philosophy from knowledge and value by sprague and taylor

7/28/2019 Philosophy From Knowledge and Value by Sprague and Taylor

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Taken fromKnowledge and Value: Introductory Readings in Philosophy edited by Elmer Sprague and Paul W.

Taylor

PHILOSOPHY

The selections in this anthology introduce the reader to certain problems (the nature of

knowledge, the nature of reality, the nature of science, the nature of the self, the evidence of God,

the possibility of miracles, the significance of evil, the nature of human freedom, the nature ofmorality, the nature of beauty) which are treated by philosophers, but which are not their exclusive

property. For the problems of philosophy may be of interest to anyone; they may cut across other

disciplines, such as the natural and social sciences, mathematics, and history, and involve otherenterprises, such as religion, politics, and art. But if these problems are not exclusive property of

philosophers, what is it that makes them philosophical? Is their association only accidental? Or are

they philosophical because they share some common characteristic or because they are amenableto some common method of investigation? In short, What is philosophy?

In considering answers to What is philosophy? the reader may be helped if he notices thesimilarity of this question to other questions he may already have considered, such as, What ispoetry?, What is art?, What is music? The answers to such questions may be given in at least

two ways. In the case of poetry, for example, the answer may be a description of who the poets are

and what they have done, or it may be a statement of what poets ought to do. The first answermight list, for example, both Robert Frost and Edith Sitwell as poets; whereas the second answer

might exclude the writings of one or the other. It would seem that the best definition of poetry

might mingle these descriptive and prescriptive elements; however, anyone who seeks such adefinition must ascertain if, and how, these elements are to be combined.

Defining philosophy is perhaps even more difficult than defining poetry. The philosophers

recognize these difficulties apparent in the answer which is sometimes given to the question Whatis philosophy?: The definition of philosophy is one of the problems of philosophy. In answering

this question we have tried to avoid some of the difficulties by offering a descriptive answer. Yet

we are apologetic about what we shall say, for our answers must characterize an enterprise whichin the Western world has been carried on by many thousands of men in many different

circumstances for some twenty five hundred years. A short description of philosophy can only be

an approximation of the truth, offered with respectful nods to both the long history of the subjectand the wide range of philosophical schools in existence today.

As a first approximation, we shall say that philosophy is the study of those subjects whichmay be understood only by considering the ways in which they are talked about. In this anthology,

the consideration of such subjects as knowledge, reality, the self, God, human freedom, moralityand beauty illustrates this definition of philosophy. When we say that one understands these

subjects by considering the ways in which they are talked about, we are not saying that philosophyis about nothing but words, but rather that philosophical subjects have their life in our language (in

our speaking and writing to one another), and that finding out how these subjects are talked about

(or are to be talked about) is the way to discover their natures. Writings that we count asphilosophical will usually turn out to be either (1) the investigation of the meaning of some old

term, or the proposal of some new term, in order to advance some area of philosophical enquiry,

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(2) the criticism of the use of some term, or (3) some combination of these activities. Philosophical

understanding, then, turns not on making some discovery in the world, but on deciding how to talk.

Other subjects besides those noticed by philosophers share the characteristic of being

understandable only through noticing how they are talked about. Here are two simple non-

philosophical illustrations. Take our use of the word meal as a collective name for the foodwhich is eaten at a given time. Suppose we say to someone who has eaten servings of roast beef,

potatoes, oven-browned carrots, sliced tomatoes, and an apple pie, You have eaten a good meal,

and he replies, Well, I ate roast beef and potatoes (and so on through the list), but I didnt eat ameal. Clearly we cannot show such a person some thingto set him straight about what a meal is.

What we must do is teach him how to use the word meal: eating a meal is eating food in just the

way that he has been eating it. Meal is a subject which is to be understood only by learning how to

talk about it.

The second example is drawn from our notions of penny and cent. Suppose that

someone asks you to explain what a penny is in the coinage of the United States of America. The

easiest thing to do would be to show him one of the coins we call a penny, or failing that, to showhim a picture. Suppose next that he asks you to explain what a cent is. You might say that a cent is

a penny. Then is cent another name for a penny? Yes; but then, no. A penny is one cent, butcent means more than penny. Using United States coins, you can certainly give someone one

cent by giving him a penny; but you can also give him a cent by giving him a nickel and receiving

four pennies in change. To understand cent, then, one must understand the uses of pieces ofUnited States money; but cent is not itself a piece of money. As a unit of money value, it has its

life in our use of money; and we explain the meaning of cent to someone by explaining to him

how to talk about the relative values of pieces of United States money, as he uses them.

Meal and cent, then, are both examples of subjects which have this characteristic in

common with philosophical subjects: we find out about them by learning how to talk about them.

They also share another characteristic with philosophical subjects. They are useful in organizingour experience of the world. At the simplest level, consider our example of a meal. A man might

consume vast quantities of beef and potatoes and never know the word meal, and neither his

appetite nor his capacity need suffer. But once he has the notion of a meal, he may refer to what hehas eaten without having to recite a menu. Or consider the notion of a cent. A person may have a

pocketful of coins, but unless he knows their relative values based on the notion of cent, he is an

innocent in the marketplace. Once he has grasped the uses of cent, though, his thought about the

coins is organized, and the possibilities of buying and selling open before him.

