Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Franklin M. DrilonRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration,respondents.Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.SARMIENTO,J.:The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"1challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;"2that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"3and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."4Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland.*In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."5As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace."Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."6It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited,7refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."8"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society."9It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."10Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will."11It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.12In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity.13In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers,"14but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution15does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class.16The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions.As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban.There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers"17this Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host countries . . ."18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino workers.19The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers"20is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B."21It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid act.22(Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection."23In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated. We quote:5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the suspension.5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and Government;5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government officials; and5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited international organizations.5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor agreements or understanding.xxx xxx xxx7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served employment contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these guidelines.xxx xxx xxx9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino workers.24xxx xxx xxxThe consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law."25Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor,"26pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.27The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement whereof.28The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits"29is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation.The Constitution declares that:Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.30"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government.31Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, wherelaissez fairehas never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.

Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Alberto Santos, Jr., et al.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 77875 February 4, 1993PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,petitioner,vs.ALBERTO SANTOS, JR., HOUDIEL MAGADIA, GILBERT ANTONIO, REGINO DURAN, PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,respondents.Fortunato Gupit, Jr., Solon R. Garcia, Rene B. Gorospe, Bienvinodo T. Jamoralin, jr. and Paulino D. Ungos, Jr. for petitioner.Adolpho M. Guerzon for private respondents.REGALADO,J.:The instant petition forcertiorariseeks to set aside the decision of The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 4-1206-85, promulgated on December 11, 1986,1containing the following disposition:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Decision appealed from is set aside and another one entered, declaring the suspension of complainants to be illegal and consequently, respondent PAL is directed to pay complainants their salaries corresponding to the respective period(s) of their suspension, and to delete the disciplinary action from complainants' service records.2These material facts recited in the basic petition are virtually undisputed and we reproduce the same hereunder:1. Individual respondents are all Port Stewards of Catering Sub-Department, Passenger Services Department of petitioner. Their duties and responsibilities, among others, are:Prepares meal orders and checklists, setting up standard equipment in accordance with the requirements of the type of service for each flight; skiing, binning, and inventorying of Commissary supplies and equipment.2. On various occasions, several deductions were made from their salary. The deductions represented losses of inventoried items charged to them for mishandling of company properties . . . which respondents resented. Such that on August 21, 1984, individual respondents, represented by the union, made a formal notice regarding the deductions to petitioner thru Mr. Reynaldo Abad, Manager for Catering. . . .3. As there was no action taken on said representation, private respondents filed a formal grievance on November 4, 1984 pursuant to the grievance machinery Step 