Perception → ideas from sensationIntrospection → ideas from reflection

2. Memory storage for ideas

3. “Operations of the Mind”

Discerning for distinguishing ideas (does not produce new ideas)Composing → complex ideas (of modes and substances) Comparing → ideas of relationsAbstracting → general ideasNaming → defined ideas, e.g.: unmarried male = bachelor

• Natural Faculties are innate!

1. But no innate ideas!

• Book 2, chaps. I, XI, XII.1

7

Readings for Thursday, April 5

• Concourse:

– Item 14, from John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

• Book I, Chap. I, and Chap. II, sections 1-5

• Book II, Chaps. 1-4, 11, 12, 23

8

• Concept Empiricism:All ideas come directly or indirectly from experience

– Ideas can be divided into two classes: simple (basic) vs. others.

– All simple (basic) ideas come directly from experience, from sensation or reflection: there is no other source of simple (basic) ideas.

– All other ideas come indirectly from experience: they are formed from simple (basic) ideas through (repeated) application of our natural (innate) cognitive faculties.

• The Chemistry of the Mind

• Disagreement with Descartes?

– Different conceptions of experience.

– Locke: Introspection depends on sensation for input ideas; bk 2, chap I, secs. 20-25.

– Disagreement about innateness.

9

• Empiricist program is committed to concept reductionism:

– All concepts can be decomposed into, analyzed, defined in terms of, basic (simple) concepts that come directly from experience.

– A very strong claim.

• Simple Ideas

– What is immediately given in experience.

• Definition at bk 2, chap II, sec 1

• Don’t confuse ideas of things and qualities with the things and qualities themselves.

– Unfortunately, Locke does that at times.

• “Simple idea/complex idea” doesn’t have to match “simple thing/complex thing” !

– Interesting case: Idea of Solidity, bk. 2, chap IV → problems ?

– Interesting case: Idea of Power → problems ?

10

11

12

13

14

• Complex Ideas: of Modes– ideas of dependencies on, or affections of, substances

• no assumption of independent existence

– e.g. ideas of:

• murder, obligation, drunkenness, fencing, a lie,…

• space, time, number, infinity

• Complex Ideas: of Relations

• Complex Ideas: of Substances– are “taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves” (bk 2, chap

XII, sec 6)

– Interesting case: The idea of God is complex, made from simpler ideas that derive ultimately from experience (chap XXIII, secs 33, 37)

• Compare: our idea of a genuine atom.

– Problem case: Idea of Substance

15

Complex Ideas of Substances (Bk 2, Chap XXIII)

• Ideas of substances (of things, such as apples, horses, shoes…) are all complex.

– Idea of a shoe: ideas A, B, C,… from experience, get bundled together to form the complex idea: [thing that is A and B and C and…]

– We suppose that ideas A, B, C,…are ideas of qualities of an underlying thing that has those qualities: a subject, substratum, substance.

• The idea of substance or thing itself (sec 1-4).

– Try to form the idea of thing itself, as distinguished from your ideas of the various qualities of a thing; mentally subtract the qualities from the thing!

• What do you get? …Err?

– The idea of a “I know not what”: a confused idea? Not really an idea?– From experience?– Problem for Empiricism?

16

Readings for Tuesday, April 10

• Concourse:

– Item 14, from John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

• Book III, Chap. 3

– Item 15, from Leibniz’s Monadology and New Essays

• David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

– Section I, first 2 paragraphs, and pages 7 to 9.

– Section II: Of the Origin of Ideas.

– Section III: Of the Association of Ideas.

17

Ideas of Body and of Soul (Bk 2, chap XXIII)

• They are ideas of substances (hence, complex ideas)

• Body ≈ an extended solid thing

≈ an extended solid substance with cohering parts and the power to communicate motion by impact.

• Spirit = Mind ≈ a thinking and willing substance with the power of putting bodies into motion by thought.

• Our knowledge of mind and body is equally shallow!

