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    ::TABLE OF CONTENTS::

    Abbreviations 4Executive Summary .. 5Introduction ... 7

    Background ... 9Methodology . 11Findings ......................................................................... 12

    Mobile Africa........................... 12Case Study: The Haitian Diaspora in Boston and UShahidi... . 17Telecommunications Access in Sudan 24Contacting Sudan: Online Survey... ...... 31How I Connect: Phone Survey ....... 41

    Recommendations and Implementation 48 Recommendation One: MSK Social Technographics Ladder .. 49 Recommendation Two: Preliminary Technographics Survey .. 53

    Recommendation Three: A New Telecommunicati ons Strategy ... 55Next Steps . 63Conclusion 65Endnotes 66Appendices 71

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    ::ABBREVIATIONS::

    CPA Comprehensive Peace AgreementGNI Gross National Income

    GoS Government of SudanGSMA Global System for Mobile Communications AssociationICT Information and Communication TechnologiesICT4D Information and Communications Technology for Development (ICT4D)IXP Internet Exchange PointITU International Telecommunications UnionMSK My Sisters Keeper SDG Sudanese PoundsSfP Sisterhood for PeaceSfP-Sudan Sisterhood for Peace Sudan network SfP-US Sisterhood for Peace U.S. network

    SPLM Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement Telecom Telecommunications or telecommunications companyUS$ United States Dollars

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    Contact via email, followed closely by calling mobile phones, are the preferred modes of U.S.-based advocacy and development organizations for communication with contacts inSudan. Nevertheless, organizations reach out to Sudanese contacts using a number of other technologies, especially Internet-based tools.

    The women of MSKs Sisterhood for Peace network can be easily organized according totelecommunications access. While most have access to a mobile phone, only half haveaccess to internet, and a very few have personal email addresses.

    Recommendations:

    1. Organize members of the SfP-Sudan network through a Social TechnographicsLadder.

    2. Categorize new members of the SfP-Sudan network according to the Social

    Technographics model by administering a brief preliminary survey.

    3. Diversify outreach methods to include phone calls, email, text messaging, and word-of-mouth communications so that members at every level of the SocialTechnographics Ladder will stay connected to MSK.

    Ultimately, MSKs new telecommunications strategy should improve the organizations

    ability to foster dialogue and build relationships between the U.S.-based Sisterhood for Peace

    network and the growing network of women in Sudan.

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    ::INTRODUCTION::

    ital to the mission of My Sisters Keeper (MSK) is creatingstrong, mutually supportive relationships between womenthat will ultimately engender social change. The

    organization is currently focused upon the Sisterhood for Peaceinitiative, which brings together Sudanese women to call for peacein their war-torn country . For My Sisters Keeper, the means creating a sisterhood of Sudanese women are just as important asis the desired end-state of peace in Sudan. While building closebonds between strangers is always difficult, deeply rooted ethnicand religious rivalries make the task doubly complex in Sudan. Tofurther complicate MSKs goal, the Sisterhood for Peace initiative(SfP) is a transnational endeavor, aiming to link women from theSudanese Diaspora who have resettled in the United States andCanada with women in Sudan. Hence, the organization must bridgenot only ideological divides, but also physical ones.

    In spite of these challenges, since November 2009, the SfPinitiative has assembled a network of nearly 70 Sudanese womenwho consistently demonstrate that working together is their toppriority. Over forty of these women reside in the United States andCanada, while the rest live in several different cities in Sudan.

    In the process of working together towards peace, thewomen of the SfP network in the United States (SfP-U.S.) havediscovered that social networking has the potential to radicallyempower Sudanese women. On a surface level, frequentcommunications through conference calls and emails have allowedwomen in SfP-U.S. to share knowledge and brainstorm ideas abouthow women can carve out the pathways to peace for Sudan. On adeeper level, the initiative has inspired sistergirlfriendhood between Sudanese women across the U.S. Women have foundwithin SfP-U.S. a support group to confer with for anything fromnaturalization advice to medical assistance. The easily accessibletelecommunications tools available in America guarantee that suchsupport is only a phone call or an email away for Sudanese womenliving here.

    Conversely, ineffective telecommunications tools haveprevented MSK from building strong relationships between womenin Sudan and women in the United States. Instead, limitations onaccess to the Internet and prohibitively high prices for traditionalcommunications services in Sudan have isolated women in Sudanfrom sisters in the West.

    V

    MISSIONSTATEMENT

    My Sisters Keeper is a

    women-led, women-

    focused, humanitarianaction group.

    We are a faith-inspired, multracial collective of women wh

    work together to lend sisterlassistance to women in varioulocations throughout the World.

    At present, we are focused onsupporting the aspiration of

    women in the African countrof Sudan. It is our hope thatour way of working together wiinspire other small groups o

    women to form sisterhoods thatsupport the hopes of women

    who dare to dream in the facof dire socioeconomicconditions. Such is the essenceof My Sisters Keeper.

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    My Sisters Keeper has created a special term to describe the deep relationships that built through the initiative: SfP engenders sistergirlfriendhood.

    Yet recent innovations in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and anexplosion of mobile phone subscribership in Africa have created opportunities to strengthennetworks between women in Sudan and women in the United States. Many Sudanese womenwho formerly did not have any access to the outside world can now be reached for the first timethrough mobile phones. Moreover, emergent mobile phone and Internet interfaces are making itpossible for mobile phone users to access the wealth of information and social networkingresources available on World Wide Web without a computer or an Internet browser. Theconsequences of these innovations are revolutionary: they could allow SfP members in the U.S.and SfP members in Sudan to communicate more frequently and more effectively than they haveever been able to in the past.

    Even so, before My Sisters Keeper can build stronger relationships between women inthe U.S. and Sudan through these powerful new technologies, they must first determine the mosteffective ways to use them. To this point, the organization has not incorporated mobileplatforms into its outreach efforts. Hence, the following report recommends the best methods of leveraging mobile phone and Internet tools towards a more effective telecommunicationsstrategy for MSK. After mastering the use of new ICT tools, MSK will be prepared to use themto foster deeper relationships between the U.S.- and Sudan-based women involved in SfP.

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    ::BACKGROUND::

    ince November of 2009, My Sisters Keeper (MSK) has begun to build twonetworks of Sudanese women through its Sisterhood for Peace (SfP) initiative: onein the United States and one in Sudan. To this point, these two groups of women

    have remained largely unconnected. While the Sisterhood for Peace initiative envisions aninterconnected network of Sudanese women in the United States, Sudan, and eventually, inseveral other nations with large Sudanese populations, incongruent levels of access totelecommunications tools for women in different countries has prevented consistent transnationalcommunications.

    MSK began to grow its network of women in the United States in November 2009. FromNovember 20 th to 22 nd, 2009, the organization held its first ever National Diaspora Training

    Conference in Boston, Massachusetts. The conference , entitled Pathways to Peace Why WeCant Wait, brought together 40 Sudanese women from different states in the U.S. (and a smallnumber of women living in Canada) to gain knowledge about how to support the local activismof resettled Sudanese communities in the West and how to connect to similar work inside Sudan.All of the women invited to the conference had demonstrated leadership in Sudanese communityand/or advocacy organizations. At the end of the conference, the women divided themselves intofive working groups dedicated to focusing on projects with concomitant aims. The objectives of the working groups range from calling for a speedy and equitable peace agreement in Darfur, todemanding conformity to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudanese NationalCongress Party and the Sudanese Peoples Libe ration Movement, to organizing a network of women on the ground in Sudan and in the Sudanese Diaspora to support each others needs, to

    reaching back into Sudan to organize educational and skill-building opportunities for Sudanesewomen and girls. Ultimately, all of these working groups seek ways to spread peace andempower women throughout Sudan.

    MSK inaugurated its SfP initiative inside of Sudan on the afternoon of December 14,2009, when the organization held a one-day conference for representatives of womensorganizations. The conference took place in Wau, Sudan. It brought together 26 women fromthe cities of Khartoum, Wau, Aweil, and Kuajock, Sudan to discuss the activities of theirwomens organizations and how they might be supported thro ugh a transnational network of Sudanese women and womens organizations.

    Since December, My Sisters Keeper has been working to maintain, connect, and growthe networks established at these two conferences. The network of women in the United Statesand Canada has been less difficult to maintain: MSK keeps the women connected throughweekly conference calls for each of the five working groups created at the conference.Moreover, in the U.S. network frequently communicate via a yahoo email list ([email protected] ). On the other hand, efforts to create dialogue betweenwomen in the Diaspora and women in Sudan and efforts to extend the network of women inSudan have been stymied by the following challenges:

    S

    mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]
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    Many of the women who attended the Wau conference do not have regular access toemail or Internet.

