police accountability and governance structures · making. as such the sessions were interactive...

Police accountability and governance structures Public attitudes and perceptions

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Contents

Executive summary.........................................................................0

1. Introduction .................................................................................0

Background and aims ................................................................................ 0

Methodology............................................................................................... 0

Qualitative analysis .................................................................................... 0

2. Perceptions of change................................................................0

Levels of awareness .................................................................................. 0

Perceptions of change ............................................................................... 0

3. Democratic Involvement.............................................................0

Where should responsibility fall?................................................................ 0

How should the selection process work? ................................................... 0

4. Representation ............................................................................0

Geographical area...................................................................................... 0

Who should be involved? ........................................................................... 0

5. Powers and Roles .......................................................................0

Financial and human resource powers ...................................................... 0

The role of holding the police to account.................................................... 0

The monitoring of powers and roles ........................................................... 0

Appendices ......................................................................................0

Appendix A: Pre-Task ................................................................................ 0

Appendix B: Discussion Guide................................................................... 0

Appendix C: Structures developed by each group ..................................... 0


Executive summary This report presents the findings from qualitative research designed to explore public

perceptions of police governance structures, and more specifically who the public feel should

hold the Police to account. The research took place in four Police Force regions across

England and Wales during the week commencing 23rd August 2010. Within each Police

Force region one workshop took place. Workshops were deliberative in nature and were

designed to allow participants to explore different options, including those proposed in the

‘Policing in the 21st Century – Reconnecting Police and the People’1 consultation paper.

Qualitative research is designed to be exploratory and to enable in-depth understanding of

views, not to be statistically representative. Conclusions therefore are indicative and not

generalisable to the wider population.

Summary of key findings The research clearly showed that there is a general desire for greater visibility in police

accountability. Participants felt a sense of reassurance in knowing the Police were currently

and would continue to be held to account, and as such they wanted to be made more aware

of any future model of governance.

This translated into a strong preference for a visible and named figurehead for police

accountability in each area. Participants thought that this figurehead should not only provide

an element of visibility, but should also be a symbol of transparency and independence.

Indeed, the need for independence was a particular focus for participants throughout

discussions. Firstly, there was strong feeling that the role of a figurehead could not be carried

out by someone with an obvious political allegiance. Secondly, it was felt that the role of the

Police themselves in accountability needed to maintain a balance between ensuring their

experience and expertise is maximised, while not allowing them to appear self-regulating in

any sense. Linked to this the role of the Chief Constable was seen to be of great importance

as providing a crucial link between Police Forces and the individual or body holding the

Police to account.

Despite participants having a strong preference for a local ‘figurehead’, only a minority of

participants wanted an individual who would be solely responsible for holding the Police to

account. The most common preferences for where responsibility should fall were either

through a structure similar to that currently in place, or through a named-individual

1 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/consultations/policing-21st-century/


plus a scrutiny panel. Participants favouring this latter option envisaged that a scrutiny

panel would work alongside a figurehead in both an advisory and scrutiny role.

Interestingly, the desire for visibility and transparency did not necessarily translate into support for greater democratic involvement. Factors, such as a preconceived cynicism

towards any Government devolving responsibility, and a questioning of the knowledge base

on which an electorate would begin to decide who should take responsibility, made

participants question this. For example, concerns were raised about possible divisive or corrupt candidates and as such there were calls for stringent vetting processes should it be

decided that elections should take place. Participants also raised concerns about the cost

burden of a formal election process.

There was also a general consensus that those with relevant experience and expertise could

be trusted to make suitable appointments for commissioner or panel roles.

What mattered more to participants in terms of lay involvement would include:

being able to feedback their experiences and opinions on crime in their local area to Police Officers through regular meetings, which those holding the Police to account

would attend;

making sure community members are in some way represented on an advisory or

scrutiny panel, possibly through a process of election; and

making sure the voices of key lay individuals are included in decision-making. This

included groups such as victims of crime and young people.

The future of police accountability

Based on the above key findings, it is possible to build a structure of police governance that

summarised the consensus view of workshop participants, as outlined in the chart below.


The structure of accountability

HMIC

General Public

SUPPORT

SCRUTINY

Advisory & Scrutiny panel

Home Office

Figurehead

Police Force and BCUsChief Constable

The preferred structure looks on paper very similar to that currently in place, with a collective

of expert panel members responsible for key decisions. However, what is notable is the

support for the inclusion of a figurehead who is visible to the public.

Alongside the preference for lay involvement in the advisory and scrutiny panel, participants

felt the inclusion of experts was important. However, how this would look was not so clear

cut. Certainly, there was a strong resistance to the involvement of politicians, and in some

respects this translated to local councillors, though opinions were mixed. Some participants

felt the inclusion of those from the business community would be beneficial given the

business and financial acumen they could bring.

The figurehead would exert any powers, such as determining budgets or setting local

priorities, through a process of negotiation with the advisory panel and Chief Constable

of a force area.

Finally, participants were on the whole supportive of another layer of governance to

oversee those holding the police to account, and there was a feeling that Her Majesty’s

Inspectorate of Constabulary would, as they currently do, be best placed to do this.


1. Introduction


1. Introduction

Background and aims

Ipsos MORI was commissioned by the Association of Police Authorities (APA) to conduct

research into public perceptions of police governance structures. The consultation paper

‘Policing in the 21st Century – Reconnecting Police and the People’2 outlined a number of

significant changes relating to policing in England and Wales. One of the main proposals

involves the abolition of Police Authorities, replacing these with elected police commissioners

in each of the 43 police force areas throughout England and Wales. This change was

premised upon providing local communities with greater ‘democratic accountability’ as well

as greater transparency on how the police are policed. Commissioners would be elected by

the general public for set four-year terms, and be charged with setting local crime and

policing priorities. The proposed changes are currently under consultation, with responses

being submitted to the Home Office throughout September 2010. Consultation responses will

be considered in light of the legislation outlined in The Police Reform and Social

Responsibility Bill, due to be introduced in autumn of this year

The overall aim of this research was to explore perceptions of these proposed changes, and,

in particular, what preferences and levels of importance the public attribute to elements of

police governance and accountability. In order to meet this objective, six key questions were

explored through the research:

1. Who should hold the police to account?

2. How should the body or individual holding the police to account be selected?

3. Who else should be involved in holding the police to account?

4. What geographical area should those holding the police to account cover?

5. What powers and roles should those holding the police to account have?

6. Who should monitor those holding the police to account?

2 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/consultations/policing-21st-century/


Methodology

A qualitative methodology was adopted in order to both explain and clarify current structures

and practice, while exploring and debating different proposal options. The research was

designed to be exploratory and discursive.

Four workshops were held during the week commencing 23rd August 2010 across four

police force locations in England and Wales: Sussex, West Midlands, South Wales and

Cumbria. The four locations were chosen to allow for geographic variation, such as urbanity

and rurality, to be taken into account, as well as to provide regional variation.

Each workshop consisted of two discussion groups and plenary sessions. Participants were

recruited to ensure participants with a broad range of socio-demographic characteristics,

such as age, social class and gender. Additional quotas were set to ensure that participants

were recruited from several locations within the relevant police force region; there was a

broad range of voting behaviour (e.g. those who did and did not vote at the last general

election); and there was a broad range of previous contact with the police (e.g. as a victim,

witness or offender).

Participants were given a pre-task sheet (see Appendix A), containing top level information

about the current and proposed models of police governance to review and consider in

advance of the workshop.

Workshops lasted two hours, and were deliberative in nature. Deliberative research involves

participants in creating and exploring different options and gets them involved in decision-

making. As such the sessions were interactive with group participants discussing and voting

on options within the six key questions, with a view to reaching a consensus on a preferred

model of police governance. A copy of the discussion guide is appended at Appendix B, and

details of the structures developed by each group can be found at Appendix C.

