poli law bar questions compiled

7/29/2019 Poli Law Bar Questions Compiled

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Poli Law Bar Questions Compilation

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ARTICLE I National TerritoryArchipelagic Doctrine (1989)No. 20: What do you understand by thearchipelagic doctrine? Is this reflected in the1987 Constitution?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:The ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINEemphasizes the unity of land and waters bydefining anarchipelago either as a group of islandssurrounded by waters or a body of watersstudded with islands. For this purpose, itrequires that baselines be drawn byconnecting theappropriate points of the "outermost islandsto encircle the islands within thearchipelago. Thewaters on the landward side of the baselinesregardless of breadth or dimensions aremerelyinternal waters.

Yes, the archipelagic doctrine is reflected inthe 1987 Constitution. Article I, Section 1providesthat the national territory of the Philippinesincludes the Philippine archipelago, with alltheislands and waters embraced therein; and

the waters around, between, and connectingtheislands of the archipelago, regardless oftheir breadth and dimensions, form part ofthe internalwaters of the Philippines.

Contiguous Zone vs. ExclusiveEconomic Zone (2004)(2-a-2) Distinguish: The contiguous zoneand the exclusive economic zone.SUGGESTED ANSWER: CONTIGUOUS

ZONE is a zone contiguous to the territorialsea and extends up to 12 nautical milesfrom the territorial sea and over which thecoastal state may exercise controlnecessary to prevent infringement of itscustoms, fiscal, immigration or sanitary lawsand regulations within its territory orterritorial sea. (Article 33 of the Conventionon the Law of the Sea.)

The EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE is azone extending up to 200 nautical miles

from the

baselines of a state over which the coastalstate has sovereign rights for the purpose ofexploringand exploiting, conserving and managingthe natural resources, whether living ornonliving, ofthe waters superjacent to the seabed and ofthe seabed and subsoil, and with regard tootheractivities for the economic exploitation andexploration of the zone. (Articles 56 and 57of theConvention on the Law of the Sea.)

Exclusive Economic Zone; Rights of theCoastal State (1994) No. 11:In the desire to improve the fishing methodsof the fishermen, the Bureau of Fisheries,

with the approval of the President, enteredinto a memorandum of agreement to allowThai fishermen to fish within 200 miles fromthe Philippine sea coasts on the conditionthat Filipino fishermen be allowed to useThai fishing equipment and vessels, and tolearn modern technology in fishing andcanning.

1) Is the agreement valid?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

1) No. the President cannot authorize theBureau of Fisheries to enter into amemorandum ofagreement allowing Thai fishermen to fishwithin the exclusive economic zone of thePhilippines,because the Constitution reserves to Filipinocitizens the use and enjoyment of theexclusiveeconomic zone of the Philippines.

Section 2. Article XII of the Constitution

provides:The State shall protect the nation's marinepart in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea,andexclusive economic zone, and reserve itsuse and enjoyment to Filipino citizens."

Section 7, Article XIII of the Constitutionprovides:"The State shall protect the rights ofsubsistence fishermen, especially of localcommunities, to the preferential use of thecommunal marine and fishing resources,

both inland and offshore. It shall providesupport to such fishermen through


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appropriate technology and research,adequate financial, production, andmarketing assistance, and other services.The State shall also protect,develop, and conserve such resources. Theprotection shall extend to offshore fishinggroundsof subsistence fishermen against foreignintrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a justshare from their labor in the utilization ofmarine and fishing resources.

Exclusive Economic Zone; Rights of theCoastal State (Q1-2005)(c) Enumerate the rights of the coastal statein the exclusive economic zone. (3%)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

In the EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE, thecoastal State has sovereign rights for thepurposeof exploring and exploiting, conserving andmanaging the natural resources, whetherliving ornon-living, of the waters superjacent to theseabed and of the seabed and its subsoil,and with regard to other activities for theeconomic exploitation and exploration of thezone, such as theproduction of energy from the water,

currents and winds in an area not extendingmore than 200nautical miles beyond the baseline fromwhich the territorial sea is measured. Otherrights include the production of energy fromthe water, currents and winds, theestablishment and use of artificial islands,installations and structures, marine scientificresearch and the protection andpreservation of the marine environment.(Art. 56, U.N. Convention on the Law of theSea)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:SOVEREIGN RIGHTS for the purpose ofexploring and exploiting, conserving andmanaging the natural resources, whetherliving or non-living, of the seabed andsubsoil and thesuperjacent waters, and with regard to otheractivities such as the production of energyfromthe water, currents and winds in an area notextending more than 200 nautical milesbeyond

the baseline from which the territorial sea ismeasured. (See Art. 56, UNCLOS)Jurisdiction,inter alia, with regard to:(1) the establishment and use of artificialislands, installations and structures;(2) marine scientific research; and(3) the protection and preservation of themarine environment.

Flag State vs. Flag of Convenience (2004)(2-a-3) Distinguish: The flag state and theflag of convenience.SUGGESTED ANSWER: FLAG STATEmeans a ship has the nationality of the flagof the state it flies, but there must be agenuine link between the state and the ship.(Article 91 of the Convention on the Law of the

Sea.) FLAG OF CONVENIENCE refers to a statewith which a vessel is registered for various reasons

such as low or non-existent taxation or lowoperating costs although the ship has nogenuine link with that state. (Harris, Cases andMaterials on International Law, 5th ed., 1998, p.425.)

Territory & Government (1996)No. 8: A law was passed dividing thePhilippines into three regions (Luzon,Visayas, and Mindanao), each constitutingan independent state except on matters of

foreign relations, national defense andnational taxation, which are vested in theCentral government. Is the law valid?Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:The law dividing the Philippines into threeregions, each constituting an independentstateand vesting in a central government mattersof foreign relations, national defense, andnational

taxation, is unconstitutional. First, it violatesArticle I, which guarantees the integrity ofthe national territory of the Philippinesbecause it divided the Philippines into threestates. Second, it violates Section 1, ArticleII of the Constitution, which provides for theestablishment of democratic and republicStates by replacing it with three Statesorganized as a confederation.Third, it violates Section 22, Article II of theConstitution, which, while recognizing andpromoting the rights of indigenous culturalcommunities, provides for national unity anddevelopment. Fourth, it violates Section 15,Article X of the Constitution, which, provides


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for autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanaoand in the Cordilleras within the frameworkof national sovereignty as well as territorialintegrity of the Republic of the Philippines.Fifth, it violates the sovereignty of theRepublic of the Philippines.Territorial Sea vs. Internal Waters (2004)(2-a-1) Distinguish: The territorial sea andthe Internal waters of the Philippines.SUGGESTED ANSWER:TERRITORIAL SEA is an adjacent belt ofsea with a breadth of 12 nautical milesmeasured from the baselines of a state andover which the state has sovereignty.(Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention on theLaw of the Sea.) Ship of all states enjoy theright of innocent passagethrough the territorial sea. (Article 14 of the

Convention on the Law of the Sea.) UnderSection 1, Article I of the 1987 Constitution,the INTERNAL WATERS of the Philippinesconsist of the waters around, between andconnecting the islands of the PhilippineArchipelago, regardless of their breadth anddimensions, including the waters in bays,rivers and lakes. No right of innocentpassage for foreign vessels exists in thecase of internal waters. (Harris, Cases andMaterials onInternational Law, 5th ed., 1998, p. 407.)

Internal waters are the waters on thelandward side ofbaselines from which the breadth of theterritorial sea is calculated. (Brownlie,Principles of PublicInternational Law, 4th ed., 1990, p. 120.)

Freedom of Expression; Censorship(2003) No IX - May the COMELEC(COMELEC) prohibitthe posting of decals and stickers on"mobile" places, public or private, such ason a privatevehicle, and limit their location only to theauthorized posting areas that the COMELECitselffixes? Explain.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:According to Adiong v. COMELEC. 207SCRA 712 [1992], the prohibition isunconstitutional. Itcurtails the freedom of expression ofindividuals who wish to express theirpreference for a

candidate by posting decals and stickers ontheir cars and to convince others to agree

with them. It is also overbroad, because itencompasses private property andconstitutes deprivation ofproperty without due process of law.Ownership of property includes the right touse. The prohibition is censorship, whichcannot be justified.

Freedom of Expression; Prior Restraint(1988)No. 16: The Secretary of Transportation andCommunications has warned radio stationoperators against selling blocked time, onthe claim that the time covered thereby areoften usedby those buying them to attack the presentadministration. Assume that the departmentimplements this warning and orders owners

and operators of radio stations not to sellblocked time to interested parties withoutprior clearance from the Department ofTransportation andCommunications. You are approached by aninterested party affected adversely by thatorder of the Secretary of Transportation andCommunications. What would you doregardingthat ban on the sale of blocked time?Explain your answer.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:I would challenge its validity in court on theground that it constitutes a prior restraint onfreedom of expression. Such a limitation isvalid only in exceptional cases, such aswhere the purpose is to prevent actualobstruction to recruitment of service or thesailing dates of transports or the numberand location of troops, or for the purpose ofenforcing the primary requirements ofdecency or the security of community life.(Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S, 697 (1931)).