    Including large numbers of women in Sudan on conference calls is expensive and difficult to organize due to time differences and network connection problems.

    Organizing in Sudan still takes place largely through traditional networks based uponword-of-mouth communications and in- person meetings. Hence, the network of womenestablished in Sudan has not been able to communicate regularly in Sudan in a way

    parallel to the frequent communications strategy for SfP participants in the U.S. and Canada.

    MSK has found many communications tools to be either unreliable or inappropriate tomaintain regular contact its SfP members in Sudan. For example, Internet voice communicationstools like Skype often do not work in Sudan due to slow Internet connections if women haveregular access to Internet at all. On the other hand, traditional methods that members of the

    Diaspora use to communicate with people back home in Sudan, such as using calling cards tocall individuals in Sudan, are very costly and time- intensive given MSKs growing network inSudan. My Sisters Keeper has attempted to keep as many of the women in Sudan as possibleinvolved in its activities through email contact. However, very few have access to the Internet.Hence, the organization relies mainly on lead field organizer Kaidi Rial (who runs the MSKOffice in Sudan with one assistant) to maintain informal contact as many women in the network as possible. Though many of the women at the Wau conference provided mobile phone numbers,it can be difficult to reach these phones given network difficulties, and communicating throughKaidi can take several days as she often must send messages through two or three other womento reach certain individuals. In summary, MSKs communications with its SfP-Sudan network are difficult to manage and inconsistent, at best. To date, there is no organized, centralized wayto streamline communications between Sisterhood for Peace participants in the Diaspora and inSudan.

    In July 2010, My Sisters Keeper plans to host a much larger womens networking andskill-building conference in Juba, Sudan. Depending on funding, this conference may includebetween 150 and 200 women from across Sudan, in addition to 10 specially trained women from

    the Diaspora network of My Sisters Keeper. Thisconference is currently being organized by theGrassroots Mobilization working grou p established atthe November conference in Boston. As the conferenceapproaches, the working group seeks new ways tocreate more sustainable and accessible modes of communication. Through more reliable communicationstools, MSK hopes to connect women in the SudaneseDiaspora to women in Sudan so that after theconference, communications might continue in a moreregular and tenable manner.

    CENTRAL QUESTION

    How can My Sisters Keeperbest leverage mobile phoneand Internet tools towards amore effective U.S.-Sudantelecommunications strategy?

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    ::METHODOLOGY::

    his report relies upon the following research strategies:

    A review of literature and current research about technological trends in Africa, andspecifically in Sudan.

    Over thirty interviews and research-based email correspondence with: Representatives of U.S.-based organizations that communicate regularly with people in

    Sudan Web developers and technological experts with experience in creating and using

    Information and Communications Technology for Development (ICT4D) Academics focusing on new applications for mobile technology in Africa and other parts

    of the developing world Students involved in the UShahidi- Haiti operation at Tufts Universitys Fletcher School

    of Law and Diplomacy MSK contacts and representatives of womens associations in Southern Sudan (collected

    during site visits in December 2009) An original online survey of 22 U.S.-based organizations that do Sudan-focused development and

    advocacy work, and rely upon regular communications with people on the ground in the country.This survey asked respondents about location and access to telecommunications tools of contactsin Sudan, the most effective tools to use to communicate with contacts in Sudan, and specificways to conference call and send materials to large groups in Sudan.

    The survey was distrib uted via hot and cold emails to staff membe rs of U.S.-based NGOsoperating in Sudan with a request that they complete it and send the link to colleagues. Thesurvey received 22 responses from organizations in 11 states, including California, Vermont,Kentucky, Washington, D.C., Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Michigan, New York, Minnesota,Iowa, and New Jersey. Moreover, respondents completed the survey on behalf of organizationsworking in development, education, humanitarian work, advocacy, film, radio, and SudaneseDiaspora community building.

    Survey results cannot be considered representative given the small number of respondentsand the large number of Sudan-focused organizations in the United States. Nevertheless, theresults may be suggestive of larger trends in usage of telecommunications tools among U.S.based, Sudan-focused organizations.

    A phone survey of women present at the December 2009 My Sisters Keeper Conference in Wau,Sudan. This survey collected information about telecommunications access and ICT use amongMSK conference participants. Of the 22 numbers called, the survey elicited 16 responses, givingit an overall response rate of 73%. Given the high response rate, findings may be representativeof the sample; however, given the small sample size, findings are not generalizable to the larger

    Sudanese population. Observations collected through site visits to the MSK Wau office, MSK Boston office, November

    2009 National Diaspora Training Conference (Boston, MA), December 2009 WomensNetworking Conference (Wau, Sudan), and myriad conference calls, emails, and conversationswith members of the Sisterhood for Peace network and My Sisters Keeper staff.

    T

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    FINDINGS

    ::MOBILE AFRICA::hy mobile phones work better than Internet in Africa

    Due to poor networking infrastructure and only recently increasing Internet penetration across the African continent, My Sisters Keeper has found it difficult tocommunicate with contacts in Sudan. However, a mobile revolution across the African continent(and other parts of the developing world) is changing the way that people in the continent,including women in the SfP-Sudan network, will use technology to access information,communicate, and participate in social networks. The following section will provide anoverview of this phenomenon. The results have profound implications for MSK, to be discussedin the following sections.

    Key findings in this section:

    1. Despite rapid growth in Internet penetration in recent years, Africa remains largelyunconnected to the rest of the world via the Internet.

    2. Mobile technology is lessening the access gap between networked Africans and thosewith telecommunications access in other parts of the world.

    Despite rapid growth in Internet penetration in recent years, Africa remains largelyunconnected to the rest of the world via the Internet.

    Over the past 20 years, a number of online communications tools, including email,Internet calling services, and social media interfaces, have emerged in the West and graduallyspread in the developing world to allow global populations to interact with each other. However,sub-Saharan Africa has consistently lagged behind other parts of the world in terms of Internetaccess per capita and technological infrastructure. For this reason, a considerable proportion of the members of African civil society have been excluded from opportunities to connect with anincreasingly global community of Internet users. Africa remains the continent with the lowestInternet penetration, and averaged an Internet usage rate of only 6.8% in late 2009 1.Comparatively, Latin America and the Caribbean had an Internet penetration rate over four timesthe penetration in Africa in late 2009 , and North Americas Internet penetration stood at nearly11 times the rate in Africa. A graph on the next page displays Internet penetration rates acrossworld regions.

    Given the co ntinents paucity of Internet users, it is easy to overlook Information andCommunications Technology (ICT) sector successes in expanding African access to globaltelecommunications tools in recent years. Between 2003 and 2008, the Internet penetration ratefor a majority of sub-Saharan African countries increased rapidly, averaging an increase of 30.6% annually 2. Such an increase reveals the severity of lack of Internet access in the half of this decade: only five years ago in 2005, African Internet penetration peaked at 2.6% 3. Internet

    penetration on the continent continues to rise, but even users may not have consistent access tothe Internet. Poor fixed-line networking infrastructure 4, a shortage of international Internetbandwidth, and scarcity of Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) drive up prices for Internet

    W

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    subscriptions in Africa 5, and many Africans lack even a personal computer with which to accessthe World Wide Web 6. For this reason, Internet Sharing ratios can reach up to an average ratio of 50 users per subscription in some parts of the African continent 7. For example, cyber-cafesprovide low-frequency access to a number of African Internet users 8.

    Data Source: Internet World StatsWorld Internet Users and Population Stats: September 30 2009

    Mobile technology is lessening the access gap between levels of networked Africans and thosewith telecommunications access in other parts of the world.

    Africas limited Internet penetration is due in great part to poor fixed-line networkinginfrastructure on the continent. The vast majority of African Internet subscribers rely upon fixedphone lines for their Internet access 9. As late as 2006, African countries could provide an

    average of three phone lines to every 100 persons this ratio was even lower for sub-SaharanAfrica, where an average of 1.6 phone lines existed for every 100 persons 10. Between 2003 and2008, the number of fixed telephone lines in Africa experienced an annual growth rate of only2.4% 11. Thus, the increasing number of African Internet users over the past four years appears tostem mainly from an expanding number of African cyber- cafes and other multi -person access

    points (such as schools and workplaces) 12, as well as emerging markets for fixed and mobilebroadband services and mobile phone Internet service 13.