Qualitative analysis

Qualitative research is not by its nature designed to be statistically representative. It is

intended to be illustrative, providing detailed and insightful levels of in-depth understanding

around a research topic. Therefore, claims cannot be made about the extent to which the

conclusions may be generalisable to the population. Instead, we present the broad range of

arguments and views given by participants, and where appropriate make reference to overall

balance of opinion or general consensus. It is important to bear in mind that findings

throughout the study deal with perceptions rather than facts.


Verbatim quotes are used throughout the report to illustrate particular bodies of opinion, but

these should not be taken to define the opinions of whole discussion groups.


2. Perceptions of change


2. Perceptions of change

Prior to more detailed discussions around the six core questions, it is important to set the

context in terms of the perceptions participants approached discussions with. Therefore, this

chapter examines prior knowledge and awareness of the current structure of police

governance, as well as perceptions motivating factors behind the proposed changes.

Levels of awareness

Overall, general awareness of the current structure of policing was very limited. There was

an underlying sense that participants assumed bodies such as the Home Office and Police

Authorities have a role to play, but it was clear that there was very little engagement and

knowledge with police governance beyond a force level. Therefore, while a small group of

participants had a more detailed understanding, the majority had a very basic awareness of

the existence of Police Authorities, and at most, a limited understanding of their function. In

some cases participants had not heard of them at all.

For many participants this lack of awareness was attributed to the perceived ‘invisibility’ of

Police Authorities in their current form. Across groups, participants felt that this ‘invisibility’

was a negative element of the current model of governance.

I'm concerned none of us have heard of them and they’re meant to be regulating them [the police]. Group participant, Cumbria

This was a criticism that was levied at the current set-up among both those who lacked prior

awareness, and those with a more in-depth knowledge of their local Police Authority.

Despite this criticism, participants were in agreement that there was a need for some form of

external regulatory body to take responsibility for holding the police to account. Indeed, very

few participants thought the police could or should be self-regulating, as it was felt forces

could not be trusted to be left to do this in an objective and trustworthy manner.

To place this in context, Ipsos MORI quantitative research3 with the general public places the

police amongst the more trusted of professions, with 60% of the public trusting them to tell

the truth (compared with 92% for doctors and only 16% for government ministers).

3 http://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/poll-trust-in-professions-topline-2009.pdf


Despite this, lack of trust was an issue that arose several times in early conversations within

the workshops. For example, concerns were raised over serious complaints against the

police resulting in very little in terms of disciplinary action being taken. This dichotomy can

perhaps be explained by the idea that the public don’t mistrust the police officers and the

work that they do on a day-to-day basis, but rather it is the need for objectivity in regulation

that they feel strongly about. This conclusion is borne out throughout this report, as it will be

seen that participants had high regard for the role of the expertise police could bring to

accountability, but overall felt that they could not be totally self-regulating.

The initial discussions also revealed that participants gained a level of reassurance upon

finding out more on the existence and primary roles of Police Authorities. As such the desire

for more visibility in police accountability became a common theme running throughout the

discussions.

However, as will be explored throughout this report, the views expressed on what more

visible governance would look like varied to some extent. There was a general sense that

participants fell on a scale between wanting greater ‘active’ visibility and a more ‘passive’

visibility. On the whole, the majority of people genuinely wanted greater ‘active’ visibility in

the form of a figurehead type character with whom they could identify and who would be

publically accountable for the decisions that were made in relation to policing. For others,

they simply felt they needed to be made more aware of Police Authorities if the current model

remains. The notion of a visible figurehead and the relationship this has to the current and

proposed models of policing are discussed in more detail in chapter three.

Perceptions of change

A common concern raised among participants across groups, was the question of why

change was being proposed. The general lack of awareness about Police Authorities fed into

uncertainty about what is motivating the Government to want change. This revealed several

schools of thought, which clearly reflected participants predetermined perceptions of the

current Government or Governments in general. For example, one school of thought was

that the proposed changes simply reflected ‘change for changes sake’. These participants

felt that changes often tend to happen when a new Government takes power, and as such,

changes were being driven by a political imperative.

A new government has come in, that’s why they’re doing this. Group participant, Cumbria


As the quote above shows, there was an element of cynicism from those participants who felt

this way. One viewpoint put forward was that even if elected commissioners were introduced,

their priorities would be still be decided from powers above, rather than emerging fully from

the communities they would represent. In this light, from the outset, the proposed changes

were seen by some as being something of a ‘PR stunt’, selling the elected commissioners as

a means to develop local ownership, while it was perceived that in reality this would not be

the case.

Conversely, however, other participants felt the motivation lay with a real desire to develop

more local ownership. This was not necessarily seen as a positive change however. Rather,

it was felt the Government were simply looking to shift responsibility away from the centre.

For some this was based on a perceived Government desire to cut costs and make financial

savings.

I think they are looking towards cutting costs...it’s the driving force to reduce the budget. Group participant, West Midlands

The assumption being made here was that the Government would only have to pay for one

individual, rather than all the members of a Police Authority.

However, there were also those who approached the group discussions with a

predetermined perception that, as change was being proposed, this must reflect inherent

problems with the current approach. As such, among those who felt that the proposed

changes were happening for a specific reason, there was a variation in whether this was

seen to be driven by a hidden agenda from the Government or a real need for change.

Therefore, the mindset with which participants assessed the Government’s motivations for

change often shaped and framed the ways in which they discussed the possible options for

police governance and accountability throughout the groups.

Chapter summary

Awareness of the current model of policing was somewhat limited to an

understanding of the roles and functions of police forces with little knowledge of tiers of

governance and regulation currently in place.

However, there was an underlying assumption that the Government would be holding the police to account in some way, though how this looked was not well known.

On the whole, participants felt Police Authorities lacked visibility and that greater

visibility of those holding the police to account would be reassuring.


Perceptions of the motivating factors behind the proposed changes varied and

provided context for the later discussions across groups. For some their perceptions

reflected a preconceived cynicism about the current Government or politics in general.

Others approached the later discussions with the assumption that the proposed changes

reflected an inherent problem with the current police structures.


3. Democratic Involvement


3. Democratic Involvement

One of the central tenets outlined within the ‘Policing in the 21st Century’ consultation paper

is the idea of greater democratic involvement. This chapter explores perceptions of

democratic involvement in policing governance, through discussions on where responsibility

for holding the police to account should fall, and the possible selection methods. As such,

findings from two of the key questions covered during discussion groups are examined:

Who should hold the police to account?

How should the body or individual holding the police to account be selected?

Where should responsibility fall?

As outlined in chapter one, many participants approached the discussions with low

awareness of Police Authorities, and as such felt that the current structure lacked visibility. In

this respect participants felt that having a sole individual in charge, without the perceived

complexities associated with others being involved, provided a clear line of responsibility to

which they could associate.

I don’t think there is any accountability [with Police Authorities] because they are anonymous. If you did have an elected official at least you would have an idea of who…has to be accountable to {the] area that they are overseeing. Group participant, West Midlands

As such, several participants preferred a structure similar to that proposed by the

Government within the ‘Policing in the 21st Century’ consultation paper, with an individual

being solely accountable. However, overall, these represented a relatively small minority of

participants. The most common preference for where this responsibility should fall was either

through a structure similar to the structure currently in place or an individual with a scrutiny

panel. While these two options differ in a number of ways, there were clear common themes

running behind the choices made. For example, the need to dilute the power and

responsibility, with decision-making being shared across a group, as opposed to it being

solely in the hands of one individual, was a common theme.

I think that any decision or implementation of policy that is made is better from a group…that’s better than one


man saying I don’t agree with what your doing, this my policy. Group participant, West Midlands

Having a panel or group of people was also seen to provide a practical means to distribute

workloads. In addition, the involvement of other people was felt to create an in-built system of

checks and balances; something many participants felt was important as a means to mitigate

the possibility of corruption taking place.