Attacks on the government, on the otherhand, cannot justify prior restraints. For ashas been pointed out, "the interest of societyand the maintenance of good governmentdemand a full discussion of public affairs.Complete liberty to comment on the conductof public men is a scalpel in the case of freespeech. The sharp incision of its proberelieves the abscesses of officialdom. Menin public life may suffer under a hostile andan unjust accusation; the wound can beassuaged with the balm of a clearconscience," (United States v Bustos, 37

Phil. 741 (1918)). The parties adverselyaffected may also disregard the regulation


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as being on its face void. As has been held,"any system of prior restraints of expressioncomes to the court bearing a heavypresumption against its constitutionalvalidity," and the government "thus carries aheavy burden of showing justification for theimposition of such a restraint." (New YorkTimes Co. v. United States,403 U.S. 713 (1971)). The usualpresumption of validity that inheres inlegislation is reversed in the case of lawsimposing prior restraint on freedom ofexpression.

Freedom of Religion; ConvictedPrisoners(1989)No. 5: "X" is serving his prison sentence in

Muntinlupa. He belongs to a religious sectthat prohibits the eating of meat. He askedthe Director of Prisons that he be servedwith meatless diet. The Director refused and"X" sued the Director for damages forviolating his religious freedom. Decide.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:Yes, the Director of Prison is liable underArticle 32 of the Civil Code for violating thereligious freedom of "X". According to thedecision of the United States Supreme Court

in the case of O'Lone vs. Estate of Shabazz,107 S. Ct. 2400, convicted prisoners retaintheir right to free exercise of religion. At thesame time, lawful incarceration brings aboutnecessary limitations of many privileges andrights justified by the considerationsunderlying the penal system. In consideringthe appropriate balance between these twofactors, reasonableness should be the test.Accommodation to religious freedom can bemade if it will not involve sacrificing theinterests of security and it will have no

impact on the allocation of the resources ofthe penitentiary. In this case, providing "X"with a meatless diet will not create a securityproblem or unduly increase the cost of foodbeing served to the prisoners. In fact, in thecase of O' Lone vs. Estate of Shabazz, itwas noted that the Moslem prisoners werebeing given a different meal whenever porkwould be served.ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:The suit should be dismissed. The FreeExercise Clause of the Constitution isessentially a restraint on governmental

interference with the right of individuals to

worship as they please. It is not a mandateto the state to take positive, affirmativeaction to enable the individual to enjoy hisfreedom. It would have been different hadthe Director of Prisons prohibited meatlessdiets in the penal institution.

Freedom of Religion; Flag Salute (2003)No III - Children who are members of areligious sect have been expelled from theirrespective public schools for refusing, onaccount of their religious beliefs, to take partin the flag ceremony which includes playingby a band or singing the national anthem,saluting the Philippine flag and reciting thepatriotic pledge. The students and theirparents assail the expulsion on the groundthat the school authorities have acted in

violation of their right to free publiceducation, freedom of speech, and religiousfreedom and worship.Decide the case.SUGGESTED ANSWER:The students cannot be expelled fromschool. As held in Ebralinag v. The DivisionSuperintendent of Schools of Cebu. 219SCRA 256 [1993], to compel students totake part in the flag ceremony when it isagainst their religious beliefs will violatetheir religious freedom. Their expulsion also

violates the duty of the State under ArticleXIV, Section 1 of the Constitution to protectand promote the right of all citizens to qualityeducation and make such educationaccessible to all.

Freedom of Religion; Non-EstablishmentClause (1988)No. 7: - Tawi-Tawi is a predominantlyMoslem province. The Governor, the Vice-Governor, and members of its Sang-guniangPanlalawigan are all Moslems. Its budget

provides the Governor with a certain amountas his discretionary funds. Recently,however, the Sangguniang Panlalawiganpassed a resolution appropriating P100,000as a special discretionary fund of theGovernor to be spent by him in leadinga pilgrimage of his provincemates to Mecca,Saudi Arabia, Islam's holiest city.Philconsa, on constitutional grounds, hasfiled suit to nullify the resolution of theSangguniang Panlalawigan giving thespecial discretionary fund to the Governorfor the stated purpose. How

would you decide the case? Give yourreasons.


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SUGGESTED ANSWER:The resolution is unconstitutional First, itviolates art. VI, sec. 29(2) of the Constitutionwhich prohibits the appropriation of publicmoney or property, directly or indirectly, forthe use, benefit or support of any system ofreligion, and, second, it contravenes art. VI,sec, 25(6) which limits the appropriation ofdiscretionary funds only for public purposes.The use of discretionary funds for purelyreligious purpose is thus unconstitutional,and the fact that the disbursement is madeby resolution of a local legislative body andnot by Congress does not make it any lessoffensive to the Constitution. Above all, theresolution constitutes a clear violation of theNon-establishment Clause (art. III, sec. 5) ofthe Constitution.

Freedom of Religion; Non-EstablishmentClause (1992)No. 10: Recognizing the value of educationin making the Philippine labor marketattractive to foreign investment, theDepartment of Education, Culture andSports offers subsidies to accreditedcolleges and universities in order to promotequality tertiary education. The DECS grantsa subsidy to a Catholic school whichrequires its students to take at least 3 hours

a week of religious instruction. a) Is thesubsidy permissible? Explain, b) Presumingthat you answer in the negative,would it make a difference if the subsidywere given solely in the form of laboratoryequipment in chemistry and physics? c)Presume, on the other hand, that thesubsidy is given in the form of scholarshipvouchers given directly to the student andwhich the student can use for paying tuitionin any accredited school of his choice,whether religious or non-sectarian. Will

your answer be different?SUGGESTED ANSWER:a) No, the subsidy is not permissible. It willfoster religion, since the school givesreligious instructions to its students.Besides, it will violate the prohibition inSection 29[2J, Article VI of the Constitutionagainst the use of public funds to aidreligion. In Lemon vs Kurtzman. 403 U.S.602, it was held that financial assistance to aschool violates the prohibition against theestablishment of religion if it fosters anexcessive government entanglement with

religion. Since the school requires itsstudents to take at least three hours a week

of religious instructions, to ensure that thefinancial assistance will not be used forreligious purposes, the government will haveto conduct a continuing surveillance. Thisinvolves excessive entanglement withreligion. b) If the assistance would be in theform of laboratory equipment in chemistryand physics, it will be valid. The purpose ofthe assistance is secular, i.e., theimprovement of the quality of tertiaryeducation. Any benefit to religion is merelyincidental. Since the equipment can onlybe used for a secular purpose, it isreligiously neutral. As held in Tilton vs.Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, it will not involveexcessive government entanglement withreligion, for the use of the equipment will notrequire surveillance. c) In general, the giving

of scholarship vouchers to students is valid.Section 2(3), Article XIV of the Constitutionrequires the State to establish a system ofsubsidies to deserving students in bothpublic and private schools. However, the lawis vague and over-broad. Under it, a studentwho wants to study for the priesthood canapply for the subsidy and use it for hisstudies. This will involve using public fundsto aid religion.

Police Power; Zoning Ordinance vs.Non-Impairment of Contracts (1989)No. 12: Pedro bought a parcel of land fromSmart Corporation, a realty firm engaged indeveloping and selling lots to the public.One of the restrictions in the deed of salewhich was annotated in the title is that thelot shall be used by the buyer exclusively forresidential purposes. A main highway havingbeen constructed across the subdivision, thearea became commercial in nature. Themunicipality later passed a zoning ordinancedeclaring the area as a commercial bankbuilding on his lot. Smart Corporation wentto court to stop the construction as violativeof the building restrictions imposed by it. Thecorporation contends that the zoningordinance cannot nullify the contractualobligation assumed by the buyer.Decide the case.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:The case must be dismissed. As held inOrtigas and Company, Limited Partnershipvs. FEATIi Bank and Trust Company, 94

SCRA 533, such a restriction in the contractcannot prevail over the zoning ordinance,


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because the enactment of the ordinance is avalid exercise of police power. It ishazardous to health and comfort touse the lot for residential purposes, since ahighway crosses the subdivision and thearea has become commercial.

Police Power; Zoning Ordinance vs.Non-Impairment of Contracts (2001)No XVIII In the deeds of sale to, and in theland titles of homeowners of a residentialsubdivision in Pasig City, there arerestrictions annotated therein to the effectthat only residential houses or structuresmay be built or constructed on the lots.However, the City Council of Pasig enactedan ordinance amending the existing zoningordinance by changing the zone

classification in that place from purelyresidential to commercial. "A", a lot owner,sold his lot to a banking firm and the latterstarted constructing a commercial buildingon the lot to house a bank inside thesubdivision. The subdivision owner and thehomeowners' association filed a case incourt to stop the construction of the buildingfor banking business purposes and torespect the restrictions embodied in thedeed of sale by the subdivision developer tothe lot owners, as well as the annotation in

the titles. If you were the Judge, how wouldyou resolve the case? (5%)SUGGESTED ANSWER:If I were the judge, I would dismiss the case.As held in Ortigas and Company LimitedPartnership vs. FEATI Bank and TrustCompany. 94 SCRA 633 (1979), the zoningordinance is a valid exercise of police powerand prevails over the contractual stipulationrestricting the use of the lot to residentialpurposes.