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    Yet an explosion of mobile phone subscriptions on the African continent has allowedAfrican telecommunications companies (telecoms) to overcome the continen ts poor fixed -lineinfrastructure. As of 2009, the average mobile penetration rate for African nations (based onindividual subscriptions as compared to overall population) stood at 37% 14 more than fivetimes the Internet penetration on the continent. Moreover, between 2003 and 2008, mobile

    subscriptions in Africa increased at a compound annual growth rate of 47%15

    , more than 1.5times as fast as Internet penetration growth in Africa over the same period. Overall, mobilesubscriptions saw an increase of nearly 550% over these five years 16. The graph belowdemonstrates the rapid growth of mobile telephony in Africa in the context of growth rates forother telecommunications tools between 1998 and 2008.

    ICT Developments in Africa, 1998-2008 penetration rate

    Source: International Telecommunications UnionInformation Society Statistical Profiles 2009-Africa

    Such explosive subscriber growth has important implications for the total number of mobile phone users on the African continent. Mobile subscriber rates underestimate the numberof mobile phone users in Africa due to multi-person access apparatuses similar to themechanisms governing Internet sharing on the continent. Across the developing world, the rapidspread of mobile telephony has been accompanied by the emergence of locally-based,entrepreneurial mobile operators 17. For example, street vendors in Uganda, where only about onein four people has a mobile phone subscription, sell mobile access on a per-call basis, and alsoallow mobile owners without access to electricity to charge their phones with car batteries for an

    affordable price.18

    Hence, a growing portion of even the most rural African communities is ableto communicate with other parts of the networked world through the emergent mobile industry.

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    A 23 year old Boda Boda (motorcycle taxi) driver in rural Uganda, with his Nokia 1100. He shares his phone with 6 people, two of whom mostly use it to receive text messages, others to receive incoming calls.

    Kyotera, Uganda. 19

    Source: Indri TulusanShared Phone Practices: Exploratory Field Research from Uganda and Beyond

    Mobile phones have given many Africans, and especially the poor, access totelecommunications for the first time 20. Furthermore, innovations in mobile phone technologyhave allowed these new users access not only to other fixed- and mobile- phone users, but to themillions of Internet users on the World Wide Web. According to Harvard Kennedy Schoolprofessor Calestous Juma, an expert on technology in Africa, the future of the Internet in Africawill depend on access from mobile phones. Internet is going to migrate onto mobile device s,he predicts. 21 Given the expansion of smart phones, and the fact that more Africans tend to usemobile phones, rather than personal computers, as their primary telecommunications tool,African mobile service providers have already begun to increase Internet subscription ratesthrough mobile broadband services 22.

    While mobile broadband and smart phones cater to those in Africa who can afford them,mobile-phone-to-Internet technologies have given those with even the simplest mobile phone theability to communicate with World Wide Web users. (Because smart phone and mobilebroadband users are able to connect to websites from their phones, they are considered a part of the current 6.8% of Africans that use the Internet; on the other hand, mobile-to-Internetinterfaces allow a much greater population of African mobile phone users to communicate withpeople on the Internet without ever using an Internet browser or connecting to a website throughtheir phones. Hence, their global networking capabilities are not captured by the Internetpenetration statistic. UShahidi, one such mobile-phone-to-Internet platform, will be discussed inthe following chapter.) Many of the services and technology combinations made possible bymobile technology in Africa, including phone-call-to-radio programs, SMS text messaginglistservs, mobile financial services and banking, mobile health and education services, andmobile broadband, have a number of important applications to the work being done by Africa-focused organizations like My Sisters Keeper in t he West.

    For many reasons, mobile phones have become the ICT tool of choice in Africa, andacross the developing world. As mentioned in the previous section, consistent Internet access inAfrica and most other parts of the developing world is prohibitively expensive. Moreover,

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    increased barriers to Internet access may be incurred by the high prices of personal computers,the usually high risk of computer theft in economically depressed areas, and the extra moneyrequired for frequenting Internet cafes in urban areas. On the other hand, mobile phones arerelatively cheap, easier to protect from theft given their small size, and require less energy andtime to charge. 23 Both the traditional services that mobile phones provide, such as voice

    communication and SMS messaging and an increasingly innovative array of services andapplications becoming available to African mobile users are allowing people even in the mostremote areas of the continent to connect with each other and with the rest of the networkedworld. Mobile technologies offer a range of new ways for organizations based in the West toelicit information and feedback from members of African civil society and to mobilize andinteract with diverse bases of supporters in the countries where they focus their work.

    In order to take advantage of such technologies, My Sisters Keeper must modify itstelecommunications strategy. In the following case study, we will see how the Diasporacommunity of a non-African developing country experiencing the mobile boom has incorporatedmobile and Internet technologies into its future plans for development work.

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    ::CASE STUDY::he Haitian Diaspora Community in Boston and UShahidi

    A case study of the Haitian communitys use of mobile phone and Internet technologiessince the January 2010 earthquake suggests that the following five steps greatly facilitateeffective use of these new telecommunications tools by Diaspora groups:

    1. Encourage a culture of openness to technological solutions.

    2. Choose and adapt tools wisely.

    3. Partner with (or hire) technical experts to install and tailor tools.

    4. Integrate new tools into already existing Diaspora community structures.

    5. Take advantage of cultural expertise, such as language and on the groundknowledge.

    OverviewDiaspora communities from the developing world have much to gain from the use of

    emerging mobile and Internet telecommunications tools. These technologies can helpimmigrants to contact relatives, to stay updated on the current state of affairs in their country, orto send money and supplies back home. The following case study will describe how, with thehelp of a dedicated team of students at the Tufts University Fletcher School of Law andDiplomacy, the Haitian Diaspora community in Boston has begun to take advantage of new

    telecommunications technologies. Especially through the use of UShahidi, an Internet-basedsystem that automatically plots messages sent in through email, text messages, or Twitter onto anonline map, the community has greatly advanced its efforts to provide relief to many back homein Haiti following the January 2010 earthquake. Most striking about this case is the extent towhich the local knowledge of Haitian immigrants in Boston has enhanced the effectiveness of the UShahidi platform. Though the tale is not yet finished, the ongoing story of UShahidi Haitican offer several key takeaways to Diaspora groups such as the Sisterhood for Peace network about how to utilize emerging mobile-to-Internet telecommunications tools.

    The Birth of UShahidi UShahidi is an online technology that has most commonly been used to track outbursts of

    violence or monitor areas devastated by natural disaster. The platform allows people to send inshort reports about what is happening through text messages, emails, Twitter posts, or a directonline form. UShahidi then identifies the exact location from which messages are sent, and postseach message onto a map and/or timeline that is continuously updated. The UShahidimethodology is based on the concept of crowdsourcing: generating public intelligence about ageographically-specific situation by aggregating the individual reports of people watching eventsunfold on the ground. Revealingly, the word ushahidi means witness or testimony inSwahili.

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    UShahidi was created in the midst of Kenyas post -election crisis in 2007. The post-election violence following the 2007 Kenyan elections heralded a new emphasis upon EastAfrican citizen media in the face of a ban on live media; in this crisis, both blogs and SMS textmessaging played a huge role in filling the gap of the traditional media. Several incidents of extreme violence broke out in the streets of Nairobi at the end of 2007, when the highly

    contested, and clearly rigged win of President Mwai Kibaki were released by the Kenyanindependent elections commission. As the situation quickly turned dire, a growing number of Kenyans turned to digital media to keep the world and their fellow citizens updated on what washappening in the country. Because Kenya had one of the highest rates of Internet usage in theAfrican continent, roughly 3 million users (or 7.9% of the population), a number of prominentKenyan blogs had been online since as early as 2003. 24 Through these online blogs, citizen

    journalists, technology experts in Kenya, and bloggers in the West began to have a conversationabout what types of new media tools would help to track the violence as it was going on. At thetime, Kenyan blogger Juliana Rotich was posting short updates on the situation in a town calledEldoret on Twitter and Flikr. Motivated by Rotichs wor k, Erik Hershman, a blogger who callshimself the White African, began writing on his blog about the need for a system that allowed

    for continuous updates from both the Internet and mobile phones. On December 31, 2007,Hershman wrote:I went to bed try ing to think of what I could do. Situations like this are where technology canreally shine. The government can squash traditional media, but not technology that it barely knowsexistsAnyone can see that the problems in Kenya right now (both news blackout and generalcommunication) also represent a real opportunity. There is a great need for a service that cant beeasily controlled by the government. How about a platform that serves as a centralized repositoryfor on the ground reports from any Kenyan via SMS? The ability for people to upload videos andimages with some text to a web- based and mobile phone accessible site. 25

    Three days later, Ory Okolloh, a South African journalist residing in Kenya posed a question onher blog when the violence forced her to return home to Johannesburg: any techies out therewilling to do a mashup of where the violence and destruction is occurring using GoogleMaps? 26 Just six days after Okollohs blog post, Ushahidi.com had been built and made live onthe Internet through the collaboration of Hershman, David Kobia, the administrator of a largewebsite for Kenyans and the Kenyan Diaspora called Mashada.com , and bloggers such as Rotichand Daudi Were. 27 The website allowed for constant updates on the Internet through SMS textmessages, and also included an interactive map to show where incidents were occurring. It took advantage of the widespread penetration and ease of mobile phone communications in Kenya inorder to make it easier for everyday Kenyan citizens to share information about what washappening in their neighborhoods. In the end, 45,000 Kenyans used the site during the post-election saga. 28

    The success of UShahidis initial deployment encouraged the founders to develop a basicweb platform that could be used for others wishing to crowdsource information around theworld. In October 2008, the UShahidi developers released a version of the platform that wouldbe deployed in several different places, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, India,the Gaza Strip, and Pakistan. 29 Since that time, UShahidi has modified the original platform andmade it easily accessible to any organization wishing to use the system. It is available todownload on the UShahidi website.

