plato's doctrine of artistic imitation and its meaning to us

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PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA

A SERIES OF MONOGRAPHS ON ANCIENT

PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

W . J. V ER DE N IU S AND J, H . W A SZ IN K

VOLUME III

W . J. VERDEN IUS, MIMESIS

~~

\~)

LEIDEN

E.

J.

BRILL

1949

MIMESIS

PLATO S DOCTRINE OF ARTISTIC IMITATION

AND ITS MEANING TO US

BY

W .

J .

VERDENIUS

Professor of Greek in the University of Utrecht

~~

~ .~

LElDEN

E.

J .

BRILL

1949

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Copyright 1949 by E. I Brill Leiden Holland

All rights reserved including the r ight to translate or to

reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form

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PREF E

The con ce pt o f im it at io n m ay be said to be the m ost v ex ed

problem of P lato s theo ry of art. No doubt h is aes thetics

conta in m ore diff icult ies , but none of them has cause d

so

m uch m isunderstanding . S o it m ay not be am iss to sub ject

. th is co nce pt to a close r exam ination tram a historica l as

- D

w ell as a system atica l po int o f view . An ex a c t i nt er p retation

\, O f P la to s doctrine of artistic im ita tion m ay not only enlarge

~ and correc t our knowledge of hi s ph ilos oph y, but it m ay

~;> al so challeng e ou r ow n reflections on the natu re at art.

;:. Howeve r, it should be borne in m ind that the fo llow ing

. 0 ob se rvations ar e neither m ea nt as a com plete acc ount O f

:: P lato s aes thetic s nor as a n e la bo ra te d theory of art.

'J I am indebt ed to m y collea gues , Professo rs A . H. Edei-

) ~ koort,

C. J.

de Vogel, an d

J.

H . W aszink for so m e h el p i u

. cr i tici sm s, and I w ish to expres s m y thank s to D r L.

J.

Guiitari,

who once m ore accepted the unpleasant task at

correcting m y English.

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CHAPTER I

PLATO S DOCTRINE OF ARTISTIC

IMITATION

It is w ell known th at Plat o made imitation th e ge neral

princi ple of ar t. Even music and da nce are regarded by

him as essen tially im itative arts 1) . Aristotle adopted the

id ea of im itation from hi s m aster, and though he modifie d

it in som e respects it re tain ed th e sam e fundamental im -

portance in his theory of art . Th e concept of imitation

deep ly influ en ced the ae sthe tic theo ri es of the He lleni stic

and Ro man worlds, and it remained the basis for many

th eories of art as late as the e ight ee nth centu ry *

2).

Afterwar ds, un der the in fluenc e of Rom anticism , it be-

came di scredite d, and this reaction was so str ong that

at pr esent it still de te rm ines the gener al es tim ation of

Plato's aesthe tics . Accordin g to W ilamow itz

3),

Plat o, in

speaking of imitation, ra pp ed ou t a fatal w ord . Many

sch olars have repeated th is co nd em natio n in similar

te rm s. O tto Ape lt, for in stance , fail s to rega rd the id ea

of im itation as anything mor e th an a system atic violation

1) Cf.

Crat.

423cd,

Rep.

399ac, 401a,

PoUt .

306d,

La ws

655d,

668a, 795e, 798d, 814e.

2 )

The sign

> I<

refers to the additional notes at the end of the

book.

3) Platen i2 (Berlin, 1920), 479.

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2

MIMESIS

of ar t , a h un ger-cure , de priv in g it of a ll its charm s

1),

A ll m ode rn obje ctions against P lato 's theory of ar t

cen tre in the asse rtion that h is . r at io na li sm p re c lu ded

him fro m recognizi ng the specific c har acte r of artistic

cr ea tio n. H e is ac cu se d o f fa sh io nin g a rt afte r th e p atte rn

. o f s c ie n ce, w hich has to copy nature as tru ly as possib le .

r i

I

He is said to have forgotten that true ar t does not copy

\\; an , exi st in g r ea li ty , but that it create s a new reality

ar is ing from the ar ti st' s ow n phantasy , and that it is

the sp onta neous char acte r 01 th is exp re ssion whic h

guaran tee s the ind ependent value of pure ly ae st he tic

quali ties. * .

However , it m ay be as ked whether th is cr it ici sm is

justifiabl e fr om a histo r ic al as w ell as a systematical po in t

of v iew . In th is case tw o questions arise , firs t ly , w h et he r

~ P lato real ly i nt en ded im itation to m ean a slavi sh copy,

an d se co nd ly , w he ther m ode rn ae sthe -ticians are r igh t--in -

di sre garding th e im it ative elemen ts in ar t and in con-

si de rin g phanta sy and sel f-expr es sion to be i ts fu ndament-

a l p r in c ip l e s. T he first q ue stion has an im portan t be ar ing

on the second: for if it should turn out tha t P lato 's

concept of im itation is not to be taken in the popular

sense , mode rn aesthetics w ou ld seem som ewhat rash in

p ro cla im in g th at its b re ak in g w ith the classica l d oc tr in e

o f i mi tation is irrevocable 2) . It is to be adm itted that

th is doctr ine in the course of h isto ry has g iv en rise to

1)

P l ai on is ch e A utsdt ze

(Leipzig-Berlin, 1912), 68-70.

2 )

F. Leander,

L es sing als iisth e tischer Denker,

Giiteborgs Hog-

skolas Arsskr ift 48 :

3

(1942),

3. -

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF ARTISTIC IMITATION

3

iiidiiY

positi ons no w defin itively aban do ned. Ye t th is

ve ry fact should induce us to rem ount to the sou rce o f

th is tradition and to ask ourse lves w he th er th e p rin cip le

in its orig inal enunciation doe s not dese rve som e re con-

s id e ra ti on .

Such a reconsideration has to be based on a careful

e xam ination of the texts . P lato' s w ritings have been

called a v er ita ble p ois on fo r c him e rica l a nd r ev olu tio nary

spi rits w ho o ve rloo k the qualifications an d lim itat ions

1) .

Howeve r, fo r th e sa m e re ason complacent and conser-

va tiv e spir its a re ap t to di spose of P lato's th oug hts too

eas ily . So let us turn to h is ow n w ords, w ith an open m in d

and at tend ing to the ir qualific ations and lim itations.

W henever a poet is seated on the M uses ' trip od , h e is

not in h is se nse s, but rese mb le s a fountain , w hich gives ,( -

fre e cours e to the upw ard rush of w ater ; and, since h is \; \~~

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ar t consi st s in im ita ti on , he is com pelle d o fte n to c on tra- .r -

d ie t h im se lf, w hen he create s ch ara cte rs of contr adicto ry ~:, .

c

moods; and he know s not w hich of th e se contradictory v. ;,

utteranc es is t

ru e

- rr - l - a w s 7 1 9 c )

2 ). --' Y U ; < ; ~ _

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Th ese w ord s w er e w ritten down by Plato to illustra te

the true na tu re of the law giv er b y c on tr as ting it w ith

th e n atu re o f t he ar tist. S o the y m ay create the im pression

o f b ein g no m ore than a cas ua l re m ark. H ow e ve r, com par-

in g th is p ass age w ith P lato 's o th er u tte rance s on the sa me

1)

P. Shorey,

Platoni sm Ancient and M odern

(Berkeley, 1938),

164.

2) Quotations from Plato are given in the translations of the

Loeb-Library.

Philosophia Antiqua II[

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4 MIMESIS

su bje ct w e seem to be enti tled to take it as a starting-

po int fo r our discussion , because it can be show n to pre-

sen t the problem in its m ost radical fo rm .

In his m aster ly p ic ture of poe tic insp iration w hich is

g iven in the 10 Plato says: God takes away the m ind of

1

these m en, anauS es them as his m in isters, just as he does

(. \ so oth say er s a nd g odly see rs, in orde r that w e who hear

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them may know that it is no t--. E ~':.-~~ . ,~~ ~ E_~~_

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_w..o rds of & re~~w lr en rhey are out of the ir wits ,

., \) c; ', ' \ bu t that it is _Q.2 5L~lrn s_~ .Lw hop ea ks and addresses us

throu gh them (534cd) . Evident ly insp ir atio n is not a

gift fre e ly to be used by the poet, bu t a compellin g forc e

blindl y to be fo llow ed. Accordingly , the poe t's ar t seem s

to be col11p le t e ly w ithdraw n from his w ill and contro l.

Th is induces us to in te rpre t h is sitting on the tr ipod of

the M use m entioned above in a m ore lite ral sense than

our m ode rn outlook m ight be inclined to do . E xa ct ly l ik e

the Delphic pr ie ste ss he opens him self so fully to h is

M use th at h er ins pira tio n p erv ad es h im e ntire ly a nd takes

c om ple te p os se ssio n of h im.

