police foundation police force collaboration report · police force collaboration ... 1 the hmic...

Kate Flannery and John Graham November 2014

Police force collaborationAn independent review of theWarwickshire / West Mercia Strategic Alliance

AcknowledgementsThis independent review was commissioned by the two Police and Crime Commissioners for Warwickshire(Ron Ball) and West Mercia (Bill Longmore) with the full support of their Deputy PCCs and chief officers. Theirwillingness to submit the Alliance to external scrutiny and allow the findings to be published is commendable.The work was conducted by Kate Flannery and John Graham from the Police Foundation, who wish to expresstheir thanks to all of the staff in both forces and from external bodies who found time in their busy schedulesto meet with us and offer candid opinions. Particular thanks go to Eric Wood, the Deputy PCC for Warwickshire,who acted as the key contact and facilitator for the review.

About the Police FoundationThe Police Foundation is an independent think tank focused on developing knowledge and understanding ofpolicing and challenging the police service and the government to improve policing for the benefit of the public.The Police Foundation acts as a bridge between the public, the police and the government, while being ownedby none of them.

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Police force collaboration 1

Police force collaborationAn independent review of theWarwickshire / West Mercia Strategic Alliance

Kate Flannery and John Graham, The Police Foundation

November 2014

2 Police force collaboration

Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................... 3

Taking stock: progress to date .................................................................... 5

Celebrating success ........................................................................................ 5

Leadership and the executive team .................................................................. 6

Accountability and governance issues .............................................................. 7

Problems with governance and accountability ................................ 7

Performance monitoring ................................................................ 9

Culture and local identity .................................................................................. 9

Managing the change process ...................................................................... 11

Structural issues ............................................................................................ 12

Regional arrangements ................................................................ 12

Protective Services ...................................................................... 13

Threats to partnership work .......................................................... 13

Internal structures – anomalies ...................................................... 14

Going forward: strengthening and deepening the Alliance .................... 15

Leadership and the executive team ................................................................ 15

Accountability and governance ...................................................................... 16

Culture and local identity ................................................................................ 18

Managing the change process ........................................................................ 19

Structural issues – form follows function.......................................................... 21

Regional arrangements ................................................................ 22

Protective Services........................................................................ 23

Partnership work .......................................................................... 24

Internal structures – anomalies ...................................................... 24

A new model of policing?............................................................................ 26

Glossary ........................................................................................................ 31


The global financial crisis in 2007 ushered in theera of austerity that now dominates much of thedebate around public services – where dopriorities lie, and how much of their cost can thepublic purse bear? For police forces the impacthas been dramatic. The need to adapt policingmodels to meet changing and growing demands,with little real growth in income, had tested chiefofficers and police authorities for a number ofyears. But the coalition government has, since2010, ramped up these challenges. All forcesmust now reduce budgets in real terms by up to20 per cent over the five-year comprehensivespending review period, while attempting to satisfylocal communities’ demands for traditional/visiblepolicing and transform operational practices tocope with internet-enabled crime that recognisesno conventional boundaries.

How have forces and Police and CrimeCommissioners reacted to this challenge?Unsurprisingly, no silver bullet has been discovered– rather, a menu of options has emerged thatencompass internal restructuring, savingsprogrammes, outsourcing, regionalisation (mostlyof specialist operations) and collaboration. HMInspectorate of Constabulary has subjectedforces’ efforts to independent scrutiny and, whilepraising the achievement of budget reductions,has been largely critical of the failure to maximisecollaborative opportunities. Indeed, it has identifiedsome examples of retrenchment, despite theHome Office’s expectation that collaborationwould help forces meet the twin pressures offinancial constraint and new policing demands.

Against this background, the success of thecollaboration between Warwickshire and WestMercia is notable. Its origins lie in discussions held

in 2010 and early 2011 about the nature andextent of collaboration between the four forces inthe West Midlands region. The region had astrong track record of productive workingtogether, especially on specialist operations andprotective services, but the four could not agreeon how to move the agenda on. Concernedabout their future prospects outside a regionalcollaborative framework, Warwickshire and WestMercia chief officers and police authority chairsagreed to embark on what became known as a‘strategic alliance’. After the dissolution of policeauthorities the newly elected Police and CrimeCommissioners (PCCs) determined to continuewith the alliance. Three years on, the bulk ofpolicing and support services across the twoforce areas are delivered under unified leadershipand processes. As a model of integrated policeprovision it has much to commend it, offeringlocal people greater protection from harm andvalue for money.

But despite a confidence in the Strategic Allianceand its impact, chief officers and the PCCs didnot want to rest on their laurels and invited thePolice Foundation to conduct an independentreview. This looked critically at both achievementsand lessons to be learnt, and identified ways inwhich the Alliance could progress. The work issummarised in this report, focusing on:

• clarifying leadership roles;• strengthening accountability and governance;• securing a cultural identity for the Alliancewithout losing what is valued aboutWarwickshire and West Mercia as individualentities;

• improving the ability to manage organisationalchange and

Introduction


• resolving anomalies in structure andprocesses.

Our conclusion is that the Strategic Allianceforged by Warwickshire and West Mercia is abeacon of collaboration that others can learnfrom, notably the integration of operationalpolicing across force boundaries and theharmonisation of finance, HR and estate services.(A note of caution, however; its success is rootedin similarities of policing environment, culture andworking practice that make its full replicationelsewhere less than straight forward.)


Celebrating success

The achievements of the Strategic Alliance to dateare significant and should be trumpeted as amodel that others could follow, albeit with anacknowledgement that the process of forging theAlliance was not perfect and lessons have had tobe learned. In particular, the Strategic Alliance hasprovided the citizens and communities ofWarwickshire and West Mercia with greaterprotection from harm and more visible policing,alongside evidence that value for money is beingsecured. Many of those interviewed paidtestament to the influence of Keith Bristow, whoseforesight and vision have left an indelible legacynot just on Warwickshire Police but in laying thefoundations for the success of the Alliance.

It was a brave move to go down this path and theimplementation of the original blueprint has beenswift and effective. Other forces look with envy atthe harmonisation of terms and conditions, anissue that has blighted many other collaborativeventures 1. The People Movement Plan deservesparticular mention, as it was a large-scaleredistribution of human assets that could havefailed spectacularly but in fact worked well, as allstaff association representatives concurred. Interms of operational policing, the Alliance can nowmore effectively ‘surge’ resources to deal withunexpected demand, 24-hour cover is availableacross more policing functions, more officers andPolice Community Support Officers (PCSOs) arebased in Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNT) thanin pre-Alliance days and a wider pool of expertiseand experience can be tapped to respondeffectively to policing challenges. Chief officers arereluctant to blow the trumpet too loudly becausethey recognise some limitations with the model,

but from an independent perspective the Allianceoffers invaluable learning to other forces onsuccessful collaboration.

Managing a major change programme is difficultenough without having to find significant financialsavings and to do this with little adverse impact onperformance is quite remarkable, albeit helped bya decline in recorded crime levels in recent years.The Alliance has clearly benefited both forces,though at this stage not necessarily equally. Staffin both forces feel they have been taken over bythe other, and benefits differ in different places – ie,they are situation-specific. Undoubtedly,Warwickshire’s position would by now have beenperilous without the Alliance – swingeing cuts inpolice numbers would have been necessary andneighbourhood policing could have beendecimated. West Mercia could, on its own, haveprovided effective policing while securing the firstphase of required cuts, but with each passing yearthis would become more and more difficult toachieve outside collaboration such as the SA. It isthus quite evidently a symbiotic arrangement thatoffers a platform for success rather than simplyeconomic survival. Perhaps the key measure ofthe Alliance’s achievement is that any futureattempt to unravel this model of integrated policeprovision would fail all serious tests ofcost-effectiveness and practicability. There is nogoing back to two stand-alone forces.

Warwickshire and West Mercia have arrived at acritical juncture in their work to bring policingservices together. Neighbourhood/local policingand the great majority of specialist operationshave in effect been merged under unifiedprocesses and leadership. Similarly, strategicpolicy-setting such as annual policing plans

Taking stock: progress to date

1 The HMIC report, Valuing the Police (July 2014), criticises thecurrent state of collaboration as sub-optimal, with stalling orbackwards movement in some areas and particular weaknessesin joining up HR and Finance.


covers both force areas consistently while supportservices – principally finance, HR, estatemanagement and IT – are increasingly close tobeing fully integrated. The question thus arises –where next? At first blush the two forces havemerged in all but name but closer examinationreveals that this is not an accurate picture. At theapex of the management and governancestructures sit two PCCs, two chief constables andtwo deputies, with some attendant complicationsaround clarities of roles, responsibilities andaccountability mechanisms. Two distinctorganisational cultures remain evident, while somestructural anomalies persist. The route map tomove the Alliance forward in the face ofincreasingly serious financial challenges istherefore a work in progress, hence the invitationto the Police Foundation to cast a critical andindependent eye on what has been achieved and,more particularly, what remains to be done.

