plato and his liberal opponents

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Plato and his Liberal Opponents

Laszlo G. Versenyi

Philosophy / Volume 46 / Issue 177 / July 1971, pp 222 - 237DOI: 10.1017/S0031819100018982, Published online: 25 February 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0031819100018982

How to cite this article:Laszlo G. Versenyi (1971). Plato and his Liberal Opponents. Philosophy, 46,pp 222-237 doi:10.1017/S0031819100018982

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PLATO AND HIS LIBERAL OPPONENTS

LASZLO G. VERSENYI

IN ONE of the few thoughtful essays that have come out of the controversyabout the Republic's political theory, Renford Bambrough draws atten-tion to the basic philosophical issue underlying the controversy in thefollowing manner:

Plato's friends, who argue that in the light of the philosophical doctrinesfrom which they have been derived the Republic's concrete proposals arenot only defensible but inescapable, have a cogent rejoinder to those ofPlato's critics who attack these proposals without regard to the contextin which they are offered. But this rejoinder is far from being a completedefense of Plato as long as it does not question and try to justify the basicprinciples from which the particular conclusions have been derived.This is where Plato's opponents, for all the emotional tone of their attack,are more philosophical than his friends. They challenge "not the connec-tion between particular proposals and the premisses from which they arederived, but rather the premisses themselves".1

Plato's basic premiss, according to Bambrough, is "that the philoso-pher's knowledge of what is entitles him to judge what ought to be" (9),while his opponents restate Hume's view "that no amount of is can everimply an ought" (11) and insist that "there is no body of knowledge suchthat from it can be derived infallible or even fallible decisions about ulti-mate political objectives" (159).

Bambrough himself sides with Plato's critics at this point, and claimsthat Plato's failure to distinguish between description and prescription,fact and value, investigation and deliberation led him to drawing falseanalogies between justice and health, statescraft and medicine, and toconfusing arguments about means and ends which were "quite differentin logical kind" (160). Plato "represents a question about what is to bedone (as an end) as if it were very like a question about what is to be done(as a means) in order to achieve some given or agreed end" (159), and thisis a logical mistake. For there are given and agreed upon ends and pur-poses guiding the physician's or navigator's decisions, but there are nosuch things for the moralist or politician. To speak of a "ship of state"or a "body politic" means to disregard the fact that navigation and medi-cine are technai, kinds of instrumental knowledge, because they areconcerned with means, while moral and political science—if there could besuch—would have to be concerned with ultimate ends. A techne is "byits very nature instrumental and not prescriptive" (12, 166), and thereforea techne politike, a prescriptive political science, is a contradiction interms. There can simply be no knowledge of what is good morally orpolitically, and thus there can be no "experts at determining what isgood both for individual men and for communities" (160). The philo-sophic ruler is a theoretical, and not just practical, impossibility.

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In the following I would like to take issue with this argument and defendPlato against his modern liberal opponents.

First I will leave aside the question whether there are in fact any recog-nized political experts in our world, in the way that there are doctors andnavigators, and merely ask whether such political expertise is possibleto have in principle even if no one happens to have it at the moment.

If the answer to this question depends on Bambrough's means andends distinction, then I think it is necessary to answer the questionaffirmatively. For, in essence, every political decision is a decision aboutmeans rather than ends, and is thus a technical-instrumental choicewhich can be, and in principle should be, guided by a techne.

This is easy to see in the case of particular examples of importantpolitical decisions we are actually faced with today. Whether, e.g.,American presence m South-East Asia is a good or a bad thing, dependsentirely on one's judgment as to whether it is conducive or counter-productive to such ends as world peace, long-term national security, theself-determination of nations, etc. But this judgment is a purely instru-mental one, and opponents on all sides claim merely that their approachand their solution to the problem will lead to the agreed upon ends.About the ends themselves there is, as far as I can determine, just aboutunanimous agreement.

The problem of integration vs. separation of races, to take anotherexample, is equally instrumental. Its solution depends on one's judgmentas to which of these approaches is the best and fastest means to an agreedupon end: equal rights and opportunities, liberty and justice for all,etc. About the end itself there is hardly any disagreement voiced in thiscase either.

One could go on in this manner to show that all the urgent politicalproblems confronting us today are in fact instrumental issues ratherthan problems about ends. But this would not be a complete rejoinderto Bambrough unless one also showed that political decisions not onlyare not but cannot in principle be decisions concerning ultimate endsand values.

