PoliticalDevelopment&Policy

Lecture2:Whywefightandthepathtopeace(PartI) ChrisBlattman

Anyquestionsabouttheclass,theassignments,grading,officehours?

Lasttime

• Whatdowemeanwhenwetalkabout“politicaldevelopment”?– Function

• Thecapabilitiesapproach:“Developmentasfreedom”– Orderandstability– Equality– Autonomy– Collectiveactionandcoordination

– Form• State:Centralized,rule-governed,depersonalizedauthoritywhomonopolizesviolence&shapessociety• Ruleoflaw:Equaltreatmentunderthelaw,includingforleaders• Democracy:Freeparticipation,representationindecision-making,&accountabilityofleaders

• Whyispoliticaldevelopmentimportant?– Manyofthesecapabilitiesandfreedomsareintrinsicallyimportantendsinthemselves– Someformsofpoliticaldevelopmentalsopromoteeconomicdevelopment,whichitselfpromotes

othercapabilitiesandfreedoms

Todayandnexttwoclasses

• Aslightdetour:Anti-politicsmachines

• Mostly:Whyistherewarandpeace?

First,adetour:Anti-politicsmachines

Themostcommonmistakeoutsidersmake

Averydifferentexample:JamesFergusoninLesotho

Cowswillteachusanawfullotaboutpoliticsinthisclass

“Theanti-politicsmachine”

• Solvingpovertyandimplementingprogramsisastechnicalproblem,notasocialandpoliticalproblem

• Developmentprojectsareapoliticalmachinesthatexisttoprovidesocialservices

• Cliques,factions,inefficiencies,andcorruptionareseenasimpedimentsratherthanstrategicreactionstotheenvironment

• Partisanandinterestedaidinterventionsaredisguisedasimpartialanddisinterested

Whenarewemorelikelytobehavelikeanti-politicsmachines?

“Peaceland”:ananthropologyofaidworkers.Arguesthatexpatriatepeacebuildersareanti-politicsmachines

“Whydosomewaysofworkingpersistwhenineffective?”

Itisnotcallousnessorstupidityorevil

Manypoliticaleconomyreasonsthatbadpolicypersists

Butshepointstounderappreciatedone:Developmentworkersinhabitadifferentsocialspace,haveadifferentlanguage,havedifferentsystemsofbeliefandmotivation,andhavebiasedwaysofcollectinginformation.

Canthisleadthemtodrawerroneousinferencesorapplyerroneoussolutions?

Question:Doyouthinkelitesorbureaucratsfromthatcountryareanydifferent?Whyorwhynot?

Restoftoday+nexttwoclasses:Thereasonsforwars

WhatIaimtocovertoday

• Conflictiscostlyissocial,economicandpoliticalterms

• Thatiswhycompetinggroupsusuallyfindapeacefulbargain.Waristheexceptionnottherule.– Ratherofthinkingofviolenceasnatural,fightingiswhathappenswhenpeacefulbargainsbreakdown

• Thereare5mainkindsofreasonswhybargainsbreakdown,whichIcall:1. Uncheckedelites2. Violentpreferences3. Systematicmistakes4. Uncertainty5. Impossiblebargains(Commitmentproblems)

• Mostconflictscanbeunderstoodintermsofthese5reasons,andmostsolutionstoconflictaresolutionstoatleastoneofthesefiveproblems

I.Warascostly,violentbargaining

Example1:RecentIndo-Pakistanconfrontation

Example2:ElPacto deFusilMedellinandthe“PactoftheMachineGun”

Thestoryofthe“BilliardsWar”Bellavista prisoninMedellin

ThereislittlewarfaretodaybetweenMedellin’s“combos”(streetgangs)

Mue

rtede

Escob

ar

Losprimeroscombosdatandelos70s(pandillas,

vigilantesyasaltantes)yseunificanbajolafigurade

Escobar

Sometimientodelasbandas

porlosparamilitares

(PEPES)

