planning for off-site response to radiation accidents in nuclear facilities

IAEA-TECDOC-225

PLANNING FOROFF-SITE RESPONSE TO

RADIATION ACCIDENTS INNUCLEAR FACILITIES

A PRE-PUBLICATION WORKING DOCUMENT

A DOCUMENT DERIVING FROMADVISORY GROUP MEETINGS ON

PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTION OFTHE PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF

AN ACCIDENT IN A NUCLEAR FACILITY,ORGANIZED BY THE

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCYAND HELD IN

ANKARA, TURKEY, 15-19 NOVEMBER 1976AND IN

LISBON, PORTUGAL, 24-28 OCTOBER 1977

A TECHNICAL DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THEINTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, VIENNA, 1979

PLANNING FOR OFF-SITE RESPONSE TO RADIATION ACCIDENTS Iff BTJCLEAR FACILITIESIAEA, VIEfflJA, 1979

Printed by the IAEA in AustriaDecember 1979

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TABLE OF CONTENTSPage No.

FOREWORDSECTION I - INTRODUCTION l

PURPOSE l

SCOPE l

General2Siting Considerations

SECTION II - ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PREDICTION OF CONSEQUENCES 3General 3Types of Accidents 3Magnitude of Accidents 3Accident Analysis 4Exposure Pathways 5Time Factors Associated with Releases 7Radiological Characteristics of Releases 8

SECTION III - PROTECTIVE MEASURES AND ASSOCIATED 11RISKS, DIFFICULTIES AND COSTS

11GeneralTYPES OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES 11TIME SCALE CONSIDERATIONS IN SELECTING 12PROTECTIVE MEASURESSELECTION OF APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE MEASURES 14BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTIVE MEASURESRISKS, DIFFICULTIES AND COSTS 16

Sheltering 16Shielding 1á

Ventilation Control ^i ftRisks, difficulties and costs °

Kadioprotective prophylaxis °Basic Principles '

21Dosage and AdministrationRisks, Difficulties and Costs 21

Control of Access and Egress« ppGeneral

Risks, Difficulties and Costs 23Evacuation 23General 3Risks, Difficulties and Costs 4

JP ge No.Personal Protective Methods 25General 25Simple respiratory protection 25Other forms of respiratory protection 26Protective clothing 26Risks, difficulties and costs 26Storage and maintenance 28Decontamination of Persons 28General 28Risks, difficulties and costs 28Medical care 28General 28Risks, difficulties and costs 30Diversion of food and water supplies 30General 30Risks, difficulties and costs 31Decontamination in Affected Areas 32General 32Risks, difficulties and costs 32

SECTION IV - FLAMING TOR RESPONSE TO AN ACCIDENT/ASSESSMENT/PREDICTION/OPERATIONAL RESPONSE 32

General 34CONCEPT OP EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES 35

Relevant Offsite Data 35ASSESSMENT OP THE ACCIIENT 41

The Role of the Nuclear Facility Operator 41The Role of Offsite Authorities 43Instrumentation for Assessment 44Huclear Facility Operational Instrumentation 44Nuclear Facility Emergency Instrumentation 44Offsite Emergency Instrumentation 45Radiological 45Fixed 45Mobile 46Meteorological 47

PREDICTION OF CONSEQUENCES 48The Role of the Nuclear Facility Operator 48

Page Íî.

The Role of Offsite Authorities 50Data Acquisition and Processing 50Information concerning the radioactive 50source termMeteorological information 50Offsite radiological information 51

PLANNING FOR THE OPERATIONAL RESPONSE 52Emergency Response Resources 52Implementation of Appropriate Protective 52MeasuresGeneral 5?Sheltering 52Administration of radioprotective prophylacticdrugs 54Control of access and egress 55Evacuation 57Personal protective equipment/emergency workers/Decontamination 58Medical care §9Diversion of food and water 60Decontamination of areas and equipment 61

PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PLANNEDOPERATIONAL RESPONSE 62

General g 2Organization and responsibility 62Derived intervention levels 62Actions Úó support groups 62Procedure format 63

REMEDIAL AND RESTORATIVE MEASURES 66General 66Measures 66Control of access and egress 66Diversion of food and water supplies 66Decontamination of areas and materials 66Fixation of remaining radioactivity 67Control of Contamination and Dose 67

Intervention Levels 68Organizational Aspects 68

PUBLIC INFORMATION ASPECTS 69UPDATING THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN 71TRAINING AND EXERCISES 72

SECTION V - INTERVENTION LEVELS AND CONSIDERATIONS 74INFLUENCING THEIR CHOICE

General 74CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE DETRIMENT 77CAUSED BY THE PROTECTIVE MEASURERISK/BENEFIT CONSIDERATIONS Ø SETTING 78INTERVENTION LEVELSINTERVENTION LEVELS 78DERIVED INTERVENTION LEVELS 79GUIDANCE FOR THE SELECTION OF INTERVENTIONLEVELS 83Appendix 84EXAMPLES OF INTERVENTION LEVELS ADOPTED BY SOME COUNTRIES 84FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 85FRANCE 88UNITED KINGDOM 89UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 92

SECTION VI - ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES 95General 95

ONSITE ORGANIZATION 96The Role of the Nuclear Facility Operator 96General 96

OFFSITE ORGANIZATION 98General 98Emergency Response Organization 98Local Organization 99National Authorities 101

ORGANIZATION AT LEVEL OF REGIONALLY ASSOCIATED COUNTRIESOR STATES 102ORGANIZATION AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 104

REFERENCES 107

FOREWORD

In the past 25 years, the nuclear energy industry has maintained an excellentsafety record, second to none with regard to public safety. Nuclear facilities aredesigned, constructed and operated with exceptional consideration for safety. Theirsophisticated safety systems are designed to protect not only the plant and itspersonnel, but also the public and the environment. In the event of a breakdownor failure within a facility, one or more of these systems will be activated,each of which is designed to ensure the ultimate integrity of the plant.

Nonetheless, a potential for a serious accident does arise, even though itsprobability is minimal. It is therefore necessary to plan in advance for emergencyaction to protect both the plant staff and the public.

In such cases, emergency action could be initiated by :- the operator of the plant as the representative of plant management,- public authorities that have the task of protecting the public andthe environment.

The plant operator will be concerned mainly with on-site action to control anyemergency situation to protect on-site personnel and to collect data concerning theaccident. The public authorities - principally public health authorities - willusually be concerned with protection of off-site population and also ihe collectingof environmental data.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has established a Nuclear SafetyStandards programme to prepare and publish a series of Codes of Practice and SafetyGuides concerned with all aspects of Nuclear Power Plant Safety. One of the guidesunder preparation, IAEA Safety Series No. 50-SG-G6, entitled "Preparedness ofPublic Authorities for Emergencies at Nuclear Power Plants" will consider someaspects of emergency planning to be used by groups outside the plant area; however,this will be primarily directed for the groups under the management of the plantoperator,

The Agency bas also recognized that a manual of guidance is needed for publichealth authorities, environmental specialists, emergency advisors, and all ofother persons or groups that have the task of organizing <r implementing off-siteemergency procedures. This guidance must also fit needs of developing countries,in which locally-available expertise may be vested only in those persons alreadyentrusted with safety tasks in the nuclear facility. This differs from thesituation in industrialized countries, where a large and independent body ofexperts may be available for consultation.

To this end, the Agency convened an Advisory Group comprisingexperts nominated Úó ÌåòÚåã States and representatives of interestedinternational organizations to draft such a document. Meetings wereheld in Ankara, 1976 and in Lisbon, 1977» under the chairmanship ofMr.H.E.Collins of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.The revised text that resulted from the latter meeting was reviewedand put into final draft by Mr. Collins in June 1979»

The text, incorporating a few additional comments received sub-sequently, is now issued in the form of a working document, to enableinterested parties to benefit from the document exped tiously, and toobtain critical comments from users of the document before proceedingto formal publication in the Safety Series.

In particular difficulty in drafting such a manual lies in the factthat there is little experience with nuclear facilities that have hadan uncontrolled release of radioactivity having major environmentalimpact. However, some insight into the problems can be gained fromlarge-scale accidents in non-nuclear industries. As examples of radio-active accidents, the Windscale incident provided experience inmonitoring and controlling contamination to pasture lands and milk, butthe Three Mile Island incident did not lead to any substantial contaminationof the environment. However, there were many lessons concerning emergencyplanning and response to be learned from such cases, and these are incor-porated in this document.

Readers of this document should be aware that it is neither a collectionof rules nor a list of approved steps and actions. Rather, it is adiscussion of the various philosophies and problems involved in the offsiteresponse to an accident in a nuclear facility. The readers who are respon-sible for setting up off-site emergency procedures for a given facilitywill have to decide on a philosophy and mode of action that suits thesituation pertaining to their specific site. For instance, actions willdepend not only upon the nature of the facility and its environs, butalso on the resources available to cope with an accident. The Agencybelieves that all the important factors and topics have been considered.

Comments from interested parties would be welcome and should beaddressed, to:

(Ref. 1ÀÅÀ_.ÒÂÑ1ÞÑ-225)Division of Nuclear Safety and Environmental ProtectionInternational Atomic Energy AgencyP.O.Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria

SECTION I INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

1.01 The purpose of this manual is to give guidance to thosewho are responsible for the protection of the public in theevent of an accident occurring at a land-based nuclear facility.This guidance should assist in the advance preparation ofemergency response plans and implementing procedures. Basicprinciples of protective measures along with their advantagesand disadvantages are discussed. Other principles related toemergency planning and the operational response to an emergencyare outlined. Although the guidance is primarily oriented towardland-based nuclear power facilities, the guidance does havegeneral application to other types of nuclear facilities.

SCOPE

The guidance in this manual is based on a consideration ofconditions which may prevail if a land-based nuclear facilityshould suffer an accident which has a potential for offsiteconsequences arising primarily from a release of radioactivematerials to the environment. Consideration has been given toa spectrum of accidents bounded at the lower end by eventswhich have a minimal potential for offsite consequences, andat the upper end by accidents for which the offsite consequencesdictate that protective measures be considered or implemented»Neither of these limits is uniquely definable; however, inSection 7. guidance is provided to assist national or otherresponsible authorities in deciding at which level, or underwhat circumstances, emergency response plans should be implemented.

1îÎÇ In the event of a nuclear accident9 some of the actions•taken to protect the public from offsite consequences aremeasures taken within the plant by the nuclear facilityoperator to control the accident situation,, Other actionstaken to protect the public offsite are primarily theresponsibility of governmental authoritieSe Actions takenwithin the nuclear facility are not covered in this manualsince appropriate measures of that type would Úå closelyrelated to the specific characteristics of the nuclearfacility,, Emergency actions for which the nuclear facilityoperating organization and the public authorities areresponsible are discussed in the MUSS publicationsIAEa Safety Series Æîâ 50-SG-06 and No. 50-SG-G6.

Siting Considerations1S04 The main objective in siting nuclear power plants from the

iriewpoint of nuclear safety is the protection of the publicagainst the radiological impact resulting from accidentalreleases of radioactivity! normal radioactive releases fromnuclear power plants have also to be considered.If a proposed site for a nuclear facility presents particulardifficulties to be overcome in developing and implementingan emergency response plan9 this could be sufficient reasonfor not selecting the site. Thereforef the general feasibilityof emergency response planning should be determined at a veryearly stage when the suitability of the site is studied» Inevaluating the suitability of a site, the following aspectsshall be considered(a) Effects of external events occurring in the region of the

particular feite (these events could be of natural orman—induced origin)»

(b) Characteristics of the site and its environment whichcould influence the transfer of released radioactivematerials to man.

(c) Population density and distribution, in view of the possibilityof implementing contingency measures.

SECTION II ACCIIEHT ANALYSIS. PREDICTION OF CONSBQJDENCES

General

2.01 This Section deals with accident analyses as a basis for thedevelopment of the emergency response plan. Nuclear powerfacilities are sited, designed, constructed and operatedaccording to strict requirements and regulations to ensurethe radiological protection of the plant personnel and thepublic. Consideration is given to factors affecting thelikelihood of an accident which could give rise to a releaseof radioactive material and the possible onsite and offsiteconsequences.

2.02 Nuclear facilities should have emergency response plans inaddition to design and engineered safety features. Augmentingthe facility emergency plan are the emergency plans of whatcan be called the "offsite authority or organization" whichis governmental in nature.

Types of Accidents2.03 Consideration is given in particular to accidents leading to a

nuclear radiation hazard to man and the environment via airborneradionuclides and ground deposited contamination, the releaseof contaminated liquids, the deposition of airborne contaminationin water, and the exposure of man and domestic animals throughcontaminated food chains. There is no specific accident sequence

that can be isolated as the one for which to plan, because eachnuclear facility, and the various accidents which can be postulated,could have different consequences both in nature and degree. Rather,emergency planning should be based upon the technical assessmentof the potential consequences, time-factors, and release characteristicsof various classes of accidents with different possible radiationconsequences.

Magnitude of Accidents2.04 A detailed analysis of all foreseeable types of accidents, including

those involving potential releases greater than those under normalconditions to those with extremely low probabilities of occurence butwith potentially severe offsite consequences, should be included in,or should be in addition to, the safety analysis report prepared

for the facility» éãîò such detailed analyses a th tiraesealerange for response action to lainiioise offsite cons quencesñàï. Úå estitsatedj and the framework for the emergency responseplans established*

2*05 Accident analysis ean aseist th planning organizations indeveloping1 a graded emergency response based upon à speetrujmof: accidents»

2»0á Th& preparation and development of emergency response plansdepend on analyses of the spectrum of potential aeeidentsf' ick will include an estimation of the off site consequences cfbese analyses should Ú« specific to tbe type of facility, itsfeatures and tbe sbsraeteristics of tbe site and region in whicathe facility is to Úå located»

2*0f The scope of the emergency plan can Úå Úàâåà in part on thefacility safety analysis report , supplemented bj further analyseswhich, assume tbe failorej however iiniikelyf of design andoperational safety features • For a given plant design.9 theqoantity of radioactive material available for relessef in itsost deleterious form will be a function of the mode of operationof the plant. 1Úå point of release and the fraction of thematerial inventory released will depend on the nature of theinitiating event and the functioning of the engineered safetyfeatures of the plant and operator actions. When these aspectsare identified, estimates can Úå made of the offsite consequeneesin terms of potential threat to the populace and property» Morethan one accident situation

may Úå considered, each of which has a different initialimpact such as direct or indirect exposure pathways; hence arange of possible offsite scenarios should be identified.

2.08 Accident analysis embraces both the datermin tion of thesize, type, nature and point of release of radioactivematerial and a projection of the consequences to offsitepersons and the environment in the absence of any response.Accident analyses can be specific to an individual facilityand can also be generic for any given type of nuclear facility.These accident analyses, which should be approved by a competentauthority, provide parameters and data on which the extent ofthe most appropriate emergency response plan can be based.

Exposure Pathways2.09 Information concerning the radiological characteristics of

releases is useful for emergency planning purposes and theprincipal radionuclides likely to be involved should beascertained as a part of the accident analysis process. Themost important routes of exposure are as follows:- direct radiation from the facility and from any released

airborne radioactive material;- inhalation of airborne material (volatiles, aerosols,

particulates)- direct radiation from ground deposition;- contamination of skin and clothing; and- ingestion of contaminated food and water.

2.10 In a continuous release of airborne radioactive materials, theactivity disperses down wind as a plume. The concentration atground level at specific distances from the release point willdepend on the quantity released, the height of the release point,wind spec!, atmospheric stability, heat contained in the release,precipitation on the terrain, physical and chemical form of thereleased material, and other factors.

2.11 In the first or early stage, in addition to possible exposureto any direct radiation from the facility, the radioactive materialreleased gives rise to external radiation doses from the activity in the

passing plume àëà deposited on the ground, as well as tointernal radiation doses from inhaled radioactive materialsand skin and clothing surface contamination.

2.12 In a second or later stage, exposure of the population couldÚå caused by inhalation of airborne material resuspended fromcontaminated surfaces and by the ingestion of either directlycontaminated water or food or contaminated agricultural productssuch as milk or vegetables.

2.13 The total external gamma radiation dose from the radioactiveplume is proportional to the time of passage. It also dependson the variation of the concentration distribution of theactivity in the vicinity of the location under consideration.The external radiation exposure does not necessarily cease whenthe plume has passed by since the plume may have depositedradioactive materials on the surfaces of streets, buildingsand open areas and also on surface water systems and agricul-tural and forest land.

2.14 A person immersed in the plume would inhale an amount of radio-active material proportional to the time of passage of the plume,the person's respiration rate, and the concentration of radio-active material at the person's location. The inhaled materialwould then travel from the lungs to the organs of the body, ina manner depending on the nature and chemical form of theradioactive material. The material would eventually be removed,in part by radioactive decay and in part by excretion and otherbiological processes. The total radiation dose from inhalationwould thus be received over a period of time that could varyfrom a few weeks to many years, depending on the chemical andphysical nature of the radioactive material and other factorssuch as the decay scheme of the radionuclides present.

2.15 While the plume spreads, some of its radioactive contents willbe transferred from the atmosphere to the ground. If rain occursduring passage of the plume, some of the radioactive materialwill be washed out and deposited on the ground. The gamma radiationfrom the deposited activity will deliver a radiation dose to aperson during the time that he remains within the contaminated

area. The rate will depend on the level of the surface activityat the position occupied.

2.16 As the ground activity gradually decays, or is removed by othermechanisms, for example wash-off and seepage, the dose ratewill decrease. In contrast to the external radiation from theplume, the external radiation from ground-deposited activity alsogives rise to radiation doses after the passage of the plume.In addition, deposited contamination may give rise to internaldoses through the food chain and from the inhalation of resuspendedmaterial.

Time Factors Associated With Releases2.17 A planning basis taking account of the time-dependence of a release

can be expressed as a range of time values in which to implementprotective action. Planners should consider the possible differenttime periods between the initiating event and arrival of the plumeand possible time periods of releases in relationship to time neededto implement protective actions. Major releases may begin in therange of one-half hour to as much as 30 hours after an initiatingevent and the duration of the releases may range from one-half hourto several days with the major portion of the release occurringwell within the first day.In addition, long plume travel times which are associated with themost adverse meteorological conditions might result in largepotential exposures far from the site. For example^under poordispersion conditions associated with low windspeeds, two hoursor more might be required for the plume to travel a distance ofeight kilometers (five miles). Higher windspeeds would result inshorter travel times but would provide more dispersion, makinghigh exposures at long distances much less likely. Therefore, inmost cases, significant advance warning of high concentrationsshould be available if early notification of offsite authoritiesis required and implemented for major releases of radioactivematerial. Warning times could vary for different types of reactors.Table I. summarizes guidance on time factors which is consideredto be representative.