– We know that minds think and that they move bodies by willing, but we don’t know how they think and how they move bodies;

– We know that bodies cohere and that they move other bodies, but we don’t know how cohesion works and how bodies move bodies through impact.

18

• Locke on general ideas (Book 3)

– Empiricist theory of abstraction: how we form abstract general ideas from particular ideas (Bk 2, chap XI, secs. 9-11; Bk 3, chap. III, secs. 1-9)

– By resemblance detection:

• Abstraction operates on observed resemblances between things

• “x resembles y” versus “x resembles y with respect to C”

– Accounting for general ideas is crucial for empiricism: scientific knowledge consists almost exclusively of generalizations.

• Locke on nominal vs. real essence (Bk 3, chap. III, secs. 10-20)– Nominal essences: definitions of our complex ideas (e.g. bachelor, gold)

– Real essence: the inner constitution of a thing on which all its properties and powers depend.

• Locke: We have knowledge of nominal essences of material things but not of their real essences!

19

Empiricism and the Limits of Knowledge

• Physics

– Given concept empiricism, we can form ideas about the inner, unobservable structure of matter.

– But knowledge empiricism implies that we don’t know much at all about the inner structure of matter; the particles constituting matter are too small for us to observe their qualities and the relations among them: We don’t know much about the real essences of material substances.

– That is: though we can think thoughts and ask questions about the real essences of things, we don’t know the answers.

– Atomistic physics does not, for the most part, give us knowledge (merely probability).

• Psychology– Similar limitations for knowledge of our own minds.

20

David Hume (1711-76)

• Scottish– Scottish Enlightenment– Friend of Adam Smith

• Historian, Essayist, and Philosopher

• British Empiricism

• Most important book: A Treatise on Human Nature (1739)– Philosophy & Psychology & Ethics

21

Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748)

• The Science of Human Nature (Section I)

– he calls it “moral philosophy”

• Perceptions of the Mind (Section II) divided into two classes:

– 1. Impressions• Outward impressions (i.e. sense impressions of colors, sounds, etc.)• Inward impressions (feelings, e.g. pain, pleasure)

– 2. Ideas• Less lively than impressions: the elements of memory, and imagination—of thoughts

other than present experiences

• Concept Empiricism:

– All ideas are copies of impressions (baby version);

– All complex ideas are ultimately composed of simple ideas; all simple ideas are copies of impressions (more serious version).

22

23

• The Missing Shade of Blue!– One paragraph, p. 12-13;

– Could you imagine a shade of blue you’ve never experienced?

– A counterexample to empiricism?

• Concept Empiricism as a tool of Criticism– If an alleged “concept” is not copied from an impression (does not derive from

experience) then it is a pseudo concept, a fake concept.

– Empiricism as a test of cognitive significance; p. 13.

• Association of ideas (Section III)– An attempt to state some psychological laws.

– Associationist Psychology

24

Readings for Thursday, April 12

• Concourse

– Item 16, Locke, Essay: • “Of Power”, bk 2, chap XXI, secs. 1-5; • “Of Cause and Effect, bk 2, chap. XXVI.

– Item 17, David: Hume

• David Hume, Enquiry

– Sections IV; V Part I; VII, XII

25

Enquiry, Section IV: Skeptical Doubts

• Two types of thoughts (propositions):

– about Relations of Ideas

• Their opposite is impossible (violates the law of non-contradiction).

• Intuitively or demonstratively certain: – e.g. mathematical & geometrical truths,

– but also trivial truths, e.g.: “All bachelors are unmarried”.

• Can be known by “the mere operation of thought”, from analyzing our own ideas.

• No factual information about the world (existence neutral).

– about Matters of Fact

• Their opposite is possible.

• Cannot be known by the mere operation of thought.

• About the world: factual information.

• “Relations of ideas”– Locke/Hume proposal for empiricist account of (our knowledge of) necessary truths.