Privacy of Communication (2001)No XII - "A" has a telephone line with anextension. One day, "A" was talking to "B"over the telephone. "A" conspired with hisfriend "C", who was at the end of theextension line listening to "A's" telephoneconversation with "B" in order to overhearand tape-record the conversation wherein"B" confidentially admitted that with evidentpremeditation, he (B) killed "D" for havingcheated him in their business partnership."B" was not aware that the telephoneconversation was being tape-recorded.

In the criminal case against "B" for murder,is the tape-recorded conversation containing

his admission admissible in evidence? Why?(5%)SUGGESTED ANSWER:The tape-recorded conversation is notadmissible in evidence. As held in Salcedo-Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA111 (1994). Republic Act No. 4200 makesthe tape-recording of a telephoneconversation done without the authorizationof all the parties to the conversation,inadmissible in evidence. In addition, thetaping of the conversation violated theguarantee of privacy of communicationsenunciated in Section 3, Article III of theConstitution.

Searches and Seizures; Incidental to

ValidSearch (1990)No. 9; Some police operatives, acting undera lawfully issued warrant for the purpose ofsearching for firearms in the House of Xlocated at No. 10 Shaw Boulevard, Pasig,Metro Manila, found, instead of firearms, tenkilograms of cocaine.(1) May the said police operatives lawfullyseize the cocaine? Explain your answer.(2) May X successfully challenge the legalityof the search on the ground that the peace

officers did not inform him about his right toremain silent and his right to counsel?Explain your answer.(3) Suppose the peace officers were able tofind unlicensed firearms in the house in anadjacent lot, that is. No, 12 Shaw Boulevard,which is also owned by X. May they lawfullyseize the said unlicensed firearms? Explainyour answer.SUGGESTED ANSWER:(1) Yes, the police operatives may lawfullyseize the cocaine, because it is an itemwhose possession is prohibited by law, itwas in plain view and it was onlyinadvertently discovered in the course of alawful search. The possession of cocaine isprohibited by Section 8 of the DangerousDrugs Act. As held in Magoncia v. Palacio,80 Phil. 770, an article whose possessionis prohibited by law may be seized withoutthe need of any search warrant if it wasdiscovered during a lawful search. Theadditional requirement laid down in Roan v.Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 that the discoveryof the article must have been made

inadvertently was also satisfied in this case.(2) No, X cannot successfully challenge the


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legality of the search simply because thepeace officers did not inform him about hisright to remain silent and his right tocounsel. Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987Constitution provides: "Any person underinvestigation for the commission of anoffense shall have the right to be informed ofhis right to remain silent and to havecompetent and independent counselpreferably of his own choice." As held inPeople v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111. for thisprovision to apply, a suspect must beunder investigation. There was noinvestigation involved in this case.(3) The unlicensed firearms stored at 12Shaw Boulevard may lawfully be seizedsince their possession is illegal. As held inMagoncia a Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, when an

individual possesses contraband(unlicensed firearms belong to thiscategory), he is committing a crimeand he can be arrested without a warrantand the contraband can be seized.ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:In accordance with the rulings in Uy Keytinv, Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 and People v. SyJuco, 64 Phil. 667, the unlicensed firearmsfound in the house at 12 Shaw Boulevardmay not be lawfully seized, since they werenot included in the description of the articles

to be seized by virtue of the search warrant.The search warrant described the articles tobe seized as firearms in the house of Xlocated at 10 Shaw Boulevard.

Searches and Seizures; Place of Search(2001)No XI - Armed with a search and seizurewarrant, a team of policemen led byInspector Trias entered a compound andsearched the house described therein asNo. 17 Speaker Perez St., Sta. Mesa

Heights, Quezon City, owned by Mr.Ernani Pelets, for a reported cache offirearms and ammunition. However, uponthorough search of the house, the policefound nothing. Then, acting on a hunch, thepolicemen proceeded to a smaller houseinside the same compound with address atNo. 17-A Speaker Perez St., entered it, andconducted a search therein over theobjection of Mr. Pelets who happened to bethe same owner of the house. There, thepolice found the unlicensed firearms andammunition they were looking for. As a

result. Mr. Ernani Pelets was criminally

charged in court with Illegal possession offirearms and ammunition as penalized underP.D. 1866, as amended by RA. 8294. At thetrial, he vehemently objected to thepresentation of the evidence against him forbeing inadmissible. Is Mr. Emani Pelet'scontention valid or not? Why? (5%)SUGGESTED ANSWER:The contention of Ernani Pelet is valid. Asheld in People vs. Court of Appeals,291SCRA 400 (1993), if the place searchedis different from that stated in the searchwarrant, the evidence seized is inadmissible.The policeman cannot modify the place tobe searched as set out in the searchwarrant.

Effects of Philippine Bill of 1902 (2001)No I - From mainland China where he wasborn of Chinese parents, Mr Nya Tsa Chanmigrated to the Philippines in 1894. As ofApril 11, 1899, he was already a permanentresident of the Philippine Islands andcontinued to reside in this country until hisdeath. During his lifetime and when he wasalready in the Philippines, Mr. Nya Tsa Chanmarried Charing, a Filipina, with whom hebegot one son, Hap Chan, who was born onOctober 18. 1897. Hap Chan got married

also to Nimfa, a Filipina, and one of theirchildren was Lacqui Chan who was born onSeptember 27, 1936. Lacqui Chan finishedthe course Bachelor of Science inCommerce and eventually engagedin business. In the May 1989 election,Lacqui Chan ran for and was electedRepresentative (Congressman). His rivalcandidate, Ramon Deloria, filed a quowarranto or disqualification case against himon the ground that he was not a Filipinocitizen. It was pointed out in particular, thatLacqui Chan did not elect Philippinecitizenship upon reaching the age of 21.Decide whether Mr. Lacqui Chan suffersfrom a isqualification or not. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:Lacqui Chan is a Filipino citizen and neednot elect Philippine citizenship. His father,Hap Chan, was a Spanish subject, wasresiding in the Philippines on April 11, 1899,and continued to reside in the Philippines. Inaccordance with Section 4 of the PhilippineBill of 1902, he was a Filipino citizen. Hence,

in accordance with Section 1(3} of the 1935Constitution, Lacqui Chan is a natural born


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Filipino citizen, since his father was aFilipino citizen.

Elected Official (1992)No. 16: Edwin Nicasio, born in thePhilippines of Filipino parents and raised inthe province of Nueva Ecija, ran forGovernor of his home province. He won andhe was sworn into office. It was recentlyrevealed, however, that Nicasio is anaturalized American citizen. a) Does he stillpossess Philippine citizenship? b) If thesecond-placer in the gubernatorial electionsfiles a quo warranto suit against Nicasio andhe is found to be disqualified from office, canthe second-placer be sworn into office asgovernor? c) If, instead, Nicasio had beenborn (of the same set of parents) in the

United States and he thereby acquiredAmerican citizenship by birth, would youranswer be different?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:a) No, Nicasio no longer possessesPhilippine citizenship. As held in Frivaldo vs.COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245, by becoming anaturalized American citizen, Nicasiolost his Philippine citizenship. Under Section1(1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63,Philippine citizenship is lost by naturalization

in a foreign country,b) 2nd placer cant be sworn to office...c) If Nicasio was born in the United States,he would still be a citizen of the Philippines,since his parents are Filipinos. UnderSection 1(2), those whose fathers ormothers are citizens of the Philippines arecitizens of the Philippines. Nicasio wouldpossess dual citizenship, since underAmerican Law persons born in the UnitedStates are American citizens. As held inAznor vs. COMELEC. 185 SCRA 703, a

person who possesses both Philippine andAmerican citizenship is still a Filipino anddoes not lose his Philippine citizenshipunless he renounces it.

Electing Philippine Citizenship (Q8-2006)1. Atty. Emily Go, a legitimate daughter of aChinese father and a Filipino mother, wasborn in 1945. At 21, she elected Philippinecitizenship and studied law. She passed thebar examinations and engaged in privatepractice for many years. The Judicial andBar Council nominated her as a candidate

for the position of Associate Justice of theSupreme Court. But her nomination is being

contested by Atty. Juris Castillo, also anaspirant to the position. She claims that Atty.Emily Go is not a natural-born citizen,hence, not qualified to be appointed to theSupreme Court. Is this contention correct?(5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:The contention is not correct. Under ArticleIV, Section 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution, it isprovided that those born before January 17,1973 of Filipino mothers, who electPhilippine Citizenship upon reaching the ageof majority are Filipino citizens. Atty. EmilyGo was born of a Filipino mother in 1945and elected citizenship upon reaching theage of 21. She is a natural born Filipinocitizen as provided by Article IV, Section 2

of the Constitution "x x x those who electPhilippine citizenship in accordance withparagraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall bedeemed natural-born citizens." Hence she isqualified to be appointed to the SupremeCourt

Commission on Appointments (2002)No III - Suppose there are 202 members inthe House of Representatives. Of thisnumber, 185 belong to the Progressive

Party of the Philippines or PPP, while 17belong to the Citizens Party or CP. Howwould you answer the following questionsregarding the representation of the House inthe Commission on Appointments?A. A How many seats would the PPP beentitled to have in the Commission onAppointments? Explain your answer fully.(5%)B. Suppose 15 of the CP representatives,while maintaining their party affiliation,entered into a political alliance with the PPPin order to form the "Rainbow Coalition'' inthe House. What effect, if any, would thishave on the right of the CP to have a seat orseats in the Commission on Appointments?Explain your answer fully. (5%)SUGGESTED ANSWER:A. The 185 members of the ProgressiveParty of the Philippines represent 91.58 percent of the 202 members of the House ofRepresentatives. In accordance with ArticleVI, Section 18 of the Constitution, it isentitled to have ten of the twelveseats in the Commission on Appointments.