Our findings are set out under five headings,outlining current problems/anomalies and thenlater in the report positing possible solutionsunder the same headings, specifically:

• Leadership and the executive team• Accountability and governance• Culture and local identity• Managing the change process• Structural issues

Leadership andthe executive team

Both Warwickshire and West Mercia benefitenormously from a cadre of chief officers andsenior police staff who possess not only a wealthof experience and expertise but who demonstratehigh degrees of trust in each other, and a

willingness to ‘give and take’ on key decisions thatis unusual at this level. Personal relationships havebeen a bedrock for the success of the Alliance todate, as both PCCs acknowledge. But it would bea mistake to take this good fortune for granted.

One threat to the growing credibility and successof the Alliance is what can only be described assub-optimal leadership arrangements, with twochief constables (CCs) and two deputy chiefconstables (DCCs) overseeing an increasinglyunified policing organisation. For an organisationwith an overarching principle of only doing thingsonce the duplication of roles and responsibilities inthe executive team is a glaring contradiction. It willbecome increasingly difficult to defend as the nextround of cuts begins to bite deep, with a realprospect of job losses. Nationally, a policeorganisation of around 3,000 sworn officers and2,500 staff would typically be managed by asix-person executive team of one chief, onedeputy and four assistant chief officers. TheAlliance has eight people working at this level,which is hard to justify and invites challenge as towhether this is a good use of public money.

Both PCCs acknowledge that the currentarrangements can at times slow downdecision-making and entail varying degrees ofcompromise. But it is easy to underestimate howmuch resource, effort and creative energy isrequired for this dual leadership to function. Thecurrent post-holders strive to make thearrangement work but strong personalrelationships between the incumbents cannot beguaranteed in future as personnel change. Inaddition, the willingness to compromise onoperational and other decisions may become evermore difficult without some clarity on how theleadership dilemma will be resolved. The majority


of those spoken to believe that a leadership teamof one CC, a DCC, two Assistant Chief Constables(ACCs) and one or two assistant chief officerswould work well. While there would be somedifficulties in one CC reporting to two PCCs theseare not insurmountable, and to a limited extent thetwo CCs each have dual reporting already.

The ACCs carry major portfolios and have beenheavily involved in designing and implementing theunified structure while the DCCs and CCs seemrelatively less weighed down. (And perhaps as aconsequence involve themselves in tactical issuessuch as equipment changes that should bedelegated to others.) The planned retirement ofNeil Brunton, Warwickshire DCC, presents anopportunity to review roles and responsibilities,and the decision not to fill the vacancy on asubstantive basis, pending longer-term decisionsabout leadership, is a sensible move.

Accountability andgovernance issues The governance and accountability framework forpolicing changed radically in 2012 when the PoliceReform and Social Responsibility Act createdelected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs)to replace police authorities. (The same Actstrengthened the duty upon policing bodies tocollaborate where it is in the interests of theefficiency or effectiveness of their own and otherpolice force areas.) The PCC role is not yetembedded; there have been some high profileproblems and disputes and it is fair to say that ‘thejury is still out’ as to whether PCCs have met theexpectations set by the government 2. The keyrelationship is that between the PCC and his/herchief constable (CC), with PCCs having theultimate power to hire and fire.

Accountability in Warwickshire and West Mercia iscomplicated by the fact that the Alliance – which iseffectively one policing organisation at the level ofACC and below – requires its personnel to reportup to two PCCs, two chiefs and two deputies.This complexity is reflected in a framework thatcurrently falls short of good governance principles.At the apex of the governance structure is theAlliance Governance Board, which meets monthlyand is chaired by the PCCs in rotation; all chiefofficers attend. A weekly Executive Board ischaired by the two CCs in rotation, informed by aweekly Operational Board. The two chiefs meetwith their respective PCCs, approximately weekly.The Police and Crime Panels meet in publicapproximately once a quarter, with a focus on thePolicing Plans and budgets.

Problems with governanceand accountability

Our overall finding is that governance isover-engineered, with lots of duplication: both CCsand both DCCs often attend meetings in tandemand frequent referrals to several boards arerequired before decisions can be confirmed. Themain reason for this cumbersome approachseems to be a perceived need on the part of eachforce to check what is being done so that it is notdisadvantaged. This need should abate as truststrengthens, but there is an enduring vulnerabilityin that trust is based heavily on personalrelationships, which will of necessity change overtime. But at the same time that the governanceand accountability framework is over-engineered,cumbersome and bureaucratic, important gapsexist – in particular, there is too little holding toaccount for value for money. A further concern isthat the Alliance may not have adequately

2 See the Home Affairs Select Committee Report, Police and CrimeCommissioners: Progress to date (May 2014); it concluded that“It is too early to say whether the introduction of PCCs has beena success” and highlighted the need for more intensive training fornew commissioners.


3 These problems are not by any means specific to Warwickshire and WestMercia – the Home Affairs Select Committee report Police and CrimeCommissioners: Progress to date (May 2014) noted that “many panels haveto date struggled to understand their powers and define their role”. It repeatedone former panel member’s description of it as a “crocodile with rubber teeth”.

future-proofed its commendable approach of jointownership of governance responsibilities alongsidea 69:31 division of resources. In other words, afuture West Mercia PCC might seek to reflect thedistribution of resources by abrogating a greatershare of decision-making and governance.

Accountability for operational and financial mattersis not well integrated, especially now that externalaudit has been weakened by the abolition of theAudit Commission and the use nationally of anopaque accounting framework that few peopleunderstand. Overall, value for money is notassessed in a sufficiently robust way, although witha Joint Treasurer and single Director of Finance forthe two forces there should be many opportunitiesto address key value for money issues. Both PCCspraised the work of the Joint Audit Committee(one committee serves both PCCs) which has arole in holding both chiefs and PCCs to account,giving it a pivotal role in the governancearrangements. But across the country Joint AuditCommittees are wrestling with the challenge ofproviding assurance both to chief constables andPCCs even though one of those bodies is chargedwith holding the other to account.

Accountability is weakened by the ad hoc natureof meetings between PCCs and chief officers. Notall meetings between the two PCCs and two chiefconstables occur on a regular formal, minutedbasis, with consequent risks that decisions maybe made on the basis of informal understandingand will lack transparency. The two PCC andDeputy PCCs would benefit from meeting moreregularly with their respective Chief Executivespresent, enabling the latter to bring greatercoherence to the work of the two offices andensuring effective delivery of PCC decisions.

The two Police and Crime Panels are not effectivein attracting and engaging members of the public;their task of holding PCCs to account isundermined by constant churn in membership,with attendant problems of poor understanding ofthe Panel’s role 3. Surprisingly, the Chair of theWest Mercia Police and Crime Panel has nevermet his counterpart in Warwickshire (despitemonths of trying to set up such a meeting). Publicaccountability is very limited – meetings aretypically attended by only a handful of individuals.The West Mercia PCC has created the role of‘community ambassador’ to extend his network of‘eyes and ears’ on the ground but the role seemsneither well defined nor understood. They aredescribed as having a ‘roving brief’ with theattendant risk that they confuse answerability andaccountability – SNT managers are notanswerable to the ambassadors but areaccountable only up the policing chain. Onoccasions the ambassadors’ enthusiasm has ledthem to interfere in local policing matters, orattempt to explain publicly about an operationalincident but get the explanation wrong.

The Alliance seems unbalanced in respect oftransparency and devolvement, partly becauseWarwickshire was a highly devolved force andWest Mercia was gripped from the centre,especially on finance and staffing issues. TheAlliance exhibits both characteristics but notnecessarily in the right ways – ie, sometimes it is‘loose’ when it should be ‘tight’ and vice-versa. Ifground rules do exist on what should be delegatedand how it is accounted for then they are not wellknown or understood. Staff associations areinvolved at key stages of debate and decisions butwithout clear ground rules on confidentiality – eg,on the decision about where to site the merged


Witness Care function, the unions ‘set lots of haresrunning’ about the various options in advance ofany decisions and before the ACC was ready toput specific proposals up for consultation. Thiscaused unnecessary alarm and distress amongstaff, who were looking for clarity and certainty.