Given one hypothesis, this might be deceptively easy to prove. Giventhe fact, namely, that the state has a certain generally recognized purposeand end, a definite function to fulfill in the lives of men, every politicaldecision becomes a decision about what particular policy the state shouldadopt and pursue (as a means) in order to fulfill its function and attainto its agreed upon end. But this proof would hardly convince Plato'sopponents who question precisely the hypothesis it presupposes andclaim that the state has no knowable, let alone universally agreed upon,function and purpose. Thus to make out a case for Plato one wouldfirst have to prove rather than merely assume the hypothesis itself. Butthis is exactly what Plato does in Book II of the Republic.

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Before Socrates even begins to construct the state in order to meetGlaucon's and Adeimantus' objections to his view of justice, he attemptsto answer the basic question concerning the state's aim, end, functionand good. The arche or genesis of the polis, the reason why it comes intobeing at all, lies in human nature. It lies in the facts that no individualis self-sufficing (autarkes) but we are all creatures of many needs, and thatno two individuals are alike but we all have different needs, desires, talentsand abilities. Given these facts, it is better for men to get together incommunities where each can to contribute to the others' satisfactionand receive from the others what he needs for his own. Such interchangeof giving and receiving, made possible by the distribution of labour whichin its turn depends on the existence of the state, leads to the mutual fulfill-ment of all in two ways: It increases production and thus satisfies thematerial needs of all individuals better (each is able to learn and thereforeperform better the one craft he practices, and each can perform better andproduce more in practicing the art he is most suited for by nature). Itincreases the inherent satisfaction every man finds in his own work(because each will find the type of activity he is naturally most suited forinherently more satisfactory than any others). Because of these benefitsthat oragnized communal living alone provides, living in the polis isnaturally good for man. Although the state is, in a sense, an artificialbody, our need for the state is not artificial but natural: it is our naturalneed and desire for self-fulfillment.

There are several points to be made in connection with this accountof the origin of the state.

In the first place, it is a purely instrumental-functional-teleologicalaccount. The state is said to be good for the fulfillment of the individualswho compose it; the state is a necessary instrument and means to man'sself-fulfillment. The sole function of the state is to make individuals livebetter; the state is excellent if and to the extent that it fulfills this functionand attains this end.

Now if the state itself is a mere instrument—in the way in which a shipis an instrument for conveying men to where they want to go—all know-ledge of matters of state is instrumental knowledge. It is a knowledgeof what internal structure and what policies in the internal and externalgovernance of each state are most likely to make the state excellent in,good at, tulfilling its function and achieving its aim.

In the second place, it is not only Socrates' interlocutors in Book IIof the Republic who agree with this definition of the aim and function ofthe state; so do Plato's liberal enemies. They may criticize this orthat institution within Plato's state, they may disagree with the divisionof the classes, the role of each, and, above all, the role of the philospherking, but as to the end of the state—the greatest possible fulfillmentof the individuals composing it—they are in substantial agreement withPlato. Therefore their controversy with him is one about means not

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ends. It is a controversy about what structure, what ruling body, andwhat policies are best for, most conducive to, the well-functioning of thestate and thus to its attainment of the agreed-upon end.

And this controversy is decidable, even according to Bambrough, in apurely cognitive manner, since it involves only factual questions, ques-tions about means. Its solution is a matter of techne, of descriptiveknowledge, and whatever prescriptions the solution leads to will be derivedfrom descriptive statements by way of an instrumental-hypotheticalreasoning: "Given the end and function of the state, and the particularstate of affairs that calls for a decision, such and such government,policy, etc., is the best (means for attaining the end)." This type of"prescription" is exactly analogous to, rather than logically differentfrom, medical or navigational directives, and is thus theoretically subjectto expertise. It is a matter of knowledge of good, i.e. of what is good asa means to an end.

However, even this is not a complete rejoinder to Bambrough. Forgiven the fact that Plato's critics do not happen to quarrel with himabout ends rather than means, it might still be possible in principle tocontest Plato's definition of the aim and function of the state. Wouldthis turn the argument into something other than a purely instrumental-hypothetical one ? I think not.

Let us assume that one disagreed with Plato as to the essential functionof the state, and proposed a different definition. If this definition wereequally teleological—states are good for . . ., have the function of . . .,etc.—then any argument concerning the state would automaticallybecome an instrumental one. To account for and to justify the existenceof the state teleologically means to justify it as a means to, a good for,the satisfaction of some human need, a remedy for some constitutionaldeficiency in the nature of man. But then such argument would notonly be an instrumental one, decidable by a reasoning from facts, but inthe end, instead of being an argument against Plato, it would be arestatement of his argument: The end of the state is the fulfillment of(some need or needs in) man.

There is only one way to escape from this teleological circle, but theprice that would have to be paid for such escape is greater than the thingis worth.