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Although the 185 members of ProgressiveParty of the Philippines represent 10.98seats in the Commission on Appointments,under the ruling in Guingona v. Gonzales,214 SCRA 789 (1992), a fractionalmembership cannot be rounded off to fullmembership because it will result in over-representation of that political partyand under-representation of the otherpolitical parties.B. The political alliance formed by the 15members of the Citizens Party with theProgressive Party of the Philippines will notresult in the diminution of the number ofseats in the Commission on Appointments towhich the Citizens Party is entitled. As heldin Cunanan v. Tan, 5 SCRA 1 (1962), atemporary alliance between the members of

one political party and another political partydoes not authorize a change in themembership of the Commission onAppointments, Otherwise, the Commissionon Appointments will have to be reorganizedas often as votes shift from one side toanother in the House of Representatives.

Delegation of Powers (2002)No XVII. - Suppose that Congress passed alaw creating a Department of Human Habitatand authorizing the Department Secretary to

promulgate implementing rules andregulations. Suppose further that the lawdeclared that violation of the implementingrules and regulations so issued would bepunishable as a crime and authorized theDepartment Secretary to prescribe thepenalty for such violation. If the law definescertain acts as violations of the law andmakes them punishable, for example, withimprisonment of three (3) years or a fine inthe amount of P10,000.00, or both suchimprisonment and fine, in the discretion of

the court, can it be provided in theimplementing rules and regulationspromulgated by the Department Secretarythat their violation will also be subject to thesame penalties as those provided in the lawitself? Explain your answer fully. (5%)SUGGESTED ANSWER:The rules and regulations promulgated bythe Secretary of Human Habitat cannotprovide that the penalties for their violationwill be the same as the penalties for theviolation of the law. As held in United Statesv. Barrias, 11 Phil. 327 (1908), the fixing of

the penalty for criminal offenses involves theexercise of legislative power and cannot be

delegated. The law itself must prescribe thepenalty.

Delegation of Powers; (Q6-2005)(2) Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670(The Magna Carta for Public SchoolTeachers) reads: Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall willfully interfere with,restrain or coerce any teacher in theexercise of his rights guaranteed by this Actor who shall in any other manner commitany act to defeat any of the provisions ofthis Act shall, upon conviction, be punishedby a fine of not less than one hundred pesosnor more than one thousand pesos, or byimprisonment, in the discretion of the court.Is the proviso granting the court the authorityto impose a penalty or imprisonment in its

discretion constitutional? Explain briefly.(4%)SUGGESTED ANSWER:The proviso is unconstitutional. Section 32of R.A. No. 4670 provides for anndeterminable period of imprisonment, witheither a minimum nor a maximum durationhaving been set by the legislative authority.The courts are thus given wide latitude ofdiscretion to fix the term of imprisonment,without even the benefit of any sufficientstandard, such that the duration thereof

may range, in the words of respondentjudge, from one minute to the life span of theaccused. This cannot be allowed. It vests inthe courts a power and a duty essentiallylegislative in nature and which, as applied tothis case, does violence to the rules onseparation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. (Peoplev. Judge Dacuycuy, G.R. No. L-45127, May5, 1989)

Pardoning Power; Pardon, Conditional(1997)No. 16; A while serving imprisonment forestafa. upon recommendation of the Boardof Pardons and Parole, was granted pardonby the President on condition that he shouldnot again violate any penal law of the land.Later, the Board of Pardons and Parolerecommended to the President thecancellation of the pardon granted himbecause A had been charged with estafa on20 counts and was convicted of the offensecharged although he took an appeal

therefrom which was still pending.


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As recommended, the President canceledthe pardon he had granted to A. A was thusarrested and imprisoned to serve thebalance of his sentence in the first case. Aclaimed in his petition for habeas corpusfiled in court that his detention was illegalbecause he had not yet been convictedby final judgment and was not given achance to be heard before he wasrecommitted to prison. Is A's argumentvalid?SUGGESTED ANSWER:The argument of A is not valid. As held inTorres vs. Gonzales. 152 SCRA 272 ajudicial pronouncement that a convict whowas granted a pardon subject to thecondition that he should not again violateany penal law is not necessary before he

can be declared to have violated thecondition of his pardon. Moreover, a hearingis not necessary before A can berecommitted to prison. By accepting theconditional pardon, A, agreed that thedetermination by the President that heviolated the condition of his pardon shallbe conclusive upon him and an order for hisarrest should at once issue.

President; Participation; LegislativeProcess

(1996)No. 7: Can the President take active part inthe legislative process? Explain.SUGGESTED ANSWER:Yes, The President can take active part inthe legislative process to the extent allowedby the Constitution. He can addressCongress at any time to propose theenactment of certain laws.He recommends the general appropriationsbill. He can call a special session ofCongress at any time. He can certify to the

necessity of the immediate enactment of abill to meet a public calamity or emergency.He can veto a bill.

Presidential Immunity from Suit (1997)No. 13: Upon complaint of the incumbentPresident of the Republic, "A" was chargedwith libel before the Regional Trial Court. "A"moved to dismiss the information on theground that the Court had no jurisdictionover the offense charged because thePresident, being immune from suit, shouldalso be disqualified from filing a case

against "A" in court. Resolve the motion.SUGGESTED ANSWER:

The motion should be denied according toSoliven us. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, theimmunity of the President from suit ispersonal to the President. It may be invokedby the President only and not by any otherperson.

Prohibition Against Multiple Positions &Additional Compensation (2002)No VI. M is the Secretary of the Departmentof Finance. He is also an ex-officio memberof the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentralng Pilipinas from which he receives anadditional compensation for every Boardmeeting attended. N, a taxpayer, filed a suitin court to declare Secretary M'smembership in the Monetary Boardand his receipt of additional compensation

illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Ninvoked Article VII, Section 13 of theConstitution which provides that thePresident, Vice-President, the Members ofthe Cabinet, and their deputies or assistantsshall not, unless otherwise provided inthe Constitution, hold any other office oremployment during their tenure. N also citedArticle IX-B, Section 8 of the Constitution,which provides that no elective or appointivepublic officer or employee shall receiveadditional, double, or indirect compensation,

unless specifically authorized by law. If youwere the judge, how would you decide thefollowing:a) the issue regarding the holding of multiplepositions? (3%) b) the issue on the paymentof additional or double compensation?(2%)Explain your answers fully.SUGGESTED ANSWER:(a) If I were the judge, I would uphold thevalidity of the designation of Secretary M asex officio member of the Monetary Board, Asstated in Liberties Union v. Executive

Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991), theprohibition against the holding ofmultiple positions by Cabinet Members inArticle VII, Section 13 of the Constitutiondoes not apply to positions occupied in anex officio capacity as provided by law and asrequired by the primary functions of theiroffice.(b) If I were the Judge, I would rule thatSecretary M cannot receive any additionalcompensation. As stated in Civil LibertiesUnion v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA317 (1991), a Cabinet Member holding an

ex-officio position has no right to receiveadditional compensation, for his services in


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that position are already paid for by thecompensation attached to his principaloffice.

2nd Placer Rule (1990)No. 7: A filed a protest with the HouseElectoral Tribunal questioning the election ofB as Member of the House ofRepresentatives in the 1987 nationalelections on the ground that B is not aresident of the district the latter isrepresenting. While the case was pending. Baccepted an ad-interim appointment asSecretary of the Department of Justice.(1) May A continue with his election protestin order to determine the real winner in thesaid elections? State your reason.

(2) Can A, who got the second highestnumber of votes in the elections, ask that hebe proclaimed elected in place of B? Explainyour answer.SUGGESTED ANSWER:(1) No, A may not continue with his protest.....(2) No, A cannot ask that he be proclaimedelected in place of B. The votes cast for Bwere not invalid votes. Hence, A garneredonly the second highest number of votes.Only the candidate who obtained the

majority or plurality of the votes is entitled tobe proclaimed elected. On this ground, itwas held in Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA1, that the fact that the candidate whoobtained the highest number of votes is noteligible does not entitle the candidate whoobtained the second highest number ofvotes to be proclaimed the winner.

2nd Placer Rule; in Quo Warranto Cases(1992)No. 16: Edwin Nicasio, born in thePhilippines of Filipino parents and raised inthe province of Nueva Ecija, ran forGovernor of his home province. He won andhe was sworn into office. It was recentlyrevealed, however, that Nicasio is anaturalized American citizen. a) Does he stillpossess Philippine citizenship?b) If the second-placer in the gubematorialelections files a quo warranto suit againstNicasio and he is found to be disqualifiedfrom office, can the second-placer be sworninto office as governor?c) If, instead, Nicasio had been born (of the

same set of parents) in the United Statesand he thereby acquired American

citizenship by birth, would your answer bedifferent?SUGGESTED ANSWER:a) No, Nicasio no longer possessesPhilippine citizenship. ...b) In accordance with the ruling in Abella us.COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253, the secondplacer cannot be sworn to office, becausehe lost the election. To be entitled to theoffice, he must have garnered the majorityor plurality of the votes.c) Yes because he will be a dual citizen ...