    Deploying UShahidi in HaitiOn January 12, 2010, the strongest earthquake in over 200 years hit Haiti. Millions

    witnessed the ensuing devastation as aid workers struggled to navigate the country in the

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    aftermath and to rescue survivors from collapsing buildings. Patrick Meier, a PhD student at theFletcher School of Tufts University and Director of Crisis Mapping for UShahidi, found outabout the earthquake in the exactly same way as most other Americans: by watching the eveningnews.

    As soon as he saw what was happening in Haiti, Meier says that he went into crisis

    mode. He knew that UShahidi would be the perfect tool to help locate and communicate withthe thousands who required timely assistance in Haiti. Meier saw the first report of theearthquake on 7 pm the Tuesday that it hit. Within half an hour, he and UShahidi director of technology development David Kobia had created a basic version of UShahidi Haiti. 30 Over thenext 24 hours, Meier and Kobia created an international team to help them gather informationand reports from Haiti and set up a local Haitian telephone number to which people requiringassistance could text in requests or reports. UShahidi was the first organization to deploy acrisis-mapping mechanism for Haiti, and within a week, it had been endorsed by the ClintonGlobal Initiative, the U.S. Department of State, and several other major partners. The UShahiditeam also played a major role in negotiating a short code, 4636 (or INFO), for anyone in Haitito text in updates to both UShahidi and other members of the humanitarian community for free. 31

    By Friday, January 15, 33,000 unique visitors had visited the UShahidi Haiti website and theplatform had received several hundred personal reports. 32 Meier quickly assembled a team of students from the Fletcher school to collect, verify, and organize these reports on the UShahidiHaiti main page. These students sent out mass emails to friends and colleagues in the Bostonarea, asking them to spend 30 minutes being trained to use the system and then volunteer theirtime to help manage the huge influx of messages. 33 Roz Sewell, the Director of Crisis Mappingfor the operation, remembers that the first few weeks of the project were exhausting forvolunteers . We were getting something like 5,000 messages a day, she recalls, And we had toverify and sort every one of them. 34

    Reaching Out to the Haitian CommunityOne of the major barriers to verifying and posting messages sent to UShahidi Haiti was a

    lack of local knowledge relevant to Haiti. For this reason, Sabina Carlson, a Tufts Universitysenior with several years of experience working with the Haitian Diaspora community in GreaterBoston through a community development project that she co-founded in northern Haiti, beganto reach out to Boston-based Haitian community members. 35 Carlson, who became the DiasporaCoordinator for the UShahidi site, called on volunteers to translate messages sent in HaitianCreole and to help the team locate street addresses that they could not find on general onlinemaps. Through the help of Haitian community members, who came into the Situation Room atthe Fletcher School or remained on call during the day through online programs such as Skype,UShahidi Haiti was eventually able to translate their entire website into Haitian Creole and tounderstand and map numerous messages that were undecipherable to non-Haitian volunteersworking at the site. 36

    The Haitian community began to play a crucial role in the operations of the FletcherSituation room during the early crisis. But as she observed their work, Carlson envisioned afuture role for UShahidi in long-term Haitian Diaspora efforts stay connected to Haiti. Carlsonwas already familiar with the strong commitment of the Haitian Diaspora to developing townsback home in Haiti. Perhaps one of the most organized Diasporas in the U.S., Haitiancommunities across America constitute over 300 regional hometown associations, and eachone of these associations is dedicated to developing a certain peyi, or home town, back in

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    Haiti. Hometown associations sponsor small-to-medium scale community development projectsin their designated peyi by collecting remittances from members. 37 They also work on largerprojects in concert with Haitian development organizations, such as Fonkoze, a micro-financeorganization calling itself Haitis Alternative Bank for the Organized Poor.

    UShahidi Haiti allows people to send text messages, emails, or Twitter posts about their current situation to an online map.

    Source: New York Times courtesy of www.ushahidi.com

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    Even before the launch of UShahidi Haiti, the Haitian Diaspora in the United States haddemonstrated openness to using new technologies to more effectively communicate with peoplestill living in Haiti. In an UShahidi blog written on January 30, 2010, Carlson recognized that,[i] n recent years, [Haitian] Diaspora groups have accelerated their search for ways to maximizetheir impact on the development of their country by using the technology that is spreading from

    Montreal to Miami to Mirebalais .38

    One example of the Haitian Diasporas use of newtechnologies took place on April 18, 2009, when Haitian organizations in New York, Boston,Miami, and Port-au-Prince organized a day-long conference where participants were linked byvideo to discuss financial literacy in the Diaspora and future strategies for economicempowerment of Haitian institutions. This conference was the first ever multi-city videoconference organized by the Diaspora. 39 Throughout the day, keynotes and roundtablediscussions were broadcast from Long Island University in Brooklyn to the other three cities. 40 Then, in the afternoon, local facilitators led workshop discussions on a set of three topics in eachof the cities involved in the conference, and the groups came back together throughvideoconference to discuss their results. 41 In this way, Internet-based video and audiocommunications programs allowed the Haitian community to facilitate collaboration and

    dialogue between its local networks at the conference.However, after the earthquake, much of the telecommunications infrastructure in Haitiwas ruined. At a time when communications between Haitians and their supporters in theDiaspora was the most crucial, the Haitian-American community would have to relytelecommunications tools that allowed them to reach home with less bandwidth and using lesssophisticated technology. UShahidi was such a tool. The platforms accessibility from mobilephones allowed people to call for help even while Internet services were unavailable during theimmediate aftermath of the quake. Carlson wrote in her January UShahidi blog that,

    the UShahidi-Haiti platform can function as a revolutionary tool for both Haitians on theground and in the Diaspora to direct the flow of aid and influence the reconstruction of theircountry. UShahidi in the long term can serve as a communication tool to create new links betweenthe Diaspora and the ground that are dynamic and quick and close as word getting passed from

    baz [community center] to baz .42

    Hence, after a series of meetings with leaders in the Boston Haitian community, the FletcherUShahidi team decided that once the crisis was over, they would shift full control of theUShahidi Haiti platform to the Haitian Diaspora community. They set a goal of transferring theoperation to the community by May 1, 2010.