One could, e.g. refuse to give functional-teleological definition—thestate is good for . . ., has the function of. . .—and simply define the stateconventionally as a group of people living together under some type andsome measure of authority, be that of man, men, or laws. But if onestopped with such a conventional definition and refused to expand itteleologically, one would have no ground for an argument against Plato,or indeed against any political theory whatsoever. For non-teleologicallywe can neither evaluate any rival political theory, nor defend one of ourown, not even attempt to justify the existence of the state itself. Plato's

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ideal state satisfies the above definition no worse than any other—demo-cratic, tyrannical, etc.—state; in terms of the definition they are all equal,and the question as to which is better, the prime question of Plato's oppo-nents, does not even arise. To be sure, knowledge (of what is good) isirrelevant to the problem of the state here, but it is irrelevant simplybecause the problem itself could not conceivably be raised. Thus wewould not have shifted the argument here from descriptive to prescription;on the contrary, we would have given up all political prescriptionaltogether and would not even be able to prescribe or justify communallife as such.

We could, of course, change the above definition and adopt a differentone, but unless we made it functional-teleological the change wouldavail nothing. If we said, e.g. that a state is a group of people livingtogether in harmony, we could make prescriptions and value-judgmentsconcerning states and their institutions (the more harmonious the groupthe better the state). But we could do so only because our definitionhas become covertly teleological: the function of the state is viewed hereas producing harmony among people, the state's purpose is to makecommunal life harmonious, and so all our value-judgments and politicaldecisions become instrumental since the state itself has become a means,an instrument to an end. And we could still not prescribe or justify theexistence of states themselves without tying it up teleologically with humanneeds and showing what group life, and harmonious rather than dis-harmonious group life, are themselves good for in the lives of men.

The upshot of this is that there is simply no way of escaping teleological,means to end reasoning in our prescriptions and evaluations. If wewant to make practical judgments about the state or anything else, wehave to reason teleologically. For all practical purposes we are in-escapably caught in the teleological circle.

This is, at least in part, what Plato meant by saying that the good wasthe highest object of knowledge: That since the essence of rational lifeis to do everything as a means to an end, the essence of practical rationalityis to think of everything functionally; that when we reason and justify wenecessarily reason and justify teleologically, i.e. in terms of a good or endwhich is presupposed but not itself justified as good within the argument.Therefore all practical reasoning is instrumental by its very nature, and allpractical judgment is subject to knowledge.

There is, of course, an obvious sense in which Plato's opponents areright in asserting that ultimate value judgments are not justifiable andtherefore not amenable to rational investigation and not subject to know-ledge qua techne. But in this sense they are merely restating Plato'sinsight into the nature of teleological reasoning, and they can hardlyuse this as a support for their arguments against Plato.

Teleological reasoning by its very nature implies that if somethingcannot be justified as a means to something else it simply cannot be

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justified. This means that any attempt to justify ultimate ends, or tojustify anything ultimately and absolutely, is self-defeating. The strictureof "ultimacy" would prevent us from going beyond the thing in questionto ground it in something else. But this is contrary to the notion ofteleology which requires that we always ground everything in somethingelse. Thus "ultimate teleological justification" is a contradiction interms. Where instrumental reasoning ends, practical rationality has itsown limit.

As regards the justification of the state, this is easy to see if we followthe argument to its Platonic end:

The question "what is the function of the state, what are states goodfor?" Plato answers: states are good for, have the function of, fulfilling(the needs, wants, interests, etc., of) the individuals who compose themand providing men with a better life than they could have living in isola-tion. But why should men want to better their lives and desire well-being,self-fulfillment, eudaimonial Because they are deficient and consciousof their deficiency, because they are rational creatures of need, i.e.teleological beings, beings aware of outstanding ends, goods thatbelong to them by nature (potentially) but are not yet attained in actuality,and therefore they necessarily strive for the attainment of what they regardas their end. Being what they are (teleological), they necessarily wantto be all that they can possibly be by nature, they necessarily want tofulfill their nature and function.

But why are men what they are? What is it good for that man isconstructed as he is by nature? Why is it good that there should behuman beings rather than no men at all ? This is where rational question-ing reaches its end because a further pursuit would be neither practicalnor rational.

It is not practically necessary for us to answer such questions, for inmoral and political practice it is our actions that we have to justifyrationally, and not our being. The choices we have to make are choicesas to what to make of our being, and not whether we come into beingat all. Given the fact of our existence, the fact that we are what we are(teleological beings), the fulfillment of our being is our necessary naturalend even in the absence of all further justification.