I would worry about one individual being in sole charge; there might be a political bias and fraudulent things going on. Group participant, Cumbria

Part of the assumption behind this was that those supporting the individual or the Police

Authority would provide a representative cross-section of views and preferences, diluting the

potential for corruption. In this sense, participants were positive about the function and

operation of the current Police Authority structure. This idea of representativeness of views is

discussed in more detail in chapter four.

The fact that you have more than one person and a cross section of society means they are independent, not open to corruption, - there are positive aspects to the way it’s done at the moment. Group participant, West Midlands

A key finding of this research was that many participants saw having an individual plus a

scrutiny panel in charge akin to a happy medium between the preferred elements of the

current system and those of the proposed new approach to police governance. The

possibility of an individual plus a scrutiny panel provided participants with a clear sense of

how visibility would be increased; the individual in each local area would act as a figurehead

for police accountability, while not solely holding all the power.

There should be one main person but others who help them decide. Group participant, Cumbria An individual is needed to lead the panel as they need to [be] visible - you need to know who they are, to be able to put a face and a name to them in order to be able to relate to them - but he wouldn’t be the person making all the decisions. Group participant, West Midlands


It is important to highlight here that when participants referred to a scrutiny panel in this

context, they were often referring to a group of people who would work alongside the

individual in both an advisory and scrutiny role. Whereas those who wanted to maintain the

current system of Police Authorities saw the process of decision-making within the Authority

as a wholly democratic one. Participants who preferred the individual plus scrutiny panel

approach saw decision-making as a slightly different process, in that the individual would

make decisions by calling on the advice of the panel. The panel in turn would be able to

scrutinise these decisions, vetoing them where they felt necessary. This differs from the

Government proposed model in which the scrutiny panel would not be able to veto the

decisions made by the individual. This highlights a key finding of the research; participants’

preferences for where responsibility should lie did not really differ too greatly from the current

structure, but the desire for greater visibility meant a slightly different structure was seen to

be preferable by many, with importance being placed on the idea of an independent

figurehead, while ensuring that the individual was not granted sole and unchecked power

and responsibility.

Political independence

There was near universal consensus on the need for such a figurehead to be politically

independent. This was driven by two main issues:

Risk of political bias: Many felt that, if any candidate was openly affiliated with a

political party, this would lead to the role (and decisions made when in the role) being

governed by political motives, as opposed to taking a necessary, ‘needs based’

pragmatic approach; and

PR exercise over substance: There was a sense amongst some participants that if

politicians filled this role then it was presumed that a number of promises would be

made that might not materialise when said person was in office.

It is important to highlight that both of the above were driven by a latent cynicism towards the

political process and politicians more generally, which reflects the way in which some

participants approached discussions.

In addition to the preference for independence, participants felt that whoever filled this role

would need to have a detailed knowledge and understanding of the local area, as well as

coming from an experienced background. As such, a number of participants felt that those

with a background in policing or law, such as ex-police Chief Constables, would be suitably

placed given their experience and previous proximity to policing.


[You] need someone who’s aware of government policy in the country. [You] need someone with some knowledge, and scrutiny group need wide group of experiences to be able to advise. Group participant, Cumbria Anyone who has done a job in the law, who has had experience of the law. Group participant, West Midlands

In contrast, a minority of participants felt that having those with a policing background might

not be suitable due to questions over how independent such an individual would be in the

role. The issue of wider representativeness of police governance is discussed in more detail

later in the report.

How should the selection process work?

The findings on whether participants preferred to have more democratic involvement, in

terms of directly electing a new commissioner and/or panel members, or a system of

appointment were not clear cut. However, many participants recognised key benefits to a

process of election. These included:

Elections encouraging visible accountability:

It’s about accountability isn’t it, if you’ve got a bunch of grey suits, no-one knows who they are, they’ve been appointed and so on. Perhaps that isn’t very accountable. If you’ve got Bill Bloggs and you know he is the Commissioner, he’s the one that has to answer for any shortcomings or get congratulations if things go well. Group participant, South Wales

Elections providing a formal mechanism for removing commissioners who had not

delivered on their pledges.

Allowing the public to have a say in who would get the position, which in turn could

have the potential benefit of improved community input on how the police were policed.

One particular advocate of this approach for commissioners likened it to that of elected

Sheriffs in America, and felt strongly that a similar system could work in England and Wales.

Despite such perceived benefits to the use of elections, a number of concerns were also

raised. Primarily, one of the main recurring themes related to concerns over how well placed


the electorate were, in terms of their knowledge and awareness of policing, to be able to

elect the best candidate or candidates. There was a sense that there would be nothing for

the electorate to compare against, and general concerns around ‘getting the decision wrong’

were prevalent.

Those in favour of a system of appointment tended to prefer this approach as it meant

positions were allocated by those better placed than the electorate to make such decisions.

It was felt that such a position or positions needed to be appointed by those who had

specialist experience in this area, such as the Home Secretary.

We can’t just have someone like me doing it…that would be ridiculous. Group participant, Sussex

You’d need a criteria…Surely someone with an experience of the field…just like a job interview so you know that whoever you’re going to get at least has experience and isn’t your local criminal. Group participant, South Wales

However, those who favoured appointments did not necessarily support current Police

Authorities. The current process whereby appointments to a Police Authority are made was

seen to lack transparency. This was borne out by many stating that they had little or no

knowledge of who currently sat on their regional Police Authority. As such, there was a

preference that any future system based on appointments needed to be much more visible

and transparent to enhance the legitimacy of this approach.

Nonetheless, whether this desire for transparency would translate into actual voting

participation was questioned across groups. A number of participants made the point that

there are already representatives (politicians) in place who have been elected to make

decisions on behalf of the public. They felt that having to vote for another set of candidates

would be excessive, leading to electoral fatigue and reduced likelihood to vote. This point

was made most strongly in the South Wales group, where, at present, participants already

vote both nationally and for an Assembly government.

I think its questionable how many people would turn out to vote for something like that. I’m not sure that many people would. Groups participant, Cumbria


In addition to this, participants discussed the consequences of low turnout generally. It was

seen to potentially widen the possibility for activist, controversial or divisive candidates to

gain power, based on the assumption their supporters may be more likely to vote.

So you might have a very low body of electors and there’d be opportunity for all sorts of things to go wrong. Group participant, South Wales

Concerns were particularly raised about controversial or divisive candidates being able to

select those who form part of their support teams. Therefore, it was felt the risks of this could

be minimised to a small extent by electing an individual but preventing them from appointing

their support team.

Cost was also mentioned by many participants across groups as a further issue related to

elections. Participants were unsure how much elections would cost, with a number feeling

support for the principle of having an elected commissioner could, in part, depend on costs.

Others assumed that the costs involved in holding further elections would not be an

insubstantial amount.

It depends on the amount spent on the elections. Group participant, Sussex

Elections involve lots of costs and do we all want another election? I would rather the money for an election be directed at the police. Group participant, South Wales

The barriers mentioned in relation to elections also made participants question the idea of

the public deciding who should take responsibility by process of a petition followed by a

referendum. Participants again raised issues on how knowledgeable the electorate would be;

whether people would be likely to begin a petition and then whether others in the community

would be likely to vote; whether divisive groups or people would be more likely to begin a

petition; and, perhaps most relevant to this type of governance structure, whether this would

introduce a feeling of post-code lotteries between areas, if neighbouring areas had different

governance structures.

Therefore, on the whole, preferences for a system of elections were based within the wider

context – that in the current system Police Authorities were seen to be too invisible – rather

than an overwhelming feeling that selection should be left solely to the electorate.

Furthermore, people emphasised the need for expert input in the selection process. For

some this meant having experts draw-up a shortlist of candidates for which the public then

vote. For others, the expert opinion was needed to vet candidates before the electorate vote.