H ow ever , if it is the M use herse lf w ho speaks through

h is m o ut h, it s ee ms s tra nge th at the poe t should involve

',.,/ h im s e lf i n c o nt ra d ic ti on s. There is no room for assum ing

,' .. a m a li gn an 1:-int e i1t-o~ --t'iie pa rt of the M use , fo r P lato

e xp re ss ly a ss ur es tha t from every poin t of v iew the

divine and the div in ity are fre e from falsehood , and

th at G od is a lto ge th er s im ple a nd tru e in d ee d a nd w ord ,

a nd n e it he r ch ang e s h im s elf n or d ec eiv es o th ers b y v is io ns

or w ords or the sending of signs in w aking or in dream s


5

I

(Rep. 3 8 2 e ). W e can only conclude that the ar t is t h im s el f

is to b lam e for cO .l)J t}sLt.:J. L-t~~ .inspirq.t io~r.}he .Muse.._ .;

This m eans that h is state of be ingcp ossessedJ ~ not ab-

so lute : the M use doe s not com ple te ly-alrecT h is to ng ue

and he does not com ple te ly lose h is hum an characte r.

P lato stre sses the poet's de pende nce , but he c er ta in ly d id

not m ean to repre sen t h im as no m ore than a speaking-

tube in the m outh of the M use .A fte r all, lLe _all~_ ~ 9_~t

J 1 . s J 1 _ t

e

SP Jeter. (1 0 534e ). D iv in e in sp ira tio n cannot reach

th e hum an world but th rough the poet's in te rp retation.

Accordingly , a poem , thou gh its orig in lie s b eyond human

cont ro l, do es not m ec hanical ly re produce a div ine message ,

but it is the re sult o r it co ntactInwhi ch di v ine as w ell

as hum an activ itie s are involved. In te rpre tation , the ':

humanasi)ect of the process of ar tistic creation , is easily ,

atte nde d by m isunderstanding . The poe t is a less ab le

maker than his M use

( Law s

6 69 c). S o if a w ork of art

s h ows c o nt ra dictions , th is is an imperfect ion to be impu ted

to h um an w ea kn ess .

It m ight be as ke d w he the r th e occurrence o f co ntra-

dic tions in a poem necessarily proves the poet to be

confused and his w ork to be im pe rfec t. P lato says :

T he p oe t co ntr adicts h im se lf, w he n h e crea te s c h ar a ct er s

of c on tr ad ic to ry m o od s . If th is re str ic tio n is take n in to

account, the poe t se em s to be free from all b lam e. In fact,

th e c on tra dic tio ns b etw een the characters of a p iece of

lite rature not only need not im pair the unity and the

harm ony of the w hole , but they m ay even be regarded as

ne cessary m eans to le nd som e varie ty to the w ork.

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6

MIMESIS

However, this arg um en t overlooks an im portan t fact

1) .

The Greeks w ere inclined to regard their great poe ts as

reliab le so urce s and infallib le a uth ori tie s for all ki nds

of practical w is do m . The y iso lated the w ords and deeds

of the epic a nd tr ag ic characters from th ei r c on te xts and

used them as general m ax im s. For ins tan ce , th e A the n-

ia ns c laim ed th e high com mand of an expedition against

th e P ersians by re ferring to the Iliad (2 , 55 2 -554) , wh e re

the A thenian M enestheus is sa id to be un equa lled in

dr aw ing up horse s and soldie rs (H dt. VIl 161) . My th o lo-

g ical exam ple s w ere als o adduced to excuse actua l

w rongdoing , an d th is practice must have been rathe r

c om m on , b ec au se it is parodied by A ristophanes Nub.

107 9-82) an d sharply critic ized by Plato (R ep . 3 77 e -3 78b ,

3 91 d-392a,

Laws

941b) .

In the ligh t of th is criticis m w e can un de rsta nd P lato 's

s tr es si ng t he c on tr ad ic to ry cha rac te r o f p oe tic al v ar ie ty .

He opposes the Greek inclin atio n to wa rd s a pr agmatical

in te rpre tation of lite rature by exposing the poet's lack

o f w ell-fo un de d k no wle dge. The poet does not know

what he is say ing

(Apol .

22bc ,

Meno

99cd,

Tim .

72 a,

Law s

8 01 be ), i.e ., the sam e ecstasy w hich enables him to

en te r into co nta ct w ith the Muse does not allow him

fully to realize the purport of h is ow n w ords. B eing ab-

so rbed in a flow of succ e ss iv e impr e ss io n s he is unaw are

of their gene ral conne ct io ns and implications, fo r his

1)

For a fuller discussion of this problem, see my papers,

L Ion de

Platon,

Mnemos. III 11 (1943), 233-262, and

P laton e t la poisie ,

ib. 12 (1944), 118-150.


7

state of posse ss io n p re cludes him from pas sing an in-

depende nt judgm ent on the im ages w hich presen t them -

selves to h is m ind. H e can only re giste r these im ages

w ith out delibe rately arr angin g them into a well -con-

sid e red whol e . So the re lat iv e characte r of their co ntra -'

d ictions is not sufficie ntly brought out, and the hearer

is le ft e ntan gled in a m ult itude of conflicting views.

This situation is like ly to back up his sceptical a ttitu de

of m ind, tempting him to choose his poetical p retexts

according to his own in te re sts. It must be adm itted that

th e poet may at tim es hit upon a va lua ble tho ught

(R ep .

377a,

Law s

682 a). Yet his work as a w hole cannot be

relied upon as a faith ful im age of trut h

(Rep .

600e).

Even the greate st poe try remains enigmat ic

(Ale.

II

14 7b,

R ep .

3 3 2 b ,

The.

194c), fo r ow ing to the irrational

origin of his w isdom it is impossib le to call the poet to

account about the real m eaning of h is w ords

(Hipp. min.

365d, Proto 3 47 e ). So it se em s w ise st to abstain from de-

f in it e i nt er p re tations (L ys. 214b, Phdr. 252b , R ep . 3 3 le) .

Th is conclusion m ight se em su rprisi ng to the Christian

point of view . A M use w ho condescends to so com plet e ly

taking posse ssion of he r servant should be expected in

som e w ay to guarantee a correct understanding of her

revelations

1) .

It would be dif ficult to g ive a gene rally

1) Cf. G. Finsler,

P iaton und die Aristo te li sc he P oe iik

(Leipzig,

1900), 185: Natiirlich ist es falsch, an eine Offenbarung zu den-

ken ... Mit einer Offenbarung wurde es doch schlecht uberein-

stimmen, dass den Dichtern nur ein Stuck der Wahrheit, hochstens

eine richt ige Vorstellung zuteil wird, und dass sie nicht hinlanglich

geeignet sind, das Gute und sein Gegenteil zu erkennen .

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8

MIMESIS

< ,

a cc ep te d d ef in it io n o f C h ri st ia n r ev e la tion . Y et th e C hr is t-

ian ideas of revelation m ay be said to have a common

fe ature in be ing based upon the pr inciple of divine love .

T he lov e of God w ould not be absolute , if it did not to a

certain exten t embrace our understanding of its m ani-

fe sta tio ns. In th is re sp ec t it is in te re stin g to co mp are the

inspiration of the P laton ic poe t w ith that of the O ld-

T es ta me nta ry p ro ph ets. These m en, too , were se ized and

ove rw helm ed by a di v ine m essa ge an d felt them selves

un der a compelli ng force . But this for ce a t the s am e tim e

mak es a mora l deman d, w hic h app eal s to the dee pest

la ye rs of the ir personality. This ap pea l does not have an

ab stra ct chara cter, but it is supported by a per sonal care :

the prophet fee ls h is God to be near to h im saying:

Do not fear, fo r I am w ith you to pro tect you (je r em .

1,8 ). T hu s d iv in e r ev elation takes the form of a pe rsonal

m e etin g, a nd th is de eply affect s t he c ha ra cte r of human

und er sta nd in g. T he. nearne ss of G od is answe red by the

c onfid en ce o f the p roph e t, w ho does not w ave r about the

m eaning of his inspirations, but simply puts h is trust in

them . Ne ither his audience need be troubled by episte-

mo lo g ic a l d o ub ts: the prophet is an e lected being and as

such infa llib le , though his words m ay have a further-

re aching , e .g . a m essian ic , tenor which he did not fully

r ea li ze h im s el f

1).

Th e P lato nic Muse, howeve r, being a true Greek god ,

does not know about love . H aving touched the poet's

1)

Cf. J. Hessen, Platonism us und P rophetismu s (Munich, 1939),

52

ff.


