philosophy of punishment: normative models and

PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: NORMATIVE MODELS AND CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL SYSTEMS

Assist. Prof. Michał Peno, Ph. D. ∗ UDK: 343.85.01 343.8:17.022.2 343.8:141.134 DOI: 10.3935/zpfz.69.3.04 Pregledni znanstveni rad Primljeno: srpanj 2018.

The paper attempts to examine a philosophy of punishment in the normative perspective and to penetrate the structure of the fundamental premises and theses of retributivism. Punishment concepts are discussed in relation to two contexts and types of expressions formulated in the philosophy of punishment – normative and descriptive. The former are a matter of axiology and normative models, whereas the latter constitute a description of existing systems of criminal responsibility. The considerations are centred on a retributive model. The model of retributivism involves normative premises and consists in seeing these premises not as unconditionally binding directives, but as optimization rules, a kind of prima facie duty. These are mainly the quasi-legal duties of the state considered from the point of view of criminal policy. Retributivism can be seen as a set of norms (rules) for constructing legal system. The core of the paper consists in outlining such a concept. The inspiration for it was provided above all by the ideas of the Polish legal theory, R. Dworkin, W. D. Ross and R. Alexy, and modern retributivists.

Key words: principles, structure of retributivism, prima facie obligations, punishment, rules for constructing legal systems

* MichałPeno,Ph.D.,AssistantProfessor,FacultyofLawandAdministration,UniversityofSzczecin,Narutowicza17A,70-240Szczecin,Poland;[email protected];

ORCIDID:orcid.org/0000-0001-9905-3783

412 Michał Peno: Philosophy of Punishment: Normative Models and Construction Principles...

I. INITIAL REMARKS ∗∗

Theaimoftheconsiderationsistodifferentiatetwopossibleapproachestothephilosophyofpunishmentandtwotypesofexpressionsformulatedbythephilosophyofpunishment.Itisastartingpointforremarkspertainingtopossiblenormativestandardsforshapingcriminallaw,alsoasdeterminantsofcriminalpolicy.Atthesametime,anattemptwasmadetooutlinetheretributivemodel.

Asaconceptofpunishing,retributivismhasseveralvariations.However,thereisacertainbackbone,thatis,acertainsetofcharacteristicssharedbyallretributiveapproaches.Onemightclaimthatthesearetheconstitutive(con-stituting)characteristicsofretributivism.Thismeansthatagivensystemofcriminalresponsibilitydeservestobecalledretributiveonlywhenitbearsthesaidcharacteristics.However,ifoneofthesecharacteristicsismissing,thename‘retributivism’doesnotfitagivensystemofcriminalresponsibility(statementofreasonsforthepunishment).

Aquestionarisesastowhethertheretributivismisatype(toagiventypebelongobjectswithacertainsetoffeatures,thereforesomeobjectsmaybetterfitthetype,othersless–itisamatterofdegree)orwhetherthereisalogicaldivision(agivenobjectisorisnotadesignateofagivenname).Itseemsthatthefirstoneiscorrect.Conceptsfromthefieldofthephilosophyofpunishmentaretypologicalandnotclassification-basedin genere.Inthephilosophyoflawthesearetypesofviewonlawandlegalinstitutions.Therefore,onecanspecifycertaincharacteristics(theses)occurringinallviewsthatareretributivism(orasocialdefence,atrendinresocialisation–socialrehabilitationordeterrence,etc.).Asetofthesecharacteristicswill formcertainpatternsormodelsandbesubjecttograduationirrespectivelyofagivenmodel(agiventypeofviewsmayberetributivetoagreaterorlesserextent,similarlylikeonecanbealegalpositivisttoagreaterorlesserextent).1Thesemodelsarediscussedinthelastpart of the considerations.

** IamgratefulthatIhadtheopportunitytodiscussthisarticleduringmystayattheFacultyofLawoftheUniversityofGreifswald(Germany).

1 Thus,onecanclaimthatthe legislatorwhowantedto introduce, for instance,amodelofafairpunishmenteithersucceededorfailed.Alternatively,regulationsaremoreorlesssuccessful(inrelationtothenormativemodel–patternasabench-mark).ThistypeofapproachshowsasimilaritytoLonFuller’sinterpretationwherefulfilmentofits8formalpostulatesregardinglawastheconditionforconsideringitsuccessfulisregardedasacertain(successfulorunsuccessful)socialundertaking.Theword ‘success’or theword ‘failure’ giveagood reflectionof smoothnatureofphilosophical criteriaandconcepts.Cf.Fuller,L.,The Morality of Law: Revised Edition,YaleUniversityPress,NewHaven,1969,pp.33-37;Murphy,C.,Lon Fuller

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II. NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT

Itcanbeeasilyseenthattheso-calledphilosophyofpunishment(sensu largo2)hastwoaspects.Thesearethedescriptiveaspectandthenormativeaspect.Expressionsformulatedbythephilosophyoflawcanalsobeanalysedintwocontexts,i.e.thenormativeoneandthedescriptiveone.3Thephilosophyoflawisapartofthetheoryoflawinabroadsense.4Expressionsformulatedonthegroundsofjurisprudencecontainbothadescriptiveandnormativeelement,thusconstitutingadescriptionofthebindingnormsandpostulatesde lege ferenda (pertainingtowhatthecontentofthenormsshouldbe).Thesefitinwiththegeneralmethodologicalassumptionsofcontemporaryjurisprudenceinthelightofwhichtheaimofthetheoryoflawistogainknowledgeonlaw,whileatthesametime,jurisprudenceispartoflawandparticipatesinhowitisshaped.5

Thedescriptiveaspectconcernsadescriptionofaprocessofpunishment,anditsvariousdimensions,asaphenomenonoccurringinasocietyruledbylaw.Thisaspectcanbecalledatheoryofpunishment(thatinvolvesscientificscrutinyofthesocialphenomenonofpunishment).Inthisapproach,thethe-oryofpunishment,similartothemodernisttheoryoflaw,canbepenologyformulatingstatementsonthesocialpracticeofpunishing.Thesearealsostate-mentsonwhichjustificationforpunishment,ideaofpunishingorphilosophy

and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law,LawandPhilosophy,vol.24,no.3,2005,pp.239-262.

2 Thiswillbeexplainedfurther.Speakingbriefly,itisaboutthegeneralscrutinyofcriminal law(theoretical,economic,axiologicaletc.),asopposedtotheso-calleddogmaticofcriminallaw(involvingananalysisofwrittenorpositivelaw).

3 See:vonWright,G.H.,Is and Ought, in:Bulygin,E.;Gardies,J.L.;Niiniluoto,I.(eds.),Man, Law, and Modern Forms of Life,Reidel,Dordrecht,1985,pp.263-281;Ross,A.,Directives and Norms,Routledge&KeganPaulLtd.,London,1968,pp.34-52,78ff.