However, given that there was a general preference for a figurehead and some form of panel

or authority supporting and advising them, one suggested approach to selection was a

combination approach. From this perspective, some members of the panel or authority could

be appointed to ensure qualified candidates, and some selected by election providing a

transparent commitment to a democratic process.

Chapter summary

Those who favoured an individual in charge did so because it was felt this would lead

to greater accountability and greater visibility to the general public, as well as

providing a clear line of responsibility.

However, overall there was a preference for a structure of police governance that was based upon a collective body rather than a sole individual. A collective body

was seen to:

- dilute the power;

- provide a safeguard against corruption; and

- be potentially more representative.

The presence of a figurehead character was felt to be of great importance,

irrespective of the type of governance structure. It was important that this individual

was politically independent and that they had some form of direct or relevant

experience. However, as has been seen throughout, the suitability of someone with a

policing background has the potential to divide opinion if they are not seen to be

inputting their expertise while not simply self-regulating.

Participants commonly also wanted a selection process that had transparency and led to greater accountability.

This translated into some support for an election process. However, there were clear

concerns raised about the electorate being solely responsible for selection, with

possible election fatigue and the costs associated with elections both being cited.

There was an overall sense that a balance was needed in selection, combining the

right levels of expertise to give the public confidence in the system, with a clear and

transparent process, be it through appointment or election.


4. Representation


4. Representation

As it stands, there are 43 Police Authorities in place in England and Wales covering the 43

police force regions. In the new model proposed in the ‘Policing in the 21st Century’

consultation paper the proposed commissioners would oversee the same geographical

Police Force area. This chapter explores findings around perceptions of geographical

coverage, alongside broader issues of representation of views both within the current set up

and the new proposed model. As such, the key questions addressed are:

What geographical area should those holding the police to account cover?

Who else should be involved in holding the police to account?

Geographical area

Participants were given several options around what geographical area those who hold the

police to account should govern. To aid understanding participants were provided with maps

to allow them to visually understand what these internal boundaries looked like in practice.

The options included:

Police force area;

Basic Command Unit (BCU) level;

Neighbourhood level; and

Cross force level.

Across the workshop locations it was apparent that participants had a low level of knowledge

of how their region was split beyond police force region level. In particular, very few had

heard of BCUs. Once they were more aware of the geographical areas, discussions revolved

around the need for those holding the police to account having an understanding of local

issues. It was felt overall that if an area was too expansive this would not be possible.

Therefore, there was very little support for any policing governance structure that covered

more than one police force region. Whilst a number of participants wondered whether cost

savings could be made by having such a structure in place, the area was felt to be too

geographically large to enable an individual and/or group to ensure local priorities were

represented.


Beyond this, there was a clear division between those who preferred police governance to be

structured at a police force area and those who wanted a more localised governance

structure at BCU level. Such preferences tended to be based on whether a group

governance, either through a panel or Police Authority, or individual commissioner was in

place. For example, despite some acknowledgement of the potential for increased costs, if

police governance was headed up by an elected commissioner, the general consensus was

that a police region would be too big an area for one person to cover, and thus would need to

have more localised governance structures.

This was raised as a particular issue in one of the groups held in Cumbria, the second

geographically largest force area in the country. Given its size local participants felt that one

regional level governing body would struggle to represent the whole county.

It should be at a more local level, because Cumbria is such a big area and if you were to go higher up it would take longer for things to get solved. Group participant, Cumbria

Linked to this, the view was expressed that within a police force area different localities

would have different crime and policing priorities. This was especially felt to be so when

comparing rural and urban areas.

Different areas have different priorities. In the country areas are more likely to deal with rustling sheep, while in towns [police] are more likely to deal with drunken rowdies. Group participant, Sussex

However, the same concerns outlined above were not expressed in the second group in

Cumbria, who on the whole preferred the idea of collective governance. As with other

participants who favoured the structure of police governance being led by a group, even if

this included a figurehead, it was felt that the geographical area covered as it is at the

moment was sufficient. It was suggested that, rather than change the structure, what was

needed was for those who work at a more local level to be able to feed into holding the police

to account, rather than be controlling this. As such many of the discussions around

geographical area actually reflected the need for various voices to be heard in holding the

police to account, rather than any other factors.

For example, several participants in South Wales, West Midlands and Cumbria expressed a

preference for the body holding the police to account to be geographically representative,

rather than politically representative. It was felt that without this, larger metropolitan areas


would be over represented at the expense of smaller areas. This is a slightly different focus

to the current model in which the make-up of Police Authorties reflects the political make-up

of the police force area. As such the wider findings in relation to who should be involved in

holding the police to account are discussed below.

Who should be involved?

Participants discussed who else should be involved in holding the police to account, in light

of their previous discussions. Overall, many participants favoured a combination of different

people consisting of a mix between experts and lay individuals. There were a number of

suggestions around preferences as to who this should and, importantly, should not involve:

Across groups there was a fairly strong preference for some form of lay involvement, whether

as part of an advisory group, scrutiny panel or Police Authority. Whilst identified as a

preference this was often given the caveat that there needs to be some purpose behind the

role of the lay people involved. For example, volunteer representatives (West Midlands),

young people (Cumbria) and previous victims of crime (Sussex) were specific groups

mentioned. Having at least a working knowledge of local issues was also deemed important

to any lay representatives.

They’d [community reps] know which area had which issues…they have knowledge of what’s going on. Group participant, Cumbria

I think you should have a couple of victims of crime…are all these people really knowing what its like for the person on the other side of what they are representing. Group participant, Sussex

However, views were more divided about expert or professional input as outlined below:

Police expertise: Given the previous discussion about the importance placed on

geographical representation in some groups, the input of senior local level police

representation was seen to be important. For others, the Chief Constable of a police force

was felt to be better placed as they could consult with more local police officers to feed this

local level knowledge combined with their policing experience. Again however, in presenting

this involvement to the public, the emphasis needs to be placed on the expertise and

experience police contribution brings, rather than suggesting the police are in any way self-

regulatory.


Politicians: A key finding of this research was that there was a strong resistance to

politicians being involved in any model of police governance, due to concerns over potential

political bias and opportunities for corruption.

Local Councillors: Opinions on the inclusion of local councillors varied. A number of

participants felt that councillors and politicians represented one and the same thing.

However, equally there was a view that conceded that local councillors should be involved in

some capacity. It was assumed that their activism at local levels would equip them with the

requisite insight and experience of the areas that they represented.

I’d keep MPs out. Not politicians. District councillors, borough councillors could stay in. Group participant, Cumbria

Magistrates: Similarly there were mixed views on the presence of magistrates. Whilst some

felt they would bring experience with their involvement, one group in particular felt that their

proximity to criminals and the justice system could lead to a conflict of interest.

They’ve got a background in law but… they’re dealing with the people who commit crime, so don’t think they should be involved. Group participant, Cumbria

Business community: There were further mixed views around the presence of members of

the business community. A number felt that such representatives would bring various skills,

such as HR and financial knowledge, as well as business acumen to the role. However,

some participants questioned the logic of having such individuals on board given their view

that the police were not a profit orientated enterprise.

Chapter Summary

Where a panel system or Police Authority structure was in place, having a regional

level body of governance was sufficient.

Where an individual was in charge, a more localised, BCU level governance structure

was preferred as it was assumed a region would be too big an area for one individual

to cover.

However, discussions around geographical area actually reflected the view that certain voices needed to be represented when holding the police to account. In particular

it was felt by some that rural and urban representation was more important that

political representation.


There was a preference for any governance structure to include various lay members, and more specifically those whose voices were seen to be most important,

such as young people and victims of crime.

Opinions on the input of experts and professionals were more divided. However, there

was very little support for the inclusion of politicians in holding the police to

account.