9

mind in its ecstasy , she does not care about the fur ther

adventure s of h er m e ss ag e. Th e poe t can only meet h is

god when being in an abnorm al state , an d this g od le ave s

h im as soon as he re turn s to san ity . So he is not on ly

enti re ly left to h im self as to the real m ea ning of the re -

velation , but his in te rpre tation is a m ere guess, because

it refe rs to som eth ing fu nd am e nta lly in ac ce ss ib le to

rational understanding. *

Accordingly , P lato adm onishe s hi s readers to distrust

a n y i nt e rp r etation of poetry . However , it h as a lr ea dy b ee n

noted th at th is w arn ing is mainly dire ct ed ag ain st the

pr ac tice of e li ci tin g paradi gmati ca l trut hs from th e gr eat

poe ts . Conse qu ently, it must not be suppose d that P lato

s ho uld h ave ut te rl y de sp ai re d o f u nd er sta nd ing anything

of a poem . The qu esti on ar ise s h ow fa r his d ou bts u po n

th e po ss ib ility of a pr ag matical in te rp re ta ti on a re c ou nt er -

balanced by a be lief in the possib ility of an aesthetical

in terpretation . P lato like s to disg uise his theoretica l

v ie ws b y h is p ed ag ogical zeal, and so his theory of art is

continually coloured by his so licitude for the mental

health o f h is c o nt empo r ar ie s. T his fa ct has cause d s er io us

m isun derstandings. It has often been denied that P lat o

he ld a doctrine , i.e . a sy ste matic al opi n ion, of art, and

that h is di scussion of the cultural function of art is based

on a theoretic a l i nt e rp r et at io n .

*

H ow e ve r, d ou bts upo n

th is fact have m ain ly arisen from the m odern point of

v iew t ha t s y st emat ic al know ledge sho uld a ls o b e enun ciated

in a systematica l for m . P lato does not ex pound his

aesthet ics in a systemati cal fo rm , but the sam e applie s

to the w hole of h is philosophy.

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10 MIMESIS

For instance , a re cen t discussion of P lato 's th eo logy

has taken the form of a varie ty of approaches , an d th e

author r ightly obse rves that (1) P lato approaches the

problem of the nature and activ itie s of the De ity in a

varie ty of w ays , (2 ) Stric tly speaking , how eve r, he

did not in the passages w hich w e have exam in ed a p-

proach th e r eligious problem as such . H e discussed o th er

subjects , such as the nature of Be ing, the natu re of the

Univers e , the status of Soul , (3 ) N o attem pt is dis cern-

ib le to coo rdinate the diff e re nt asp ects of the theological

pr oblem in a comp reh e ri sive and unified theory , (4 )

W e should o ve rs ta te our ca se , how ever , if we refused

to find any con tinuity at all in P lat o' s su ccess ive att ack s

on th e probl em 1) . The sam e applies to P lato' s ae st hetics.

H is approaches to the problem of art are seldom con -

cerned w ith art as such and his educ ation al interest is

se ld om a bs en t. But it does not fo llow that h is criticism s

should not also have a philosophical aim . This aim is

mos tly h idden by othe r ar gum ents and it can only be

reconstr uc ted by com bining m any scatter ed passages .

W hat is the ae sthetica l mean ing of P la to's conception

of ins pi ra tio na l know ledge? In the 1 0 it is on ly said that

the poe t is out of h is sense s, that he is in an ecstas y,

and that he is possessed by the M use (53 3e-53 4d), bu t

Plato does not go in to a psychologic al exa mination of

th is m ental sta te . He pro bably adhe red to th e t ra d it io n al

b elie f in the div ine characte r of in sp iration . * H e only

s ta te s th at ecs tasy is a pre requisite fo r ar tistic q ua lity

1)

F . SO lms~he oiogy-(i tll~;a, N~y.,-19 42 ), --i3 t',

161.


11

',; ,

an d tha t it cannot be rep laced by a ratio na l m e th od:

All th e good epic poe ts utte r all those fine poem s not

from art, but as insp ired and poss essed, and the go od

lyric poe ts likewise . F or a poet is a ligh t and w inged

a nd sa cr ed th in g, and is unable eve r to indite until he

has been insp ired and put out of h is sense s, and his m ind

is no longe r in h im : eve ry m an, w hilst he re tains po s-

ses si on of that, is powerless to in dite a ve rse or chant

an oracl e (/ 0 53 3 e , 53 4b). The sa m e vie w is expr e ss ed

in the P h aedr us (2 45a) : He who w ithout the divine l

m ad ness com es to the door of the M us es, co nfident that

h e w ill be a good poe t by art, m eets w ith no succe ss, and

th e poe try of th e san e m an vanishe s in to noth in gness

be for e th at of the in sp ired m adm an . Acco rdin gly , P lato

stre sses the fact fl1aCci'· t ruepoetshoul d not com pos e

arg umen ts , but tales

(Phd.

61b) .

These passages a r e impor ta n t, be ca use th ey show that

Plato knew how to distinguish good poe try from bad

po etry, i.e ., that he kn ew how to co nc eiv e of .poetry in

purely ae st he ti c t erms. Th is is borne out by m any other

fa cts: h is w ritin g verse in yo uth , hi s m any qu otatio ns

from Greek p oe try , the poe ti ca l qu ali ty of hi s pr ose , his

avow al of a ce rtain love and reverence for Hom er that

ha s po ssessed m e from a boy

(Rep.

595b), and his ad -

m is sio n of bein g un de r th e sp ell of poetry (R ep . 607c ). *

Now , if P lato w as able to judge a po em from an aesthe -

tic al p oin t o f v ie w, he is n ot lik ely to have confined him -

s elf to em ph asizing the irratio nal or igin of inspi rati on ;

we also expect h im to have explained the character of

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12

MIMES[S

p oe tica l e xp re ssio n. H ow ev er, in ste ad o f a n e xp la na tio n

he pre sen ts us w ith a paradox. In the passage w hich

form ed our startin g-poin t the poe t is said to contradic t

h im se lf, since h is art consists in im itation . W ould it

no t be m uch m ore natural, if he contradic ted him se lf in

sp ite of the fact that he use s the m ethod of im itation?

H ow ev er, w e h av e s ee n th at (1 ) th es e c on tr ad ic tio ns a rise

fro m the fact that the poe t's in te rpre tation ne ce ssarily

confuse s the M use 's insp iration , and (2 ) im itation is the

b as is o f a rt. It fo llow s that confusion doe s not tak e place

in sp ite of im itation , but that it fo rm s an essen tial cha-

ra ct e ris tic of imitati on .

If our assum ption that P lato h eld a s ys te ma tic al d oc -

tr ine of ar t is tru e , it m ust b e possib le to g ive a furthe r

de fin ition of th is confuse d characte r of im itation . T he

d eg re e o f c on fu sio n o bv io usly d ep en ds u po n th e a rtist's

fa milia rity w ith h is o bje ct.

,,[t

is p lain to all that the

.iim itative tribe w ill im itate w ith m ost ease and success

l

the th ings am idst w hich it has been reared, w he reas it is

II

hard fo r any m an to im itate w ell in action w hat lie s out-

\' s ide the range o f h is rear ing , and still harde r in spe ech

j Tim. 1 9d ). T his is a s im ple th ou gh t, b ut it h as im po rtan t

consequences . The poe t im itate s hum an characte rs and

he is gu ide d b y the M use . W hy th is guidance ? O bviously

be cause the M use w ants h im to e xpre ss som eth ing mo re

th an th e fac ts o f e ve ry da y life in th eir c asu al s uc ce ss io n.

If th is w ere the only aim of his ar t, im itation w ould ne ve r

fail. T hat it d oes fail, is an indicatio n that it a lso re fers to

som eth ing not dire ctly obse rvable and de scribable , to a

PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF ARTISTIC IMITATION 13

m or e general aspect of reality . Evidently it is the task

of the poe t to re pre se nt the se ge ne ral value s th rou gh the

m ed iu m o f h um an life . Im ita tin g c ha ra cte rs a nd a ctio ns

he m ust at the sam e tim e try to evoke an idea of the ir

u ltim ate pr incip le s. These lie so far from his natural

range of thought th at he needs the he lp o f d iv ine inspira-

tio n. U nfo rtu na te ly , t he e cs ta tic al c on ditio n w h ic h b rings

h im into contact w ith the M use a lso p re clu de s h im fr om

fu ll y u nd erstanding he r in tentions. H e can only reg iste r

hi s impre ss ions , o r in o the r w ords, imitat e th e im age s

w hich p resen t th emse lve s to h is m ind . Cons eq uently, h is

re p re sen tations are lac ki ng in articulatene ss: they rem ain

ten tative sugg estion s, in w hich the gene ral and the parti-

cular, the abstract and the concre te , the e ssen tial and

th e a cc id en ta l a re b le nd ed so m uch that the w ork taken

as a w hole appears to be inconsistent.