This is another way of saying that all ethical decision is instrumentaldecision. The final end—our own being to whose fulfillment all actionis instrumental—we have no choice about. Thus the only meaningfulquestion is "how am I to live?", and this can be answered if I know whatI am, what are my needs, talents, abilities, what is my natural functionand end.

It is not rationally possible for us to answer the "ultimate" question:why act and live at all ? For if this question is not answered by "beingwhat I am I want to live and be what I am as fully as possible", it cannotbe answered at all. If life, the good life, is not an inherent good and

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raison d'etre for the living, then there can be no good and no raison d'etrefor them and it is useless to ask for one. It is useless, because all justifi-cation is teleological, and so it would merely defer rather than resolve theissue to try to justify our being in terms of something else which wouldthen have to be justified in its turn, and so on, ad infinitum. Thereforeit makes more sense to stop with our own existence as an ultimate, un-justifiable, brute fact, than to try to go on with no hope of ever gettinganywhere.

As in Kant the idea of an absolute whole, the absolute totality of allexperience, is an idea of reason and not a matter of knowledge andexperience, so in Plato the absolute end, the final ground of all, theultimate good, is an idea above and beyond knowledge and truth. Itis an idea that man's teleological reason necessarily frames but cannotunderstand—teleologically. It is a demand of reason that reason cannotsatisfy.

So Plato's opponents are, in a sense, right in saying that ultimate endsare not knowable and subject to rational discussion. But this considera-tion is completely irrelevant to any practical—moral or political—delibera-tion which necessarily presupposes the fact of our being (deficient andteleological) and aims at its improvement and fulfillment rather than itsjustification. Meaningful moral or political discussion is reasoning fromthe facts we are confronted with—our nature and the nature of the world—and not an ultimate justification of the facts. That is why it is subjectto factual knowledge, the knowledge of our natural ends and the naturalmeans to their attainment; that is why virtue, moral and political, istechne (in Bambrough's terms), wisdom (in Plato's), knowledge of humangood and evil.

The real weakness of the case of Plato's opponents is, of course, notthat they want to go beyond such knowledge but that they want to stopfar short of it, claiming that even this knowledge (of our function) isunavailable to man, and that questions concerning each individual's, ormankind's, nature and end are themselves "ultimate" questions un-decidable by factual argument and reasoning from experience.

Their argument rests on a radical fact-value, means-end, natural-normative distinction. But even if this distinction were tenable, itwould not support their argument; on the contrary it would destroy thebasis of their opposition not only to Plato but to any moral and politicaltheory.

The distinction is untenable because means and end, nature and normare correlative terms, and what ought to be is not absolutely separablefrom what is. "End in itself", "good in itself", "absolute norm" areempty concepts, for the only meaning these words have is a referentialmeaning. Nothing can be an end or good absolutely, without referenceto anything; a thing can be an end or good only for and in relation tosomething. What determines, e.g. whether anything is good (valuable,

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useful, beneficial, helpful, etc.) for man, is the inherent nature, constitution,function of the thing in relation to the inherent nature (needs, interests,natural activity and function) of man. Since teleologically—and howelse can one speak of goods and ends?—good means "good for" andend "end of", it makes no sense to speak of the good absolutely (divorcedfrom all relations in which something can be good for something), non-naturally (without regard to the nature of the thing the good is supposedto be good for) and of ends non-functionally (without reference to thefunction and activity of a thing in terms of which the end is defined).2

What I am (potentially, by nature) determines what is good for me; whatI am good for (what I can do, what is my natural work and function)determines what is my good or end as well as what is virtue or excellencefor me, i.e. excellence in being what I am. Excellence as a non-referential,absolute term is as empty as the "good in itself". Therefore all normsfor man, all norms defining human excellence, all prescriptions, com-mands, and oughts man is asked to obey, must be founded in humannature, the nature of the thing they are prescribed for, or else they loseeither their foundation or their content. Nothing but an "is" can justifyan "ought".

Instead of belabouring this point any further, let us ask what happensif this natural-functional-teleological account of values, goods, ends andnorms is rejected and goods and ends are divorced from the naturalconstitution of things and declared to be unknowable.