5. Powers and Roles


5. Powers and Roles

Under the new proposals outlined in the ‘Policing in the 21st Century’ consultation paper,

elected commissioners would take on certain roles and powers. In light of this, this chapter

considers the findings on the roles and powers those holding the police to account, whatever

form this model of governance looks like, should have. In addition, findings on whether there

needs to be another level of governance are also explored. As such the key questions

addressed are:

What powers and roles should those holding the police to account have?

Who should monitor those holding the police to account?

Financial and human resource powers

Budget setting powers

Views on budgets were, in part, based upon the type of governance system that would be in

place. For example, there was some preference stated for limited budgetary powers if the

structure outlined in the ‘Policing in the 21st Century’ consultation paper were to come into

place. The two main reasons for this were that it would be too much power to allocate to one

individual, and that such powers would be a burden to someone who also had to focus on a

number of other policing based roles that came with the position. However, there was less

concern over full budgetary powers when police governance took the form of a collective

body.

A more popular view was that budgets should be determined by negotiation. This negotiation

would take place between Chief Constables and Police Commissioners to establish funding

allocation. There were various suggestions as to how this negotiation should work in

practice. These included;

Directly providing Chief Constables with a % of the budget and then having the

governing body redistribute the remaining % amongst forces;

Give full budget to the governing body and have Chief Constables apply via a grant

based system based upon force needs; and

Full negotiations between Chief Constables, Commissioners and scrutiny panel

members to determine budgets.


A negotiated exchange tended to be the approach deemed most appropriate, especially in

relation to a more dictatorial approach from either Chief Constables or Commissioners.

Hiring and Firing Powers

There was strong resistance amongst participants towards any form of police governing body

having the power to hire, and in particular, dismiss police officers. Arguments put forward to

justify this view included that those holding the police to account would be too far removed

from front line policing to be able to make such judgements. In one group it was argued that

there needed to be measures put in place to protect officers from disciplinary action if this

power was granted.

There was general agreement across different groups that, where the police governance

structure took the form of a Police Authority or advisory / scrutiny panel, it should retain the

executive power to hire and fire Chief Constables. However, where the governing structure

involved an individual Commissioner, preference for such powers was more conditional on

measures to make this process transparent. Arguments put forward for such conditions

included:

Providing a commissioner with these powers, but holding an inquiry before any

decisions are made on dismissals.

You’d want to know why [a Chief Constable had been sacked] – the guy’s got to be able to defend himself depending on what he has done. Group participant, West Midlands

Whilst a Commissioner should have veto over who works under them, measures would

be needed to avoid nepotism with appointments.

The power of hire and fire in the hands of one individual was seen as too powerful, so

appointments and dismissals should be transparent and visible to the general public.

The role of holding the police to account

Participants were asked to discuss the role those holding the police to account had in terms

of cross-force working, setting local priorities, public-facing meetings and the provision of

information.

As touched upon above, a number of groups felt that in relation to geographical area,

covering an area bigger than a police force region would have limited benefits. However, in


terms of roles there was an expectation that cross-force working should be in place.

Reasoning was often based within wider concerns that many crimes tended to be cross-

border (such as drug dealing), and as such there should be some mechanism in place to

ensure such problems are dealt with as effectively as possible.

Looking at the setting of local priorities, participants were asked to state a preference on

whether they felt that priorities should be set through local consultation or via expert

knowledge. Views on both approaches were mixed. Those in favour of public consultation felt

that public engagement was important, as they would be able to report on issues within their

communities. Another view put forward was that the public should be one of many actors

who should be consulted when priorities are being set. A further point made was that there

should be feedback mechanisms in place to allow residents to know what was being done in

their communities, based upon priorities.

For those more in favour of expert knowledge being the basis for priority setting, this was

underpinned by the two pronged view that (a) the public are not necessarily the most

knowledgeable source when it comes to identifying local crime problems and (b) police were

best placed to know this information and would be much better placed to interpret crime

trends and patterns to be able to identify priorities. Therefore, for some there was an

expectation that forces, and Chief Constables in particular, would work with those holding the

police to account to identify policing priorities.

The best person for that [setting priorities] is the police – they know what each area is known for. Group participant, Cumbria

I don’t think it should be open to anyone - whoever is in charge must have a knowledge of the law...the ordinary man in street couldn’t do it…At the end of the day they [those who are in the police force] are the only ones who know where the money is best spent. Group participant, West Midlands

Such findings link to a theme common throughout groups; participants want some form of

involvement, but full democratic powers to elect and dictate priorities were not necessarily

seen as preferable. Rather, there was a clear sense that in many respects participants saw

the public as an important part in the chain of governance, but without them holding too

much power. In this respect, participants expressed a general desire for increased public

meetings with police, with some mention that the governing body, in whatever form, should

also look to contribute to such meetings.


They [those holding the police to account] should be approachable. I think that an organised public meeting would enable you to meet with the person who you needed to in order to voice your concerns. Group participant, Sussex

The issue was raised in one group that there is nothing prohibiting such meetings taking

place as things currently stand, but this was countered with the point that embedding such

meetings into communities would require a wider cultural shift so that these became the

norm.

In terms of information, there was general agreement that participants would like additional

crime information. One suggestion made was that information provision should be expanded

to include information on how police budgets were being spent.

The monitoring of powers and roles

Under proposals set out in ‘Policing in the 21st Century’ the intention is to have a panel

oversee the commissioner. In light of this proposal, participants were asked to comment on

who or what they felt should ‘monitor the monitor’, and whether such a role was needed.

On the whole only a minority of participants questioned whether another layer of governance

and oversight would be needed. Where this was questioned it was particularly so among

groups who recognised a role for a scrutiny panel.

The most popular preference for this monitoring body was for the Her Majesty’s Inspectorate

of Constabulary (HMIC) to take on this function. There was a feeling amongst a number of

participants that the HMIC was best placed given that relevant skills and knowledge to

undertake take such a role would already be in place and that, if anything, it should be given

additional powers to become the ‘monitor’s monitor’.

[They should] leave [HMIC] as it is as they know exactly what they are doing. Group participant, Cumbria

I’d leave HMIC to be in charge of this…if it was a group of people, say a Police Authority, as opposed to an individual, then I think HMIC as it is now, that’s fair enough…if that [scrutiny panel being more powerful than HMIC], then I think the panel would have to have certain authority. Group participant, South Wales


Despite preferences being displayed for lay involvement at other levels of police governance,

the inclusion of non-experts at this level was less popular. For those making this point, it was

felt that the role would require a level of skill unlikely to be present amongst general

members of communities.

Chapter Summary

The findings suggest several key ideas in terms of the powers and roles of those holding the

police to account. These included:

The allocation of police budgets being agreed through a process of negotiation between Chief Constables and whatever governance structure was in place.

Police governance structures taking the format of an individual plus advisory panel or

Police Authority should have executive powers over hiring and firing Chief Constables, but not police officers.

If an individual commissioner is introduced, hiring and firing powers should remain in

place but with a number of safeguards.

Priorities should be set by experts, such as the police, as they were identified as

being more knowledgeable about crime than local residents, although the role of

consultation was also acknowledged.

There was a desire for more meetings with police as well as Police Authorities,

and a preference for receiving information about crime, but also greater transparency

around budget expenditure.

HMIC with additional powers was identified as the preferred approach to

‘monitoring the monitor’, particularly as the infrastructure was already in place.


Appendices


Appendices

Appendix A: Pre-Task

Thank you for agreeing to take part in an Ipsos MORI research workshop.

The purpose of the workshop is to find out your views on the way police are held to

account. Your views are really important in shaping how this could look in the future so we hope you can make it along.

It would be great if you could take a look at this sheet and have a think about the questions before coming to the workshop. Remember this isn’t designed to be a test - we’re just keen

to get your opinion and views on this topic.