Performance monitoring

In line with a changed emphasis from the HomeSecretary, both Warwickshire and West Merciahave moved away from a prescriptive targetsregime. This has proved beneficial in creating morespace for a focus on protection from harm butwork is still required to embed a full understandingof how this principle affects policing on a dailybasis. How should it influence decisions madeabout how officers spend their time and howmanagers direct resources? The answers to theseand related questions need to be set within a fullerand more accurate analysis of demand – “Whereand how do the communities and citizens ofWarwickshire and West Mercia need protectionfrom harm?” – that has yet to be elaborated. Acomprehensive understanding of demand willbecome increasingly important as the policingenvironment changes rapidly, and thus its absenceis a glaring gap.

The absence of national or force targets does notin any way eliminate the need for appropriateperformance information. PCCs cannot knowwhether service standards are rising or fallingwithout relevant data, presented in an accessibleand timely manner. Currently, PCCs lack bothindependent performance information and thecapability to analyse what data is available,though they recognise the need to improve in thisarea. Both forces have stopped the regularperformance forums which existed in the ‘old’ era

of targets, league tables, sanctions for poorperformance etc. In the absence of robustperformance monitoring, PCCs may too oftenresort to ‘analysis by anecdote’ – feeding backcomments or complaints picked up on theirtravels around farmers’ markets, parish councils,neighbourhood forums etc. It is also difficult, whendiscussing police performance with a layaudience, to avoid defaulting to simple metricssuch as police numbers, response times andcrime rates rather than preventative measures –less quantifiable but more valuable.

Questions put to chief officers too often relate todetailed management matters rather thangovernance. Worryingly, there is evidence that attimes the responsibility to pose challengingquestions to the CC is subjugated to theimportance of maintaining good workingrelationships. Risk registers exist but there is littleevidence that they are used properly. Did thePCCs know, for example, that HMIC was likely toreport critically about both forces’ poor record onrape investigation? While it may not always beeasy to maintain a healthy balance betweenchallenge and support, such balance is essential ifPCCs are to maximise beneficial outcomes fortheir policing areas.

Culture and local identity Three key elements permeate the organisationalvision/values of the Alliance:

• everything should be done just once;• protecting the public from harm is at theheart of all police actions; and

• prescriptive targets are not appropriate.

Moving forward the task is to ensure thatstructures, processes and functions are all


aligned to these three principles. Two potentialadditional elements relate to the practicalities ofhow things get done, namely the principles of‘give and take’ and ‘going where the work is’.(The latter in particular builds on doing everythingjust once.) More work is still needed to embedvision/values, especially on the centrality ofprotection from harm among West Mercianofficers and staff. Any decision to move to asingle Operations and Communications Centre(OCC) base may also be a determining factor inhow culture change will be managed.

A consensus is apparent about the maindifferences in organisational culture that came tothe surface as the two forces joined servicestogether. The West Mercia culture is characterisedas more traditional, hierarchical and deferentialwith a tendency towards risk aversion, but alsowith a strong ‘one family’ ethos. Warwickshire’ssmall size is reflected in short lines ofcommunication, a sense that everyone knowseveryone and feels able to approach chief officersdirectly, and decisions are devolved as far aspracticable. But at times devolvement went toofar and decisions had to be recalled to the centre.

As work progressed to unify policies and processesa deliberate decision was made not to push forreconciliation of these cultural traits – rather, to let anew culture emerge organically over time. Inrecognising that some aspects of the old culturesmay not work in the new set-up it is important notto ‘throw babies out with the bathwater’. A cultureaudit has been undertaken to assist with thisstock-take of what needs to be preserved andwhere change is required, which is commendable.

A central motif of the emerging new culture is‘one workforce’ but some clarification would be

helpful to ensure that this very worthy principlecan be embraced. For some people the phrasemeans an end to traditional barriers betweenpolice officers and police staff – the latter oftenfeeling that they are treated as second classcitizens. Warwickshire’s leadership has workedhard to create a sense of ‘we’re all in thistogether’ and achieved a commendable degreeof success. However, some West Mercia officersand staff perceive the ‘one workforce’ adage tomean that Warwickshire and West Mercia forcesare now a unified grouping. Both interpretationsare helpful in moving the Alliance forward butshould not be used interchangeably.

Differences between towns within forceboundaries can be more marked than variancesacross county borders; for example, Worcesterand Stratford-upon-Avon have morecommonalities than Telford and Hereford. It isimportant therefore not to overstate thesignificance of artificial constructs such as WestMercia, which means little or nothing to mostcitizens. It may be more helpful to consider simplythat the Alliance provides policing services to fourcounties, each with a proud history and allrequiring similar – but not identical – levels andtypes of policing.

The issue of logos – notably the traditional bearand ragged staff in Warwickshire, which is thecounty logo as well as the force’s – and wordingon lanyards, vehicles etc has been vexing at timesbut securing a consensus here on core principlescould be extremely helpful. While there is clearlysome attachment on the part of some officers andstaff to logos and existing wording, it is highlydebatable whether the public notice – or careabout – much other than the word ‘police’. Logos


and badging do not in themselves contributeanything to quality of service and there is noevidence that they affect trust and confidence.Consequently, decisions on these matters shouldbe driven by business interests – eg, savingmoney by standardising uniforms – rather thansubjective attachments.

Numerous interviewees referred to the use ofsocial media to communicate with local people,particularly on aspects of neighbourhood policing.Unlike traditional, unilateral communicationchannels such as television and advertising, socialmedia provides an opportunity to establish atwo-way dialogue with audiences, activelyengaging people in conversations rather thansimply providing them with information. Inpractice, however, the police often use socialmedia platforms simply to give or ask forinformation rather than engage in a dialogue withthe public. It will become increasingly importantfor the police to understand and exploit differentforms of social media, developing better ways ofaccessing and interpreting the information that isavailable through it. In the absence of a nationalsocial media strategy the Strategic Alliance shouldconsider developing its own.

Managing the change process

As the Strategic Alliance enters its third year thePCCs and chief officers are keen to examine howit can be “strengthened and deepened”. Apre-requisite is to review the first phase ofamalgamating services, which has been describedbluntly as “crashing the two organisationstogether”. The early change managementprogramme was conducted in silos, with only aco-ordinating role for the centre and with the two

DCCs acting jointly as Senior Responsible Officers(SROs). Most of the work was directorate-led andinevitably some differences emerged. For example,in some instances staff were relieved from theirordinary duties to implement changes but moretypically people delivered the required changes ontop of their day jobs.

Effective communication is a fundamentalunderpinning of a well-managed changeprogramme, aligned with a consultative approachthat helps ensure a degree of ‘ownership’ on thepart of those affected by changes. Clearly, a lot ofeffort went into communicating to the workforcewhat had to change and why, but someimprovement can be made in future by adoptingsome good practice approaches. In particular, thestyle of communication matters almost as muchas content and, on occasions, staff weredismayed by the length of e-mails and memosand/or the amount of jargon used to conveyinformation. They switched off and did not feelimpelled to take responsibility for finding thingsout because they feared that the informationbeing made available was not accessible.

One issue cited frequently by interviewees wasthe inadequacy of HR support for the changeprocess. Too many staff with the necessaryexperience and expertise left the organisation atthe very point when that experience was mostneeded. Consequently, delays occurred inimportant transactional processes such as newcontracts, changed terms and conditions,redeployment and so on. Promises made tomanagers that “we won’t start with gaps” couldnot be kept and resilience was sacrificed in favourof savings. That problems persist with HR supportis evidenced in particular by vacancy levels in


Occupational Health, which at the time of thereview were said to be at around 50 per cent.Occupational Health is a vital resource to help theorganisation adjust to new structures andprocesses, providing support to new workingpractices and an outlet for dealing with workplacestress. If it is not fully staffed this may jeopardisefurther progress and the difficulties arising fromvacancies (which may relate to ‘rate for the job’issues) need to be addressed.

The existing level of reserves – some £87 million –represents both a threat and an opportunity. Theopportunities are obvious, especially in financingsome of the costs of change, funding capitalinvestment and supporting the PCCs’ policingpriorities. But the reserve levels may tempt theHome Office to reduce the degree of financialsupport provided through the grant regime. Theymay also help a new PCC bankroll a decision todismantle elements of the amalgamation ofpolicing provision. It is therefore vital that the PCCsand chief constables agree a detailed proposal forapplication of the reserves and make whatevercommitments are appropriate in this respect asthey reduce the projected level of combinedreserves to approximately £20 million by 2018.

The PCCs should prepare for different electoralscenarios and formulate a contingency plan forlikely changes in the external and internalenvironments, notably the general electionscheduled for 2015 and PCC elections in 2016. (Itis also possible that the referendum onindependence for Scotland, to be held inSeptember 2014, may have implications forEnglish and Welsh forces.)