Plato's opponents, as represented by Bambrough, argue that there canbe no knowledge of what is good morally and politically, and therefore noexperts at determining what is good for individuals or communities.From this they draw the conclusion that each man, rather than Plato'sphilosopher ruler, is the best judge of what is good for him, and all mentogether are the best judge of what is good for the community. But thisconclusion in no way follows from their premisses. On the contrary,if the good—of individual and state—is unknowable then no man canjudge in any way whatsoever what is good for him or the state. We allbecome "equally qualified" judges only in the sense that none of us isqualified to judge at all. But in this case no argument against Plato'sstate, and in favour of a pluralistic society, has any basis. If no oneknows anything about the good of the individual and the state then noone is qualified to rule, and it simply makes no difference who rules andhow many people—one, few, many—are given a say in the government.Since ruling is no longer an art (techne in Bambrough's sense) directed atknowable ends and thus subject to knowable principles, the question ofwho should rule and how is an undecidable question. Any answer to it isarbitrary and any controversy about it is senseless.

The same is true of all arguments about moral and political law. If, asPlato's opponents argue, conventional law and norm cannot be foundedin natural law, then they have no foundation at all. If the law's being

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harmonious with or antithetical to the nature and function of individualand community is not a measure of its goodness or badness, then it has nomeasure or criterion and cannot be rationally evaluated. If its aim andfunction is no longer the satisfaction of natural human ends and functions,it simply has no practical end and function. The law is law simply bydefinition—in as much as it has been convened upon, enacted, decreed aslaw—and the question what should be law does not arise. Once moraland political decision has no basis in investigation and judgment, asBambrough would have it, all deliberation is equally unguided, arbitraryand irrational; all deliberation about laws and norms is equally pointless.In the absence of knowledge (of the good) opinions (as to what is good)themselves have no foundation. Since it is impossible to distinguishbetween right and wrong opinion—at least in moral and political matters—all opinions are equally good and true. Since none are susceptible toproof, all are equally justified, i.e. none has any justification.

Seen in this light, there is a curiously familiar ring to the position ofPlato's opponents: That in moral and political matters no one is a betterjudge than anyone else; that each is the best judge and measure of hisown "wisdom"; that all opinions are equally true—have we not, indeedhas not Plato already, heard these views long before his modern foesarticulated them? We have, and so has Plato (see Theat. 161C-E).They are nothing but a restatement of the views of ancient Sophistry atits worst; only they are a covert restatement that does not even have thecourage or the insight to draw the necessary conclusions which ancientSophistry even at its worst was acute enough to draw. Plato's attack onProtagoras (Theat. 170E-171B; 178A-179A) may have been misdirected,3

but it has full force against the position of our modern Sophists.* * *

In the preceding I have argued for Plato's principles on a largelytheoretical level, but this type of argument is bound to remain unsatisfac-tory unless one is also willing to draw the practical implications fromPlato's theory of the state. Not only because Plato would be the last manto divorce theory from practice, but also because it is on this level that hiscritics have the strongest and most deep-seated disagreement with him.And no matter how much one succeeded in showing that Plato's theory isthe best in principle, such demonstration would remain unconvincing, andindeed rightly suspect, if the theory defended led. to practical conclusionswhich one was simply unwilling to accept and put into practice in one'sown moral and political life. So the question that must be raised is:Does Plato's theory lead to unacceptable, morally and politically repug-nant practical conclusions?

Plato's enemies clearly think so. This is what explains, even if it doesnot excuse, the violence and moral fervour of their attack. As Bambroughpoints out: "Those who attack Plato's metaphysic of morals are promptednot only by a metaphysical or epistemological motive, but also by a moral

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motive . . .: namely the motive of anti-authoritarianism. It is becausethey believe in democratic political institutions and practices that Russelland Popper and Crossman are moved to attack Plato in the first place;the first prong of their attack is directed against the authoritarian institu-tions of the Republic" (15-16).

I would like to deal with this matter of moral-political motivation byasking two questions: Is Plato's authoritarianism morally repugnant?Do Plato's principles, rightly understood, undermine and endanger thedemocratic political institutions and practices which Plato's friends andenemies alike cherish and want to preserve ? To my mind the answer toboth of these questions is: no.

Those who simply equate Plato's state with some historical despotismof the present or the recent past and consider this an argument againstPlato, do not deserve much attention. No man argued more consistentlyand with greater insight against despotism than Plato did. His authori-tarianism was aristocratic, not despotic; he advocated giving unlimitedauthority to those who possessed the greatest knowledge of what is good,and would therefore necessarily do what is good rather than bad forindividual and state alike. Despotism is the exact opposite of aristo-cratic government: it is the rule of those who know least and thereforein the long run will harm most the state and all individuals composing it,including themselves. Since political power in Plato is allocated to eachman in proportion to his power to use it for good rather than evil, andsince this power flows from a knowledge of good, a knowledge which thedespot by definition does not have and cannot be given, one simply cannotpoint to the most unenlightened and irrational absolute rulers in historyand use them as an argument against Plato's principle that the best man,the man with the greatest knowledge of the good, should rule.