On the evening, you will be given £50 as a thank you and to cover any costs for you coming along.

We look forward to seeing you at the workshop!

Policing now: This diagram shows how policing is currently structured, and a bit more about what Police Authorities do. We’d really like to get your thoughts on this, so have a look at the questions at the bottom and let us know what you think on the day.

POLICE FORCE

POLICE AUTHORITY

You might be familiar with your local police force – there are 43 in total throughout England and Wales. Each force has one Police Authority.

Authorities hold the police to account on behalf of you and your local community.

They are made up of appointed councillors, magistrates and local independent people

They control the budget.

They can hire and fire Chief Constables and Senior Police Officers.

They makes sure policing improvement takes place in your community

RESPONSE OFFICERS

What do you think the good points and bad points of this

model might be?

COMMUNITY OFFICERS

What had you heard about Police Authorities before

today?


Another Model of Policing

This diagram shows a different approach to policing. In this approach Police Authorities would be replaced by an individual Police Commissioner who you would help elect. Have a look to see what you think!

Thank you for taking the time to think about these questions.

We look forward to seeing you at the workshop!

CHIEF CONSTABLE POLICE FORCE

Police Commissioner

Commissioners would be elected by you.

They can come from a political or a totally independent background.

They will set what policing priorities for that force are.

They will hold the police to account.

They will control the budget and hire and fire Chief Constables.

COMMUNITY OFFICERS

RESPONSE OFFICERS

What can you find out about this model on the internet?

What do your family and friends think?

Do they think one was better than the other?

Which model do you prefer? Can you think of any positives and

negative?


Appendix B: Discussion Guide

APA Models of Policing

Objectives: - The overall objective of the workshop is to get feedback from members of the public

on how the police are held to account.

- In particular the aim is to discuss and debate different models of governance in policing and the various elements that make up these models.

- More generally, the aim is to identify strong points of consensus with different aspects that make up the models and what factors are negotiable and non-negotiable.

DESCRIPTION AIM TIME NOTES RESOURCES WELCOME

Thank participants for coming Explain purpose of session - the session is about views and preferences on different ways in which the police can be held to account. There are no right or wrong answers. Cover housekeeping points.

Welcome and thank participants for coming. Introduce the purpose of the group, and let them know what to expect in the next 2 hrs.

18:00

PRESENTATION

Lead moderator to present short presentation on the current structure of policing that covers briefly:

- role of the Home Office - role of Chief Constables and police

forces - role of BCUs

- It will also introduce Police

Authorities, covering their purpose, role and how members are appointed.

- The monitoring purposes of HMIC will

also be covered. ASK PARTICIPANTS TO MOVE TO THE SEPARATE GROUPS

To develop a solid knowledge base amongst participants on the current structure of policing.

18:05 Powerpoint presentation, laptop, projector, screen. First name cards for tables


INTRODUCTIONS

Group introductions - Intro - Go round the table with brief

introductions (name, where they live, what they do etc) or use the warm-up sheets.

To introduce the group to each other and put participants and ease when talking.

18:12 Warm-up

sheets

PRE-TASK REVIEW

Remind participants about the pre-task (reinforcing that it doesn’t matter if they were unable to look at it) Current model

- What bits of the current model have you heard about before? What are your initial thoughts on these?

- What pros and cons can you see to the current model?

- Are the roles of each of the current structure clear?

Proposed model - Had you heard about the new model

before being recruited? Where did you hear about it? What were you initial thoughts?

- What do your family and friends think?

- What pros and cons can you see to the proposed model?

- Which model do you prefer? Why is that?

Explain that we are going to look at the different aspects that could make up a structure of policing, thinking about the role of who should make the police accountable in more detail. Explain that after each section participants will be asked to vote on the aspects of the model that they most preferred

To review the task, reminding participants of the key features of the two models. To gain top of mind thoughts on the two models?

18:15 Pre-task sheets for each person

WHO HOW SHOULD THEY BE APPOINTED WHO ELSE SHOULD BE INVOLVED

Explain that the purpose of this part of the group is to get participants to think about who is the best choice to hold the police to account. Add that we will also

To encourage participants

18:25

A3 sheets for each element showing the


be thinking about how they are appointed and who else they might think should be involved. Remind participants of the current and new models and how they work as they have heard in the presentation. The flow of the discussion will dictate the order options from each element are discussed in. For each option in the ‘WHO’ element you will need to discuss how this would work in terms of appointments, and who else would be involved. Ensure all options from the three elements are discussed by the end of this section, before the voting takes place. ENSURE PROBE ON:

- What are the particular strengths/ benefits?

- What are the drawbacks/ limitations? - How would this work in practice? - Is there anything unique to this

area that would impact on how the following might work?

WHO should hold the police to account?

- In your view, who do you think would be best placed to hold the police to account?

- Why is this?

FORCE: Should police be self governing? How would you feel about your local police force doing this? How would you want to find out about what they are doing? POLICE AUTHORITY: How many people should be part of a police authority? How do you think decisions would be made? INDIVIDUAL: Can one person ensure that all different groups within a community are represented? INDIVIDUAL + SCRUTINY PANEL: What type of role would the panel play? What powers would they have? WHOEVER THE PUBLIC DECIDE:

(introduce the idea of a referendum if

to discuss who should hold the police to account, linking this to how they should be appointed or elected and whether others need to be involved.

options. Stickers. Plain paper to cover options.


people weren’t happy with the current model) - How would this work? PROBE ON

PETITION AND REFERENDUM. What factors would decide who you wanted? How do you think people in your area would feel about this? How would you feel about voting? What information would you like to have?

Using stickers provided, ask participants to highlight their preferences onto the A3 sheet to show what selections they prefer. How should they be appointed?

- In your view, how should those holding the police to account be chosen?

- Why is this?

If necessary, explain the difference between elected and appointed to the group. ELECTED: If an individual –

- What experience, if any, should this person have?

- How long should the elected period be?

- When should elections be held? What system should be used?

If a group of people -

- How many people should this be? - How representative of the region

should they be? - What things would you consider in

electing them? - How long should the elected period

be? - When should elections be held? - What system should be used?

BY APPOINTMENT: If an individual –

- How representative of the region should they be?

- Who should appoint them? - What things would you want to be

considered when electing them? - How long should the elected period

be? When should elections be held? What system should be used?

1 STICKER PER PARTICPANT/ NOTE ON FLIPCHART

For the option WHOEVER THE PUBLIC DECIDE - The APA are considering a model that involves a proportion of the population in an area signing a petition to change the current model. A referendum would then be held on which model people would want. This will be discussed at the end of the workshop. It may be helpful to introduce this here.


If a group -

- How many people should this be? - How representative of the region

should they be? - Who should appoint them? - What things would you want to be

considered when electing them? - How long should the elected period

be? When should elections be held? What system should be used?

COMBINATION:

- What would this look like? - How would it work? - What input would you want to have?

OTHER:

- What would this look like? - How would it work? - What input would you want to have?

Using stickers provided, ask participants to highlight their preferences onto the A3 sheet to show what selections they prefer. Who else should be involved: How do you feel about others being involved in holding the police to account? Can you describe who you think this should ideally include? What role would they play? Probe for each option below. Probe on:

- What are the benefits? - What are the drawbacks? - What would their particular role be? - Who would decide who it was? - Would it matter where they live / who

they work for / political party etc? ONE POLITICIAN

LOCAL COUNCILLORS APPOINTED BY LOCAL COUNCILS MAGISTRATES PEOPLE FROM THE BUSINESS COMMUINITY: INDEPENEDENT COMMUNITY


REPRESENTATIVES: A COMBINATION: NOBODY: OTHER:

Using stickers provided, ask participants to highlight their preferences onto the A3 sheet to show what selections they prefer.

