Plato’s SophistNon-being and the Beard

Philip Reynor___________________________________________________________________________

Those of us who wish to undertake investigations into Plato’s Sophist must not loose

sight of Plato’s skopos or aim in writing the dialogue. If we immediately leap into an

investigation of ‘being’ or the verb ‘to be’, we have taken too great a leap and surpassed

that aim. The purpose of this presentation is to explicate Plato’s encounters with

non-being, focusing mainly on the Sophist, and furthermore to address the notion of,

what W.V.O Quine has labelled, Plato’s beard in his landmark paper ‘On What there

is’, the importance of which, is not only to admit a contemporary view, but to spell out

some misconceptions, and what G.E.L Owen refers to as ‘commonplaces’, in his

interpretation of Plato’s solution to the problem of non-being. Finally, in staying true

to Plato’s aim in the Sophist it is imperative to keep the unity of the dialogue, along

with its conceptual unity, intact. Thus, we have set out a four-fold task: firstly, to

uncover Plato’s skopos in writing the dialogue, this first step will ensure we are

entering Plato’s house through the door rather then the window; secondly, to engage

with Plato’s investigations into non-being; thirdly, to expound and examine Plato’s

beard and finally, to ensure the unity of the Sophist is maintained, this final theme

bleeds into and thus can be illuminated alongside our first. In focusing our searchlight

on a certain area, let us not allow that everything else be thrown into the darkness of

neglect. After all ‘… every logos must be put together like a living thing, as if it had a

body of its own, so as not to lack either head or feet, but to have a centre and both

ends, so written as to fit each other and the whole’.[1]

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In searching for the skopos of the Sophist, we can consult the Anonymous

Prolegomena as our guide. Within this Neoplatonic commentary[2] there are ten rules

whose purpose is to chaperone us in our attempts to unveil the skopos of any Platonic

dialogue. Here (following Notomi) we will focus on its two most important rules for

establishing the skopos. First, ‘a dialogue must have only one skopos, not many (21.13,

18 – 28)’; and secondly, ‘the skopos must cover the doctrine of the whole work, and not

be confined to the content of one part (21.14, 22. 1 – 20)’.[3] So how do we begin to

discover the aim of the Sophist? Proclus, in attempting to unveil the skopos of the

dialogue, lays his emphasis on the prologue and from Proclus we shall take our first

clue since the purpose of a prologue is to preface the dialogue with an indication as to

its overall project. As a result, Proclus makes the claim that:

Plato thus entitled the Sophist, since this, namely the sophist, was the subject proposed for

investigation in the dialogue. Although many things are also said about what is and about what

is not, these are discussed for the sake of argument on the sophist. (In Rep. I 8.23-28).[4]

However, Proclus here seems a little short sighted. If we take a look at the beginning of

the dialogue, the interlocutors clearly indicate that Plato’s project is to uncover the

sophist and differentiate him from the philosopher. We see Socrates raise the issue of

the appearance of the philosopher in direct comparison to the sophist:

…thanks to the ignorance of others, these people – I mean, not the sham, but the genuine

philosophers – appear in various disguises, ‘roaming from city to city’, watching the life

beneath them from their heights. They seem to some people worthless, to others above all

worthy. Sometimes they appear to be statesmen, and sometimes to be sophists; and sometimes

there are some people to whom they give the impression that they are completely mad. [Sph:

216c2- d2].

This passage indicates that the interlocutors are concerned with the appearance of the

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philosopher both as statesman and as sophist. They call, first and foremost, for a

definition of the sophist [216a1 – 218c1] and, since the Sophist is indeed succeeded by

the Statesman, we can safely assume that the aim here is not to define the statesman.

Furthermore, of the three kinds mentioned here: the philosopher, the sophist and the

statesman, what becomes of Plato’s attempt to define the philosopher? We may argue,

as many scholars do, that Plato had intended to write a third dialogue but abandoned

the project; [5] or we can take the line that within the investigations of the Sophist and

the Statesman, the definition of the philosopher comes to the fore, thus negating the

need to write the third dialogue.[6] In taking this line, we can then enlarge Proclus’

claim to include the philosopher himself and thus the skopos of the Sophist becomes an

attempt to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher.