1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and the union. . . . The topics which the union wanted to be discussed in the said grievance were the illegal/questionable salary deductions and inventory of bonded goods and merchandise being done by catering service personnel which they believed should not be their duty.4. The said grievance was submitted on November 21, 1984 to the office of Mr. Reynaldo Abad, Manager for Catering, who at the time was on vacation leave. . . .5. Subsequently, the grievants (individual respondents) thru the shop steward wrote a letter on December 5, 1984 addressed to the office of Mr. Abad, who was still on leave at the time, that inasmuch as no reply was made to their grievance which "was duly received by your secretary" and considering that petitioner had only five days to resolve the grievance as provided for in the CBA, said grievance as believed by them (private respondents) was deemed resolved in their favor. . . .6. Upon Mr. Abad's return on December 7, 1984, he immediately informed the grievants and scheduled a meeting on December 12, 1984. . . .7. Thereafter, the individual respondents refused to conduct inventory works. Alberto Santos, Jr. did not conduct ramp inventory on December 7, 10 and 12. Gilbert Antonio did not conduct ramp inventory on December 10. In like manner, Regino Duran and Houdiel Magadia did not conduct the same on December 10 and 12.8. At the grievance meeting which was attended by some union representatives, Mr. Abad resolved the grievance by denying the petition of individual respondents and adopted the position that inventory of bonded goods is part of their duty as catering service personnel, and as for the salary deductions for losses, he rationalized:1. It was only proper that employees are charged for the amount due to mishandling of company property which resulted to losses. However, loss may be cost price 1/10 selling price.9. As there was no ramp inventory conducted on the mentioned dates, Mr. Abad, on January 3, 1985 wrote by an inter-office memorandum addressed to the grievants, individual respondents herein, for them to explain on (sic) why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for not conducting ramp inventory. . . .10. The directive was complied with . . . . The reason for not conducting ramp inventory was put forth as:4. Since the grievance step 1 was not decided and no action was done by your office within 5 days from November 21, 1984, per provision of the PAL-PALEA CBA, Art. IV, Sec. 2, the grievance is deemed resolved in PALEA's favor.11. Going over the explanation, Mr. Abad found the same unsatisfactory. Thus, a penalty of suspension ranging from 7 days to 30 days were (sic) imposed depending on the number of infractions committed.*12. After the penalty of suspension was meted down, PALEA filed another grievance asking for lifting of, or at least, holding in abeyance the execution of said penalty. The said grievance was forthwith denied but the penalty of suspension with respect to respondent Ramos was modified, such that his suspension which was originally from January 15, 1985 to April 5, 1985 was shortened by one month and was lifted on March 5, 1985. The union, however, made a demand for the reimbursement of the salaries of individual respondents during the period of their suspension.13. Petitioner stood pat (o)n the validity of the suspensions. Hence, a complaint for illegal suspension was filed before theArbitration Branch of the Commission, . . . Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana, on March 17, 1986, ruled in favor of petitioner by dismissing the complaint. . . .3Private respondents appealed the decision of the labor arbiter to respondent commission which rendered the aforequoted decision setting aside the labor arbiter's order of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it interposed the present petition.The Court is accordingly called upon to resolve the issue of whether or not public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering the aforementioned decision.Evidently basic and firmly settled is the rule that judicial review by this Court in labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officer or office based his or its determination, but is limited to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.4It has not been shown that respondent NLRC has unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins it to perform as a duty or has otherwise unlawfully excluded petitioner from the exercise of a right to which it is entitled.The instant case hinges on the interpretation of Section 2, Article IV of the PAL-PALEA Collective Bargaining Agreement, (hereinafter, CBA), to wit:Sec. 2 Processing of Grievancesxxx xxx xxxSTEP 1 Any employee who believes that he has a justifiable grievance shall take the matter up with his shop steward. If the shop steward feels there is justification for taking the matter up with the Company, he shall record the grievance on the grievance form heretofore agreed upon by the parties. Two (2) copies of the grievance form properly filled, accepted, and signed shall then be presented to and discussed by the shop steward with the division head. The division head shall answer the grievance within five (5) days from the date of presentation by inserting his decision on the grievance form, signing and dating same, and returning one copy to the shop steward.If the division head fails to act within the five (5)-day regl(e)mentary