Guidance os isltiatioa. and Baraiion o ' lelea&e

Time fros the initiating event to 0.5 hou tostart of atmospheric releas® oae dayTiass period over «bicfe radioactive 0,5 feour tosat erial èàó be continuously released several days

Time at -which major portion of 0*5 bour to 1 daw-release àçó occur after start of

releaseTravel time for release 8 Ik /5 Æ/-to exposure point " 0„5 to 2 hours(tine after release) lg Km /10 Mi/~

1 to 4 hours

Radiological Characteristic of Releases2.18 Planners will need information on the characteristics of potential

radioactivity releases to specify the characteristics of monitoringinstrumentation, to develop decisional aids to estimate projecteddoses, and to identify critical exposure modes. For atmospheric releasesfrom nuclear power facilities, three dominant exposure modes have beenidentified. These are (l) whole body ("bone marrow) exposure from externalgamma radiation; (2) thyroid exposure froa inhalation or ingestion ofradioiodines; and (3) exposure of other organs (e.g.luag) from inhalationor ingestion of radioactive aaterials. Any of these exposure modes coulddominate (i.e. result in the largest exposures) depending upon therelative quantities of various isotopes released.Radioactive materials produced in the operation of nuclear reactorsinclude fission products and traneuranias generated within the fuel materialitself and activation products generated by neutron exposure of the struc-tural and other materials within and immediately around the reactor core.The fission products consist of a very large number of different kindsof isotopes (nuclides), almost all of which are radioactive. The amountsof these fission products and their potential for escape from their normalplaces of confinement represent the dominant potential for consequencesto the public. Sadioactive fission products exist in a variety of physicaland chemical forms of varied volatility. Virtually all activation productsand transuranics exist as non—volatile solids. The characteristics ofthese materials show quite clearly that, the potential for releases to theenvironment decreases dramatically in this orders

(l) Gaseous materials; (2) volatile solids; and (3) non-volatilesolids. For this reason, guidance for source terms representinghypothetical fission product activity within a nuclear power plantcontainment structure emphasizes the development of plans relatingto the release of noble gases and of volatiles such as iodine.However, consideration of particulate materials should not Úåcompletely neglected. For example, capability to determine thepresence or absence of key particulate radionuclides will be neededto identify requirements for additional resources. The followingTable II provides a list of key radionuclides that might be expectedto be dominant for each exposure pathway. More detailed lists ofreactor core inventories are found in a variety of publicationsincluding the U.S.Reactor Safety Study (Appendix V), NUEEG-75/014(WASH-1400), October 1975.

Table II.RADIONUCLIDES WITH SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO DOMINANT EXPOSURE MODES

Radionuclides with SignificantContribution to Thyroid Exposure

Radionuclides with SignificantContribution to Whole Body Exposure.

Radionuclides with SignificantContribution to Lung Exposure*(Lung only controlling whenthyroid dose is reduced by iodineblocking or there is a long delayprior to releases)

Radionuclide

1-1311-1321-133.1-1341-135

Te-132Kr-88

Half Life(days)8.050.08580.8750.0366

.0283.250.11?

Radionuclide1-131

Te-132Xe-1331-133

Xe-1351-135

Cs-134Kr-88Cs-137

Half Life(days)8.053.255.280.8750.384

.028750

0.11711,000

Radionuclide.1-1311-1321-1331-134•1-135

Cs-134Kr-88Cs-137Ru-106Te-132Ce-144

Half Life(days )8.050.08580.8750.0356

,028750

0.11711,000

3653.25

284

"Derived from the more probable U.S. Reactor Safety Study fuel melt categories and from postulated design basisaccident releases.

SECTIOir III. PROTECTIVE J ASURES AND ASSOCIATED RISKS,DIFFICULTIES AND COSTS.

GJjJiJSftAL

3*01 This Section provides a general discussion of the possibleprotective measures that could Úå implemented to protect thepublic in the event of an accident at a nuclear facility whichresults in a release of radioactive materials to the environment.

3*02 In the event of an accident, the decision-making authorities mustto apply protective measures aimed at reducing the radiological

exposures to the public to a value as low as reasonably achievable*

3.03 When an accident takes place, the resulting exposure can onlyÚå limited in a substantial way by implementing protective measuresappropriate to the nature of the risk and by applying them at theappropriate time. These measures mast be sufficiently flexible to beadaptable to the actual situation and must take into account thetype of accident and the environment potentially affected by therelease. The protective measures should be selected on the basis oftheir effectiveness in reducing the dose, and no effort should bewasted on measures of only marginal or questionable value in anygiven situation. Additionally,the risk or difficulty in implementingany protective measure in any given situation should be balancedagainst the risk from any projected radiological exposure.

3*04 In order to make effective use of certain protective measures, itis necessary to have a good communication system for giving publicwarning of the hazards, and for giving instructions. This isparticularly relevant for sheltering, radioprotective prophylaxis,evacuation and personal protective measures. An alarm system forthe public in the immediate vicinity of the potential release mayin some situations be desirable.

TYPES OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES3.05 The possible protective measures can be categorized as follows:

- sheltering- radioactive prophylaxiscontrol of access and egress

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- evacuation- personal protective methods*- decontamination of persons- medical care- diversion of food and water supplies- use of stored animal feed- decontamination of areas

TIME SCALE CONSHERATIOMS IS SELECTING PROTECTIVE MEASURES3.06 The selection of one or more of these protective measures must take

into account the nature of the accident and its attendant risks andin particular the time scale associated with these two factors. Timescales associated with an accident can generally be classified asfollows:- the early phase, where the immediate risk from an airborne release

may be the inhalation of radioactive material and/or irradiationfrom the radioactive plume. This phase extends for some hoursfrom the start of the accident,

- the intermediate phase, where the risk may be due to:i/ external radiation from ground depositions;ii/ internal radiation from inhalation of resuspended particulate

radioactivity;iii/ internal radiation from ingestion of contaminated fresh food

(milk, vegetables and fruits) and water. This phase may extend fromdays to weeks after the early phase,

- the late phase, where the risk may be due to consumption of contaminatedfood in general, and contamination of the environment. This phase mayextend from some weeks to several years after the earlier phasesdepending upon the nature of the release.

3.Q7 The possible application of the individual protective measures duringthe various phases of the accident is indicated in Table Øbelow.

* NOTE: Measures such as sophisticated respiratory protection andprotective clothing are more appropriate for protectingemergency teams than for protecting the general public. Simplerespiratory protection for the public can be recommended andis discussed in this document.

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TABLE IIIAPPLICABILITY OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES

PhaseEarly Intermediate

Sheltering ** *Radioprotective prophylaxis ** *Control of access and egress ** **Evacuation ** **Personal protective methods * *Decontamination of persons * *Medical care * **Diversion of food andwater supplies ** **

Use of stored animal feed ** **Decontamination of areas - *

** applicable and possibly essential* applicable- not applicable or of limited application

Late

_-#--**

******

NOTE: Although the protective measure of removing domestic animals in the foodchain from pasture and putting them on stored animal feed is not an immediateprotective measure beneficial to humans, nevertheless, if the situationwarrants, the earlier the animals are put on stored feed the greater maybe the dose savings at a later point when animal products begin to enterthe food chain.

13

SELECTION OP APPROPRIATE PROTECTIVE MEASURES

3.08 The relevance of the protective measures in relation toparticular hazards is illustrated in Table IV.

14

TABLE IV - RELEVANCE OP PROTECTION MASURES TO PARTICULAR HAZARDS

Potential Hazard Routes Time-Scale Applicable Protective Measures for General Public

Direct radiation from facility

1-Direct radiation from plume (andpossibly ground deposition)

2-Inhalation of volatiles (e.g.Iodine)

13-Inhalation of aerosols

4-Contamination of skin and clothes

5-Inhalation of resuspended particules

6-Radiation from ground deposition

7-Ingestion of contaminated food and water

H tes 1. Medical care may be required in any of the time-scaleauthorities when and if necessary

2. The use of stored animal feeds to limit the uptake ofcan be applicable in any of the time-scale phases.

Aë0>

Ô+>tôÎ)ÑáËë0)

EvacuationControl of accessShelteringControl of accessEvacuationShelteringRadioprotective prophylaxisControl of accessEvacuationPersonal protective methodsShelteringControl of accessEvacuationPersonal protective methodsShelteringControl of accessEvacuationDecontamination of personsEvacuationControl of accessPersonal protective methodsDecontamination of areEvacuationControl of accessShelteringDecontamination of areasDiversion of food and water

phases, and should be implemented by competentradionuclides by domestic animals in the food-chain

3.09 As a general principle it will Úå appropriate to implementprotective measures only when their social cost and risk willbe less than those resulting from the radiological exposurethat would Úå avoided.In many cases this is a very difficult decision.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OP PROTECTIVE MEASURES - RISKS, DIFFICULTIES AHD COSTSSheltering

3.10 A simple protective measure for mitigating the impact of adrifting plume of radioactive material is to advise people toseek shelter indoors, preferably in inner rooms or areas, andapply ad hoc respiratory protection. They should also be advisedto tune in local radio or television stations for further information.

3.11 For external radiation a reduction of whole body and possibly skindoses can be achieved by remaining indoors^If windows and outerdoors, as well as ventilation systems and other openings, are closed,a reduction of the concentration of radioactive material in theshelter air will result. A substantial reduction of inhalation dosecan be achieved which will be of particular importance for such organsas the thyroid, the lungs, and the gastrointestinal tract,(a) Shielding

3.12 The shielding effect against the direct radiation from a passingplume will depend to a considerable extent on the type of buildingbeing used as a shelter. Attenuation of gamma radiation depends firston an approximation of the mass of material between the source ofradiation and the person. The shielding effect will thus generally begreater for a building that is constructed of dense materials and inwhich there are a large number of floors between the radiation sourceand the occupied area. Sheltering in the basement or in undergroundstructures willconsequently provide the best protection. Attenuation ofradiation through windows will, however, be only slight. Persons shouldbe advised to stay in basements or centrally located rooms, if possiblewithout windows. Where it may be necessary to stay in rooms with largerwindows facing open air, they should be instructed to locate themselves^if possible, in corners or other placea shaded from direct daylightthrough windows.Because of the great variability of building structures, onlyapproximate values for shielding factors are available.(Table ÒÏ).

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3.13 It would be desirable for responsible authorities to acquireinformation concerning shielding factors for different typesof buildings that could be designated as shelters in thevicinity of particular nuclear facilities,(b) Ventilation control

3.14 The rate of ventilation of a building influences the rate at whichthe concentration of airborne contaminants from a passing plumeincreases within the building. Some estimate of the protectivebenefits of remaining indoors and limitating the ventilation ratecan be obtained from Figure I. E r using the number of air changes perhour multiplied by the immersion time in the plume in hours one candetermine the fraction of dose avoided.

Figure I« Effect of ventilation rate and immersion time onfraction of dose

Q.O o.i /* G 5 1.0 2. *» & & do ã A 6/Ventilation Rate/ x /Immersion Time/

d loo

3.15 With respect to ventilation control, persons taking shelter shouldbe requested to close all windows and outer doors and to stay in thatpart of the building which does not face the wind and which has aminimum number of windows and outer doors» Instruction should also begiven to put out any fires, in heaters or fireplaces, and to closeheater and chimney dampers. It is advisable to place radio-sensitivepersons5 such as young children and pregnant women, in rooms with

17

greater shielding factors and airtightness. However, it isimportant to ensure that adequate air supplies are maintainedin all occupied rooms.

3*16 With appropriate ventilation control, sheltering indoors can beregarded as a special case of respiratory protection. Wherefeasible, the rate of air exchange can Úå reduced still further,

*'ËÚó placing layers of moist newspaper or cloths in the chinks ofdoors and windows which can Úå opened. An additional reductionof inhalation doses Úó a protection factor of approximately 10may possibly Úå obtained in this way.*

3.17 When the airborne radioactive plume has passed, the shelteredpersons should Úå advised to quickly open windows and doors andto permit a thorough ventilation of the building. Persons shouldÚå urged to stay indoors for some time and open only window ordoor openings on the down side of the shelter until informationis available concerning the extent of any surface contaminationoutside the structure,c) Hisks, difficulties and costs

3.18 The adverse effects of requiring the public to seek shelter arerelatively small. Most persons are likely to Úå in the proximityof some kind of building or at their homes, and the possible harmor risks caused Úó such sheltering are negligible.

3.19 Few social difficulties are associated with temporary sheltering,since the public will appreciate the reasonableness of thisprecaution and will Úå willing to follow simple instructionsconcerning sheltering requirements. However, long term sheltering,that is for more than about 12 hours, may cause both social,medical and hygienic problems, except in specially designed facilities»Por a period of 24 hours or longer, food and medical care for shelteroccupants will also need to be considered. The need for long termsheltering might also imply a relatively long release time for theradiation with an attendant relatively low dose commitment rate.For this situation (except for severe inclemant weather) an orderlyevacuation of the area would be more appropriate after an initialshelter period.

* See IAEA Technical Reports Series No. 152. Table LXVII.

18

3«20 In most cases, it will be possible for all potentially affectedpersons to find shelter, if the alarm is given early enough»When it can Úå envisaged that a major city will Úå exposed toa radioactive plume from a severe accident, sheltering actionfor such a large population group may Úå preferable to massiveevacuation because of the potential physical injury and propertyloss risks associated with such an operation»

3«21 The overall cost of short term sheltering in any community doesnot impose any severe direct financial burdens for planning orresponse»

Radieprotectiyejgrophylaxis(a) Basic principles

3«22 Radioprotective prophylaxis means the intake of specific stablechemical compounds which have a reducing or blocking effect uponthe uptake of certain radioactive isotopes»

3«23 Examples of such blocking substances are stable iodine compoundSjfor example potassium iodide or potassium iodate. These compoundsare effective in reducing the uptake in the thyroid gland of 1—131and other iodine radioisotopes which are expected to be present ina fission product release» However, these drugs will not protectother possibly more important body organs.

3»24 The uptake of iodine in the thyroid gland is age-dependent andfor metabolic reasons is greater in young children and progressivelydecreases with age in older children until they have the sameuptake as adults» The radiation-dose to the thyroid gland afterinhalation of 1-131 and other isotopes of iodine will be largein newborns. Tue average dose for all children over a range ofages is about 3 times the dose to adults»

19

3«25 After an intake of 1-131, the quantity in the thyroidreaches a maximum in 1-2 days, and about half of this value isreached in about 6 hours. Consequently it is imperative that theprophylactic use of stable iodine compounds should be implementedbefore exposure to inhalation of radioactive iodine or as soon aspracticable thereafter.

3.26 If such compounds are administered six hours after intake ofradioactive iodine, a reduction in dose to the thyroid ofapproximately 50$ is anticipated. Little reduction in dose isachieved if they are administered more than 12 hours later.Their administration after 24 hours is ineffective.

3»27 In principle, the intake of stable iodine compounds may also beapplied to protection against the uptake of I-13I and other radio-iodines from contaminated milk, foodstuffs and drinking water.However, since the uptake of radioiodines from such substances ismore of a problem during later phases of the accident, it seemsreasonable to assume that diversion of food and water supplies maybe more effective as a protective measure during these late phases.

3.28 Experience has shown that both potassium iodide (ÊÃ) and potassiumiodate (KIO ) are effective prophylactics. However, the lattermay be stored for longer periods without deterioration and isnow the recommended chemical form if manufactured into tablets.However, tablets may be unsuitable for administration to smallchildren and infants and procedures should be provided foradministering to that critical group.

20

3.29 A publication by the U.S, National Council on RadiologicalProtection and Measurements (NCRP)* gives an up-to-datereview on the subject and a comprehensive list of references.These should Úå consulted Úó persons responsible for emergencyplanning.(Ú) Dosage and administration

3*30 The recommended dosages of these stable iodine compounds thatrepresent a consensus viewpoint are as follows:i) All individuals above age of 1 year;

130 mg KI or 170 mg ÊÒÎ-, •——during the first 24 hours(100 mg iodide equivalent)65 mg KI or 85 KIO j —— every day following first 24 hours(50 mg iodide equivalent)

ii) Infants under age of 1 year65 mg KI •—— every 24 hours.

3*31 The administration of stahle iodine compounds should not becontinued unnecessarily* It is recommended that the maximum totaldose should not exceed one gram. The public health authority shouldrecommend when these compounds should Úå used and in what quantities*(o) Risks, difficulties and costs

3*32 Risk caused Úó administration of a radioprotective prophylacticdrug should be lower than the potential risks caused Úó exposureto the radiation. Undesirable side effects may occur in a limitednumber of the population. It is therefore considered that no major

* HCRP Report No. 55

21

risks are associated with the use of this protective measure.3.33 An important point to keep in mind is that intake of stable

iodine compound tablets specifically protects against irradiationof the thyroid gland only. This protective measure must thereforebe looked upon as a supplement to other protective measures andwill not necessarily replace them in any given situation.

3*34 The implementation of this protective measure would be moreeffective if the stable iodine compounds were distributedbefore an accident has occurred. However, difficult problems withpredistribution are encountered and this practice is not recommended.The effectiveness of the distribution and administration of thesecompounds after the accident has occurred will depend on the time-liness of distribution. To obtain the best results, it is essentialthat an efficient organization exists for the rapid distributionof the drug which of course must be on hand in suitable locations.

3.35 The overall cost of the manufacture, distribution and use ofa radioprotective prophylactic compound is not too expensiveand cost considerations should not preclude its use as a protectivemeasure.

Control of access and egress(a) General

3*36 Control of movement to and from the areas affected by a nuclearaccident is a protective measure often mentioned, but usuallyleft unclarified in emergency plans. Control of entry to a definedarea may be required within a short period of time from theoccurrence of an accident. The area over which control muat beexercised may vary with time after the accident.

3.37 Some of the reasons envisaged for control of access and egressas a protective measure are:- during the initial phase of the accident, to avoid unnecessary

entry of additional persons into the projected danger area;- during early and intermediate phases of the accident to clear

routes to facilitate evacuation, and to facilitate the accessof emergency teams to the accident site and of radiological

22

monitoring teams to the affected areas;- during later phases of the accident, after the passage of the

radioactive plume, to reduce unnecessary exposure of personsto ground contamination and to inhalation of resuspended radio-active material and avoid unnecessary contamination of emergencyequipment and supplies;

- during any post evacuation stage, to prevent unauthorized re-entryinto contaminated areas and to ensure security of property leftbehind Úó evacuees;

- during later phases of the accident, to ensure that no unauthorizedtransfer of contaminated artciles (foodstuffs, crops, etc.) toclean areas takes place;

- during all phases of the accident, to permit efficient routing ofessential traffic through affected areas and to avoid the transportof unnecessary equipment and supplies into the contaminated areas,(b) f sksiti|d:LfficultiieiBiiiand_costs

3.38 The risks involved are mainly those of accidents due to trafficcongestion. These, however, become negligible if proper teamwork is ensured by the responsible authorities.

3.39 The overall cost attributable to this protective measure isacceptable and involves mainly additional manpower to establishaccess control teams with provision for their reliefs. Additionalindirect costs are minimal in terms of team equipage since most ofthe equipment should be available from emergency, military,andpolice service organizations*

Evacuation(a) General

3.40 Evacuation is the ultimate protective measure that can be implementedif suitable conditions exist. As a protective measure related toradiological releases to the environs, it can be used for theprotection of peoples

- from direct radiation from the nuclear facility- from inhalation of radioactive materials- from external exposure due to the passing plume- from external exposure due to ground contamination- from inhalation of resuspended radioactive material

23

The value of evacuation in relationship to other protectivemeasures assumes that the hazard is great enough to warrant itsuse. Factors influencing the choice of evacuation include themagnitude and characteristics of the accident, size of populationto be evacuated, available routes away from the area to be evacuated,modes of transportation, weather conditions and resources. Evacuationrequires time, and in some circumstances it may not be feasible duringthe early phase of the accident. During that stage only relativelysmall communities can be efficiently evacuated in a timely fashion»

3.41 Evacuation can be effective during the intermediate phase followingsheltering as a means of reducing exposure dose from a highlycontaminated environment. However, the ideal time to implementevacuation is prior to the plume arrival.

3.42 If evacuation is envisaged during the passage of the plume, itis possible that higher doses might be received by the evacuees,as opposed to keeping them in shelter. In addition, it must alsobe remembered that the time scale for mobilizing vehicles is long,and it may prove impossible to evacuate before the plume arrives,(b) Risks, difficulties and costs

3.43 The risks associated with evacuation have generally been statedto be relatively small. In most cases no panic or hysteria has beenobserved. Evacuation can be performed at relatively low risk ifproperly preplanned and efficiently carried out. However, trafficaccidents remain as a possible risk. In addition, other risks may beassociated with the evacuation of special groups (e.g. elderlypersons and invalids), and consideration must be given to this aspect.