It fo llow s that poe tical im itation cannot be a copy

true to nature . It rem ains confused and defective , be -

cause it refe rs to an object w ith w hich it is only partly

familiar . Im itation im pl ie s tra ns fo rm atio n, a nd tra ns -

f or m at io n im p lie s c on fu sio n, if it is de te rm ined by a

sp he re of reality (in th is case , th e p oe ti c al m in d) in fe rio r

to its object . T his c on ce ptio n h as it s roo ts in th e general

s pirit o f P la to 's p hilo so ph y. T he w orld is c alle d a d iv in e

w ork of art

Tim.

2 8a-2 9a, 3 7c). A s such it is an im age

o f so me th ing else (2 9b , 92 c), an im itation of a super io r

m od el (4 8e ). F ro m th es e p as sages it is apparen t th at the

concept o f im ita tio n h as a m e ta ph ys ic al fo un da tio n. T his

fo un da tio n is e xp la in ed in th e te nth b oo k o f t he Republ ic ,

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16

MIMESIS

al ex planation m igh t on the face of it se em attra ctive,

beca use the con tr ad ictions, on ce th ey ar e stow ed away in

the dep th o f the sou l, ar e rem oved from our fie ld of vision

an d ea sily forgotten. However, thi s solution o f the para -

do x w ill hard ly sa tisfy anyo ne who is con v in ce d o f

Pl a to 's hav ing a w e ll-balanc ed pe rsonality. This con -

viction induce s us to se ek fo r an o the r interpreta tion and

to validate the impor tance of Pla to 's ideal is tic v ie w of

ar t by conn ecting it w ith his general sp he re of thought .

The c lue to a co rre ct u nd erstanding o f Pla to 's philo-

sophy lie s in his conception o f a hi e rarchica l st ructure

o f r e al it y.

*

There are d if fe re nt plane s of be ing, e ac h o f

them (except the Good , wh ich is absolute ly rea l) try ing ,

w ithin its own lim its , to expres s the valu e s sup e rio r to

it. C onsequently, the degree of re ali ty o f anything is de -

penden t upon its deg ree o f ap pro xim ation to ete rnal

B eing. The empi r ic al w orld does no t represe nt true

re ality, but is onl y an approxim ati on to it, som ethin g

that resemble s re al be ing bu t is no t that (R ep . 597a),

it yearns to be like the ideal Form s but fa lls sho rt

of the m

(Phd.

74d, 75ab), w ith diff icu lty it reveals

som eth ing o f the supe rio r world o f which it is an im age

(Phdr. 2 50b).

The te rm im age show s that P la to 's d oc trine o f im i-

tation is cl os e ly re lat ed to his hie rarch ical conce ption o f

re ality . In fact, the idea o f im itation is a t the cen tr e

o f his philosophy

1) .

Our though ts and argum ents are

im itations of re ality (Tim. 47bc , Crit. 107 bc ), w ords are

1)

A. Dies,

Autour de Platon

(Paris, 1927), 594.


17

im itation s o f th in gs (Crat. 42 3 e -42 4b), soun ds are im ita -

tio ns of d iv in e har m ony (Tim. 80b) , tim e im itate s e te rnit y

(Tim. 3 8a ), law s im ita te tr u th (po lit. 300e), hu m an gov ern-

m ent s ar e im ita tion s of true gove rnm ent iPolii. 2 93 e ,

2 97c), d ev out m en try to im itate the ir god s (Phdr. 2 52 ed ,

2 53 b,

Law s

71 3 e ), visib le figures are im it a tio ns o f e te rn al

ones (Tim. 50 c), e tc.

Thi s is suf fici en t p roo f that P latonic im ita tion is bound

up w ith the id ea of .approximati on an d doe s no t m ean

a true copy

1).

P lato h im se lf ha s w ar ned us aga in st thi s

in te rp re tation: Th e im ag e m ust not by any m eans re-

t

p roduce all th e qualitie s of that wh ich it im ita te s, if it

is to be an im age . Do you not perc e ive how far im ages i

ar e from pos se ss in g th e sam e qu alities as th e o rig inals

w hic h th ey imitate? Yes, I do (Crat. 43 2 bd ). In o the r

w ords , imitation can neve r be m ore th an su ggestion or

evocat ion

2) .

W e can now pro ce ed to the que stion what is th e c ha ra c-

te r of art istic sugge stion . It cannot d ire ct ly re fe r to

the id ea l valu es , fo r art is se pa rat ed from the p lane of

re al B eing by the dom ain o f pheno m ena l re ali ty . So it

m ust conten t it se lf w ith rep re senting vi su al obj ect s, it

m ust even hu mble itse lf be fore m ateri al rea lity , in so

fa r as it canno t p ro duce anyt hin g but b loo d less im ages.

Y et w e have seen that true art is in spi red by a di vine vo ice

1)

As is maintained e.g.

by E.

Bignami,

La poetica di Aristotele

e il co ncetio dell arte presso gli antichi

(Florence, 1932), 128-9.

2 ) Cf. R . Schaere r,

La question platonicienne

(Neuchatel, 1938),

163 n. 1.

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18

MIMESIS

and that it refe rs to an ideal pattern of beauty . Now

the hie rarch ical structure of reality prevents the ideal

Form s from directly m anife sting them se lves in v isual

bodies. B eauty itse lf w ill no t be found pre se nte d in the

guise of a face or of hands or of any othe r portion of the

body, nor as a par ticular descrip tion or p iece of know l-

edge , nor as existin g s om ew he re in an oth er su bs ta nc e,

such as an anim al or the earth or sky or an y ot her thin g;

bu t exi sting e ve r in s in gu la rity of for m in de pe nd en t b y

itself

(S ym p.

2 11 ab). Corre sp onding ly , the Muse neve r

co m plet e ly descends to the hu m an le ve l, but to a certain

e xten t she keep s he r secre t. To a ce rtain exten t, fo r P la-

tonic tr an scend ence is m itigated by the idea of exe mpla-

r in ess. Th e Dem iurge be in g dev oid of en vy des ir ed tha t

all s hould be , so far a s p oss ib le , like unto H im se lf

(Tim.

2ge ). So a gradually fading sheen of eterna l r ad ia nc e

m ay be said to pe rvade all stages of reality .

Accordingly , art is no t confined to the lim its of its

v isual m ode ls. True ar t does not laps e into fla t re alism ,

but it s trive s to transcend the m ate rial w or ld ; in its p oo r

im ages it trie s to evocate som et h ing of that h ighe r

re alm of be in g w hic h als o g lim m ers th ro ugh ph enomena l

reality . It is true tha t P lato atta ch es m uch value to the

likeness of a w ork of art, but th is idea should not be

interpre ted in m ode rn te rm s. In t ru e art lik en es s d oe s n ot

r ef er to c om m on pla ce reality , but to id ea l B ea uty 1) .

1)

Cf.

La w s

668b:

lLxoucrav ~\I ofLm6TIJ t a 't i i> t ou xaAou fLLf1.1jfLan.

I

take this much disputed phrase to mean: which gets i ts l ikeness

from its being a representation of Beauty .


19

This carrie s us back to the confuse d character of poe t-

i c al im i ta t ion. The above discu ssion w ill h av e s hown th at

th e d efic ie nc ie s o f p oe try , th ough they are exagg erated

by Plato for h is pedago gic al p ur po se , a re c lo se ly b ou nd

up w ith the onto logical status of art in general. L ike

p ain tin g, p oe tic al im itatio n lie s o n a lo we r le ve l o f r eality

than its object, o f w hich it can o nly p ro du ce a n ad um br a-

tion. It tries to transcend itse lf , but is ham pered by the

ina dequacy of its m eans. This incommensur ab ility of

m eans and ends cau se s poe tr y to ap pr oac h to div inatio n .

But the sam e hol ds go od of art in gene ral; m usi c , for

in sta nc e, is s aid to b e fu ll o f g ue ssin g (Phil. 56a, 62

S 1

l

rt, th e re for e , has a doub le as pect : in its v is ib le m a ni-

festati on it is a th ing of th e m ost infe rior va lue , a sha-

do w ; yet it has a n i nd irect re la tio n to the essen ti al nature

of things . The in tensi ty of thi s re lation de pends upon the

deg ree to whic h th e ar tist succeeds in illum in ating th e

hi ghe r aspe cts of the in term ed iat e pl ane, v iz . of vi sual

reali ty . Thus im itation , w hen viewed in the iig h t of a

hi e rarchical conce ption of reality , m ay constitute a re -

concilia ti on of realism and ide ali sm in art.