2nd Placer Rule; Rule of Succession(1996)No. 13: 1) A and B were the only candidatesfor mayor of Bigaa, Bulacan in the May 1995local elections. A obtained 10,000 votes as

against 3,000 votes for B. In the sameelections, X got the highest number of votesamong the candidates for the SangguniangBayan of the same town. A died the daybefore his proclamation.a) Who should the Board of Canvassersproclaim as elected mayor, A, B or X?Explain,b) Who is entitled to discharge the functionsof the office of the mayor, B or X? Explain.SUGGESTED ANSWER:In accordance with Benito vs. COMELEC,

235 SCRA 436, it is A who should beproclaimed as winner, because he was theone who obtained the highest number ofvotes for the position of mayor, but anotation should be made that he died for thepurpose of applying the rule on successionto office. B cannot be proclaimed, becausethe death of the candidate who obtainedthe highest number of votes does not entitlethe candidate who obtained the next highestnumber of votes to be proclaimed thewinner, since he was not the choice of the

electorate. X is not entitled to be proclaimedelected as mayor, because he ran for theSangguniang Bayan. Neither B nor X isentitled to discharge the functions of theoffice of mayor. B is not entitled to dischargethe office of mayor, since he was defeated inthe election. X is not entitled to dischargethe office of mayor. Under Section 44 ofthe Local Government Code, it is the vicemayor who should succeed in case ofpermanent vacancy in the office of themayor. It is only when the position of thevice mayor is also vacant that the member

of the Sangguniang Bayan who obtained the


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highest number of votes will succeed to theoffice of mayor.

Vacancy; Rule of Succession (1995)No. 7: The Vice Mayor of a municipality filedhis certificate of candidacy for the sameoffice in the last elections. The MunicipalMayor was also running for re-election. Bothwere official candidates of the same politicalparty. After the last day for the filing ofcertificates of candidacy, the Mayor died.Under these facts -a) Can the Vice Mayor succeed to the officeof Mayor pursuant to the provisions of theLocal Government Code? Explain.b) Assuming that the Vice Mayor succeedsto the position of Mayor after the incumbent

died, which position is now different from theone for which he has filed his certificate ofcandidacy, can he still continue to run asVice Mayor? Explain.c) Is there any legal impediment to the ViceMayor to replace the re-electionist Mayorwho died? Explain,SUGGESTED ANSWER: Yes,the vice mayor can succeed to the office ofmayor. Under Section 44 of the LocalGovernment Code, he stands next in line tothe office of mayor in case of a permanent

vacancy in it. His filing of a Certificate ofCandidacy for Mayor did not automaticallyresult to his being considered resigned (Sec.67, Omnibus Election Code).

Yes, the vice mayor can continue to run asvice mayor. At the time that he filed hiscertificate of candidacy, the vice mayor ranfor the same office he was holding. Indetermining whether a candidate is runningfor a position other than the one he isholding in a permanent capacity andshould be considered resigned, it is theoffice he was holding at the time he filed hiscertificate of candidacy should beconsidered. There is no legal impediment tothe vice mayor running as mayor toreplace the vice mayor who died underSection 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, ifa candidate dies after the last day for filingcertificates of candidacy, he may bereplaced by a person belonging to hispolitical party. However, it is required that heshould first withdraw his Certificate ofCandidacy for Vice-Mayor and file a new

Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor.

Vacancy; SB; Rule on Succession (2002)No XV. A vacancy occurred in thesangguniang bayan of a municipality whenX, a member, died. X did not belong to anypolitical party. To fill up the vacancy, theprovincial governor appointed A upon therecommendation of the sangguniangpanlalawigan. On the other hand, for thesame vacancy, the municipal mayorappointed B upon the recommendation ofthe sangguniang bayan. Which of theseappointments is valid? (5%)SUGGESTED ANSWER:As held in Farinas v. Barba, 256 SCRA 396(1996), neither of the appointments is valid.Under Section 45 of the Local GovernmentCode, in case of a permanent vacancy in theSangguniang Bayan created by the

cessation in office of a member who doesnot belong to any political party, theGovernor shall appoint a qualified personrecommended by the Sangguniang Bayan.Since A was not recommended by theSangguniang Bayan, his appointment by theGovernor is not valid. Since B was notappointed by the Governor but by theMunicipal Mayor, his appointment isalso not valid.

Franchise; prior approval of LGU

necessary(1988)No. 9: Macabebe, Pampanga has severalbarrios along the Pampanga river. Toservice the needs of their residents themunicipality has been operating a ferryservice at the same river, for a number ofyears already. Sometime in 1987, themunicipality was served a copy of an orderfrom the Land Tansportation Franchisingand Regulatory Board (LTFRB), granting acertificate of public convenience to Mr.Ricardo Macapinlac, a resident ofMacabebe, to operate ferry service acrossthe same river and between the samebarrios being serviced presently by themunicipality's ferry boats. A check of therecords of the application of Macapinlacshows that the application was filed somemonths before, set for hearing, and noticesof such hearing were published in twonewspapers of general circulation in thetown of Macabebe, and in the province ofPampanga. The municipality had neverbeen directly served a copy of that notice of

hearing nor had the Sangguniang Bayanbeen requested by Macapinlac for any


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operate. The municipality immediately filed amotion for reconsideration with the LTFRBwhich was denied. It the went to theSupreme Court on a petition for certiorari tonullify the order granting a certificateof public convenience to Macapinlac on twogrounds:(1) Denial of due process to the municipality;and(2) For failure of Macapinlac to secureapproval ofthe Sangguniang Bayan for him to operate aferry service in Macabebe,Resolve the two points in the petition withreasons.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:The petition for certiorari should be granted,

1. As a party directly affected by theoperation of the ferry service, theMunicipality of Macabebe, Pampanga wasentitled to be directly notified by the LTFRB....2. It has been held that where a ferryoperation lies entirely within the municipality,the prior approval of the Municipalgovernment is necessary. Once approved,the operator must then apply with theLTFRB for a certificate of publicconvenience and shall be subject to

LTFRB supervision, (Municipality ofEchague v. Abellera, supra).

Law fixing the terms of local electiveofficials(Q4-2006)State whether or not the law isconstitutional.Explain briefly.3. A law fixing the terms of local electiveofficials, other than barangay officials, to 6years. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:The law is invalid. Under Article X, Section 8of the 1987 Constitution, "the term of officeof elective local officials, except barangayofficials, which shall be determined by law,shall be three years and no such officialshall serve for more than three consecutiveterms." The law clearly goes against theaforesaid constitutional requirement of threeyear terms for local officials except forbarangay officials.

Ordinance; Use & Lease of Properties;

PublicUse (1997)

No. 9: Due to over-crowding in the publicmarket in Paco, Manila, the City Councilpassed an ordinance allowing the lease tovendors of parts of the streets where thepublic market is located, provided that thelessees pay to the city government a fee ofP50 per square meter of the area occupiedby the lessees. The residents in the areacomplained to the Mayor that the leaseof the public streets would cause serioustraffic problems to them. The Mayorcancelled the lease and ordered the removalof the stalls constructed on the streets. Wasthe act of the Mayor legal?SUGGESTED ANSWER:The cancellation of the lease and theremoval of the stalls are valid. As held inMacasiano vs. Diokno, 212 SCRA 464, the

lease of public streets is void, since they arereserved for public use and are outside thecommerce of man.

Ordinance; Validity; Closure or Lease ofProperties for Public Use (2003)No XI - An aggrieved resident of the City ofManila filed mandamus proceedings againstthe city mayor and the city engineer tocompel these officials to remove the marketstalls from certain city streets which theyhad designated as flea markets. Portions of

the said city streets were leased or licensedby the respondent officials to marketstallholders by virtue of a city ordinance.Decide the dispute.FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:The petition should be granted. Inaccordance with Macasiano v. Diokno. 212SCRA 464 [1992], since public streets areproperties for public use and are outside thecommerce of man, the City Mayor and theCity Engineer cannot lease or licenseportions of the city streets to market

stallholders.SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:The petition should be denied. UnderSection 21(d)of the Local GovernmentCode, a city may by ordinance temporarilyclose a street so that a flea market may beestablished.

Discipline; Effect of Pardon Granted inFavorof Public Officers (1999)No IV - C. A City Assistant Treasurer was

convicted of Estafa through falsification ofpublic document. While serving sentence,


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he was granted absolute pardon by thePresident.1 Assuming that the position of AssistantCity Treasurer has remained vacant, wouldhe be entitled to a reinstatement without theneed of a new appointment? Explain. (2%)2 If later the same position becomes vacant,could he reapply and be reappointed?Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:C. 1.) As held in Monsanto v. Factoran, 170SCRA 190, pardon merely frees theindividual from all the penalties and legaldisabilities imposed upon him because of hisconviction. It does not restore him to thepublic office relinquished by reason of theconviction.

FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:2.) The Assistant City Treasurer can reapplyand be appointed to the position, since thepardon removed the disqualification to holdpublic office.SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:2.) The Assistant City Treasurer cannotreapply and be appointed to the position,Under Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code,a pardon does not restore the right to holdpublic office unless such right be expresslyrestored by the pardon;

Discipline; Preventive Suspension &Appeal; entitlement to salary pendente(2001)No XV - Alfonso Beit, a supply officer in theDepartment of Science and Technology(DOST), was charged administratively.Pending investigation, he was preventivelysuspended for 90 days. The DOSTSecretary found him guilty and meted himthe penalty of removal from office.He appealed to the Civil Service

Commission (CSC). In the meantime, thedecision was executed pending appeal. TheCSC rendered a decision which modified theappealed decision by imposing only apenalty of reprimand, and whichdecision became final.a) Can Alfonso Belt claim salary for theperiod that his case was pendinginvestigation? Why? (3%)b) Can he claim salary for the period that hiscase was pending appeal? Why? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER;

a) Alfonso Beit cannot claim any salary forthe period of his preventive suspension

during the pendency of the investigation. Asheld in Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, 306SCRA 287 (1997), under Section 52 of theCivil Service Law, the provision for paymentof salaries during the period of preventivesuspension during the pendency of theinvestigation has been deleted. Thepreventive suspension was not a penalty. Itsimposition was lawful, since it wasauthorized by law.b) If the penalty was modified becauseAlfonso Beit was exonerated of the chargethat was the basis for the decision orderinghis dismissal, he is entitled to back wages,otherwise, this would be tantamount topunishing him after exoneration from thecharge which caused his dismissal.[Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, 3O6 SCRA 287

(1997)]. If he was reprimanded for the samecharge which was the basis of the decisionordering his dismissal, Alfonso Belt is notentitled to back wages, because he wasfound guilty, and the penalty was merelycommuted. (Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals,305 SCRA 303 (1998)].

Discipline; Preventive Suspension (1990)No. 6: In 1986, F, then the officer-in-chargeof Botolan, Zambales, was accused ofhaving violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.Before he could be arrainged, he waselected Governor of Zambales, After hisarraignment, he was put under preventivesuspension by the Sandiganbayan "for theduration of the trial".(1) Can F successfully challenge the legalityof his preventive suspension on the groundthat the criminal case against him involvedacts committed during his term as officer-in-charge and not during his term asGovernor?

(2) Can F validly object to the aforestatedduration of his suspension?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:(1) No, F cannot successfully challenge thelegality of his preventive suspension on theground that the criminal case against himinvolve acts committed during his term asOIC and not during his term as governorbecause suspension from office underRepublic Act 3019 refers to any office thatthe respondent is presently holding and notnecessarily to the one which he hold when

he committed the crime with which he is


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charged. This was the ruling in Deloso v.Sandiganbayan 173 SCRA 409.(2) Yes, F can validly object to the durationof the suspension. In Deloso u.Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409, it was heldthat the imposition of preventive suspensionfor an indefinite period of time isunreasonable and violates the right of theaccused to due process. The people whoelected the governor to office would bedeprived of his services for an indefiniteperiod, and his right to hold office would benullified. Moreover, since under Section 42of the Civil Service Decree the duration ofpreventive suspension should be limited toninety (90) days, equal protection demandsthat the duration of preventive suspensionunder the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices

Act he also limited to ninety (90) days.

Acquisition of Lands; Citizenship issue(1994)No. 17: A and B leased their residential landconsisting of one thousand (1,000) squaremeters to Peter Co, a Chinese citizen, for aperiod of fifty (50) years. In 1992, before theterm of the lease expired. Co asked A and Bto convey the land to him as the contractgave him the option to purchase said land if

he became a naturalized Filipino citizen. Cotook his oath as a Filipino citizen in 1991.1) Was the contract of lease for a period offifty (50) years valid considering that thelessee was an alien?2) What is the effect of the naturalization ofPeter Co as a Filipino citizen on the validityof the option to purchase given him?ANSWER:1) As held in Philippine Banking Corporationvs. Lui She. 21 SCRA 52, the lease of aparcel of land with an option to buy to analien is a virtual transfer of ownership to thealien and falls within the scope of theprohibition in Section 7, Article XII of theConstitution against the acquisition ofprivate lands by aliens.2) Because of the naturalization of Peter Coas a Filipino citizen, he can exercise theoption to purchase the land. In accordancewith the ruling in Yap vs. Grageda, 121SCRA 244. since he is qualified to own land,the policy to preserve lands for Filipinos willbe achieved.

Acquisition of Lands; Citizenship issue(1995)

No 11; In June 1978 spouses Joel andMichelle purchased a parcel of land. Lot No.143, Cadastral Survey No. 38-D, with anarea of 600 square meters for theirresidence in Cainta, Rizal, from Cecille whoby herself and her predecessor-in-interesthad been in open, public, peaceful,continuous and exclusive possession ofthe property under a bona fide claim ofownership long before 12 June 1945. At thetime of purchase, the spouses Joel andMichelle were then natural born Filipinocitizens. In February 1987 the spouses filedan application for registration of their titlebefore the proper court. This time howeverJoel and Michelle were no longer Filipinocitizens. The government opposed theirapplication for registration alleging that they

have not acquired proprietary rights over thesubject lot because of their subsequentacquisition of Canadian citizenship, and thatunregistered lands are presumed to bepublic lands under the principle that lands ofwhatever classification belong to the Stateunder the Regalian doctrine, hence, they stillpertain to the State. How will you resolve theissues raised by the applicants and theoppositor? Discuss fully.

ANSWER:

The argument of the government thatunregistered lands are presumed to bepublic lands is utterly unmeritorious. As heldin Republic vs. Court of Appeals. 235 SCRA562, in accordance with Section 48 of thePublic Land Act, since the predecessors-in-interest of Joel and Michelle had been inopen, public, peaceful, continuous andexclusive possession of the land under abona fide claim of ownership long beforeJune 12. 1945, their predecessors- in-interest had acquired the land, because they

were conclusively presumed to haveperformed all conditions essential to agovernment grant. The land ceased to be apart of the public domain. It is alienable anddisposable land. Joel and Michelle acquiredthe rights of their predecessors-in-interest byvirtue of the sale to them. Joel and Michellecan have the land registered in their names.They were natural-born Filipino citizens atthe time of their acquisition of the land.In any event they were Filipino citizens atthe time of their acquisition of the land. Theirbecoming Canadian citizens subsequently is

immaterial. Article XII, Sec. 8 of the 1987


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Constitution presupposes that theypurchased the land after they lost Filipinocitizenship. It does not apply in this case atall.

National Economy & Patrimony;ConstitutionalProhibition (2004) (8-b) B. EAP is agovernment corporation created for thepurpose of reclaiming lands includingforeshore and submerged areas, aswell as to develop, improve, acquire, leaseand sell any and all kinds of lands. A lawwas passed transferring title to EAP of landsalready reclaimed in the foreshore andoffshore areas of MM Bay, particularly theso-called Liberty Islands, as alienable

and disposable lands of the public domain.Titles were duly issued in EAP's name.Subsequently, EAP entered into a jointventure agreement (JVA) with ARI, a privateforeign corporation, to develop LibertyIslands. Additionally, the JVA provided forthe reclamation of 250 hectares ofsubmerged land in the area surroundingLiberty Islands. EAP agreed to selland transfer to ARI a portion of LibertyIslands and a portion of the area to bereclaimed as the consideration for ARI's role

and participation in the joint venture, uponapproval by the Office of the President. Isthere any constitutional obstacle to the saleand transfer by EAP to ARI of both portionsas provided for in the JVA? (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:B. ARI cannot acquire a portion of LibertyIslands because, although EAP has title toLiberty Islands and thus such lands arealienable and disposable land, they cannotbe sold, only leased, to private corporations.The portion of the area to be reclaimedcannot be sold and transferred to ARIbecause the seabed is inalienable land ofthe public domain. (Section 3, Article XII ofthe 1987 Constitution; Chavez v. PublicEstates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 [2002]).

National Patrimony; definition (1999)No XII - What is meant by NationalPatrimony?Explain the concept of National Patrimony?(2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

According to Manila Prince Hotel v.Government Service Insurance System, 267SCRA 408, the national patrimony refers notonly to our natural resources but also to ourcultural heritage.Nationalized Activities (1994)1) Give a business activity the equity ofwhich must be owned by Filipino citizens:a) at least 60%b) at least 70%c) 100%2) Give two cases in which aliens may beallowed to acquire equity in a businessactivity but cannot participate in themanagement thereof?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:1) a) At least sixty per cent (60%) of the

equity of the entities engaged in thefollowing business must be owned byFilipino citizens under the Constitution.1 Co-production, Joint venture, orproduction-sharing agreement with theState for the exploration, development,and utilization of natural resources(Section 2, Article XII)2 Operation of a public utility(Section 11, Article XII)3 Education (Section 4(2), ArticleXIV)

b) At least seventy percent (70%) of theequity of business entities engaged inadvertising must be owned by Filipinocitizens under the Constitution.(Section 11(2), Article XVI)

c) Mass media must be wholly owned byFilipino citizens under the Constitution(Section 11(1), Article XVI).