3«44 Difficulties during evacuation such as traffic congestion, masscommunications difficulties, confusion and reluctance to evacuateon the part of some individuals, language barriers and ethnicconsiderations have been reported. Time constraints impose additionalproblems. The time required for people to prepare to leave afternotification depends on such factors as:1. Whether family units are together, and their special problems.2. Type of community involved.3. Special evacuation considerations for institutions, industries,

hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, etc.4. Refusal to cooperate with evacuation authorities.

24

3»45 The impact of implementing evacuation as a protective measureon communities varies according to the type of community involved.A variety of communities may be found surrounding differentnuclear facility sites. These may include residential, urban,rural or agriculture, industrial or commercial, and recreationalcommunities.

3«46 The economic considerations associated with evacuation are relatedto the type of community involved. For example, the evacuation ofpeople from an area used for agriculture presents unique problems,and the costs incurred include those related to the care of domesticanimals. In general, the major cost is the financial cost resultingfrom loss of farm products and, on a long-term basis, the withdrawalof land from use. Similarily, evacuation of personnel from a largeindustrial plant could cause great economic loss and damage tocritical plant equipment.

3»47 The financial impact of evacuation on residential, and perhapsrecreational, areas would probably be less severe. This assumes, ofcourse, that there are adequate relocation centers for evacuees andadequate private or governmental resources to care for them. It alsoassumes that there is adequate law enforcement for the protection ofevacuated properties.

3.48 In summary, the overall costs of evacuation may be very high and theyinclude the costs of alternate housing, food, transportation, andother displacement costs.

Personal protective methods(a.) General

3.49 Two forms of personal protective methods may be applicable in thiscontext, namely respiratory protection and protective clothing. Thesemeasures offer protection against airborne and deposited radioactivity.The correct fitting, use, and care of such equipment requires that theinvolved individuals be given some formal training in its use. Thisis not feasible when dealing with the general public. Consequently,if any use is to be made of such measures by the public, the simpleequipment and techniques to be employed can only b© of a veryrudimentary nature.

25

(b) Simple respiratory protection3.50 This may be provided Úó the use of handkershiefs, soft absorbant paper

products, clothing and other items which can be used to cover the mouthand nostrils. The public can be advised to use such simple itemswhile proceeding to take shelter, and possibly during sheltering.Similar precautions could be recommended while members of the publicwere being evacuated from a contaminated area.Table >7>...; in this section indicates the relative degree of respiratoryprotection provided by several common household and personal useitems against aerosols of 1-3 micron particle size.(c) Other forms of respiratory protection

3«51 Special groups such as police, ambulance service, firemen, andradiological monitoring and rescue teams might be required to operatein contaminated areas. Under such conditions, they would be requiredto use more sophisticated respiratory equipment. These include fullface respirators with appropriate filters, or self-contained breathingapparatus. Such persons must be trained to use this equipment.(d) Protective clothing

3.52 Any form of clothing will provide a certain degree of protectionagainst contamination from any source. It is not practicable toprovide members of the public with purpose-designed protective wear.However, the special emergency teams may require appropriate protectiveclothing. These groups should be trained in the proper wearing andremoval of this clothing.(e) Risks, difficulties and costs

3.53 For work with protective clothing and.respiratory protection, thereare special rules which should be observed in accident situationsbecause of the burden and risk such devices represent to the wearer.The capability of specific individuals - assigned to emergency orrescue team - to wear "supplied air" or other respiratory protectionmust be ascertained by periodic medical examination and drills involvingthe actual use of the protective clothing and equipment. Periodictraining under simulated accident conditions is of great importancefor ensuring the readiness of both personnel and equipment for operationin an actual emergency.

3«54 Because this protective measure is generally applicable only to smallspecialized groups of the offsite emergency organization, its associatedcosts are relatively minimal. Some additional equipment may have to be

26

TABLE V.

RESPIRATORY PROTECTION PROVIIED BY COMMON HOUSEHOLD AND PERSONAL ITEMSAGAINST AEROSOLS OF 1 TO 5u PARTICLE SIZE

NumberItem of Resistance

Thick- „ „ _.mm of H_0nesses 2

Handkerchief ,man's cotton

Toilet paperHandkerchief,man's cotton

16

3

8

3613

18Handkerchief,man's cotton Crumpled -

Bath towel,turki sh

Bath towel,turki sh

Bed. sheet, muslinBath towel,turki sh

Shirt , cottonShirt, cottonHandkerchief,

woman1 s cottonHand&erchi e f ,man's cotton

Dress material,cotton

Handkerchief,woman's cotton

Slip, rayonDress material,cotton

Shirt, cotton

Handkerchiefman's cotton

2

11

1 (wet)1 (wet)2

4 (wet)

1 (wet)

1 (wet)

41

11

1

11

522

3I5oa

7

84a

98a

180a

26

53

2

a. Resistance obtained when checked immediatelyresistance began to decrease after about onestarted to dry.

Reference : American

GeometricMean

Efficiency,%

94.2

91.4

88.9

88.1

85.1

73.972.0

70.265.965.5

63.0

62.6

56.3

55.550.0

47.634.6

27.5

after hand wringing. Thisminute when the material

Industrial Hygiene Assn-1963RESPIRATORY PROTECTIVE DEVICES MANUAL

27

acquired for some offsite emergency organizations who normallyare not provided with this specialized protective equipment andthis represents an additional but minor cost factor.(f) Storage and maintenance

3.55 Storage and maintenance of simple respiratory protection andprotective clothing items present no problems. However, moreelaborate equipment must Úå carefully stored and regularly maintainedin accordance with the manufacturer's instructionse

Decontamination of persons(a) General

3»56 If decontamination as a protective measure is associated with takingshelter, then if possible it should be performed before taking shelterin order to maintain the radiological cleanliness of the shelter»It is advisable to decontaminate any heavily contaminated personsas a first priority and if evacuation takes place after taking shelterthere is a need for monitoring and decontamination of persons.

3.57 Usually persons can be decontaminated in ordinary shower facilities.If adequate facilities do not exist at a fixed location, fieldpersonnel decontamination facilities can be constructed, usingbasic equipment readily available to industry and to the armedforces of most nations» Most clothing can be decontaminated bysimple washing using normal procedures.

3.58 Medical assistance may be required in the case of personnel decon-tamination, particularly where injuries are involved.

3*59 Adequate respositories for the storage of decontamination wastes arerequired when these wastes can be effectively collected.**(b) Risks, difficulties aM costs

3.60 Risks associated with decontamination are generally acceptable and thecost involved in its implementation depends on local circumstances.

Medical Care(a) General

3.61 When an accident results in radiation exposure or other injury limitedto the facility operators, any first aid required should be provided

** NOTE: The collection of waste water from decontamination or personnelor clothing is, in general, not practical where large scalecontamination already exists in the environment.

28

Úó appropriately trained personnels The operating organizationof the facility requires that adequately trained personnel Úåpresent on every shift. Medical personnel from suitable off sitemedical centres should also Úå readily available according to theemergency plan of the nuclear facility.

3.62 First aid is primarily directed at preventing traumatic injuriesfrom threatening life. It may also include some assessment ofcontamination and the performance of limited decontamination.Definitive medical care requires hospitalization, medicaltreatment and assessment of the dose that has Úååï received Úó theaccident victims. Medical treatment may Úå required on an outpatientbasis or in a hospital according to the radiation exposure andinjuries involved. In the case of accidents resulting in radiationexposure to off site populations, the extent to which medical carewill Úå required depends on the size of the accident, the level ofthe doses received, and the number of persons affected. If there isa great number of persons involved, for example more than severalhundreds needing medical treatment, medical care may be difficult andmay be less effective than where only a few persons are affectedwho can be treated carefully in special medical facilities.

3.63 The basic principles of first aid and medical treatment where radiationexposure is involved are generally based on the same methods usedfor handling other accidents modified by considerations of radiationexposure or contamination»

3.64 First aid for members of the public should be performed by personnelof emergency services organizations, for example Red Cross, police,Civil Defense, hospitals or other personnel who have been adequatelytrained. Medical advice with respect to radiation exposure or injuryshould be given by physicians of the public health services or otherswith appropriate knowledge or experience» The medical staff shoulddivide the population of the affected area into three categories:a) persons believed to be free of injury or radiation exposure;b) persons with any signs of radiation sickness, who should be sent

for appropriate treatment;c) persons with any radiation sickness and contaminated injuries9

who have to be transported to special clinics.The medical staff should administer according to sound medicaljudgement, ohelating substances to people who could have ingestedand/or inhaled large quantities of radioactive contaminants.

29

(b) Risks, difficulties and costs3.65 Medical care of persons exposed to radiation does not usually pose

additional risks to other persons. Hadiologically contaminatedpersons do pose a risk to others and hence decontamination becomesimportant to reduce or eliminate this risk. Difficulties may risefrom a lack of proper training of the personnel available to providefirst aid and medical care.

3.66 In most countries an organization for handling victims of everydayaccidents will already exist in one form or another. Special facilitiesfor the medical care of radiation injuries are of limited availabilityand existing facilities may have to be used for this purpose.Training programs in radiological matters should be provided to atminimum a nucleus of medical personnel at existing medical facilitieswho may be called upon to cope with any radiation injuries. In somecases, additional equipment may be required for emergency medicalteams. Planned maximum use of trained radiologists and radiationmedicine resources should minimize the costs of planning in thisarea.

Diversion of food and water supplies(a) General

3,67 Diversion of foodstuffs means control of the distribution of thecontaminated food products, their possible dilution and mixing withproducts from clean regions, and their conversion to other products,to achieve an acceptable,low activity concentration in the resultingproducts. Under certain conditions, and if properly accomplished, theconsumption of these end products may not lead to any harm to theconsumer but expert advice will be needed to utilize this technique.Diversion of water supplies that are contaminated usually means shuttingoff normal supply intake to the contaminated source. Diversion can alsoimply destruction, and using alternative sources* of foods and watersupplies. Although these are somewhat different actions than diversion,for simplicity they are contained under the same heading.

*ÃÎÈÇ: Alternative sources means the supply of the public in the affectedarea with uncontaminated food and water supplies from other sources,generally outside of the contaminated area.

30

3»68 Destruction of foodstuffs means that the contaminated, products willnot Úå used for human food. When used otherwise, for example as feedfor animals, care should be taken that they do not indirectly affecthuman beings. Destruction has no practical applicability to contaminatedwater supplies.

3„69 Owing to their interdependence, protective measures involvingthe control of food and water supplies, i.e. diversion,destruction and alternative sources, can be discussed together.These three protective measures are mainly applicable in theintermediate and late phases. This means that before orderingthe diversion of foods or water, or destruction of foods, orthe use of foods or water from outside the contaminated area,the results of special radiological measurements should beavailable. Such measurements give information about the mainradionuclides present and their concentrations in the variousfoodstuffs and water supplies. Based on this information, theresponsible authority is able to balance the potential risk fromradiation against the social and economic costs of its avoidance,(b) Risk3[Vi [difficultieiS[ jancl costg_

3.70 The change of diet due to these protective measures may be incon-venient or even pose a risk to some people, especially olderpersons, children and the ill. Ethnic considerations may alsobe a factor in some areas.

3.71 In the case of large contaminated areas, social and economicconsiderations are very important. The supply of uncontaminatedfoods and. water may raise various transportation and supplydifficulties and these must be considered before initiating theseprotective measures.

3«?2 The costs associated with implementing the protective measuresare dominated by the value of the food destroyed or diverted.Decisions will need to be made when considering the destructionof food stuffs in areas where food may be necessary for consumptionbecause of the economic conditions of the population. Immediateremoval of grazing dairy animals from possibly contaminated pastureshould minimize costs of protective actions for this exposure pathway.Monitoring should have an additional objective of providing data todetermine when dairy animals can return to pasture.

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Decontamination in affected areas(a) General

3*73 Decontamination of areas, equipment, buildings, roads, land, etc., isa protective measure that applies to the intermediate or late phase*.This protective measure involves mainly the removal of the radioactivityfrom an affected area to another location where it will be less hazardous.Several actions can be envisaged such as:

washing or vacuum sweeping of roads and the surfaces of buildings.This can be done with fire fighting or industrial equipment;

- plowing agricultural lands and pastures. This technique does not get rid ofcontamination but relocates surface contamination to deeper layers inthe soil;

- removal of surface layers of earth to a storage place;- washing and cleaning of equipment with water and appropriate detergents;- fixation of contaminants.

3»74 Adequate repositories for the storage of decontamination wastes arerequired. In the case of decontamination of land by large scale surfaceearth removal, adequate heavy duty transportation equipment is of specialimportance.(b) Risks, difficulties and costs

3*75 Risks associated with this protective measure arise from the exposure ofthe persons performing the action through inhalation, ingestion and externalirradiation. These persons more than likely will require protective clothingand equipment and radiological exposure control.

3*76 Some difficulties can be encountered with decontamination especially in thecase of massive decontamination of land areas by large scale surface earthremoval. Massive decontamination of structures and other environmentalsurfaces such as roads can pose a variety of problems.

3*77 Weather conditions can affect the decontamination feasibility and effective-ness to a marked degree. In general, decontamination in cold weather wouldusually be more difficult than in warm weather.

«ÍÎÒÅ: Por a relatively detailed treatise on decontamination, see theU.S. Reactor Safety Study.I UREG-75/014 /WASH-1400/, APPENDIX VI.Appendix K, October 1975.

32

3»78 The overall costs of this protective measure can be highespecially in the case of large scale surface removal andmassive decontamination of structures and of other surfacessuch as roads. Storage or disposal of radioactive wastescan pose additional problems. Loss of property or loss ofits use, through radioactive contamination, may be a majorfactor in the overall financial considerations and this costcould be quite high.

33

SECTION IV - PLANNING FOR RESPONSE TO AN ACCIDENT/ASSESSMENT/PREDICTION/OPERATIONAL RESPONSE.

General4.01 This Section provides a general discussion of matters relating to the

handling of accident situations and deals, in particular, with planningthe implementation of protective measures from the point of view of theoffsite organizations involved and with consideration of the role ofthe nuclear facility operator. It also discusses the practical organi-zational aspects and difficulties which may occur in implementingprotective measures. In essence, it is concerned with the actual developmentof the emergency response plan through application of the guidance onaccident analysis, protective measures, intervention levels, discussed inSections II, III, V and this Section.

4.02 To plan for the important operational aspects of emergency response toan accident, that is, to determine the actual offsite consequencesand to select and implement appropriate protective measures, it isnecessary to identify the available emergency response resources in termsof trained manpower, special equipment, facilities, shelters and othersupportive resources. Adapting the response to the accident situations isvery important in terms of conserving available resources and minimizingdisruptions to the surrounding populations, homes, industry and theenvironment, while at the same time ensuring that the protective measuresselected are adequate to minimize any risk from exposure.

4.03 Flexible emergency response plans capable of coping with a spectrum ofaccidents are complicated for the following reasons- the relatively wide spectrum of accident situations that may be

envi saged;- the expected extremely low probability (frequency) of occurrence

of serious accidents;- the need to identify immediately the accident situation

and to project its offsite consequences which may be subject to thevariation in time factors associated with a radioactive release

- the requirement for a large number of different actions to be takenboth on and offsite which may be interrelated, and may have to be wellcoordinated and implemented simultaneously;

- the human and material resources needed for the response;- the variety of the skills and qualifications of persons and organizations

required to implement these actions.

34

4.04 After the emergency response plan is developed, emergencyprocedures covering the details of operational response throughimplementation of protective measures should be developed foreach part of the response organization identified in the emergencyplan.

CONCEPT OF EMERGEHGY ÐØØØ? ZOHES4.05 Since the various types of nuclear facilities have different

potentials for accidents, it is necessary to analyze thesepotentials in terms of projected offsite consequences. Theoffsite areas that might be affected must be identified andthe characteristics of these areas in terms of demography,environment and land use must be ascertained since these canbe affected by an accidental release of radioactive materialfrom the facility. The local conditions may vary rather widelyfrom site to site and it is important to take these variationsinto consideration when developing the emergency plan.

4.06 With regard to the area over which planning efforts should becarried out, the concept of establishing Emergency PlanningZones (EPZs) around each nuclear facility can be useful to theorganizations charged with defining the scope of emergencyplanning efforts to be carried out. These zones can be definedin terms of roughly circular area with its center at the nuclearfacility appropriately divided into sectors and segments,(i) Size of the Zones The zones can be selected in terms of

either a site specific or generic distance out from thefacility(for common types of nuclear facilities) basedupon analysis of the accidents considered for planning purposesin terms of projected radiological doses offsite. The relation-ship between these projected doses and Intervention, Action,or Emergency Reference Levels, or Protective Action Guides,can be established, and either a site specific or genericdistance can be selected within which these levels or guidesmight be reached. Thus the purpose of the Emergency PlanningZones is to facilitate emergency planning in the vicinity

35

of nuclear facilities and the objective of establishingthese Bones is to plan for dose savings in the environment.It is expected that judgement of the planner will be used indetermining the precise size and shape of the EPZs consideringlocal conditions such as demography, topography and land usecharacteristics, access routes, jurisdictional boundaries, andarrangements with the nuclear facility operator for notificationand response assistance. The exact size and shape of the EPZsshould be determined by the responsible governmental authorities.

(ii)Types of ZonesEmergency Planning Zones can be established for two basic exposurepathways; (l) the short-term "plume exposure pathway" (thyroid,whole body and other organ exposures from an airborne radiolo-gical release) and (2) the "ingestion exposure pathway" (internalexposure from agricultural, milk and water pathways). Protectivemeasures which may have to be implemented for the ingestion pathwaymay involve geographical areas substantially much larger than theareas involved in the plume exposure pathway. The concept ofEmergency Planning Zones is illustrated in Figure 3*.

(iii)Emergency Planning Zone (Plume Exposure Pathway)For the plume exposure pathway (airborne radiological release),an Emergency Planning Zone can be defined in terms of a genericdistance (for similar nuclear facilities) at which InterventionLevels for this pathway (such as whole body and thyroid levelsor guides) should not be exceeded outside the zone as a resultof releases postulated for the largest accident considered forplanning purposes.

(iv)Emergency Planning Zone (ingestion Pathway)For the agricultural, milk and water pathways, an EmergencyPlanning Zone can be also defined in terms of a "generic distance"(for similar nuclear facilities) at which Intervention Levelsfor the ingestion pathway should not be exceeded outside the zoneas a result of releases postulated for the largest accidentconsidered for planning purposes.

36

(v)Characteristics of the Emergenp^ Planning ZonesCharacteristics of the Emergency Planning Zones surroundingeach nuclear facility should be determined since thisinformation is directly related to the types of protectivemeasures which can or should be taken in the surroundingenvironment.

vi)Planning within the^Zones.Emergency Planning Zones can be designated as the areas forwhich planning is recommended to assure that prompt andeffective actions can be taken to protect the public in theevent of an accident. Responsible government officials canapply the applicable planning items listed in this manualwithin the selected zones.The following are example planning elements consideredappropriate for the EPZs!

Identify responsible onsite and offsite emergency responseorganizations and the mechanisms for activation of theirservices,Establish effective communication networks to promptlynotify cognizant authorities and the public,

(3) Designate pre-determined actions as appropriate,(4) Develop procedures for use by emergency response personnel(5) Identify applicable radiation measurement survey and

monitoring equipment,Identify Emergency Operations Centers and alternatelocations, assembly points, and radiation monitoringlocations,Impalement training programs for emergency response personnelas appropriate, and

(8) Develop procedures for testing emergency response plans,communications systems and related equipment.

Emergency planning should predetermine appropriate emergencyresponses within the EPZ as a function of population groups,environmental conditions, plant conditions and time availableto respond. For the plume exposure zone, sheltering and/or

37

woo

REACTOR SITE

PLUMETRAVELDIRECTION

EXAMPLE RESPONSEAREA FOR THEPLUME EXPOSUREPATHWAY.