Th is doctr ine is w e ll illustr ated by the sp irit o f G re ek

ar t. It has been argued th at th e G reek artis t on ly aim ed

at de cep tiv e im ita tio n o f n atu re , but that h is inne r be ing

unconscio usly and aga in st h is own prejudice best owed

a n id ealis tic characte r on his wo rk . In th is respect, it is

sa id , th e p ra ctic e o f a rt w as in adv anc e o f th e theory of

art . The G reek m ind, in sp ite of its g ift fo r ideali stic a rt,

Philosophia Antiqua III 2

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MIMES IS

rem ained unconscious of the fact that true idealism

should abandon given reality 1) .

H ow ever , the te rm abandon is out of p lace here . It

is true that the G reek artist fo llow ed nature , but he did

not stick to its casual aspects; he rathe r tried to detect

its d ee pe r m e an in gs. H e w as w e ll aw ar e of the fact that

th e e ss ent ial natu re of th ings is no t id en tic al w ith the ir

visual app ea rance , but that it m ust s till b e re pr e sen ted

in natur al fo rm s. H e al so knew that suggesting a deepe r

mean ing is no t to be achi eved thr ough de form in g natu re

bu t th rough cl ar ifying it s fund am ental structure . So

th ere is no re ason to assum e a contrast be tw een artistic

pr odu ction and ae sthe tic cons ciousne ss . The m aste rs of

G reek idealistic ar t w ould have su bsc ri be d to P lato's

aesthetics 2 ) .

Gre ek ar t in P lato 's tim e , howeve r, w as show ing an in-

cr easing tendency tow ar ds re alism , and it is not to be

w onde red at that he had se ri ous w orr ies abou t it .

*

He

sh arp ly critic izes illusionistic ar t, w hich thro ug h a s kilfu l

use of perspective and polyc hrom y trie s to create the

im pre ssion of a second or ig inal. Th is kind of im itation

is denounced as im post ure and jugg ler y (R ep. 598d, 602 d) ,

because it claim s to p ro du ce a double t of its obje ct . On ly

a g od c ou ld m ake a double t of a li v ing be ing (Crai. 432bc ) .

1) Bignami,

op . ci i. ,

175, H.

J.

M. Broos,

P lato s oe sc ho uw in g v an

kunsi

en

schoonheid (Leyden, 1948), 13 n. 19, O.

J.

Hoogewerff

V er be el di ng en voorsteliing . De ontw ikkeling van het

kunstoesej»

(Amsterdam, 1944), 43.

2)

Cf. R O. Steven,

Plato a nd th e Ar t oj h is T im e ,

Class. Quart.

27 (1933), 153.

P LA TO 'S D OC TRINE OF ARTISTIC IMITATION

2 1

M an cannot extend the exis tin g w hole of th ings and so is

unable to cre ate anythi ng . A cco rdingly, true artistic re-

pre sen tation does not aim at a deceptive reproduction

of the oute r appearance of its object, but it is based on a

prof ound study of the real p ro po rtions an d c olo ur s (Soph .

2 3 3 e - 2 3 6 c,

Laws

668de).

It m ay be concluded that the re are tw o p oin ts d iffe r-

en tiating good ar t fr om m ere tri ck e ry : i ts t ru th fu ln e ss

an d its m odes ty . The ar tis t should not conten t h imse l f

w ith a su pe rficial g lan ce at h is ob je ct, b ut he m ust try

to pe netrate it s inner structure . H is tas k is fa ith ful in ter -

pretation , n ot s la vi sh im ita tio n. S ec on dly , h e sh ould h av e

th e ho nesty to ad m it th e poo rness of h is m eans an d not

try to over ste p th e lim itat ions they lay upo n him . H is

w or k sho uld c learly sh ow tha t its repr e sen tati o n o f re ality ,

in sp ite of, o r rather , on account of, its ve ry fai thfulne ss,

is fundam ent ally diffe ren t fr om reality itse lf . It s ho uld

presen t its elf, n ot as a copy, but as a tr ansp osition on a

d iff eren t le v el and as ob edi en t to the law s of th is m edi um .

*

W e are n ow a ble to u nd er sta nd what it m eans w he n art

is calle d a p lay (e .g . Rep. 602 b , Sop h. 2 34ab , Polito 2 88c,

Law s 79 6b, 88 9d e ). In P lato 's tho ugh t th is te rm do es no t

re fe r to an arb it rary past im e or a m ere discharge of

su rp lu s ene rgy , bu t it denote s eve ry ac tiv ity w hich is

exe rcis ed w ith a vi ew to some thing m ore im portant 1) .

Acc ordingly , ar t do es not hav e it s end in itse lf , but it is

on ly re lativ e ly impo rta n t, in so fa r a s it s sugg est iv e p ow e r

re fe rs to a hi ghe r p lane of re ality . The illu sionistic artist

1)

Schaerer,

o p. cit.,

22 n. 1.

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2 2

MIMESIS

is no t con te nt ed w ith such a subs e rv ient role , h e a tt em p ts

se ri ous ly to im itat e al1 th ings

(Rep.

397a) and he is

ea ger to aba ndon him se lf to the fash ion ing of pha ntoms

and se ts this in the fore fro nt of his lif e as th e be st th ing

he has

(Rep .

599a).

It shou ld be re m embe red that P lato does no t le ve l h is

c ritic ism at contemporary art as such , bu t in so far as it

exem plifie s a danger resident in art in genera i 1) . In a

sense every artist is unable to recogn iz e th e p lay in g

and re lative characte r of his w orks. The reason lies in

the fact that he has nothing m ore valuab le than the

thin gs he has compose d o r w ritten

(Phdr.

2 78 d) , i .e ., he

d oe s n ot k no w a stan dard of t rue be in g w hic h m ig ht p oin t

ou t to h im the real place of his products in the o rde r o f

th ings. A rt is called by Plato a w aking dream

(Soph.

2 66c ). The nature of the dream state , w he the r the man

is asle ep o r aw ak e , lie s in th e m istak in g o f r ese mb lan ce

for id en tity

(Rep.

476c). T he artist, w ho so in tense ly

ab so rb s h im se lf in his subject m atte r that h is soul

su p po se s h e rs elf to be am ong the scenes he is describing

(1 0

5 35b ), is lik ely to fo rg et th e cle av ag e w h ic h s ep ar ate s

him from reality an d to claim a greate r ind epend ence for

his im ages than they d ese rve .

*

Even if he should de li-

berate ly re ject a sl avish real ism and sh ould sincer e ly

at tem pt to evocate the deeper background of things, his

ve ry need of se lf -transce ndence m akes him run the risk

of takin g him se lf too se rious ly. T he ideal artist, th ou gh

b es tow in g s er io u s la bo urs on his wo rk , w ou ld n ot attac h

1)

Schaerer, op. cit. 208.


2 3

m uch value to h is im itatio ns. In fact, if he had genuine

kn ow ledge of the th ings he im itates he w ould far rather

d ev ote h im se lf to real things than to the im itation of

them

(Rep .

59 gb). So he would fran kly ad mit the de-

fic ie nc ies of h is know ledge and h is m eans and w oul d gi ve

h is p ro ducts for what th ey are : im ages w hich , by inter-

p re tin g the real n ature of the ir o bjects, try to suggest

somethin g of the w orld o f ideal Be ing , bu t which never

b eli e th eir ir rational origin and the lim itations of the ir

medium .

H ow ever, Plato rea liz es ve ry well th at such a com-

bination o f s e lf-tran scendence and hum bleness m ust be

a rar e th ing. H ence he w arn s his readers to keep a guarded

attitu de ag ainst all art

(Rep.

608ab,

L a ws

669bc) . The

sp e ll o f im ita tio n m ay e as ily o ve rta ke u s, so th at w e ab an -

don ourse lves to unre liab le authoritie s. Th is r isk is

taken by Plato very se riously : Wha t sha ll it pro fit a

m an if he gain the w ho le w orld of po etry an d art, and lose

h is o wn so ul?

(R ep.

607d). For art seem s to be a co r-

rup tion of the m ind of all those w ho do not poss ess as an

antidote a know ledge o f its re al na ture

(Rep.

595b).

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CHAPTER

n

THE MESSAGEOF PLATONIC IMITATION

It m igh t seem a rathe r bo ld en te rprise to show that

Plato's doctr ine o f a r ti s ti c im itatio n still m atter s to us.