    Transferring UShahidi to the DiasporaCrisis-mapping director Roz Sewell notes that the ways people in Haiti are using the

    UShahidi Haiti platform have already changed dramatically. 43 In mid-January, the UShahidiSituation Room was in crisis mode 24 hours a day. Now, messages are not nearly as frequent,and may be less time-sensitive. Hence, Diaspora liaisons such as Fletcher student Nona Lambert

    have begun the slow process of transferring the tool out of their own hands, and into the care of Haitian Diaspora organizations. According to Lambert,Were trying to tailor our approach to the way that Haitians coordinate their owndevelopmentIts not about getting rid of the relation ship, but we see our role in the immediatecrisis, and after that dies out, then the community will take this over as much as they want. 44

    After all, Lambert reflects, the idea of UShahidi is to give people a voice at the grassroots .45 Hence, through UShahidi, the Fletcher team hopes to better prepare the Haitian community to aidin reconstruction and development efforts that will connect the resources of Haitian HometownAssociations with needs coming in from the ground.

    http://haiti.ushahidi.com/http://haiti.ushahidi.com/http://haiti.ushahidi.com/
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    The Diaspora community welcomes the transfer of UShahidi to Haitian control. In fact,according to UShahidi Haiti creator Patrick Meier, they told us that regardless of whether theearthquake had happened or not, they would be equally excited. They are absolutely just super-super-thr illed to have this platform to do their work .46 Rather than shy away from unfamiliartechnologies, Meier says that people in the Haitian community are excited to learn, they want to

    be trained, [and] they want to know how to do this themselves.47

    ANALYSIS: Applying Lessons from UShahidi Haiti to the A ims of My Sisters Keeper

    Though the Haitian community has just begun to take ownership of the UShahidi platform, this Diasporas use of telecommunications technology in recent years is instructive forMy Sisters Keeper. There are several parallels between the development aims of the Haitianand Sudanese Diasporas (in Boston and across the United States) and between thetelecommunications infrastructures of these two developing countries. Before the earthquake,Haitis Internet penetration stood at 11% and its mobile phone penetration was 35%. 48 Similarly,Sudans Internet penetration is currently 10%, and its mobile penetration stands at approximately43%. 49 The earthquake in Haiti delivered a severe blow to the countrys burgeoning

    telecommunications infrastructure by damaging the countrys new undersea fiber link for transporting voice and data across Haiti. 50 Even so, the sorry state of Haitiantelecommunications structure only amplifies the achievements of UShahidi. If such a tool canwork in the midst of a crisis where the majority of an already-weak telecommunicationsinfrastructure was wiped out by disaster, then the implications for applications of similar tools toother underconnected and unstable countries, like Sudan, are promising.

    Moreover, both Haiti and Sudan have active Diaspora populations interested in creatingstrong networks between people in the home country and communities in their new countries of residence. Both Diasporas are also interested in contributing resources towards empowermentand development in their countries of origin.

    In order to help My Sisters Keeper create a new telecommunications strategy, h ere are fivefindings from the Haitian Communitys use of tech nology:

    1. Encourage a culture of openness to technological solutions.Overall, the Haitian community has demonstrated openness to using newtelecommunications tools, even when these tools are unfamiliar and require communitymembers to build technical skills. UShahidi Haiti found that by building relationshipswith community leaders, training community members to do basic upkeep tasks theUShahidi system, and matching the specific skills of certain volunteers to needs withinthe operation, they could increase community buy-in for the project.

    2. Choose and adapt tools wisely.UShahidi has been proven time and time again to work well in crisis situations.However, transitioning the platform to be used for a long-term development effort hasrequired a careful and ongoing assessment of changing the needs on the ground in Haitiand the resources that the Diaspora can offer. After the reconstruction of Haitistelecommunications infrastructure, the Diaspora may choose to return to the use of videoconferences and or even to more advanced mobile phone and Internet tools to connectwith Haitians on the ground. In the end, the effectiveness of any tool depends on the

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    adeptness of its users. It is important to ensure that telecommunications tools being usedare appropriate given the telecommunications capacity and the needs of the communitiesexpected to use them.

    3. Partner with (or hire) technical experts to install and tailor tools.

    UShahidi Haiti would never have gotten off the ground without the devoted team of students running the Situation Room at Fletcher. This team of students not only operatedthe system during its first few month s, but they also worked out kinks to make theplatform work more smoothly in Haiti. Rarely does a project arise in which such adedicated group of technical and administrative experts will volunteer the majority of their days to run it. Indeed, the Haiti earthquake is unique in that the pure tragedy of theevent attracted the goodwill of many volunteers and donors to UShahidi Haiti. However,developers with just as much, if not more expertise, can be hired to set up and tailor suchtools. Moreover, many donors such as Humanity United and the members of ClintonGlobal Initiative are beginning to invest in the use of telecommunications tools forhumanitarian work.

    4. Integrate new tools into already existing Diaspora community structures.The UShahidi Haiti team has made the platform more sustainable by tailoring its uses tothe organizational structure of Haitian Hometown Associations. Haitian communityleaders have been more receptive to the use of UShahidi for future Diaspora developmentefforts because the system will not require them to create a new organizational structurefor Diaspora organizations. In the same way, My Sisters Keeper must determine how toincorporate the use of new mobile telecommunications tools into its existing structure,which consists of localized networks of Sudanese women in different parts in the U.S.and Canada.

    5. Take advantage of cultural expertise, such as language and on the ground knowledge.While any Western organization can set up innovative telecommunications platforms toreach into developing nations, Diaspora communities have valuable expertise that willenhance the effectiveness of communications. Haitians in Boston have increased theefficacy of UShahidi by their knowledge of Creole and geographical locations. Likewise,the Sudanese women in the Sisterhood for Peace Initiative can use their familiarity withlocal customs, proficiency in Sudanese dialects, and understanding of the political andcultural context in Sudan towards relationship-building with women on the groundregardless of the telecommunications tools ultimately chosen by My Sisters Keeper.

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    ::TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACCESS IN SUDAN::ow Africas mobile explosion has affected the Sudanese telecom infrastructure

    This section will give an overview of the Sudanese telecommunications infrastructureand highlight several key dynamics in the telecom sector that are relevant to any communicationsstrategy to be pursued by My Sisters Keeper.

    Key findings in this section:

    1. Mobile penetration in Sudan has outstripped Internet and fixed line penetration,and continues to grow.

    2. Buying a mobile subscription is the cheapest, easiest way to acquire continuoustelecommunications access in Sudan.

    3. There is a high level of government surveillance and interference across all types of telecommunications services in Sudan.

    4. Illiteracy, religious customs, and cultural norms lead to a gender gap in access tomobile technology in Sudan.

    Mobile penetration in Sudan has outstripped Internet and fixed line penetration, and continues to grow.

    Source: Numbers for Internet and mobile penetration from Business Monitor International;number for fixed-line penetration from Geoge Bevir, "Connecting Sudan."

    H

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    Sudans quickly growing telecommunications infrastructure covers over 80% of thecountry 51, and at the end of 2009, an estimated 42.6% of the Sudanese population had a mobilephone subscription 52. Mobile subscribers outnumber Internet users by a factor of over four toone Sudans Internet penetration currently stands at 10% 53. Moreover, though fixed-line

    services in Sudan are difficult to quantify due to limited reporting from fixed-line telecomleaders Canar and Sudatel, the fixed-line penetration in January 2009 was estimated at 3.7% 54.

    Sudanese telecoms are rapidly moving into formerly un-networked areas.Mobile penetration in Sudan has been increasing rapidly since February 2006, when Zain,

    a Kuwaiti mobile company, acquired Sudans first mobile company (Mobitel) to launch Zai nSudan. Zain quickly became the leading telecom in the country, and had captured 52% of market share by the third quarter of 2008 55. Major nationwide competitors include the nationaltelecom, Sudani, and the South African-owned MTN.

    During Sudans 21 -year civil war, the southern part of the country was largely neglectedin terms of infrastructure and telecommunications services. For this reason, Southern Sudan lags

    far behind other parts of the country in terms of mobile phone service availability andsubscriptions. 56 Nevertheless, the South has seen remarkable growth in telecommunications overthe past five years. In 2005, the year in which a Comprehensive Peace Agreement marked theend of the civil war, an American telecommunications engineer remarked, Most countr ies, evenAfghanistan, have some infrastructure. But southern Sudan - zero". 57 Only five years later, allthree of the major nationwide mobile providers have moved into the region. Silvestro Bakhiet,President of development NGO New Sudan Generation, notes that:

    Yei, Maridi, Wau, Malakal, Bor, Tori t, Juba these major cities in Southern Sudan [all have]cell phone accessespecially after the CPA. Two years later, all these cities are now connected even if you go down into a village area, you will connect .58

    Two telecoms even cater specifically to Southern Sudan. In January 2009, Vivacell, the secondtelecom to launch exclusively in Southern Sudan 59, moved in to challenge Gemtel, a Ugandan

    telecom that has had a presence in the region for over 15 years (though limited until the end of the civil war). 60

    Several Americans who travel regularly to Sudan on behalf of development and advocacyorganizations have also noticed the rapid improvement in mobile phone infrastructure in theSouth. Greg Larson, associate director of the Valentino Achak Deng Foundation, remembers thefirst time that he visited Aweil, the capital city of Northern Bahr el Ghazal state, South Sudan, in2008. Aweil didnt have a cell phone tower at that time, he says. However, by the time thatLarson returned to the city in spring of 2009, it seemed that everybody had cell phones.Larson explains, One tower went up , and another tower had gone up, and there were two orthree providers .61 Similarly, Bill Andress, moderator of the Sudan Advocacy Action Forum,observed the beginning stages of construction of the first cell phone tower in Pibor town of

    Jonglei State, South Sudan, in March 2010. Andress notes that people in Pibor currently havevirtually no communications ability. Currently,

    they rely on one satellite phone which they hook up for about three hours every night to get wifi[wireless Internet ]However, they are now building a 60 ft high cell phone tower that will reachout for about25 -30 miles. This is the first time people will be able to be connected .62

    Many new operators are looking to the South as a way to increase growth quickly. 63 Astelecoms compete to fill the void of mobile services in Southern Sudan, rapid expansionof mobile infrastructure can be expected to continue.