26

• Granted (if only for sake of argument): Observation and memory give us knowledge of some present and past matters of fact:

– of facts we observe now

– of facts we did observe in the past and still remember

• Question: How do we know about “absent” matters of fact?

– Take “absent” here to mean:

• facts that we believe exist now, but that we do not observe now;

• facts we believe existed in the past but did not observe then;

• facts we believe will exist.

• Answer:

27

Hume on Causal Inference (Secs IV & V)

• Our knowledge, if we have any, of absent (unobserved) matters of fact is based on causal inference: – From observed causes we infer unobserved effects;

– From observed effects we infer unobserved causes.

• What is the foundation of such causal inferences?

• Hume’s claim is going to be:

– Causal inference is based on experience not on logic/the intellect/reason (sec. IV: p. 17)

28

Causal Inference (first try)

Event A occurs now. (present observation)Event B will occur. (prediction)

• Not a logical (i.e. deductively valid) inference !

– Not a relation of ideas.– A and B are two distinct events.

• Causal inference depends on past experience of constant conjunction of events.

– When Hume talks about “constant conjunction” think about correlation: events of type A always correlated with events of type B.

29

Causal Inference (second try)

Whenever events like A occurred in the past, they were followed by events like B. (memory of past observations)

Event A occurs now. (present observation)

Event B will occur (prediction)

• Is this a logical (deductively valid) inference?– No

– What is the principle or rule of Inference?

– Not Modus Ponens!

– Pages 21 to 22!

30

The Uniformity of Nature (UN)

• All causal inference relies on the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature:

– The future will resemble the past, or– Unobserved cases behave like observed cases, or– The world is not chaotic, or– Future futures will be like past futures, or…

• Different laws of nature are different, more specific, manifestations of the UN-principle:

– All metals expand when heated.

31

Causal Inference (third try: final)

Nature is uniform. (=UN, by … ?)Whenever events like A occurred in the past, they were followed by events like B. (by mem. of past obs.)Event A occurs now. (present obs.)

Event B will occur. (prediction)

• Valid but:– UN is not a logical principle (not a relation of ideas)!

– If true, it is a matter of fact, an unobserved (“absent”) matter of fact.

• Therefore, it cannot be established by causal inference!

– Hume’s circularity argument (sec IV, pp. 22-25)

– Since UN is an absent matter fact itself, we must go back and put UN into Hume’s argument: see what happens.

32

K of AMFsdepends on

Causal Inf.depends on

Past Experience of Regularities+K of the UN,

= since UN = an AMFK of AMF

goto top

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Skeptical Conclusion (“Skeptical Solution”?)

• Causal inference is “not based on reasoning or any process of the understanding” (the intellect): he means, it is not deductive.

↓• We don’t have certain knowledge about any unobserved matters of fact.

• But we do constantly make causal inferences! (Sec V, part 1)

• Underlying principle is not a principle of the intellect, but a “principle” of human nature, a habit, an animal instinct (p. 29):

– When we have experienced in the past a constant conjunction (correlation) between two types of events, we are determined by habit (custom, animal instinct) to expect an event of the second type as soon as we observe an event of the first type.

34

“The” Principle of Causation??

• Remember: Relations of ideas vs. matters of fact.

• Compare:

– PC1: Every effect has a cause.

– PC2: Every event has a cause.

• Did Descartes confuse the two?

35

Readings for Tuesday, April 17

• Hume, Enquiry

– Section VII: Of the Idea of Necessary Connection

– Section XII: Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy

36

Knowledge Empiricism and Concept Empiricism

• Locke might say:– Okay, so it follows from Knowledge Empiricism that we cannot know for certain

whether A causes B,– but it can still be rational to believe that A causes B; it can be a probable opinion.

• Hume responds (see below):– Nope, – not really, – not in the ordinary sense of “A causes B”,– not if Concept Empiricism is true.