Now that we have taken the aim of Plato’s Sophist to be the attempt to

distinguish the sophist from the philosopher, we can begin to move in the direction of

non-being, however, once again we must not be hasty. The central part of the dialogue

gives life to some problems and these problems are the result of attempts to snare

the sophist, to capture him in a dialectical net and define his art of imitation. The hunt

begins with a question from the Eleatic Stranger:

Stranger: But about the Sophist, tell me, is it now clear that he is a sort of wizard, an imitator of

real things – or are we still uncertain whether he may or may not possess genuine knowledge of

all the things he seems capable of disputing about?

Theaetetus: He cannot, sir. It is clear enough from what has been said that he is one of those

whose province is play.

Stranger: Then we may class him as a wizard and an imitator of some sort.

Theaetetus: Certainly. [Sph: 235a].

In their attempts to differentiate the sophist from the philosopher, the Eleatic Stranger

and Theaetetus have come upon an impasse. Thus far, they have only scratched the

surface of the labyrinth of problems to come, which have at their root, these attempts

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to characterise the sophist as an imitator, someone who appears to be something he is

not – a deceiver [233c6-11]. The art of imitation is divided by the two speakers into

two forms. The first of which is likenesses and likeness making [235d6-e1]; the second

division is semblance and semblance making [236b4-9]. From here they reach their

impasse, which of these two forms of imitation are they to attribute to the sophist?

Yes, but even now I cannot see clearly how to settle the doubt I then expressed – under which

of the two arts [likeness making and semblance making] we must place the Sophist. It is really

surprising how hard it is to get a clear view of the man. At this very moment he has taken

refuge in a class which baffles investigation. [Sph: 236c10-d2].

This passage is crucial to our discussion two reasons. The first being that we can see

the skopos at work here; the investigation of the character of the sophist continues on

from the introductory discussion and this speaks in favour of our scholastic

interpretation and also towards the unity of Plato’s project. The attempt to catch the

sophist in his ‘lurking place’ is coming to a head, in this middle part of the dialogue

our two speakers are still finding it tricky to ‘get a clear view’ of the sophist’s sanctum

and are incapable of distinguishing him from the philosopher. This leads us to our

second reason, which is that this characterisation signals the entrée of some of the

great problems of the Sophist, which, as we will see, are still unresolved in our own

time. These problems are three in number (1) appearance and seeming without ‘being’

(2) falsehood and (3) what is not. In explicating these concepts as they arise together,

we remain faithful to the unity of the project while simultaneously unpacking the

notion of ‘what is not’ within the appropriate conceptual framework. Our three

problems surface in the following passage:

Stranger: The truth is, my friend, that we are faced with an extremely difficult question. This

(1) ‘appearing’ or ‘seeming’ without really ‘being’, and (2) the saying of something which yet is

not true – all these expressions have always been and still are deeply involved in perplexity. It is

extremely hard, Theaetetus, to find correct terms in which one may say or think that

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falsehoods have real existence, without being caught in a contradiction by the mere utterance

of such words.

Theaetetus: Why?

Stranger: The audacity of the statement lies in its implication that (3) ‘what is not’ has being,

for in no other way could a falsehood come to have being. But, my young friend, when we were

of your age the great Parmenides from beginning to end testified against this, constantly telling

us what he also says in his poem, ‘Never shall this be proved – that things that are not are, but

do thou in thy inquiry, hold back thy thought from this way.’

So we have the great man’s testimony, and the best way to obtain a confession of the truth may

be to put the statement itself to a mild degree of torture. [Sph: 236d9-237b2].

In relation to our skopos we can see that the appearance of the sophist heads the list of

difficulties raised in above extract. We saw earlier that the characterisation of the

sophist as an imitator leads to him essentially appearing or seeming to be something he

is not i.e. wise [233c6-11] and also that this characterisation is a decisive development

in the dialogue. Thus, in the forthcoming discussion we must be vigilant and not lose

sight of our bases and allow the sophist to elude us. The (1) appearing or seeming of

the sophist underlies all the other problems; (2) falsehood makes the appearing

possible since he ‘has turned out to us to be a possessor of a kind of seeming

knowledge about all things, but not the truth’ [233c8-11]; so how do we speak about

this ‘seeming knowledge’ or ‘appearance without being’ of the sophist without being

led into contradiction? The problem concerning (3) ‘what is not’ arises here for the

first time, Parmenides thesis being that upon which the other two problematics rely.