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    Buying a mobile subscription is the cheapest, easiest way to acquire continuous telecommunications access in Sudan.

    Using 2008 figures for GNI per capita, a mobile subscription provides the most feasible,constant telecommunications access at a low price when compared to Internet subscription,

    Internet rental (at cyber cafes), and fixed line subscription rates in Sudan. The average Sudanesemobile phone user spent about 11.14 SDG (US$4.8) a month on mobile phone services in2008. 64 This amounted to approximately 6% of monthly Gross National Income (GNI) percapita. 65 The same user would have to pay more than six times as much for a month of homeInternet services, and the same amount of money would cover only about 5.3 hours of Internetaccess at a local cyber caf. Over the course of a year, these prices become even more telling.The following chart shows the amount of services that a person in Sudan could afford for 6% of annual GNI per capita (or US$57.60 based on 2008 figures from the InternationalTelecommunications Union):

    For 6% of annual income, the average person in Sudan could buy:13 months of a fixed-line phone subscription

    12 months of a mobile phone subscription128 half-hour visits to a cyber caf

    2 months of an Internet subscription

    Note: Cyber caf costs based upon average Internet caf price per hour in Sudan as quoted by African EconomicOutlook. All other prices based upon ITU price basket figures, 2008. 66

    Upon analysis of the options in the chart above, it becomes apparent that a yearly mobilesubscription is more feasible than a fixed-line or Internet subscription in terms of availabletelecommunications infrastructure and price. While fixed phone services are the cheapest way toaccess telecommunications in Sudan, costing only 10.21 SDG (US$4.4) per month, 67 fixed linesservices are widely unavailable in Sudan due to poor networking. Thus, fixed-line phonesremain unavailable to the vast majority of Sudanese people. Moreover, few Sudanese peoplesubscribe to monthly Internet services at home given a prohibitively high cost of 67.64 SDG(US$29.1) per month. 68 Hence, only mobile subscriptions and visits to Internet cafes remainviable options for the majority of the Sudanese population.

    Of the two remaining options, a yearly mobile phone subscription provides the moreconsistent telecommunications access to users than does using Internet at a cyber caf. Giventhat most mobile phone subscriptions in Sudan are prepaid, the ITU estimates that monthlysubscription would allow mobile subscribers an average of 25 outgoing calls in predeterminedratio and 30 SMS text mes sages. 69 Many people in Sudan use Internet sporadically, 70 and 128half-hour visits to a caf might even be gratuitous for the average person in Sudan. Nevertheless,these cyber caf visits provide only occasional access to the networked world. Mobile phonesubscribership, on the other hand, provides constant access. More frequent access via cyber cafInternet rental would not only be prohibitively expensive for many people in Sudan, but alsologistically unfeasible: many Sudanese must either travel long distances to reach a cyber caf orcompete with everyone else in their city or town for time on a limited number of computers toaccess the Internet. 71 Hence, mobile subscribership emerges as the cheapest and easiest way toacquire consistent telecommunications access in Sudan.

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    Calling and sending text messages to mobile phones are very low-cost communications methodsin Sudan.

    Prices from Zain, the largest mobile telecom provider in Sudan, demonstrate the low costof mobile communications in Sudan. Zain subscribers can send text messages to anyone in thecountry for just 0.05 SDG. 72 International text messages are still inexpensive, costing 0.25

    SDG.73

    While voice calls to other people in Sudan cost 0.18 SDG with a Zain subscription, theyare cheaper when calling Zain subscribers (0.12 SDG/min) or when calling one of three favoritenumbers chosen by the subscriber (0.10 SDG/min). 74 It should be noted that, regardless of theservice provider, receiving calls and text messages in Sudan does not cost the mobile subscriberanything. 75

    Mobile phone rates, Zain Sudan

    Service Price in Sudanese Pounds (SDG) Price in U.S. Dollars (US$)

    Cost of an outgoing local call tosubscriber using a different service 0.18 SDG/min 0.08 US$/min

    Cost of an outgoing local call to aZain subscriber 0.12 SDG/min 0.05 US$/min

    Cost of an outgoing local call tothree favorite numbers 0.10 SDG/min 0.04 US$/min

    Cost of an outgoing international call 1.00 SDG/min 0.43 US$/min

    Cost of leaving a voicemail message 0.12 SDG/min 0.05 US$/min

    Cost of an incoming call Free Free

    Cost of a outgoing local text message 0.05 SDG 0.02 US$

    Cost of an outgoing international textmessage 0.25 SDG 0.11 US$

    Cost of an incoming text message Free FreeSource: Zain Sudan , Zain Prepaid Calling Rates

    http://www.sd.zain.com/autoforms/portal/home/Calling%20Rates/Local%20Calls/Prepaid%20Plans

    Investment in a basic mobile phone costs 6% of current GNI per capita.About 70% of Sudanese mobile users own basic phones such as the Nokia 1200 or the

    Sony Ericson J100. These basic phones typically cost between 65 and 110 Sudanese pounds(approximately US$28-47) 76. Furthermore, over the past three years, telecom operators havesignificantly reduced the price of SIM cards from 116 SDG (US$50) to 3.50 SDG (US$1.50),

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    making it much more affordable to buy one, or several, mobile lines 77. The combined costs of abasic mobile phone and a SIM card is about 6% of the 2010 GNI per capita in Sudan. 78

    The ZTE A61 is one of the cheapest phones currently available on the Sudanese mobile market, with aretail price of 65 Sudanese pounds (SDG). The average cost of a SIM card is 3.50 SDG.

    Photo Source: Nairaland Forum Post, December 15, 2009http://www.nairaland.com/nigeria/topic-346309.0.html

    There is a high level of government surveillance and interference across all types of telecommunications services in Sudan.

    Internet filtering in Sudan prevents users from accessing certain sites. In July 2005, afterthe signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan(GoS) and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), the government agreed to stopits long-practiced methods of media censorship. However, according to the OpenNet Initiative,in 2008 the government restored censorship in 2008, which has primarily affected traditionalmedia, but has had some effects on website filtering, as well. 79 The Sudanese NationalTelecommunication Corporation openly admits to blocking Internet content that is morallyoffensive and in violation of public ethics and order, [and] that may promote corruption anddeface traditional identity .80 Much of the Internet content blocked in Sudan is eitherpornographic or pertains to narcotics, bombs, alcohol, gambling and blasphemy against Islam. 81 However, Internet filtering has also taken political undertones: in August 2008, ReportersWithout Borders raised issues of freedom of expression after the government blocked the videosharing Web site youtube.com 82, and in February 2008, the NTC also reportedly blocked e-mailaccess for all staff at the UN Mission in Sudan 83.

    The politics behind government surveillance of mobile telephony are even more clearlypolitical. According to a source that preferred to remain anonymous, it is sometimes dangerousto contact political figures in Darfur from the United States. The source reported that,

    Mobile phones are the best way to c ontact people in Sudan. But whenever there is a securitysituation [in Darfur], they [the government] accuse[s] people of sending information about thehuman rights situation to the West. So sometimes, it is a bad idea to call certain people. All thephone companies are owned by the government in Sudan If someone receives several calls perweek from the West, it will be a situation for them.

    The source continued that while the issue of government surveillance of calls was riskier forpeople in Darfur, where the political situation is very ten se, the government spies on all the

    phone lines across the country. Radio Dabanga, a news website in Darfur, confirmed this

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    allegation, reporting that in November 2009, the Khartoum-based National Congress Partyrequested a list of phone numbers for SPLM leaders so as to put them under surveillance. 84 Inthe report, Radio Dabanga published a letter that they say was sent from former nationalSecretary of Political Affairs Mandour al Mahdi to state representatives of the National CongressParty (NCP). In this letter, SPLM officials are accused o f being in contact with enemies. This

    letter came two months after Mahdi had accused elements of the Sudan Peoples LiberationMovement (SPLM) of devoting themselves to serving foreign agendas and receiving millions of dollars from foreign allies. 85 The letter reads:

    In reference to the fore-mentioned subject and through monitoring of phone calls conducted bytelephone stations we have come to know that the SPLM has contacts with enemies. From our sidewe have drawn attention to all Sudanese telephone companies Zain, Sudani, Canar and MTN

    to monitor and follow any call that can jeopardize the national interest. Station (x) has beenidentified to trace and follow the Thuraya and international telecom activities conducted bysatellite for the same purpose. Therefore I would like you to collect all the telephone numbers of the SPLM leaders in your state so as to be put under surveillance. 86

    Though the NCP officially denied sending this letter, Radio Dabanga claims that they obtainedthe letter after a copy of it was leaked to daily newspaper Agrass al Hurriya.