But not all of Plato's opponents take this easy way out. Some of them,at least, recognize that the philosopher king is not a Hitler or Stalin.Nevertheless they object to the unlimited rule of even the most enlightenedand benevolent of men, and argue that even such rule is repugnant becauseit denies certain inherent and inalienable rights of the individual, withoutthe possession and exercise of which no human life can be called humanand good. At first sight this appears to be a much better argument; onreflection, however, this too turns out to be no argument at all.

For what are the rights of men Plato's state denies, and what gives menthese rights? In his description of democracy in Book VIII (557A-B)Plato identifies these rights as the freedom of each man to do as he likeswithout intereference from others, and the equal share and participationof all in the government of the city. It is moral and political freedomand equality that the Republic denies and its opponents insist on ashuman rights.

To resolve this issue of "rights" rationally means to ask the teleologicalquestion: What is the aim and end of granting people these rights?

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What purpose do they serve? What are they good for in the lives ofindividuals? In what way do they make a man's life better rather thanworse ?

Is freedom good for man? Asked in this manner, without furtherqualification, the question is undecidable. To make it answerable onehas to specify what kind of freedom one means, freedom from what andfor what. And once this is specified it is obvious that not all freedom isworth having. The freedom of the criminal to destroy himself and othersis not a good freedom if one assumes that under wise guidance andrestraint this man would have been able to lead a more meaningful andsatisfactory (even to him) life. The freedom of the natural slave, theman so devoid of a knowledge of what is good for him that he is incapableof ruling himself for his own good, is not good for the slave. For his owngood, he should be ruled, absolutely, by someone who knows.

In other words, freedom, like everything else, is good only to the extentthat it is accompanied by knowledge. For good is what is good to have,what fulfills us and makes our lives excellent, and only knowledge doesthat. Knowledge of the good alone makes us free: free to fulfill ourselves.And that is the only worthwhile freedom to have. The rest—freedomfrom all restriction regardless of how little we know—results in theopposite of true freedom: utter inability to fulfill ourselves, material andspiritual misery rather than welfare and excellence. Freedom is givennot by a lack of restriction but by rational restriction and guidance.

And this is the freedom that Plato's state is designed to provide. Everyargument agamst the "illiberal" nature of the ideal state should be evalu-ated in view of this conception of freedom. If it is, it is easily seen thatthis state, far from denying freedom, liberates man better than any rivalpolity, be it as "liberal" as it may.

As for "equal rights", the argument follows the same lines. Peopleshould be granted the rights that are good for them to have. Since peopleare not equal in nature, and above all not equal in their knowledge ofwhat is good for them as individuals and in the state, it is not good forthem to be given equal shares and functions, whether as individuals or asmembers of the state. Their unequal natures suit them to different tasksand require different activities for their fulfillment. This necessarilyleads to a diversified and hierarchical organization within the state; a sub-ordination and superordination that puts each individual in its naturalplace: the one he can fill by nature. The well-constructed state is anorganism; its different members are suited for and are given differentfunctions within it. An indiscriminate and arbitrary levelling of allnatural differences and equating of all men will weaken the state ratherthan contribute to its health. Therefore inequality rather than equalityin the distribution of tasks, powers and responsibilities is good for indivi-dual and state alike, and ideally equal rights should never be granted to all.

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Now Plato's opponents may argue for freedom and equality becausethey hold that all men have sufficient moral and political knowledge andtherefore all deserve moral and political freedom, and that men aresufficiently equal in nature to be treated as equals in the state. If so, theyhave no argument with Plato's principles (of who is to have politicalfreedom and why); they disagree only on factual matters which could bedecided by empirical investigation. (They come in conflict not so muchwith Plato's theory here as with their own which rules out moral andpolitical knowledge.)

If, on the other hand, Plato's critics take issue with this type of instru-mental-teleological evaluation of freedom and equality, and claim thatfreedom and equality are not instrumental goods, valuable in terms ofwhat they provide, but ultimate ends and values, then no rational argu-ment can have any force against their claim because by making it theyhave abandoned the field of rational argument. If freedom and equalityas ultimate values are beyond rational-teleological justification, then theyare beyond justification. Immediate intuition, passionate conviction,conscience, aesthetic inspiration or mystical insight can provide no sanc-tion or ground for them, for an appeal to such sanctions is merely a wayof arbitrarily positing unargued and unjustified first principles andultimate ends. To recur to this is to abandon moral and political philo-sophy for moral and political faith.