4 Peczenik,A.,A Theory of Legal Doctrine,RatioJuris,vol.14,no.1,2001,pp.75-105.5 Peczenik,A.,Scientia Juris: Legal Doctrine as Knowledge of Law and as a Source of Law,

Springer, Dordrecht,2005,pp.14-25;Feteris,E.T.,Fundamentals of Legal Argumen-tation. A Survey of Theories on the Justification of Judicial Decisions,Springer,Dordrecht,1999,pp.62-72;Peczenik,A.,Non-Positivist Conception of Law,in:Teoria prawa. Filo-zofia prawa. Współczesne prawo i prawoznawstwo,UMK,Toruń,1998,pp.225ff.;Ziem-biński,Z.,The Methodological Problems of Theory and Philosophy of Law. A Survey, in:Ziembiński,Z.(ed.),Polish Contributions to the Theory and Philosophy of Law, Poznań StudiesinthePhilosophyoftheSciencesandtheHumanities,BrillRodopi,Am-sterdam,1987,pp.39-74.


ofpunishmentareapprovedinagivenstate,inagivenjurisprudence,etc.inagiventime.Thedescriptivephilosophyofpunishmentwouldhenceformulateexpressionspertainingtoagivenphilosophical(particularlyaxiological)viewoncriminallaw(e.g.instatePduringtimeTaretributivejustificationforpun-ishmentisapproved).Inthiscontext,itcouldalsodescribetheactualprocessofholdingsomeonecriminallyliableorthedirectionofcriminalpolicy.Incontrasttothenormativephilosophyofpunishment,itgivesnorecommendationsbutinsteadeitherdescribesthepunishingprocessorconstructsacommontheoryofpunishment,whichisapenologyfreefromevaluation.Evenifonewastoconsidersuchadescriptiontobeamodel,itdoesnotallowadutytobederivedfromit(thereisnotransitionfrom‘is’to‘should’,whileinpractice,itcannotbestatedthatsincesomeoneorsomethingactsinmannerS,thenoneshouldactinmannerS).

Inthenormativeaspect,thephilosophyofpunishmentformulatespostu-lates, recommendations anddirectives regardingwhatpunishmentought tobe.Thisapproachcanbecalledaphilosophyofpunishmentper se in terms of methods,aimsanditsapproachtoresearchobject.6Theobjectiveofnormativephilosophyofpunishmentishencetoformulaterecommendations,primarily,toassesscriminallawandtheconceptofpunishment.Theassessmentismadefromtheperspectiveofvariouscriteria;however,itisaboveallanassessmentaccordingtothecriterionofvalidity,justiceormoralityofpunishment.Thus,thephilosophyoflawcanbedefinedasanaxiologyofpunishment.Naturally,othercriteriacanbeapplied,suchaspraxeology,effectivenessofpunishment,etc.Thenormativephilosophyofpunishment formulatesa conceptofpun-ishment–itisnotadescriptionofagiventheoryofpunishment,butasetofassessmentsandpostulatesonpunishment.For instance, fromadescriptivepointofview,onewouldsaythatpunishmentisakindofrevenge,orajustretribution(intermsofsocialfunctionsandrolesinasociety).Normativelyitcanbeclaimedthatpunishmentoughttobearetribution(thenthereareatleasttwopossibilities:punishmentisaretributionoritisnotaretributioninthelightofagivensystemofcriminallaw).Thelawdoesnotalwaysworkasitwouldappearfromthenormativeconceptoflegalinstitutions.7

Itisworthtonotethatnormativeconsiderationsofthissortplayaspecificroleincriminalpolicy–theyconstitutethebasicframeworkorassumptions

6 Cf.Aleksander,A., Philosophy of Criminal Law,in:Coleman,J.;Shapiro,S.J.(eds.),The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford Handbooks),OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2011,pp.815-867.

7 Chiao,V.,Two Conceptions of the Criminal Law,in:Flanders,C.;Hoskins,Z.(eds.),The New Philosophy of Criminal Law,RowmanandLittlefield,NewYork,2016,pp.20-36.

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ofcriminalpolicy.Thisisbecausecriminalpolicycoverspatternsforshapingcriminalresponsibilityandothermechanismsforfightingcrime(beingtargetedattheeffectivenessoflawatthesametime).

Bynature,anormativeperspectivereferstoanassessment.Thenotionoftheassessmentincludingitssemioticanalysisandroleplayedinthephilosophyoflawrequiresaseparatediscussion.However,anassessmentisundoubtedlythebasisforformulatingrecommendationsanddirectives,andconsequently,aspecificconceptofpunishment.8

Oneoftheaimsofthestudyistoanalyseachosennormativeconceptofpunishingasacertainnormativeproject.Duetotherelativeclarityofassump-tions,theanalysiswillbemadeontheexampleofaretributivism.Itisimport-anttostressthattheretributivismisusedasanexample.Therefore,furtherremarksshallcontainassessmentoftheretributiveapproachtopunishment.Oneshouldbearinmind,however,thatthechoiceofretributivismisaresultofthistrendbeingassessedasadeservingpromotionoratleastdefence.Theretributivephilosophyofpunishmentmaybediscussedinadescriptivemanner–itisthenadescriptionofamodelofjustificationforpunishmentreferringtojusticedefinedinvariousways.

In thedescriptiveaspect, the retributivismconstitutesa certainattempttocharacterisethewaysofjustifyingpunishmentfromthepointofviewofacertainphilosophicalandlegalposition.Hence,itisacertaintheoryofpunish-ment,adescriptionofajustpunishment(inthetypeof“Everyonewhocommitsevil,thatis,anoffence,istobeheldresponsibleandpunishedproportionallytotheweightoftheevildone”,“theguiltypersonispunished”,etc.).9 On the otherhand,inthenormativeaspect,retributivismformulatescertaindirectivesregardingwhentheoffendershouldbepunished,andwhenthecommunityorthestateshouldnotapplyacriminalreaction.Retributivismformulatescertainrecommendations regardingpunishment.Perceived in suchaway, it consti-tutesanormativeconcept(ormodel)ofpunishment.Normativelyunderstoodretributivismcouldbeanalysedasaconceptthatincludesasetofrulesfortheconstructionofalegalsysteminthefieldofcriminallaw,andthedutiesim-posedbythatconceptonthelegislator.Asaresultoftheacceptancethatsuch

8 Cf.von.Wright,G.H.,Norm and action. A logical enquiry,Routledge&KeganPaul,London,1963,pp.6-16.

9 Morris,H.,Persons and Punishment,TheMonist,no.52,1968,pp.475–501;Tunick,M.,Punishment. Theory and Practice,UniversityofCaliforniaPress,Berkeley–LosAn-geles–Oxford,1992,pp.69ff.;Lucas,J.R.,Responsibility,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2004,pp.86ff.


aconceptisofatypologicalnature,itwillbenecessarytoreconstructacertainminimum–anormativeskeletonofretributivism,allowingforrecognisingagivenconceptasretributiveandimplicationsresultingfromtheadoptionofthisconcept(consideredfromtheperspectiveofthelegislator).