Structural issues

The next phase is not about ‘crashing’ twoorganisations together and gradually assessingwhat works and what needs amendment, butsystematically preparing for the nextcomprehensive spending review, which willdemand much more painful cost reductions.Warwickshire has previously peered over afinancial precipice and had embarked upon radicalchange prior to the Alliance, whereas West Merciahas achieved substantial gains by ‘plucking thelow hanging fruit’. As everyone acknowledges,future savings will be considerably harder tosecure. Structural change alone cannot delivercost savings or real benefits – streamlining unitsand systems will bring gains only at the margins ofwhat is required. Primarily, structural changesshould reflect the need for greater efficiency andeffectiveness and enable decision-making to bemore timely and less risk-averse. But, asmentioned earlier, the work to date has beenhampered by the lack of a comprehensive androbust analysis of demand across the fourcounties, both explicit (eg, calls for service) andunmet demand in fields such as human traffickingand cyber-enabled crime, which often fail to cometo light in conventional ways. Under the heading ofstructural issues to address we highlight:

• Regional arrangements• Protective Services• Threats to partnership work• Internal structure – anomalies

Regional arrangements

Regional arrangements function effectively –Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs),confidential units etc – but the Alliance lacks


traction in the collective ‘grab’ for resources.Tasking is chaired by an ACC from West MidlandsPolice and, because resources are allocatedaccording to risk and priorities, the West Midlandsarea – and in particular Birmingham – gets the‘lion’s share’. (This is not a criticism, simply astatement of fact.) Governance is very weak, inpart because working relationships among PCCsneed strengthening. The Central MotorwaysPolicing Group (CMPG) almost certainlyrepresents poor value – around one-third of itscost is consumed by overheads (it has its ownperformance, finance, HR etc) and it focuses toomuch on motoring offences or automatic numberplace recognition tasking for the National CrimeAgency (NCA). In the past it has been criticised forits weak performance framework and inadequateprioritisation, and has struggled to demonstratevalue for money. In addition, some concerns havebeen expressed that forces may be ‘hiding’ someof their own costs in CMPG.

Protective Services

Across the range of protective services – majorcrime, Protecting Vulnerable People (PVP),specialist operations etc – West Mercia had builtup its service levels to a gold standard and wasalmost certainly over-provisioned in relation todemand, whereas Warwickshire had strippedprovision right back to dangerous levels and reliedheavily on officers wearing two or three hats tomeet demand. Bringing the two functionstogether under one ACC has allowed somerebalancing and offers both an appropriategeneral level of resourcing and value for money.But three areas merit review, namely:

• pressures on key aspects of ProtectiveServices – for example, the anticipated steep

increase in demands upon PVP, while thehigh-tech units are under-resourced andcannot cope with demand (eg, for forensicexamination of computers) such thatenormous backlogs build up which posemajor risks to public safety and reputation;

• the management structure of the Operationsdepartment, where one superintendent hasaround 600 people under his command; and

• whether there is a continuing need for twosurveillance teams.

Both PCCs articulate a clear vision about‘protecting the front line’ and preserving localidentities. But despite the adoption of protectingpeople from harm as a principal aim, a worryingchasm exists around how protective servicesoperate and why their work will rarely bementioned by members of the public, who tend tosee only visible, accessible policing (ie, bobbieson beats) as important. Without a strong localnarrative on some of the critical issues that sitbelow the public radar – and which carry thegreatest reputational risk – it is possible thatchoices about priorities and allocation of scareresources may not be as well informed as theyshould be.

Threats to partnership work

The austerity regime applies across much of thepublic sector, with local authorities beingespecially challenged to reduce expenditure.Whenever councils need to impose cuts theyfocus, for obvious reasons, on discretionaryservices rather than those underpinned bystatutory requirements. This will have implicationsfor policing if – or more likely when – councilsseek to ‘shunt’ some of the costs incurred ontotheir partners and/or simply stop doing certain


work. Examples of police-related vulnerableservices include whole swathes of communitysafety partnership work, CCTV monitoring, youthservices, some aspects of road safety/trafficmanagement, support for victims of domesticabuse and trading standards enforcement. ThePCCs are alert to this vulnerability but thedetermination to respond effectively is hindered bythe ‘patchwork quilt’ of community safetypartnerships at county, unitary and district levelacross four counties.

Internal structure – anomalies

Finally, we have identified two internal structureissues that may be viewed as anomalous. First,the Professional Standards Department (PSD)does not sit comfortably in the Enabling ServicesDirectorate, as the arrangement requires the Headof PSD to report to two bosses. This breaches acore principle of single lines of accountability andshould be resolved by putting the PSD within thebailiwick of a DCC. The argument that much ofPSD’s work generates learning and intelligence onpolicies and processes that Enabling Services canbest feed back into the organisation is notpersuasive. Second, Finance and EnablingServices are separate directorates whereas inmany similar-sized forces they would moretypically operate as one.


4 Interestingly, the Home Affairs Select Committee report Police and CrimeCommissioners: Progress to date (May 2014) expressed support forthe Alliance and concluded that “Where such alliances prove successfuland supported by the public, we believe there is a case for facilitatingthe full merger of forces under a single PCC and chief constable”.

Leadership andthe executive team

As noted earlier, the Alliance benefits enormouslyfrom a chief officer team with significantexperience and expertise gained in diverse policingenvironments, balancing urban and rural settingsand with a good mix of major crime and otherspecialisms. However, the workload across theexecutive team is not equitable and it is vital thatroles and responsibilities are reviewed to bring abetter balance. At the same time an investment inteam-building would be beneficial. Some appetiteevidently exists for a greater degree of visibility ofthe forces’ leadership and the PCCs. Whilegeography is a constraining factor, efforts shouldbe made to adopt more ‘management bywalkabout’. But of greater concern going forwardis the unresolved dilemma about the number ofposts and the degree of duplication among thefour chief and deputy chief constables.

When the current PCCs were elected the twoforces had embarked upon extensivecollaboration and indeed were moving cautiouslyin the direction of a merger, but this is nowdescribed as being ‘off the table’. West Merciawould be content to unify the Alliance under onechief constable but Warwickshire’s PCC iscommitted to retaining a chief constable for hiscounty for the foreseeable future. Both PCCs arestrongly committed to independence and expressa wish to ‘take politics out of policing’. While it isof course possible to be non-partisan – steeringclear of party political standpoints – the keydecisions which fall to PCCs entail choices aboutthe allocation of scarce public resources and are

thus intrinsically political. In the absence of partypolitical influences, decisions can be driven solelyby the ‘best interests’ test, doing what is right forlocal communities.

It is argued that neither PCC has a democraticmandate to unify the leadership under one chiefconstable and a deputy chief constable. (And notjust because the percentage of West Mercia andWarwickshire residents who actually cast theirvote for the respective PCCs is in single figures.)Some decisions needed to progress the StrategicAlliance – for example, the location of the singlecontrol room – could become highly contentious ifopened up to public debate and/or a referendum.The role of both PCC and chief constable wouldquickly become impossible if a mandate was seenas necessary to underpin every major decision.Perhaps the closest thing to a democraticmandate for the shape of policing in Warwickshirewas the general approval secured duringconsultation in 2006 for a merger withneighbouring forces, in the face of overwhelmingevidence that the force would no longer be viableas a self-sustaining police entity.

What then are the options for the PCCs as theylook ahead to an electoral platform in 2016?Going into the campaign with a status quoposition of two PCCs, two CCs and two DCCs isof course one option, but likely to be criticised insome quarters as an expensive fudge. An electionmanifesto that pledges streamlining leadership –with limited public debate or understanding of theissues – would be a gift to opponents. So if amore streamlined leadership model is to bepursued that stops short of merger 4 it needs to

Going forward: strengtheningand deepening the Alliance


be settled prior to the election, perhaps followinga public consultation exercise that states thebenefits accrued by the Alliance to date andmakes the business case for and against a singlechief constable to lead both Warwickshire andWest Mercia. The level of public support canundoubtedly be influenced by the strength of thebusiness case and the way that the issues areframed.

Accountability and governance

Interview evidence collected for this reviewhighlighted some key weaknesses and gaps inthe governance framework and work is under wayto address these. A reliable body of evidenceexists on good governance principles for publicbodies suggesting that a revamped frameworkshould help the PCCs to:

• be clear about the organisation’s purposeand ensure the provision of high quality,cost-effective services;

• clarify the responsibilities of those chargedwith governance roles;

• put organisational values into practice;• ensure rigorous and transparentdecision-making and effective riskmanagement; and

• take an active, planned approach to dialoguewith, and accountability to, the public andinstitutional stakeholders/partners.