37

Hume on the Concept of Causation (sec VII)

• The ordinary concept of causation has two ingredients:

– (1) constant conjunction (correlation) between types of events

– (2) necessary connection between events (force, power, a must)

• What is the origin of our concept (idea) of necessary connection?

• Hume: It does not come from experience!

• He examines:

– Body to body causation

– Mind to body causation

– Mind to mind causation

38

• He finds no impressions from which the idea of a necessary connection (a must, a force, a power) could have been copied or derived.

• Given concept empiricism, it follows that “necessary connection” is a pseudo concept:

– It doesn’t derive from any impressions = it doesn’t come from experience = it’s not really a genuine idea/concept = it doesn’t make any sense, it’s just meaningless words

• Hence, our ordinary “concept of causation” is defective:

“A causes B” means, in our mouths:• (1) A-type events are always followed by B-type events; and

• (2) A nuddleduddels B;

• Hume offers two replacement concepts, p. 51:

39

• Humean Causation (1):

“A causes1 B” = A is followed by B, and all events like A are followed by

events like B

– Objective, empirically respectable, scientific: but thin.

– Causation as mere constant conjunction (or regular correlation) of events; p. 51.

• Humean Causation (2):

“A causes2 B” = A is followed by B, and whenever we observe an event

like A we expect an event like B.

– Thicker but partly psychological: subjective.

– It contains our feeling of expectation; p. 51.

• Hume holds that the pseudo-concept of a necessary connection results from a confusion: it’s a projection from an inner impression (a feeling of expectation) onto the outer world.

40

Comments on Hume

• In action we constantly rely on causal assumptions:– They do not constitute knowledge, according to Hume

– Animal instincts• Pavlov’s dog: conditioned response → Behaviorism

• Watch out: Even with the ordinary concept of causation replaced by one of Hume’s, the skeptical results from earlier still remain:– “A causes1 B” entails that all events like A are followed by events like B

– We can’t know that for certain

– But at least it makes sense and we can have probable opinion about it

• Inductive inference:

– Inference from observed samples to a new case.

– Inference from observed samples to a population in general.

– Hume’s skeptical arguments about causal inference apply equally to inductive inference.

41

More Comments

• Hume ≈ Malebranche minus God.

• Humean causation1 suggests a (surprising) response to the problem of interaction:

– If causation is just correlation (constant conjunction), why shouldn’t mental events cause physical events, and vice versa, even if mental events are immaterial?

• Pairing problem still open: Why does this mental event cause that physical event?

• Is causation really nothing more than just correlation (constant conjunction)? Is correlation enough?

• Humean causation too thin for real causation?

– Causation and correlation– Studying science, you’re being told: correlation is necessary but not sufficient for

causation.

42

Enquiry, Section 12: Skepticism About External World

• How de we get knowledge about the world?

– Hume so far: Skepticism about unobserved (absent) matters of fact.

– Hume: Considering the nature of observation, the situation is even worse.

– Earlier he granted, for the sake of argument, that observation gives knowledge of “observed” matters of fact, but:

• The only things we directly observe (experience) are sense impressions (sense data):

– we make tacit causal inferences to external world: we regard our sense impressions as effects of causes outside us

– but causal reasoning does not give us knowledge

– the situation is especially bad in this case

• because the relevant correlations are never observable

• General skepticism about external world follows inevitably (pp. 104-5).

43

Empiricism vs. Rationalism

• A dilemma?

– Rationalism: hard to swallow (?)

• What is this intellectual intuition by which we access first principles?

• Can there be a scientific explanation of how the intuition-faculty works?

– Empiricism: appears to lead to rampant skepticism.

• Not only do we know much less than we thought we did (Locke, Hume);

• We are also talking non-sense much more often than we think we do (Hume).

44

Readings for Thursday, April 19

• Concourse

– Item 18, Augustine on Free Choice.

– Item 19, Aquinas on God’s Knowledge.

• Hume, Enquiry

– Sections VIII: Of Liberty and Necessity.