We can see the clear ties in the following statement:

And a false statement, I suppose, is to be regarded in the same light, as stating things that are,

are not, and that things that are not, are. [Sph: 240e10-12].

The trio of relations are now becoming perspicuous. The sophist has been

characterized as appearing as an imitator, a likeness or semblance maker and thus a

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deceiver, masquerading as something he is not. It is up to Theaetetus and the Eleatic

stranger to catch the sophist and distinguish him from the philosopher, however, the

sophist has certain cunning and when the two speakers begin to corner him he

pounces back with devastating force attempting to mute his enemies.

[The sophist] will say that we are contradicting what was just said now, when we have the face

to say that falsehoods exist in thoughts and in statements, for we are constantly being obliged

to attribute what has being to what is not, after agreeing just now that this was altogether

impossible. [Sph: 241a5-9].

Thus, the sophist: imitator, deceiver, purveyor of falsehood, has found his niche, what

is described as an ‘impenetrable lurking place’ [239c5-6] he has taken ‘refuge in the

darkness of not-being where is at home and has the knack of feeling his way’

[254a2-3].[7] The extent of their impasse is now realised and the two friends find

themselves in a warren of puzzlement which leads them in an ellipse back to the ‘great

Parmenides’ and his thesis. The Eleatic Stranger now finds it prudent to commit ‘a

sort of parricide’ [241d3-4] and in their own defence ‘to put to the question that

pronouncement of father Parmenides’ [241d6-7]:

It is not possible for what is nothing to be. For thou canst not know what is not, nor utter it.

What is, is uncreated and indestructible; nor was it ever, nor will it ever be; for now it is, all at

once, a continuous one; moreover it is immovable. For what kind origin for it wilt thou look

for? I shall not let thee say nor think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be thought

nor uttered that any thing is not.[8]

Our speakers are thrust against the edifice of the Parmenidean doctrine, which the

sophist appears to be using as subterfuge. They are left with two choices both of which

have their consequences, the first is to allow the sophist his niche and abandon the

idea of non-being, but, in taking this road the speakers would be embarking on the

destruction of our experience and our language. The negative nature of Parmenides

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thesis is for some unthinkable and its ideal of the unity and changelessness of the one

undermines our understanding of the world, ourselves and everything. If there is no

non-being there is no passage from nothing to being and therefore no becoming; all

motion grinds to a halt since it depends on empty beingless space; there is no past or

future, since both are examples of not-being and therefore are nothing; all

individuality, otherness and plurality in space and time cease; furthermore, since

thought depends on non-being, in any attempt to elucidate a thing we must explain its

cause, its becoming, and contrast that with its non-existence our ability to perform

this within the Parmenidean world dissolves: nothing breeds nothing. Raphael Demos

goes so far as to conclude that a ‘reality like that of Parmenides, in which everything is

reduced to unity, is simply unthinkable’.[9] Yet here we are thinking about it,

explaining that our pockets have been emptied, reminiscing of our youth, planning

our future, considering ourselves as opposed to others; every time we read Homer and

think of ‘Achilleus giving pleasure to his heart with a clear-voiced lyre’[10] we are

reading about and thinking about what Parmenides takes as nothing. Yet, how is this

possible, since we consider Achilleus and his lyre to be in a certain sense and,

additionally, to be endowed with meaning and significance? It is from this position

that the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus approach their alternative, that is, to subject

the thesis of Parmenides to the question and in so doing also torture its consequences.

Before we forward Plato’s solution to the problem let us introduce, however

briefly, Quine’s engagement with the problem of non-being. He sets the problem up as

follows: How is it possible to speak of that which does not exist? This, very familiar

sounding question, echoes the discussion thus far – it draws in the problem of what is

not and that of falsehood. Quine writes:

Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? This tangled doctrine

might be nicknamed Plato’s Beard; historically it has proved tough, frequently dulling the edge

of Occam’s Razor.[11]

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However, in what way does Plato’s Beard blunt the blade of Occam? The thesis that

Occam forwards, simply put, states that we should not multiply entities beyond

necessity. The blade becomes dull when we ask the question of Quine’s title, ‘What is

there?’ And answer – as he does in his opening paragraph – ‘Everything’.[12]

Nevertheless, Quine has taken a leap into the verb ‘to be’, he pays no heed to the

skopos of the Sophist, he neglects the appearance of the sophist and his distinction

from the philosopher and as such jilts the unity and purpose of the dialogue itself. He

leaps two-footed and with gusto into the problem of, what he calls, ‘nonbeing’ and in

so doing he passes those foundational, critical issues. The consequences of this leap are

fatal for Quine as he misses his destination and lands himself in a ravine full of

nothings and in his attempts to escape, he must climb the tangled web of Plato’s Beard.

