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Saravanamuttu & Loh Political Culture in Malaysia

Paper prepared for the 20th IPSA World Congress July 9-13, Fukuoka, Japan

Please do not cite without authors’ permission

Political Culture in Malaysia: Contesting Developmentalism in a

Multi-Ethnic Society Johan Saravanamuttu and Francis Loh Kok Wah

Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang

Abstract Early work on the Malaysian polity assumed that as a plural society, Malaysian political culture would be deeply embedded in ethnicity and communalism. Much of the writing on Malaysian politics that followed basically took communal politics as a given. Communalism was seen as a debilitating, negative phenomenon of every ethnic group working for its self-interest or whenever possible, domination of the ‘other’. Such a realist perspective of social and political relations was taken even further by theorists of the plural society who began to put the accent on the conflictual elements of the plural society, discarding altogether the pragmatic considerations of mutual gains, and depicting it a recipe for democratic disaster. For writers like these, plural societies were marked by “mutually incompatible” social structures, values and belief systems as well as systems of action at the “cultural core” and thereby, merely a formal diversity in the basic system of compulsory institutions. Then came a genre of studies which looked at Malaysian politics through the lens of consociationalism, which we argue is still an insufficient basis for understanding Malaysian political culture. This paper has stressed the importance of developmentalism growing out of the articulation of a developmental state within a growing, affluent middle class society since the 1980s as a major non-ethnic factor impacting on Malaysian political culture. Developmentalism has affected all ethnic communities and tends to create a quiescent political culture in which people see the state as the guarantor of a modern livelihood and lifestyle. We suggest that despite this overall quiescence an element of activism is demonstrated in the rich data provided by survey research. There is clearly a strong sense of faith and confidence in the capacity of the state, which generally is seen as an interventionist one. When it comes to tenets of politics, we find participant but not necessary sophisticated political actors. Malaysians are generally clearly still on the conservative side when it comes to political activism. Nevertheless, there is a minority that has this orientation (but their numbers remain small) and this same minority sometimes swelling to a majority is highly critical of governmental malpractices. Perhaps this is indicative that “new politics” has taken root in Malaysia. In general, there is a great preference for electoralism among Malaysians over other forms of less formal political participation. Malaysians are also highly nationalistic but at the same time do betray strong ethnic and religious affiliations. Perhaps we could tentatively conclude that Malaysian political culture, from this survey, while shown to be participant, is still deeply embedded in developmentalism and ethnicity.

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Introduction

In spite of continuous parliamentary rule and the regular holding of elections

since Independence in 1957, nonetheless, there has occurred increasing concentration

of powers by the executive at the expense of the judiciary, legislative, the mass media,

and civil society more generally. Nowadays, Malaysia is described variously as a

“quasi democracy” (Zakaria 1989), a “semi democracy” (Case 1993), a “repressive-

responsive regime” (Crouch 1996) or even a “syncretic state” (Jesudason). For some

other critics, Malaysia is better described nowadays as a system of rule by law, no

longer one of rule of law (Rais Yatim 1995). In this paper we shall not elaborate on

the coercive laws and institutional constraints that restrict the scope of political

participation in Malaysia.1 We focus instead on the political culture(s), defined

broadly, of Malaysians. Specifically, we want to understand why Malaysians

themselves seem to acquiesce with this authoritarian rule by law.

After a brief background to Malaysia, we discuss the spell of democratic

ferment – the so-called reformasi movement and the formation of an opposition

coalition - which occurred in 1998-99 following Malaysia’s “dual crises”: the regional

financial crisis and the sacking and incarceration of Anwar Ibrahim, the then deputy

prime minister. Despite anticipation that a change of government was in the offing,

the ruling coalition was returned to power in the November 1999 general election. A

discussion of the political values, attitudes and orientations of Malaysians, based on

the Asia Europe Survey (ASESurvey) follows. We suggest that these values, attitudes

and orientations should be related to the rise of “developmentalism”, the cultural

corollary to the dirigiste developmental state which characterized the Malaysian, and

many other East and Southeast Asian regimes, during the 1980s and early 1990s. It is

this developmentalism, therefore, that explains the values, attitudes and orientations

of the Malaysians, which in turn poses limits to democratization. However, the fact

that democratic ferment is nonetheless occurring suggests that this developmentalism

is being contested.

1 A copious literature already exists on the manner by which top-down institutional structures within the formal and non-formal political process has created what has sometimes been labelled a bureaucratic-authoritarian state. See, among others, Saravanamuttu, 1987, Crouch, 1996, Loh, 2000.

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From Independence to the NEP

Census 2001 put Malaysia’s population at 22 million people in 1999. Today it

is estimated at about 26 million. Officially the people are categorized as bumiputera

or indigenous people and non-bumiputera or non-indigenous people. Malays, the

aboriginal groups in peninsular Malaysia and the “natives” of Sabah and Sarawak

states (both located in northern Borneo) account for over 60 percent of the population,

and together constitute the bumiputera. Chinese (about 24 percent) and Indians (about

7 percent), who began emigrating in large numbers to Malaysia during British

colonial rule in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, constitute the non-

bumiputera. Apart from linguistic and cultural differences, religion further

distinguishes the ethnic groups from one another. The Malays are invariably Muslims,

the Chinese predominantly Buddhists and Taoists, and the Indians Hindus with

smaller numbers of Muslims and Sikhs. A small minority of Malaysians (drawn from

all the ethnic groups (including the Kadazan and Dayak bumiputera of Sabah and

Sarawak respectively, but excluding the indigenous Malays) are Christians.

Between independence in 1957 until 1969, the Federation of Malaysia was

ruled by the Alliance Party, a multi-ethnic coalition government comprising the

United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the dominant partner, the Malaysian

Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). Nominally, it

practiced a Westminister system of government and held federal and state elections

regularly. For some observers, Malaysia appeared an example of consociational

democracy in developing countries.

In fact, and in spite of regular elections and parliamentary rule, a strong state

dominated by the executive had been put into place since independence. However, its

control of civil society was achieved not through the use of brute force, the

suspension of the Constitution or elections, but through use of coercive legislations

passed by parliament. The most important consideration in this regard was how the

British expanded and consolidated the Malaysian (then colonial) state quickly as a

result of the communist uprising, euphemistically termed the Emergency (1948-60). It

was only with the advent of independence that a set of participatory governmental

institutions was introduced from above. The state’s coercive powers granted under the

Emergency Regulations were then amended and incorporated into the Independence

Constitution and/or other laws for their use in ordinary times in post-independence

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Malaysia. Ironically, the Malaysian nationalists worked hand-in-glove with the British

to expand and consolidate the national state, ensuring the defeat of the communist

insurrection.

It was upon such strong foundations that the state was reformed further by the

post-independence executive to serve its own political ends. Through promulgation of

new laws, amendments to these laws as well as to the Constitution, this control and

domination has been uninterrupted. Consequently, there have developed very few

independent organizations capable of advocating the rights and interests of civil

society in sustained fashion. Hence the Alliance was able to maintain power from

1957 to 1969.

However, the absence of consensus outside the Alliance leadership and an

economic slowdown in the late 1960s contributed to worsening ethnic relations,

culminating in the worst-ever incident of communal riots in May 1969. The riots led

to the suspension of parliamentary rule. The National Operations Council, largely

drawn from the ruling Malay elites in UMNO and the upper echelons of the

administrative and security forces also dominated by Malays, ruled for almost 21

months. Several important changes to the original consociational arrangements,

geared toward promoting Malay interests, were introduced before parliamentary rule

was restored in early 1971.