– Section VI: Of Probability.

45

Freedom and Determinism

– In the Enquiry, Hume applies his results about causation to a number of interesting topics, e.g.:

– Section VIII: “Of Liberty and Necessity”

– Some background

46

The No-Freedom Argument

1. All events are determined.2. If all events are determined, then there are no free actions.

3. There are no free actions.

• Assumption: All actions are events; that’s obvious.

• Note: the issue is not whether some actions are not free.

• Distinguish two versions of determinism: – Logical determinism

– Causal determinism

47

Freedom and Divine Omniscience (Logical Determinism)

• Divine foreknowledge.

• Is God’s omniscience compatible with human freedom?

• Worry: The answer might be “No”.

• Popular Argument:

– Whatever is going to happen, God, being omniscient, already knows that it will happen, so it must happen: therefore, our actions are not free: we can’t make God wrong.

– Compare Augustine.– Example: Marian, eating frog-legs next Thanksgiving.

• Is God’s omniscience even compatible with His own freedom?

48

Response

• Thomas Aquinas: The popular argument relies on a confusion. Consider:

K: If something is known, then it must be the case.

• Distinguish:

K1: Necessary: [if it is known that p, then it is the case that p].

K2: If it is known that p, then necessary: [p is the case].

K1 is true, but it does not yield the result that we are not free.

K2 would yield the result that we are not free, but it is not true.

Compare:• 1. Necessarily, if Jones is a husband, then he is married. • 2. If Jones is a husband, then he is necessarily married.

49

Additional Points

• God can know contingent truths,

– i.e. truths that might have been otherwise– it doesn’t follow that He might have been wrong.

• Compare knowledge of the past:

– “I know what you did last summer; hence, your actions weren’t free then.”

• Say I will have frog-legs Thanksgiving 2012. Of course, God knows that I will, but:

– Will I have frog-legs because God knows that I will?or

– Does God know that I will have frog-legs because I will have frog-legs?

• God knows in advance our (and His own) free actions; and his foreknowledge does not make them any less free.

50

Logical Determinism: One more time

51

The No-Freedom Argument

1. All events are determined.2. If all events are determined, then there are no free actions.

3. There are no free actions.

• Assumption: All actions are events; that’s obvious.

• Note: the issue is not whether some actions are not free.

• Distinguish two versions of determinism: – Logical determinism

– Causal determinism

52

Freedom and Causal Determinism

• Principle of Determinism (causal):

All events are causally determined by antecedent events and/or conditions.

• Determinism and Prediction:– Determinism implies in-principle predictability

• Determinism (alternative formulation):– A complete description of the state of the universe at any time tn combined with all

the laws of nature logically entails a complete description of the state of the universe at tn+1.

Laplace’s Demon: “We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.”—Pierre Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, 1814.

53

Determinism

• Hume, pp. 53-61; he says:

• We all believe in determinism; especially with respect to human actions:

– I perform an action because I want to.

– I want to perform an action because I have various desires and various beliefs about how to realize my desires.

• Our actions are determined by our motives:– Beliefs & desires (= motives) decisions (intentions) actions

• In the same circumstances, the same motives lead to the same decisions which lead to the same actions: determinism.

54

Readings for Tuesday, April 24

• Hume, Enquiry

– Sections VIII: Of Liberty and Necessity.– Section VI: Of Probability.

• Concourse

– Item 4, Thomas Hobbes, “Of the Liberty of Subjects”, Chap. 21 of Leviathan.

• Locke, Essay– Of Power; Bk. 2, Chap. 21, Sections 7 to end of chapter.

55

Hard Determinism (HD):

Affirms 1: All events are determined.

Affirms 2: Determinism is incompatible with freedom of action.

Concludes 3: There are no free actions.

• Freedom is an illusion!

– A train running along on its track thinking it’s free.– Libet’s Experiment (?)

• There is no moral responsibility!

– Ought implies Can– Responsibility requires freedom: no freedom no responsibility.

