Philosophy 220AbortionLiberal, Moderate and Conservative Views

Warren, "Moral and Legal Status"In addressing the question of the moral status of abortion Warren starts where we started: with a discussion of how to define the moral community.As we discovered, defining it requires specifying the property(ies) that establishes Direct Moral Standing.

One Answer: Genetic HumanityAs we saw in JPII's discussion, some people identify our shared genetic heritage as the property that establishes DMS.Problem: Without an account of the connection between our biology and our morality (and perhaps even with) this claim is question begging."in the absence of any argument showing that whatever is genetically human is also morally humannothing more than genetic humanity can be demonstrated by the presence of the human genetic code" (385c2).

Warren's AnswerDistinguishing genetic humanity from moral humanity, Warren's identification of the property that establishes DMS is: "the moral community consists of all and only people, rather than all or only human beings [in the genetic sense] (385c2)."Not a perfect definition. What about this concept of "Person?"

Defining PersonhoodOne question to ask is: "Is it one thing that makes someone a moral person, or is it a number of things?"Warren thinks the latter is true. A number of features (or capacities) must be present for the property of personhood to be present.See the list at 386c1.Warren does not claim that these criteria are exhaustive or even necessary, but she insists that something which meets none of these criteria cannot be considered a person in the moral sense.

The Thought ExperimentWarren uses a thought experiment to help us grasp what she thinks is the intuitive appeal of the capacities on the list.If we encountered an alien species with substantial apparent social/technological development, what capacities would we look for to determine whether they were members of the moral community?

Important ImplicationsSome human beings (in the genetic sense) are not people and some people are not human beings.If we take this implication seriously, we must recognize that assigning moral rights to a non-person is as unjustified as assigning moral responsibilities to them.

Two Important QuestionsAt what level of fetal development should a fetus be considered a person? Warren insists that we should not let similarities of appearance confuse the issue (387c2).What about the potential of the fetus to be a person? Though Warren does not deny the significance of this potential, she does insist that the rights of potential persons in no way outweigh rights of an actual person.

Postscript on InfanticideTo the objection that the personhood criteria enumerated in the article would seem to lead to the conclusion that there is nothing morally wrong with infanticide, Warren points to the value that children have to other people (instrumental value).To the counter claim that these sort of concerns also suggest that abortion is wrong, Warren notes that there is a difference. In the case of infants, the mother's rights to self-determination are not impacted (the child is independent). But forcing a woman to carry a baby does impact her rights.

Thomson For the "Defense"Thomson starts where Warren leaves us, with the concept of person.Like Warren, she's not too complimentary of various attempts to define the fetus as a person, that is to grant it DMS.She highlights a new line of argument: the problem of line drawing.Her response is to identify it as a slippery slope fallacy.

Right To Life?Even if we granted the claim to personhood, it would not be enough to assign to it a right to life.Thought Experiment: The Unconscious Violinist."Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation" (392c2)?This thought experiment allows her to quickly review and catalog a range of conservative positions.

What is a Right to Life?One of the temptations to talk of a 'right to life' is that the nature of the right is underdetermined.Some interpret it broadly as a right to the means necessary to sustain life.Certainly can't include subordination of others to your right.Others interpret it more narrowly as a right not to be killed by anyone.Here too, however, we have to be careful to recognize coordinate rights (the violinist has no right to the use of your kidneys).

Do We have a Right to Life?Does justice require your subordination to the life of the violinist?Only if you have agreed to the use of your kidneys and then renege. So if he does have a right to life, it's not one you violate by unplugging yourself from him.The upshot of all of this is not that we don't have a right to life, but that, "having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or allowed the right to be allowed continued use of another person's body" (394c1).

What about AbortionFor Thomson, the proper understanding of the right to life is the "right not to be killed unjustly (394c1).Thus, for Thomson, the issue is not does the fetus have DMS, but, even if it does, does that moral standing make killing it unjust.

Is Abortion Unjust Killing?One important concern is the proximity of pregnancy to the violin player thought experiment.After all, weve already noted that if you agreed to let the violin player use your kidneys, you are in a much different situation than if you were just an unwilling host.One common claim (that the woman willingly engaged in intercourse knowing that pregnancy was a possible implication) would suggest that the woman has at least partial responsibility for the pregnancy and thus it would be unjust to have an abortion.