I ts c on clu si on , w hich regards art as a source of m en tal

co rrupt io n on ly to be ne utrali zed by know le dge o f its

re al nature , leaves the im pressio n o f a fatal re turn to the

educationalistic positio n, and not man y of us would

agr ee w ith such a narrow ing down of the a rt is t's ta sk .

Howeve r, P la to 's c on ce ption of art w as n ot lim ite d to th e

e du catio na l p oin t o f v ie w. H is w arn ings against the dan -

ge rs of artistic rep resentation are also intended to hold

g oo d f or p u re ly a es th e ti ca l e nj oym en t. W hen a ppr e ci at in g

art w e should never forge t its lim itations.

Y et th is c on clu sio n, to o, is lik ely to m ee t w ith m od er n

ob je ctions. Fo r instance , a recen t book on poe tics is

based on the co ntention th at a p ure appreciation of art

i s p o ssib le o nly if n o qu estio n is raise d ab ou t th e c haract e r

o f a rt. The m ere inten tion to ask such a question, even

the m ere consciousness of th e po ss ib i li ty of a th eore tical ,

i.e ., a non-artistic , approach to art is said to falsify our

appreciation . The sam e w rite r argues that the essence

o f art is inacce ssib le to sc ien ti fi c d e te rm in a tion and that

su ch a d ete rm in ation m ust acqu iesce in the negativ e

conc lusion that the re lat ion of artistic to non-artist ic

THE MESSAGE OF PLATONIC IMITATION 2 5

re alit y is i ne xp li ca ble in rational te rm s

1) .

It m ay be

asked whethe r this argum ent is no t sel f-contradictory.

An aesthetician who argues that the essence of art is

inacc essib le to sc ien ti fic de te rminatio n p ro nounces a

gene ral stateme nt about art. It seem s im po ssi ble to pr o -

no unce a general statem ent about any ob je ct w ithout

hav ing a theo re tic al a pp ro ach to that objec t. However,

th e sam e sta tem ent presupposes an ins ight in to the

essence o f art. But by what o the r m ethod cou ld this in -

sight be at tain ed th an by true appreciation ? Art is ti c

appreciation is said to be true app reciation so long on ly

as it is free from theoret ic al by -thought s. Consequently ,

at the m oment that the art-lo ver turns in to a sci entific

ae sthetici an, he loses h is contact w ith the esse nce of art .

How , then , cou ld such an aest he ti ci an v en tu re to g ive

a d ef in ition, although a nega ti ve d ef in ition, o f art?

It m ight be objected that the sc ie nti fi c aes thetician

does no t w ant to give a negativ e definition of art, bu t

o n ly d ec la res h im se lf to be unable to g ive any true de-

fi nition of art. H e adm its that his scie nti fic a nalysis is

neve r adequate to the ar tis tic p he no m en on its elf. But

in u sing the word never h e o ve rste ps th e lim its o f a

personal c o nf es si on , f or w hat he rea lly wants to say is

that science as such cannot penetrate in to the essence

of art, w hich am ounts to a negative d ef in iti on of art .

It se em s im possib le that th is n eg ati ve con c lu s io n s hould

automatical ly spring from the collisio n o f s cie ntif ic c on -

1) E. G. Wolff, Aesthetik der Dichtkunst (Zurich, 1944), 19

ff.

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MIMESIS

c ep ts an d ar tistic fe elin g. In orde r to giv e a negative de-

f in iti on o f art it is no t sufficient to state that th e s cie n-

tific and the artistic approach es to art are diffe ren t, but

it is n ec essary to c om par e th eir v alu es. T he fact that such

a c om par iso n is p ossib le ,sh ow s th at th ere m ust b e p oin ts

o f c on ta ct b etw ee n a rti stic f ee li ng a nd r ati on al th in ki ng .

I shall no t try to give a defin ition of these points of

contac t. Ye t the conclusion seem s to be w arran ted that

true appreciation of art m ay b e a cc om p an ie d b y th eo re ti c-

al co nsi deration s. W hen artistic ap pre ciation is ra nked

higher than scien tific de te rm ination , it is ta ci tly assumed

that th is confron ta tion, though it brings the artistic

ap p ro ac h i nto co ntact w it h a non -a rtis tic approac h, does

not im pair its pure ness . If it d id, the p r ef er en c e o f a rtistic

appreciation would not be based on a true app reci ation

of art.

W e m ay even go furthe r and ask our sel ves whe the r a

ce rtain deg ree of theo re tical con sciousness is n ot a ne-

cessary precondition to true app reciation . W e are to ld

th at a n ar tist c an no t b ut c on ce iv e o f r eality as an ar tistic

real ity , that such a conception exc ludes any know le dg e

of a n on-artistic reality (and hence also an y c om p ar is on

of artistic exec ution and non-artistic subject-matter),

and that accordin gly artistic ap preciatio n is free from

non -a ppr e ci at iv e con si de r at io n s, ev en fr om the recogn i-

tio n of a particu lar w ork as a w ork o f art , b u t immedi at el y

arises from its ph enom enal aspect as such

1) .

Howeve r ,

1)

Wolff,

op. cii.

19, 21,

40-41,

201-202. More instances of this

view

are-mentioned

by

J.

Hospers,

Meaning and Truth in the Arts

(Chapel Hil l, 1946), 201 n. 59, who rightly remarks that we can

never forget entirely that there is an outside world .

THE MESSAGE OF PLATONIC IMITATION 27

in that ca se art ist ic creation and ar ti st ic a pprecia ti on w o uld

require a m ental attitu de ig nor in g all th in gs in th e w or ld

excep t the work of art w ith which they are concerned .

S uc h a state o f c om ple te abso rp tio n se em s to r un counte r

to c om m on e xp er ie nc e in so far as ne ithe r th e artist no r

th e ar t-lo ve r c an u nfo ld th eir ac ti vi ti es w i th ou t r e al iz i ng

that they are concerned w ith a sp e ci fi c p h e nome non ,

vi z. art . The histo ry of art an d the history o f crit icism

ar e s uf fi ci en t p ro o f th at th is r ea li za ti on o f b ei ng c on ce rn ed

w it h a speci fic ph enom enon ex ist s and that in m any

cases it even develops int o some idea o f w ha t ar t ou ght

to b e. C onsequen tly , Plato seem s to be right in his con-

te ntion that a true ap preciation of a work of art presup-

p os es a c er ta in degree o f t he o re ti ca l c o n sc io u sn ess as to

the natu re of art in ge nera l. '

J t is ab ou t th is general natur e of art th at m any mod ern

philos ophers dis agree w ith P lato 's v ie w . So we mus t

tr eat th is po int at grea ter length . P la to never tire s of

emphas izin g the lim it at io ns of art : In his op inio n art

doe s not posse ss an y independ en t value in the se nse o f

ha vi ng its aim in itsel f. It is important only in so far as

it points to som ething more important. It de rive s it s

r ight of existence from a hi gher stan dard founded in a

m ore e sse ntial realm of be in g of w hich it is an indirect

reflection, a shadow y im age . A rt is r ela tive also in this

sense th at its m eans are doo med to fall short of its end s:

though transcending it se lf it neve r gr asps the object in

i ts f ull ne ss. Every work of art is allegorical: it always

e xp re ss es s om e th in g d iff er en t fr om w h at i t w ants to say .

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MIMESIS

In short, art cannot be autonom ous cre ation , but at m ost

tentat iv e in te rp re ta tio n 1) .

The se characte rizations se em to am ount to a radical

dethronem ent of art w hich at first sigh t doe s not sa ti sfy

us. Tw o obje ctions have b ee n ra ise d in th is c on ne ctio n.

P lato g ive s art a p lace in the sam e hie rarch ical scale of

realitie s as ideal be ing and the ph en om en al worl d , so

th at it s se lf-tra nscending function re fe rs to obje cts w hic h

are only fully grasped by factu al k no wle dge and philo-

so ph ical in sigh t. This has been re gar ded as an int e lle c tu al-

is ti c de form ation of ar t. Fo r in stan ce , P lat o' s concep tio n

of a pain ting as a th ing which is tw o re mov es fro m tr ue

reality is said to be based on the naive supposition that

the pu rp ose of a pa in ting is th e sa me 'as that of i ts vi su al

m ode l (e .g . a rea l bed)- on ly un de r th is assumption

could it pe rtinen tly be calle d a r ep ro du ction or a co py.

Th e pain ting , ho weve r, is no t at all a se cond or a th ird

bed;

it is , in all respects, a

painting .