First, the Alliance multi-ethnic ruling coalition was expanded to include the

erstwhile opposition parties and renamed the Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front).

At the same time, there occurred a shift from participative to executive institutions.

Following amendments to the Constitution and to the Sedition Act, certain “sensitive

issues” were declared to lie beyond the bounds of public discourse. These issues

included the special rights of the Malays, the position of the traditional rulers as heads

of state, Malay as the national language, and Islam as the official religion on the one

hand, and the citizenship rights of the non-Malays on the other. Second, various

moves to promote a common national identity were undertaken. This included the

introduction of a National Cultural Policy (which emphasized Islam and the cultural

attributes of the majority and indigenous Malays as the essential bases of the Cultural

Policy), the belated implementation of the National Language (Malay) and National

Educational policies (including the progressive use of Malay as the sole medium of

instruction in secondary schools and universities beginning from 1971 which had

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been passed by parliament in the 1960s), and the pronouncement of the Rukunegara,

the national ideology based on five motherhood principles.2

Third, the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1971-90) was formulated and

launched. The NEP’s premises were that Malay poverty and resentment of inter-

ethnic income and wealth inequalities, and the ethnic division of labour which

favoured the non-bumiputeras and discriminated against the rural bumiputeras, lay at

the heart of the May 1969 communal riots. Hence the NEP’s “Outline Prospective

Plan, 1971-90” proposed that poverty be eradicated regardless of ethnic group (the

poverty rate was especially high among rural bumiputeras) while bumiputera share of

corporate equity be increased from 2.5 percent in 1970 to 30 percent in 1990. A

massive affirmative action programme favouring bumiputeras was launched.

However, to ensure that non-bumiputera Chinese and Indians were not adversely

affected, the NEP was set within the context of achieving rapid economic growth

during the duration of the Plan. Foreign domination of the economy, which in 1970

accounted for 60.7 percent ownership of assets in the corporate sector, would also be

reduced drastically.

Inevitably, the various groups of Malaysians differed in their opinions with

regard to the NEP. Malays, bumiputera more generally, who benefited from it largely

welcomed the restructuring as necessary for fostering national unity while non-

Malays tended to resent it as ethnic discrimination, arguing that it worsened ethnic

relations. Non-Malay leaders of the BN ruling coalition who claimed to support the

NEP, nonetheless, were apt to complain about its overzealous implementation by

Malay bureaucrats. There was also the important criticism by non-Malays as well as

opposition Malay parties that a political patronage system had been spawned as a

result of the NEP (Gomez 1996). At the root of the problem was the availability of

business licenses, government projects and soft loans specifically for bumiputeras in

accordance with NEP quota requirements. The proliferation of public enterprises and

the setting up of companies by these enterprises further resulted in the creation of

numerous directorships, managerial and executive positions as well as ordinary job

opportunities. The most lucrative business opportunities and top positions often went

to top UMNO leaders, who either acted as trustees on behalf of UMNO, or in their

own private capacities. In turn, these UMNO leaders made available the less lucrative 2 These are: belief in God, loyalty to king and country, upholding the constitution, rule of law, and good behaviour and morality.

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opportunities and positions to their own supporters. Consequently, UMNO ended up

in business. This involvement of UMNO and subsequently other BN political parties

in business has led to the so-called phenomenon of “money politics” in Malaysia.

Indeed, public debates over the NEP were sometimes acrimonious. Yet, in the end,

there was general acceptance among Malays and non-Malays of the NEP and for

some form of state intervention in the economy on behalf of Malay interests.

Such consensus was facilitated by the steady economic growth that occurred

throughout the 1970s and early 1980s (Jomo 1990). Fortuitously, the first decade of

the NEP coincided with Malaysia’s discovery of offshore petroleum and an

international commodities boom resulting in favourable export earnings enabling the

government to implement the NEP. But the growth was also spurred on by increased

foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Malaysia’s export-oriented industrialization

programme which began in the 1970s. Free trade zones were created and various

incentives offered to foreign companies. With industrialization and rapid growth

generally, employment opportunities expanded. Unemployment rates fell while per

capita income rose (Jomo 1990). By any standards, growth was impressive, even

more so when the need for inter-ethnic restructuring is considered. However in 1985-

86, a severe recession occurred due to falling commodity prices including that of

petroleum. Local and foreign investments also fell. Many mismanaged and

uneconomic public enterprises were closed down. It was under such circumstances

that the NEP was held in abeyance. To resuscitate the economy, guidelines for foreign

equity ownership in manufacturing were liberalized. Other economic deregulation

policies and privatization projects, in line with neo-liberal global trends, were also

adopted (Loh 2000: 71-2). Due to these critical changes to development policy,

favourable growth rates were resumed by the late 1980s and into the 1990s. By that

time, however, the NEP had officially come to a close.

Meanwhile the BN coalition consolidated its rule. Political ferment which had

occurred during the mid-1980s recession was nipped in the bud by mass arrests of

NGO activists, opposition leaders, unionists and educationists in an operation

codenamed Operasi Lalang in October 1987. Following the tightening of various

laws, the government even initiated an assault on the conservative, but independent

judiciary in 1988. The upshot was the removal of the head of the Supreme Court and

suspension of five other judges. Although the opposition gained ground in the 1990

general election, the BN reversed that trend by the time the 1995 general election was

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held. On that occasion, the BN coalition polled 66 percent of the votes and won four-

fifths of all seats in parliament. A year earlier in the 1994 state election in Sabah state,

the BN had also performed well replacing the Parti Bersatu Sabah which had been in

power since 1995. In Sarawak, the Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak which had quit the

Sarawak BN coalition in 1983 rejoined the BN in 1994. Finally, Semangat 46, the

Malay opposition party which was created after the split right down the middle in

UMNO in 1987/88, voted to dissolve itself in October 1996 after eights years in

opposition. Its leaders and their followers returned to the UMNO fold. Before this, the

Islamic movement Darul Arqam which had been banned in 1994, was successfully

disbanded too. All told, it appeared that the BN had consolidated itself by the mid-

1990s, after a hiccup in the mid-1980s (Loh 2002: 38-40).

It was therefore an unexpected twist of fate that a reformasi (reforms)

movement emerged in 1998-99. No doubt, this volte face had everything to do with

the so-called “Anwar saga”. The 1997 financial crisis had brought differences

between Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and his deputy Anwar Ibrahim to a head,

particularly over how the crisis should be managed. Anwar, who was then finance

minister, severely cut government expenditure and allowed interest rates to float

upwards. Privatised “mega projects” were shelved. Calls to bail out Malaysian

companies facing bankruptcies were rejected. But Mahathir considered these and

related Anwar measures to miss the point. They were no different from the

International Monetary Fund’s response to the crisis and, to his mind, failed to

recognize that the crisis was not a result of domestic shortcomings. Rather, Mahathir

maintained that the crisis was caused by international currency speculators and hedge

fund managers. Moreover, by refusing to assist the Malaysian, specifically the

bumiputera corporations, Anwar was allowing the gains secured under the NEP,

specifically, the development of a Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community

(BCIC), to become unstuck. Consequently, a different set of policies focusing

attention on how to deal with foreign manipulation of the Malaysian economy on the

one hand and on bailing out Malaysian corporations via restructuring, debt relief and

access to new credit on the other were proposed by the National Economic Action

Council (NEAC), headed by former finance minister and Mahathir confidante, Daim

Zainuddin. In June 1998, when the UMNO Youth leader associated with Anwar

launched an attack on cronyism and nepotism at the UMNO annual general assembly,

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Mahathir hit back openly at Anwar and his supporters. With this turn of events,

Anwar’s position in government became untenable. And on September 2, 1998 he

was ousted.