THE RESPONSEAREA FOR THEINGESTION EXPOSUREPATHWAY WOULDHAVE THE SAMERELATIVE SHAPEBUT WOULD BELARGER.

TRANSPORT OFMILK TO DAIRYPROCESSING CENTER

-*g———ô———i&p-INDICATES VARIABLERESPONSE BOUNDARY.

Figure 2<Concept of Emergency Planning Zonas

evacuation and/or radioprotective prophylaxis wouldlikely be the principal immediate protective actionsto be recommended for the general public within thisEPZ. The ability of a protective action to best reducethe exposure of the population should determine theappropriate response. The key to effective planning isgood communication to authorities who know what theyare going to do with respect to implementing protectivemeasures under pre-determined conditions.Ðîã the ingestion exposure Emergency Planning Zone, theplanning effort involves the identification of themajor pathways for exposure from contaminated food andwater and the associated control points and mechanisms.In general, the ingestion pathways for exposure wouldrepresent a longer term problem, although some earlyprotective actions to minimize subsequent contaminationof milk or other natural foods should be initiated (e.g.put cows on stored feed , isolate agricultural products,and harvest crops immediately). In this zone, authoritiesshould have preplanned actions to control or interdictradiological exposure via the ingestion or food-chainpathway.

4.0? Relevant Offsite DataIn order to assist in the selection of the most effectiveprotective measures, the characteristics of the offsite areasmost likely to be affected by the release should be identified.These offsite regions can be referred to by mapping them inthe Emergency Planning Zones selected for the facility,appropriately divided into sectors or segments.

4.08 The extent to which such mapping would be useful can bedetermined from calculations which show those areas in whichradiation contamination levels may exceed the applicableintervention levels (see Section V). Information on populationdistribution, industry, water sources, etc. relevant to eachzone, will indicate whether there are critical areas, withrespect to potential exposure routes. A knowledge of theamenities (for example communications, transport) in each zone

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will also indicate which protective measures would Úå morelikely to achieve the desired results, especially where optionsexist. On the basis of such information the characteristics ofthe zones can be established.

4.09 These characteristics of the zones can be divided into thefollowing general categories:- data on organization, facilities, and equipment, of importance

for the emergency response planning and response organization- data on population, domestic animals in the food chain, agri-

culture industry in the region of the site;- data on topography and geographical features surrounding the

site.4.10 In relation to these categories the following information should be

available:(a) Population statistics

(i) Demographic information for the area surrounding thenuclear facility.

(ii ) Special population surveys where the available informationis sparse or transient and temporary population distribu-tions have been identified.

(b) Public institutions and services(i) Pire, ambulance and other emergency services and police

and military organizations and their availability,(ii) Locations of recreational, educational, transportation,

hospital and shopping areas.(c) Public utilities

(i) Rivers, streams, lakes, the locations of water holdingareas, such as reservoirs used for portable water supplies,industrial purposes and irrigation. Control points for thewater distribution system and demands,

(ii) Storm water and sewage system pumping stations.( i) Telephone services, communications equipment centers, and

public broadcast radio and television transmitters and theirstudios,

(iv) Electric power generation and distribution systems.

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(d) Transport systems(i) National and sub-national highways, and local

roads around the nuclear facility boundaries(out to about 20 km). Traffic densities and thecapacity of these highways and roads to carryvehicular traffic. The capacity of local publictransport systems and transport available fromother sources.

(ii) Rail transport system in the areas of concern.This should include the passanger and freightservice facilities.

(iii) Commercial airports, and other privately andgovernment owned landing fields.

(iv) Uavigable water (oceans, lakes, rivers, canals)traffic and usage.

(e) Agricultural land and domestic animalsLand areas devoted to food crops, animal feed or grazingalong with their principal uses. Animals raised for theirmeat, milk, hides, fur or hair to supply human needs.

(f) IndustryIndustry in the vicinity of a nuclear facility (e.g.a chemical or petrochemical plant where shut down of theplant may require considerable effort and time and involvesafety considerations.

(g) Topography and GeographyMountain ranges, lakes, oceans, rivers, watershed areas.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ACCIBEM1The Role of the Nuclear Facility Operator4.11 As the operator of a nuclear facility is in the best position

to make an initial assessment of the operational conditions atthe time of the accident, including any engineered safetyfeatures which may have been activated or may have failed tofunction, it follows that the unecruivocal responsibility forthe initial assessment of the accident situation at the facilityrests with the operator. The initial prediction of any offsiteconsequences of an accident is also a responsibility of the

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facility operator since it must be based upon the initialassessment at the facility if timely protective measuresare to be implemented offsite. Subsequent reassessmentby the facility operator may result in a revised predictionof offsite consequences which will then be considered orconfirmed by the offsite authorities.

4.12 Section VI describes the role of the nuclear facility operatorsin relation to preplanning for the estimation of offsiteconsequences arising from accidents at the facility. The operatorshave an additional part to play in assessing an actual accidentsituation and predicting the offsite conditions that may result.These offsite conditions may occur immediately after the accidentor they may be delayed for a period of time ranging from minutesto hours. In any case, the facility operator must use hispersonnel, equipment and other resources immediately after theaccident occurs in order to put the plant in as safe a configu-ration as possible which includes an assessment of the functioningof engineered safety features. Additionally, he must implement anydesirable onsite personnel protective measures, and assess thenature and magnitude of the accident, including the nature ofany radioactive release to th environment.The facility operator must also estimate, as soon as possible,the direction, height and dispersion of any radioactive plumeinto offsite areas. The estimates regarding the plume, predictionsof the potential radiation exposure of the nearby population andthe possibilities for contamination of the offsite environmentmust be communicated to the appropriate offsite organizations asearlyas practicable by the facility operators, since time is requiredto activate the local emergency response personnel and facilities.

4.13 These early estimates should be revised when more realistic informationis available from the more detailed assessment of the accident and whenadditional radiological and meteorological measurements have been madeonsite and offsite. In response to requests from the responsible offsiteauthorities for advice, the facility operator may initially recommendappropriate protective measures for the protection of the public becauseof the time necessary for offsite authorities to mobilize and takecorrective action.

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4.14 In addition to the tasks of the nuclear facility emergencyteams maintained for accident situations which are confinedto the site (for example small fires, industrial accidents),these teams could also be charged with initial tasks relatedto accident assessment covered by offsite emergency responseplans. The availability of facility personnel to conduct initialassessments offsite will depend on to a great degree on thesize of the facility staff and the arrangements with offsiteauthorities.

The Role of Offsite Authorities4.15 Offsite authorities who have responsibilities for emergency

preparedness may be categorized into those that are immediatelyadjacent to the nuclear facility and those that are located atsome distances away.

4.16 The responsibilities of offsite authorities for conducting offsiteassessment and predicting offsite consequences of releases fromthe nuclear facility should be clearly defined. In the early phasesof an accident the offsite authorities' assessment and predictionshould be supported by the assessment and prediction made by thefacility operator.

4.17 It is mandatory for offsite authorities to make arrangements withthe facility operator for them to be provided with information concerningearly warning and prediction of offsite consequences and recommen-dations of the facility operator for protective measures for thesurrounding population which should be implemented immediately.However, offsite authorities1 assessment teams should conduct anindependent offsite complementary assessment as early as possiblein order to assist in ascertaining the actual impact of the release*However, the initial need to take protective measures should notawait this assessment but should be based upon recommendations ofthe facility operator.*)

4.18 In the later phase of an accident, the definitive and independentassessment and prediction of radioactive contamination in theenvironment surrounding the facility should be controlled by theoffsite authorities.*)For major accidents, resources recjuired for implementing protectivemeasures in the immediate environs should not be diluted forassessment actions, especially in the early time frame.

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Instrumentation for AssessmentNuclear Facility Operational Instrumentation4Ë9 Instrumentation specifically designed to monitor and control

plant operating conditions can serve to help assess the typeof accident that has occurred and some of its onsite and offsiteconsequences.

4.20 It can be anticipated that some of the following information maybe provided by such operational instrumentation:- an estimate of the amount of radioactivity that may have been

released to the environment ;- the point of release,- the time characteristics of the release (probable beginning and

duration of release),- the radiological characteristics of the release (e.g. probable

content of gaseous, volatile and non-volatile radionuclides).- the operational status of engineered safety features of the

facility.- projection of the future course of events.

4.21 These instruments may include radiological monitors in buildings,containment and ventilation systems, pressure and temperatureindicators showing the status of ventilation systems and containmentintegrity (e.g.doors, piping, etc.) and the air flow in releasestacks. Meteorological instruments should also be located onsitewhich will provide useful information.

4.22 In case of an accident it may be advantageous to have remote readingsof some of these instruments. It should be noted that some parametersunder accident conditions may be many orders of magnitude abovethose encountered during routine operation. Therefore operationalinstrumentation should be capable of giving reliable informationunless they are damaged in the accident.

Nuclear Facility Emergency Instrumentation4.23 Nuclear facilities should be equipped with fixed and mobile sensors

and instrumentation specifically designed for emergency situations.4.24 Some of this instrumentation may be the same instrumentation as

that used under normal plant operating conditions, but care should

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Úå taken to ensure that the instruments are designed to measurethe much higher levels associated with accident conditions andthat they will operate under the pressure, temperature, humidityand other conditions that may prevail following an accident. Thisinstrumentation should include the capability to assess the radio-logical characteristics of the release.

Offsite Emergency Instrumentation(a) Radiological

(1) Fixed4.25 Depending upon national laws and regulations, some offsite authorities

may have responsibilities for routinely monitoring the environmentsurrounding nuclear facilities on a periodical or continuous basis.These authorities may not necessarily be the same as those that areresponsible for directing the response to accidents. The data outputof the instruments may be telemetered to a central location (and afteran accident to an emergency center) or periodically read or processedmanually. During the different phases of the accident, instrumentationof this type, with telemetered outputs could be useful for accident assess-ment provided the range of the equipment extends to the expected levels.The fixed stations should provide, as a minimum, measurements of externalradiation dose rate, cumulative external radiation dose, and radioiodineconcentrations in air. If possible, a distinction should be made betweenthe radiation levels arising from airborne and ground deposited radio-active material. For very severe accidents in the early time frame, andin the immediate vicinity of the facility, manpower needs for assessingthe offsite consequences and for implementing protective measures willbe high.

4.26 The offsite fixed instrumentation is often installed in the downwinddirection of prevailing winds or in the direction of population centers,or both. However, there is no assurance that during an accident the windwill blow in that particular direction, or that the down-wind distanceof the monitoring station is located to be of some value under emergencyconditions. Thus careful thought must be given to the choice of instrumentsand the location of a fixed station if it is to be utilized for emergencysituations. Moreover, fixed stations are usually intended for environmental

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monitoring during normal operations, while for an accident situationall the above mentioned equipment should have a measuring rangeappropriate to emergency situations and the results should be madereadily available to the head of the emergency organization, eithervia telemetry or by other rapid communications.(2) Mobile

4.27 The type of instruments needed will include those capable of readinggamma exposure rates from the airborne plume or deposited materialand those for determining airborne concentrations of radioiodines andparticulates material. Air samplers may be powered by selfcontainedpower units or by power from an electrical system on a vehicle. Portableequipment may also be included as an integral part of a mobile laboratorywhich may be a surface vehicle and/or an aircraft.

4.28 Portable or mobile radiological monitoring instrumentation and equipmentshould be available to the responsible offsite organizations. The locationand availability of this instrumentation and equipment relative to thenuclear facilities, along with the necessary transportation resourcesto move it rapidly to the scene of any accident, determines its usefulnessduring the initial phases of an accident. The timely availability ofqualified, well-trained personnel to operate it is another factor whichmust be taken into consideration. The mobile units should be equippedwith suitable instrumentation for the determination of external radiationdose rate, cumulative external dose, radioiodine and other radipnuclideconcentration in air, and general contamination on the ground and othersurfaces. In most cases the most effectiveand rapid way to acquire qualitative information on the movements of agamma-emitting radioactive plume is by the use of suitable radioactiveinstrumentation in an aircraft. Aerial surveys are effective formaking measurements of gamma-emitting radioactive contamination on theground and on roads and other man made construction. Aerial surveys arealso the quickest way to map ground contamination patterns. However,severe weather conditions may affect the immediate availability of aircraftfor serial monitoring. In that case it will be necessary to depend uponmobile teams for ground monitoring and the survey of roads, bridges,building exterior and other man-made construction. Unless the terrain isrelatively flat,the use of fixed wing aircraft for radioactive surveypurposes may not be practical. However helicopters provide an effectiveoption.

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(b) Meteorological4.29 Provision should be made for all relevant meteorological information -

climatological statistics, diffusion studies etc. - to be availableto the Offsite Emergency Response Organizations, Emergency CoordinationCenter (EGG). However, if the assessment of meteorological conditionsis to be made outside this center, e.g. at a regional meteorologicalforecasting center, this information must be relayed to that locationfor the use of the responsible meteorologist. In addition, the fore-casting center should have all the necessary aids to facilitate theprediction of plume trajectory and dispersion. These aids can beeither of the manual type or preferably take the form of computerprograms designed for immediate utilization in case of an accident.

4.30 Offsite meteorological information should Úå used to providea better estimation of the plume trajectory and to help inforecasting any change in the weather which may affect thediffusion and fall-out patterns and may also affect the onsiteand offsite emergency operations. In addition to the informationsupplied by onsite meteorological equipment, the data at othermeteorological stations offsite should be available for theEmergency Co-ordiantion Center. Therefore it should be ascertainedwhether any stations belonging to a meteorological forecastingnetwork can be used for this purpose» If such stations are available theirequipment should be checked to make sure that they could providethe necessary meteorological infomation.

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4.31 If such stations are not available, and in-particular in the prevailingdown-wind direction, additional fixed stations should be establishedto supply, as a minimum standard meteorological data (wind directionand speed, barometric pressure, temperature humidity) to the EmergencyCoordination Center.*) Mobile meteorological stations can and shouldbe used where data from fixed stations is inadequate.

PREDICTION OF CONSEQUENCESThe Role of the Nuclear Facility Operator4.32 Depending upon the available instrumentation or data processing

capability at the facility for assessments, predictions can be madeutilizing previously prepared charts and nomograms. The charts andnomograms for prediction of offsite consequences can be based onðãå-calculated information such as the following:- information on conceivable release of radioactive material from

the facility for a representative spectrum of postulated accidents;- information on the dispersion patterns of radioactive material

released to the atmosphere or hydrosphere for various meteorologicaland hydrological conditions typically observed at the facility site;

- relationship between concentration distributions of radioactivematerial in the environment and projected radiation exposuresof the population;

- information for interpretation of instrument readings.

*) The meteorological network should have enough stations to assurea sufficient supply of information to the emergency center. Inaddition to information from the permanent network, measurementsby mobile units can aid in the prediction of the plume trajectoryand fallout pattern.Visual observations of local weather and winddirection should be recognized as valid and valuable information.

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4.33 The output of these calculations should be the integratedprojected doses for whole body external exposure andinhalation exposure from the plume and the whole bodyexternal dose from deposited radionuclides as a functionof the time since the accident. Projections of externalgamma dose rates in space and time following a releasewould be most useful for monitoring teams.

4.34 More sophisticated methods can and should be considered.The offsite conditions can be predicted, for instance,by a computer which may map information and provide situationreports. Such computers utilise as input the radiologicaland meteorological assessment data, actual and predicted, andsuperimpose on it the measurements reported by the instrumentsand the monitoring teams. The computer can compare these datawith those predicted for a certain type of accident and printor display a status report together with the recommended actionto be taken in specified offsite areas.

4.35 In addition to the radiological characteristics for atmosphericreleases, information will be needed regarding predicting thedirection in which the released material will be carried, thespeed at which it will travel and the dilution and depletionof the plume as a function of distance. Meteorological datashould be available from onsite instrumentation for localconditions and from general weather service information forlarger areas. Measurements can and should be supplemented byobservations in the field.

4.36 General weather forecast information is necessary to predictcharacteristics of the plume travel over long distance and aprolonged release time. The nuclear facility should havecommunications with offsite meteorological stations.

4.37 The necessary onsite measurements include:- Wind direction and speed, from ground level and tower

instruments;- General weather observations;- Precipitation measurements;- Temperature gradient to predict the atmosphere stability class.

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4.38 Other useful onsite measurements may include- Inversion-base height- Upper-air movements;- Barometric pressure, temperature and humidity.

The Role of Offsite AuthoritiesData Acquisition and Processing4.39 The data which should be available for offsite Emergency

Coordination Centers (ECCs) can be classified into threecategories:

4.40 (a) Information concerning the radioactive source term.This information should include the estimated inventoryof radionuclides involved in the accident, the physicalform of the release, the release rates and probable changesin release rate, and those thermodynamic characteristics ofthe release that are necessary to estimate the effectiveairborne height of the release. It can initially be basedon pre-calculated estimation and later on instrument readings.

4.41 (b) Meteorological informationThis information is necessary not only for the preliminaryaccident assessment but for the efficient utilization of theoffsite monitoring teams. The meteorological informationshould be utilized to give the head of the Emergency CoordinationCenter long range radioactive plume trajectories and concentrations,both predicted and actual. These data should include onsite andoffsite ground level wind data, diffusion parameters, upper-airwind data, temperature-inversion data, and present and forecastsynoptic charts.Though subjective methods for meteorological analysis are known,the fastest way to obtain plume trajectories is by computeranalyses of reported data. It should be recognized that theoreticalpredictionsof dispersion would be best for strong wind speedsand may be very poor for low wind speeds. Further, wind andweather conditions at locations several kilometers apart may bequite different, even over flat terrain, but especially in areasof complex topography.

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4.42 (ñ) Offsite radiological informationThe most urgently required information is the locationand speed of movement of the plume and its approximatedimensions. This information can be provided by bothfixed and mobile instruments after a period of time.

The following information should be collected in the field:- external radiation dose rate fields, both gamma and beta-

- external cumulative radiation doses- periodic measurements of any ground contamination and the

nature of deposited radionuclides- periodic measurements of the airborne radioactive concentration

and its radionuclide composition.All the information mentioned above should be displayed on mapsor on a computer display/print out. In addition, the time of datacollection and the last measured values should be displayed. Allresults should be recorded for evaluation as the course of theaccident progresses.

4.43 With this input information, the Emergency Coordination Centershould be able to calculate projected radiation doses for guidancein selecting protective measures. The plotting of data can be donemanually. Computer analysis properly programmed can be completedfaster than manual analysis.

4.44 In addition to the calculations based on real or estimated releasedata and the assumed dispersion mechanism, offsite environmentalmonitoring data are necessary for:- more precise dose estimates from plume exposure pathways- more precise estimates of whole body and inhalation doses

from deposited material- historical and legal purposes.To achieve these goals, suitable equipment and qualified personnelare needed.

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FLAMING FOR THE OPERATIOML RESPONSEEmergency Response Resources4.45 The resources for responding to a radiological emergency are

in general much the same as those required for responding tonon-radiological emergencies, with one important and uniqueexception. Trained radiological monitoring teams with appropriatemonitoring and sampling equipment and a capability to analyse theresults of radiological surveys, are essential.

Implementation of Appropriate Protective Measures(a) General

4.46 It is reemphasized that for very severe accidents, initiation ofpredetermined protective measures in predetermined areas shouldcommence upon recommendation of the nuclear facility operatorwithout the necessity for initial confirmatory radiologicalmeasurement data in the immediate environs. For such accidentsradiological data at longer distances may be most timely andpractical.

