policy options for a depressed economy · jordi galí (crei, upf and barcelona gse) federico...
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Policy Options for a Depressed Economy
Jordi Galí
CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE
Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 1 / 21
The Legacy of the Financial Crisis
Persistent decline in economic activity
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 2 / 21
The Legacy of the Financial Crisis
Persistent decline in economic activity
Monetary policy: Policy rates at the zero lower bound
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 3 / 21
The Legacy of the Financial Crisis
Persistent decline in economic activity
Monetary policy: Policy rates at the zero lower bound
Fiscal policy: High debt/GDP ratios
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 4 / 21
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Debt/GDP 2007 Debt/GDP 2013
The Legacy of the Financial Crisis Debt/GDP Ratios
The Legacy of the Financial Crisis
Persistent decline in economic activity
Monetary policy: Policy rates at the zero lower bound
Fiscal policy: High debt/GDP ratios
What is to be done?
Answer : It depends on one�s "model" of the determinants of economicactivity
Key message: Policy choices based on "the wrong model" may beine¤ective or have unintended consequences
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 5 / 21
Outline of the Lectures
First Lecture:
a) What determines economic activity? Classical vs. Keynesian viewsb) Policy options (I): Supply-side policies
Second Lecture:
a) Policy options (II): Demand-side policiesb) Concluding remarks
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 6 / 21
What Determines Aggregate Activity? The Classical View
Key ingredient: Perfect competition in goods markets
Firm�s problem:maxNt
PtYt �WtNt
subject toYt = AtN1�α
t
Optimality condition:
Pt =Wt
(1� α)AtN�αt
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 7 / 21
What Determines Aggregate Activity? The Classical View
Key ingredient: Perfect competition in goods markets
Firm�s problem:maxNt
PtYt �WtNt
subject toYt = AtN1�α
t
Optimality condition:
Pt =Wt
(1� α)AtN�αt
Equivalently:
(1� α)AtN�αt =
Wt
Pt
) "labor demand"
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 8 / 21
What Determines Aggregate Activity? The Classical View
Key ingredient: Perfect competition in goods marketsFirm�s problem:
maxNt
PtYt �WtNt
subject toYt = AtN1�α
t
Optimality condition:
Pt =Wt
(1� α)AtN�αt
Equivalently:
(1� α)AtN�αt =
Wt
Pt
) "labor demand"
Competitive ("Walrasian") equilibrium
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 9 / 21
Employment
Real wage Labor supply
Labor demand
What Determines Economic Activity? The Classical View
W/P
N
What Determines Aggregate Activity? The Keynesian View
Key ingredients:
(i) Imperfect competition in goods markets(ii) Infrequent price adjustment by �rms
Pt =Mt
�Wt
(1� α)AtN�αt
�with markupMt variable in the short-run, constant in the long-run.Equivalently ("price-wage schedule"):
(1� α)AtN�αt
Mt=Wt
Pt(iii) Demand determined output
Yt = Ct + It + Gt +NXt
Labor demand:
Nt =�YtAt
� 11�α
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 10 / 21
Employment
Real wage
What Determines Economic Activity? The Keynesian View
N
Labor demand Labor supply
Price-wage schedule
W/P
Employment
Real wage
What Determines Economic Activity? The Keynesian View
N
Labor demand Labor supply
Price-wage schedule
W/P
Policy Options (I): Supply-side Policies
Example #1: "Structural reforms" aimed at increasing aggregatee¢ ciency (" At)Example #2: Reduction in payroll taxes, aimed at stimulatingemployment.
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 11 / 21
The Short Run E¤ects of "Structural Reforms"
Classical view:Wt
Pt= (1� α)AtN�α
t
) increase in labor demand, given the wage.
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 12 / 21
Employment
Real wage Labor supply
Labor demand
The Short Run Effects of an Increase in Aggregate Efficiency The Classical View
(W/P)1
(W/P)0
N0 N1
E0
E1
The Short Run E¤ects of "Structural Reforms"
Classical view:Wt
Pt= (1� α)AtN�α
t
) increase in labor demand, given the wage.
Keynesian view:
Nt =�YtAt
� 11�α
) decrease in labor demand, given output.
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 13 / 21
Employment
Real wage
N0
Labor demand Labor supply
Price-wage schedule
N1
E0
E1
(W/P)0
(W/P)1
The Short Run Effects of an Increase in Aggregate Efficiency The Keynesian View
The Short Run E¤ects of "Structural Reforms"
Classical view:Wt
Pt= (1� α)AtN�α
t
) increase in labor demand, given the wage.
Keynesian view:
Nt =�YtAt
� 11�α
) decrease in labor demand, given output.
Empirical evidence: Galí (AER, 1999), Basu et al. (AER, 2006).
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 14 / 21
The Short Run E¤ects of a Payroll Tax Cut
Classical view:(1+ τt )Wt
Pt= (1� α)AtN�α
t
Equivalently,Wt
Pt=(1� α)AtN�α
t
1+ τt
) increase in labor demand, given the wage.