2) Under the Constitution, aliens may

acquire equity but cannot participate in themanagement of business entities engagedin the following activities:1) Public utilities (Section 11, ArticleXII)2) Education (Section 4(2) .Article XIV)3) Advertising (Section 11(2), ArticleXVI)

Ownership Requirement of Mass Media(1989)

No. 11: (1) A domestic corporation with 30%foreign equity proposes to publish a weekly


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magazine for general circulation in MetroManila which will feature the lifestyles of therich and the famous. May this be done? Citethe constitutional provision in point.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:(1) No, the corporation cannot publish aweekly magazine since it is engaged in theoperation of a mass media and is not whollyowned by Philippine citizens. Section 11(1),Article XVI of the 1987 Constitutionprovides; "The ownership and managementof mass media shall be limited to citizens ofthe Philippines, or to corporations,cooperatives or associations, wholly-ownedand managed by such citizens."

Chinese citizens; engaging in retail trade

(Q4-2006)State whether or not the following laws areconstitutional. Explain briefly.4. A law prohibiting Chinese citizens fromengaging in retail trade. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:The law is invalid as it singles out anddeprives Chinese citizens from engaging inretail trade. In Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R.No. L-7995, May 31,1957, the court heldthat the Treaty of Amity between the

Republic of the Philippines and the Republicof China guarantees equality of treatment tothe Chinese nationals "upon the same termsas the nationals of any other country." Thus,the court ruled therein that the nationals ofChina are not discriminated against becausenationals of all other countries, except thoseof the United States, who are grantedspecial rights by the Constitution, are allprohibited from engaging in the retail trade.In the case at bar, the law discriminates onlyagainst Chinese citizens and thus violates

the equal protection clause.

Exploration, development, and utilizationof natural resources (Q4-2006)State whether or not the law isconstitutional.Explain briefly.5. A law creating a state corporation toexploit, develop, and utilize compressednatural gas. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:The law is valid as under Article XII, Section

2 of the 1987 Constitution, the exploration,development, and utilization of natural

resources shall be under the full control andsupervision of the State. It is also providedthat the State may directly undertake suchactivities or it may enter into co-production,joint venture or sharing agreements withFilipino citizens or corporations orassociations, at least 60% Filipino-owned.Furthermore, the President may enter intoagreements with foreign-owned corporationsinvolving technical or financial assistance forlarge-scale exploration, development, andutilization of minerals, petroleum and othermineral oils, according to terms andconditions provided by law. A statecorporation, unlike a private corporation,may be created by special law and placedunder the control of the President, subject tosuch conditions as the creating statute may

provide.

Education; Flag Salute (1987)No. XIII: The requirement that schoolchildren participate in flag ceremonies hasbeen the subject of controversy. On the onehand it is the view that the requirementviolates religious freedom; on the other isthe Supreme Court decision that because ofrelevant provisions of the 1935 Constitutionthe flag salute may be validly required.

Which of the above finds support on 1987Constitution, Cite at least two provisions toprove your point.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:The view that flag salute may validly berequired finds support in the followingprovisions of the 1987 Constitution:(a) Art, XIV, Sec. 3(2), which provides thatall educational institutions shall inculcate instudents, among other civil virtues,patriotism and nationalism and teach themthe rights and duties of citizenship. Thusconsiderably broadening the aims of schoolsis originally stated in the 1935 Constitutionwhich the Supreme Court relied uponfor its decision in Gerona v. Secretary ofEducation, 106 Phil. 2 (1959), upholding theflag salute in the Philippines. The 1935Constitution simply mentioned thedevelopment of civic conscience and theteaching of the duties of citizenship.(b) Art II, Sec, 13 mandates the State to"inculcate in the youth patriotism andnationalism," while Sec. 17 requires the

State to give priority to education, among


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other concerns, "to foster patriotism andnationalism."

Education; Right to Choose Profession(2000)No IV. Undaunted by his three failures in theNational Medical Admission Test (NMAT),Cruz applied to take it again but he wasrefused because of an order of theDepartment of Education, Culture andSports (DECS) disallowing flunkers fromtaking the test a fourth time. Cruz filed suitassailing this rule raising the constitutionalgrounds of accessible quality education,academic freedom and equal protection.The government opposes this, upholding theconstitutionality of the rule on the ground ofexercise of police power. Decide the case

discussing the grounds raised. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:As held in Department of Education, Cultureand Sports v. San Diego,180 SCRA 533(1989), the rule is a valid exercise of policepower to ensure that those admitted to themedical profession are qualified. Thearguments of Cruz are not meritorious. Theright to quality education and academicfreedom are not absolute. Under Section5(3), Article XIV of the Constitution, the

right to choose a profession is subject to fair,reasonable and equitable admission andacademic requirements. The rule does notviolate equal protection. There is asubstantial distinction between medicalstudents and other students. Unlike otherprofessions, the medical professiondirectly affects the lives of the people.

ARTICLE XVIII Transitory

Provisions Transitory Provisions;ForeignMilitary Bases (1996)No. 4 - 1) Under the executive agreemententered into between the Philippines andthe other members of the ASEAN, the othermembers will each send a battalion-size unitof their respective armed forces to conduct acombined military exercise in the Subic BayArea. A group of concerned citizens soughtto enjoin the entry of foreign troops asviolative of the 1987 Constitution

that prohibited the stationing of foreigntroops and the use by them, of local

facilities. As the Judge, decide the case.Explain.SUGGESTED ANSWER:1) As a judge, I shall dismiss the case. WhatSection 25, Article XVII of the Constitutionprohibits in the absence of a treaty is thestationing of troops and facilities of foreigncountries in the Philippines. It does notinclude the temporary presence in thePhilippines of foreign troops for the purposeof a combined military exercise. Besides, theholding of the combined military exercise isconnected with defense, which is asovereign function. In accordance with theruling in Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1, thefiling of an action interfering with thedefense of the State amounts to a suitagainst the State without its consent.

Transitory Provisions; Foreign MilitaryBases(1988)No. 22: The Secretary of Justice hadrecently ruled that the President maynegotiate for a modification or extension ofmilitary bases agreement with theUnited States regardless of the "no nukes"provisions in the 1987 Constitution. ThePresident forthwith announced that she findsthe same opinion "acceptable" and will

adopt it. The Senators on the other hand,led by the Senate President, areskeptical, and had even warned that notreaty or international agreement may gointo effect without the concurrence of two-thirds of all members of the Senate.A former senator had said, "it is completelywrong, if not erroneous," and "is anamendment of the Constitution bymisinterpretation." Some membersof the Lower House agree with SecretaryOrdonez, while others lament the latter's

opinion as "questionable, unfortunate, andwithout any basis at all."Do you or do you not agree with theaforementioned ruling of the Department ofJustice? Why?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:No. The Constitution provides that if foreignmilitary bases, troops or facilities are to beallowed after the expiration of the presentPhilippine-American Military BasesAgreement in 1991, it must be "under atreaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,

when the Congress so requires, ratified by amajority of the votes cast by


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the people in a national referendum." (Art.XVIII, sec. 25) A mere agreement, therefore,not a treaty, without the concurrence of atleast 2/3 of all the members of the Senatewill not be valid (Art. VII, sec. 21, Art. XVIII,sec. 4). With respect to the provisionallowing nuclear weapons within the bases,the Constitution appears to ban suchweapons from the Philippine territory. Itdeclares as a state policy that "thePhilippines, consistent with the nationalinterest, adopts and pursues a policy offreedom from nuclear weapons in itsterritory." (Art, II, sec. 8) However, thedeliberations of the ConstitutionalCommission would seem to indicate that thisprovision of the Constitution is "notsomething absolute nor 100 percent without

exception." It may therefore be thatcircumstances may justify a provision onnuclear weapons.

Diplomatic Immunity; Ambassadors(1990)No. 5: D, the Ambassador of the Kingdom ofNepal to the Philippines, leased a house inBaguio City as his personal vacation home.On account of military disturbance in Nepal,

D did not receive his salary and allowancesfrom his government and so he failed to payhis rentals for more than one year. E, thelessor, filed an action for recovery of hisproperty with the Regional Trial Court ofBaguio City.(1) Can the action against D prosper?(2) Can E ask for the attachment of thefurniture and other personal properties of Dafter getting hold of evidence that D is aboutto leave the country?(3} Can E ask for the court to stop D'sdeparture from the Philippines?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:(1) Yes, the action can prosper. Article 31 ofthe Vienna Convention on DiplomaticRelations provides:"1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunityfrom the criminal jurisdiction of the receivingState. He shall also enjoy immunity from itscivil and administrative jurisdiction, except inthe case of:(a) A real action relating to privateimmovable property situated in the territory

of the receiving State, unless he holds it on

behalf of the sending State the purposes ofthe mission;"The action against the Ambassador is a realaction involving private immovable propertysituated within the territory of the Philippinesas the receiving state. The action falls withinthe exception to the grant of immunity fromthe civil and administrative jurisdiction of thePhilippines.