Thus, Plato’s Beard becomes a method of rescue for Quine’s interpretation rather then

a bridge from which he can gain an understanding of Plato’s solution. For the

moment we must leave Quine in his ravine and turn our attention to a question - how

did we progress from Parmenides negating our ability to think at all to the idea that

everything we think has an ontological status? To answer this we must return to the

Sophist and to Plato.

It is slowly becoming evident that the key to excavating the sophist from his lair

lies in attempting to solve our three problems. This solution begins with an inquiry

into the possibility of combining kinds, the Eleatic Stranger asks: ‘Let us explain then,

how it is that we call the same thing – whatever is in question at the moment – by

several names’[251a6-8] and agree that ‘the greatest absurdity of all results from

pursuing the theory of those very people who will not allow one thing to share in the

quality of another and so be called by its name’[252b9-11] from here they conclude

that the kinds are in a sense like the letters of the alphabet ‘[s]ome of these will not be

conjoined others will fit together’ their task becomes an attempt to prove that ‘what is

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not’ can be combined with ‘what is’. The ‘science’ needed to gain knowledge of this

blending process comes as a shock to the Eleatic Stranger and to Theaetetus:

Stranger: And what name shall we give to this science? Or – good gracious Theaetetus, have

we stumbled unawares upon the free man’s knowledge and, in seeking for the Sophist, chanced

to find the philosopher first?

Theaetetus: How do you mean?

They go on to allow a ‘mastery of dialectic’ to the ‘pure and rightful lover of wisdom’

[253e4-5] and contrast the sophist, lurking in the darkness of not-being (what is not),

to the philosopher who dwells in the bright glare of reality (what is), almost divine.

This once again brings us back our skopos and gives us our first clue as to the

consequences of Quine’s leap: ‘what is not’ or nonbeing is the refuge of the sophist, it

is then, at least metaphorically, something rather then nothing and has been

characterized variously throughout our discussion, ‘nothing’ as it stands cannot be

characterized in such a way. Nevertheless, back to our discussion. The speakers now

explain how knowledge of the dialectic ensures the proper combination of kinds

[253d1-e3]. This knowledge he attributes to the philosopher and thus, the manifold of

problems in defining ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ is related directly to those of defining

the dialectic philosopher and the imitating sophist respectively. As we have seen

[254a2-3; p.6, above] the sophist is skulking in the realm of ‘what is not’ whereas the

philosopher ‘always clings through reasoning to the kind of what is’[13] [254a7-8].

The search now begins for the philosopher, as the Eleatic Stranger had told us

[253e8-9], through a demonstration of the art of dialectic in the proper combination

of the megista gen· or greatest kinds.

To begin with the greatest kinds are taken to be ‘what is’, motion and rest

[254d4-13]. Motion and rest are unmixable, since to suggest that rest is somehow in

motion is contradictory [254d7-9], but ‘what is’ is mixable with both thus the three

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megista gen· can be regarded as distinct, since each one is different from the other two

and the same as itself [254d13-14]. The Eleatic Stranger now asks ‘[w]hat do we mean

by these words we have just used – ‘same’ and ‘different’?’ [254e2-3]. We need to

discover whether we have two additional kinds or can we apply these terms freely to

our original three without reservations. If sameness or difference were applied to

motion and rest then their natures would be mixed leading to contradiction. If ‘what

is’ and sameness or difference were one we would, on the one hand, have to posit

change and rest are the same, thus sameness must be a distinct kind, and on the other

hand, have to posit a difference that was not in reference to another thing, thus

difference is considered a distinct kind. [255b8-e7] Now the inquirers can ‘see if there

is any opening allowing us to assert that what is not, really is what is not and escape

unscathed’ [254c9-d1]. Thus, the argument is set up as follows:[14]

[A-1] Motion[15] is different from rest; therefore, change is not rest;

[A-2] Motion is, by partaking of what is;

[B-1] Motion is different from the same; motion is not the same;

[B-2] Motion is the same as itself, by partaking of the same;

[C-1] Motion is different from difference; motion is not different;

[C-2] Motion is different, (by partaking of difference);

[D-1] Motion is different from what is; motion is not what is;

[D-2] Motion is, by partaking of what is.