Anwar’s sacking from government, expulsion from UMNO, subsequent arrest,

prosecution and being sentenced to six years’ imprisonment, and his black eye caused

by a beating while under detention by the Inspector-General of Police galvanized his

supporters in and outside UMNO, the opposition parties and the NGOs into a mass

movement. Public rallies and street demonstrations in support of Anwar occurred.

Anwar’s treatment and the regime’s abuse of power generally were widely criticized

in publications, cassetttes, video-cassette tapes and in numerous websites. The

demands of the movement quickly moved beyond concern for Anwar’s personal well-

being. Thus was the reformasi movement born, demanding “rule of law”,

“participatory democracy” and “justice for all”. It also called for the repeal of

coercive laws like the Internal Security Act (ISA – which allows for detention without

trial), for “accountability” and “transparency” in decision-making so as to put an end

to “corruption, cronyism and nepotism”, and ultimately for Dr Mahathir’s resignation.

The leaders of the reformasi movement first formed ADIL, and subsequently Parti

Keadilan Nasional, led by Dr Wan Azizah Ismail, Anwar’s wife.

Initially, ADIL and Parti Keadilan cooperated with the opposition parties and

various NGOs under two umbrella organizations called Gagasan and Gerak. In

anticipation of the general elections due by mid-2000, Parti Keadilan and three

opposition parties - the Malay-based Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), the Chinese-

based Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the small multi-ethnic socialist-inclined

Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM) - subsequently formed a new opposition coalition, the

Barisan Alternatif (BA) in mid-1999. The discourse of participatory democracy,

previously the purview of small groups of middle-class and liberal-minded

Malaysians, especially those involved in the NGOs, now developed into a significant

counter-discourse involving the opposition parties too. At any rate, the formation of

BA was not merely a “marriage of convenience” among incompatibles. Enough

leaders and members of the four parties subscribed to the democratic discourse. And

through extended debate and give and take, they reached agreement on the

distribution of electoral seats, the contents of a joint manifesto “For a Just Malaysia”

(which contained many social democratic features), and even on a “people friendly”

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alternative budget which sought to jump-start the economy by increasing public

spending for social programmes. Apart from these efforts by the opposition parties,

many other independent groups – including women’s groups, environmentalists, new

as well as old NGOs, artists - not directly related to the BA also made their voices

heard in the run up to the elections (Loh 2003).

Taken together, these developments showed that Malaysia was clearly in

political ferment. They linked the present impulse towards democracy to the

burgeoning popular movement in the mid-1980s, which had similarly called for “rule

of law”, “participatory democracy”, “accountability”, etc during an earlier period of

economic recession. As mentioned, that momentum was nipped in the bud when mass

arrests were conducted during Operasi Lalang in October 1987. Indeed, some of

these demands for justice and democracy had been foreshadowed in the struggles of

the radical wings of the independence movement in the 1940s and 1950s, and by the

leftist Opposition in the 1960s.

Nonetheless, there was a significant difference between the previous

democratic movements from the recent one. For the first time significant numbers of

the Malay middle classes were involved. Predictable supporters of the BN

government in times past, many middle-class Malays now considered the BN

government zalim (cruel) and tidak adil (unjust). They expressed their anger openly,

which for some observers, was out of character with traditional Malay norms. This

change in attitude and orientation had everything to do with Anwar’s sacking and

unjust treatment. In this regard it is important to note that Mahathir’s treatment of

Anwar was often criticised by the Malay dissidents as having breached “traditional”

norms and practices (Philip Khoo 1999). At any rate, because these dissident middle-

class Malays had contact with the grassroots through their organisations like ABIM

(Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement) and JIM

(Jemaah Islah Malaysia or Islamic Reform Congregation of Malaysia), this movement

drew in considerable support from lower class Malays in the rural as well as urban

areas. Because of such popular support and the democratic ferment generally,

expectations ran high for a change of government in the forthcoming polls.

However, change did not occur. Although the percentage of popular votes

which the BN polled dropped from 65% in the 1995 election to 56.5% in the 1999

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one, nonetheless the BN still won two thirds of all parliamentary seats. At this

juncture it is necessary to clarify that the Malaysian government was relatively

successful in handling the 1997 financial crisis. Whereas in 1998 Indonesia saw an

economic decline of more than 13 percent, Thailand and the Philippines, 10-11

percent, Malaysia registered a 7 percent decline. (Singapore registered next to no

growth that year). More importantly, Malaysia began to turn around its economy by

mid-1999 emboldening the BN government to call for general elections in November

1999 (Saravanamuttu 2002).3 Moreover, whereas the financial crisis led to ethnic

conflict and political instability especially in Indonesia, but also in Thailand and the

Philippines, political stability ensued in Malaysia, the challenges of the reformasi

movement notwithstanding. The Malaysian government was not oblivious to its

relatively favourable circumstances and made much of this in the mass media by

comparing itself to its less fortunate neighbours. No doubt, this was part of the BN’s

electoral strategy in 1999, used, apparently to good effect. Indeed, the challenges of

the reformasi movement and the NGOs were depicted in the BN electoral propaganda

as threatening the prevailing political stability and the capacity of the BN government

to further resuscitate the economy. It was amidst such developments that the

ASESurvey was conducted in Malaysia from 1 November to 11 December 2000.4

Identities

Malaysians, from the ASESurvey, score extremely high on the question of

national identity along with their Southeast Asian neighbours. Some 980 respondents

(or 98 percent) don’t think of themselves as any other nationality other than as

Malaysian. Other questions of nationality confirm this overall affective orientation.

More than 95 percent feel nationality is extremely or somewhat important, 83.8

percent believed that their nationality is respected by others and so forth. Some 73.4

percent also feel that nationality is extremely important and 20 percent somewhat

important.

3 Following the economic crisis, Malaysia’s growth declined by 6.7 percent in 1998 but governmental measures restored a positive growth of one percent by 1999. The growth dipped again (post-election) to negative region in 2000 before recovering to 3.5 percent in 2001. 4 It should be noted that the survey was conducted only in Peninsular Malaysia and did not cover the East Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah. A total of one thousand male and female respondents aged 18-79 years were interviewed by the local market research company Taylor Nelson Sofres Malaysia on behalf of Gallup International. English, Malay and Mandarin were the languages used in the survey instrument.

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Table 1: Do you think of yourself as Nationality? (Q1)

Country As nationality As another nationality

Don’t think of myselfthis way

NA

Japan 65.5 - 34.4 0.2 S. Korea 99.7 - 0.3 - China 78.3 - 21.7 - Taiwan 85.9 6.2 7.9 - Singapore 93.8 4.3 1.9 - Malaysia 98.0 - 1.4 - Thailand 99.7 0.2 0.4 Philippines 99.7 0.3 - -

How does the strong sense of nationality square with a sense of pride in the country’s

accomplishments? Again the scores are high. Fully 77 percent are proud of Malaysian

democracy, 70.2 percent proud of its political influence in the world, 77.5 percent of

its social welfare system and, highest of all, 82.4 percent take pride in the country’s

economic achievements. The strong Malaysian sense of national identity is consonant

with the developmentalist culture which puts premium on the national unit as the

prime locus of loyalty, and by extension, a propensity of such a culture to accept the

dirigiste character of the national state.