period, the grievance must be resolved in favor of the aggrieved party. If the division head's decision is not appealed to Step II, the grievance shall be considered settled on the basis of the decision made, and shall not be eligible for further appeal.5(Emphasis ours.)Petitioner submits that since the grievance machinery was established for both labor and management as a vehicle to thresh out whatever problems may arise in the course of their relationship, every employee is duty bound to present the matter before management and give the latter an opportunity to impose whatever corrective measure is possible. Under normal circumstances, an employee should not preempt the resolution of his grievance; rather, he has the duty to observe thestatus quo.6Citing Section 1, Article IV of the CBA, petitioner further argues that respondent employees have the obligation, just as management has, to settle all labor disputes through friendly negotiations. Thus, Section 2 of the CBA should not be narrowly interpreted.7Before the prescriptive period of five days begins to run, two concurrent requirements must be met,i.e.,presentmentof the grievance and itsdiscussionbetween the shop steward and the division head who in this case is Mr. Abad. Section 2 is not self-executing; the mere filing of the grievance does not trigger the tolling of the prescriptive period.8Petitioner has sorely missed the point.It is a fact that the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the Constitution imposes such sympathy, but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital.9The constitutional mandate for the promotion of labor is as explicit as it is demanding. The purpose is to place the workingman on an equal plane with management with all its power and influence in negotiating for the advancement of his interests and the defense of his rights.10Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in life should have more privileges in law.11It is clear that the grievance was filed with Mr. Abad's secretary during his absence.12Under Section 2 of the CBA aforequoted, the division head shall act on the grievance within five (5) days from the date of presentation thereof, otherwise "the grievance must be resolved in favor of the aggrieved party." It is not disputed that the grievants knew that division head Reynaldo Abad was then "on leave" when they filed their grievance which was received by Abad's secretary.13This knowledge, however, should not prevent the application of the CBA.On this score, respondent NLRC aptly ruled:. . . Based on the facts heretofore narrated, division head Reynaldo Abad had to act on the grievance of complainants within five days from 21 November 1984. Therefore, when Reynaldo Abad, failed to act within the reglementary period, complainants, believing in good faith that the effect of the CBA had already set in, cannot be blamed if they did not conduct ramp inventory for the days thereafter. In this regard, respondent PAL argued that Reynaldo Abad was on leave at the time the grievance was presented. This, however, is of no moment, for it is hard to believe that everything under Abad's authority would have to stand still during his absence from office. To be sure, it is to be expected that someone has to be left to attend to Abad's duties. Of course, this may be a product of inadvertence on the part of PAL management, but certainly, complainants should not be made to suffer the consequences.14Contrary to petitioner's submission,15the grievance of employees is not a matter which requires the personal act of Mr. Abad and thus could not be delegated. Petitioner could at least have assigned an officer-in-charge to look into the grievance and possibly make his recommendation to Mr. Abad. It is of no moment that Mr. Abad immediately looked into the grievance upon returning to work, for it must be remembered that the grievants are workingmen who suffered salary deductions and who rely so much on their meager income for their daily subsistence and survival. Besides, it is noteworthy that when these employees first presented their complaint on August 21, 1984, petitioner failed to act on it. It was only after a formal grievance was filed and after Mr. Abad returned to work on December 7, 1984 that petitioner decided to turn an ear to their plaints.As respondent NLRC has pointed out, Abad's failure to act on the matter may have been due to petitioner's inadvertence,16but it is clearly too much of an injustice if the employees be made to bear the dire effects thereof. Much as the latter were willing to discuss their grievance with their employer, the latter closed the door to this possibility by not assigning someone else to look into the matter during Abad's absence. Thus, private respondents should not be faulted for believing that the effects of the CBA in their favor had already stepped into the controversy.If the Court were to follow petitioner's line of reasoning, it would be easy for management to delay the resolution of labor problems, the complaints of the workers in particular, and hide under the cloak of its officers being "on leave" to avoid being caught by the 5-day deadline under the CBA. If this should be allowed, the workingmen will suffer great injustice for they will necessarily be at the mercy of their employer. That could not have been the intendment of the pertinent provision of the CBA, much less the benevolent policy underlying our labor laws.ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. This judgment is immediately executory.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.Philippine Education Co., Inc. vs. Union of Philippine Education Employees (NLU), et al.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-13778 April 29, 1960PHILIPPINE EDUCATION CO., INC.,petitioner,vs.UNION OF PHILIPPINE EDUCATION EMPLOYEES (NLU) and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,respondents.Marcial Esposo for petitioner.Eulogio R. Lerum for respondent Union. Jose B. Bolisay for respondent CIR.MONTEMAYOR,J.:The Philippine Education Company, Inc. is appealing the order of the Court of Industrial Relations, dated February 7, 1958, directing it to reinstate its former employee, Ernesto Carpio, to his former or equivalent position, without backpay, and from the resolution of the same courtin banc, dated March 22, 1958, denying the company's motion for reconsideration.Ernesto Carpio and other employees of the company, members of the Union of Philippine Education Employees (NLU) joined a strike staged on January 16, 1953. After the labor dispute was settled, the Industrial Court ordered the reinstatement of the strikers, including Carpio. The company, however, opposed the reinstatement of Carpio for the reason that a criminal complaint had been filed against him in the Municipal Court of Manila for theft of magazines allegedly belonging to the company. He was convicted and sentenced to two months and one day ofarresto mayor. On appeal to the Court of First Instance, Carpio was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.The question of Carpio's reinstatement was heard by the Industrial Court where the parties submitted as evidence the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the hearing in the criminal case before the Court of First Instance of Manila, the exhibits presented in said case, as well as the decisions of the Municipal Court convicting him, and that of the Court of First Instance acquitting him, or rather dismissing the case against him on reasonable doubt. After said hearing, the Industrial Court agreed with the finding of the Court of First Instance that the offense had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and held that Carpio's acquittal entitled him to reinstatement, though without backpay.We have examined the aforementioned evidence, and we are inclined to agree with the Municipal Court that Carpio's guilt had been duly established. At least, the preponderance of evidence was against his innocence. The question for determination is whether the whether the acquittal of an employee, specially on the ground of reasonable doubt, in a criminal case for theft involving articles and merchandise belonging to his employer, entitles said employee to reinstatement.In the case of National Labor Organization of Employees and Laborers vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 95 Phil., 727; Off. Gaz. (9) 4219, we said:. . . the acquittal of a employee in a criminal case is no bar to the Court of Industrial Relations, after proper hearing, finding the same employee guilty of facts inimical to the interests of his employer and justifying loss of confidence in him by said employer, thereby warranting his dismissal or the refusal of the Company to reinstate him. The reason for this is not difficult to see. The evidence required by law to establish guilt and to warrant conviction in a criminal case substantially differs from the evidence necessary to establish responsibility or liability in a civil or non-criminal case. The difference is in the amount and weight of evidence and also in degree. In a criminal case, the evidence or proof must be beyond reasonable doubt while in a civil or non criminal case it is merely preponderance of evidence. In further support of this principle we may refer to Art. 29 of the New Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) which provides that when the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted where only a preponderance of evidence is necessary to establish liability. From all this it is clear that the Court of Industrial Relations was justified in denying the petition of Rivas and Tolentino for reinstatement in the cement company, because of their illegal possession of hand grenades intended by them for purposes of sabotage in connection with the strike on March 16, 1952.Then in the case of National Labor Union vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company, 73 Phil., 279, the City Fiscal refused to prosecute two employees charged with theft for lack of evidence and yet this Tribunal upheld their dismissal from the employer company on the ground that their employer had ample reason to distrust them.The relation of employer and employee, specially where the employee has access to the employer's property in the form of articles and merchandise for sale, necessarily involves trust and confidence. If said merchandise are lost and said loss is reasonably attributed to said employee, and he is charged with theft, even if he is acquitted of the form of articles and merchandise for sale, necessarily involves trust and confidence. If said merchandise are lost and said loss is reasonably attributed to said employee, and he is charged with theft, even if he is acquitted of the charge on reasonable doubt, when the employer has lost its confidence in him, it would be highly unfair to require said employer to continue employing him or to reinstate him, for in that case the former might find it necessary for its protection to employ another person to watch and keep an eye on him. In the present case, Carpio was refused reinstatement not because of any union affiliation or activity or because the company has been guilty of any unfair labor practice. As already stated, Carpio was convicted in the Municipal Court and although he was acquitted on reasonable doubt in the Court of First Instance, the company had ample reason to distrust him. Under the circumstances, we cannot in conscience require the company to reemploy or reinstate him.In view of the foregoing, the appealed orders of the Industrial Court of February 7, 1958 and March 22, 1958 are hereby reversed. No costs.Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ.,concur.