Onthisbackgroundwecansee thatnormativitymayrefer to rules thatdetermine(a)themannerinwhichpunishmentisshapedasacertaininsti-tutionor(b) for justifyingpunishment. Inthe lattercase, thispertains tonormativeconditionsfulfilmentofwhichdetermineswhetherpunishmentisjustifiedornot(forinstance,punishmentshouldmeetconditionsa-c,ifitistobejustified).Thedifferencebetweenthefirstandthesecondapproachisasfollows.Theanalysisofthedegreetowhichthefirsttypeofprinciplesareimplementedpertainstoconsideringagivensystemofcriminalresponsibilitytoberetributive(orfittingtothisoranotherapproachtopunishment–beit utilitarian, communicative ormixed). They answer the questionwhichconditionsmustbemetsothatagivensystemofcriminalresponsibilityisconsideredretributive(oranotherthatservesforusasapointofreference).Inturn,principlesofthesecondkindconcernthepossibilityofjustifyingpun-ishmentingeneralorinanadoptedordeclaredmodel,orinanymodel(i.e.justificationofpunishmentinagiventime,givenstate,givenlegalsystem).Hence,theyanswerthequestiononwhichconditionsshouldbemetinorderforpunishmenttobeconsideredjustified.

III. NORMATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT AND RULES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM

Letustakeacloserlookatrulesthatdeterminethemodel(models)ofcrim-inalresponsibility(punishment)andtheirrelationswithcriminalpolicy.Thesemodelscanbeconsideredassomemeta-rules(meta-norms)thatareaddressedtoastateoralegislature,whichisforthosewhoareresponsibleforshapinga systemof criminal law.Thenormativeconceptofpunishment formulatesrecommendations that canbe recognised as certain principles or rules thatconstructacriminaljusticesystem,inagivencountry.Theywillbecertainrulesfortheconstructionofthelegalsystemconcerningthissectionofrealitywhichconcernscriminallaw.Thesewillbeakindofmeta-rulesbecausethelegislatorfeelsboundbythemwhileshapingcriminalpolicy,especiallyintheprocessofcreatinglaw(butalsointheaspectofapplyingandinterpretingthelaw).Thenatureoftheserulesisdisputable.Theyaremeta-rules,sincetheydeterminethecontentoflower-levelrules–regularlegalnormscreatedpursu-anttothepositivisticconceptofsourcesoflaw.Theyareasifprinciples,yet

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theydonotbelongtothelegalsystem.10Meta-rulesarenotapartofthelegalsysteminthesensethattheserulesarenotasourceoflaw.Butthelegislatorisfeelingtobeboundbytheserulesorprinciples.TheStateorthelegislatorisreadytoembodythesemeta-rulesonlybecauseachosennormativemodelismorally,politically,ideologicallyetc.acceptedordemanded.Nonetheless,itisnotboundbythesemeta-ruleslikeforinstancebytheconstitutionoranactoflaw.Inthissense,itcanbesaidthattheyarebindingonlyduetoaxiologi-calreasonsandnotformalones.WhenobservingtransformationsinCentralEurope,itissometimesdifficulttodeterminewhichvaluesarethelegislator’sdrivingforce–however,itiscertainthatheisdrivenbysomerationality.Ifheisarationalentity(theassumptionofrationalitybeinganecessaryidealisation),hischoices,inessence,shouldbeconsistent.Thesameconsistencyisthecauseofbeingboundbythepreviouslychosendirection.Therefore,ifthechoicewasajustretribution,thelegislatorwillfeelboundbytheprincipleofguiltandproportionalityofpunishmenttothesaidguilt.ThesearenotjustregularnormsincludedinthePenalCodeorprinciplesoflawasnormsdistinguishedforsomereason(ofmajorimportance,moresignificantthanothers),butprinciplesthatorganisethelegalsystemandthecriminallawsystem(asifofmeta-orpre-legalcharacter).However,itseemsthatitisstilllaw(inabroadsense).

Whatisacharacterofnorms,rulesorprinciplescreatingagivenmodelofpunishment,atthelevelofrulesforconstructingthelegalsystem?Thechosenmodelofpunishmentisnotmanifesteddirectlyinthelegaltexts, includingtheconstitution;however,itmaygovernthelower-tierlegalrulesinthesensethateverynewlower-rankrulewillbeconsistentwithit.Itisenoughforthelegislator tobeboundbysuchameta-rule for it tobe recognisedas legallybinding (although thiswill be of specific validity, resulting from its formaleffectiveness).Itisworthnotingthatthesaidvalueofjusticewillnotonlybedecodedorreconstructedfromthelegaltextatthetimeofinterpretation,butwilldirectlydeterminethecontentoflegalnorms.Retributivismcanbeanalysedinasimilarway.Moreover,thisphilosophicalconceptwillsetsomequasi-legaldutiesaddressedtothelegislator.

Itshouldbeemphasisedonceagainthatthemeta-rulesdiscussedherearelegallybindinginaspecificway;inanycaseitisnotatypicalpositivistvalid-ityofthenorm(thatis,basedonitsestablishmentbythecompetentbodyofthestate,theso-calledorigintest),butrathervaliditythroughthesenseofthelegislator(especiallyunderstoodastheactualentitycreatingthelaw)thatthese

10 Peno,M.;Jaśkiewicz,J.,Rule of Law as the Construction Principle of the Legal System,in:Belov,M.(ed.),Rule of Law at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century,ElevenInterna-tionalPublishing,Hague,Netherlands,2018,pp.21-33.


rulesare(legally)bindingonhim.Inaddition,thisvalidityisaffectedbyinsti-tutionalsupport–convictionofthecourts,thescienceoflaw(legaldoctrine)etc.,thattheserulesarebindinginthecreation,aswellastheapplicationandinterpretationofthelaw.