Malaysians do however strongly consider that they are also part of other

supranational groups. Allegiance to the national unit does not prevent Malaysians

from feeling bonds with ethnic and religious communities beyond the nation.

Interestingly, this is true for 16.7 percent who identify as “Chinese” and a significant

43 percent who see themselves as Muslims. Only 28.3 percent of Malaysians don’t

have any supranational allegiances. Has there an increase in this sense

supranationalism? The answer is apparently in the affirmative since some 59 percent

feel it has become more important and some 26.4 percent somewhat more important.

When seen across ethnicity, it is confirmed that Chinese Malaysians almost full

identify with the supranational Chinese category (98.8 percent), Malays identify with

the Islamic supranational category (98.4 percent) and even 86.7 percent of Indians

identity with an ‘other’ supranational category. Interestingly, very few Malaysians,

whether Malay (5 percent), Chinese (5.5 percent) or Indian (9.9 percent), prefer to

consider themselves as ‘Asian’.

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Trust, Satisfaction and Confidence

Now, let us turn to issues of trust in state institutions, including the

government generally, the courts, the civil service and the police and various political

processes. Confidence in government captures a majority of responses, with some

28.4 percent with a great deal of confidence, 39.9 percent having quite a lot.

However, some 18 percent don’t have much confidence and 4 percent none at all. The

law courts fare a bit worse with some 23.2 percent having low confidence and 6.8

percent none at all. The police also see a rather significant 28 percent and 8.8 in these

respective categories while the civil service mirrors the courts with 24.5 percent and 4

percent respectively. Having said this, we should note that a majority of these

Malaysian respondents still have confidence in these institutions.

If we turn to political processes, or institutions that are involved in such processes,

there is also a similar pattern of scepticism with such processes. Low confidence level

with respect to the national parliament stands at about 24.7 percent (combining ‘not

much’ and ‘none at all’), in respect of mass media at 25 percent, political leaders at

27.4 percent and political parties at a significant 33.3 percent. Indeed, barely half (51

percent) of the respondents put their faith in political parties. This is a significant

finding, which is related to ‘satisfaction’ in the next section.

On the question of ‘satisfaction with politics’ which in some ways is

surrogate also for trust and confidence in the system, the Malaysian respondents are

again generally positive, with more than half (52.2 percent) at the upper end of

satisfaction. But it is clear that although dissatisfaction rates only about 14.8 percent,

a large section of the respondents fall into an ‘indifferent’ category of 33 percent.

When the two categories are combined, this is almost tantamount to saying that

practically half of our Malaysians are not particularly satisfied with the state of

politics. When ethnic difference is considered (Table 2), some 40 percent of Chinese

respondents show such indifference while Indians, on the other hand, show the

highest satisfaction at almost 68 percent. Gender and income as factors are largely

insignificant.

Table2: How Satisfied are you with politics in your society today? (Q502)

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Malay Chinese Indian/Others

Very satisfied 17.2 9.9 19.8

2 33.7 37.9 48.1.

3 30.6 40.6 26.7

4 12.7 9.2 4.6

Very dissatisfied 5.9 2.4 0.8

On the broader question of satisfaction with life as a whole, the figure rises, with 72.3

percent in the satisfied categories. Malays and Indians don’t seem to show much

difference on this but a palpably smaller percentage of Chinese at 66.9 percent,

somewhat below the average (Table 3).

Table 3: How satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? (Q518)


Very satisfied 19.3 18.4 22.9

2 54.9 48.5 53.4

3 20.0 28.7 19.8

4 4.7 4.1 3.1

Very dissatisfied 11.7 1.7 0.6

On the flipside of satisfaction are ‘anxiety’ indicators which will allow us to

probe more deeply into the issue of satisfaction. With regard to the work situation,

some 48.6 percent indicated they are very or somewhat worried about it. On health,

the score rises to 64.9 percent. With respect to the country in general, their strong

sense of nationality does not prevent some 61.2 percent of Malaysians from being

worried about it. Even on the question of family life, 47.9 percent evince concern.

However, there is a strong sense of non-anxiety about their neighborhood among

Malaysians, with some 65.8 percent showing no worry. Like Asians elsewhere,

Malaysians, too, are worried over a variety of issues – from the state of the economy

and unemployment, human rights abuses and political corruption to environmental

13


degradation, crime, immigration and ethnic and religious conflict. In the cases of the

economy, unemployment and political corruption, the percentages given in Table 4

are lower than the average for all nine Asian countries surveyed. On the other hand,

the percentages of Malaysians who are very worried are higher than the Asian average

when it comes to immigration, ethnic conflict and religious conflict.

Table 4: Level of anxiety (how worried ) over problems (Q205)

Very worried (Asian average)

Very worried

Somewhat worried

Not worried

Don’t know

Economy 46.0 33.3 46.1 17.8 2.8 Unemployment 53.0 37.0 42.3 18.1 2.6 Political corruption

39.7 36.8 40.4 13.2 9.6

Human rights 22.6 25.8 42.4 22.6 9.2 Level of crime 55.5 52.6 38.0 7.9 1.5 Quality of public services

17.3 16.5 47.4 31.5 4.6

Level of immigration

16.9 25.8 35.0 26.4 12.8

Ethnic conflict 18.0 25.1 35.1 33.1 6.7 Religious conflict

18.7 26.9 33.1 32.4 7.6

Condition of environment

33.9 27.2 40.7 28.0 4.1

Regardless of the level of anxiety Malaysians registered, whether absolutely or in

comparison to other Asian countries vis-à-vis these problems, Malaysians had the

highest confidence in the ability of the government to deal with them, with the

exception of Singaporeans. For instance, 78.1 percent thought that the government

was handling the economy fairly or very well. Even when the issue was ethnic

conflict, which Malaysians were more worried about than most other Asians, 68.2

percent thought that the government was dealing with the problem fairly or very well.

The results are mirrored when the issue is religious conflict.

As to be expected, the sense of anxiety extends to the international situation,

with 56 percent feeling concerned about the world. This is probably a result of

Malaysia’s experience of economic meltdown which many see as a result of global

effects. Malays are most worried of all with 62 percent feeling this way, Chinese, 50.5

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percent and Indians, 42 percent. As a surrogate for capturing concern over

globalization, we could take the question which deals with confidence in various

global multilateral forces and institutions. There is clear hesitation in showing

confidence about international big business since about 25.2 percent have not much or

no confidence at all in it. Among the Chinese, tough some 55.3 percent evince

confidence in international big business. The Malay and Indian figure is about 10

percent lower (Table 5).

Table 5: How worried are you about the international situation generally? (Q202f)


Very worried 18.6 19.1 15.3

Somewhat worried 43.4 31.4 26.7

Not worried at all 26.4 30.7 26.7

Don’t know 11.6 18.8 31.3

Do Malaysians have confidence in global economic multilateral institutions? With

respect to the WTO, there clear scepticism, with some 30.7 percent showing not much

or no confidence at all. The confidence figure is 29. 4 percent, that is lower than the

former. As for the World Bank, the no confidence figure remains at about the same at

33.4 percent and confidence at 35.9 percent. In both questions, we find a rather large

number who don’t respond to the question which in itself is indicative of a sort of lack

of assurance about the role of these institutions. No particularly significant differences

occur across ethnicity in these questions. Malaysians do not have a high opinion of

the UN with only 23.7 percent having confidence in it. However they show a healthier

respect for regional multilateral arrangements such as ASEAN, Japan, Korea and

China, with some 44.5 percent having confidence in the regional East Asian system.