It should also

be noted that, if 'the ex ce lle nc e or beauty or tru th of

every structure , an im ate or inanim ate , and of ev e ry

action of m an, is re lative to the use for w hich nat ure or

the artis t has in te nde d the m' (Rep. 601d ), then it is no t

p e rmiss ib le to condemn a pain ting as an inf e rior sub stitute

fo r a bed; for, it was neve r in tended to se rve as such .

A fte r al l, P lato , having m ade an unsound pre m is e ,

s ti ll d rew a s ou nd c on clu sio n: if ar t is on ly appearance,

it is defin ite ly conde mned 2 ). T he se s en te nc es reflect

1)

Cf .

also Schaerer,

La question platonicienne,158-159 •

. ,2 ) F. O. Nolte, Art and Reality (Lancaster. 1942), 107,108, 113:

THE MESSAGE OF PLATONIC IMITATION

2 9

th e ge neral m isunderstan di ng of P lato 's controv e rsial

in ten tions w hich I have tri ed to refute in th e prec edi ng

chapte r. P lato does not conceive of im itat ion as a s la vis h

cop y and he does no t con dem n art as a su bstitu te for

real be ing, but he condem ns those art ist s and those

in terpre te rs w ho take ar tistic im a ge s to b e e qu iv ale nt

to re ality .

*

So he do es not cont radic t him se lf w hen he

claim s to have defi ned art in acc ordan ce w ith the use

for which it is in tended. H is w hole argum ent is co n-

ce ntrated upon an atte mp t to c irc um scri be the lim its of

ar t as such an d to assi gn to it its p ro pe r p lac e in th e

who le of th ings 1).

How e ve r, th ough Plato did not regard art as a substi-

tu te for ot he r th ings, he did caII it an adum bration of

th ose realitie s to w hich fac tu al an d p hilos op hi ca l k no wl-

edge , too , re fer (cf. Polito 2 7 7c ). It m ust be ad m itte d th at

th is position savour s of the sam e int e ll ec tua lism whi ch

also induced him to call p hiloso ph y the true Muse

(R ep .

548b, cf. Phd. 61a,

Laws

68 9d, 8l7bc ). P la to di d

too little ju stice to the sp ec ific fu nction s o f ae sthetica l

feeling and em ot ion , thou gh he did no t comp le te ly ignore

th em . For instanc e, he re co gni zed the impo rt ance of

tr ue pl eas ures in art is tic appr eci at ion (Phil. 51 b ff. )

an d of qu ali tat ive proport ion as di sti nct fr om mathem a-

tic al p roportion

(Po lit.

2 84 e ).

*

Yet he m ay be reproached

fo r om itting to determ ine th e rel ation s be tw een the rat io-

na l and the no n-r ati on al as pect s of ar t. But how m any

mod ern philos oph e rs ha ve succeeded in thi s tas k?

1) Cf .

Schaerer,

op. cit., 186-187.

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MIMESIS

T he p re ce di ng obje ction w as direc te d against P lato's

in te l le ct ua li st ic c on ce ption of the dependent character

of art. A second and last obje ction opposes the ide a of

d ep e nd en ce i ts e lf. I have already rem arked that P lato 's

aesthe tics is o fte n ce nsu re d fo r p utting im ita tio n, instead

of expre ssion , at the centre of art. In this conn ection

expre ssion really m eans se lf- e x p r es sion, and se lf re fers

to the w orld o f imaginatio n. I shall no t dea l w ith the place

of im ag ination in art but only discuss th e ge ner al con-

ce ption und erlying th ose v iew s which take this facto r

to be all -im portan t, viz . the con cept ion of ar t as the

c re atio n o f a n a uton om ou s re ality . T his d octrin e h as fo und

its cla ssical expr es sion in Bradle y' s w or ds : P oe try m ay

have also an ult e rior value as a m eans to culture or re li-

gi on ; because it conveys instruction , or softens the

pa ss ions, or fur the rs a good cause ... But its ulterior

wort h neither is nor can directly de term ine it s poetic

worth as a sat isfy ing im aginat ive expe rience ; an d th is is

to be judged entire ly from w ithin ... For its nature is

to be not a part, nor ye t a copy, of the real w orld (as w e

co mm only unde rstand that phra se ), but to be a world

by its e lf , ind ependent, com ple te , aut onomous; and to

po ssess it fu lly yo u must en ter th at wor ld , conf orm to its

law s, and ignore for the tim e the beli e fs , aims, and pa rti-

cu lar c on di ti ons w hich be long to you in the othe r world

of reali ty

1) .

I t c an not be denied that th is doctrin e ha s exe rcised a

sa lut ary influence as a reaction aga inst that unde r-

1)

A. C. Bradley, O xfo rd Lectures

on

P oetry (London, 1909), 4-5.

THE M ESSA GE OF PLATONIC IM ITATION

31

e st im ation which regar de d po etr y as the de cora tion of

a pr eco ncei ved an d c le ar ly de fined matte r

1) ,

and that

ov e r- e stimation which call ed it the mos t beautifu l, im -

pr essi ve and w idely effec tiv e m od e of saying things

(Arnold) , the breath and fine r spir it o f all kno w ledge

(W or dsw orth), the stuff of which ou r life is m ade

(H azlitt)

* ,

an d which carried it se lf

ad absurdu m

in W i lde 's

say ing th at external Nature im itat e s A rt 2).

Howeve r, th e conceptio n of art as a w orld by itself

g iv e s rise to m any di ff ic ult ie s, some of which m ay be

mentioned he re . In th e firs t p lace , if artistic va lu e is

to be ju dg ed e ntire ly fr om w ith in , th e e sse nc e o f a w ork

of art is sup posed to lie in its in ne r harm ony, i.e ., its

fo rm al beaut y. It has often been sa id that Beauty is the

ob ject of ar t, an d it is not to be w ond er ed a t th at this

v iew should also have be en pron oun ce d as a criticism

of P lato

3 ).

Acco rdingly , ar tis ti c ap pr eci ation is said to

be con fined to th e enjoyment of behold ing ph enom ena l

form s 4) or to a deligh t in co nstr u ction itse lf 6). Plat o

has so unded a warning not e aga in st th is cult of beaut y,

w hich th reat ens to re duce ar t to the level of a s up er fic ial

1)

This characterization is borrowed from Bradley, op, cii.,

23.

2) O. Wilde,

Co m pl e te W orks

(New York, 1927), 63.

3) E.g. by C. Ritter, Di e Ke rnge da nke n der p laioniscnen Philo-

sophie (Munich, 1931), 307.

4) Cf. N. Hartmann, Das Prob lem des geist ige n Se ins (Berlin,

1933), 413, 452, L. W. Beck, jud gment s o f Meaning in Art, Journ.

of

Phil os. 41 (1944), 175: The phenomenon is all that is needed

in art .

5)

S. Alexander,

Ph ilosophica l and Litera ry P iece s

(London, 1939),

248.

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MIMESIS

and arb itra ry form alism . H e flays the shallow nes s of

those m inds who se artistic sense can only be en thra lle d

by the play of col ours and form s

(Rep .

601a) , an d he

dem and s th at our app rec iation sho uld be focu sed through

the bea u tiful form on its conte n t

(Laws

669ab)

1).

W e seem to fo llow his advice w hen calling a w ork of

art p rofou nd o r super fic ial an d w he n asc ribing a

d ef in ite d eg ree of insight to an artist . In that case w e

u se a stand ard w hich tr an sc en ds th e r ea lm o f im ag in atio n

an d which bear s an an alogy to the idea of trut h . Artist ic

truth, ju st as sc ie ntific tru th, cannot be r es tr ic te d to

inter nal co nsi ste nc y , b u t inv o lv es a re fe rence t o s omet hing

el se which is no t art itse lf. Bradley is ri ght in arg uing

that the m eaning of a w ork of art canno t be adequately

expressed in an y lan guag e but its own, bu t he e rrs in

c on clu din g th at it m ean s itse lf 2) . A th ing w h ic h m e an s

itse lf is a m onstrum , fo r m ean ing cannot be defined in

te rm s o f se lf-c on tain me nt, b ut alw ay s im plie s a r efe rence

to so me th in g d iffe re nt fro m that by which it is m eant.

B ra dle y i mplic itly adm its his ow n contrad iction when he

rem arks that art still se em s to be trying something

beyond itse lf and that it r e fe rs to , and inte rpre ts,

reality

3 ). *

The second difficu lty af fects the idea o f creation . It

ha s b een rem arked that the real gro und w hy P lato m ade

1) Aristotle has developed this view, d. H. L. Tracy, Aristotle

on Aesthetic Pleasure Class. Phil. 41 (1946), 43-46, 193-206.

2 )

Op.

cit. 24-25.

lI)

Op. cit. 26, 34.