Therules(asetofrules)forconstructinglegalsystemsarenormsrelatedtothecourseofthelaw-makingprocessanddirectedtothelegislator,andinthiscase–alsonormswhichgovernhowtoorganisetheapplicationoflaw(andasaresult,thenormativeaspectsofthefunctioningofpublicadministration).Therulesconstructingthelegalsystemspecifyhowtomakelawsinavalidway,i.e.whentheactmakingalawiseffectiveaswellaswhentheactapplyinglawisvalid.Theserulescanbedirectedtotheinstitutionallegislator(formally–asasubjectwithlaw-makingcompetencyunderacertainconvention)andtothefactual(sociological)legislatorwho,asaresultofsomeconvention,hasthefactualpowertoinfluencethecontentofeffectivelegalnorms.11

Atraditional,legal-positivistpointofviewwoulddefinetherulesconstructingthelegalsystemasthelegislator’s(sovereign’s)ordersthatareaddressedtothelegislatorhimself(autonomousrules)andorganisethelaw-makingprocessandtheapplicationoflaw.Fromtheperspectiveoflegalrealism,theseruleswouldbeinfactsomekindofdirectivesoflawpolicyfocusedoneffectivenessinarationalandinstrumentalsense.

IV. NORMATIVE RETRIBUTIVE CONCEPT AND RULES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM

Onecaneasilynotice that the functionsand rolesof these rules canbemultiplied.Bynecessity,thescopehadtobelimitedtotheirgeneralcharac-teristics. Itseemsthatthenormativeapproachtotheconceptsof justifyingpunishmentcanbeconsideredonseverallevels.Philosophersper se have created complexconceptsofjustifyingpunishment.Infact,theseconceptsareasetofstandards,recommendations,principles,andeachoneofthemworksasakindofanormativemodelofapunishment(oranormativemodelofagivensystemofcriminallaw).Thephilosophyoflawknowsthreemodels:utilitarian,mixedorretributive.12

11 See:Czepita,S.,Reguły konstrukcji systemu prawnego a prawotwórstwom [Rules of Con-struction of a Legal System and the Law-Making Process],RuchPrawniczy,EkonomicznyiSocjologiczny,vol.LVI,no.4,1994,pp.31-38;Peno,M.,Jaśkiewicz,J.,op. cit. (fn.10),pp.21-25.

12 Cf.Lucas,J.R.,op. cit. (fn.9),pp.280-287.

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Furtherdiscussionshallbededicatedtoretributivism.However,itisonlyachoiceofanexampleforillustratingnormativeaspectsofthephilosophyofpunishment.

Onecanimaginevariouswaysofshapingthenotionoftheretributivism.Thisisatypeofmodelofpunishment.Asitwillbeseenfurther,agivensystemofcriminallawmaybemoreorlessretributive.However,thismodelshouldbeusedasconsistentaspossiblebythelegislature.Thisaimisnotdifficulttoachieve,becausemodelsbynaturearerelativelyflexible.13

Theretributiveconceptisatype,andsomecharacteristicsaredecisiveforbelongingtoit.Becauseretributivism(asamodel)isatypeofjustificationforpunishment,oneofthethreebasiconesthatareknowninthelegalphilosophy(therearealsoutilitarianismandtheso-calledmixedtheories),thequestionarisesaboutacertainminimumsetof features thatanormative retributiveconceptmustpossess,thereforeacertainskeletonoftheretributiveconceptofpunishment.Generallyspeaking,retributivismrecommendstheapplicationofpunishmentasretributionproportionaltotheburdenofevilcommittedbytheperpetrator.14Thisisthebasicprincipleofretributivism.Ofcourse,retributivismhasmanymorevariants.

Itcanbesaidthatthreemainapproaches(withinabroadermodelofretrib-utivism)canbecurrentlydistinguishedinconnectiontoretributivism.First–thepuretheoryofrepayment,second–theexpressivetheory,andthird–thefairnesstheory(socialbalancetheory).15Thefirsttheoryreferstoanarrowlyunderstoodcategoryofretributivejusticethatdemandsapunishmentpropor-tionaltothewrongthatwasdone(totheoffence).Theperpetratorofanoffencedeservestobepunished,whichconstitutesrepayment,ifnotvengeance.Theoffenderoughttobepunishedbecauseheorshedeservesit.16Philosophyof

13 Aswewillseearetributivemodel isgovernedbyaspecialprinciple(herecalledretributionprinciple)fromwhichonecandeducelessimportantrulesordirectives.Therearealsodifferentinterpretationsofthisprinciple(andrules),asaresulttherearedifferentmodelsofretributivism.

14 Honderich,T.,Punishment. The Supposed Justifications Revisited,PlutoPress,London,2005,pp.36ff.;Anderson,S.,The Enforcement Approach to Coercion,JournalofEthicsandSocialPhilosophy,no.1,2010,pp.1–31.

15 Ryberg,J.,The Ethics of Proportionate Punishment. A Critical Investigation,KluwerAca-demicPublishers,Dordrecht,2004,pp.43-50.

16 Nozick,R.,Philosophical Explanations,HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,1981,pp.377ff.;Zaibert,L.,Punishment and Revenge,LawandPhilosophy,vol.25,no.1,2006,pp.81ff.


criminallawincludesadialogicalelementinthesecondtheory,namely,theperpetratordeservestobepunished,but,ontopofthat,punishmentshouldbeexactedbecauseofthemessageitcarries,acondemnationoftheact,andthedemandofsociety,includingthevictim,forthewrongtoberighted.Theperpetratordeservespunishmentaswellascondemnation,andheorsheoughttorepent(theso-calledsecularrepentance).17Thethirdtheorystemsfromtheideaofsocialcontractandsocialbalanceandassertsthattheperpetratoroughttobepunishednotonlybecauseheorshedeservesit,butalsobecauseacertainbalanceofbenefitsandburdensmustberestored.Theperpetratorenjoysmorefreedomsandfewerburdensthanhisorherfellowcitizenswhochosenottocommitanoffenceandremainhonestmembersofsociety.Balanceoughttoberestored,whichispossiblebymeansofcriminalpunishment.18

Alltheseapproachesshareacommoncorethatisalinkwithvengeance.Vengeanceisretaliationforaharmdone.19Itinvolves,asaresult,theclaimthatsocietyorthestatehasanobligationtorepay(retaliate)forawrong(anoffence)manifestedinpunishment20,whichcanadditionallycarryamessagetotheresponsiblemoralsubject–theperpetrator–orameanstorestoreafairbalanceofburdensandbenefits–ordo iuris.Theydonotexhaustallpossiblewaysofjustifyingpunishment,ofcourse.Thefundamentalistcharacterofthisclaimdoesn’tallowforaformulationofaconditionaljustification–thatisonethatwouldincludeconditionalityofthedutytorepay.Itissoeventhoughdogmaticinstitutionsofcriminallawthemselvesallowforlimitationsinconnectiontotheobligationtopunish,andsotheimpossibilityofjustifyingpunishmentincertaincircumstances(e.g.instancesofapoliticalandcriminalprotectionofoffenderswhotestifyincriminalcases).21Also,thegoalofcriminalproceedingsinmostjurisdictionsisnotonlytopunishtheperpetrator,butalsotoensurethataninnocentpersonisnotpunished(whichisanactofbalancingtheinterestoftheinnocentwiththeobligationtorespondtoacrime–sometimesthelatter

17 Feinberg,J.,The Expressive Function of Punishment,PrincetonUniversityPress,Princ-eton,1970,p.98;Primoratz,I.,Punishment as Language,Philosophy,vol. 64,no.248,1989,p.199.