G.R. No. 87698 September 24, 1991PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and OSCAR IRINEO,respondents.The Legal Department, PAL for petitioner.Francisco M. Delos Reyes for private respondent.NARVASA,J.:pThis case treats of an employee of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), who was dismissed from his work onAugust 23, 1967on the basis of the findings and recommendations of a Fact Finding Panel, submitted on August 11, 1967 after an investigation commenced in July, 1967 in coordination with a well known accounting firm.1The Fact Finding Panel recommended the criminal prosecution of the employee, Oscar Irineo, together with four others, namely: Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, Jacinto Macatol and Jesus Saba, on account of complicity in irregular refunds of international plane tickets.2On the basis of the panel's report, and the testimony of witnesses taken in the course of the investigation, criminal proceedings were also initiated against four of the PAL employees above named, namely: Oscar Irineo, Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, and Jacinto Macatol. They were prosecuted forestafathru falsification of commercial documents in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, under an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal onSeptember 25, 1968.3The case resulted in the conviction after due trial of all the accused onMarch 1, 1976;this, despite the fiscal's having earlier moved for the dismissal of the charges as against Irineo and Macatol.4All four (4) defendants filed motions for reconsideration and/or new trial. All the motions were denied except Macatol's. After due hearing on said motions, the Trial Court rendered an amended decision datedSeptember 23, 1977absolving Macatol of any liability for the offense charged, "for lack of sufficient evidence." The other three appealed.5OnJuly 6, 1978 about twelve (12) years after his dismissal from employment Macatol filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL in the Department of Labor. His complaint was however dismissed by the Labor Arbiter on the ground that his right of action had prescribed. That dismissal was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission in a decision promulgated onMay 30, 1980. The Commission ruled that "the running of the prescriptive period ... commenced on the date ... (Macatol's) cause of action accrued;" that such cause of action did not accrue "upon the termination of the criminal case," but upon "his dismissal, the legality or illegality of which could be determined soon after it was effected ... (and a) suit to contest its legality could proceed independently of any criminal proceedings;" that "if no criminal case was instituted, following the logic of the complainant's argument, the cause of action would not and could not have accrued at all; ... (and) the institution of the criminal action did not bar the complainant from filing a complaint for illegal dismissal."6On the other hand, the appeal taken by Oscar Irineo, Rogelio Damian, Antonio Rabasco, resulted in a decision promulgated onSeptember 23, 1983by the Intermediate Appellate Court,7affirming the judgment of conviction only as regards Rogelio Damian, but acquitting Irineo and Rabasco "on grounds of reasonable doubt."8OnMay 10, 1984,seventeen (17) years after the termination of his employment on August 23, 1967, Irineo filed a complaint against PAL for reinstatement and back wages on the claim that that termination was illegal. It is the action thus instituted that has given rise to the proceedings now before this Court.Irineo's action eventuated in a decision of the Labor Arbiter dated November 12, 1985,9decreeing his reinstatement to his position in 1967 without loss of seniority rights and the payment to him of back wages "from August 13, 1967 up to his actual reinstatement," as well asmoral damages in the amount of P300,000.00.The Arbiter overruled the defense of prescription asserted by PAL, among others. The Arbiter held that since there was a PAL circular dated June 15, 1966 to the effect that "(a)n employee charged with any crime inimical to the company's interest shall be placed under preventive suspension until the final adjudication of his case," and there was, too, a standing order by the Court of Industrial Relations at that time forbidding the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court authority, the termination by PAL of Irineo's employment on August 23, 1967 merely "amounted to a suspension per (said) PAL IRD Circular No. 66-11." According to the Arbiter, said IRD Circular No. 66-11 was not raised in