1 STICKER PER PARTICPANT/ NOTE ON FLIPCHART 4 STICKERS PER PARTICIPANT/ NOTE ON FLIPCHART

AREA Explain that the purpose of this part of the group is to get participants to think about the size of area that should be covered by the individual/ body in charge of holding police to account. Discuss that this is currently force level (show map) and that Police Authorities hold the police to account over this area). Go through each of the options (revealing each individually) with participants Use the map to distinguish between the types of area. Ensure that you refer back to previous elements when discussing. Eg. Would they feel differently if it was an individual or an authority? FOR EACH ENSURE PROBE ON:

- What are the particular strengths/ benefits of covering this size of area?

- What are the drawbacks/ limitations of covering this size of area?

POLICE FORCE AREA: (show on the map) CROSS POLICE FORCE AREA

- What would be the benefits compared to a single force area?

- What would be the drawbacks? - How many forces would need to be

included?

To understand what the concept of area means to participants and how this affects preferences for who should hold the police to account.

18:50 All areas have set boundaries other than neighbourhood. For this option, we want to get a sense of what this means to people, and what they think it would mean to others in their community.

Map of force areas with councils showing. A3 sheets for each element showing the options. Stickers. Plain paper to cover options.


- How would you choose? BCU ( Basic command unit/ local

command unit) - What would be the benefits compared

to a police force? How about a cross force area?

- How do you think this would work in practice?

NEIGHBOURHOOD:

- What does this mean to you? - How would other people define their

neighbourhood? OTHER: What other areas would you think about covering? Would they be larger or smaller than the options? What would be the benefits and drawbacks? Using stickers provided, ask participants to highlight their preferences onto the A3 sheet to show what selections they prefer.

1 STICKER PER PARTICIPANT/ NOTE ON FLIPCHART

ALL FORCES ARE DIVIDED INTO BCU’S – MOST MOST FORCES INTO AT LEAST THREE, BUT OFTEN MORE, E.G. LONDON BCU’S ARE ALIGNED TO THE 32 LONDON BOROUGHs

POWERS AND ROLES Explain that the purpose of this part of the group is to get participants to think about the powers and roles the individual/ body in charge of holding police to account should have. Go through each of the options (revealing each individually) with participants. Ensure that you refer back to previous elements when discussing. Eg. Would they feel differently if it was an individual or an authority? Does the area covered make a difference to the powers they have? Remind participants about the current model and the role of Police Authorities. For each option probe on For powers selected : Why this power/ role? How might this work in practice? What particular benefits lie with providing

these powers?

To understand what participants see the roles looking like in terms of the powers they hold. To understand the link between the powers and the type of model.

19:00

A3 sheets for each element showing the options. Stickers. Plain paper to cover options.


What particular limitations might there be

with providing these powers? Are any powers related to who is charged

with holding the police to account and how these people are chosen?

For powers rejected: What reason(s) is there for rejecting this/

these power/ power(s)? BUDGETS: FULL POWERS TO SET POLICE BUDGET: What aspects of the budget do you imagine are included in this? How do you think they would choose to spend the money? LIMITED POWERS TO SET POLICE BUDGET: What aspects of the budget do you imagine are included in this? How do you think they would choose to spend the money? Should this include police wages? POLICE FORCES SHOULD DECIDE OWN BUDGET: How would this work? Who would make the

final decisions? STAFF

HIRE AND FIRE CHIEF CONSTABLES: - Should this be the decision of an

individual or group? Who should make the final decision? What safeguards, if any, should be in place? What level of transparency should be in place for these decisions (for example how much should be made public in terms of suitable candidates/ current Chief Constable performance?)

HIRE AND FIRE POLICE OFFICERS:

- As above. PRIORITIES AND PLANNING SET LOCAL PRIORITIES THROUGH CONSULTATION:

- How should local priorities be set? Who should decide on this? How is best to find this information out? Can there ever be agreement on deciding what are priorities? How

PARTICIPANTS CAN CHOSE HOWEVER MANY POWERS THEY LIKE ACROSS THIS SECTION- ONLY ONE STICKER TO BE USED PER CHOICE / NOTE ON FLIPCHART

Police budgets are made up of council tax (approx 27%) and central funding (approx 73%). This pot of money is given to the Police Authority to divide up amongst the force. THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE POLICE WAGES Full powers will mean that they receive the budget and decide which areas of crime to focus on / how much goes to admin etc. IT DOES NOT INCLUDE POLICE WAGES. At present although police authorities cannot decide the terms and conditions of police officers


much information do the public need to know what key local priorities are?

SET LOCAL PRIORITIES BASED ON

EXPERT KNOWLEDGE OF AREA: - Who or which groups would be

seen as experts? What qualifications would they need to have? If residents are seen as experts who should be asked? Why? If police, why? Community safety?

DEVELOP A POLICING PLAN: - What should this contain? How could this

be best accessed by the public? How binding should the plan be? (for example should it amount to a pledge or should it be less binding?)

PUBLIC FACING HOLD PUBLIC MEETINGS:

- Who should be invited to these? How often do you think they should happen? Who would attend?

PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC

ON CRIME AND POLICING? - What kinds of information would

this include? Can you describe how you would like to receive it?

OTHER WORK WITH OTHER FORCES TO

TACKLE CROSS-FORCE CRIME? Which forces should work together? How

would this work? INVESTIGATE COMPLAINTS AGAINST

THE POLICE: OTHER Using stickers provided, ask participants to highlight their preferences onto the A3 sheet to show what selections they prefer. PARTICIPANTS CAN ATTACH STICKERS TO MORE THAN ONE OPTION.

outside of the national negotiating body, they can decide the overall make-up of the workforce, e.g between the number of officers, civilians and PCSOs Limited powers will mean the amount they receive is capped, and they do not decide the budget for some aspects. At present policing plans are agreed annually - usually they are developed by the force and sign-off by the police authority. They set out the priorities, targets and resources for the coming year. Often these are then broken down into BCU plans as well.

WHO HOLDS AUTHORITY/ ELECTED REP TO ACCOUNT


So far participants have looked at the make up of a body/ individual with the role of holding police to account. This final section asks about their preferences towards what system, if any, should be in place to monitor the ‘monitors’ REMIND PARTICIPANTS ABOUT THE CURRENT ROLE OF HMIC AND THE CRIME PANEL AS DISCUSSED. Go through each of the options (revealing each individually) with participants. Ensure that you refer back to previous elements when discussing. Eg. Would they feel differently if it was an individual or an authority? Does the area covered make a difference to the powers they have? For each option probe on

- What are the benefits? - What would be the drawbacks? - How would it work in practice? - Who should know about what

they monitor and find out? - How often should they monitor? - What powers should they have? - What experience or expertise

would be needed? - Who would appoint or elect?

(depending on option) HMIC:

- Would their role remain the same? How would this work?

ELECTED PANEL: APPOINTED PANEL (LAY): APPOINTED PANEL (EXPERT) APPOINTED PANEL (COMBINATION) APPOINTED INDIVIDUAL:

- How long would they hold that role for?

ELECTED INDIVIDUAL:

- How long would they hold that role for?

DOES NOT NEED TO BE MONITORED:

To understand if participants see a need for the governing body to be held to account, and what this would look like. To understand the link between this and the model of policing.

19:25 A3 sheets for each element showing the options. Stickers. Plain paper to cover options.


- Would there need to be any alternative safeguards?

Using stickers provided, ask participants to highlight their preferences onto the A3 sheet to show what selections they prefer.

1 STICKER PER PARTICIPANT / NOTE ON FLIPCHART

REVIEW Draw the consensus model on A3. Include key points on area and powers around the outside. How do you feel about the model of policing we have developed? Would it work in practice? - What are the key strengths/ benefits? Are they any drawbacks you can see? Where the group agree something would not work, encourage a consensus on which options to include. Annotate chart with comments

To review the preferred elements as a whole model, and to understand if together participants views change in any way.