Those of Plato's critics who are willing to do this are doing exactly whatthey objected to Plato's doing in the Republic. They are creating politicalmyth, which, however, quite unlike Plato, they are unwilling to argue andincapable of justifying. As Meyerhoff pointed out, "these critics' ownpolitical vocabularly cannot dispense with myths in disguise. For,according to Mr Popper, the ultimate moral values which we choose asgoals for the good society are 'decision' or 'conventions', which are notrationally justifiable and which invariably contain a 'certain element ofarbitrariness'. Now if liberty and equality are chosen as ultimate moralvalues not on rational grounds, but by an ineluctably arbitrary act of will,or faith, do they not have the status of political myths?" (195). They do,of course, and anyone willing to accept them as such should not even pre-tend to participate in a philosophical discussion of the nature and functionof the state.

We have now come to the final question that we must answer in orderto resolve or at least soften the controversy between Plato and his liberalopponents. Since the latters' motivation for their attack is to such a largeextent the fear that Plato's principles, if admitted to be right, constitutea danger to the democratic institutions and practices most of us arereluctant to relinquish, no defense of Plato is complete unless it succeedsin allaying this fear. This is what I would like to do briefly in theremaining portion of this paper.

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In mediating between Plato and his opponents Bambrough remarks:"It is falsely assumed both by Plato and his critics that if there is such athing as moral knowledge then an authoritarian state is the best state"(16). Put in these terms, I myself share this assumption, and so I wouldrather modify Bambrough's remark in a way that will help us clarify theissue between Plato and his critics and at the same time enable us toavoid the distasteful consequences we are trying to avoid.

It is falsely assumed, not so much by Plato as by his critics, that if inprinciple there is such a thing as moral knowledge and therefore, again inprinciple, an authoritarian aristocracy is the best form of government, thendemocratic institutions and practices have no justification and we shouldattempt to replace them with totalitarian institutions and practices.

This assumption is false simply because Plato's authoritarian aristo-cratic state, while best in principle, is an unattainable ideal. This doesnot make it either wrong in theory or useless in practice. As Plato him-self argued (472B-473A), even if we cannot show that the ideal is realizablewe can still use it as a guide to direct our action and make it as conformableas possible to the ideal. I would like to make this use of the ideal here byshowing, first, that it is indeed unrealizable, and, second, that democraticinstitutions come closest to its realization or, what is the same, are at leastfurthest removed from its total negation in practice.

The ideal is unrealizable because the establishment of the aristocraticstate presupposes itself and thus this state cannot be set up initially. Inthe ideal state everything depends on the rule of the philosopher king.But how are we to find the philosophic ruler, given the fact that we do notyet have him? There is no way to do this. For only the philosopher,the man who knows what is good for each individual in the state andwhat each individual in the state is good for, is qualified to make theselection. But how are we to select the philosopher to select the philoso-pher to rule? Obviously the process of selection is circular and cantherefore never begin. Since he has not already been found, the philo-sopher king can never be found.

What immediately follows from the logical impossibility of establishingthe aristocratic state is that no authoritarian state, no ruler with absoluteand unrestricted authority, should ever be set up on earth. This conclu-sion is in strict accordance with Plato's principle that power—over himselfand over others—should be given to each man in proportion to his know-ledge of what is good. Since we have no absolute assurance that anyman possesses this knowledge, or of which of us possesses it to a higherdegree than anyone else, we have to guard against giving any man un-restricted power. In this way we can at least avoid the worst evil Platoenvisaged: the absolute rule of men who are not qualified to rule. This isexactly what democracy does. While incapable of bringing the ideal toearth, it is most capable and effective in avoiding its opposite, the despoticstate. Therefore the democratic state, while not the best possible in

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theory, is still the best possible in practice. Plato's theory of the statesupports rather than undermines the establishment of democraticinstitutions.

It does so in fact much better than his opponents' insistence on libertyand equality as ultimate values and ends. For not only is this insistencerationally unjustifiable and therefore no basis for rational argument atall, but if allowed it would make mock of most of our democratic institu-tions and practices.

If all men were really equal, not just "before the law"4 but in fact, ourelaborate processes of electing political officials would be pointless.Since all men are equal—in nature or at least in political expertise andknowledge—it does not matter in the least who fills any office, who is putinto any place, who is given what function. If all are equal, all are equallygood for and at anything. Since there is no such thing as the "best man"for any position, selection has no purpose and it is a sheer waste of time togo through the motions of electing people for political office. Evenenfranchizing the masses, or any man, is pointless, since voting as suchcan serve no conceivable purpose. The only rational method of selectionon this presupposition is a random allocation of offices by lot or any othermethod of random selection. (Adopted, in line with the principle ofequality, in Plato's democracy—Rep. 557A—but illogically scorned bythose of our contemporaries who pretend to believe in this principle).