Guerraentrelostraficantes

dedrogaSebastiányValenciano

Nuevoorden:oligopolioydiferentesestructurascriminales

(domesticacióndelcrimen)

EvolutionofthehomiciderateinMedellinGuerra

paramilitaryguerrillera

(ascensodeDonBerna)

Controlcentralizado(DonBerna)ynuevosenfoquesen

seguridadlocal

Desmovilización

de

losparamilitares

Extradiciónde

Don

Berna

Thisissurprising,becauseyouwouldthinkhundredsofneighboringcomboswouldbearecipeforincessantwarfare

• Manyrovingbandits

• Evenifsomearestationarybandits,theyhaveincentivestotakeoverneighboringterritory

• Lookslikethesamesituationofanarchyastheglobalstatesystemthroughouthistory

• Andlotsofhotheadedyoungmenand“billiardswars”

Whatkindsofforcespushtowardsgangwars?Whatforcespushagainst?

Comboshavesomeincentivesforpeace

• Theproblemswithwar:– Yoursoldiersgetkilled– Customersforyourdrugs,

consumergoodsstayaway– Youhavetospendalotoftime

andmoneyarminganddefendingyourterritory

– Policenosearound

• Whatyouwouldliketodoisnegotiatepeacefullymuchofthetime

• Butthisishardtodoinasystemofanarchy

Bothexamplespointtoasimilarinsight:Waristheexception,peaceistherule

• Somecommonplaceviews:– Waristhe“naturalstateofhumankind”– Ethnicviolenceandactiveconflictareubiquitous– Hostilerivalsaredestinedtofight

• However,therearemillionsofcompetitive,hostile,evenhatefulrivalriesintheworld.Mostofthemdon’tleadtolarge-scale,sustainedviolencebetweengroups(war)

• Rivalsfrequentlyskirmishviolently.Mostofthetime,however,theymanagetofindarrangementstoavoidwar

Ararequantitativeexample:ViolenceinAfrica,1979-94

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.” The American Political Science Review 90 (1996): 715–35.

Askingwhythereiswarisreallyaskingwhythenormalpeacefuldealsdon’tgetmade. Mostrivalsdealratherthanfight.

“Waristhecontinuationofpoliticsbyothermeans.”

— CarlvonClausewitz,OnWar,1832

Askingwhythereiswarisreallyaskingwhythenormalpeacefuldealsdon’tgetmade. Mostrivalsdealratherthanfight.

• Fightingisviolentbargaining

• Wewillseehowfightingistypicallycostlierthanfindingadeal– Thusthereisalmostalwaysapeacefulbargainthat

leavesbothsidesbetteroff– Enemiesfindwaystocompeteandnegotiatepeacefully

(evenifcutthroatanddirty)

• Insteadofasking“whatcausesfighting?”weoughttoaskaslightlydifferentquestion:“whendoenemiesswitchmodes,choosingcostlyviolenceovercuttingadeal?” “Waristhecontinuationof

politicsbyothermeans.”— CarlvonClausewitz,OnWar,1832

Thismeansitisequallyimportanttostudythewarsthatneverwere

• Manystudiesofwarstracebackthehistoryofaconflicttofindits“rootcauses”

• Thisisaclassicerror:Selectiononthedependentvariable– Probablyleadstogettingthecausesofwarwrong

Question:Whatapproach(orresearchdesign)wouldimproveoutabilitytounderstandthecausesofwar?

Butletmeillustratelogicbehindtheclaimthat“thereisalmostalwaysapeacefulbargainthatleavesbothsidesbetteroff”(adaptedfromFearon

1995)ImaginetherearetwosideswecallAthens andSparta.

Theyarefightingforapieworth$100.Ifthereisawar,thewinnergetsX=$100,theloser$0.

$100

SupposeAthensbelievesthatitandSpartaareevenlymatched.ThusAthenshasap=50%chanceofwinningaconflict.