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER;No, the action will not prosper. Although theaction is a real action relating to privateimmovable property within the territory of thePhilippines, nonetheless, the vacation housemay be considered property held by theAmbassador In behalf of his state (the

Kingdom of Nepal) for the purposes of themission and, therefore, such is beyond thecivil and administrative jurisdiction of thePhilippines, including its courts,

SUGGESTED ANSWER:(2) No, E cannot ask for the attachment ofthe personal properties of the Ambassador.Arts. 30 and 31 of the Vienna Convention onDiplomatic Relations provides that thepapers, correspondence and the property ofdiplomat agents shall be inviolable.

Therefore, a writ of attachment cannotbe issued against his furniture and anypersonal properties. Moreover, on theassumption that the Kingdom of Nepalgrants similar protection to Philippinediplomatic agents. Section 4 of RepublicAct No. 75 provides that any writ or processissued by any court in the Philippines for theattachment of the goods or chattels of theambassador of a foreign State to thePhilippines shall be void.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:(3) No, E cannot ask the court to stop thedeparture of the Ambassador of theKingdom of Nepal from the Philippines.Article 29 of the Vienna Convention onDiplomatic Relations provides: "The personof a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. Heshall not be liable to any form ofarrest or detention."

Diplomatic Immunity; Coverage (Q3-2005)(2) Adams and Baker are American citizens

residing in the Philippines. Adamsbefriended Baker and became a frequent


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visitor at his house. One day, Adams arrivedwith 30 members of the Philippine NationalPolice, armed with a Search Warrantauthorizing the search of Baker's houseand its premises for dangerous drugs beingtrafficked to the United States of America.The search purportedly yielded positiveresults, and Baker was charged withViolation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.Adams was the prosecution's principalwitness. However, for failure to prove hisguilt beyond reasonable doubt, Baker wasacquitted. Baker then sued Adams fordamages for filing trumped-up chargesagainst him. Among the defenses raised byAdams is that he has diplomatic immunity,conformably with the Vienna Convention onDiplomatic Relations. He presented

Diplomatic Notes from the AmericanEmbassy stating that he is an agent of theUnited States Drug Enforcement Agencytasked with "conducting surveillanceoperations" on suspected drug dealers inthe Philippines believed to be the source ofprohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S. Itwas also stated that after having ascertainedthe target, Adams would then inform thePhilippine narcotic agents to make theactual arrest. (5%)a) As counsel of plaintiff Baker, argue

why his complaint should not be dismissedon the ground of defendant Adams'diplomatic immunity from suit.SUGGESTED ANSWER.

As counsel for Baker, I would argue thatAdams is not a diplomatic agent consideringthat he is not a head of mission nor is hepart of the diplomatic staff that is accordeddiplomatic rank. Thus, the suit should not bedismissed as Adams has no diplomaticimmunity under the 1961 Vienna Conventionon Diplomatic Relations.

b) As counsel of defendant Adams, arguefor the dismissal of the complaint.SUGGESTED ANSWER As counsel forAdams, I would argue that he worked for theUnited States Drug Enforcement Agencyandwas tasked to conduct surveillance ofsuspected drug activities within the countrywith the approval of the Philippinegovernment.Under the doctrine of State Immunity fromSuit, if the acts giving rise to a suit are thoseof

a foreign government done by its foreignagent, although not necessarily a diplomatic

personage, but acting in his official capacity,the complaint could be barred by theimmunity of the foreign sovereign from suitwithout its consent. Adams may not be adiplomatic agent but the Philippinegovernment has given its imprimatur, if notconsent, to the activities within Philippineterritory of Adams and thus he is entitled tothe defense of state immunity from suit.(Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396,February 11, 2003)

Extradition; Grounds (2002)No XVIII. John is a former President of theRepublic X, bent on regaining power whichhe lost to President Harry in an election.

Fully convinced that he was cheated, he setout to destabilize the government ofPresident Harry by means of a series ofprotest actions. His plan was to weaken thegovernment and, when the situation becameripe for a take-over, to assassinatePresident Harry. William, on the other hand,is a believer in human rights and a formerfollower of President Harry. Noting thesystematic acts of harassment committed bygovernment agents against farmersprotesting the seizure of their lands, laborers

complaining of low wages, and studentsseeking free tuition, William organizedgroups which held peaceful rallies in front ofthe Presidential Palace to express theirgrievances. On the eve of the assassinationattempt, John's men were caught bymembers of the Presidential Security Group.President Harry went on air threatening toprosecute plotters and dissidents ofhis administration. The next day, thegovernment charged John withassassination attempt and William withinciting to sedition. John fled to Republic A.William, who was in Republic B attending alecture on democracywas advised by hisfriends to stay in Republic B. Both RepublicA and Republic B have conventionalextradition treaties with Republic X.If Republic X requests the extradition ofJohn and William, can Republic A deny therequest? Why? State your reason fully. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:Republic A can refuse to extradite John,because his offense is a political offense.

John was plotting to take over thegovernment and the plan of John to


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assassinate President Harry was part ofsuch plan. However, if the extradition treatycontains an attentat clause, Republic A canextradite John, because under the attentatclause, the taking of the life or attemptagainst the life of a head of state or that ofthe members of his family does notconstitute a political offense and istherefore extraditable.

FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:Republic A may or can refuse the request ofextradition of William because he is not in itsterritory and thus it is not in the position todeliver him to Republic X.Even if William were in the territorialjurisdiction of Republic A, he may not beextradited because inciting to sedition, of

which he is charged, constitutes a politicaloffense. It is a standard provision ofextradition treaties, such as the onebetween Republic A and Republic X, thatpolitical offenses are not extraditable.

SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:Republic B can deny the request of RepublicX to extradite William, because his offensewas not a political offense. On the basis ofthe predominance or proportionality test hisacts were not directly connected to any

purely political offense.

Extradition; Retroactive Application (Q2-2005)(1) The Philippines and Australia enteredinto a Treaty of Extradition concurred in bythe Senate of the Philippines on September10, 1990. Both governments have notifiedeach other that the requirements for theentry into force of the Treaty have beencomplied with. It took effect in 1990.The Australian government is requesting the

Philippine government to extradite its citizen,Gibson, who has committed in his countrythe indictable offense of Obtaining Propertyby Deception in 1985. The said offense isamong those enumerated as extraditable inthe Treaty. For his defense, Gibson assertsthat the retroactive application of theextradition treaty amounts to an ex postfacto law. Rule on Gibson's contention. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER: Gibson isincorrect. In Wright v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No.113213, August 15,1994, it was held that

the retroactive application of the Treaty of

Extradition does not violate the prohibitionagainst ex post facto laws, because theTreaty is neither a piece of criminallegislation nor a criminal procedural statute.It merely provided for the extradition ofpersons wanted for offenses alreadycommitted at the time the treaty was ratified.

Intl Court of Justice; Parties; PleadingsandOral Argument (1994)No. 20: The sovereignty over certain islandsis disputed between State A and State B.These two states agreed to submit theirdisputes to the International Court of Justice[ICJ].

3) What language shall be used in thepleadings and oral argument?4) In case State A, the petitioner, falls toappear at the oral argument, can State B,the respondent, move for the dismissal ofthe petition?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:3) Under Article 39 of the Statutes of theInternational Court of Justice, the officiallanguages of the court are English andFrench. In the absence of an agreement,

each party may use the language it prefers.At the request of any party, the court mayauthorize a party to use a language otherthan English or French.4) Under Article 53 of the Statutes of theInternational Court of Justice, whenever oneof the parties does not appear before thecourt or fails to defend its case, the otherparty may ask the court to decide in favor ofits claim. However, the court must, beforedoing so, satisfy itself it has Jurisdiction andthat the claim is well founded in fact and law.

International Convention; Law of the Sea(2004)(2-b) En route to the tuna fishing grounds inthe Pacific Ocean, a vessel registered inCountry TW entered the Balintang Channelnorth of Babuyan Island and with specialhooks and nets dragged up red corals foundnear Batanes. By international conventioncertain corals are protected species, justbefore the vessel reached the high seas, theCoast Guard patrol intercepted the vesseland seized its cargo including tuna. The

master of the vessel and the owner of thecargo protested, claiming the rights of transit


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passage and innocent passage, and soughtrecovery of the cargo and the release of theship. Is the claim meritorious or not? Reasonbriefly. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER; The claim ofinnocent passage is not meritorious. Whilethe vessel has the right of innocent passage,it should not commit a violation of anyinternational convention. The vessel did notmerely navigate through the territorial sea, italso dragged red corals in violation of theinternational convention which protected thered corals. This is prejudicial to the goodorder of the Philippines. (Article 19(2) of theConvention on the Law of the Sea)

International Court of Justice (Q9-2006)

1 Where is the seat of the InternationalCourt of Justice? 11%) The seat of theInternational Court of Justice is at the Hagueor elsewhere, as it may decide, exceptduring the judicial vacations the dates andduration of which it shall fix (I.C.J. Statute,Art. 22).2 How many are its members? (1%) TheCourt is composed of fifteen members whomust be of high moral character andpossess the qualifications required in theirrespective countries for appointment to the

highest judicial office or are jurisconsults ofrecognized competence in international law(I.C.J. Statute, Art. 2).3 What is the term of their office? (1%)They are elected for a term of nine years,staggered at three-year intervals by dividingthe judges first elected into three equalgroups and assigni

poli law bar questions compiled

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