• Warning: Do not confuse Determinism (the principle of) with Hard Determinism!!

56

Simple Libertarianism (SL):

Agrees with 2: If all events are determined, then there are no free actions.

Rejects 3: There are free actions.

Concludes: Not all events are determined. = not 1

• According to SL, the Principle of Determinism is simply false: – there are events that are not determined.

– In particular, free actions are (or essentially involve) events that are not determined.

57

• A Nasty Problem for Simple Libertarianism:

– SL says there are events, namely free actions, that are not determined.

– BUT, events that are not determined are random.

– AND events that are random are not free actions!

• they just happen,

• they are not under the agent’s control,

• they aren’t really his/her actions at all,

• the agent is not responsible for such happenings,

• see Part 2 of Hume’s Section 8;

– Hence: SL does not allow for free actions after all!

–

58

59

Dilemma

• If you believe that our actions are (sometimes) free, then the No-Freedom Argument seems to generate a serious dilemma:

• Affirm Determinism → no freedom• Deny Determinism → no freedom• Not good.

• Can one get out of this? Can one argue that the dilemma rests on some mistake?

• Remember Premise 2 of the No-Freedom Argument:

– If all events are determined, then there are no free actions.=

– Determinism is incompatible with freedom.

• The dilemma presupposes this premise:

– Both, HD and SL, accept Premise 2; – they both assume that Determinism and freedom are incompatible.

60

Soft Determinism (SD)

Affirms 1: All events are determined.

Does not conclude 3 (that there are no free actions), because it

Denies 2, that is, it affirms Compatibilism:

• Compatibilism: Freedom and Determinism are compatible.

• See Hobbes, Locke, Hume.

• If acceptable, SD offers a way out of the dilemma because it denies the assumption shared by both horns of the dilemma.

• But how could one swallow Compatibilism?

• What do we mean by free action?

61

Freedom of Action

• I am free ≈ I can do what I want

• A free action: an action the agent wanted to perform.

• An agent wants to perform an action because she has various desires and various beliefs about how to realize her desires.

• Motivation:Beliefs & desires → decisions/wants → intentions to act → actions

☝unless somethingintervenes

62

Soft Determinism (SD): A compatibilist account of free actions.

– Freedom of action requires only the ability to do what one wants;

– This is not incompatible with determinism, on the contrary:

– A free action is determined (caused) by the agent’s decision (choosing / wanting) to do it.• Hence, the agent is responsible for it.

• See slide 69 for a refinement of this account!

– An unfree action is also determined (caused) but by something other than the agent’s decision (choosing / wanting) to do it.• Hence, the agent is not responsible for it.

• SD promises a resolution to our dilemma!

– Freedom with Determinism.

63

64

• Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651):

– See Item 21: contains the first two pages of chapter xxi of his very notorious book.– Already gives a compatibilist account of free action, – a relatively simple one, like the one given above.

• Locke, Essay, bk II, chap. xxi, sections 7-38:

– See Item 16: Locke’s discussion intended as improvement on Hobbes.

• Hume, Enquiry, Sec VIII, pp. 63-64: compatibilist account of free actions.

– Hume’s account is intended as an improvement on Locke.– Up to p. 63, he mostly emphasizes how our actions are determined by our beliefs & desires

(motives): regular correlations between motives (beliefs & desires) and decisions and actions.– In Part 2 of Sec VIII, he argues that freedom and responsibility require determinism; i.e. that

Simple Libertarianism doesn’t work.

65

Readings for Thursday, April 26

• [Concourse

– Item 21, Thomas Hobbes, Liberty.– Item 16, Locke, Essay, “Of Power”, Bk. 2; Chap. 2; Sections 7-38.

• Hume, Enquiry

– Sections VIII: Of Liberty and Necessity.– Section VI: Of Probability.]

• Concourse

– Item 22: Taylor, Freedom and Determinism.