Now something must be said of the way philosophical subjects differ from subjects like

meal and cent. There are two large differences. The first is the fundamental importance ofphilosophical subjects to a reflective person: the matters about which he believes that it is possible

to have knowledge, the things which he counts as real, and the acts which he regards as good are

among the crucial and pervasive considerations that shape his life.

The second large difference between meal and cent and philosophical subjects is to be

found in the general agreement about what a meal and a cent are and the lack of any such general

agreement about how a given philosophical subject is to be defined. Knowledge, reality, and

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goodness, for example, can be and have been characterized in many different and sometimes

incompatible ways. This elasticity of characterization, far exceeding that of meal and cent, is a

necessary property of philosophical subjects. Of course, ultimately, one characterization of a givenphilosophical subject might come to prevailagreement among philosophers is conceivable. But

in the history of philosophy it has certainly not been achieved.

It follows that in an anthology of this kind, the reader must not expect one answer to such

questions as What is knowledge?, What is reality?, and Is there a God? Although a given

philosopher may offer only one answer, philosophy, viewed as a collective though not necessarilycooperative enterprise, offers many answers. One mans having produced, say, an analysis of

reality or of moral good, in no way precludes another man from developing his own thoughts on

these topics, just as Jane Austens novels did not render Dickens unnecessary, and Mozarts

symphonies did not foreclose the possibility of Tschaikowskys writing his. Of coursephilosophers may share viewpoints and methods, and when there is agreement, a given philosopher

may accept the work of others without feeling a need to redo it, even though he may still feel a

need to put his own stamp on it. But we do not mean to say that all philosophy is beyond the reach

of rational examination, and it is to this topic that we must now turn.

The first task in reading philosophy is to get clear what the author is sayingto follow hisdirections for talking about a subject which can only be known by learning how to talk of it.

The readers second task is to evaluate what the philosopher has said. How is thisevaluation to be carried out? An old rule states that we should ask of every piece of philosophy: is

it consistent with the world? And, is it consistent with itself? The value of these rules can only be

learned in practice, and readers who are studying philosophy with a teacher will have the

advantage of his example to guide them. The following three incidents from the life of Platoscontemporary, Diogenes, illustrate how philosophy may be evaluated by questioning its

consistency with the world. For example, Diogenes replied to one who had been asserting that

there was no such thing as motion, by getting up and walking away.1

In another situation, Diogenes criticized Plato:

Plato defined man thus: Man is a two-footed, featherless animal, and was

much praised for the definition; so Diogenes plucked a cock and brought it into his

school, and said This is Platos man. On which account this addition was made to

the definition, With broad flat nails.2

The last sentence shows that the charge of inconsistency with the world is not a fatal

criticism, since the philosopher is able to amend his directions for talking about something.

In this final example, Diogenes charged that Plato talked of things which do not exist.

When Plato was discoursing about his ideas, and using the nouns

tableness and cupness; I, O Plato! interrupted Diogenes, see a table and a cup,

1 Diogenes Laertius, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers, trans., C.D. Yonge, George Bell and Sons,

London, 1895, p. 231.2 Ibid.

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but I see no tableness or cupness. Plato made answer, That is natural enough, for

you have eyes, by which a cup and a table are contemplated; but you have not

intellect, by which tableness and cupness are seen.3

The issue between Diogenes and Plato might be put in the following way: Diogenes is saying that

the world contains only what he can see, and he can see only cups. Plato is saying that if there arecups there must also be cupness. Diogenes and Plato espouse competing worlds, and Platos

includes more items than Diogenes.

The examination of a philosophy by considering its consistency with itself is a process

capable of several variations, of which the following are some of the more important. At the very

simplest one may consider whether what a philosopher says on one page is consistent with what hesays on any other page. A slightly more sophisticated activity is to consider whether he uses any of

his terms ambiguously, and if he does, whether the ambiguity permits him to draw conclusions

which a straightforward use of the terms would rule out. Do his statements have implications

which he does not follow out, but which, when they are brought into the open, contradict hispreviously stated views? An example of testing a philosophy for consistency with itself is

Socrates examination of Euthyphros definitions of piety, which appears as the first selection in

this book under the heading A Philosopher at Work.

While each philosopher, at least at first acquaintance, must be credited with trying to speak

sensibly about philosophical subjects and trying to be consistent with both the world and himself,philosophy itself is a chorus of many voices saying many different things. We have tried to show

why this is so; and thus we have tried to arm our readers against those first and fatal reactions to

philosophy wherein it is regarded as a meaningless game, or an idle pastime, or at worst the

manufacture of nonsense. No one who understands the place of organizing concepts in the life of areflective person can fail to appreciate the importance of philosophy, the enterprise of proposing,

analyzing and criticizing those concepts.

Philosophical thinking is a lifetime activity. The problems it deals with are so complex and

far-reaching that no final, universally acceptable solutions have yet been found. The only thing we

can do is to carry on our philosophical thinking as clearly and as carefully as possible, hoping thatwe may advance a little toward more enlightened points of view. Meanwhile, we must live our

practical lives. How can this be done in a rational way if we cannot arrive at final conclusions

concerning a true world view and philosophy of life? We can only live according to tentativeconclusions, re-examining them as our philosophical thinking develops. Such a life has been called

the life of reason. To live this kind of life is to live as a thinking being.

3 Ibid., p.236.

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philosophy from knowledge and value by sprague and taylor

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