18 Cottingham,J.G.,Varieties of Retribution,PhilosophicalQuarterly,vol.29,1979,pp.238ff.;Duff,R.A.,Trials & Punishment,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,1986,p.289;Morris,H., op. cit. (fn.9),pp.475ff.

19 Cragg,W.,The Practice of Punishment: Towards a Theory of Restorative Justice, Routledge,London&NewYork,2016,p.12.

20 Itcanbecalled“retributiveprinciple”.Seesupra.21 Cf.Husak,D.,Overcriminalization. The Limits of the Criminal Law,OxfordUniversityPress,NewYork,2008.

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mustgivewaybeforetheformer,whichreflectsthewaycriminalproceedingsorthesystemofcriminaljusticeisshapedper se).22

Whatarethentherulesthatdeterminethemodelof(normative)retributiv-ism?J.R.Lucasindicatesthefollowingcharacteristicsofretributivism:firstly,punishmentshouldbearetributionfortheevildone,secondly,punishmentshouldbeakindofsufferingorailment,thirdly,itshouldbeconditionedonguilt,andfourthly,mercyshouldgivewaytostrictandstrongreactiontoevil(anoffence).Likewise,J.R.Lucascharacterizesotherapproachestopunishment,butthatisnottheonlycharacteristicpresentintheliterature.23

Summingup,theprincipleofretributivismprimarilyimposesthedutiesof:a)punishmentof(only)theperpetratoroftheoffense(thusnottheinnocentindividual),b)punishmentonlyforthesakeofjustice–punishmentasretribu-tion,c)punishmentproportionaltotheburdenofevilcommitted.Asaresult,anotherdutyarises, that is, thedutyofd)penalizingonlysuchactswhosemoraldisapprovalcanbedemonstratedinthemanneradoptedinagivensocialsystem.Theserulesdeterminethecriminaljusticesysteminagivencountryandthewayitisshaped.Punishmentasretributionseemstobejustifiedifandonlyifconditions(a)–(d)aremet.24

Letusnoticethatthissortofcharacteristicsofretributivism,i.e.rulesthat determinehow the retributivemodel of criminal responsibility shouldoperate,canbeconsideredasetofconditionsforusingtheword‘retributivism’properly.Thismeansthatthelegalsystemthatconsciouslypunishestheinnocentordoessoinamannerthatisdisproportionatetotheburdenofone’sguilt,etc.doesnotdeservetobecalledretributive(dependingontheintensityofutili-tarianfeaturescouldbeforinstancecalledamixedone).Consequently,fromtheperspectiveofpunishmentjustification,punishmentcouldnotbejustifiedinaretributivemanner.Thus,itwouldnotbeajustretribution.Therefore,foranadvocateofajustpunishment,itwouldbeameansforimplementingsocialobjectivesattheexpenseofaman,andhenceareactiontoanoffenceofimmoralnature(asprovedby,e.g.HerbertMorriswhocriticizedthesocialrehabilitation

22 Cf.Merryman,J.H., The Civil Law Tradition. An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America, StanfordUniversity Press, Stanford, 1969, pp.132-148;Duff,R.A.,Answering for Crime. Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law, HartPublishing,Oxford-Portland,2007,pp.195ff.

23 Lucas,J.R.,op. cit. (fn.9),pp.92-93.24 Bennett,Ch.,The Varieties of retributive experience,PhilosophicalQuarterly,vol.52,no. 207, 2002, pp. 145–163; deGreiff, P.,Deliberative Democracy and Punishment,BuffaloCriminalLawReview,vol.5,no.2,2002,pp.373–403.


model).25Anothermatterisdeterminingthemomentfromwhichpunishmentwouldnotbejustifiableinanyway(poena iniustissima non est poena).

Therulesfortheconstructionofalegalsystemreflectapatternofshapingthebroadlyunderstoodcriminallawinagivencountry;itisrootedinaspecificlegalcultureandsocialorder.Themeta-rulesdefiningretributivismcanbere-ducedtofourmainpoints.Forinstance,retributivismclaimsthatperpetratorsoughttobepunishedbecauseofthedemandsofjustice–becausetheydeservetobepunished.Moreover,thestateoughttoprotecttheinnocentandpunishthosewhoareguilty(nullum crimen sine poena).Onemoreisaproportionalityofthepunishmenttotheguilt(severityoftheoffence)andisalsoanoptimizationnorm(directive),acertainprincipleofpunishment.Itisworthtonotethatduetothetypologicalnatureofconceptssuchasretributivism(utilitarianism,etc.)andthesoftnatureofmeta-rulesthatdetermineagivensystemofpunishment,thesedutiesthatarisefromthesaidmeta-rulescannotbeconsideredinzero-oneterms,asbinding(forthelegislator)ornon-binding.Thisisbecausethesearenotbindinginthesamewayregularrulesdo,butasprinciples(tomakeareferencetoRonaldDworkin).26

Itseemsthatthesemeta-rulesareoptimizationsnorm(thatnormcanbefulfilledonlytosomeextent).Itdoesn’tmeanthatthestatemaypunishtheinnocentintheinterestofsociety(i.e.thereisnonormthatprohibitspunish-ingtheinnocentasameanstoagoalor,allthemoreso,adutytodoso),butthatitoughttodoeverythinginitspowernottopunishtheinnocent,buttopromoting the nullum crimen sine poena principle.Thatgoalcannotsomuchbeachievedornotachievedasachievedgradually.Itseems,however,thattheywillbeprima facieduties.Inotherwords,anormativeframeworkofpunishmenthas a prima facie character.

Presented characteristic is just a proposal that should be developed andmodified.However,thesefourelements,takentogether,characterizeretribu-tivism as a general dutytoadministerjusticeinlinewiththeretributivemodelof punishment.The guilty-principle is fundamental, however, as it definesretributivisminapositiveway.Theyoutlineretributivism’scoreinrelationto

25 Morris,H.,op. cit.(fn.9),pp.480ff.;Wootton,B.,Crime and the Criminal Law: Re-flections of a Magistrate and Social Scientist,Stevens&Sons,London,1981,pp.31–64;Lucas,J.R.,op. cit. (fn.9),pp.87–123,280–286;Kaufman,A.S.,The Reform Theory of Punishment,Ethics, vol. 71,no.1,1960,pp.49–53;Arrigo,B.A.,Social Justice/Criminal Justice. The Maturation of Critical Theory in Law, Crime, and Deviance,West/Wadstworth,Scarborough,1998,pp.1–14.