4.47 To a great degree, the results of assessment and prediction ofconsequences at the time of the accident will guide the selectionof appropriate protective measures. Local restraints, such as thefactors outlined in Section III on Protective measures and in thisSection, together with meteorological or seasonal conditions, maylimit the type of protectivemeasures which can be effectivelyemployed. Por example, a severe storm or snow-fall in the area ofa nuclear facility where an accident has occurred may precludethe employment of evacuation as a protective measure., and thealternatives of seeking shelter or applying other protective measuresmay have to be considered. Weather conditions may also make effectiveradiological monitoring very difficult in which case action willhave to be based upon estimates. The type of protective measure,or combination of protective measures, to be implemented may dependon the elapsed time since the accident as previously indicated inSection III. The emergency response plan should relate the selectionof protective measures to the early, intermediate and late phasesof the accident. Clearly it is not possible to differentiate sharplybetween these phases and a good deal of judgement may have to be usedin deciding which protective measures should be selected ana. when theyshould be commenced and terminated.

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Table VI.

Representative reduction factors for deposited radioactivity

Structure and/or location Reduction factor

1 ni above a hypothetical infinite smooth plane 1.001 m above ordinary ground 0.701 m above center of 50-ft roadway half way contaminated 0.55cars, pickups, buses and trucks on 50-ft road

road fully contaminated 0.5road 50 contaminated 0.5road fully decontaminated 0.25

Trains 0.41 & 2-story wood frame homes (no basement) 0.41 &. 2-story block or brick homes (no basement) 0.2*Hone basement — 1 or 2 walls fully exposed 0.1*

- 1-story less than 2 ft ofbasement walls exposed 0.05*

- 2-story,less than 2 ft ofbasement walls exposed 0.03*

3 or 4-story structures, 5000-10 000 ft per floorfirst and second floors 0.05*b as ement 0.01*

2multi-story structured 10 000 ft per floor

upper floors 0.01*basement 0.005*

* Away from doors and windows

Representative reduction factors for cloud source

Structure location Reduction factor

Outside 1.0Vehicles 1.0Wood frame house, no basement 0.9Masonry house, no basement O.6Basement of wood frame house 0.6Basement of masonry house 0.4Large office or industrial-type building 0.2 or lessaway from doors and windows

/rHealth Physics Pergamon Press 1977, Vol.33/September/pp.287-298. :/'

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4*48 The relating of the emergency response to the projected oractual accident conditions is most important in terms of conservingresources and minimizing disruption of the surrounding population)industry and environs. The response aimed at protecting urbanpopulations is obviously quite different from the response aimedat protecting rural population and, although the same protectivemeasures might Úå selected for "both in any given situation, themethods Úó which they are implemented may Úå quite different.(b) Sheltering

4«49 The prerequisites for a proper choice between sheltering andother protective measures such as evacuation and radioprotectiveprophylaxis are:- assessment of the availability of buildings (which are

suitable as shelters) within the area in relation to thenumber of potentially affected people

- assessment and specification of the shielding effectivenessof available buildings with respect to reduction of directdoses from the plume

- assessment and specification of the shielding effectivenesswith respect to reduction of doses from the deposited materialon the ground or on the shelter itself. /Table VI./

- assessment and specification of air changes per hour in buildingsto be used for sheltering, such as business premises and privatehomes within the potentially affected area to provide a basisfor selecting those in which the air changes are as low as possible.When a decision has been made to implement sheltering as a protectivemeasure, timely communication of the decision to the public is ofgreat importance.

(c) Administration of radioprotective prophylactic drugs4»50 Before deciding on this protective measure, it should be

considered whether other measures, such as sheltering, mightbe just as effective to reduce the up-take of radioactivematerial by inhalation. The evacuation of people from theexposure area is another protective measure to be taken intoconsideration.The use of stable iodine tablets as protective measuremay be warranted in some situations involving large population groups.

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4»51 I*1 emergency plans, due to the practical difficulties inusing blocking substances, it should not Úå forgotten thatblocking substances can play only a supplementary role inrelation to other protective measures»

(d) Control of access and egress4*52 Degrees of access control are:

- no access, except for emergency personnel respondingto the accident and approved by the controlling authority;and

- limited access in which case specific authorization toenter controlled areas access should be granted and means ofcontrolling the limited access must be provided by theresponsible authority at the area. The use of specialmarkings for vehicles and persons authorized to haveaccess to the area is desirable.Methods of access control are:

- physical blocking, using such means as constructionmaterials or vehicles, of access routes with or withoutthe presence of access control teams at the blockingpoints;

- "physical" blocking of access routes by control teams;

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- posting of warning signs containing instructions? and- publicly announced orders or instructions.Whenever possible it is advisable to control access atroad junctions so that traffic can Úå detoured or re-routed without being sent back over the route used toreach the junctions.The composition of each access control team should includeat least one uniformed police officer with authority toenforce laws and impose legitimate orders on civilians.The team should be mobile. It should, if possible, beequipped for radiocommunication to a local central controlpoint or directly to an emergency control center; the teamshould also be equipped with rugged, simple to operate,radiation monitoring instruments and personnel dosimeters(direct reading plus TLD or other "process type" dosimeter).These teams should have had some advance training andexercises in the use of radiation monitoring instrumentsand radio communications equipment. If access control isrequired for an extended length of time, a plan for period-ically relieving the teams is necessary. A specific teamfor posting warning signs at appropriate points may beneeded. Access control teams should be provided withwritten standing orders.Possible sources of manpower for access control teamscould be: police, fire brigadesf civil defense or militarypersonnel, health department personnel and possibly alimited number of persons from the involved nuclear facility,and from areas close to the nuclear facility site boundary.

Prompt and factual notification of the public is important,especially when the access control measures affect largeurban areas and need to be imposed for any length of time.The information given should include delineation of thearea affected, the type of control in effect and itsestimated duration, as well as the reasons for the controlmeasures.

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(e) Evacuation4.53 When evacuation as a protective measure is to be considered,

the following information should already be available atthe Emergency Coordination Center:1. The number of persons who may have to be evacuated,

including the estimated normal population during workinghours and leisure hours and the number of persons whoare occupants of hospitals, schools, industrial plants,prisons and other such locations during regular workinghours and off hours where there is a fluctuating pop-ulation.

2. Transport-capacity (private and public), detailing theestimated types of transport vehicles, their numbersand locations;

3. The means available for transmitting the evacuationnotification and information to the public and organ-izations.

4. Routes and alternative routes of evacuation, which aredetermined to be best suited to direct the populationvia the fastest way from potentially affected areas;

5. Plans for optimization of traffic conditions.6. A time schedule to ensure an unrestrained flow of the

evacuation.7. Provisions for radiological monitoring of evacuees*,

and others, as required, including decontamination, ifneeded, and any necessary recording of exposure estimates;

8. Provision of advance arrangements for relocation ofevacuees, including identification of relocation sites,capacity to handle evacuees and availability of shelter,water supply and sanitary arrangements;

9. Provision of food supplies and medical care for evacuees;10. Provision of an information and locator service for

evacuees, if required;11. Provisions to ensure security and safety, for example

fire and police protection for the evacuated area;12. Special arrangements for applying protective measures

to hospitals, schools, prisons and other institutions;

* for external and internal contamination

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13» Identification of the persons predesignated to implementthe evacuation plan.

(f) Personal protective equipment (emergency workers)4»54 PT planning of personal protective equipment it is necessary

to take into consideration the number of groups or persons whomight Úå required to operate at special conditions in contaminatedareas»(g) Decontamination

4»55 Provisional and adequate facilities should Úå selected andplanned for personnel decontamination on the hasis ofcharacteristics of the site and its environment.When persons are advised to seek shelter in Tmil dingslocated in a contaminated area they should also Úå advised toremove their outer clothing hefore entering the shelter if possible andwash or shower if facilities are availahle.Used clothes should Úå stored separately in order to preventpossible spread of contamination.

4.56 In the case of evacuationf decontamination will Úå mosteffective if it can Úå done at the checkpoint where personsleaving the contaminated area are controlled, eans fordecontamination should Úå availahle at the checkpoint such as:1. Radiation survey instruments;2. Clean water and facilities for showering or washing

hands, faces, necks, etc;3. Stocks of clean clothes and foot wear;4» Additional cleaning facilities for decontamination of

personal helongings and possibly vehicles.

4.57 When persons need prompt medical care, decontamination shouldnot preclude the necessary medical measures. However, it shouldÚå possible to remove contaminated clothing immediately and dosome washing and cleaning during the medical treatment.

4.58 Checkpoints for controlling the spread of contamination by evacueesmay be at selected fixed locations or established by mobile stations.Mobile stations are preferable since the affected area cannot beknown before the accident and the decontamination of evacuees andvehicles should be carried out as close to the contaminated area aspossible to minimize the spread of contamination from the contaminatedarea.(h) Medical care

4.59 At the checkpoints for controlling the spread of radioactive contaminationand for decontamination of the involved members of the public, themedical staff or protection personnel should be in a position to identifythose persons needing treatment for radiation exposure or medicalattention for injuries and initiating the appropriate medical attention.

(Manual on Early Medical Treatment of Possible Radiation Injury,Safety Series No.47 Vienna 1978).

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4*60 Advance plans are necessary for -the organization andnotification of the medical staff for the checkpoint»A list of physicians qualified to treat patients forradiation sickness, and a list of medical support personnelshould Úå available.The medical staff therefore needs to have:1. A list of medical facilities situated in their own

country or state and neighboring countries or states*2. A list of possible centres for specialized treatment;3. Transport facilities and means of access to them;4* Stocks of commonly used medicaments and chelating substances.(i) Division of food and water

4*61 The following resources should Úå provided for dealingwith the contamination of foodstuffs, agricultural productsand drinking water:- properly equipped sampling vehicles;- laboratories capable of analyzing large numbers of

samples quickly and in detail;— maps showing the use of land surrounding each nuclear

facility;— maps showing the distribution and collection stations

for milk and other agricultural products.4*62 These maps can assist in planning the diversion of the

contaminated products and in locating the supply of productsoutside of contaminated areas.

4,63 The following foodstuffs control should be enforced in acontaminated agricultural region:(i) milk

If suitable processing facilities exist, milk fromgrazing cows in the contaminated area can be converted tovarious other dairy products, such as cheese, or can bedestroyed, depending on the radionuclides present and theirconcentrations* Storage of cheese products would permitradioactive decay to safe levels for some radionuclidessuch as the iodine isotopes.

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(ii)agricultural products and animal feedIf contamination is only short-lived radionuclides,the remedial action can Úå the storage of contaminatedfoods and animal feeds in preservable forms. Iflonger-lived radionuclides are present in concentrationsabove the adopted levels, the agricultural products forhuman consumption and animal feed should Úå destroyed.

(iii )domestic grazing animalsIf grazing land is contaminated above adopted inter-vention levels, animals should be placed on stored,uncontaminated feed,

4.64 Derived intervention levels for radioactivity would be thecriteria for the appropriate protective measures. Milkhaving a radioactivity value below the intervention levelwould be free for consumption, but milk with a higheractivity level could be distributed to different process-ing facilities and converted into storable dairy products.A similar decision would have to be made for agriculturalproducts and other foods.

(j) Decontamination of areas and equipment4.65 Decontamination of areas and equipment is a countermeasure

to be used in the later or, possibly, intermediate phase.Sufficient time will usually be available, therefore, tochoose the appropriate measures and establish the organ-izational requirements. A brief description of possiblemeasures may be found in Section III.

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PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PLANNED OPERATIONAL RESPONSE

4.66 GeneralIn general the characteristics of a given nuclear facilitysite will influence significantly the choice of protectivemeasures. This should Úå taken into account during the planningstage.

4.6? It should be recognized that the types of protective measuresor combinations of measures to be implemented may vary withthe time that has elapsed since the discovery of the accident.It is useful in this connection to differentiate the followingphases of the accident: early phase., intermediate phase,late phase. These phases are defined in Section III.(a) Organization and responsibility

4.68 In the planning stage, the organizational requirements ofthe emergency plan are specified including the assignment ofresponsibilities to particular emergency response groups(see Section VI). The specification of the tasks given tothese groups, in written form, facilitates immediate actionswhen required.(b ) Derived intervention levels

4.69 Taking into account the particular accident conditions,derived intervention levels should be specified for thepractical application of emergency procedures. The individualsand/or organization units, responsible for the implementationof protective measures should apply the appropriate derivedintervention levels /Section V,/(c) Action by support groups

4.70 The specific actions to be performed by emergency supportgroups (fire brigades, police, civil defense, etc.) should beidentified in the procedures dealing with their activities.If the emergency actions performed by these groups requirecoordination with other elements of the emergency organization,this requirement should be specified in the procedures.

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(d) Procedure format4.71 A rigid format for implementing procedures is not recommended.

An appropriate format should clearly state the action stepsin order that the individuals or groups involved in followingthe procedures can clearly understand their duties. The formatof procedures that specify immediate actions should be briefand explicit so that the procedures can be followed easilyand quickly.

(i) Conditions and prerequisitesEach procedure should explain the conditions andprerequisites that should exist before the specifiedactions or operations are performed. Some of theseshould be in the form of intervention levels,

(ii) Actions and limitations

Procedures should present the required actions in asuccinct and concise manner, in step-by-step order andlogical sequence. Instructions should be sufficientlydetailed for a qualified individual to perform therequired actions without supervision but need not providea completely detailed description of the actions,methods, or processes. Particular attention should begiven to include specific precautions to be taken inimplementing emergency procedures.

(iii) Check-off sheetsComplex or lengthy controlling procedures should haveprovision for check-off sheets or lists to documentthe fact that required actions have been taken or havebeen completed. Examples include notification calllists and personnel accountability lists.

4«72 There should be a separate procedure for each identifiedemergency condition to specify and implement the preplannedresponse actions required.The following paragraphs list examples of specific subjectsthat should be included in the procedures. The titles ofspecific procedures, as well as their d tails, nay vary tosuit the needs of the offsite organizations, but the actionsor subjects described below should be covered within the groupof procedures that implement the emergency plan.

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4."73 (i) CommunicationsCommunications procedures should require formalacknowledgements of orders and reports. A system forgiving priority to emergency communications should beestablished. Provision for recording all transmissions.

(ii) notificationsCall lists to alert and mobilize the emergency organizationand supporting groups should be specified for eachidentified emergency condition. If call lists are nottoo lengthy or complex, they should be incorporatedinto the notification procedures or included by reference.A system to authenticate the validity of notificationsshould be devised.

(iii) Radiological surveysProcedures should specify the methods and preplannedlocations, if feasible, for emergency radiologicalsurveys in the areas surrounding the facility site.The procedures should include or refer to requirementsfor providing the radiological data collected andinformation to the individual directing protectiveaction from the Emergency Coordination Center.

(iv) Personnel monitoring and decontaminationThe procedures should require the monitoring ofindividuals leaving restricted areas or other areasknown or suspected to be contaminated. The proceduresshould specify the contamination levels that call fordecontamination actions. They should also prescribeor refer to the decontamination procedures for varioustypes and levels of radioactive contamination.

(v) Evacuation of offsite areasProcedures for evacuation should include the interventionlevels that require evacuation of persons from offsitecontaminated areas. Primary and secondary evacuationroutes and evacuee assembly areas should be designated.These procedures should refer to or be related to theprocedures for personnel accountability and, personnelmonitoring.

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(vi) Personnel accountabilityA method of accounting for all evacuees and of recordingthe areas to which they are relocated should Úå established,

(vii) Assessment of radiological hazardsProcedures should describe the system for gatheringinformation and data on which to base decisions toexpand or restrict emergency response actions. Proceduresshould identify the types,and sources of informationavailable such as in—plant control room .instrumentationand other instrumentation for radiological and meteorol-ogical assessment located elsewhere in the plant andat the site boundary. There should be proceduresfor using onsite and offsite monitoring team surveysfor determining ambient radiation arid contaminationlevels. The procedures should specify interventionlevels based on readings from a number of sensors.The procedures should assign responsibilities forgathering and using accident assessment data andinformation.

(viii) ReentryProcedures should be developed for reentry to previouslyevacuated areas for saving lives, finding missing andinjured persons, or manipulating, repairing or recoveringcritical equipment or other articles. Specific guide-lines on maximum emergency radiation exposures forreentry and rescue personnel should be included inthese procedures. Guidelines should also be developedfor permitting the voluntary acceptance of higher thanthe specified maximum emergency exposure so as toperform lifesaving actions.

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REMEBIAL AH » RESTORATIVE MEASURES4.74 General

During the later phase of the accident, the protectivemeasures which are undertaken may Úå referred to as "remedial"or "restorative" measures. Section III deals with informationregarding protective measures which are suitable for both theearly and intermediate phases of the accident. In this section,brief consideration will Úå given to the suitability of thedifferent procedures that may Úå applicable to the late phase.

4.75 The time period before remedial and restorative measuresshould be taken usually permits the collection of sufficientdata to enable a decision to be reached on the most appropriatetechniques to Úå used,. Nevertheless some advance planning isnecessary to assure that such measures can be initiatedpromptly with a minimum of delay when needed.MeasuresControl of access and egress

4.76 This is necessary where levels of contamination are such thatunacceptably high radiation doses could be received. Criteriashould be developed for decontrolling areas or zones, andfor re-entry of the public into any previously evacuated areasand for the resumption of normal activities.Diversion of food and water, supplies

4.77 This protective measure will be necessary in areas where con-tamination might enter the food chain, for example, throughthe consumption of crops grown on contaminated soil, thecontamination of drinking water supplies, and the use ofagricultural and dairy products from contaminated farmland.Criteria will have to be developed to serve as a basis fordecisions on the necessary actions regarding the dispositionof such food stuffs.Decontamination of areas and materials

4.78 The following are some examples of feasible decontaminationmeasures:- the washing of vehicles;- the washing of paired surfaces, roofs of buildings and

external walls of buildings with fire hoses;

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- the mechanized flushing of streets;- the mowing of lawns and disposal of clippings, for example

Úó putting them in drums followed Úó burial at a radiologicaldisposal site;

- the re-noval of lawns and grassland by sodcutting andappropriate disposal of the material removed, followed Úóreseeding;

- the scraping of radioactively contaminated topsoil anddisposal at a suitable radiological disposal site.

Fixation of remaining radioactivity4.79 After decontamination has been completed, or in the cases

where complete decontamination cannot be done, it is recommendedthat the remaining contaminants be fixed so that they cannotbe spread, more widely over the area or be resuspended into theair. Such fixation also offers some shielding effect, atleast against alpha and beta-radiation and possibly alsoagainst low energy gamma—radiation.

4-80 Typical examples of methods of fixation are:- paving or repaving areas with asphalt ;- painting or repainting houses and equipment;- ploughing or reploughing fields and other agricultural land;- covering with sand or soil.Control of Contamination and Dose

4.8l The magnitude of the offsite radiological consequences willdetermine the level of control necessary. Depending upon thetype of areas affected, the responsible authorities shouldtake the necessary steps to measure the radioactivity of water,food, soil and biological and botanical samples from theoffsite area and to calculate the resulting potential dosesto persons. The methods of measurement and evaluation shouldbe the same as those used in the routine radiological surv-eillance, conducted in the vicinity of nuclear facilities,but their capacity and range should be related to the mag-nitude of the problems involved.

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4.82 Depending on the level of contamination^ the types of surfacesand size of the area affected, continuous monitoring ofradiation dose rates at certain locations, and continuousmonitoring of the radioactivity in water àëà air may Úå necessaryfor some time. The cumulative doses to persons present inareas to which access is controlled can Úå measured byintegrating dosemeters, such as film badges:J or solid state dosimeters.Intervention levels

4.83 In the late phase of an accident, the dose limits recommendedby the ICRP, in principle, should apply, since the sourceof radiation is now under control. To check compliance withthese recommendations, the doses to individuals and possiblythe collective doses to populations should be calculated.