    Such requests for identity-related telecommunications data would be consistent with pastgovernment behavior. In 2008, the Sudanese government instituted a regulatory requirement thatordered telecom operators to collect extensive registration information from all mobilesubscribers. 87 Blogger Henry Owera reported that mobile subscribers across Juba received phonecalls with the following requests:

    This is customer care [Khartoum] shall you avail us your full names i.e the four names: your twonames, your father's name and grand father's name. Please also avail your passport number,nationality and the block number or plot number of your residence. Thank you. 88

    After failing to provide this information, the government requested that MTN Sudan disconnect1.1 million subscribers in the second quarter of 2008. 89

    The government has also been known to interfere with network towers of commercialmobile services. A 2009 paper from the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative claims that the

    government of Sudanese regularly switches off the mobile phone network when authorities areengaged in activities that the government does not want reported. 90 Once again, the motivationbehind such actions is clearly political.

    While government monitoring and interference in Sudanese telecommunications issubstantial, it is important to remember that these actions most commonly result from activitythat the government finds threatening. For this reason, the purpose for which My Siste rs Keeper wishes to use telecommunications tools in Sudan is extremely significant. Because My Sister sKeeper works women from across the country of Sudan, who may disagree on many politicalissues, the overarching aim of creating an international network is to serve as a support towomens empowerment in Sudanese communities inside Sudan and abroad. Th e degree towhich such an aim would be considered threatening must be considered on a regional basis. For

    example, while women in the North and West may experience greater difficulties in trying toorganize themselves, the 2005 CPA specifically encouraged civic participation of women in theSouth. Thus, womens organizing may be considered much more of a political act in the Northand West than it is in the South. Moreover, it is important to consider what types of messagesMy Sisters Keeper is already sending to women in Sudan. If they have not caused problems forthe organization to this point, then there may be little to worry about. After all, newtelecommunications methods enabled by mobile-phone-to-Internet technologies rely on the samebasic telecommunications tools that are already commonly used by US-based organizations

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    calls, SMS text messages, Internet sites, and emails. Further analysis and recommendations abouthow to de-politicize any telecommunications strategies adopted by My Sisters Ke eper will be

    provided in the Recommendations section of this report.

    Illiteracy, religious customs, and cultural norms lead to a gender gap in access to mobile

    technology in Sudan.

    Experts in the field of telecommunications have only recently begun to research thegender dynamics of mobile phone usage and ownership in the developing world. In February2010, the Global System for Mobile Communications Association (GSMA) Development Fundand the Cherie Blair Foundation for Women published a pioneering joint study on the mobilephone gender gap in low and middle income countries. The study reveals that women in sub-Saharan Africa are 23% less likely to own mobile phones than men. 91

    Indeed, a number of the interviewees and survey respondents for this report noticed agender dynamic affecting telecommunications access in Sudan, as well. Both Gabriel AkechKwai and Silvestro Bakhiet, two founders of US-based organizations dedicated to education and

    development in South Sudan, commented that due to limited education and traditional religiousvalues in some parts of the country, women may not have access to any telecommunicationstools because they are in the hands of the men. 92 Several others brought up the fact that illiteracyprecludes widespread use of SMS text messages among this demographic. 93

    Despite these setbacks, there are ways to increase the effectiveness of communicationswith Sudanese women through telecommunications tools. Some interviewees found thatcommunicating in a womans voice and us ing Arabic and other local languages enhances theeffectiveness of voice communications through mobile technology. 94 Many others observed thatwomen in more developed areas of the country, or women from wealthy families in the poorerareas of Sudan, are easier to reach through both mobile phones and email; subsequently, thesewomen are often capable of spreading messages to women without mobile phone access in theircommunities. 95

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    ::CONTACTING SUDAN A COMMUNICATIONS STUDY::ow U.S.-based organizations reach contacts in Sudan

    This section will reveal the major findings from the online survey performed for thereport.

    The following observations hold across all of the organizations surveyed:

    1. In Darfur, Khartoum, and Southern Sudan, contacts have greater access to mobilephones than they do to Internet.

    2. Contact via email, followed closely by contact by calling mobile phones, are thepreferred modes of communication with contacts in Sudan.

    3. Despite low access to Internet among contacts, several organizations have found thatcommunication through social media and websites can reach Sudanese on theground indirectly through friends or relatives with access to the Internet.

    4. The least popular modes of communication among contacts are calls to landlinephones and text messaging.

    5. The vast majority of the organizations do not take advantage of the mobile-to-internet technologies available to them to communicate with people in Sudan.

    Overview

    This online survey elicited responses from 22 U.S. based organizations in 11 states that focus ondevelopment, education, and humanitarian assistance in Sudan and on Sudan-focused advocacy,educational media (filmmaking and radio) and Diaspora community building in the UnitedStates. Ten or more of the organizations had contacts in Darfur, Khartoum, and SouthernSudan , while fewer had contacts in Kordofan, Eastern Sudan or the northernmost states in thecountry.

    While the survey cannot be considered representative, it provided several important insights intohow the organizations surveyed contact people in Sudan. These results may or may not besuggestive for the greater population of Sudan-focused organizations in the United States. Amore representative survey would be required to determine overall trends for the population.

    Nevertheless, all of the organizations surveyed engage in activities on the ground in Sudan inways that are similar to the work of My Sisters Keeper. Hence, at the very least, survey resultselucidate how a handful of peers of My Sisters Keeper currently engage with contacts in Sudan.

    When speaking of these three areas, Darfur refers to the three states of Northern Darfur, Western Darfur, andSouthern Darfur, Khartoum refers to Khartoum State, Jazera State, and White Nile State, and Southern Sudanrefers to the following states: Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, Unity/Wahda, Upper Nile,Jonglei, Lakes/Al Buhrayat, Western Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, and Bahr el Jabal.

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    In Darfur, Khartoum, and Southern Sudan, contacts have greater access to mobile phones than they do to the Internet.

    This survey divided Sudan into eight regions of three-four states each, and asked respondents if and how often they contacted people in each region. Overall, at least four organizations were

    found to be in contact with people in each of the regions. However, the most widely contactedregions among organizations surveyed fell into three distinct areas: Region 2, whichencompasses the three states of Darfur, Region 4, which encompasses Khartoum and twoneighboring states, and Regions 6-8, which comprise the semi-autonomous area of SouthernSudan. In each of these three areas, organizations indicated that more of their contacts hadregular access to mobile phones than they did to the Internet.

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    Though email is the most widely used telecommunications tool, calling mobile phones is rated the most effective tool.

    Twenty-one of the organizations surveyed use email, but only 15 of these organizations said thatemail is either effective or very effective. On the other hand, 19 organizations call mobile

    phones and 17 said that calling mobiles is either effective or very effective

    . These resultsindicate a greater level of satisfaction with calling mobile phones than with sending emails.

    Calling mobile phones is equally effective for sending out or soliciting information. On thecontrary, email is slightly better for soliciting information than for sending out messages.

    When asked to compare the effectiveness of telecommunications tools for specific tasks,respondents indicated that calling mobile phones is equally useful and the most effective tool for sending out and soliciting information. For both tasks, 16/22 respondents (73%) indicatedthat calling mobile phones was one of the most effective communications methods.

    All of those who say email rate email as effective or very effective actually use it. 16 of the 17 organizationswho say calling mobile phones is effective or very effective say that they call mobile phones. It is unclear whythe 17 th organization in this category, Mercy Without Borders, does not call mobile phones. However, thisorganization rated online communications (including email, publishing information on a website, and a self-specified category of sending eNewsletters) as very effective, indicating that the organization prefers web -basedoutreach.

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    Respondents indicated a slight preference for using email to solicit information, rather than tosend information out. Fifteen respondents (68%) said that email was one of the most effectiveinformation-gathering tools. On the other hand, just 12 respondents regarded email as aneffective tool for sending information to large numbers of people in Sudan.

    Word of mouth extends the reach of emails and mobile calls.