Implications of WillfulnessThis claim opens up a new line of argumentation which highlights the dependency of the fetus on the mother (emphasizing the responsibility inherent in willfulness). This form of argument leaves open a series of exceptions including all of those when the will of the woman is constrained or interrupted (occurent or dispositional coercion).Claim is not as obvious as it is common.Open window does not give a burglar a right to come in; defective bars do not change the matter.At best, Thomson suggests, willfulness establishes that some cases of abortion are unjust, not that they all are.

Argument from VirtueLeaving justice to the side, Thomson want us to recognize that the right to life doesnt exhaust the issue.Let's say that the violinist only needed an hour of your time. She suggests that it would be immoral to detach her not because she has a right to life but because the burden on us is so small that to refuse it would be callous and selfish.In other words, virtue ethical concerns seem operative in these circumstances (e.g., abortion) and should lead us to conclude that some (though not all) abortions are wrong (though not necessarily unjust and not because of the fetuss right to life).

Good vs. Minimally Decent SamaritanThe Good Samaritan is a person who goes out of the way, at some significant personal cost, to help someone out.The Minimally Decent Samaritan is the person who seeks to help, but not at any significant personal cost or deflection.Thomson argues that the proper standard, both morally and legally, is the MDS. To require GS is to require of moral agents more than they are responsible for (supererogatory actions).That's all that we can ask of pregnant women.

Two Liberal ObjectionsThomson's view is a moderate one. There may be many cases when carrying a child to terms requires only MDS, and in these cases the mother has a moral obligation to do so.Largely on the basis of Virtue Ethical concerns.The permissibility of abortion in a number of situations is not equivalent to a right to kill a fetus. She's not explicit here, but she seems to suggest that after viability, methods of abortion which would preserve fetal life (C-section) should be employed.

Marquis on the Immorality of AbortionMarquis's purpose is to provide a defensible anti-abortion position which is free from irrational religious dogma or philosophical confusion.His position is that abortion is in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being.[A]bortion is, except possibly in rare cases, seriously immoral (400c1).

An Important AssumptionThough Marquis doesnt use the language, his argument relies on the assumption of a prima facie duty: If fetuses are in the same category as adult human beings with respect to the moral value of their lives, then the presumption that any particular abortion is immoral is exceedingly strong. Such a presumption could be overridden only by considerations more compelling than a woman's right to privacy (400c1).

Getting At Abortion Somewhat surprisingly, Marquis does not begin by trying to establish the basis for the shared DMS of innocent adults and fetuses.Instead, he begins by trying to establish the moral status of murder by providing an account of why murder is wrong.The answer that he comes up with is that the immorality of murder lies in the effect that it has on the victim, not in the mere loss of life, but in the loss of the value of my future (cf. 401c2).

Whats With the Future?Of course, Marquis cannot just assert that his account of the wrongness of murder is preferable, he has to give us some reasons to accept it.Marquis points to our common moral intuition that murder is more serious than other crimes and to the accounts of some people facing death.His more (philosophically) interesting claim is that in futurity (the projective character of existence; the capacity for experiences, meaningfulness, value in the future) he has located a natural property that both fits our intuitions about the matter and that it is the only one that does so.

Other AdvantagesThere are various advantages to the futurity theory that Marquis identifies.Like personhood theories, it avoids the claim that moral standing is a function of biology. Entails that it is wrong to kill any being that has this sort of futurity (including perhaps some non-human animals).Does not rule out active euthanasia.Establishes the moral impermissibility of infanticide (advantage over personhood theories like Warren's).

How Does this Help with Abortion?Marquis specifies futurity as the property that establishes DMS.Works in the case of murder, but what about other cases?If the fetus has a future, then it is wrong to kill it for the same reason that it is wrong to kill any other futural being.What about this If?Marquis thinks that this is the place where his theory has the most advantage over one like Thomsons.He insists that futurity is not like potential, and is thus by implication immune to the sort of arguments Thomson offered.

What about ContraceptionA possible (and possibly important) counter-claim to Marquiss account of the wrongness of abortion is it's consequences for contraception.Contraception can be understood as a loss of futurity (this is, for example, one way of understanding the Catholic Churchs objections).Marquis rejects this argument on the grounds of the difference between an actual as opposed to merely potential futurity.There is a possible contradiction here with Marquiss rejection of counter-arguments like Thomsons.

The Final AnalysisClearly it is wrong to kill adult human beings. Clearly it is not wrong to end the life of some arbitrarily chosen single human cell. Fetuses seem to be likehuman cells in some respects and like adult humans in other respects. The problem of the ethics of abortion is the problem of determine the fetal property that settles this moral controversy (404c2).Marquis: Futurity.