ButwarwouldcostitC=$10.

WhatAthensexpectstogetifitwins(50%chance):$100-10=$90

WhatAthensgetsifitloses(50%chance):$0-$10=-$10

Athens

WhatistheexpectedvalueofwartoAthens?

Theincentivesforpeaceandthebargainingrange

• ThisimpliesthatAthenswouldfindanysplitgreaterthan$40preferabletowar

• The$10costtoeachsidecreatesabargainingrangethatis$10+$10=$20wide

• Thisisaversionofthe“Coasetheorem”:thereareincentivesforapeacefulbargain– IfAthenscanmakeSpartaatake-it-or-leave-itoffer,

wherethealternativeiswar,thenSpartawillalwaysacceptanyofferx>$40ratherthanwar

– Iftheynegotiateovermultiplerounds,bothpreferanySpartansharexinthebargainingrange$40<x<$60towar,andwillfindanxpeacefully

– Theactualsplitxthendependsontherulesandfirstmover

Sparta

AthensBargaining

range

Here,itiscrucialthatwariscostly.Butinwhatsenseiswarcostly,andfor

whom?

Now,supposeAthensstillhasa50%chanceofwinningaconflict(p=0.5),butitbeginsholding$75oftheterritory.Doyoupredictwar?Whyorwhynot?

Sparta

Athens

Doyoufindthisaplausibledescriptionoftheincentivesfacinghumangroups?Whyorwhynot?

• Empiricallydoyouobservesomethingdifferentintheworld?

• Whatassumptionsinthissimplesetupstrikeyouasimplausible?

Sparta

AthensBargaining

range

II.Thereasonsforwars

Oneview:

“Thereisareasonforeverywarandawarforevery

reason.”

Myview:True,butthereareonlysomanykinds ofreasons

• Weneedtostepbackandsimplifywhatseemslikeacomplexmessofcauses

• Onceyoudo,yourealizethereareonlyahandfulofexplanationsforwar.

• Eachonecanbeseenasadeparturefromthesimpleassumptionsthatleadtothepeacefulbargaininthepreviousexample

• Myargumentinthisclass:Mostexplanationsformostconflictsareoneoffivetypesofdeparturefromtheassumptions

Almosteveryexplanationforfightingboilsdowntooneoffivekindsofproblem

1. Uncheckedelites.Groupsaremorelikelytofightwhendecision-makersignorethecostsofwarorreceivepersonalbenefits(andnooneholdsthemtoaccount)

2. Violentvalues.Sometimestheactofviolenceisitsownreward,intermsofstatus,emotion,orprinciple.Thesearenon-materialincentivesforwar

3. Systematicmistakes.Competitionisacomplexsetofdecisions,andhumanstendtosystematicmistakeswhenevaluatingcostsorchancesofvictory

4. Uncertainty.Whentheopposinggroup’sstrengthorintentionsareambiguous,takingachancebyfightingcanbethebestwaytoresolvetheuncertainty,sothatwaristheresultofariskygamble

5. Impossiblebargains/Commitmentproblems.Somecircumstancesgiveonesideanirresistibleincentivetoriskwar.Evenifthereisapeacefuldealthatmakesbothsidesbetteroff,thatdealisnon-credible,asatleastoncesidehasincentivestorenege

1. Uncheckedelites

2. Violentpreferences

3. Systematicmistakes

4. Uncertainty

5. Impossiblebargains(Commitmentproblems)

Withthisframework,Itrytotobringtogethergame-theoreticandmore“behavioral”orpsychologicalexplanationsforwar

1. Uncheckedelites

2. Violentpreferences

3. Systematicmistakes

4. Uncertainty

5. Impossiblebargains(Commitmentproblems)

(Theclaimthatwarsaretheexceptionnottheruleisalsoagametheoretic&rationalistclaim)

Withthisframework,Itrytotobringtogethergame-theoreticandmore“behavioral”orpsychologicalexplanationsforwar