4.84 Depending upon the extent of the affected area and its dem-ography, decisions have to be made concerning acceptablevalues for the levels of contamination of water, milk, crops,vegetable, meat, fish and other food to be used for generalconsumption by the population and by domestic animals in thefood chain. These values should be compatible with therecommendations of ICRP.

4.85 Criteria should be developed for the normal or restrictedusage of property, equipment, crops, lands, foodstuffs, andwater supplies that have been radiologically contaminated.

4.86 The applicable dose limits for workers should be adopted forthe restarting of essential facilities which may have beenshut down. For the reentry of the general public into anyevacuated area, criteria based on individual dose limitsand also on collective doses should be developed.Organizational aspects

4.87 A local, and/or national technical group should be establishedwith responsibilities for the development, direction, andevaluation of offsite area recovery and reentry operations.

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4.88 The availability of any public or commercial services thatcan provide technical assistance to national or local authoritiesin recovery or reentry operations should be ascertained inadvance.

PUBLIC IUPORMATION ASPECTS4.89 If an accident occurs it is very important to ensure that

both individuals and population groups follow the instructionsgiven Úó the emergency response personnel dealing with thesituation. It is very important to avoid any panic among thepopulation as the consequences of panic may Úå even moredangerous than the consequences of the accident itself. Itis well known that, provided they have been informed aboutthe true situation, people will generally react logicallywhen faced with potentially dangerous situations.

4.90 In "the event of an accident it is very important to informthe public as quickly as possible. In the early phaserelatively little information may be available other thanthe fact that an accident has occurred and precautionaryprotective measures are being implemented. As soon as theresults of radiological surveys are available their sig-nificance should be explained to the public in simple,ordinary language. At the same time it should be possibleto explain to the public the means by which they can bestbe protected against the possibility of radiation exposure.

4.91 Prepared messages and instructions should be available atthe Emergency Coordination Centers that can Úåcompleted by inserting the appropriate factual informationand can be immediately released to the local population,news media and governmental organizations with the minimumdelay. It is important that all sectors of the community arekept informed of the situation at frequent intervals.

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4.92 Local radio and television services can be used to adviseand warn the population and plans should be made in advancefor the use of these services. A more direct method ofwarning a particular segment of the population is the useof vehicles equipped with loud speakers (such as police andcivil defense units). Telephones may be useful to warnpeople in sparsely populated areas. Sirens or horns may beused, if available, to alert the general population to danger,but they should always be followed by voice instructions overother means of communication. Por example, a siren alertcould be used to indicate to the public that they should listento radio and television for emergency instructions. Of course,if sirens are to be used in a specific area, the public mustbe informed in advance what they are expected to do uponhearing the sirens.

4-93 If ships are moored at docks or in harbors or rivers inlocations that might be affected by an accident, means mustbe devised for warning the crews of any hazard from theaccident.

4-94 Special information may be given by telephone to institutionssuch as hospitals, -schools, and prisons and to other placeswhere people may be congregated, such as factories, recreationareas, and shopping centers. A list of relevant telephonenumbers should be prepared in advance and maintained by theEmergency Coordination Center.

4.95 There will be numerous enquiries from press, radio andtelevision reporters. A center dealing with these enquiriesshould be established and manned by press liaison officersor public affairs officers who will obtain any necessaryinformation from the director of the Emergency CoordinationCenter. It is important to instruct all members of theemergency staff and adjacent local organizations, that messagesto the public are to be given only by the press liaison orpublic affairs officer and on the basis of information releasedby the director of the Emergency Coordination Center.

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4.96 There will also Úå many enquiries from relatives of personswho may Úå evacuated from the affected areas. Lists of suchpersons should Úå drawn up and a center estaÚlished fordealing with incoming enquiries. The telephone nurnber ofthis center could Úå publicized over the national or localradio and television services.

4-97 The existence of emergency plans should Úå made known to thepublic. A simple information leaflet or brochure should Úåprepared and distributed to residents close to the facility(distance to Úå determined Úó Governmental authorities)outlining some basic aspects of the emergency response planand simple straight forward-emergency instructions.

UPDATING THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN4.98 The emergency response plans should take account of the special

needs of specific facilities, organizations and activitieswhile providing for the implementation of generally applicableprinciples. As the special needs may change, it is importantto review and update the emergency plans at regular intervals.The responsibility for updating the emergency response plansshould Úå clearly assigned.

4-99 Several key matters should Úå considered and appropriatechanges in the emergency plans should Úå made as necessaryto ensure that a practical plan in maintained. Examplesof such matters are:1. Organizational changes such as changes in the

responsiMlities of offsite authorities and organizations.2. Changes in the use and temporary and permanent occupancy

of all areas adjacent to the facility including thoseareas within the Emergency Planning Zones selected forthe facility.

3. Changes in the offsite radiological consequences predictedÚó the facility operator or Úó the regulatory authority.

4. Changes in the offsite authorities' capabilities forassessing radiological hazards.

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5. Changes of industry or commerce in the areas around thenuclear facility site.

6. Changes in roads, bridges and public transport systems.7. Changes in communication systems for both normal and

emergency use.8. Changes in names, locations and telephone numbers.

TRAXHUTG AFD EXERCISESA.100 To ensure that emergency plans can be effectively implemented

when needed, provision should be made for basic instructionand periodic training of the emergency response staffs,including monitoring, and support teams. While most of thepersonnel will have the basic knowledge needed for theirspecialized emergency assignments, they niay not be familiarwith the different conditions, imposed by the radiologicalcharactersitics of the accident, under which they must carryout their assigned duties. The basic instruction should beaimed at clarifying these differences and should also include,appropriate information on the emergency organization, plans,procedures, standards, standing' orders, etc» Periodictraining cowering the necessary basic information and anychanges in the emergency plans, including exercises and drills,should also be provided.

4.101 Exercises and drills based on realistic simulation of foreseenemergency conditions should be carried out. While exercisesand drills can be used as training for maintaining theproficiency level of the teams they can also be used to testthe adequacy of the plansf procedures, equipment, communications,etc. The various emergency response teams should be specificallytrained in their individual assignment and operation of equip-ment and also in their co-ordinated operations as a group.Observers have a useful part to play in evaluating exercisesand drills and critiques are valuable as a means of improvingplans, procedures, and co-ordinated emergency response.

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4.102 The following categories of personnel are examples of whoshould participate in the training program:1. Supervisory and staff personnel of the nuclear facility

emergency organization2. Personnel responsible for accident assessment, including

nuclear facility control room shift staff.3. Radiological monitoring teams.4. Advisory groups of experts.5« Fire control teams and fire brigades.6. Civil Defense or Emergency Services Organizations.7. First aid and rescue teams.8. Offsit e emergency services and support personnel.9. Medical and health support personnel.10. Nuclear facility headquarters support personnel.11. Police units.

4.103 Training exercises usually test the functioning of theEmergency Response organization as a whole. Trainingdrills usually test specific skills such as the operationof equipment. Exercises and drills can be conducted onseveral levels of participation and complexity such as:- drills involving single teams in specific procedures and

uses of equipment- communications drills involving simulated responses by

onsite and offsite personnel.- exercising of the entire onsite and offsite emergency

response organizations- offsite organization exercises with or without the

involvement of personnel of the nuclear facility- exercises involving simulated activity on the part of

the public.4.104 It is possible to involve members of the public in exercises

but it is not recommended. However, local government organiz-ations and officials of emergency services can be notified inadvance when exercises are planned, or the exercises can beunannounced. The public should be notified that unannouncedexercises may be conducted within a certain time period. Allexercise communications should be clearly identified as being anexercise or drill.

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SECTION V - INTERVENTION IEVELS AND CONSIDERATION'S INFLUENCING THEIRCHOICE

General5.01 The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)

has considered in detail ' the types of criteria appropriatefor regulating exposure from "controllable" and "uncontrolled"sources of radiation. In normal circumstances, when exposurecan Úå controlled Úó proper operating procedures and byengineered safety features and design, the ICRP's doselimitation system for occupational exposure of workers andfor members of the public, apply. However, when the sourceis "uncontrolled", as a result of an accident, the exposureof the public to radiation can be limited only by takingprotective measures that interfere with normal working andliving conditions, such as evacuation, the closing of areas,the control of food supplies, and others previously mentioned.

5.02 The hazards and social costs of such protective measures mustbe justified by the reduction of radiation risk that willresult from them. Since the effectiveness and the risk tothe public associated with these protective measures dependson geographical, meteorological and other local conditions,the ICRP has found it inappropriate to recommend any doselevels above which mandatory protective measures are to betaken in emergency situations. The responsibility fordecisions on such matters must lie with national authorities.In emergency planning for a nuclear accident which couldexpose the general public to harmful radiation doses, publicofficials need criteria for the application of protective measures.

ICRP Publication 26 (1977)

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5 «03 The rate of discharge to the environment of radiomclidesfrom a nuclear facility may for a short period of timesignificantly exceed the authorized release rate limitswithout any significant increase in the risk to the populationin the vicinity of the facility because the time integralconcentration of the radionuclides will be small. Studieshave indicated that accidents at nuclear power facilitieswhich have a. potential for serious offsite effects, would beinitiated by an event recognizable to the facility operatorsand, that with early notification, a period of time wouldbe available for offsite authorities to implement protectivemeasures prior to the start of a major release to theenvironment from the facility.

5.04 In other situations, where the rate of discharge exceedsthe authorized release rate limits for a long period oftime, a decision on whether a significant radiation accident«has occured, and more specifically on the necessity to protectthe population, would require information for the determinationof the following parameters:- the critical radionuclides present in the release|- the likely ; pathways for radiological exposure;- the critical population groups;

the estimate of the.quantity of radionuclides likely tobe released.

5.05 For developing this information, data will be required on:- the radionuclide composition and discharge rate?- the time integral concentrations of radionuclides in

air, water, etc.;- rate of intake of radionuclides by population groups.

5.06 This Section provides information intended to guide nationalauthorities in the selection of the criteria referred to inpara. 5.02. Each such national authority must assign itsown values to the criteria based on the conditions andpolicies that prevail in that country and for the particularfacility under consideration.

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5.07 The decision to initiate protective measures will also haveto take account of the particular circumstances that existat the time of the accident. As a general principle, itwill be appropriate to institute protective measures onlywhen their social cost and risk will be less than the riskassociated with the exposure to be avoided. It must Úåemphasised that, although protective measures will usuallyÚå based on derived intervention levels that are related tomeasured or estimated values at the time of the accident, thebasic criteria for setting the intervention levels are theprojected dose or dose commitment to the whole body or tothe tissues at risk for the most sensitive population groups;together with a consideration of the dose avoided by theprotective measure.

5.08 The appropriate protective measure to be applied after anaccident cannot be selected solely on the basis of theradiation doses that might be received; it is also necessaryto consider the practicality of implementing protectivemeasures, the risks the latter might involve, the size ofthe population affected, and the dose that may be avoided.For this purpose, it is convenient to define a range of inter-vention levels.

5.09 The lower end of the range is the dose level below whichintervention is not likely to be justifiable on a technicalbasis. However, those responsible for deciding whether toimplement protective measures may wish to consider actionsbelow this level for social, psychological or economic reasons.

5.10 The upper end of the range is the dose level at which thereis not doubt as to the need for implementing protectivemeasures. Responsible officials could specify the interventionlevel to be used within the range, taking into considerationthe difficulties, risks, and social costs apparent at thetime of the accident, and the dose that can be avoided bythe protective measures.

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5.11 Three phases of accident response have been defined inSection III in which decisions will Úå required regarding theneed for protective measures,, These are the early, theintermediate and the late phases associated with the accident.The basis on which the intervention levels for the threephases are selected may Úå different for each phase.

5.12 Owing to the many unknown variables governing individual andpopulation exposures it is desirable to have separate inter-vention levels for each of these phases that are independentof the dose that may have accrued before that period, and ofthe dose that may be received in a subsequent period. However,it may not be desirable, as part of the planning process, tospecify intervention levels for the long term exposure periodbecause adequate time should be available after the accidentfor setting such levels if they are required.

COHSIDERATIOHS REGARDING THE DETRIMEHT CAUSED BY THE PROTECTIVE MEASURE5.13 All protective measures that can be applied to reduce the

exposure of members of the public carry some detriment tothe persons concerned, whether by some risk to health or somesocial disruption. The magnitude of this detriment willvary with the nature of the protective measures and with thecircumstances in which they are applied; for example, withthe size of the population involved»

5.14 The detriment due to a protective measure can sometimes beassessed from statistical information on similar situations.For example, evacuation risks can be assessed from informationabout injuries and lethal accidents experienced in evacuationfor different incidents in different circumstances and ofdifferent severity.

5.15 For some type of protective measures, such as the use ofchemical compounds to block the uptake of some radionuclides,the individual risk of the protective measure is independentof the number of persons involved. In present practice, theonly relevant case is the use of potassium iodide or iodatetablets to block the uptake of radioiodines. As discussedin Section III, the individual risk, in this case, is probablyvery small.

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RISK/BENEFIT CONSIDERATIONS Ø SETTING INTERVENTION LEVELS

5.16 A decision to introduce a protective measure should be basedon a balance between the detriment the measure carries andthe benefit resulting from the reduction of the exposure.Such balances should be considered at the time when thecompetent authority establishes the emergency plan, and theintervention levels selected on the basis of these balancesshould appear in that plan. They should be selected for eachpossible exposure pathway, should relate to the type ofprotective measures envisaged, and should take into considerationeach phase of the response (early, intermediate and late).These balances would, of course, be very dependent on localconditions and therefore the intervention levels may beapplicable only to the circumstances for which they have beenestablished» In addition, as the effectiveness of protectivemeasures usually depends on the speed with which they canbe introduced, the intervention levels can only give generalguidance and the decision to introduce protective measuresshould be taken in the light of the information available atthe time of the accident.

_ __ __ #INTERVENTION LEVELS5.17 Because of the great variability of circumstances in which

protective measures might be considered, it is not possibleto recommend intervention levels that would be appropriatefor all occasions. Examples of intervention levels aregiven in this document in the Appendix.

5.18 To set the values of intervention levels it is necessary tochoose convenient criteria. The basic limits recommended bythe ICRP are intended to apply only to those conditions wherethe source of exposure is under control. No specific numericallimits for emergency exposure of the public have been specifiedby the ICRP.

Countries use varying terminology regarding what is referred to as"intervention levels" in this manual. These include "emergency referencelevels", "action levels", and "protective action guides". In thegreat majority of cases these terms correspond to the term "interventionlevel" as used here. 78

5.19 In practice, emergency planning is simplified if one canidentify a range or spectrum of protective doses above whichserious consideration should be given to protective measuresbecause the risks from radiation exposure are likely to behigher than the risks of the protective measures. Belowthis range, plans would not be made to implement protectivemeasures and any decisions that are made to implement themwould be based on social, psychological or economic considerationsor on uncertainties regarding dose projections; but not onthe basis of risk comparisons. Authorities would be atliberty to adjust intervention levels within the range selectedon the basis of considerations of risk comparison, socialdisruption or ease of completing the protective measures.

5.20 Intervention levels should not be set so low as to cause therisk associated with the protective measures to exceed therisk from the radiation dose that would be avoided. If,on the other hand, the projected dose is undesirable interms of its overall consequences, it may be important enoughto require protective measures, even if these involve riskand considerable costs.

5.21 The intervention levels are given as total doses to thewhole body or to particular organs or tissues. In the caseof the accidents envisaged here, the organs are essentiallythe thyroid, bone marrow and the lungs.

DERIVED INTERVENTION LEVELS .5.22 For each intervention level derived values can Úå calculated

for the vectors that would cause that level of dose. Inthis way derived intervention levels can be established forinhaled air, drinking water, foodstuffs and external irradiationfor the individual radionuclides or radionuclide mixturesthat can be predicted to occur. Summaries of interventionlevels that have been specified by various countries fortheir parTicular situations are compiled in the Appendix.These summaries are provided as information that may beuseful in selecting intervention levels for response planning.

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5.23 After an accident, the radiation hazard might result fromexternal exposure and/or from internal exposure. The dosefrom each such source depends on particular circumstancesfincluding the nature and specific activity of the radionuclidesand the meteorological conditions.

5.24 For the assessment of external irradiation of the whole bodyand superficial tissues, such as the skin, the dose commitmentis the integral of the dose rate over the exposure time;for constant dose rates, the dose commitment is simply theproduct of dose rate and time of exposure. Ðîã the gammaradiation that might occur trader accident conditions, theabsorbed dose will not be significantly different frommeasured exposures and therefore the derived interventionlevel may be expressed in terms of dose or exposure„

5«25 Since the dose commitments from internal exposure haveto be estimated from the concentration of radioactivity inthe direct pathway, derived intervention levels are formulatedwhich are directly measurable quantities and which correspondto the intervention levels on the basis of simplifiedassumptions concerning the relevant parameters. The stepsinvolved in such formulations can be summarized as follows:(a) Identification of critical radionuclides released into

the environment,(b) Determination of the critical group of the population to

be affected.(c) Choice of metabolic data and factors pertaining to the

critical pathways of the radionuclides involved.5.26 In the case of an accident at a nuclear power facility of

the types now operating, the characteristics of radioactivematerials that might escape into the environment, and theirmetabolism by man, indicate that isotopes of iodine, strontiumand cesium are usually the critical radionuclides and shouldreceive the most detailed consideration from the viewpointof intake. For other types of nuclear facilities otherradionuclides may be the most critical

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5«27 In some cases, ingesti n of milk or agricultural productsmay Úå the predominant route of intake.. In other cases,inhalation or external exposure from the passing plume isthe critical pathway. In each case? derived interventionlevels will be needed that are related to the media that aremonitored for radioactive contamination» There may also bea need for derived intervention levels for general contaminationof the environment, including pastures. Since after anaccident preliminary information on the extent of the depositionwill frequently be available before milk itself can be monitored9it will be useful as a precaution to have an assessment ofthe radioactivity deposited on a pasture for comparison withthe intervention levels,

5»28 It is generally recognized that in the great majority of easestchildren constitute the critical group of the population formilk exposure pathways because of their particular sensitivityto radiation, their higher rate of metabolism,, lower volumeof their critical organs and the increased consumption ofmilk. In addition to ages the dietary habitss profession^sesj status of healths etc. may be used to identify criticalgroups of the population*,

5»29 To facilitate deeision-makingj it would be useful to preparea summary table containing data on critical pathways, nuclidesjpopulation groups and derived intervention levels for variousperiods following an accident„ An example of such a summaryis given in Table VW,

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TABLE W TOPICS THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHEN ESTABLISHING DERIVED HJTERVEHTIO T LEVELS.

Early phase (hours) Intermediate phase(days - weeks )

Late phase(months, years)

1. Criticalpathways

direct radiation from the facilitywhole body irradiation

from the plumeinhalationconsumption of directlycontaminated water and food

consumption of milkconsumption of the first cropirradiation from grounddeposition

consumption of waterinhalation of resuspendedmaterial

inhalation of resus-pended material

consumption of thesecond and subsequentcrops

irradiation from grounddeposition

2. Criticalnuc ides

00

- noble gases- iodines

89particulates (for core-meltaccidents)

90 137f t Cs and otherlong lived radio-nuclides depending onthe source terms

3. Dose concepts only individual doses individual and collectivedoses

individual and collect-ive doses

4. Derivedinterventionlevels *

- time integral of concentrationin air

- activity of food- activity of potable water

activity of surfacecontamination

activity in milkactivity of crops, vegetation, etc.activity of potable waterair activity

activity of cultivatesdepth of soil

activity in cropactivity of potablewater

air activity

In the case where the critical radionuclides are the iodines, separate derived intervention levels should bedeveloped for children and adults.