    Five organizations independently acknowledged using email or mobile phone calls to propelfurther communications by word of mouth. These organizations explained that word of mouth isusually the only way to communicate with rural populations. One organization mentioned agroup of specially appointed contact people living in cities, whom they communicate with byphone and then charge to spread[] the message through word of mouth in rural areas. Another

    organization relies on phone conversations with the relatives of members to spread word to ruralareas.

    Two organizations mentioned the necessity of spreading messages through word of mouth because email access is sporadic. According to one of them, a vast majority of people live inrural areas and are inaccessible via phone and email. But those with means do travel to townsevery now and then and can check their emails.

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    results indicate that the use of websites and social media tools can be effective forcommunicating, though sometimes indirectly, with people in Sudan.

    The least popular modes of communication among contacts are calls to landline phones and text messaging.

    Few organizations surveyed call landline phones and or send text messages to communicate withpeople in Sudan. The reported usage rate for each of the methods was 27%, or 6/22. However,analysis indicates different reasons for the low rates of usage.

    Low rates of calling landline phones may stem from issues of access and/or effectiveness.Thirteen of the 22 organizations surveyed have contacts in Sudan that can access landline phonesregularly. This number indicates only moderate landline phone accessibility in the sample.Moreover, calling landline phones had the highest number of ineffective or very ineffectiveratings (six), and the lowest number of effective or very effective ratings (four) of allcommunications tools in the survey. Finally, only three of the six organizations that use landlinetelephones reported that the method was either effective or very effective, indicating asatisfaction rate among users of 3/6 (or 50%). While there is no way to deduce causation from

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    the numbers above, these statistics are significantly different from the statistics for textmessaging and mobile phones.

    On the other hand, low rates of text messaging do not appear to result from issues of accessand/or effectiveness. Twenty of the 22 organization surveyed have contacts in Sudan that can

    regularly access mobile phones, indicating very high mobile phone accessibility. While threeorganizations f ound text messaging ineffective, seven organizations found the methodeffective or very effective. In addition, all six of the organizations who text messagecontacts in Sudan find the method either effective or very effective, indicating a 100% satisfaction rate among users.

    The limited results suggest that texting mobile phones is a more viable communications strategy,in terms of accessibility and effectiveness, than calling landline phones. However, a study with alarger sample size and more targeted questions about why organizations use or do not use certaintools would be required to substantiate this suggestion.

    The vast majority of the organizations do not take advantage of the mobile-to-Internetinterfaces available to them to communicate with people in Sudan.

    Several results of this survey indicate that the majority, if not all, of the organizations surveyedcould use mobile-to-Internet tools. First, 21 of the 22 organizations regularly call mobile phonesto communicate with people in Sudan. Several others report that they use text messaging, Skype,and sites like freeconferencecalls.com. However, only two respondents reported any use of toolsthat allow them to reach out to mobile phones in Sudan through an Internet platform:

    The majority of those who use Skype said that they use it to connect computer tocomputer. Only one respondent, Maggie Fick of the Enough Project, reported use of theprepaid Skype conference call feature. Through this feature, callers can connect tomultiple other people using either mobile phones or a Skype browser for the call. Fick says that the Skype conference calls are very cheap, and rates the quality of these callsas good.

    Silvestro Bakhiet of New Sudan Generation, said that he had begun to explore the use of CellAlert, a platform designed to allow mobile phone users to receive automatic mobilephone alerts from the World Wide Web about predetermined search queries (i.e., jobalerts, weather alerts, price alerts, or security alerts). Bakhiet does not currently use theplatform, but is in contact with CellAlert creator Israel Kloss about the system.

    Aside from these two cases, survey respondents did not report use of mobile-to-Internettechnologies. Follow-up interviews with ten different representatives of the organizationssurveyed indicated a widespread unawareness of such technologies, even when featured inInternet tools such as Skype that they already used. Nevertheless, given the novelty of suchtechnologies, it is perhaps no surprise that many organizations have not yet begun to use thesetools.

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    A detailed map of SudanSource: One World-Nations Online Project

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    ::HOW I CONNECT A COMMUNICATIONS STUDY::evels of telecommunications access for the women of the SfP network in Sudan

    This section will provide results from the phone survey performed for this report.

    The phone survey revealed that:

    1. At least one woman in Kuajok and Wau can be contacted via email, mobile phonecalls, and text messages. (In Aweil and Khartoum, MSK has other contacts that canbe reached through all three means of communication.)

    2. Sixteen of the women from the 2009 networking conference in Wau are reachablevia mobile phone calls

    3. Twelve (75%) of the women reached use text messages

    4. While eight (50%) of the women reached have Internet access, only four (25%) haveemail addresses

    5. The women prefer Arabic

    6. Most women subscribe to either Sudani or Zain

    OverviewAlthough there were a total of 27 names on the final roster of MSKs 2009 Sisterhood for PeaceConference in Wau, Sudan, only 22 of these women provided contact information. Of these 22women, 16 were reachable by mobile phone. Half of the women surveyed (8/16) live in WauWestern Bahr el-Ghazal, Sudan. Of the others, four live in Kuajok, Warrap State, two live inAweil, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State, and two live in Khartoum, Khartoum State.

    At least one woman in Kuajok and Wau can be contacted via email, mobile phone calls, and text messages. In Aweil and Khartoum, MSK has other contacts that can be reached through all three means of communication.

    According to My Sisters Keeper field manager Kaidi Rial, her method for inviting women to the2009 SfP conference was simple: In each of the cities represented at the conference, Kaidi askedone woman who she knew had connections to many others to spread the word. Kaidi says, You

    For the survey, Monica Ilario, who supports Kaidi Rial in the Wau MSK office (and is hence a part of the MSKteam), was substituted for Achol Cyer Rehan, who attended only the final parts of the conference (and thus, is notlisted on the official roster).

    L

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    Internet access at home. In the case that MSK wishes to identify a point person with access to allthree means of communication covered in this section, Kaidi grew up in Khartoum and has alarge number of contacts there.

    Sixteen of the women from the 2009 networking conference in Wau are reachable via mobile phone calls.

    Overall, 16 of the 22 women that provided contact numbers on the conference roster werereachable by phone. All of the 16 women reached said that they could be contacted via mobile

    phone calls at the mobile numbers provided. While eight of the working numbers connected onthe first call, the average number of calls to connect with the remaining women was 4.7 . Callsthat would not connect gave messages such as, The subscriber you are trying to reach is out of service, or Sorry, the number you dialed cannot be reached at this time. Please try again later.(Once connected, call quality varied. The best connections were made during the daytime, andin good weather . However, women were most available to speak after work hours or on theweekend.)

    The weather is bad right now. Its a bad connection. I cant hear you. - Emmanuela Isidoro, Wau, Ministry of Physical Infrastructure

    Women called nine-ten times at varying times of the day over the course of three days or more with no connectionwere considered unreachable in this survey. Calls to unreach able numbers never connected, but rather receivedmessages that the phone was either turned off, out of service, or unreachable. One of the women in this categorycould not be reached because the number provided was not hers. Calls to connect is defined as the number of calls required to hear ringing or a busy tone. Even after callsconnected, several women did not answer or had busy signals. Several survey responses and interviews confirmed that call quality can depend on weather.

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    Twelve (75%) of the women reached use text messages.

    Twelve of the women reached, or 75%, said that they were able to receive text messages on theirphones. (One of these respondents admitted that she had never tried using text messages, thoughshe knew that it was possible.) Generally, women seemed surprised that My Sisters Keeper

    might be able to reach them by text message from America, but were not surprised to hear thatMy Sisters Keeper could reach them by email.

    Try the SMS. I use text messages with my family and with myfriends in Sudan, but didnt know that you could send me an SMSfrom Amreeka! -Eman Hamza, Khartoum, Zenab Women for Development

    Send me a text message and I will get back to you. - Josphine Ayak Awet, Kuajok, Womens Productive Unit

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    While eight (50%) of the women reached have Internet access, only four (25%) have email addresses.

    Half of the women (8/16) reported that they had access to email either at home or at work,though only four, a quarter of women reached, had email addresses. Specifically, two women

    had access to email at only at work, four had access to email only at home, and two had access tothe Internet in both places.

    Several of the women who reported some Internet access still did not have a personal emailaddress. Six of the 12 women without email addresses said that they could be contacted throughthe email address of a friend. Only one of the women without regular Internet access mentionedthe possibility of going to an Internet caf.

    I have Internet access 24 hours a day. There is Internet in the office, and I have a laptop forInternet at home. Getting on the Internet is easy for me. -Hala Saleem, Kh