Gametheoreticor“rationalist”

“Behavioral”scienceeconomics,psychology,evolutionarybiology,…

Almostalloftheseexplanationswerepresagedby50yearsofscholarsconflictresearch

• Journalistsseemtofavor“greed”andvariouspassions– e.g.“Ancientethnichatreds”

• Economists&quantitativepoliticalscientistshavemostlyignoredemotions&miscalculation

• Understandingthecausesofaconflictismostlyreinterpretingwhathistoriansandpoliticalscientistssayinthefivecauses(andlookingforthethingstheymissed)

Toillustrate,I’llstartwithaclassicexample(literally):Example3:Greekcitystates,Athens&Spartain4thcenturyB.C.E.

IpurposefullystartwithawarfewwillknowmuchaboutsoIcanillustratethe5reasonsinanoversimplifiedway,withanoversimplifiedversionofanimportantwarinworldhistory

Twogreatpowers,representingtwovastlydifferentidealsandsocialorganization

• Athens– Birthplaceofdemocracy– Flourishingcenterforarts,philosophy,science– BuildsavastmaritimeempireinAegeanSea,theDelianLeague,providingsecurityfortribute

• Sparta– Ruledbymilitaryoligarchs– 4in5subjectsenslavedasagriculturalists– Everymalecitizentrainedfromearliestagetobeacompletespecialistinviolenceandwar– Disdainfortrades,littleinfrastructure,nowallsbecauseofidealsoffightingprowess– Alongwithitsalliesitdominatesavastlandempire,ThePeloponnesianLeague

Inthelate20thcentury,therivalryisoftencomparedtotheUSandUSSR

Ober,Josiah. TheriseandfallofclassicalGreece.PrincetonUniversityPress(2015).Kagan,Donald."ThePeloponnesianWar." NewYork:Penguin (2003).

TheGreekWorld,circa431B.C.E.

Thisbringsusbacktooursimpleexampleofincentivesforpeace

SupposetheGreekworldisapieworth$100.Ifthereisawar,thewinnergetsX=$100,theloser$0.

Hereisapossiblepeacefulsplitofthepieforequallypowerfulgroups(i.e.p=50%chanceofwinningawar)

Sparta

AthensTheGreekworld

Theincentivesforpeaceandthebargainingrange

• ThisimpliesthatAthenswouldfindanysplitgreaterthan$40preferabletowar

• The$10costtoeachsidecreatesabargainingrangethatis$10+$10=$20wide

• Costlywarprovidesincentivesforapeacefulbargain– IfAthenscanmakeSpartaatake-it-or-leave-itoffer,

wherethealternativeiswar,thenSpartawillalwaysacceptanyofferx>$40ratherthanwar

– Iftheynegotiateovermultiplerounds,bothpreferanySpartansharexinthebargainingrange$40<x<$60towar,andwillfindanxpeacefully

– Theactualsplitxthendependsontherulesandfirstmover

Sparta

AthensBargaining

range

FamedaccountofthewarcomesfromthehistorianThucydides:“Itwastheriseof Athens andthefearthatthisinstilledinSparta

thatmadewarinevitable.”

SoimagineastateoftheworldwhereSpartabecomesmuchweaker,andhasonlya25%chanceofwinningawar.Itholds50%oftheterritory,

however.Whatdowepredictaunitary,rationalSpartatodo?