26 See:Dworkin,R.,Taking Right Seriously,HarvardUniversityPress,Harvard-Cam-bridge,1980.

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utilitarianismorpenalabolitionism.Theclaimthatthereisanormpromotingretributivereaction,insteadofnormprohibitingcriminalpunishmentasre-paymentforawrong(itcanbecalledthemerci-principle)noranormrequiringthat instrumental resultsbeobtained throughpunishment, is inoppositiontotheprogramofpenalutilitarianism,whichseespunishmentasameanstocertainsocialorpersonalends(asprevention,resocializationetc.).27 It is also aconclusionincompatiblewiththeabolitionistorminimalistapproach,whichseespunishmentasconditionallypermittedorprohibitedformoralreasons.28 Theydonotprovideananswertothequestionaboutthereasonforpunishing,however–yetifweeliminatetheutilitarianvalue,justiceconsiderationsstandoutfromamongotherpossibilities.Supplementingtheacceptanceofpunish-mentasrepaymentforanoffencearethreefartherduties,whicharehoweveroptimizationnorms,meaningthattheydon’thaveafundamentalcharacter.Rather,theymustbeperformedinthehighestpossibledegree.Violatingthemisnotpermissibleasamatterofprinciple,however.

Retributivistsdeclarethatitisadutyofsocietyorthestatetorepayforawrong(offence)bymeansofpunishment.Inprinciple,theyalsoopposepun-ishingtheinnocent(butthisisratheramatteroffacts).29Retributivistsbelievethatdisregardingoffenceandguiltmanifestsunjustifiedobjectivizationoftheoffender.Thesymmetricaloppositeoftherighttobepunishedistherightnottobepunished.Itseemsthatitisimpossibletoavoidpunishingtheinnocent,atleastintherealworld.Thisisnot,however,amatterofnormativity,butrathertheadjustmentofnormativitytofacts.Nonormativemodelwouldworkifitdoesnotcorrespondtoactualsocialexpectationsandneeds.Assuch,whichcanbeseeneveninHansKelsen’sworks,eachnormativesystemmusthaveacertainminimumsocialeffectiveness.30Forthatreason,thenormativemodelofretributivism(punishment)willaccountforthefactthatsometimesthosewhoarepunishedareinnocentorthatoffendersarenotpunishedforvariousreasons.Asaresult,therearetwopossiblesolutions.Abandoningsomenorms

27 Kaufman,A.S.,op. cit. (fn.25),pp.49-53.28 Christie,N.,Conflicts as Property,BritishJournalofCriminology,vol.17,no.1,1977,pp.1–15;Peno,M.,Punishing (Non-)Citizens,ArchiwumFilozofiiPrawaiFilozofiiSpołecznej[ArchivesforPhilosophyofLawandSocialPhilosophy],vol.2,no.13,2016,pp.28-38.

29 Cf.Tebbit,M.,Philosophy of Law,Routledge,London-NewYork,2005,pp.155-230.30 See:Kelsen,H., Law, State and Justice in the Pure Theory of Law,TheYaleLawJournal,

vol.57,No.3,1948,pp.377-390.Cf.Vinx,L.,Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law: Legal-ity and Legitimacy,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2007;Clark,R.S.,Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law,JournalofLegalEducation,vol.22,no.2,1969,pp.170-196.


asinadequateandmodifyingthemodelorconsideringthesenorms–rulesthatdeterminethenormativemodelofpunishmenttobeaprima facierule(i.e.moreorlesseffectiveinaccordancetothescheme).

Asitisseentwoanalogiescanbeemployedtoexplainhowtheideaofmodelretributivismworks.Thefirstanalogyusesaconceptof legalprinciple.Thesecond one refers to an idea of prima facie obligations.31 The vision of prima facie dutydependsoninterpretation.Prima faciedutyisonlyanapparentbutnotarealduty;orarealdutythatcanbeoutweighedbymorestringentconsiderationsbut continues to survive evenwhen outweighed.The second interpretationseemstobebettersuitedtotheretributivismideaofpunishment.Thereisarealobligationordutytopunish,butthereisnottheobligationthatcanbeeitherfulfilledornot.Itcanbeassumedthatthesocietyorthestatehastheobligationtodoasmuchasit’spossibletorepayforanevilandpromotinganideaofjustice.

Rulesfortheconstructionofalegalsystemasrulesthatdeterminetheman-nerofshapingcriminallawshowsomesimilaritiestotheprinciplesoflawinRonaldDworkin’sapproach,exceptforthefactthattheyareappliedprimarilytothecreationoflaw,andonlyasaconsequence,totheapplicationandinter-pretationoflaw(itisworthrememberingthoughthatDworkindevelopedtheissueofprinciplesonthebasisofthelegalsysteminwhichthecourtscreatelaw).32Thismeansthatthelegislatorwillfulfilthedutiesresultingfromtheretributiveconceptinsofarastheyarenotpermanentlyinconflictwithothervalues.Thefactthatsomeactisamoralevilorharmdonebysomeone(evenbeingacrime)doesnotmeanthatitwillbepunishedfairly.Thelegislatormaydecidethatagivenactshouldremainintheareaofmoralityratherthancrim-

31 W.D.Rossintroducestheconceptofprima facieduty.Hesuggeststhename“primafacieduty”or“conditionalduty”asa“asabriefwayofreferringtothecharacter-istic(quitedistinctfromthatofbeingadutyproper)whichanacthas,invirtueofbeingofacertainkind(e.g.thekeepingofapromise),ofbeinganactwhichwouldbeadutyproperifitwerenotatthesametimeofanotherkindwhichismorallysignificant.” Fartheronweread:“Wehavetodistinguishfromthecharacteristicofbeingourdutythatoftendingtobeourduty.Anyactthatwedocontainsvariouselementsinvirtueofwhichitfallsundervariouscategories.Invirtueofbeingthebreaking of a promise, for instance, it tends to bewrong; in virtue of being aninstanceofrelievingdistressittendstoberight”.Ross,W.D.,Right and the Good,ClarendonPress,Oxford,1930,p.19.

32 Dworkin,R.,op. cit. (fn.26),pp.22ff;Dworkin,R.,The Model of Rules,in:Hughes,G. (ed.),Law, Reason, and Justice,University of LondonPress,New-York-London,1969,pp.14 ff.Theapplicationand interpretationof law take intoaccount thevaluescodedinthelegaltextbythelegislatorinthelaw-makingprocess.