The PCC and Deputy PCC for Warwickshire haveexpressed a wish to see more ‘embeddedgovernance’, reflecting the old police authoritytechnique of posting a Police Authority member onkey management and policy groups and setting upcommittees or working groups, for example, whichmirror force structures. This may or may not be

desirable; it increases the risk that those taskedinitially with a governance role get drawn intooperations and management, becoming socomplicit in decision-making that the scope forobjective oversight is seriously compromised. Buteven if it were possible to embed governance it isalmost certainly not feasible, because the PCCsdo not have the resources to post themselvesand/or their staff across the myriad structure ofpolicy – and decision-making fora that exist in theAlliance. To maximise the delivery of effectivepolicing all four key players – the two PCCs andthe chief constables – must know exactly what isgoing on and that all key matters are minuted andrecorded for defensive purposes. The PCCs mustgrasp the importance of governance at this level –it cannot be delegated.

Accountability across the Alliance is weakened bythe current ad hoc nature of meetings betweenPCCs and chief officers. Meetings between the twoPCCs and two chief constables should be placedon a regular formal, minuted basis to avoid anysuggestion that business is being conducted onthe basis of a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ approach,and to ensure transparency. It would also be helpfulif the two PCCs and Deputy PCCs met regularly asa foursome with their respective Chief Executivespresent. This could facilitate the intention to makethe operation of the two offices more coherent andstreamlined and improve the translation from policyinto practice. Overall, governance andaccountability would benefit from a restatement ofkey principles and a re-design of decision-makingarchitecture, spelling out where key decisions willbe made and formalising through protocols thebases of delegated powers. Such protocols couldalso encompass guidance on consultation andconfidentiality so that parties to policy formulation


and options for decisions are clear about what canbe communicated and when.

However the governance arrangements areenhanced and streamlined, the PCCs shouldaddress, head on, the issue of how to reconcilethe 69:31 resource split with the current 50:50division of governance responsibilities. If therationale is not clear now, the Alliance becomesvulnerable to future challenges.

Accountability for operational and financialmatters should be better integrated, exploiting thebenefit of the Joint Treasurer and Director ofFinance roles – which, unusually, span both forces– and that of the Joint Audit Committee. Togetherthese structures present many opportunities toscrutinise key value for money issues.Consideration should be given to the creation of a‘star chamber’ or equivalent – a high level forumwith a sharp focus on the ‘big ticket’ items in thebudget. It would probe in a structured wayquestions such as “Why do we undertake thisactivity? Could we get the same or better resultsfor less? How should this activity/function changein coming years?”.

PCCs need to understand whether or not servicestandards are rising or falling and should thereforerequire from chief officers relevant performanceinformation presented in an accessible and timelymanner. The PCC role needs to home in on thecritical issues – “Are we delivering what we set outto deliver? Are we getting good value from ourresources? Are our officers and staff deployedaccording to threat and risk?” for example. Inother words, PCCs need to be more intrusive andproactive, and the two newly appointed chiefexecutives clearly understand their role insupporting PCCs here. While a good working

relationship between PCC and the chief constableis important this should not be allowed to becometoo cosy – a degree of bite and challenge isessential if the chief is to be held to account.

The move away from a prescriptive targetsregime was a welcome one and PCCs shouldcontinue to encourage the focus on protectionfrom harm and the application of officerdiscretion. In conveying to local communitieswhat has been achieved by the Strategic Alliance,chief officers and PCCs have commendably triedto home in upon outcomes rather than inputs. Amature evaluation should judge policing on theabsence of crime rather than the response to it,but this requires a shift in both professional andpublic attitudes. PCCs can play a vital role inre-orienting the assessment of policeperformance by holding chief constables toaccount for prevention rather than reaction.

The introduction of community ambassadors hasbeen an interesting and innovative approach tooutreach and can claim a degree of success. Itcan be built upon but there needs to be greaterclarity about the role and some scrutiny of how itis being discharged. In particular, ambassadorsneed to be very careful not to conflateanswerability and accountability.

Efforts should be made to strengthen the work ofthe Police and Crime Panels. Legislation (thePolice Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011)points to a dual role of ‘light touch’ scrutiny of,and support to, PCCs, and as noted earlier it canbe hard to strike an appropriate balance betweenchallenge and support. The churn in membershipis problematic and panels have very limitedresources at their disposal to train members andexercise an effective scrutiny role. It is unclear


how amenable these issues are to improvementwithout changes in legislation, but some obvioussteps could be taken. The PCCs could facilitateregular meetings with both Panel chairs andprovide a forward plan of key decisions andsupporting information. PCCs could also exploitthe potential leverage of Panels in developingstrategies for effective partnership work aroundcrime reduction and prevention. The PCCs mightalso consider how they can strengthen thePanels’ ability to exercise scrutiny, perhapsthrough funding for training programmes.

A linked issue is the need for PCCs to delineatemore fully what they hope to achieve over andabove police-specific goals. It is evident that bothPCCs have thrown themselves wholeheartedlyinto their police commissioner role, representingtheir diverse communities and seeking to holdchief constables to account. But by their ownadmission much of the ‘and Crime’ element ofthe PCC role has yet to receive the sameattention. Victim care and commissioningstrategies are still in their relative infancy but arenow clearly on the agenda, and Police and CrimePanels could play a useful role in fleshing theseout and helping in their delivery.

Culture and local identity

As work progressed to unify policies andprocesses a deliberate decision was made not topush culture change and try to reconcile theseand other differences quickly – rather, theapproach was to let a new culture emergeorganically over time. Given the amount of changethat had to be absorbed in the first two years ofthe Alliance this may well have been the rightapproach, but it is evident now that moving

forward will require more explicit consideration ofkey elements of organisational culture, such as:

• our vision – what is policing about?• leadership styles;• degrees of empowerment – getting the‘loose/tight’ balance right; and

• inclusivity – breaking down barriers betweensworn officers and police staff.

Chief officers and others have expressed a stronginterest in pushing a more radical approach toculture change, moving on from the basicdevelopmental model – small incremental steps toimprove – and the transitional approach ofrebuilding in a series of revisions , replacing ‘whatis’ with new approaches. The desired model istransformational, a brave and challengingapproach that is often prompted by majorchanges in the external environment. In thepolicing context these pressures include thefinancial strictures of the comprehensive spendingreview, implications of the Winsor reports 5,problems with the working of the criminal justicesystem and potential political changes that mayflow from the General Election in 2015. Atransformational change programme does nothave a specified end point but is more akin to aleap into the unknown, and cannot be managedsolely within linear, time-bound programme.Change occurs in four key areas:

• organisational vision;• people – what skill sets are needed, how theyrelate to each other;

• the nature of the services delivered; and• processes involved in the delivery of services.

It would without doubt be a major undertaking toembark upon a transformational change

5 The reports: Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remunerationand Conditions – Part 1 Report (March 2011) and Independent Review ofPolice Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions – Final Report(March 2012) were an outcome of an independent review into police payand conditions conducted by Thomas P Winsor.


programme and it is understandable that a degreeof trepidation accompanies these discussions.But it would reflect the need to think verydifferently about the nature of the policing demandconfronting the Alliance and how it shapes itsresponse. An opportunity exists in the shape ofthe single OCC to make a major impression onculture and mindset across the organisation. Thesignificance for the Alliance moving forward of asingle command and control facility covering allfour counties cannot be overstated. In terms oftechnological capability it has long been possiblefor one facility to serve two or more forces; thestumbling block has been the strong culturaltradition that gave pre-eminence to a chiefconstable’s command and control of resources.The OCC decision marks a break with thistradition and reflects the maturity of the dialoguebetween PCCs and chief officers about how toprogress the Alliance.

Local identity is clearly seen as a key element ofculture change, but does not seem to be underthreat. Local policing is the building block, theplatform on which everything else is based andthe SNTs are largely unaffected by the Alliance(other than positively by being better supported).It is vital that PCCs in particular are clear on whatis meant by ‘local’ and ‘front-line’ policing in thecontext of a rapidly changing environment; crimeis increasingly not rooted in a physical place –streets, homes, parks etc – but in cyberspace.(This also casts further doubt upon the relevanceto the public of branding and logos.)

At the same time methods of communication arechanging – increasingly people obtain news andviews via mechanisms such as the internet,Facebook, Twitter etc rather than newspapers or

meetings. In a consent-based policing systemengagement is crucial in building public trust andconfidence. Social media enables the police toengage better and to build relationships as well asto gather information and intelligence. It allowsofficers to respond in real time to incidents andcan help forces demonstrate greateraccountability and transparency. An onlinepresence which is interactive, rather than onewhich simply provides information, can create apersonal connection with users and promotepositive attitudes. It is particularly useful forengaging with ‘hard to reach’ groups, reaching adifferent demographic from those (very few!) whotraditionally attend public meetings; in particular,young people are much more likely to contact thepolice online. These issues could usefully becaptured in a social media strategy specific to theAlliance.