Thenewbargainingrange(ifc=$10stillforboth)

• Forexample,theSpartansmightbethemostadvancedatwar,butiftheysendtoomanytroopsaway,theirslaveempirerevolts

• OrperhapsthisisaworldwhereAthens’svasttradingempireandtributarysystem,theDelianLeague,givesitthewealthtorunalongwarorthenavytooutmatchSparta

• Eitherway,Spartawillacceptany$15<x<$35overwarinthisworld

• Spartawilltransferterritoryortributetoavoidawar

Sparta

AthensBargaining

range

Insomeways,thisisnotaterribledescriptionoftheGreekworldbeforethePeloponnesianWar

• Therearemanyhostilerivalriesamongcitystates,butonlysomeofthemareviolent

• AllianceslikeTheDelianLeague(Athens)orThePeloponnesianLeague(Sparta)arepeacefuldeals(howeverunequal)– Weakerstatestransfertributetothestrongerones,ratherthanfight– Imperialismandtributearecommonalternativestoconflictthroughouthistory

• Whentheyareviolent(andtherearemanywarsbetweenGreekcitystates)theseconflictstendtobeofshortduration,oftendecidedinsingleskirmishesorbattles– Therearenolongandsustainedconflicts

Thus:HowtoexplainthePeloponnesianWar?

Also:CanwealsoexplaintheneedforviolentbattlessonormalamongGreekcitystates?(Asitisperhapsunfairtotreattheseas“skirmishes”andbasicallypeaceful)

Butconflictdoesbreakout:ThePeloponnesianWar431–404BC

Atypologyoffiveexplanations

1. Uncheckedelites

2. Violentpreferences

3. Systematicmistakes

4. Uncertainty

5. Impossiblebargains(Commitmentproblems)

Whatifwerelaxunitaryactorassumption?Ifleadersignorethecostsofwar,thenbargainingrangeshrinks

• Totheextentthatleadersignorecosts,thisshrinksthebargainingrange– Sometimescalledan“agencyproblem”

• Butifabargainingrangestillexists,warstillremainsa“puzzle”– Butnarrowerrangescanaccentuateasymmetricinformationandcommitmentproblemsandothercausesofwar

Sparta

AthensNewBargaining

range

e.g.Costsbornebyserfsandsoldiers,not

Spartancitizens

Underwhatcircumstancescoulduncheckedleadersaloneeliminate

peacefulbargains?

Now,Ihavenottoldyoumuchaboutculture,power,orpoliticsintheseGreekcity-states,butthisiswhatyougetfromaGoogleImagesearchof…

“Athens” “Sparta”

Whatkindsoffactorsoccurtoyouaspossiblymakingtheseelitesmoreorlesslikelytointernalizethecostsofwar?

Whywouldleaderswouldactanythingbutselfishly?Whendorulersinternalizethecostsofwarandsolvetheagencyproblem?

Psychological/behavioral• Internally-imposedregardforothers

– Yournature,ethics,preferences

• Arisesfromsocialization,culture,genetics

• Humansdisplay“socialpreferences”suchasaltruismandreciprocity

• Weseemtobebiasedtoour“ingroup”– “Parochialaltruism”– Thedefinitionandwidthofthein-group

matters

Political/institutional• Externally-imposedregardforothers

– Therules,power,andconstraintsimposedbyothers

• Aproductofhowpowerisdistributedinasociety,andhowithasbeeninstitutionalized

• Moredecentralized,inclusive,professionalizedformalsystems,andstrongerinformalsystemsofnorms,tendtorestrainleaders

RecallAmbrogio Lorenzetti’sAllegoryofGoodandBadGovernment(Sienna,Italy,1338-39):Goodrulersareconstrained

Ruler

Peace

Fortitude

Prudence

Justice

Magnanimity

Temperance

Justice

Civicofficersandelitecitizens

Rope Rope

Whycallthisreason“uncheckedelites”ratherthan“selfishleaders”?Becauseself-regardisuniversalbutchecksarenot.Groupsvarymainlyinthechecksupon,notvirtueof,theirleaders

Ruler

Peace

Fortitude

Prudence

Justice

Magnanimity

Temperance

Justice

Civicofficersandelitecitizens

Rope Rope

Atypologyoffiveexplanations

1. Uncheckedelites

2. Violentpreferences

3. Systematicmistakes

4. Uncertainty

5. Impossiblebargains(Commitmentproblems)

Therearesomecircumstanceswhereviolencebecomesitsownreward

• Therearemanyexamplesofviolenceasintrinsicallyvaluable– anemotionalrewardthatcomesfromfighting– Moralbeliefsorreligiousvalues