issue in the earlier case instituted by Macatol,supra,10and this serves to distinguish Macatol's case from Irineo's, precluding reaching a conclusion in the latter similar to that in the former (i.e., that the claim was barred by prescription). The Arbiter held, in fine, that in view of said Circular No. 66-11, PAL's termination of Irineo's employment should be deemed only as an act by which "Irineo was placed under preventive suspension until his (criminal) case was finally adjudicated, for after all, the arbitration branch of the Commission should put meaning to the law between the parties and unless such law between the parties are (sic) implemented the same would become useless." The Arbiter concluded with the following disposition:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered directing PAL to terminate the suspension of Irineo which it imposed on August 23, 1967 and to reinstate him to his position without loss of seniority rights and with backwages from August 13, 1967 up to his actual reinstatement.Lastly, moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00 is (sic) awarded to complainant.PAL appealed to the NLRC but failed to obtain reversal of the Arbiter's judgment. In a Resolution promulgated on February 28, 1989, the Third Division of the NLRC upheld all the Arbiter's conclusions.11The NLRC agreed with the Arbiter that "applying the mandate of IRD Circular No. 66-11 which respondent PAL itself solely promulgated," Irineo was never dismissed from employment but "was merely under preventive suspension;" and that PAL's termination of Irineo's work was violative of the "Injunction Order dated September 3, 1963 in CIR Case No. 43-IPA" (forbidding, during the pendency of said case, the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court authority), even though that order "lost its efficacy when the parties concerned entered into a valid Certified Bargaining Agreement" (on December 7, 1965, according to petitioner PAL12). It also affirmed the award of moral damages.PAL is now before this Court, praying for the issuance of a writ ofcertiorarito nullify and set aside the NLRC Resolution of February 28, 1989 as constituting "a plain case of patent abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of the same an exemplary example of power arbitrarily exercised without due regard to the rule of law." The Court issued a temporary restraining order on April 26, 1989 prohibiting enforcement or implementation of the challenged resolution.13Required to comment in public respondent's behalf, the Office of the Solicitor General begged to be excused, declaring that "(a)fter an exhaustive and judicious scrutiny of the records of the case, as well as the applicable law and jurisprudence on the issues involved, ... (it could not), without violating the law, espouse the position taken by the respondent ... (NLRC) ..." Comments were filed by private respondent14and the Senior Research Attorney of the NLRC in the latter's behalf,15which the Court resolved to treat as their answers to PAL's petition.In light of the material facts above set out, it is not indeed possible, as the Solicitor General holds, to defend the decision of the respondent Commission or that of the Labor Arbiter.That there should be care and solicitude in the protection and vindication of the rights of workingmen cannot be gainsaid; but that care and solicitude can not justify disregard of relevant facts or eschewal of rationality in the construction of the text of applicable rules in order to arrive at a disposition in favor of an employee who is perceived as otherwise deserving of sympathy and commiseration.The letter to Oscar Irineo of then PAL President Benigno P. Toda, Jr. dated August 23, 1967, based evidently on the investigation and report of the fact finding panel, leaves no doubt that Irineo's employment was being ended; the language is plain and categorical. It reads pertinently as follows:16To: Oscar IreneoComptroller's DepartmentFor being involved in the irregular refund of tickets in the international service to the damage and prejudice of the company,you are dismissed from the service effective immediately.The acts committed being criminal, resulting in the swindling of the company, the Legal Department is directed to file immediately the corresponding criminal cases against you.To say, as both the Arbiter and the respondent Commission do, that that declaration, "you are dismissed from the service effective immediately," should be construed merely as a suspension, not a dismissal, from employment, is illogical if not downright ludicrous. They attempt to justify this conclusion by adverting to a PAL circular dated June 15, 1966 to the effect that "(a)n employee charged with any crime inimical to the company's interest shall be placed under preventive suspension until the final adjudication of his case," and construe this as a complete foreclosure or prohibition of any alternative or concurrent action on PAL's part, such as the imposition of administrative sanctions or penalties; in other words, any disciplinary action against an erring employee was absolutely dependent on the outcome of the criminal action against the latter, no disciplinary measure of any nature being permissible against the employee "until the final adjudication" of his criminal case. It is a construction that has nothing to support it, is contrary to common sense, and one certainly not justified by the recorded