Given these broad indications of considerable anxiety about the domestic and

international situation, it is therefore extremely odd that a whopping 88.6 percent feel

that things have improved a lot or somewhat in the country over the last 10 years.

Also some 76.8 percent feel this way about the international situation. It would appear

15


that while Malaysians have a dim view of their country and the world around them,

the great majority of them are generally optimistic about what the country is capable

of doing. This apparent contradiction is no doubt part and parcel of the ideology of

developmentalism which is deeply embedded in the Malaysian public psyche. Put

simply, economic development is still the answer to problems of day and the

developmental state remains the primary vehicle to overcome these problems.

Social Values

We will now use the survey date to tap broadly into the social values of our

Malaysian respondents. Previous studies have found Malaysians to hold conservative

attitudes such matters as women’s role in society but strong on communitarian and

family values but weak on respect for political freedoms and human rights. In a

survey conducted in 1995 of voters from the three Northern states of Penang, Kedah

and Kelantan, 4,015 respondents were asked to respond to issues ranging from ethnic

relations, state and welfare, politics, development and human rights, ethics, popular

culture and environment. The major findings can be summarised as follows:

• respondents showed a high degree of ethnic tolerance on most measures except on the question of cross-racial and cross-religious marriages.

• On issues of state and welfare a large majority believed that government funding should provide a high level of public services.

• On questions of politics in general respondents demonstrated a high sense of political efficacy while tending to be conservative with respect to the exercise of democratic rights.

• An interesting finding was with regard to the question of the civil rights of foreign workers where our respondents tended to have a generalised attitude to the foreign workers as an “underclass” which should not be accorded an equal and permanent footing with Malaysian citizens.

• Another significant finding was that respondents believe that the family is the most important agent for cultivating moral and ethical values and that more men than women have faith in religious institutions and government as agents for nurturing such values.

• Respondents demonstrated a high level of awareness about ecological issues and believe in strong support for strict enforcement of environmental standards

• The scores based on the civil consciousness index constructed from responses to selective questions were high except for civil rights awareness. An interesting finding was that as income rises, the tendency is for civil consciousness to also rise correspondingly.

16


(Saravanamuttu et al., 1996, p.32)

In the ASEsurvey, to the question as to whether women’s primary role is in

the home, only 16.1 percent but combined with the ‘disagree’ category, we have 41.3

percent (but not a majority) believing that women should primarily stay at home.

Accounting for gender and ethnicity yields some interesting observations (Table 6).

As to be expected, men are generally more conservative on this score; only 30.7

percent disagree with the proposition while some 54.2 percent of women find it

unacceptable. Disagreement from Malays rate about the same at 49 percent and 47,1

percent respectively while Indians have only 34.4 percent in this category.

Table 6: How much do you agree with the statement, ‘a woman’s primary role is in

the home’? (Q412c)

Malay Chinese Indian/Other Male FemaleStrongly agree 8.5 5.5 9.2 - - Agree 22.7 16.0 29.0 26.3 15.5. Neither agree nor Disagree

26.7 25.3 20.6 31.7 17.3

Disagree 24.7 28.0 21.4 20.3 31.6 Strongly disagree 15.3 19.1 13.0 10.4 23.6 Don’t know 2.1 6.1 6.9 3.9 3.9

If we take the question on achieving consensus versus encouraging individual

initiative, the attitude emerges that Malaysians are consensus seekers. Only a

miniscule 6.4 percent prefer individual initiative. No major differences are found in

ethnic groupings or for gender. On the follow-up question of that individuals should

strive for their own good rather than for the good of society, Malays registered the

highest score for disagreement with 48.4 percent, Chinese 36.1 percent and Indians,

32.9 percent. Finally, on the question of whether the public interest should always

come before family obligations, we do interestingly find more people agreeing with

the statement at 44.6 percent compared with disagreement at 28.5 percent. Again, a

majority of Malays come out disagreeing at 51.2percent, Chinese at 31.7 percent and

Indians at 41.2 percent. Most of these findings tend to confirm that Malaysians have a

conservative social slant.

17


This overall conservative outlook on social issues explains to a great degree

the willingness of Malaysians to tolerate authoritarianism and with it the high-handed

actions of the state even in curbing their political and individual freedoms. The next

section on political tenets tends to confirm these observations.

Political Tenets

Previous empirical work have found Malaysians to be lacking in political

awareness, or simply, political knowledge. A survey of 913 voters in the Bayan Baru

parliamentary constituency in Penang was conducted just before the 1999 general

election (Saravanamuttu, 2002). The findings revealed shocking evidence of the state

of political knowledge or political awareness of the Bayan Baru voter. It is not an

exaggeration to say that the Bayan Baru voter fits the bill as classical Grecan "idiots"

(i.e. people with no awareness of or inclination for politics) but in today’s political

parlance may simply be dubbed as ‘apolitical’. Some 90 per cent and above of the

respondents had neither attended Barisan Nasional (BN) nor Barisan Alternatif (BA)

political talks or ceramah at the point of time when we conducted the survey, one

week before the election. Only 19 persons or 2 per cent of the sample attended up to

three BA talks while 9 persons (1 per cent) did the same for BN talks.

Some 742 respondents (81 per cent) had no idea who would be the Prime

Minister if the BA won the election. Indeed, fully 36.6 per cent of the respondents had

never heard of the term Barisan Alternatif, the new opposition coalition contesting the

incumbent BN. A vast majority of the respondents, well over 75 per cent, obtained

their political information from the mainstream media (newspapers and television),

while only 18 per cent said they turn to alternative media for information. It

interesting to note that 40 percent of those who said they would vote the BN had no

understanding of the BA. Out of those who said they were voting opposition, 22 per

cent said did not know about the BA.

These earlier survey findings indicate that Malaysians are not uniform in

political culture or orientations. Many Malaysians do evince a strong sense of public

purpose and it can also be suggested from broad observations that significant sections

of society have coalesced into a nascent Malaysian civil society but it is remains one

18


that is deeply embbeded in ethnic awareness with an ethnic slant in sociability.

Surveys such as the one cited show that although Malaysians are sorely lacking in

political awareness, they are strong ethnic political actors and by that token are also,

by and large, democratic political actors. While it is true that ethnic associations have

over the years been superimposed by crosscutting affiliations in a variety of civil and

civic associations, ethnic affiliations still predominate in Malaysian society. Other

than the ethnicity issue, Malaysians are somewhat still unconcerned with civil

liberties and rights although they have a strong sense of political efficacy, such as in

the use of the vote and other means of political articulation.

Many of these observations can also be drawn from the ASESurvey, to which

we now turn. The first point to establish is that about 50 percent of Malaysians stated

that they are fairly or very interested in politics while the other 50 percent stated that

they are not at all or not so interested. In this regard, Malaysians are less interested in

politics than Japanese, Koreans, Thais and Filipinos but more interested than

Taiwanese, Singaporeans and Indonesians. Among Malaysians, Malays (59.0 percent)

were more interested than Indians (40.5 percent) or Chinese (33.8 percent). The more

years one went to school also influenced one’s interest in politics: 52.2 percent of

those who spent more than 11 years in school were interested; 51.1 percent of those

who spent 6-10 years in school; 47.2 percent those who attended 1-5 years of school;

and only 30.4 percent those who did not receive any schooling. (The significance of

these findings will be elaborated on later).