66

Soft-Determinism and the Nature of Freedom

• SD claims to offer a way out of our dilemma.

• But does it give an adequate account of free actions?

↓

• Debate about SD becomes debate over the correct account of free action.

• Opponents of SD: – “SD’s compatibilist account of free action is not sufficient: it’s a scam!”

– Freedom of action requires more than doing what one wants to do;

– It also requires the ability to do otherwise.

67

Objections to SD’s Account of Free Action (first sort):

• Locke’s Room: Man in locked room who wants to stay.

– He could not have done otherwise, even if he had wanted to → His staying was not a free action.

– Intuition says: “If you do what you want to do, you’re free.” Not, Locke says, if you couldn’t do otherwise even if you wanted to.

– Locke, bk. II, chap. xxi, sec. 10.

• SD’s response:

68

Enriched SD Account of Free Action:

An agent’s action A is free ≈ (1) if she wanted to do A, then she would do A, and

(2) if she wanted not to do A, then she would refrain from doing A.

• Take this as a refinement of the earlier formulation (slide 59), spelling out what it means to say that a free action is determined by the agent’s decision.

– See Hume, Enquiry, p. 63: “hypothetical liberty”

• But does this allow for the genuine ability to do otherwise?

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Objections to SD’s Account of Free Action (second sort):

• Induced wants/decisions/desires:

– Neuroscientist with remote mind control (Delgado’s experiments)– Hypnotist– Brainwashing (B.F. Skinner book: Walden II)– Drugs

Actions determined by “induced” wants/decisions/desires are not free actions.

• SD’s response:

– These cases aren’t really counterexamples because such persons are not acting based on their own wants: these wants are induced by outside forces.

• Opponents response to response:

– But if determinism is true, all wants (decisions, desires, etc.) ultimately come from outside forces. What’s the difference?

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A Basic Worry About Soft Determinism

• According to SD,

– My so-called “free actions” are determined by my decisions/wants, which are determined by my beliefs & desires, which are determined by my earlier beliefs & desires, which are determined by my character and my genetic makeup, which are determined by…factors outside me, factors over which I don’t have control:

• Does this really leave room for genuine freedom of action?

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Moral (so far)

• Free action requires:

– the ability to do what one wants (chooses, decides) to do,

– and

– the genuine ability to do otherwise: the agent’s want (or choice, or decision) must be free.

• Freedom of action only if Freedom of will (choice, decision).

– Note: Apparently it’s important in this debate to distinguish freedom of action and freedom of will

– They are different but, it seems, connected.

• This leads to a serious worry ↓

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Back to Dilemma?

• Do we have freedom of choice / freedom of the will?

– Hard Determinism: Nope.

– Simple Libertarianism: Nope.

• SL says: “Our choices/decisions are not determined.”• But then they are random events.• Random events just happen.• They are not our choices/decisions.

– Soft Determinism: Nope.

• Try to modify the compatibilist account of free action so that it applies to free choice/will;• You get something absurd.

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• We have a version of the original dilemma: only this time it’s about freedom of the will.

• And since (if) freedom of will is required for freedom of action, we again get the result that there is no freedom of action. We are back where we started.

• Or should we embrace SD and swallow its compatibilist account of freedom of action after all? But is that real freedom of action; isn’t it a scam?

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Agency Theory: A Way Out?

• See Taylor; Concourse Item 22.

• Take a second look at Principle of Determinism:

– “All events are determined.”– More precisely:– All events are determined by antecedent events and conditions.

• Denial of this principle:

– Some events are not determined by antecedent events and conditions.

• Does that entail that such events are not determined at all?

• No!! – such events could be determined by things other than antecedent events/conditions: – they could be determined by agents/persons.

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• Denial of Principle of Determinism:

– Not all events are determined by antecedent events and conditions.=

– Some events are not determined by antecedent events and conditions.

• It follows that:

1. Some events are not determined at all,

OR

2. Some events are determined by something other than antecedent events and conditions.

• The argument against SL overlooked the second possibility.