19:35 Flipchart and pens

COMPARISON [BRING BOTH GROUPS TOGETHER]

Share A3 versions of the current and proposed model. Based on our discussions, what are the benefits of each model? What are the drawbacks? If they had to choose one of them today, which would it be? Introduce the A3 version of the APA proposition. Go through how this would work. What would be the benefits of this approach? What would be the drawbacks? How would they feel about being asked to vote? Who in your communities would sign the petition? What information would you like before voting?

To understand how participants perceive the models together and where preferences lie.

19:45 A3 versions of the current and proposal models A3 sheet describing the APA proposition ideas


If this was introduced how would it make you feel about the different models? GAIN A SENSE ACROSS THE GROUP EITHER BY A SHOW OF HANDS OR STAND NEXT TO FAVOURED MODEL Why would they choose that model? THANK YOU Thank participants for coming. Hand out incentives.

19:55 Incentive and sign off sheets.

END 20:00


Appendix C: Structures developed by each group

WHO/ WHAT SHOULD

HOLD POLICE TO ACCOUNT?

INDEPENDENT INDIVIDUAL + SCRUTINY PANEL INCLUDING

LOCAL RESIDENT REPRESENTATION FROM EACH BCU

HOW SHOULD THIS TAKE PLACE?

BY INDIVIDUAL APPOINTMENT

WHO ELSE SHOULD BE INVOLVED?

A COMBINATION THAT INCLUDES A POLICE OFFICER

WHAT AREA SHOULD THE

ACCOUNTABILITY BODY COVER

BASIC COMMAND UNIT

BUDGETS

COMBINATION - BUDGET SET BY INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP

IN CONSULTATION WITH CHIEF CONSTABLE

STAFF

HIRE & FIRE CHIEF CONSTABLES

PRIORITIES AND PLANNING

SET PRIORITIES THROUGH CONSULTATION

PUBLIC FACING

HOLD PUBLIC MEETINGS

WHAT POWERS AND

ROLES?

OTHER

INVESTIGATE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE

WHO SHOULD MONITOR?

HMIC

BIRMINGHAM – GROUP A


WHO/ WHAT

SHOULD HOLD POLICE TO ACCOUNT?

INDEPENDENT, NON-POLITICAL INDIVIDUAL + SCRUTINY PANEL

HOW SHOULD THIS

TAKE PLACE?

BY TRANSPARENT GROUP APPOINTMENT

WHO ELSE SHOULD

BE INVOLVED?

A COMBINATION THAT INCLUDES MAGISTRATES AND

INDEPENDENTS



BASIC COMMAND UNIT OR POLICE FORCE AREA

BUDGETS

LIMITED POWERS

STAFF

HIRE & FIRE POLICE OFFICERS


SET PRIORITIES BASED ON EXPERT KNOWLEDGE

PUBLIC FACING

PROVIDE INFORMATION TO PUBLIC ON CRIME AND POLICING

WHAT POWERS AND ROLES?

OTHER

WORK CROSS FORCE TO TACKLE PROBLEMS

WHO SHOULD MONITOR?

APPOINTED PANEL MADE UP OF LAY PERSONS AND

EXPERTS

BIRMINGHAM – GROUP B


WHO/ WHAT


INDIVIDUAL + SCRUTINY PANEL


COMBINATION - A SHORTLIST OF SUITABLY EXPERIENCED CANDIDATES TO BE APPOINTED THEN GO TO AN ELECTION

WHO ELSE SHOULD

BE INVOLVED?

A COMBINATION OF ALL OPTIONS



OTHER – HALF A POLICE FORCE AREA

BUDGETS

FULL POWERS THROUGH A NEGOTIATION PROCESS WITH

THE POLICE

STAFF



SET PRIORITIES THROUGH CONSULTATION AND EXPERT KNOWLEDGE

PUBLIC FACING



OTHER

WORK WITH OTHER POLICE FORCES TO TACKLE CROSS-BORDER CRIME AND INVESTIGATE COMPLAINTS AGAINST

THE POLICE

WHO SHOULD MONITOR?

ELECTED PANEL

BRIGHTON – GROUP A


WHO/ WHAT SHOULD

HOLD POLICE TO ACCOUNT?

INDIVIDUAL AND SCRUTINY PANEL MADE UP OF AT LEAST SOME LOCAL PEOPLE

HOW SHOULD THIS

TAKE PLACE?

ELECTED INDIVIDUAL

WHO ELSE SHOULD BE

INVOLVED?

COMBINATION OF ALL OPTIONS EXCEPT POLITICIANS

WHAT AREA SHOULD THE ACCOUNTABILITY

BODY COVER

POLICE FORCE AREA

BUDGETS

FULL POWERS

STAFF

HIRE & FIRE CHIEF CONSTABLES AND POLICE OFFICERS


SET PRIORITIES THROUGH CONSULTATION WITH EXPERTS

AND LOCAL PEOPLE

PUBLIC FACING

PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC ON CRIME AND POLICING


OTHER

WORK WITH OTHER POLICE FORCES TO TACKLE CROSS-BORDER CRIME AND INVESTIGATE COMPLAINTS AGAINST

POLICE

WHO SHOULD

MONITOR?

HMIC

BRIGHTON – GROUP B


WHO/ WHAT


INDIVIDUAL + SCRUTINY PANEL


ELECTED – BOTH INDIVIDUAL AND PANEL


UNDECIDED



UNDECIDED

BUDGETS

LIMITED POWERS

STAFF




PUBLIC FACING


AND HOLD MEETINGS


OTHER

UNDECIDED

WHO SHOULD MONITOR?

HMIC

CARDIFF – GROUP A


WHO/ WHAT


POLICE AUTHORITY THAT IS NOT POLITICALLY ALIGNED


BY GROUP APPOINTMENT OR COMBINATION


COMBINATION OF ALL OPTIONS



BASIC COMMAND UNIT OR POLICE FORCE AREA

BUDGETS

LIMITED POWERS

STAFF

HIRE & FIRE POLICE OFFICERS



PUBLIC FACING



OTHER

WORK CROSS FORCE TO TACKLE PROBLEMS

WHO SHOULD MONITOR?

APPOINTED PANEL MADE UP OF LAY PERSONS AND

EXPERTS

CARDIFF – GROUP B


WHO/ WHAT SHOULD HOLD

POLICE TO ACCOUNT?

INDIVIDUAL AND SCRUTINY PANEL


ELECTED GROUP OF PEOPLE


INDEPENDENT COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDING

PEOPLE FROM THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND LOCAL COUNCILLORS



NEIGHBOURHOOD OR BASIC COMMAND UNIT

BUDGETS

LIMITED POWERS

STAFF



SET PRIORITIES BASED ON EXPERT KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL

AREA

PUBLIC FACING

PROVIDE INFORMATION TO PUBLIC ON CRIME AND POLICING AND HOLD MEETINGS


OTHER

WORK WITH OTHER POLICE FORCES TO TACKLE CROSS-BORDER CRIME

WHO SHOULD MONITOR?

HMIC OR APPOINTED PANEL MADE UP OF LAY PERSONS AND

EXPERTS

CUMBRIA – GROUP A


WHO/ WHAT


POLICE AUTHORITY


APPOINTED GROUP OF PEOPLE


COMBINATION OF ALL OPTIONS



POLICE FORCE AREA

BUDGETS

POLICE FORCES DECIDE THEIR OWN BUDGET

STAFF



SET PRIORITIES BASED ON EXPERT KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL

AREA

PUBLIC FACING

HOLD PUBLIC MEETINGS


OTHER

WORK WITH OTHER POLICE FORCES TO TACKLE CROSS-BORDER CRIME

WHO SHOULD MONITOR?

HMIC

CUMBRIA – GROUP B

police accountability and governance structures · making. as such the sessions were interactive...

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