Managing the change process

The success achieved in ensuring a ‘business asusual’ approach throughout the first phase ofamalgamation is testament to the dedication,diligence and quality of the staff involved, butcame at a cost. ‘Change fatigue’ is evident andsome problems/mistakes are still being workedthrough. What lessons can be learned for the nextphase of change, especially if the nature ofchange migrates from developmental/transitionalto a fully transformational model?

Any organisation going through a changeprogramme can benefit from the use of a triedand tested model to help navigate from A to B.One potentially helpful public sector managementmodel identifies six structural concepts orelements which can be the building blocks of


reform, sometimes known as the three ‘Ss’ andthree ‘Ps’, namely:

• Strategy• Structure• Systems – operational, HR, finance, etc• People• Performance• Politics

This model is designed on principles of clarity andsimplicity and its strengths lie in the unity of vision,coherence and its all-encompassing nature. Theconcept of strategy is the key component of themodel as it ‘drives’ the other concepts includingfinancial management. Another well-knownapproach is the McKinsey 7S model. Thisidentifies the ‘hard’ components of strategy,structure and systems which can be directlyinfluenced by management, and the ‘soft’, lesstangible elements of shared values, staff, skillsand style which are more influenced by culture.Each element must be aligned to achieve mutualreinforcement and the model helps inunderstanding how the various elementsinter-relate as the organisation is transformed.

It may seem a statement of the obvious butmanaging a major business change programmethat encompasses complex IT and other projectsis not the core business of police forces, and theyare thus most unlikely to possess the relevantskills, knowledge and experience needed to besuccessful in such endeavours. This fact must beat the forefront of decisions about how toresource the work and how to ensure effectivegovernance that contains the necessary checksand balances. A robust programme managementapproach must be adhered to throughout,including techniques such as critical gateway

reviews, alongside a financial reporting systemwith an appropriate level of granularity to keepcosts on track. It would be a good investment toprovide formal training in change management tosome senior officers and staff.

One of the cultural features of successful changemanagement is honest reporting of progress thatavoids optimistic, ‘rose-tinted’ briefings, lullingchief officers and PCCs into a false sense ofsecurity until disaster strikes. (One characteristicof traditional police culture has been that badnews does not travel upwards.) Staff can beencouraged to air doubts and concerns in a safeenvironment through techniques such as‘pre-mortems’, which ask people “If this newproject/programme were to fail, what do you thinkwould be the most likely causes of failure?”.

Going forward there should be just one SRO, withone of the DCCs an obvious choice for this role.The SRO needs to be supported by a centralprogramme team to drive the process on a ‘wholeorganisation’ basis, supported by newappointments – either temporary contracts orspecialist consultants – with relevant experienceand expertise. Such expenditure would be a gooduse of the reserves. A new Blueprint is needed inthe shape of a detailed programme planencompassing structure, governance, milestones,risk assessments and so on.

Officer and staff morale must remain a keyconsideration, given the change fatigue referred toabove. This can be mitigated through morebottom-up engagement (we note that the recentHMIC report on achievement of savings wascritical on this point), acknowledging feedbackfrom staff, recognising good ideas and formulatinga comprehensive plan for consulting the


workforce and partners as to how the Alliance willdevelop. Rather than telling the workforce whatdecisions have been made, managers can seektheir buy in, minimising the resistance to changeand providing a platform for success. Essentialpoints for effective communication are: keep itsimple, do not promise what cannot be deliveredand avoid leakages about decisions before theyhave been confirmed and explained. It may beworth securing some expert support ondeveloping and implementing a communicationsstrategy to support transformational change.

A factor in bringing services together was thedecision that for key processes one force’sapproach would be adopted for functions such asIT, finance, HR and duties management etc,across the Alliance. Inevitably, there was often animperfect fit for practical or cultural reasons andsome adaptation was needed. Such processevolution should be planned and prioritised toextract maximum benefit, and not allowed tohappen organically on an ad hoc basis.

Going forward there should be an absolutecommitment to anticipate vacancies and avoid,as far as is practicable, delays in filling them.Again, this is a legitimate use of reserves insupport of the change process. A linked issue isbusiness continuity, which ensures that majorchanges such as the move to a single commandand control are conducted without disruption toservices. For major, complex projects such asthe OCC business continuity will requireconsiderable investment in the shape of back-upsystems, experienced staff and a degree of‘doubling up’ of posts. While the resources areavailable to support business continuity, theneed for it to be carefully planned and managed

should feature prominently in the overall changeprogramme strategy.

In order to maintain momentum the PCCs shouldconsider an initiative or gesture to help ‘kick start’the next phase. An example would be anagreement that the two offices of the PCCs – ledby the chief executives – will share resources ormerge particular functions such ascommunications/PR. This would have theadvantage of unifying the key messages of thetwo PCCs as well as sending a clear message toofficers, staff and the public that the two PCCsare integrating some of their resources too.Publication of a single Police and Crime Plan(underpinned by a single strategic assessment)would also go some way towards ‘strengtheningand deepening’ the Alliance.

As noted earlier, the Alliance would benefit from astrategic plan on how best to exploit the veryfavourable position afforded by the scale of thecombined reserves. While absolutely notadvocating a ‘blank cheque’ approach, a verystrong case can be made to draw upon reservesspecifically to support the change managementprogramme – in particular, buying in expertise andbackfilling to avoid gaps in service as changes aremade to structures and processes.

Structural issues –form follows function

Before considering any element of structuralchange the first priority is to undertake athorough, robust assessment of demand (risk,harm, threat) to identify where mismatches exist inrelation to resource usage. This exercise, ifconducted in a comprehensive and disciplinedway, will highlight some areas/functions from


which resources can be trimmed or withdrawnaltogether (including the rising number ofnon-crime incidents to which the police respond)as well as pinpointing unmet need. Most forceshave undertaken exercises of this kind in recentyears but with varying degrees of robustness –Staffordshire is cited as an example of one of themost intensive approaches. The best possibleunderstanding of demand is needed to planstructures for the future and optimise resourceallocation, and this needs to be treated as astandalone project, not a task grafted ontosomeone’s day job. Staffordshire Police usedexternal consultants to support the work and thismay be a route to follow. Warwick BusinessSchool is currently conducting a major analysis onthe factors driving police service delivery whichmay also be useful. The key players in the Alliancemust identify and tackle weaknesses jointly – forexample, in protecting vulnerable people –wherever they exist either functionally orgeographically. This may require more flexibilityand fluidity in how resources are brigaded.

A robust demand analysis may also identify scopefor managing down the expectations of partnersand the wider public by promoting prevention andself-policing. This could apply particularly in thefield of cyber crime, where businesses andindividuals must take more responsibility forprotection against hacking by keeping security upto date, changing passwords regularly and so on.Prevention remains the poor relation of policework, with resources channelled predominantlyinto reaction and investigation after the fact. PCCsand chief officers could derive very substantialbenefits for their communities if they moreeffectively championed prevention and self-help,through campaigns and public education

programmes as well as targeted training forpublic-facing officers.

Earlier we highlighted some problems and optionsunder a heading of structural change, covering:

• Regional arrangements• Protective Services • Threats to partnership work• Internal structure – anomalies

Regional arrangements

Regional collaboration is seen nationally as theappropriate response to major cross-border crimeand some elements of protective services, andthere is little appetite for a large-scale withdrawalfrom regional work, much of which functions veryeffectively. But this general satisfaction should notblinker the Alliance from looking critically at certainaspects of current collaboration. Everyoneaccepts that current governance arrangementsare weak but is this simply to be tolerated, or arethere ways of challenging it? One or two aspectsof collaboration offer less value for money thanothers, with roads policing being the primeexample and the ROCU coming under somescrutiny.

If there is little prospect of improvement in termsof both governance and operational returns oninvestment in the ROCU, it may be prudent toconsider the Kent/Essex model on tacklingserious and organised crime. (These forces arecurrently in talks with the Home Office to seewhether they can withdraw from ROCUarrangements.) The Alliance should give seriousthought to withdrawing from CMPG if it candemonstrate objectively that the investment (wellover £1 million annually) could be better spent. It


might, for example, deploy ‘mini task forces’ tocrime/harm hot spots, or alternatively adopt aversion of the West Yorkshire approach, wherebya specialist roads policing team (Odyssey) targetsmajor criminals operating across the area, to goodeffect. The business case for staying in the CMPGmust be made convincingly in the face of strongcounter-arguments for withdrawal on bothfinancial and policing grounds – other areas ofProtective Services have a strong argument foradditional resources.