Table 7: How interested are you in politics? (Q402)

By ethnicity

Malays Chinese Indians Total Very or fairly interested

59.0 33.8 40.5 50.3

Little or not at all interested

39 66.2 59.5 49.7

By years of schooling

No schooling 1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years Very or fairly interested

30.4 47.2 51.1 52.2

Little or not at all interested

69.5 52.8 50.9 47.9

19


When asked to place themselves on a left to right spectrum of political views,

a significant 42 percent of Malaysians said they didn’t know how. Only in Singapore

and Taiwan were there more people who could not determine where they stood.

Elsewhere, the other Asians were more conscious than Malaysians of their own

political orientation. Accordingly, some 46 percent of Malaysians evinced that the

idea of left and right is somewhat or extremely important for them while the

remainder either didn’t know or thought the matter of little or no importance.

Table 8: Attitudes towards the Role of Government (Q306a, b, d, e, f)

Agree/ Strongly agree (Asian average)

Agree/ Strongly agree

Neither agree nor disagree/ don’t know

Disagree/ strongly disagree

Competition is good and stimulates new ideas

83.6 91.4 6.4 1.2

Government should endure social welfare

86.1 84.5 12.5 3.0

We should do what government wants

41.8 58.9 23.8 17.3

Government knows best how to run country

56.2 73.5 19.5 7.0

Need government intervention in economic problems

70.1 74.5 18.7 6.8

Society better off when business free to make profits

52.5 60.8 24.2 15.0

The responses of Malaysians to the statements listed in Table 8 suggest that

Malaysians evince a high regard for a strong state, one that intervenes in economic

problems (74.5 percent agree/strongly agree) as well as provides adequate social

welfare to all (84.5 percent agree or strongly agree). Accordingly fewer – 60.8 percent

- agree/strongly agree that society is better off when business is free to make as much

profit as it can. Be that the case Malaysians are in favour of competition (91.4 percent

agree or strongly agree). Some 73.5 percent think that government knows best how to

run the country although less - 58.9 percent - agree/strongly agree that we should all

do what the government wants.

These sentiments for a strong state which intervenes in the economy to solve

problems as well as to play a distributive role indicate an affinity for the

20


developmental state. The valorization of competition as well as a more regulatory role

towards business coincides with the relationship of the developmental state to

business and the desired economic environment. That said, Malaysians still consider

that they are a democracy, an issue we take up in the following section

Malaysia’s Version of Democracy

In a study comparing democratic governance among nine Asian countries,

Inoguchi (2000) has highlighted an important discrepancy between the ranking of

these countries based on objective indicators of democratic governance derived from

Freedom House data on political rights and civil liberties and that based on subjective

indicators derived from the Gallup Millenium Survey (GMS) data.

Thus whereas Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are clearly ranked as more

democratic than Malaysia (and Singapore) in the Freedom House schema, they are

ranked considerably lower according to the GMS schema. As Inoguchi (2000: 4-5)

notes:

It is those quasi-democratic and semi-authoritarian countries that are accorded highest scores for subjective democratic governance along with such seemingly highly democratic countries such as Switzerland, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and UK. It is those highly democratic countries such as Japan and South Korea that are given low scores of democratic governance along with Cameroon and Colombia [in the GMS schema]. It looks as if how [they] respond to the questions on corruption, people’s will, justice and governing efficacy made significant differences. Those quasi-democratic and semi-authoritarian countries are given bonuses to their democratic scores despite some illiberal practices.

The same sentiment is captured in the ASESurvey 2000. When asked ‘how proud or

not proud are you of the way Malaysia’s democracy works, 41.6 percent of

respondents replied that they were “very proud” while another 35.4 percent replied

that they were “somewhat proud”. Only 11.2 percent replied that they were “not so

proud” and another 5.2 “not proud at all”. Malaysians scored highest of all with the

exception of Singaporeans. By contrast only 53.2 percent of Japanese respondents and

37.2 percent of South Koreans appeared positive about the way their democracy

worked.

21


Table 9: The way the country’s democracy works (Q14a)

Very proud Somewhat proud

Not so proud

Not proud at all

Don’t know

Japan 14.6 38.6 30.5 6.9 9.3 South Korea 4.6 32.9 46.5 12.0 4.1 Taiwan 12.0 47.5 27.2 7.7 5.6 Singapore 20.9 62.6 9.7 2.1 4.7 Malaysia 41.6 35.4 11.2 5.2 6.6 Indonesia 6.4 40.9 42.6 3.6 6.4 Thailand 28.3 35.5 27.1 5.7 3.4 Philippines 35.1 40.3 18.2 5.7 0.7 Asian Average

18.1 37.1 23.8 5.4 4.6

This high evaluation by Malaysians of the working of their democracy coincides with

the positive responses of Malaysians when asked whether they have confidence or not

in various political institutions and leaders as listed in the table below.

Table 10: Confidence in Malaysian political institutions and leaders (Q101)

Great deal (Asian average)

Great deal

Quite a lot

Not much

None No opinion

Parliament 8.9 22.1 35.1 21.7 3.0 18.1 Political parties 6.3 15.2 35.8 29.4 3.9 15.7 Government 10.8 28.4 39.9 18.0 4.0 9.7 Law and Courts 11.6 22.5 35.4 23.2 6.8 12.1 Political leaders 9.8 25.3 37.8 20.4 7.0 9.5 Police 10.2 20.7 36.6 28.0 8.8 5.9 Civil Service 10.2 18.8 44.2 24.5 4.0 8.5 Military 15.3 25.6 40.8 18.0 3.8 11.8 Big business 8.8 14.3 39.9 21.5 3.9 20.4 Mass media 9.8 15.4 39.4 26.4 8.6 10.2

The confidence of Malaysians in their political institutions and leaders is corroborated

by their opinions that citizens have a duty to vote in elections (68.4 percent strongly

agree and another 28.5 percent agree) and that the way people vote decides how the

country is run (34.0 percent strongly agree and another 45.6 percent agree).

Accordingly they strongly disagree (30.1 percent) or disagree (41.1 percent) when it is

stated that “it doesn’t matter whether I vote or not”. This high regard for electoralism

has also been noted by other researchers (Crouch 1996) as well as by the authors

themselves elsewhere (Saravanamuttu 2003 and Loh 2002). For although the BN

22


ruling coalition has won every general election since Independence, there remains

much anxiety that they should not be allowed to win by more than two-thirds majority

of all parliamentary seats which would allow the BN to amend the Constitution at

will.

At any rate, it is significant that whereas Malaysians have a high regard for

electoralism, they remain somewhat split in their opinions of those placed in positions

of authority. For instance, 61.4 percent strongly agree or agree that there is

widespread corruption among those who manage Malaysia’s national politics while

38.6 percent disagree or strongly disagree. Another 22.2 percent are neutral or don’t

know. More pointedly, 45 percent strongly agree or agree that ordinary people don’t

have some say in what government does while another 32.4 percent disagree or

strongly disagree; another 22.6 are neutral or don’t know. Likewise, 32.4 percent

strongly agree or agree that elected people stop thinking about public interest while

34.2 percent disagree/strongly disagree; another 33.4 percent are neutral or don’t

know. Finally, 40.1 percent strongly agree or agree that officials don’t care much

what people think while 28.8 percent disagree or strongly disagree; 31.1 percent are

neutral or don’t know. It appears therefore that a substantial proportion of Malaysians

are critical of their politicians and elected officials. Like those who are less critical of

the politicians and elected officials, they too have a high regard for electoralism. It is

probable that elections are anticipated not because of the possibility of a change of

government but rather the possibility of denying the BN a two-thirds’ majority of

parliamentary seats which is in fact the BN’s own measure of whether it has

succeeded or not in the polls.