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 15 / 21
Employment
Real wage Labor supply
Labor demand
The Short Run Effects of a Payroll Tax Cut The Classical View
(W/P)1
(W/P)0
N0 N1
E0
E1
The Short Run E¤ects of a Payroll Tax Cut
Classical view:(1+ τt )Wt
Pt= (1� α)AtN�α
t
Equivalently,Wt
Pt=(1� α)AtN�α
t
1+ τt
) increase in labor demand, given the wage.
Keynesian view:
Nt = Nt =�YtAt
� 11�α
) unchanged labor demand, given output.
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 16 / 21
Employment
Real wage
N0
Labor demand Labor supply
Price-wage schedule
E0 (W/P)0
The Short Run Effects of a Payroll Tax Cut The Keynesian View
(W/P)1 E1
Dynamic Adjustment to Supply-side Shocks: The Role ofMonetary Policy
Key assumptions of the New Keynesian model:
(i) monopolistic competition in goods and labor markets(ii) staggered nominal wage and price setting à la Calvo(iii) no capital accumulation, closed economy(iv) monetary policy rule:
it = ρ+ φpπpt + φybytTransmission mechanism to output and employment
" a , # τ ) # πp ) # i ) # r ) " y ) " n
) key role for endogenous monetary policy response
Simulations
- technology shocks- payroll tax cut
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 17 / 21
0 5 10 150
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
output
φp = 1.5
φp = 1.1
φp = 3
0 5 10 15-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
employment0 5 10 15
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
inflation
0 5 10 15-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
nominal rate0 5 10 15
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
real rate0 5 10 15
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
technology
Responses to a Technology Shock in the New Keynesian Model: The Role of Monetary Policy
0 5 10 15-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
output
0 5 10 15-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
employment0 5 10 15
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
inflation
0 5 10 15-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
nominal rate0 5 10 15
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
real rate0 5 10 15
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
payroll tax
φp =1.5
φp =1.1
φp =3
Responses to a Payroll Tax Cut in the New Keynesian Model: The Role of Monetary Policy
Dynamic Adjustment to Supply-side Shocks: The Role ofMonetary Policy
Key assumptions of the New Keynesian model:
(i) monopolistic competition in goods and labor markets(ii) staggered nominal wage and price setting à la Calvo(iii) no capital accumulation, closed economy(iv) monetary policy rule:
it = ρ+ φpπpt + φybytTransmission mechanism to output and employment
" a , # τ ) # πp ) # i ) # r ) " y ) " n) key role for endogenous monetary policy response
SimulationsEmpirical evidence on the role of monetary policy (Galí, López-Salido andVallés, JME 2003)
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 18 / 21
The Response of Hours to a Technology Shock: Empirical Evidence on The Role of Monetary Policy
Pre-Volcker period Volcker-Greenspan period
Source: Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (JME, 2003)
Dynamic Adjustment to Supply-side Shocks: The Role ofthe Exchange Rate Regime
Based on Galí and Monacelli (2014): small open economy New Keynesianmodel, producer currency pricing, complete markets.Regime #1 : In�ation targeting, �exible exchange rate:
πpt = 0
- transmission mechanism:
" a , # τ ) # πp ) ## i ) # r , " e ) " y ) " n
Regime #2: Exchange rate peg/Currency union:
et = 0 ) it = i�t
- transmission mechanism:
" a , # τ ) # πp ) # pH , " st , " r ) ' y , ' n
Simulation: in�ation targeting vs. currency unionJordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 19 / 21
0 5 10 15-1
0
1
2
3
output
inflation targetingcurrency union
0 5 10 15-1
0
1
2
3
4
employment0 5 10 15
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
consumption
0 5 10 15-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
inflation0 5 10 15
-3
-2
-1
0
1
nominal rate0 5 10 15
-3
-2
-1
0
1
real rate
0 5 10 15-1
0
1
2
3
nominal exchange rate0 5 10 15
-1
0
1
2
3
terms of trade0 5 10 15
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
payroll tax
Responses to a Payroll Tax Cut in the New Keynesian Small Open Economy Model: The Role of the Exchange Rate Regime
Lecture One: Key Ideas
Both Classical and Keynesian models are taught and used in economics,but they represent radically di¤erent views about the determination ofaggregate activity.
In a Classical world, supply-side policies are likely to be very e¤ective instimulating economic activity.
In a Keynesian world, supply-side policies may fail to stimulate economicactivity unless they are accompanied by su¢ ciently accommodatingmonetary policies.
Monetary policy rules that make interest rates highly responsive toin�ation in the face of supply-side policies are likely to make the lattermore e¤ective.
Supply-side policies are likely to be the least e¤ective in (small) countriesthat are part of a currency union (Galí-Monacelli 2014), or facing abinding zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate(Eggertsson-Ferrero-Ra¤o 2014).
Jordi Galí (CREI, UPF and Barcelona GSE) Federico Ca¤è Lectures Federico Ca¤è Lectures 2014 20 / 21