Protective Services

Everyone in West Mercia and Warwickshire isacutely aware that enduring financial pressures willmake it ever more difficult to maintain currentservice levels, irrespective of improvements inefficiency and effectiveness. It is vital that, despitethese pressures, PCCs and other public figures donot pander to populism by promising at all costs to‘protect the front line’ or ‘preserve visible policing’.Effective policing – protecting people andcommunities from harm – requires a balancebetween the work of neighbourhood teams andthe range of specialist operations and investigation.Much vital policing is completely hidden from publicview and in many instances must remain so.Internet-enabled crime in all its facets cannot bedealt with by uniformed officers on the beat and ahigh level of visible reassurance patrol will notmaintain confidence if levels of serious crime andoffences such as on-line paedophilia, ID theft andcomputer hacking go unchecked becauseProtective Services have been denuded.

A worrying aspect of the way that the publicagenda across the four counties is conducted isan imbalance in this area – the importance of

Protective Services is not being well promoted,even though this aspect of policing carries thebulk of reputational risk. PCCs should strive tocreate and promote a compelling local narrativeon serious and organised crime, and help raisepublic awareness of how citizens can best protectthemselves against new crime threats such ascyber-crime and internet-enabled fraud. In relationto protecting the public from harm, further workcould be done to give victims a stronger voiceand improve their experience.

As resources contract, the need to review theirallocation between different elements of policingbecomes ever more critical, and there is anawareness of particular pressures upon PVP thatmust be addressed. Everyone acknowledges thatPVP almost certainly will require more resourcesso there is an urgent need for a rapid consensuson where these resources will come from, and aplan to implement these decisions. Our attentionwas also drawn to the need for the managementof the specialist operations department to bestrengthened to create greater resilience atsuperintending and inspector ranks.

In looking for ways to strengthen elements ofProtective Services in difficult financialcircumstances, the Alliance should consider theviability of its two surveillance teams. Conventionalsurveillance is very people-intensive and thus ahighly expensive resource. While it does still havea place in investigative work, much tracking ofcriminals’ movements can now be done throughcomputers and mobile phone tracking, or throughopen source information such as credit cardtransactions, ATM withdrawals – even the use ofOcado orders or Nectar cards. Calls forsurveillance are often a stock request from Senior


Investigating Officers (SIOs) but there needs to bemore challenge to them – asking first “Whatexactly is your intelligence requirement?” thenresponding to that in the most cost-efficient way.

Another potential source of additional funds forProtective Services is Project Athena, a majornational network (although currently without 100per cent sign-up) which will create a substantial,consolidated and accessible database of criminaland other Criminal Justice Service (CJS) recordsdrawn from all of the constituent forces. It willspeed up the process of investigation by makinglinks between offences and offenders and should,over time, allow a reduction in IT staffing. It maybe worth reviewing whether the spend on thisproject can be speeded up to release thebenefits more quickly. And there are alsoanalytical software programmes for improvingdata-sharing on organised crime groups, suchas ‘click-tech’, and a crime group mappingtool being developed in Greater ManchesterPolice, which merit exploration.

Partnership work

The PCCs are very conscious of the pressuresthat their partners in community safety work areexperiencing, which will only increase as financialcutbacks intensify. It may become necessary toestablish criteria for joint work so that the Alliancecan hold partners to account for retrenchment –the more willingness shown to take up any slack,the greater will be the temptation for councils andothers to cost shunt.

Internal structure – anomalies

Professional Standards does not sit comfortably inthe Enabling Services Directorate, primarily

because this location requires the Head of PSD toreport to two bosses. (The Director of EnablingServices can handle day-to-day management butnot issues of professional corruption and the like.)This breaches a core principle of single lines ofaccountability and should be resolved by puttingPSD within the bailiwick of a DCC. While there ismerit currently in keeping Finance and EnablingServices as separate directorates because of theworkload generated by merging processes andestablishing new ways of working, a migrationplan to a single directorate should be formulatedonce new processes and structures have beddeddown. It is also worth noting that much of theFinance Directorate workload flows from the needto account for two organisations rather than one.Finance and accounting for a single organisationwould be markedly simpler.

While sympathetic to the reality that estatestrategies tend to work on the basis of decadesrather than annual cycles, some further thoughtneeds to be given to how ‘surplus’ properties aremanaged. Adhering to the adage that ‘formfollows function’ means that sometimesdecisions must be made to either leaveproperties empty or sell at a loss rather thanshoehorning units into locations that do not meetthe optimal operational requirement – anexample being the move of intelligence teams toRugby, which caused significant operationalproblems. The Joint Property Vehicle looksextremely promising and could provide a modelfor future provision of support services, but untilit is up and running, any decisions to replicatethe approach would be premature.

Throughout the interviews we invited views onwhether the Alliance approach could be extended


beyond Warwickshire and West Mercia. Mostrespondents agreed that, while in theory it wouldbe possible to bring a third force into the Alliance,practical and other difficulties make it anunattractive option that is best taken off theagenda completely for the foreseeable future.More benefit might be secured from taking onfunctions for non-police organisations, theobvious example being the dispatch function for afire service. More calls for service to fire brigadesemanate from road traffic accidents than fromfires, so the learning curve for OCC operatorswould not be steep and the workload is relativelyvery small. Northamptonshire has gone some waydown this road and may merit contact from PCCsto explore further.

A final point on structure relates to the possibilitythat some services may in future be outsourced, inline with the patterns followed by an increasingnumber of forces to create ‘mixed economies’ 6.But whenever the question was posed inWarwickshire and West Mercia the stock responsewas ‘not until we’ve squeezed every last efficiencyfrom current arrangements’. The Alliance needs tobe more proactive in exploring opportunities forcontracting out – waiting until all existing pips havebeen squeezed is a recipe for inaction, as thiscounsel of perfection is rarely achieved.

Engaging with private contractors requires bothtime and specialist expertise, otherwise thelikelihood is that resulting arrangements are morelikely to favour contractors rather than the publicpurse. It is vital that preparatory work starts now,to identify options for outsourcing and ifnecessary to bring in relevant specialists incontract specification and tendering etc. Contractflexibility is critical – outsourcing must deliver

significant operational cost savings and ideallycontracts should be let for short but renewableperiods. This would allow the contracting body toalter the contract as appropriate at the completionof each contracted period. A major problem withoutsourcing is that, while it may offer a reductionin overhead costs, the agency may become a‘captured consumer’, totally reliant on the servicesprovided by the outsource contractor or supplier.The power imbalance could then potentially growover time in the supplier’s favour, or even create amonopoly situation.

The most obvious areas for outsourcing includethe transactional elements of HR and finance,such as payroll, recruitment and recordsmanagement but too often efforts to combinewith other forces in pursuit of economies of scaleare stymied by a collective unwillingness tocompromise over the lead role. In other words,forces see the benefits of grouping thesefunctions in one contract but each wants thesystem adopted to be theirs, rather than cedeownership. The other potentially fruitful area for adegree of outsourcing/privatising is IT but a majorstumbling block here is a lack of commonality inoperating platforms and inadequate nationaldirectives to exploit economies of scale. Anypressure that PCCs and chief officers can exert tocreate a more beneficial environment for nationalIT solutions would be very worthwhile.

6 After much debate and resistance the near monopoly role of theForensic Science Service was broken up in favour of competitivecontracts and, without any loss of service quality, the police servicebill for forensics dropped from £200 million to £130 million, withexpectations of significant further reductions.


A new model of policing?The economic recession, which began in late2007, changed the fiscal landscape for policingand other public services, and ushered in an eraof tight financial settlements that is expected tolast up to a decade. (Some pessimisticpredictions point to a halving of current spendingpower by 2020.) Forces are being pressed both tomaintain officer numbers – for fear of a publicbacklash if swingeing cuts are made – andcontinue to deliver high quality services, includingspecial programmes such as community policing,while budgets are reducing. To pull off this trickybalancing act, police managers are examiningnew and alternative approaches from a menu ofoptions that include collaboration, regionalisationof some services, outsourcing, civilianisation andrestructuring. Some see the task as a relentless,grinding search for efficiencies but others are keento seize the opportunity presented by a changingclimate to innovate, breaking away fromconventional models of police service delivery.Difficult decisions about saying ‘no’ to certainnon-priority demands on resources have morelegitimacy when, metaphorically, backs are upagainst the wall. And extreme external pressuresmay help to overcome traditional, ratherbureaucratic policing cultures characterised byinflexibility, lack of innovation and creativity andresistance to change.