(ØÌÅÃÑÅ FOR THE SELECTION OP 3MER EIfIO

5»30 Responsible authorities in a particular country will be facedwith the problem of identifying the intervention levelsappropriate for their conditions and policies and taking intoaccount their particular sites and facilities» It is recommendedthat intervention levels be defined as a range of projecteddoses and that this range should be specified for at leastthe first two post~accident phases that have been identifiedin Section III«

5»31 The bases for setting the intervention level ranges may bedifferent for each phase. Por example, for the early phase(the period for protection of the population from inhalationand whole body exposure from the plume and from depositedmaterial) intervention levels would be based on individualdose as opposed to collective dose. The ranges for theother two phases would consider both individual and collectivedose.

5.32 The intermediate phase of exposure may be characterized bytwo or more components which would require the considerationof individual doses for some component and the collectivedose of the exposed population for the other component. Forexample, for an airborne release, food products includingmilk and water would be the principal exposure pathways.The intervention level for the limited number of persons inthe nearby contaminated areas would be based on individualdoses, whereas the collective dose might be more appropriatefor the much larger population groups that would consumethe food and the water contaminated to a lower level andresulting in a much lower dose to the individuals, but arelatively high collective dose in terms of man-rem.

5.33 For long term exposure there should be adequate time followingthe accident to specify appropriate intervention levelsbased on the considerations presented in this Section. Theresponsible authorities would therefore not need to includein their emergency response plan specific values for interventionlevels for the late phase. It should be sufficient toidentify in the plan appropriate restorative measures andtheir relative costs and benefits in dose reduction asdiscussed in Sections III and IV.

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Appendix

BXAMPLES OF INTERVENTION LEVELS ADOPTED BY SOME COUNTRIES

It is recognized that the social and economic conditions, thetypes of nuclear facilities installed, and the environmentalcharacteristics of the nuclear sites vary from country to country.The assignment of values for intervention levels should takeinto account these parameters in addition to technical informationprovided in r .guidance, and therefore universally applicablevalues cannot Úå recommended.

The following paragraphs provide examples of intervention levelswith definitions and notes on their application.

Responsible officials are encouraged to refer to these data indeveloping guidance on intervention levels for their countries.Several countries other than those referred to in this appendixhave developed similar guidance which may also provide usefulreference material.

These examples were provided by members of the Advisory Groupjbase* on national experience in certain countries. The IGRP Publication 26provides the basis for further development.

84

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAHY

Recommended emergency reference levels and action levels,The Radiation Protection Ordinance dated from 13 October 1976specifies the following design basis accident levels of dose (dosecommitment ) to apply to members of the general population, whichnowadays are considered as emergency reference levels too:Table l) Levels of dose

ifhole body, Bone marrow, Gonads, Uterus

Skin, Bone (Endosteal tissue)

Hands and Feet (Skin included)

Fhyroid, any other organ or tissue

5 rem

30 rem

60 rem

15 rem

In case of an incident or accident, which causes these referencelevels of dose or makes them imminent, a disaster alert shall Úå given.Below these levels there is no need to implement immediate measuresto protect the population itself.Above the levels there are action levels belonging to certain actions.It must Úå emphasized, that the appropriate protective actions cannotÚå decided solely on the basis of fixed action levels; it is alsonecessary to consider the situation, the probable^ development of thesituation, the phase of the accident and the practicability andefficiency of instituting countermeasures at the given circumstances.

S5

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OP QERMAFT( Ñ ont inue'd )'

Table II) Recommended action levels based on dose in open airfrom external irradiation and inhalation of radio-nuclides

rangeofrisk

A)

IIIIII

B)I

II

III

expecteddose inopen airwithoutshielding(rem)

Irradi t ic

warning to stayin house andclose doors andwindows 1 )

m of the Whole bod,inhaled radionuclides

<2525-100>100

Irradi t i ñ<25

25-500

>500

usefulnecessarynecessary (untilevacuation)

n of Thyroid by inusefulnecessary

necessary untilevacuation

intakeof iodidetablets 2)

y by external

«.

-—

haled iodinesnotnecessaryuseful ;necessarywhen>100 remnecessaryeven whenevacuated

evacuation 3)(under favour-able conditions)

radiation and

nousefulnecessary

and Te-132nonot necessary

useful;necessary when> 1.000 rem

l) expected dose reduction at least about a factor oftwo in case of inhalation and a factor of 5 in caseof external irradiation

2) expected dose reduction about a factor of five byintake within 2 hours after inhalation and about2 Úó intake within 6 hours,,

3) prior dose reduction Úó staying in house or takingiodide tablets expected

!

86

REPUBLIC OF{ continued )

Table III) Recommended derived, action levels for inhalationof 1-131

rangeofrisk

I

II

III

expectedthryoid-dose (rem)

<2525-500

>500

time integral of coiin air (Ci sm~ )

child

< 0,035

0,035-0,7

>0,7

ncentration of activity

adult

<0,08

0,08-1,5

>1,5

After an accidental escape of 1-131 from an operating reactor therewill always Úå a contribution to dose from other short-livedisotopes of iodine and Te-132. To allow for this, the value forthe time integral of concentration of activity of 1-131 in airshould Úå reduced Úó a factor of 2 when the reactor has beenoperating about 1 month or more or by a factor of 10 for a reactorat start-up

87

FRANCE

In accordance with ICRP Recommendations (Publication 26, p. 242-243)the policy adopted in Prance is that the intervention levels foremergencies are so dependent on the respective characteristics ofeach site and each situation that it is impossible to specifyreference levels applicable in any case even in the form of a rangeof projected dose commitments above which protective measures arerequired and below which protective measures should never be needed.Practically the approach to the problem is different whether theplanning or operational stage is concerned,

1. Itaring the planning stage, when one considers one particularsite with its socioeconomic background it is possible toget, for each phase following an accident (early and inter-mediate phase) and for each protective measure, provisionalreference levels suited to the populationsand taking into account the feasibility of the implementationof protective measures and the reduction of dose commitmentthus gained by the application of protective measure.Taking into account the actual conditions of possibleaccidents (meteorological conditions for example) thesereference levels are then set as a range of projecteddose commitments.Derived emergency reference levels are related to theseintervention levels concerning projected dose commttaents.

2. During the operational stage the decision of implementationof one specific protective measure will be taken for onevalue of the projected dose commitment within the dose rangeresulting from preliminary studies, but selected accordingto the actual circumstances of the accident, such as climaticand m t orologie conditions, day, hour, etc...

88

UNITED KINGDOM

Emergency reference levels. (ERL)*)The emergency reference level of dose ' is the basic standard.

It is briefly defined as the radiation dose below which counter-measures are unlikely to be justified. When it seats likely thata radiation dose will exceed the ERL, countermeasures should beundertaken provided that a substantial reduction of dose is likelyto be achieved and provided that the countermeasures can be carriedout without undue risk to the community. If the doses are onlymoderately in excess of the ERLs, the countermeasures should be suchthat they do not involve appreciable risk to the community. Counter-measures involving greater hazard should be applied only if radiationexposures would otherwise be considerable.The ERLs are put forward not as firm action levels but as dose levelsat which the responsible authorities should judge whether counter-measures should be introduced, full account being taken of thedisadvantages and risks these countermeasures might create. Inorder that particular situations can be rapidly assessed in practice,it is necessary to have derived emergency reference levels, eitherof exposure or of activity in environmental materials, which correspondto the ERLs of dose.

' Although the meaning of the term is strictly that of "doseequivalent", in this report the shorter term "dose" is used forconvenience.

89

UNITED KINGDOM(continued)

Definitions and Specifications

The Emergency Reference Levels of Dose applicable in the UnitedKingdom are :-

Whole body 10 remThyroid 30 remLung 30 remBone: Endosteal tissue 30 rem

Marrow 10 remGonads 10 remSuperficial tissuesirradiated by (3 rays 60 remAny other organ or tissue 30 rem

Note: All doses are dose commitments and apply to members of thegeneral population, and embryos "in utero".To allow essential duties to be performed, a special categoryis envisaged, consisting of a few adult males, or femalesabove reproductive age, who might receive up to twice thelimits specified above.

* For external gamma radiation, the dose to the whole body specifiedabove is met sufficiently closely in practice if an exposure of 15Ris not exceeded.The recommended values of Derived Emergency Reference Levels forinternal radiation, in the United Kingdom are:-

Derived ERL

ERL of time integralof concentration ofactivity in air(Ci s m"3)ERL of peakactivity in, milk(nCi litre -1)ERL of initialactivity on pasturewith respect tomilk production(nCi m )

131Tchild

0104*

*0.25

2*

adult

0.15

3.5

25

137Cschild

3.5

*5.5

20*

adult

1.5*

10

35

9°Srchild

0.05*

0.15

6.5*

adult

0.08

0.55

25

Srchild

0.85*

ËÖ.3.5

200*

adult

6

100

6500

90

UNITED ÊÈÒÎÂÎÌ'(continued)

Note: The values are based on the following ERL*s of dose:-for isotopes of iodinefor «Teefor isotopes of strontium

30 rem to the thyroid10 rem to the whole body10 rem to the bone marrow

After an accidental escape of 131, from an operating reactor therewill always Úå a contribution to ose from other short lived isotopesof iodine and 132 Òå. Òî allow for this, the value for the timeintegral of concentration of activity of 131T should be reduced by afactor 2 when the reactor has been operating long enough for theisotopes of iodine to be in equilibrium, or by a factor of 10 for areactor at start-up.* Indicates whether child or adult is most at risk.Derived Emergency Reference Levels of time integral of concentrationof activity in air for selected radionuclides, as applied in theUnited Kingdom, are:-

239 Pu242 Cm95Zr+95Nb106Ru+106Rh140Ba+140La144Ce+144Pr

Dose per nCi inhaled(rem nCi )

adult

28083

0.173.10.122.6

6 month child

28008301.731

1.226

ERL of time integral ofconcentration of activityin air (Ci s m )adult

1áõÞ"40.770.0421.10.050

6 month child

5* ado'40.250.0140.360.016

Note: The above values are based on an ERL dose of 30 rem averagedthroughout lung tissue.Por J3 -emitters which have radioactive daughters, the valuegiven in terms of dose per uCi inhaled is the dose for 1 uCiof parent plus 1 jiCi of daughter. It is assumed that they arein radioactive equilibrium when they are inhaled.The ERL of time integral of concentration of activity in airis based on particles of AMD = 1 uni.

91

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Protective Action GuidesÐîã purposes of radiological emergency response planning, the UnitedStates recognizes three phases of response; early, intermediateand long-term. The phases do not represent definite time periodsbut each phase has corresponding principal exposure pathways. Theprincipal exposure pathway for the early phase are whole bodyexternal exposure from the plume and from deposited material andinhalation dose from the plume; for the intermediate phase, ingestionof contaminated food and water; for the long term phase, whole bodyexternal, inhalation and ingestion from deposited material. ProtectiveAction Guides (PAGs) have been developed for the early and intermediatephases. Ðîã the long term exposure phase, sufficient time shouldbe available for expert evaluation and guidance following the accidentand no PAGs have been developed for this phase.It is important to recognize that the PAGs are defined in terms ofprojected dose following a contaminating event. Projected dose isthe dose that would be received by individuals in the population ifno protective action were taken.Except in extreme cases the projected dose does not include dosethat may have been received prior to the time of estimating theprojected dose. PAGs are considered mandatory values for purposesof planning, but under accident conditions, the values are guidancesubject to unanticipated conditions and constraints such that con-siderable judgement may be required for their application. However,for serious accident associated with core melt or precursors thereto,predetermined protective actions in predetermined areas are plannedto be initiated immediately; such to include evacuation of thenearby environs barring extreme local constraints such as extremelysevere weather conditions at the time.

92

MITED STATES OF AMERICA(continued)

The following PAG values apply to the early phase of the accidentwhere the principal exposure pathways would Úå whole body externalgamma dose and iodine inhalation thyroid dose.

PROTECTIVE ÀÑÒÊÆ G IBES POR THE PLUME EXPOSURE PHASE OP THE ACCIDENT

Projected whole Projected thyroidbody external inhalation dose

Population at Risk dose (rem) (rem)

General populationEmergency workersLifesaving activities

1 to 5 (a)

2575

5 to1250»)

25 (a)

NOTES;(a) When ranges are shown, the lowest value should Úå used if

there are no major local constraints in providing protectionat that level, especially to sensitive populations. Localconstraints may make lower values impractical to use, but inno case should the higher value be exceeded in determining theneed for protective action.

(b ) No specific upper limit is given for thyroid exposure sincein the extreme case complete thyroid loss might be an acceptablepenalty for a life saved. However, this should not be necessaryif respirators and/or thyroid protection for rescue personnelare available as the result of adequate planning.

93

PAGs FOR INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAYS *

Exposure Pathways

Ingestion ofmilk1-131 (Thyroid)Sr-89, Sr-90,and Cs-137(whole body orbone marrow)

Ingestion offresh food cropsSr-89, Sr-90and Cs-137

PAGs for suitable sampleof the populationFirst yeardose

10 rads

3,3 rads

2 rads

Total projecteddose

10 rads

5 rads

no value

PAGs for individuals in thepopulationFirst yeardose

30 rads

10 rads

5 rads

Total projecteddose

30 rads

15 rads

no value

U)î÷

Mî

USA Ingestion Exposure Pathway PAGs are currently being re-evaluated for possible revision

SECTION VI - ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

General

6.01 The purpose of this section is to define and tie togetherthe areas of responsibility and the role of the variousorganizations involved in the response and assistance thatmay be necessary in the event of a nuclear facility accidentin which offsite consequences may Úå expected to occur.These responsibilities should Úå itemized and well definedin an emergency response plan and detailed in organizationalplans. This should Úå done in such a manner that no ambiguitiesor oversights occur and that wherever there is an interactionbetween two or more involved organizations, that is forexample between those onsite and those offsite, the requiredliaison must be established. Actions required under theemergency response plan must Úå efficiently coordinated.

6.02 The scope of the emergency response plan should be determinedby the national competent authorities bearingin mind the facility to which it will apply. The organizations,local governmental etc., to be held responsible to organizeand execute the offsite components of the plan in co-operationwith the nuclear facility operator must be identified. Thenational licensing or the competent authorities should ensurethat all such organizations are consulted in the initialestablishment and any subsequent alteration or revision ofthe emergency response plan. The emergency response planwhen prepared should be reviewed and endorsed by the nationallicensing or competent authorities responsible for permittingthe facility to operate. It should contain aspects relatingto the generalities of both the onsite and offsite emergencyorganizations and the relationship between them.

6.03 In view of the differences in national practices the contentof this section relating to the assignment of responsibilityshould be used as guidance only. However, the duties of thefacility operator can be more precisely established sincethey are technical in nature as opposed to governmentalrelationships which vary.

95

6.04 Authorities, responsibilities and chains of command andactions for the emergency response organization must beclearly known to all involved and provisions should be madeto ensure this is so. The provisions are considered in thissection; the responsibilities, chains of command and actionsare also discussed in Section IV, of this manual. Insofaras possible, normal chains of command and authority shouldbe used with some modifications if necessary to facilitatea timely response. Planning should concentrate on provisionsfor support and advisory services for the primary emergencyresponse organization.

ONSITE ORGANIZATIONThe Role of the Nuclear Facility OperatorGeneral6.05 Detailed guidance on the onsite organization is outside the

scope of this manual. However a few general observationsrelating it to the offsite organization are of importance.

6.06 The operational status of the nuclear facility must be keptunder continuous surveillance by the operator. Deviationsfrom normal operating conditions and any automaticallyinitiated safety functions will be initially observed by theoperating staff. The operator is then in the best positionto make the immediate assessment of any abnormal situationand to initiate appropriate plant corrective action andrecommend or implement any protective measures that are tobe applied. Depending on the nature and severity of thesituation, such measures include actions to protect facilitypersonnel, the alerting of the facility emergency organization,notification and the requesting of external assistance aspreviously agreed with the competent authorities.

6.07 It is the duty of the operator of a nuclear facility tooperate the facility in the best possible manner and inaccordance with established procedures so as to minimizethe risk of an accident, to localize and contain the accidentshould it occur, to utilize every possible means to reducethe release should the accident become uncontained and totake any necessary action - technical, organizational andinformative - to facilitate offsite emergency response operations.

96

á»08 The mclear facility operator is responsible for theorganization, maintenance, and execution of the onsitefacility emergency plan, which should Úå reviewed andendorsed Úó any national licensing authorities or othergovernmental authorities responsible for permitting thefacility to operate.

6.09 Onsite plans should Úå sufficiently broad in scope to coverthose emergency circumstances that might arise from anycredible type of emergency situation that can be anticipatedin connection with the operation of the nuclear facility.Minimum requirements should be established in advance bythe licensing authorities including any obligation by theoperator to organize, maintain and execute initial offsiteactions.

6.10 The operator of a nuclear facility should set up an emergencyresponse group. This group should be responsible, in theplanning stage, for the approval of all onsite technicalprocedures, and organizational plans. Boring the pre-commissioning stage of the nuclear facility, this group shouldsupervise the installation of emergency equipment, review andfinalize the onsite emergency plans and procedures and directthe training of the facility personnel for their variousemergency tasks. During the operation of the facility, theemergency response group should conduct periodic exercisesof the emergency plan and inspect and test emergency equipment.It should periodically review the emergency response plansand revise them, if necessary. The emergency response groupshould assume the leading role in the onsite emergency responseorganization, particularly with regard to any liaison withthe offsite organization.

6.11 In the event of an accident with probable offsite consequences,timely implementation of offsite protective measures isdependent upon prompt assessment by the nucleaf facilityoperator and timely notification to the authorities withinformation on the accident situation at the facility and a

97

prediction of the course of the accident. If possible thenuclear facility operator should issue a preliminary warningor "standby alert" to offsite authorities when appropriate.The responsibility of the nuclear facility operator isunequivocal in this regard.

OFFSITE ORGANIZATIONGeneralEmergency Response Organization6.12 The responsible offsite governmental authority should

provide for an Emergency Response Organization that willensure first, that the necessary plans are prepared andprovide for the action to be taken by local public authoritiesand any other responsible offsite organizations; and second,that the responsible authority itself can carry out anyaction that devolves upon it. Generally the action to be takenby the responsible public authority will increase with theseverity of an accident, and will increase with the extent towhich the consequences of an accident extend beyond theboundaries of the nuclear facility site. Emergency plansin support of the nuclear facility should be coordinated withother existing emergency plans (e.g. fire, flood, nationaldisasters).

6.13 The responsible authority should ensure that all otherappropriate public authorities are brought into the EmergencyResponse Organization. Such organizations could includethe licensing authorities, the public health, food andagriculture authorities, weather forecasting services, civildefense, police, medical hospital and ambulance services.

6.14 Elements that should be considered in the organization includethe location of emergency assistance personnel that canrespond quickly to a notification of an accident and provideservices for local authorities.

6.15 The organizational plan should clearly define responsibility,authority and chains of command and any planned transfer ofresponsibility and authority if an accident actually occurs.

98

Local Organization6.16 Generally, the local organization emergency response plan

will comprise the most important and difficult task forthe Emergency Response Organization to develop. Theemergency response plan should include among other things,provision for;- assessment and projection of offsite consequences (as a

backup to the nuclear facility);- activation of response and implementation of protective

measures, including their enforcement if necessary;- surveillance and monitoring of radiological exposure control;- provision of support services (technical, medical decont-

amination, transport, logistic, social, etc.);- public information;- telecommunication;- control of operational emergency teams.

6.17 The responsibilities and operational procedures must be welldefined and documented for each operational emergency teamor function of the Emergency Response Organization. Theseprocedures should be set out in the form of standing orders.

6.18. The importance of logistic support for the operationalemergency teams cannot be overemphasized. The resourcesneeded should be identified in the planning stage and re-evaluated from time to time during training periods andexercises. Their continuous availability for emergenciesshould be ensured by determining the proper organizationto maintain a supply of the resources and provide for theirstorage, maintenance and eventual distribution.