On the series of problems covering human rights, environment, women’s

rights, unemployment and so on, it is clear that while concern prevails, Malaysians

however tend to feel that their own government has generally coped well with these

problems. For example, 60 percent believe that the government has dealt effectively

with women’s rights and almost 70 percent say this of the unemployment problem.

Taking another response, as much as 73.9 percent strongly agree or agree that the

government knows how best to run the country. Put differently, Malaysians clearly

have a positive and sanguine view of state capacity. Following upon the previous

observations, if we examine the question of whether one needs government

23


intervention in economic problems, a large percentage of 74.5 of the respondents are

affirmative about this. Furthermore, 79.4 percent feel that the government has a great

effect or some effect on their lives.

It is clear form most the questions pertaining to globalization and from questions

dealing with government capacity that Malaysians do have a high degree of

confidence in governmental capacity to cope with social a economic problems

including those emanating from the impact of globalization. Even if they don’t have

good reasons to think so, it is clear that they have a strong belief that this is the case.

Table11: Great deal or quite a lot of confidence in political Institutions and leaders, by ethnicity (Q101) Malays Chinese Indians Total Parliament Political parties Government 75.9 56.3 61.8 68.3 Law and Courts 60.6 49.9 64.2 57.9 Political leaders Police 63.6 43.4 51.1 57.3 Civil Service 75.2 42.7 55.0 63.0 Military Big business Mass media 51.4 58.3 59.5 54.8

Being a multi-ethnic country it is not surprising that there are significant

differences in the political sentiments of Malaysians. This is apparent when we

consider their degree of confidence in the political institutions and leaders: Malays

tend to have greater confidence than the Chinese with the Indians coming in between.

For instance, 75.9 percent Malays had quite a lot or a great deal of confidence in

government as opposed to 56.3 percent for Chinese and 61.8 percent for Indians.

About the same ratios are evident in their responses vis-à-vis parliament and the

political parties. With regard to law and the courts 60.6 percent Malays had quite a lot

or a great deal of confidence towards the institution but Chinese only registered 49.9

percent and the Indians highest of all, at 64.2 percent. (Interestingly, some 9.2 percent

Malays, the highest for any ethnic group, stated that they had “no confidence

whatsoever” in the law and courts. These Malays are probably supporters of Anwar

Ibrahim, the former deputy prime minister, and are disillusioned with how Anwar had

24


not, in their eyes, been treated fairly). The Chinese only registered higher confidence

than Malays when it came to the mass media. In this case it is probably on account of

the fact that the Chinese-medium press have traditionally been viewed as more

balanced and objective in their views that the Malay-medium or English-medium

press, the principal ones of which are owned or controlled by the ruling political

parties (Mustafa Anuar 2002 and Zaharom Nain 2002).

Political Action

Table 12 presents the rate of participation of Malaysians in parliamentary and state

assembly elections; there appears no significant difference. This is because the

parliamentary and state elections are held simultaneously for the peninsula Malaysia

states. However, it should be clarified that local elections at the village, town or city

levels no longer occur in Malaysia. These were suspended in the 1960s on account of

the Confrontation with Indonesia, and subsequently abolished by fiat of parliament in

the early 1970s in spite of the recommendation by a Royal Commission of Enquiry

into the Workings of Local Authorities that local-level elections and elected local

government be reinstated.

At any rate, slightly over 70 percent of all respondents have voted in all or

some of these parliamentary and state elections. This percentage lags behind that for

most of the other Asian states, but can be easily explained because a higher

percentage of Malaysian respondents were “not qualified” to vote. Disregarding this

group of respondents, the rate of participation of Malaysians would be about the same

as those for other Asian countries, in some cases, higher.

Further investigation of the survey data reveals that about half the Malaysian

respondents are inclined to talk to their family members and friends about problems

facing the country, about international problems or even about party politics. The

comparative data shows that about the same percentage of other Asians are inclined to

do the same. Like most other Asians, most Malaysians too are disinclined to contact

politicians about a local or national issue. However, almost 20 percent of Malaysians

indicated that they have joined political parties, the highest percentage registered

25


among all Asians. When those who “might” join political parties, another 22.1

percent, are considered, Malaysians registered an uncharacteristically high regard for

its political parties, again, as compared to other Asians. By contrast, only 7.7 percent

of South Koreans have joined political parties while 17.1 percent more “might” do so,

the highest among East Asians. Among Southeast Asians, the Filipinos registered the

next highest regard for political parties: 11.5 percent have joined while another 24.5

percent might do so. Accordingly, Malaysians are also more inclined than most other

Asians to help a political party or candidate during elections (slightly behind Filipinos

and Japanese but clearly higher than other Asians surveyed) and to contribute

financially to a party or candidate (highest among all Asians). Malaysia’s relatively

positive identification with its parties is consistent with the earlier observation that

Malaysians have considerably high confidence in its political institutions.

Table 12: Involvement in political activities (Q405a-k)

Often done

Once or twice

Might do

Would never

Don’t know

Talk about country’s problems with family & friends

26.0 28.8 26.9 14.8 3.5

Talk about international problems with family & friends

21.2 27.9 26.3 19.2 5.4

Talk about party politics with family & friends

19.0 24.2 25.0 27.1 4.7

Contact politician about personal/local problem

3.0 8.0 23.7 56.7 8.6

Contact politician about national issue

4.3 8.0 22.5 56.7 8.3

Help party or candidate at election

6.2 8.8 23.5 53.3 8.2

Join party 14.7 5.2 22.1 48.2 9.8 Contribute money to candidate/party

3.9 6.0 15.6 66.7 7.8

Get together with others in local area to solve problem

3.7 8.1 20.0 59.0 9.2

Sign petition 4.1 6.2 16.1 61.1 12.5 Attend a protest 0.9 3.4 8.8 78.7 8.2

However, whereas the Japanese, South Koreans and Filipinos who also

registered positive identification with political parties are inclined to attend a protest

or sign a petition, Malaysians are disinclined to engage in these extra electoral

political activities. It appears that Malaysians are not only disinclined to participate in

26


extra-electoral politics, some 36.4 percent of Malaysian respondents also think that

people should not be allowed to organize public meetings although they might agree

that one is entitled to express one’s opinion. This percentage opposing the right to

hold public meetings is the highest for all of the Asian countries surveyed.

Accordingly, some 73.5 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the government knows

best how to run a country. This is the highest percentage registered for any of the

Asian countries (including Singapore). Only 7 percent disagreed while another 19.5

neither agreed nor disagreed or didn’t know.

Table 13: Everyone should have the right to express opinion and to organise public

meetings (Q208b, Q 208c)

Strongly agree (Asian average)

Strongly agree

agree Neither agree nor disagree/don’t know

Disagree Strongly disagree

Everyone should have the right to express their opinion

30.5 34.6 46.3 14.4 4.0 0.7

People should be allowed to organize public meetings

16.3 16.6 24.9 22.1 23.7 12.7

Ethnicity and Participation

Predictably, there are differences in the rates of participation in elections by

the different ethnic groups. Surprisingly, it is the Chinese who registered the lowest

rates for interest in politics who now registered the highest rates of participation in

these elections (75.1 percent responded that they had voted in all or some of the

parliamentary and 74.4 percent in all or some of the state assembly elections). This

was followed by Malays (69.4 percent for parliamentary; 70.6 percent state), then

Indians (65.6 percent parliamentary; 64.8 percent state).