Thus, we can see that any X is the same and not the same, first, by partaking in

sameness, and second, by the very nature of difference. This allows Plato to conclude

that motion and rest are through participation in ‘what is’ and different from ‘what is’

through their participation in difference. From this the speakers conclude that ‘when

we speak of ‘that which is not’, it seems that we do not mean something contrary to

what exists but only something that is different’[257b2-c2]. This definition is at the

hub of what G. E. L Owen refers to as ‘commonplaces’ in the investigations into Plato’s

dialogues.[16] These ‘commonplaces’ are uncovered by distinguishing two uses of the

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verb ‘to be’ (1) ‘a complete or substantive use in which it determines a one-place

predicate (“X is”, “X is not”)’ and (2) ‘an incomplete use in which it determines a two

place predicate (“X is Y”, “X is not Y”)’.[17] Plato realises Parmenides problem, and

the key to locating the sophist, is to avoid confusing confusion of ‘what is not’ with

nothing. Plato recognises that ‘what is not’ is not contrary to what is but merely

different from it as the sophist is from the philosopher. The Eleatic Stranger can now

assert that:

(a) the kinds blend; (b) that persistence and existence pervade them all, and pervade one

another (c) the difference [or the different] by partaking of existence, is by virtue of that

participation, but on the other hand is not that existence of which it partakes, but is different,

and since it is different from existence [or an existent], quite clearly it must be possible that it

should be a thing that it is not ,(d) and again, existence having a part in difference, will be

different from all the rest of the kinds and, because it is different from them all, it is not any

one of them, nor yet all the others put together, but is only itself. [259a1-b3].

In distinguishing the philosopher for his dialectic then applying that method in the

search for the sophist the speakers themselves are nascent philosophers and have, for

the moment, solved the riddle of ‘what is not’ Thus, they have laid bare the sanctum of

the sophist and exposed him as the imitator they believe he is, however, in the process

they have brought us back to Quine who in his interpretation of this solution

attributes ‘to Plato the thesis that ‘What is not must in some sense be, for we are

ascribing some character to it’ i.e, in saying something is not, we are ascribing some

character to something which in some sense, is viz., which subsists’.[18]

When Quine offers us the solution of Plato’s beard, as Read claims he does,[19]

what does he think that Plato is propounding? Take, for example, the name Pegasus,

this empty name must, on Quine’s account of Plato, or Mr. X as he calls him, in some

sense be, have existence or have existence attributed to it. It can be whispered that

Pegasus has an ontological status, Pegasus has character.[20] Quine and his fictional

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debating partner Mr X, representing Plato, differ in their ontology’s; Mr X maintains

that there is something, an entity, which Quine maintains there is not, and thus we are

back to our problem. With respect to Quine’s formulation of the problem, he cannot

without contradiction claim that Mr X’s entity is not, as, in his own words.

‘[n]on-being must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not?’[21] Quine

sustains that this is confusion on the part of Plato who must admit that a physical

being, such as Pegasus, does not exist and instead must posit being for the mental

Pegasus-idea. However, Plato would never suffer confusion regarding the Parthenon

and Parthenon-idea, so why tolerate it with Pegasus and why not just admit to the

non-being of Pegasus? Enter Quine’s second apparent opponent Wyman who upholds

the being of Pegasus as an unactualized possible or as subsisting. Wyman admits the

non-existence or non-actuality of Pegasus while simultaneously maintaining that it is,

that is, it subsists. Thus, Quine attributes to Plato the thesis that empty names, such as

Pegasus, have a subsistent existence, sentences containing these names have meaning

since the names denote subsistent entities due to our granting of their character. This,

according to Quine, is Plato’s solution to the problem of nonbeing, to posit a world

full of subsistent entities – Plato’s beard is the growth of such entities. Read, unlike