Our educational practices would be no less wasteful and pointless underthe principle of equality. Their selectiveness—that not all are admittedto any type of institution whatsoever—as well as their openness—equalopportunity for all—would be unjustified. For educational selection andguidance is justifiable only on the principle that not all men are equal intalents and abilities, and therefore men need different types and can profitfrom different amounts of education. And giving people equal oppor-tunity in education makes sense only if we assume that they are unequal innature but we do not know who is fit for, capable in what, and can profitfrom what type and what amount of education. That is why we shouldgive all equal chance, so that each can discover—for himself and to us—what he needs and can do. And once he has done that, we can make arational selection as to who should partake of what type and amount ofeducation.

There is no need to pursue this matter any further. The point is thatboth the freedom and the power we give individuals in a liberal state, aswell as the restrictions we impose on their freedom and power, can bejustified, albeit negatively, by Plato's moral and political theory: In theabsence of the philosophic ruler, i.e. since we do not know who is bynature best qualified for what, we give all men equal say in the govern-ment and equal opportunity in education—at least until they demonstrateby their action that they are unqualified for them; and since we are nevercertain that those we put into positions of responsibility are qualified to

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hold them we restrict severely both their power and tenure. Ideally wegive them just enough power to fulfill their task, and impose just enoughrestriction to prevent flagrant abuse. How much is enough, what is theright measure and proper limit of freedom and power, is of course a matterof trial and error—for us who are not endowed with the insight of thephilosopher king. At any rate, it is a matter of experimental knowledgeand instrumental—technical in Bambrough's sense—decision. Forpolitical power and freedom, as well as the very existence of the state, aremeans to an end rather than ends in themselves. The end, according toboth Plato and his liberal enemies, is helping all men to a fully human,physically and spiritually excellent life through the utmost possibledevelopment of their inborn talents and the concomitant satisfaction oftheir needs and wants.

Viewed in these terms, Plato is a friend rather than an enemy ofdemocratic institutions. Philosophically, he is certainly a better friendof democracy than democracy's would be defenders, his avowed critics,could ever hope to be. For he argues where they state articles of faith,and where they posit ultimate and therefore unjustifiable values he showsthese to be rationally defensible means to man's natural end and thereforetrue goods and necessary practical principles in the lives of men.Williams College,Williamstown, Massachusetts.

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^enford Bambrough, "Plato's Modern Friends and Enemies", Philosophy 37(1962); reprinted in Bambrough, Plato, Popper and Politics, Cambridge, 1967. Allpage references in my paper refer to this book unless otherwise indicated.

2Glaucon's and Adeimantus' request to Socrates in Book II of the Republic is attimes interpreted as if the brothers were asking Socrates to show that justice was anultimate value, an end in itself, rather than just an instrumental good that was good for,beneficial to, its possessor. But this is a misinterpretation. The distinction they makebetween intrinsic and extrinsic goodness, goodness "by nature" and goodness "byopinion" (367C), is not one between absolute goodness in itself and relative, instru-mental goodness. Glaucon and Adeimantus explicitly say that what they want to knowabout justice and injustice is "what effect (dynamis) each has in itself on the soul thathas it, regardless of (later, social) rewards and consequences" (358B), "what power(dynamis) each has by itself on the possessor in whose soul it dwells, (even if it is) hiddenfrom gods and men" (366E), "what each of itself does to its possessor" even if one takesaway the social reputation attached to each (367B, E). They are not asking Socrates toshow that justice is good in itself, regardless of any benefits it may bring to, any goodeffect it may have on, its possessor. This is clear from the examples of intrinsic goods(harmless pleasures and joys) and intrinsic and extrinsic goods (knowledge, sight, health)they give. Pleasure and joy are not good in themselves but only good for, in the lifeof, a being capable of experiencing them and naturally rejoicing in them. Knowledgeis an intrinsic good not in itself but only for a rational being who finds the acquisition ofknowledge, the exercise of his rational faculties, inherently satisfactory (even apart fromthe long-run, extrinsic benefits knowledge brings to its possessor). Health is neithergood nor meaningful "in itself": it can be meaningful and good only in reference tosome living organism whose well-functioning can be in question. For such an organismhealth is intrinsically pleasurable as well as beneficial in the long run.

'Because Protagoras did not quite hold the position of later Sophistry that Platoattributes to him in the Theatetus. I have tried to show this in Socratic Humanism,chapter on Protagoras.

4For "equality before the law" is an instrumental matter, justifiable even if themen's "equality by nature" is denied.

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plato and his liberal opponents

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