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inallaworprovidefornon-punishmentduetotheobjectivesofthecriminalpolicy(non-convictionofkeywitnesses).Theremaybefinallyacaseinwhich,forpreventiveorsocialreasons,thelegislatordecidestopunishforactsthatarenotevilor,incertaincases,allowpunishmentexceedingthemoralburdenoftheact.However,weshouldinprincipleclaimtobedealingwitharetributivemodelofpunishment,andthatpunishmentwillhavearetributivejustification.

Therulesfortheconstructionofthelegalsystemalsoshowsomesimilar-itytotheprogramstandards(policies)andaresometimesreflectedinactsofconstitutionalrank(e.g.regardingcriminalliabilityortheruleoflaw).Theyordertodoeverythingpossibleinthegivencircumstancestoachievecertaingoals.Fromaformalview,thereareobviouslylimitationstothisliquidityofcontentofnormsorrulesspecifyingcriminalresponsibility.Theseareprima facie,butonlytosomeextent.Hence,thereisaframeworktothiselasticity.Thisisaninterestingissue,whichcomesasquiteobvioustolawyers.Itseemsforexamplethattheprincipleofnullum crimen,nulla poena sine legeisnotsuchanoptimizationalnorm,becauseoftheprincipleoftheruleoflaw,whichprohibitspunishmentforactsthatwerenotoffensesatthetimewhentheywerecom-mitted.However,itisworthrememberingthatintheeventofacollisionwithothervalues(humandignity),thepunishmentofoffensesthatdidnotconstituteoffensesatthetimeoftheircommitmentcanbejustifiedinthelightofpositivelaw(therehavebeenprecedents,forinstanceNuremberg).OnecanhardlymissthelinkbetweentheoutlineofcriminaljusticepresentedaboveandRobertAlexy’sunderstandingofprinciples.AccordingtoRobertAlexy,principlesareoptimizationrequirements.Theycanbefulfilledonlytosomeextent.33 This isalsohowaprincipleofretributivismcanbeformulated.Itwouldassertthatthestateoughttorealizejusticeinthehighestpossibledegree.Itseemsthatthisapproachisnotonlycompatiblewiththeessenceofretributivismbutalsoremainsinoppositiontopenalutilitarianism.

Theprincipleof retributivismoutlinedabove,and theduties coveredbythisprinciple,areprima facieinnature.34Thismeansthatthelegislatorshouldonlystrivetofulfilallrecommendationsresultingfromtheretributivism.Ofcourse,theywillonlystriveforthisiftheywanttoimplementtheformulaofretributivejusticeinthecriminallaw,whichshouldbeexpressedinlegaltextsorlegislativematerials,ifthelegalsystemrecognizesthemassourcesoflaw.Fromanormativepointofview,thedutiesarisingforthelegislatorfromthe

33 See:Alexy,R.,On the Structure of Legal Principles,RatioJuris,vol.13,no.3,2000,pp.294-304.

34 Cf.Hart,H.L.A.,The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights,in:FlewA.(ed.),Essays on Logic and Language,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,1951,pp.145-166.


adoptionofanormativeconceptofretributivismincriminallawmaybecon-sidered prima facieaccordingtoW.D.Ross.Onthislevel,theprincipleoffairretributioniscertainlyrelative(e.g.thelegislatoralways,forimportantreasons,canprovideforamoreorlessseverepunishmentthanitresultsfromthenatureofthepunishableoffense).Retributivismpresupposes(assumes),however,thatitisnotimmoraltoreturnevil(punishment)forevil(crime).Thesupportersofpenalabolitionism(NilsChristieet al.)areoftheoppositeopinion.35 This assumptionisabsoluteandistheethicalbasisofretributivism(alongwiththeideaofretributivejustice).

Taking retributivismas a certainnormativemodel leadsus to followingconclusions.Thelegislatorshoulddoeverythingpossibletoachieveobjectivesarisingfromtherecognized(adopted)modelofthecriminallawsystem(oraconcretephilosophyofpunishment).Theimplementationofthechosenmodelisakindofprima facieobligation(ofapoliticalorquasi-legalnature),ifitispos-sibleinagivensocio-legalsituationorcontext.Moreover,directives(standards,rulesorprinciples)resultingfromtheadoptedmodelofthepenalsystemareprima faciebynature.

Importantly,itdoesn’tmeanthatonewouldhavetodevelopamixedtheory,whichwouldontheonehandincludetheteleologicalaspectofpunishmentandontheotherhandthedutytorepay.Everypenaltheoryconstitutesamodel,which,asanidealization,enablesthestudyoranalysisofpunishment.Itdoesn’treflectreality,butmayrespondtoitschallenges.Takingtheaxiologicalstand-point,onemaythinkofW.D.Ross’theoryofprima facieduties.InW.D.Ross’ethicalsystemrightnessisidentifiedwithmoralduty.Arightactisanactthatstilloughttobeperformed(morallybinding).36 Besides characterizing prima facie duty,Rossproposesalistofcertainfundamentalprima faciedutiesinvolvingthedutiesofreparation(ofawrong)orthedutiesofjusticewhicharecharacteristicfor retributivism.37Rosssays thatoneprinciplecanalwaysbeabandoned foranother,inthesensethatsomedeparturesfromtherulearepermitted.Ross’stheory,fromthepointofviewofretributivism,isonlyakindofguideline.More-

35 Christie,N.,Crime control as Drama,JournalofLawandSociety,vol.13no.1,1986,pp.1-8.

36 Ross,W.D.,op. cit. (fn.31),pp.3,91–93.37 Theseare:1)thedutiesoffidelity,2)thedutiesofreparation(ofawrong),3)thedutiesofgratitude(toothers forservicesdonebythemtoone),3) thedutiesofjustice,4)thedutiesofbeneficence,5)thedutiesofself-improvement,6)thedutyofnon-maleficence.Ross,W.D.,op. cit. (fn.31),pp.21–22,27.Cf.Johnson,O.A.,Rightness and Goodness. A Study in Contemporary Ethical Theory,TheMartinusNijhoff,Hague,1969,p.9.