Quine, uses the phrase Plato’s beard not as Plato’s solution to the problem of

non-being but as establishing the problem in the first place. From here he too goes on

to give Plato a beard of subsistent entities as, according to Durrant’s article, ‘it is clear

from his writing that in his view Plato would treat King Lear as having some kind of

subsistent existence, as would the father of Goneril and Regan and, further, a golden

mountain’.[22]

To assume Plato’s commitment to such subsistent entities, not only

demonstrates a poor reading of the dialogues,[23] but is also contrary to what is

written in the Sophist [237b7-e2]. As we have seen Plato is aware both metaphorically

and formally of the importance of distinguishing not-being from nothing, so much so

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that this distinction pervades the dialogue in it’s skopos as the character and location of

the sophist is continually linked with not-being, with darkness but not nothing, with a

hiding place, that it is possible to find or stumble upon and is contrasted with the

philosopher who dwells in what is. Plato was well aware of what he was instantiating

here and discusses it from the beginning of the middle part [from 235a]. This indicates

that Plato’s central concern lay with the complete or substantive use of ‘to be’ which,

following Owen, leads to ‘commonplaces’ which ‘reject negative constructions of the

verb as breeding intolerable paradox’.[24] Thus, Plato would have to admit that he is

incapable of uttering ‘Pegasus does not exist’, which again is contrary to the contents

of the dialogue. The intolerable paradoxes actually arise, as we have seen through the

Parmenidean confusion of not-being with nothing in which he too is guilty of

neglecting the incomplete form of the verb and isolating the substantive form.

However, Plato can offer us negative constructions of the verb by giving up this

Parmenidean confusion, which he does, and all without positing a single subsistent

entity. In conclusion, Plato’s beard is devoid of a single strand and Quine, stranded in

his ravine, is forced to climb nothing in order to escape.

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Endnotes:

[1] Plato, Phaedrus; 264c2-5.

[2] Chapter 9.

[3] Notomi, N; ‘The Unity of Plato’s Sophist: Between the Sophist and the Philosopher’; p. 10-11.

[4] Ibid; p. 13.

[5] For example, Campbell (1867), The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato; Cornford (1935), Plato’s Theory of Knowledge; Skemp (1952), Fujisawa (1976), Plato, The Sophist; Guthrie (1978), A History of Greek Philosophy V, the later Plato and the Academy and Bostock (1988), Plato’s Theaetetus.

[6] This view is advocated by, Friedländer (1969), Plato 3: The Dialogues, Second and Third Periods; Klein (1977), Plato’s Trilogy, Theaetetus, The Sophist and The Statesman; Miller (1988), Cobb (1990), Plato’s Sophist; Frede, M (1996), The Literary Form of the Sophist; Rowe (1995), Plato: Statesman.

[7] See also: 260d1-4.

[8] Demos, R; The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 30, No. 4, p. 85.

[9] Ibid; p. 86.

[10] Homer, Iliad; Book 9: 186-187; trans: Hammond, M; Penguin (London 1987).

[11] Quine, W.V.O, On What there is; p.2.

[12] Ibid; p.1.

[13] In this case the translation is by Notomi, p. 238; the Collected Dialogues translation reads: ‘Whereas the philosopher, whose thoughts constantly dwell upon the nature of reality…’. See also: 250e1-251a4.

[14] This structuring of Plato’s arguments is taken from: Notomi, p.242; the italics are my own.

[15] Notomi here uses the translation ‘change’ but I prefer to stick with the translation ‘motion’, as it appears in the Collected Dialogues.

[16] Owen, G. E. L; ‘Plato on Not-Being’; p. 223.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Durrant, M; Plato’s Quinean Beard: Did Plato ever grow it?; p.116.

[19] Read, S; Thinking about Logic; p.123.

[20] Quine, W.V.O; On What there is; p. 2-3.

[21] Ibid; p.1.

[22] Durrant; p.114.

[23] Both Quine and Read fail to refer to the location of their evidence in the dialogues.

[24] Owen; p.225 – 231.

14

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Durant, M; ‘Plato’s Quinean Beard: Did Plato ever grow it?’ in Philosophy, Vol. 73 (1998); p.

113-121.

Lee, E. N; ‘Plato on Negation and not-Being in the Sophist’ in The Philosophical Review, Vol.

81 (1969); p. 267-304.

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Owen, G. E. L; ‘Plato on Not-Being’; in Vlatos, G (ed.), Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology;

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