• Exterminatingfalsegodsorideologies

– Vengeance• Revengeisintrinsicallyvalued

• Again,narrowerbargainingrangescanaccentuatetheothercausesofwar

• Intheextreme,onesidecanactuallygetnetbenefitsfromwar,sothatwarisnopuzzle

Sparta

AthensNewbargaining

range

StickingittotheAtheniansweighsagainstcosts

Let’sconsidervengeance,withamoderndigression

Dowehaveingrainedfairnessnorms&awillingnesstopaytopunishinjustice?Evidencefromexperimentalgamese.g.FehrandGachter 2000

• “Dictatorgame”– PersonAget$X– AchoosesX≥x≥0togivepersonB– Measures“altruism”

• Ultimatumgame– PersonAget$X– AchoosesX≥x≥0togivepersonB– Bcanchoosewhethertoacceptxorrejectandbothget0

– Measures“fairness”

Homoeconomicus?Offerfromanultimatumgamein15smallscale-societies

• Greatdealofsimilarityacrosstimeandpopulations,withoffersof40-50%common

• Offerslessthan20%arefrequentlyrejected

• Modalofferina“DictatorGame”oftenzero,thoughaverageofferistypically20-30%

• Bothresultssuggestpeopleactoutofasenseoffairnessandprosociality

Indeed,“injustice”isacommonexplanationinhistoriesandethnographiesofwhoparticipatesinrevoltsandrebellions

Itisdifficulttoignoreemotionasafactorinconflict,andintrinsicpreferencesforpunishmentorjusticeareonewaytobringemotioninto

ourframework

Allbooksaboutallrevolutionsbeginwithachapterthatdescribesthedecayoftotteringauthorityorthemiseryandsufferingsofthepeople.

Theyshouldbeginwithapsychologicalchapter,onethatshowshowaharassed,terrifiedmansuddenlybreakshisterror,stopsbeingafraid.

Thisunusualprocess,sometimesaccomplishedinaninstantlikeashockoralustration,demandsilluminating.Mangetsridoffearandfeelsfree.Withoutthattherewouldbenorevolution.

— Ryszard Kapuscinski,ShahofShahs,1985

Manyformsofpoliticalparticipationarehardtoexplainwithoutanappealtopreferences:intrinsicmotivationsoremotionalrewards

BacktoAthensversusSparta

• Ex-antethisdoesnotlooklikeawarofvengeanceorideals– Despitethedifferences,littleindicationthis

wasanintrinsicallyvalue-basedwar– Norealmotiveforvengeanceattheoutset

• Buthistoriansofthewartellusthatviolence,oncebegun,elicitedpowerfulemotionsandresponses.

• Couldthishelpexplainpersistentwarsevenifstartedbyotherforces?

• Ifso,whydobothpartiestaketherisk?– Ariskygamble?Miscalculation?

Anger,frustrationandadesireforvengeanceincreasedasthefightingdraggedon,resultinginaprogressionofatrocities…

— Kagan(2003,p.xxiv)

TherearealsoinstancesoftheSpartansstrategicallyusingemotionsandpreferencesforjustice

• Spartahasworld’sgreatestlandarmy– Theyknowthattheycannotbeatthenavel

powerAthensatsea

• LeaderofAthensknowsthattheywillbedefeatediftheymeetSpartaonfield

• HenceAthensbuildstheLongWalls– Spartanscannotbreachthem

• SpartansroamAtheniancountrysideburningvillagesandpropertiesattemptingtoenrageandembarrassnoblesandcitizens– GoadingAtheniansintothebattlefield

ThelongwallsofAthens

Informal“assignment”:Thinkofreasonsforwarthatyoudonot

thinkbelonginthismodel

Also,intermsofyourreadings…