The Strategic Alliance has, to some extent, a footin both camps. It has delivered a raft of savingsand efficiency gains through traditional methodsbut is not shying away from asking radicalquestions about how policing must change tomeet the challenges of ‘new’ crimes, risingdemand and shrinking resources. It is vital that theAlliance avoids an incremental approach tosecuring savings, resorting to historical strategies

of fine-tuning, streamlining, staffing cuts and‘salami slicing’ the current structures andprocesses, which are too cemented in traditionalsilos. Instead, PCCs and chief officers shouldconsider what shape the organisation needs to bein five years’ time and beyond. Along with otherforces, the Alliance will need to adapt itsproblem-oriented approach to policing in a worldwhere geographic borders matter less and less,while a rapid and intelligent response to differentpatterns of criminality matters more and more.Supporting this more innovative thinking is arealisation of the limitations of the currentmeasures of crime and police agencyperformance; a comprehensive, dynamic andflexible management and performance frameworkis required to adapt to any further changes in theoperating environment.

A whole raft of work is now related tocyber-enabled crime – fraud, ID theft, hacking,child sex exploitation and so on – which oftencrosses borders (force and national) or ignoresthem altogether. An informed view is that thepolice service cannot simply enforce its way out ofthis problem because the threat is often neithergeographically based nor responsive toconventional policing tactics. Increasingly, theresponse is through regional or national resourcessuch as confidential units, ROCUs, the NCA andeven GCHQ. Forces need to invest in skilledpeople who understand the cyber-crime businessand how it can be tackled. These are not likely tobe career detectives although, with a modicum oftraining, generalist officers (in the CriminalInvestigation Department and SNTs) can do muchof the work. Indeed, the government’scyber-security strategy requires forces tomainstream cyber awareness, capacity and


capability and improve their understanding of itsscale and nature as well as their skills in dealingwith it. The Home Affairs Select Committee reporton e-crime recommends that forces setbenchmarks to gauge whether such skills areimproving. The Alliance could review current crimereport forms to flag (if not already included) anydigital connection/evidence relating to a crime, andthus enhance understanding of the scale andnature of the e-crime problem. Obviously there is aresource implication here so the Alliance mustdetermine what it can reasonably deliver. Althoughthe government has provided some additionalfunding, to do this work properly the Alliancewould benefit from investment in a dedicated teamto help shape thinking.

With a paucity of enforcement options available,prevention becomes ever more important butmost police officers are ill-equipped to offerappropriate advice. Crime prevention is still stuckin ‘bolts and locks’ type of advice rather thanprotecting people’s computers from botnets andother malware attacks, for example. A newpolicing model will almost certainly represent ahuge cultural shift and require a very different andmore diverse workforce. We will increasingly neednot the ‘50-year old sweaty detective’ but20-plus year olds who have grown up usingcomputers on a daily basis. In addition to cyber,the other marked change in criminal activityconcerns fraud, which since the banking crisishas grown alarmingly and is now probably moredamaging and costly than illicit drugs 7. Usingconventional CJS responses to combat fraud isuntenable – it is both too expensive and oftenunsuccessful – so we need to gear up for afuture where the police take much moreresponsibility, with PCCs, for developing new

approaches to prevent and tackle fraud(including cyber-enabled fraud).

Across England and Wales forces have embarkedupon a range of change programmes which couldbe described as ‘new policing models’ butcommonalities are difficult to discern other thanthe acknowledgement that there is no ‘silverbullet’ magically transforming the core business.Design and implementation of new approaches ispart trial and error, part act of faith and a hugedose of hard work. But one factor that doesfeature in some of the more successfuldevelopments concerns integration with otheragencies to tackle a small number of highlychaotic and costly problem families whichconsume a significant degree of resources for allthe agencies involved. This phenomenon is not byany means a new revelation but, over the lastdecade or more, the responses have continued tobe isolated and atomised with a principal goal ofreferring the problems on. But success can comeonly from integrated multi-agency andmulti-disciplinary teams that share informationabout, and co-ordinate triaged responses to,troubled families and individuals. Leading edgepractice here emphasises the need to create apublic sector ethos in which relationships, trust,integrity and a holistic approach to the family canflourish. Typically, each troubled family is allocateda key worker who engages with the whole familyto generate sustainable changes in behaviour. Inworking closely with the local authority and otheragencies addressing troubled families, effectivepolicing focuses in particular on preventivestrategies around domestic abuse.

Consideration about changing models of policingcan be informed by asking three basic questions,

7 Lancashire Constabulary estimate an increase in reported fraud ofalmost 200 per cent since the onset of the recession.


8 Although considerable resources are now absorbed by alcohol-relatedoffending, especially where a thriving night-time economy exists, andit is fair to ask whether more of these costs should be borne by pubs,clubs and drinks manufacturers.

not dissimilar to the ‘must/should/could’ testsapplied in the early Blueprint:

• What are the activities we must alwaysundertake? These would include ProtectiveServices, some crime investigation and adegree of neighbourhood policing.

• Which areas of policing demand arediminishing? Examples include burglary andmotor vehicle crime. Violent crime in theconventional sense of public disorder andassault is also falling,8 but the police areincreasingly drawn into the more opaqueworld of internet-related bullying andharassment such as trolls. The police mayalso benefit from criteria to assistdecision-making on how best to respond tonon-crime incidents, especially aroundnuisance and antisocial behaviour whichstops short of the criminal threshold, wheredemand is rising as other agencies reactpredictably to budget pressures by cuttingback on services.

• Where do we need to invest to meetrising demand? Cybercrime in all itsmanifestations and fraud are the mostobvious examples, along with elements of thePVP agenda, especially around sexualoffences and child and domestic abuse.Vulnerability may merit explicit inclusion in thethreat/risk/harm matrix.

PCCs and forces can and often do conductrobust analyses of this kind but may struggle tobalance them against public concerns, which maybe ill-informed (ie, lacking an evidence base orfounded on expectations that the police willrespond to matters which are not within theirlocus). This poses a dilemma when it comes to

allocating resources to national security threats,which is why the government publishes theannual Strategic Policing Requirement. Does theAlliance conduct an annual evidence-basedassessment of national threats as part of itsStrategic Threat and Risk Assessment?

It is important to ensure clarity of purpose goingforward – what is the Alliance’s sharedvision/purpose? The Alliance could become abeacon of best practice in delivering cutting edge,‘fleet-of-foot’ policing services that places harmreduction at the core of its business, whoever itaffects and wherever it occurs. But PCCs need toconvey confidence that this is the direction theywish to pursue, and communicate it effectively.The question “What is the end game?” has to beanswered convincingly, given that many officersand staff consider that the two forces haveeffectively merged already. Key questions posedin this context include “What does fair policinglook like?”. This will assume increasing importancefollowing HMIC’s recent announcement that it willconduct annual inspections of every force basedaround three criteria – efficiency, effectiveness andlegitimacy. All forces will need to consider howthey measure and improve police trust andlegitimacy with ‘fair policing’ being a corecomponent here.

PCCs should prepare for different electoralscenarios, notably the General Election scheduledfor 2015 and PCC elections in 2016 andformulate a contingency plan for likely changes inthe external and internal environments. (It is alsopossible that the referendum on independence forScotland, to be held in September 2014, mayrequire a response from English and Welshforces.) The most radical structural change would


9 At the ACPO conference in June 2014 various speakers predictedthat in some areas the required budgetary cuts can only be managedthrough a merger process.

of course be a full merger of the two forces. Thecurrent Home Office position is understood to beto support and facilitate voluntary mergers but notto impose them; this may change if the 2015general election produces a Labour governmentas the party now favours fewer, larger forces9.

Warwickshire’s PCC has expressed strongopposition to a merger, believing that the county’spopulation values its force and the role that theforce and chief constable play in local identity. Inaddition, his preference is for small rather thanlarge-scale entities and he worries that a mergerwould impact negatively on force morale. Butwhatever the strength of feeling against a mergerthere is an argument for some objective analysis –what is the business case for and against amerger? What would be the financial implicationsof a full merger, bearing in mind that theframework for the current collaboration (notably,the 69:31 resourcing split) is quite complex?Nationally, talk of mergers will not go away, withsome considerations either bubbling up fromforces on the brink of non-viability or filtering downfrom governmental recognition that 43 forcescannot be sustained going forward. It is surelybetter to anticipate the continuing debate andsecure a position for Warwickshire and WestMercia that meets all relevant criteria for value formoney and resilient, effective policing.


GlossaryACC Assistant Chief Constable

CC Chief Constable

CMPG Central Motorways Policing Group

DCC Deputy Chief Constable

HMIC Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary

NCA National Crime Agency

OCC Operations and Communications Centre

PCC Police and Crime Commissioner

PCSO Police Community Support Officer

PSD Professional Standards Department

PVP Protecting Vulnerable People

ROCU Regional Organised Crime Unit

SIO Senior Investigating Officer

SNT Safer Neighbourhood Team

SRO Senior Responsible Officer

© 2014: The Police Foundation

ISBN: 0 947692 55 X

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Enquiries concerning reproduction should be sent tothe Police Foundation at [email protected].

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