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imitation the essence o f art lie s in the fact that he did

no t ye t know the no tion of creation

1).

T his is true ,

bu t is Pla to to be ce ns ure d for not ye t knowing the

no tion of crea tio n? Is the re no danger i n p r o cl aim ing the

freedom of artistic crea tio n? And is the re no w isdom in

P lato 's w arn ing that a man who cla im s to have created

s omet hi n g a b so lu te ly n ew is to be regarded as a charl atan

producing fals e i llusio ns just as the sop hists

(Soph.

2 34 b ,

Rep.

596c ,

C ra i.

43 2b c)? T he history o f art seem s to g iv e

an answ er to these que stio ns. W hene ver artistic im ag in a-

tion has taken absolute pow er , fr eedom has deg en era te d

into ca p rice , cr eation in to juggle ry , and ex pr ess io n in to

se lf-idolization. In fact it has too often been forgo tten

that the arti st is no t h im se lf a M use , bu t a se rv an t of

the M use , as P lato puts it (1 0 534c). H is fre edom is

restr icted by the fact that he lives in a given w orld.

So he can not create new rea lities , bu t can only try to

gi ve n ew in te rp re ta tio ns of re ality.

It w ill at once be objected that the re is at least one

branch of art whe re it se em s i mp os sible to replace the

pr incip le o f c re ation by tha t o f i nte rp re ta tion, viz. music.

H ere the p he no m en al fo rm s are said to have an inde-

penden t existence , and not to rece ive the ir sense from

something e lse . I shall no t try to give a systematical

defence of the inte rp re tative characte r o f m usic, but

on ly w ish to recall that m any great m usi cians have

a vo w ed th eir be ing inspired by a w ider range o f re ality.

1)

J.

Walter,

Die Geschichte der Aesthetik im Altertum

(Leipzig

]893), 442. .

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MIMESIS

M oz ar t w as v er y s en sitiv e to the beauty of natur al scene ry

and desired to reproduce the se im pre ssions in h is w ork;

Beethoven , w he n asked for an explanation of the minor

sonata, rep lied Read Shakespeare's Tempest ; an d

Schum ann w rote : '\1 reflect on all that goes on in the

w orld in m y ow n w ay, an d it is sue s outw ards in the form

o f m u sic . The re is no reason to deny that the se w ide r

exp er ie nc es shou ld be mo re th an arbi tr ary occas io ns a nd

ha ve a v ita l im po rt an ce to the m eaning of the m usica l

w o rk s t hem se lv e s. *

The re is a seco nd object ion against the in terpretative

conception of art w hich m ay be br ie fly discu ss ed h ere .

It has been argued that w ork s of art are ne ith er m utu all y

co m pa tib le nor m utua lly ' co ntra dictory , so th at they

cannot re ve al the nature of the actual w orl d , but re fe r

to the sphe re of possibility. Acco rdingly , eve ry w ork of

art is an iso lat ed s el f- su ff ic ien t structur e w hi ch ofte n

impre sse s us as be ing a w ind ow less m onad which m irrors

a w orld , an alte rnative to the a ctu al w hich is in tri nsic -

al ly si gni fican t and valuable because it is be tte r than

th e actual 1) . Le t us pass ove r the questi on as to th e

va lue of possib le w orlds and ask ourse lve s w he ther real ly

Cezann e 's vi sion of th ree-dim ensio nal sp ace and of the

objects in that space is ra dic ally in co mp atib le w ith th e

v ision of Tu rner 2 ). Cezann e and Turner m ay be said

1) D. Walsh, The Cognitive Content oj Art, Philos. Rev. 52 (1943),

438-449.

2 ) Op. cit.

439. On p. 440 it is maintained that in Cezanne's

works the graceful vistas of Watteau's landscapes are not merely

absent or neglected; they are specifically rejected . This seems to


35

to int e rpre t re ali ty from differe n t points of v ie w , a nd it

is h ard to see why these poin ts of v iew should not be

co m pa tible . It m ust be admit ted that , if they are co m -

patible , they m ust be ca pabl e of synthe sis in to large r

m ore adequate or m ore i nc lu s iv e who le s 1) . Th e re ar e

many examples of w or ks of art w hich constitu te a syn -

th e sis of prev ious and m ore one -sided app roa ches. But

eve n if such a sy nt hesis ca nnot be real ized in a disti nct

work of art , it seem s to take place in the m ind of the

spectato r, in an analog ou s w ay as w hen a tourist who ha s

had a se rie s of diff e rent v iew s of a landscape can com bi ne

them to a ge ne ra l impre ss io n in his m ind.

Finally , I w ish to call a tten tion to a m isunderstand ing

which has oft en obscu red th e true fu nction of art . A rt is

rightly sa id to posse ss a prope r valu e w hich cann ot be

commun icated by oth e r m eans. In thi s sense arti s ti c

valu e m ay be ca ll ed immane nt and excl usive ly foun d-

ed in the w or k of ar t itse lf . H oweve r , it doe s n ot fo llow

th at a w ork of ar t creat e s its o wn signi ficance in th is

sense th at it is itse lf it s ow n ob ject and orig inates fr om

it se lf 2) . This autarchi st ic vi ew of art ar ise s from a

co nf usio n of ar tistic value and artistic m eaning which

seem s to have been ca use d by the dual m eani ng o f th e

I

run counter to the author's view that works of art are not mutually

contradictory, for a contradiction is said to take place, if the

acceptance of one must necessitate the rejection of others .

1) Op. ci t., 440.

2 )

D. Bartling,

De structuu r va n het ku nstw erk

(Amsterdam,

1941), 24, 105, 113.

Philosophia Antiqua III 3



36

MIMESIS

te rm sign if ica nc e , viz. (1 ) im po rtance or value, and

(2 ) re ference or signification

1) .

I h av e arg ued that P lato's doctrine of artistic imitation

is based on the conception of art as an in te rpre tation of

reality and that th is principle is still a sound basis for

o ur th eory of a rt. This is no new discove ry , fo r th e in te r-

p ret ative charac ter of art se em s to becom e more and

more recognized in differen t qua r te rs . * I hav e only tr ied

to poin t out that th is recogni tio n m ay sav e us fr om

serious the ore tic al d iff icul ties . These difficulti es may be

summed up as fo llow s: so long as ar t is considere d to be

essent ia l ly c r eat iv e, a n a rtisti c r ep re se nt ation of a natural

obje ct m ust be taken to be at the same tim e identical

w ith, a nd diffe rent from , th is object.

*

But also the pr act ice of ar t m ay ge t som e benef it

fr om Plato's thoughts. They m ay help to keep it of f a

sup e rf ic ial cu lt of fo rm al bea uty as w ell as off an ove r-

s tr ain ed d esire of orig inality . I have alrea dy spo ken about

the se dange rs , but sh ould like to ad d a few words ab out

1)

Th. M. Greene,

The Arts and the Art of Criticism

(Princeton,

1940),229 n. 1, has rightly pointed out this difference. Even B. C.

Heyl,

New Bearings in Esthetics

an d

Art Criticism

(New Haven,

1943), who aims to show in what ways and to what degree linguistic

confusion is responsible for the inadequacy of contemporary art

criticism and esthetics (1), seems to confuse artistic value and

artistic meaning and to conclude from the immanent character of

the former to the immanent character of the latter, when he says:

I f works of art are taken as symbols, their artistic meanings or

values seem so intimately bound up with the objects themselves

that external references and associations are esthetically un-

warranted (84).


37

the latter. Fal se orig ina lity seems to spri ng from the

delu sion that artist ic creation is alm ighty . P lato st re sse s

the weakn ess of art, th e poorness of its images. Th e tr ue

art is t is c on sc ious of these de ficie nc ie s, h e k no ws th at h e

lag s behind his object and that he can never fully express

it s essence. B ut this ve ry consc io usne ss of producin g mere

adumbrations of t he real natu re of th ings seem s t o enabl e

him to reveal som eth ing of w hat is behind appe aran ce 1).

Only tha t se rva nt of the M uses who fee ls himself not an

in ve nto r, b ut a translator

2 )

w ill be a m aster. Only th at

artist who is convinced of the sm allne ss of his art w ill

c re ate g re at art. T he ab ove reflections on Plato 's doctrine

o f artistic im itatio n m ay co ntr ibu te to th is m od esty .

I) Cf. also G. van der Leeuw,

W egen en Gr en zen-

(Amsterdam,

1948), 384. However, it does not seem necessary to call any true

work of art religious for this reason

(ibid. , 427).

2 )

M. Proust, quoted by Schaerer,

op. cit.

158 n. 2.

.

I,

t :

I '

I :

plato's doctrine of artistic imitation and its meaning to us

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