• By what could such events be determined, if not by other events and conditions?

– Agency Theory: By persons (agents).

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• Agency Theory:

– A free action is an event that is determined by another event: the agents free choice (a mental event);

– An agent’s free choice is an event not determined by another event;

– An agent’s free choice is determined by the agent: the agent makes her choice (period); and nothing determines the agent to make her choice.

“If we are responsible…then we have a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing—or no one—causes us to cause those events to happen.” (Roderick Chisholm: Human Freedom and the Self)

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Worries About Agency Theory:

• Mysterious;

• Agent causation is weird causation.

• Doesn’t the agent make her “free” choice or decision because of her beliefs and desires?

– At least when the choice/decision is rational.

– Do we ever just make a choice? What about deliberation? – Doesn’t this bring back the threat of no-freedom?

• A free agent has to have the power/the ability to cause her decision (make a choice);– When acting freely, she has to exercise that power:– But isn’t the exercise of a power an event?

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Freedom & Determinism

Compatibilism Incompatibilism

Soft ? Hard SimpleDeterminism Determinism Libertarianism

• What goes for ?

• Where does the agency theory go?

– It depends on how you understand determinism.

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• Compatibilists:

1. Often claim that “free will” doesn’t really make sense; only “free action” makes sense.

2. What do they say about actions done under some threat/coercion?

3. Can they make clear why “unnaturally induced wants/decisions” result in loss of freedom while “naturally induced wants/decisions” do not?

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A Point About Determinism and Incompatibilism

• Don’t say: According to determinism, what actually happens must happen (is necessary, etc.)!

• Determinism (event-event): An event, E, is determined iff there is a set of antecedent events/conditions, C, and laws of nature, L, such that:

C & L E⇒ (this is necessary)

• No Control Argument:Necessary: C & L E⇒No control over LNo control over CNo control over E

– Valid? Sound?– Go back to a past C that’s clearly out of our control– This is an alternative argument for Incompatibilism

• How does it relate to others?

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• Moral of our discussion of freedom:

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Readings for Tuesday, May 1

• Concourse

– Item 23, Locke: Faith and Reason.

• Start with the two sections preceding the chapter.

• Hume, Enquiry– Section X: “Of Miracles”

• Final Exam

– Monday, May 7, 10:30 to 12:30

– Here = Hesburgh Library 107

– Same format as midterm (same length)

– Officially cumulative BUT …

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Locke: Of Faith and Reason

• If God has revealed that X, then it is the case that X.

– The divine reliability conditional

– It expresses God’s trustworthiness/reliability

– Faith!

If God has revealed that X, then it is the case that X.God has revealed that X.It is the case that X.

If God has revealed that X, then it is the case that X.It is not the case that X.

It is not the case that God has revealed that X.

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If God has revealed that X, then it is the case that X.It is not probable that X.It is not probable that God has revealed that X.

p qp q

Lockep qnot q not p

p Humenot q

not: p q

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Hume: Of Miracles

• Reliability conditional: If Jones testifies that X, then it is the case that X. – In case of “ordinary” witnesses, this is, of course, not 100%

– The more probable this is, the more reliable the witness.

– The less probable this is, the less reliable the witness.

Jones testifies that XNot X

Not: if Jones testifies that X, then it is the case that X.

• Jones testifies that X, even though not X.• Jones’ testimony is wrong: He deceives or is himself deceived (mistaken).

Jones testifies that XProbable not XProbable not: if Jones testifies that X, then it is the case that X

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Final Exam

• Monday, May 7, 10:30 to 12:30

• Here = Hesburgh Library 107

• Same format as midterm (same length)

• Bring scratch paper

• Officially cumulative BUT only because I want to be able to ask you questions about logic, and about other topics that are presupposed by things discussed in second half of semester (e.g. empiricism vs. rationalism. the problem of our knowledge of the external world, and suchlike)

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