facts.The attempt to sustain the strained theory ofdismissal-qua-suspensionby referring to a standing order by the Court of Industrial Relations at that time forbidding the dismissal of any employee by PAL without court authority, is equally indefensible. That prohibition was imposed only in relation to a labor dispute then pending before the Court of Industrial Relations. That dispute however ended when the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement two (2) years or so before Irineo was fired on August 23, 1967. In other words, when Irineo's employment was terminated, the CIR injunction adverted was alreadyfunctions officioand could no longer have any relevance to that event.There is moreover, nothing in the record to excuse respondent Irineo's omission to impugn his termination of employment by PAL in line with the respondent commission's theory, i.e., that under existing PAL rules and the CIR injunction, he could only be placed under preventive suspension and therefore his dismissal was illegal. His assertion thereof after seventeen (17) years from his discharge from employment can only mean that he slept on his rights or that his counsel did not share the respondent Commission's belief in the soundness of the theory. His claim must thus be rejected as time-barred, as being unpardonably tardy.Premises considered, it appears clear to the Court that the respondent Commission's conclusions are flawed by errors so serious as to constitute grave abuse of discretion and should on this account be struck down.WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and issues the writ of certiorari prayed for, NULLIFYING AND SETTING ASIDE the respondent Commission's Resolutions promulgated on February 28, 1989 and on March 20, 1989, MAKING PERMANENT the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on April 26, 1989, and DISMISSING private respondent's complaint. No costs.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.Pacific Mills, Inc vs. Zenaida AlonzoRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 78090 July 26, 1991PACIFIC MILLS, INC.,petitioner,vs.ZENAIDA ALONZO,respondent.Napoleon L. Apostol for petitioner.NARVASA,J.:pFrom July 30, 1973, Zenaida Alonzo was employed as a ring frame operator in the Pacific Mills, Inc. until September 30, 1982 when she was discharged by Management.The record shows that in the early afternoon of September 22, 1982, Zenaida challenged Company Inspector Ernesto Tamondong to a fight, saying: "Putang Ina mo, lumabas ka, tarantado, kalalaki mong tao, duwag ka . . Ipagugulpi kita sa labas at kaya kitang ipakaladkad dito sa loob ng compound palabas ng gate sa mga kamag-anak ko." And suiting action to the word, she thereupon boxed Tamondong in the stomach. The motive for the assault was Zenaida's resentment at having been reprimanded, together with other employees, two days earlier by Tamondong for wasting time by engaging in Idle chatter.1Tamondong forthwith reported the incident to the firm's Administrative Manager2as well as the Chairman of Barangay Balombato, Quezon City.3On September 30, 1982, Zenaida Alonzo was given a Memorandum by the company's Executive Vice President & General Manager terminating her employment as of October 1, 1982 on various grounds: poor work, habitual absences and tardiness, wasting time, insubordination and gross disrespect. The service of that memorandum of dismissal on her was not preceded by any complaint, hearing or other formality. These were apparently considered unnecessary by Management4in view of the provision in the Company Rules and Regulations (embodied in the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the company and the union representing the employees) that:Fighting or attempting to inflict harm to another employee, will render (sic) the aggressor to outright dismissal.It was only at the hearing of the complaint for illegal dismissal (and non-payment of proportionate 13th month pay) instituted by Zenaida on October 4, 1982 in the NCR Arbitration Branch, that evidence was presented by the company not only of the assault by Zenaida on her superior but also of many other violations by her of company rules and regulations, in an attempt to substantiate the validity of her dismissal from work.The Labor Arbiter found that Alonzo had indeed verbally abused and struck her superior, Tamondong, and rejected her contention that the assault was not punishable since it was "not work-connected and was provoked/instigated by Ernesto Tamondong."5The Arbiter also declared as "fully established the previous infractions of complainant," these being "a matter of record and not denied by complainant (Zenaida)."The Arbiter was of the view, however, that Alonzo was entitled to relief, because (a) the penalty imposed was "harsh and severe and not commensurate with the offense, . . . suspension of three (3) months . . (being) the proper, just and reasonable penalty . . .;" and because (b) the company had failed "to investigate complainant before she was dismissed." The Arbiter thus ordered Pacific Mills, Inc., Zenaida's employer:. . . to reinstate complainant without loss of seniority rights and to pay her backwages from January 1, 1983 until fully reinstated, the period from October 1, 1982 to December 31, 1982 complainant being under suspension without pay . . . (as well as) to pay complainant's 13th month pay in the amount of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY-ONE PESOS ONLY (P351.00).Acting on the employer's appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered judgment on March 23, 1987, sustaining the Labor Arbiter's findings. It however limited the award of back wages to Zenaida only to three (3) years, in accordance with this Court's judgment inFeati University Faculty Club (PAFLU) vs.Feati University,58 SCRA 396.6Pacific Mills Inc. has instituted in this Court the special civil action ofcertiorariat bar praying for nullification of the judgment of the NLRC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.In the comment thereon,7required of him by the Court, the Solicitor General opined that:. . . both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC apparently failed to take into consideration the fact that Zenaida Alonzo was dismissed not because of this isolated act (of assault against her superior) but rather because of numerous and repeated violations of company rules and regulations. It was only this last incident which compelled Pacific Mills, Inc. to finally terminate her services. It is the totality of the infractions committed by the employee which should have been considered in determining whether or not there is just cause for her dismissal.Zenaida Alonzo was caught several times leaving her place of work to chat with her co-employees. This is reprehensible conduct since, as ring frame operator, she must be at her post during work hours to prevent the occurrence of incidents which could damage the machine. The company inspector precisely warned her against doing this. She had also been repeatedly reprimanded for insubordination, habitual tardiness, wasting time and not wearing the required company uniform, In spite of these infractions the company bore with her services and did not see fit to dismiss her. Her assault on the company inspector was apparently the last straw which compelled Pacific Mills, Inc. to terminate her services.Accordingly, the Solicitor General recommended "payment of separation pay equivalent to three (3) years backwages but without reinstatement" and of "proportionate 13th month pay."For their part, the Chief Legal Officer of the NLRC,8and the private respondent,9insist that since the dismissal of Zenaida Alonzo was not preceded by any notice of the charges and a hearing thereon, the judgment of the NLRC must be sustained.Decisive of this controversy is the judgment of the Courten bancinWenphil Corporation v.NLRC, promulgated on February 8, 1989,10in which the following policy pronouncements were made:The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement to the service of an employee without loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during the period of his separation until his actual reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years without qualification or deduction, when it appears he was not afforded due process, although his dismissal was found to be for just and authorized cause in an appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and Employment, should be re-examined. It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the undeserving, if not undesirable, remains in the service.Thus in the present case, where the private respondent, who appears to be of violent temper, caused trouble during office hours and even defied his superiors as they tried to pacify him, should not be rewarded with reemployment and back wages. It may encourage him to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe. Under the circumstances, the dismissal of the private respondent for just cause should be maintained. He has no right to return to his former employer.However, the petitioner (employer) must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized cause and after due process (Section 1, Rule XIV, Implementing Regulations of the Labor Code). Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing . . . (respondent) from employment. Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of tills award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer.The Court perceives no sufficient cause, it has indeed been cited to none by the respondents, to decline to apply theWenphildoctrine to the case at bar.While it is true that Pacific Mills, Inc. had not complied with the requirements of due process prior to removing Zenaida Alonzo from employment, it is also true that subsequently, in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter in which Zenaida Alonzo had of course taken active part, it had succeeded in satisfactorily proving the commission by Zenaida of many violations of company rules and regulations justifying termination of her employment. Under the circumstances, it is clear that, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to her employer's interests and that,citingSan Miguel Corporation v.NLRC,11the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. And it was oppressive and unjust in the premises to require reinstatement of the employee.WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the challenged decision of the respondent Commission dated March 23, 1987 and that of the Labor Arbiter thereby affirmed, are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. However, the petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent a proportionate part of the 13th month pay due her, amounting to P351.00 as well as to indemnify her in the sum of P1,000.00. No costs.SO ORDERED.Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.