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over,thechapterofRoss’sThe Right and the Gooddealingwiththerelationshipbetweenthedutiesofthestateandtherightsofthecitizensinthecontextofpunishmentiswell-known.AccordingtoRossthestatehasthedutytoprotecttheinnocent.Itoughttodoeverythinginitspowerinordertopreventcitizens’rightsfrombeingviolated,butthosewhodonotrespectothers’righttolife,free-domorpossessionlose(orlimit)theirownrighttothesegoods.Therefore,thestatedoesn’thaveaprima facieobligationtoprotectoffenders.TheconclusionsRossdrawsareincompatiblewithretributivism–also,thefluidcharacteroftheprincipleofjustice,asitwere(itsprima faciecharacter),seemstocontradictmodernretributivistthoughtinspiredbyKant’sethics.Rossstatesthatsociety’sinterestmaybegreatenoughtojustifytherighttopunishaninnocentindividual,soastopreventthedestructionofthewholenation.38Theessenceofretributivismisitsclearoppositiontosacrificinganindividualforthecommongoodasprincipleofcriminalresponsibility.Otherwiseretributivismwouldbecomeasupplementtoutilitarianismreducedtotherequirementtoconsiderguiltapremiseofre-sponsibilityandmoralcondemnationofcrimes,whileacceptingthepossibilitytomakeexceptionsforthesakeofspecialconsiderations,suchaspublicinterest.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Inconclusion, itmustbeemphasisedthatthephilosophyofpunishmentcreatesnormativemodelsofacriminallaw.Thesemodelshavespecificnames(i.e.retributivism)andeachofthemcanbeunderstoodasasetofdirectivesaddressedtothelegislator.Thesedirectives(rules,principles)areforconstructinglegalsystem(includingthesystemofcriminallaw).Byitsnormativecharactertheyaremorally,ideologically,orquasi-legallybindingforthelegislator.Thesedirectivesmaybeinterpretedalsoasprima facieobligations,justliketherulesthatmakeupthesenormativemodels.Butinfact,theserulesarebindingandare at theheartof the legal system.As forpractical consequences,wemayconsider de lege ferendapostulatetoputmainrulesforconstructingsaidmodeldirectlyintotheconstitutionoractsthatregulatecriminalpolicy.Ifneeded,suchregulationsmustbesimplycreatedandenacted.Itisaresponsibilityofpoliticaldecision-makers.Itwouldbetheimplementationofthelegalphiloso-phytopractice.Therearemanyexampleswhypenalcodesfailedinthisarea.39

38 Ross,W.D.,op. cit. (fn.31),pp.56-64.39 Cf.Ristroph,A.,Two Conditions of Legitimate Punishment,in:Flanders,Ch.;Hoskins,Z.(ed.)The New Philosophy of Criminal Law,RowmanandLittlefield,NewYork2016,pp.76-92.


Itshouldbeemphasisedthatthelegislatorisfreetochoosetheconceptofpunishment,butthechoicemade(e.g.relatedtothereformofcriminallaw)meanstheobligationtopursueaspecificcriminalpolicy.40 If the legislator adopts agivenvisionofcriminaljustice,theyshouldbeconsistentandthedegreeofimplementationoftheadoptedassumptionswillbesubjecttoassessmentandwill affect thepossibilityof justifyingpunishment in a given social systemandlegalorder.Achangeincriminalpolicywillrequireanexplicitchangeintheformulaofjustice.Theidealwouldbeifthelegislatordirectlyinthelegaltext(e.g.inthecriminallegislation)definedtheadoptedprinciplesofcriminalpolicies,tasksofpunishmentandrelatedtoliabilitypunishmentvalues(e.g.byintroducingtheadoptedformulaofretributivejusticeintothelegaltext).

What,then,doestheretributivismdemandfromthelegislator?Theretrib-utivecharacteroftheoutlinedconceptismanifestedbythefollowingcharac-teristics.First–justiceremainsavaluethatmustbepursuedinthehighestpossibledegree.Ajustrepaymentisthusthevalueandthegoalthatoughttobepursued.Second–theassertionthatpunishmentshouldn’tconstitute(only)ameanstoachievingcertaingoalsandshouldn’tbeinappropriatetothedegreeofguiltandtheseverityoftheoffence.

Itisworthwhiletoconsidersuchapproachestoretributivismwhich,whilemodifyingtheclassical,formalandfundamental(andthuscontrafactual)ideaofjustice,remaininacuteoppositiontotheutilitarianprogrammeincriminallaw.41Theconceptionoutlinedhereembracesthisideaofjustpunishment.

Retributivism,asanormativeconceptofpunishment,imposesonthelegislatorsomedutiesofaquasi-legalnature,butalsomoralones.Italsomeansthelegis-lator’srecognitionofacertainhierarchyofvalues,reflectedinlegalregulations.Thesearenotabsoluteduties.However,despitetheprima faciecharacter,theyareparticularlybindingonthestate,andonecandemandtheirimplementationbyreferringtotheprincipleofademocraticstateoflaw(theruleoflaw).Citizenscandemandstableandconsistentcriminalpolicyonthisbasis.42 These categories areblurred,butifthephilosophyofcriminallawhastheambitiontogobeyondpostulates,itmustlookfornormativeconcretizationsofitsconcepts.

40 See: Carvalho,H.,Liberty and Insecurity in the Criminal Law: Lessons from Thomas Hobbes,CriminalLawandPhilosophy,vol.X, no.11,2017,pp.249–271.

41 Itseemsthatretributivism,havingundergonevariouschanges,hasgraduallyad-optedamixedform,essentiallycombiningutilitarianismwithcertainjustice-ori-ented considerations.

42 Cf.Duff,R.,A Criminal Law for Citizens,TheoreticalCriminology,no.14,2010,pp.293-309;Scalia,A.,The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,UniversityofChicagoLawReview,no.56,1989,pp.1175–1188.

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Sažetak

Doc. dr. sc. Michał Peno *

FILOZOFIJA KAŽNJAVANJA: NORMATIVNI MODELI I GRADIVNA NAČELA PRAVNIH SUSTAVA

U radu se pokušava analizirati filozofija kažnjavanja iz normativne perspektive te prodrijeti u strukturu temeljnih premisa i teza retributivizma. O konceptima kažnjavanja raspravlja se s obzirom na dva konteksta i tipa izražavanja koji su izgrađeni u filozofiji kažnjavanja – normativni i deskriptivni. Prvi pripadaju području aksiologije i normativ-nih modela, dok drugi opisuju postojeće sustave kaznene odgovornosti. Rasprava u radu pritom je usredotočena na retributivni model. Model retributivizma uključuje normativne premise te ih ne smatra bezuvjetno obvezujućim smjernicama nego pravilima optimizacije, na određeni način prima facie obvezom. To su u prvom redu kvazipravne obveze države promatrane sa stajališta kaznene politike. Retributivizam se može shvatiti kao skup normi (pravila) za izgradnju pravnog sustava. Jezgra je rada upravo razrada toga koncepta, pri čemu su inspiraciju za navedeni pristup dale teze iznesene u poljskoj teoriji prava te djela i ideje R. Dworkina, W. D. Rossa i R. Alexya, kao i modernih retributivista.

Ključne riječi: načela, struktura retributivizma, prima facie obveze, kazna, pravila za izgradnju pravnih sustava

* Dr.sc.MichałPeno,docent,Fakultetpravaijavneuprave,SveučilišteuSzczecinu,Narutowicza17A,70-240Szczecin,Poljska;[email protected];

ORCIDID:orcid.org/0000-0001-9905-3783

philosophy of punishment: normative models and

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