6.19 The material resources needed include, among other things,access to operational facilities, medical, laboratory,storage and decontamination facilities, means of transportation,communication systems, instrumentation, safety protection andother equipment and materials, radioprotective prophylacticagents, together with instructions and prepared messages forthe news media, replacement personnel and adequate repairfacilities for instruments, transport and communications.There are always crucial items under emergency conditions.

99

6.20 Ðîã timely initial response in the vicinity of the facilitythe Emergency Response Organization should Úå provided witha local Emergency Coordination Center (E.C.C.). The directorof this center, usually a government official, should havethe task and authority to coordinate, supervise and decideon the action of all organizations involved locally inthe protection of the population (e.g. police, health authorities,transportation, civil defence, etc.).

6.21 The director should have with him, in the center, executivesof all the involved organizations and groups, and they, inturn, should have good means for communication with theirrespective staffs and teams.

6.22 The director should have available as a part of his staffadvisors, specialists in health physics, nuclear medicine,meteorology, agriculture and any other specialists of pertinentfields which are not covered by the group of executives. Itis the task of these specialists to evaluate the informationarriving from the facility emergency center and from theaccident assessment or from monitoring teams, and to recommendto the director the protective measures which should be taken.

6.23 The advisory staff could be organized as separate functionalgroups working in close contact with the executive part ofthe emergency center.

6.24 Through a liaison officer the director should keep thenational authorities well informed of the course of events.His authority to implement protective measures should bedecided on and defined in advance and should be spelled outin the emergency plans. He should apply, should he deem itnecessary, and according to predetermined criteria, to thenational authorities for assistance. This assistance can bein the form of sending re-enforcement personnel, technicalequipment, logistic equipment, etc.

6.25 The director should have on his staff, a public informationofficer to assist in the preparation of all public noticesand press releases (This function may be handled on anational level in some countries).

100

6.26 Since it is the duty of the director to coordinate the workof many groups he should direct the pre-planning, thepreparation and the routine exercising of the groups in theirvarious emergency tasks, and the integration of these groupsinto one functioning organization. The center, the personnel *and equipment should Úå organized so that they are readilyavailable and functional in case of an accident on short notice,

National Authorities6.27 The national authority constitutes the highest governmental*central authoritative and executive body . The following

aspect of emergency planning and response should be theresponsibility of the national authority:1. Maintain close contact with the local organization, as

well as liaison with other international organizations.2. Assume full responsibility for governmental actions and

decision making on the national level on issues ofnationwide impact such as the establishment of actionlevels.

3. Develop in advance national level emergency plans andprocedures, along with information, guidance and trainingfor local authorities on handling of radiation emergencysituations. This should be done and should be made arequirement before a nuclear facility is placea intooperation.

4. Plan for the mobilization of expert national governmentemergency teams and resources, depending on the magnitudeof the situation, for evaluation and assessment of theaccident and the development of any other necessaryemergency procedures. Ensure the adequate performanceof these teams by providing training, emergency drillsof personnel and equipment, and special research anddevelopment to improve the overall emergency responsecapabilities.

(• // The national experts can serve as consultants to the emergencycoordination center./

101

5. Ensure that there will be continuous assessment of thesituation regarding the public at large and the environment.

6. Assume official and overall responsibility for nationallevel public information relating to the nature of theaccident, the emergency situation, the actual consequencesand steps being taken "to mitigate the effects of theaccident.

7. Where possible negotiate pre-arranged mutual emergencyassistance agreements with other countries in case of need.

8t Take the leadership to ensure coordination of differentgroups with different jurisdictions.

9. Ensure that steps are taken to identify which medicalfacilities can care for any radiation accident victims.

10. Decide on the needs of the public for information onnational emergency planning and through which channelsthese plans should be made public.

11. Be prepared to assist local authorities in respondingto the emergency, and implementing appropriate protectivemeasures.

12. National authority should also provide alerting as wellas detailed data, if there is radiological impact beyondthe national boundaries.

ORGANIZATION AT LEVEL OF REGIQKALLY ASSOCIATED COUSTRIES. OR STATES6.28 The extent of the consequences arising from a nuclear facility

accident might be of such magnitude that the national andlocal capabilities of one country or state may not be sufficientto deal with them. Even when both the national and local cap-abilities are generally adequate, it is possible that suchcapabilities may need to be augmented depending upon theseverity of the accident. In this event, the need forexternal assistance becomes a reality and it would indeed be highly

advisable if arrangements for mutual emergency assistancehave been made beforehand.

102

6.29 On the basis of geographical considerations, it is desirablethat neighbouring countries or states join in cooperativeagreements concerning coordination of response procedures incase of an accident, particularly for nuclear facilitieslocated near common borders,

6.30 Agreements for cooperation and coordination should include:a. the exchange of information regarding the site, the

technical characteristics of the nuclear facility andits accident analyses.

b. Provisions for collaboration in the development ofradiological emergency response plans.

c. Arrangements for immediate notification in case of anaccident in order that protective actions may be initiated.

d. Cooperation on the establishment of intervention levels,criteria for the evaluation of emergency situations,radiological hazard, monitoring, and decision makingresponsibilities on emergency actions that could be ofmutual concern to the countries or states involved.

6.31 The agreement, which should be signed on a ministerial level,should includea. Terms of assistance which will define the responsibilities

of both the requesting and the assisting countries orStates.

b. Financial provisions which will define which expensesincurred during the assistance period will be paid bythe respective parties to the agreement.

c. Liability provisions which will define who shall bearthe costs of damages and losses and legal claims forpersonal and property injuries resulting from the assist-ance operations of the assisting and/or assisted countriesor States.

d. Designation of authorities competent to make emergencypreparedness decisions for and on behalf of their governments.

e. Statements of privileges and immunities relative to theactivities of assisting country or State's citizens whilein areas under the jurisdiction of the country or Statesbeing assisted.

103

ORGANIZATION AT INTERNATIONAL LEVEL6.32 Since 1959 the IAEA had had an action plan by which it will,

upon request, arrange to provide assistance to any memberState, following an accident involving radioactive materials.There are three major aspects to the current plan.

6.33 ÌåãàÚåã States have been encouraged to analyse and to scopein advance the various types of radiation related incidentsin which they could be involved. They have been encouragedto inventory their human and equipment resources to handlethese emergencies. They should build up their own capabilityso that, to the maximum extent, they would be able to handlea radiological emergency independent of the need for outsideassistance. Except perhaps that there may be some specializedservices and facilities that it would not be economical toprovide in every country. Important examples of specialized facilitieswould be aerial monitoring capability, a. whole body counter todetermine the presence of radioactive material inside thehuman body or specialized hospital rooms to provide anabsolutely sterile environment for the treatment of individualswith high external exposure involving blood-cell changes.

6.34 Member States have been encouraged by the IAEA to enter intobilateral or multilateral assistance agreements with neigh-bouring states with or without the Agency participations.This is to provide the technical services which they mightneed which are beyond their own resources. Terms and conditionshave been prepared to apply to such agreements.

6.35 Preplanning is particularly advantageous since it overcomesthe vexing problems under emergency stress such as determiningappropriate channels of communication, knowing who to contact,obtaining necessary visas and custom clearances as well asagreement on reimbursement of costs, liability and otheradministrative matters. In October 1963» the Nordic Agreement(Nordic Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement in Connectionwith Radiation Accidents) was signed by representatives fromDenmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the IAEA. This agreementwith appropriate minor changes can be used as a model agreementbetween Member States. Similar cooperative regional agreements

exist within the European Atomic Energy Community and there arebilateral agreements between Switzerland and the Federal Republicof Germany.

á„3á Through training programs Member States have been encouragedto develop their own capabilities to handle radiologicalemergencies.

6.37 The IAEA is available, following an emergency, to act as thethird party to arrange for specialized assistance or supportbetween Member States, e.g. medical and radiological support.Starting in 1963 the IAEA has collected from Member Statesinformation on the type of assistance that might be madeavailable as well as the individual or office to be contactedfor request for assistance. This information is issuedperiodically in report WP-35 "Matual Emergency Assistancefor Radiation Accidents". World Health Organization, Poodand Agriculture Organization, International Labour Organ-ization, have participated in the most recent revisions tothis publication. The latest issue was published in 1971(and presently being up-dated). It is stressed that helpfrom other nations cannot be expected until more than 24 hourshave elapsed . Local emergency planning response and medicalassistance must cover that initial period.

6.38 The IAEA maintains the capability through a duty officerroster to have a senior technical person available in theevent of any request for assistance. Usually one of the 20people involved on the duty officer list can be availableat the IAEA emergency control post within one hour of theinitial request. Also special arrangements have been madeinternally as well as with Austrian authorities so thattelex or telephone requests for assistance will receiveimmediate attention» The program also includes the capabilityfor the IAEA to send a small group of observers or consultants(usually two) to the scene of the emergency. Pour suitcase-type kits are available with instruments and protectiveclothing suitable to provide support to the IAEA group forany radiological situation.

105

6.39 In addition, the facilities of the Agency's laboratory forradiochemical analysis of environmental samples or forMoassay and whole body counting are also available.

6.40 Each duty officer has in his possession a copy of the IAEAEmergency Assistance Handbook which contains approximately50 pages of detailed instructions or reference material toassist in handling an emergency request. This handbookdescribes the internal arrangements by which the Agencywould render assistance, and also defines the responsibilityof each staff member who would be involved in the response.In order to achieve rapid and accurate response, simplicityhas been the main concern in preparing the operating procedures.

6.41 Since in the 18-year history of the Emergency Assistance Planthere have been only two requests for medical assistance;it is necessary to test the program and train the duty officersthrough test exercises. These are done on approximately asix-months interval.

6.42 In 1977 the Agency entered into an agreement with the UnitedNations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) to coordinatethe activities of IAEA and UNDRO more closely with respectto disaster relief in order to make the most effectiveuse of the services available in the two organizations forthe benefit of countries in which radiation accidents haveoccured. The two organizations will co-operate in thepromotion of disaster prevention and IAEA will provide uponrequest from the affected Government or UNDRO relevanttechnical and scientific assistance whenever the effects ofa natural disaster threaten or cause damage to a nuclearinstallation which might result in a radiation accident.

106

REFERENCES

1. Preparedness of Public Authorities for Emergencies at luclearPower Plants (in preparation)IAEA Safety Series No. 0-SG-G6

2. Preparedness of the Operating Organization for Emergencies atNuclear Power Plants (in preparation)IAEA Safety Series O.50-SG-06

3. Safety in Nuclear Power Plant SitingIAEA Safety Series No.50-C-S /Vienna, 1978./

4. Conduct of Regulatory Review and Assessment During the LicensingProcess for Nuclear Power PlantsIAEA Safety Series No.50-SG-G3/1979

5. U.S. Reactor Safety Study (Appendix V) App.VT.NUREG-75/014 (Wash-1400), October 1975.

6. Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local GovernmentRadiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light WaterNuclear Power PlantsNUREG-0396, EPA 520/1-78-016. December 1978.

7. U.S.National Council on Radiological Protection and Measurements(NCRP Report N0.55).

8. Respiratory Protective Devices ManualAmerican Industrial Hygiene Assn« - 1963»

9. Health Physics Vol.33/September 1977. pp.287-298(Pergamon Press)

10. Recommendations of the International Commission on RadiologicalProtection/ ICRP Publication 26. Adopted January 17, 1977/.Pergamon Press (Oscford; New York; Frankfurt).

11. Agreements Registered with the International Atomic Energy Agency/Seventh Edition/Legal Series Bb.3, Vienna 1978.

12. Mutual Emergency Assistance for Radiation Accidents/Vienna 1977/IAEA/PAO/ILO/WHO publication.

13. Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for NuclearIncidents, EPA 5201 1-75-001, U.S.Environmental Protection Agency,Office of Radiation Programs, Washington, D.C., U.S.A., September 1975»

14. Evacuation Risks - An Evaluation, EPA 52016-74-002, U.S.Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation Programs,Washington, B.C., U.S.A., June 1974.

15. Guide and Checklist for Development and Evaluation of State and LocalGovernment Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support ofFixed Nuclear Facilities, NUREG 75/11 (formerly WASH 1293), RevisionNo.l, December 1, lf?4t U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office ofInternational and State Programs, Washington, B.C., U.S.A.

16. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC), Report UCRL-77200,Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, U.S. Energy Research and DevelopmentAdministration, September 8, 1975.

17. Environmental Monitoring in Emergency Situations, Safety Series N6.18,IAEA, Vienna 1966.

107

18. Risk Evaluation for Protection of the Public in RadiationAccidents, Safety Series No.23:, IAEA, Vienna 1967.

19. Planning for the Handling of Radiation Accidents, SafetySeries No.32, IAEA, Vienna 1969.

20. Evaluation of Radiation Emergencies and Accidents, SelectedCriteria and Data, Technical Reports Series Ho.152, IAEA,Vienna 1974»

21. Handling of Radiation Accidents, Proceedings of a Symposium19 - 23 May 1969, IAEA, Vienna.

22. Mutual Emergency Assistance for Radiation Accidents, WO/35/Rev. 4, IAEA, Vienna( in preparation)

23. Regulatory Guide 1.101 Emergency Planning for Nuclear PowerPlants, U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, November 1975»

24. Manual on Early Medical Treatment of Possible RadiationInjuryIAEA Safety Series No.47, Vienna 1978.

108

PREPARAT IQBT OP MANUAL OP GUIDANCE

I. ADVISORY GROUP ON PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTION OPTHE PUBLIC Ø THE EVENT OP AN ACCIDENT

Æ A NUCLEAR FACILITYANKARA, TURKEY, 15 - 19 NOVEMBER 1976

MEMBER STATESAUSTRIA

M. Tschurlovits

assisted by

Ê. M tck

BELGIUM

C. H. M. Pieuw

DENMARK

J. Schultz-Larsen

assisted by

H. Jensen

H. P. Ryder

Atominstitut der Osterreichische HochschulenVienna

Osterreichische Studiengesellschafte furAtomenergieVienna

SCK/CENMol

Arviebiologisk InstitutCopenhagen

Atomic Energy Commissions ' Inspectorateof Nuclear InstallationsRoskilde

EGYPTA. M. El-Naggar

assisted ÚóA. P. Ayad

Atomic Energy CentreInshas

Atomic Energy EstablishmentCairo

109

FRANCEM. Dousset

assisted byJ. Hamard

GERMANY, FED. REP.J. Narrog

assisted ÚóH. J. Hardt

HUNGARYL. B. Sztanyik

ISRAELY. Gonen

NETHERLANDS

J. L. Baas

assisted byC. J. Van Daatselaar

L. Strackee

PHILIPPINESB. C. Bernardo

SWITZERLANDS. Pr tre

Commissariat L'Energie AtomiqueFont enay-aux-Rose s

Commissariat L'Energie AtomiqueFont enay-aux-Rose s

Ministerium f r Arbeit, Gesundheit undSozialordnung des Landes Baden-WttrttembergStuttgart

Bundesministerium des InnernBonn

National Research Institute for Radiobiologyand RadiohygieneBudapest

NRCNBeersheva

Ministry of Health and EnvironmentalProtectionLeidschendam

Ministry of Social AffairsThe HagueNational Institute of Public HealthBilthoven

Philippine Atomic Energy CommissionQuezon City

Division pour la S curit des InstallationsNucl airesWttrenlingen

110

TURKEYS. Gaksel

assisted Úó12 Observers

UNITED KINGDOMJ. A. Driscoll

assisted ÚóR. B. Pepper

UNITED STATES OP AMERICAH. E. Collins (Chairman)

assisted ÚóJ. Logsdon

R. Zintz

U.S.S.RJ. V. Sivint sev

assisted ÚóV. A. Belev

DTPERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONSOECD/NEAE. Wallauschek

WHOG. Guttuso

SCIENTIFIC SECRETARY

G. E. Swindell

Nuclear Research and Training CentreCtetaece

Ankara, Cekmece and Istanbul

Nuclear Installations InspectorateLiverpool

Central Electricity Generating BoardLondon

Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington

Environmental Protection AgencyWashingt onEnergy Research and Development AdministrationWashington

Institute of Atomic EnergyMoscow

Institute of Atomic EnergyMoscow

Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECDParisPrance

WHO representativeAnkara

Division of Nuclear Safety and EnvironmentalProtectionIAEAViennaAustria

111

É. ABVISORY GROUP ON PLANNING FOR THE PROTECTIONOF THE PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF ANACCIDENT IN A NUCLEAR FACILITY

LISBON, PORTUGAL^ 24 - 28 OCTOBER 1977

MEMBER STATESAUSTRIAM. Tschurlovits

assisted byK. Muck

DENMARKJ. Schultz-Larsen

assisted byH. Jensen

H. P. Ryder

Atominstitut der Osterreichische HochschulenVienna

Osterreichische Studiengesellschafte fto1

AtomenergieVienna

Arviebiologisk InstitutCopenhagen

Atomic Energy Commission's Inspectorateof Nuclear InstallationsRoskilde

EGYPTA» M. El-Naggar

assisted ÚóA. F. Ayad

FRANCEM, Dousset

assisted 'byJ» Eamard

Atomic Energy CentreInshas

Atomic Energy EstablishmentCairo

Commissariat L'Energie AtomiqueFont enay-aux-Ro ses

Commissariat L'Energie AtomiqueFontenay-aux-Roses

è:

ÑÅÃÎØÏÃ, FED. REP.

J. Narrog

assisted Úó

H. J. Hardt

HUNGARY

L. B. Sztanyik

ISRAEL

E. Asculai

NETHERLANDS

J. Baas

assisted Úó

Ñ. J. Van Daatselaar

PORTUGALA. Severo )G. M. Branco Pedro )J. Yaz Carreiro )H. Carreira Pich )

SWITZERLANDS. Pr tre

UNITED KINGDOMJ. A. Driscoll

assisted ÚóR. Â. Pepper

Ministerium fttr Arbeit, Gestindheit tmdSozialordunang des Landes Baden-WérttemÚeãgStuttgart

Bundesministeritm des InnernBonn

National Research Institute for RadioÚiologyand RadiohygieneBudapest

NRCNBeersheva

Ministry of Health and Environmental ProtectionLeidschendam

Ministry of Social AffairsThe Hague

Junta de Energie Nuclear, Lisbon

Division pour la S curit des InstallationsNucl airesWttrenlingen

Nuclear Installations InspectorateLiverpool

Central Electricity Generating BoardLondon

113

UNITED STATES OP AMERICAH. E. Collins (Chairman)

assisted byJ. Logsdon

R. Zintz

U.S.S.R.J. V. Sivintsev

assisted ÚóV. A. Klimanov

Suelear Regulatory CommissionWashington

Environmental Protection AgencyWashingtonEnergy Research and DevelopmentAdraini strat ionWashington

Institute of Atomic EnergyMoscowInstitute of Atomic EnergyMoscow

DfTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONSICRPM. Dousset

OECD/HEAE. Wallauschek

Commissariat L*Energie AtomiquePont enay-atuc-Ro sesPrance

Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECDParisPrance

SCIENTIPIC SECRETARYG. E. Swindell Division of Nuclear Safety and Environmental

ProtectionInternational Atomic Energy AgencyViennaAustria

114

III. CONSULTANTS WHO ASSISTED IN PREPARATION OP TEXT

1. PREPARATION OP DRAFT MANUAL OP GUIDANCE

VHMNA, SEPTEMBER 1977

H.E.Collins

Y. Gonen

2. PINALIZATION OP MANUAL

VIENNA, JUNE 1979

H.E.Collins

J.Kovacs International Atomic Energy AgencyDivision of Nuclear Safety andEnvironmental Protection

115

planning for off-site response to radiation accidents in nuclear facilities

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