Be that the case, in almost all other regards vis-à-vis political participation,

Malays and Indians often scored higher than Chinese. For instance, Malays and

Indians are more inclined to talk about international issues, national problems and

27


Table 14: Participation in Parliamentary and State Assembly Elections (Q406)

Voted in almost all

Voted in some

Rarely voted

Never voted

Not qualified

Parliamentary 57.1 13.5 4.9 8.4 14.0 State Assembly

57.8 13.2 4.9 8.7 15.4

party affairs with their family members and friends than are the Chinese. The same

holds vis-à-vis contacting politicians to resolve local/personal or national problems.

The rates of participation in political parties (Malays 17.8 percent; Indians 14.5

percent; and Chinese 6.8 percent); helping a candidate or party during elections

(Malays 19.6 percent; Indians 13.7 percent; and Chinese 6.5 percent); and

contributing towards political parties or candidates (Malays: 12.5 percent; Indians 9.2

percent; and Chinese 5.1 percent) further indicate the same. This is also so when it

comes to getting together with others to solve a local problem, petitioning, or

participating in a protest.

Table 15: Have often or at least once or twice been involved in the following political activity, by ethnicity (Q405f) Malays Chinese Indians Total Talk about country’s problems with family & friends

63.2 45.8 38.1 54.0

Talk about international problems with family & friends

57.8 40.0 31.3 49.1

Talk about party politics with family & friends

50.9 35.8 25.9 43.2

Contact politician about personal/local problem

12.7 7.5 11.4 11.0

Contact politician about national issue

14.9 8.5 9.1 12.3

Help party or candidate at election

19.6 6.5 13.7 15.0

Join party 27.8 6.8 14.5 19.9 Contribute money to candidate/party

12.5 5.1 9.2 9.9

Get together with others in local area to solve problem

15.1 6.1 9.9 11.8

Sign petition 11.2 7.8 12.2 10.3 Attend a protest 5.4 1.4 6.1 4.3

28


Urban-Rural Differences

Apart from ethnic background, it also appears that there exists an urban-rural

divide. Malaysians who live in villages with population size less than 1,000 people

tend to be more involved in the political activities mentioned earlier. Malaysians who

live in large towns having more than 75,000 people are somewhat less active. Least

active of all are the Malaysians residing in the semi-urban small towns ranging from

1001 to 74,999 people.

It is evident that the highest rate of participation in the elections occurs among

Malaysians who live in rural villages. Next comes Malaysians who live in large

towns. Lower rates are recorded for those who live in semi-urban small towns.

Perhaps contrary to expectations, it is the villagers again who talk most about national

politics with family members and friends. They are also more inclined than those in

urban and semi-urban areas to contact politicians about local or national issues. They

register the highest participation rate in political parties, and a higher proportion of

these Malaysians are also prepared to contribute money and to help out during

elections. They are also more prepared to get together with others in the local area to

solve problems. However, they are less inclined to sign petitions and to attend a

protest. In fact, most of these rural Malaysians are Malays who, as we noted earlier,

also register a higher participation rate in these various political activities, especially

with regard to the political parties. Taken together with our earlier discussion of

political involvement by ethnic background, these findings suggest that rural Malays

more so than any other are the most politically involved Malaysians.

By Way of Conclusion

Most studies of Malaysian political culture have been unflattering about its

broad orientation. Early work on the Malaysian polity assumed that as a plural society

(Furnivall, 1948), Malaysian political culture would be deeply embedded in ethnicity

and communalism (Ratnam, 1965). Much of the writing on Malaysian politics that

29


followed (Milne, 1965, Means, 1970, Vasil, 1971, Von Vorys, 1975) basically took

communal politics as a given.

Communalism was seen as a debilitating, negative phenomenon of every

ethnic group working for its self-interest or whenever possible, domination of the

‘other’. Such a realist perspective of social and political relations was taken even

further by post-Furnivall theorists of the plural society who, basing their work on

Africa and the Caribbean, began to put the accent on the conflictual elements of the

plural society, discarding altogether the pragmatic considerations of mutual gains, and

depicting it a recipe for democratic disaster. For writers like these, plural societies

were marked by “mutually incompatible” social structures, values and belief systems

as well as systems of action at the “cultural core” and thereby, merely a formal

diversity in the basic system of compulsory institutions.

However, Dutch political scientist, Arend Lijphart (1977), whose theorising

interestingly takes its point of departure from European experiences, has provided a

somewhat more liberal, and sympathetic treatment of the plural society. Lijphart’s

fundamental points were that ethnically divided societies could live with their ethnic

cleavages, that conflict could be contained by elites and leaders of ethnic

communities, that democracy is possible within such ethnically divided societies and

that formal institutional arrangements such as federalism and proportional

representation could used to contain conflict. Writers like Milne and Mauzy (1978:

352ff) have shown with arguable success that consociationalism can be applied with

some modification to Malaysia.

We would stress that looking at Malaysian politics through the lens of

consociationalism does not provide the full picture. This paper has stressed the

importance of developmentalism growing out of the articulation of a developmental

state within a growing, affluent middle class society since the 1980s as a major non-

ethnic factor impacting on Malaysian political culture. Developmentalism has affected

all ethnic communities and tends to create a quiescent political culture in which

people see the state as the guarantor of a modern livelihood and lifestyle.

30


This notwithstanding, there have been debates which revolved around whether

middle class political culture is quiescent or activist. Some writers argued that the

middle classes evince no particular direction or activism in politics (Kahn, 1996a and

1996b), or alternatively, that they tend to be conservative political actors supportive of

the status quo (Crouch, 1984). Others like Saravanamuttu (1992, 2001a, 2001b) and

Lev (1993) suggested that middle-class groups have played a distinctive role in

politics while yet others like Kahn (1996a, 1996b), Abdul Rahman (1998) and Loh

(1997) generally turned to the lifestyles and consumerism of the middle class for

explanations of social and political behaviour.

If these debates remain unresolved in the academe, the fact of the matter is

that political events certainly have overtaken them. In the post-economic crisis

developments of 1998, it was clear that a “new politics” had affected Malaysian

political culture. As we have alluded in the introduction, not only were the nascent

elements of civil society roused to political action, large numbers of hitherto dormant

forces, including significant numbers of a Malay middle class, became supporters of

the reformasi movement. And although in the 1999 general election that followed no

major political change occurred, we would argue that the jury is still out on whether a

shift of overall political orientations has occurred in Malaysia.

Turning to the ASEsurvey, we must tentatively conclude that both elements of

quiescence and activism seem to be demonstrated in the rich data. There is certainly

evidence that a ‘developmentalist’ orientation has found its way into Malaysian

political culture. There is clearly a strong sense of faith and confidence in the capacity

of the state, which generally is seen as an interventionist one. When it comes to tenets

of politics, we find participant but not necessary sophisticated political actors.

Malaysians are generally clearly still on the conservative side when it comes to

political activism. Nevertheless, there is a minority that has this orientation (but their

numbers remain small) and this same minority sometimes swelling to a majority is

highly critical of governmental malpractices. Perhaps this is indicative that “new

politics” has taken root in Malaysia. In general, there is a great preference for

electoralism among Malaysians over other forms of less formal political participation.

Malaysians are also highly nationalistic but at the same time do betray strong ethnic

and religious affiliations. Perhaps we could tentatively conclude that Malaysian

31


political culture, from this survey, while shown to be participant, is still deeply

embedded in developmentalism and ethnicity.

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