Tana Copenhagen ApS

Klosterstræde 23, 1st

1157 Copenhagen K

Denmark

By Erik Bryld

and

Christine Kamau

Danish Refugee Council and UNICEF

Community-Driven Recovery and Development Project

Political Economy Analysis in Mogadishu Final draft report May 2012

Tana Copenhagen ApS

Klosterstræde 23, 1st

1157 Copenhagen K

Denmark

Content

EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY   3  

1   INTRODUCTION   6  

2   METHODOLOGY  AND  LIMITATIONS   7  

3   MOGADISHU  CONTEXT   9  

4   OVERVIEW  OF  FINDINGS  AT  DISTRICT  LEVEL   11  

5   LOCAL  GOVERNANCE  IN  MOGADISHU   20  

6   FEASIBILITY  OF  APPLYING  CDRD  IN  MOGADISHU   23  

7   THE  THREE  DISTRICTS   25  

7.1   Cabdicasiis  (Abdiaziz)   26  

7.2   Howlwadaag   27  

7.3   Shibis   28  

7.4   Stakeholders   29  

8   APPLYING  CDRD  IN  THE  CONTEXT  OF  MOGADISHU  –  DISCUSSION  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS   33  

8.1   Considerations  for  CDRD  implementation  in  Mogadishu   33  

8.2   Revising  the  CDRD  operations   34  

8.3   CDRD  and  JPLG   37  

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Executive  Summary  The Community Driven Recovery and Development (CDRD) project was asked by DFID to undertake a district based political economy analysis in Mogadishu to identify avenues for CDRD implementation in the City. The analysis was implemented in two phases. The first phase focused on the local level/community structures in all of Mogadishu, and the objective was to identify the most suitable districts for CDRD implementation.

In phase 2, a more in-depth analysis was undertaken of the three districts identified in phase 1: Cabdicasis, Howlwaadaag and Shibis. The analysis was produced to identify entry points for CDRD in the three districts and ensure a minimum of ‘Do No Harm’ in the CDRD approach. In total 85 interviews were conducted with key decision-makers at local level as well as citizens of Mogadishu.

The legal basis for the local governance setup in Mogadishu is not fully clear to the persons interviewed. The City and Councils have geographical overlap with the Benadir Region and its 16 districts. The main difference is in the mandate, with the governorate being responsible for security related links to the TFG, while the City is responsible for service delivery. Since 2008 the Governorate and the City has de facto been merged. While the legal basis for the local governance in the Benadir Region and Mogadishu City remains unclear, the de facto structures, appointees and functions of these are clear to the Mogadishu administration as well as to the men and women interviewed.

There are three local government tiers below the DC: The Waah level which comprises 4 divisions; the Laan level that always comprises 4 sub-divisions under each Waah; and finally, the Tabelle, or neighbourhood level, of which there are four under each Laan. Ideally, the chairpersons for each level should be selected by the community elders, endorsed by the DC, and appointed by the Mayor. But, as the analysis in this phase 2 shows, this is the exception and not the norm, and the DC, more often than not, selects the candidates to be appointed.

In most districts the local government structures are in place, but the de facto leadership at local level is split between informal institutions such as clan leadership, which holds the highest level of legitimacy and the formal local government structures. In most places there is an overlap of personalities between the informal and formal leaders.

Operating with CDRD in Mogadishu requires the programme to operate in a fragile environment with contested and parallel authorities. In short, the CDRD will need to take into consideration: (1) The inducement of resources and engaging in community mobilisation in Mogadishu can exacerbate existing conflicts. To limit the conflict potential and ensure a minimum of ‘Do No Harm’, the CDRD will need to engage all relevant stakeholders early in the process and ensure that there is sufficient ownership with these for the programme. (2)

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CDRD must be conscious of the fact that the legitimacy and the de facto leadership at local government level rests with institutions that are instituted through tradition or force. (3) The existing and unique local government structures comprising 4 levels, each with its own political representation, but having limited capacity and legitimacy. (4) Recognise the fragility of the links and alliances between the different political layers. The project will thus have to balance potential difference between the leadership of the different layers while still aiming at improving the local government capacities from below. (5) The challenges posed by implementing the project in a fragile urban context. For example; opportunity costs of potential beneficiaries in an urban area; the cost levels in an urban setting and therefore the size of the grants; and the implementation time required in order to allow for ownership of sub-projects. (6) The security situation is still fragile to the extent that international staff will not be in a position to visit the communities. The monitoring arrangement will therefore have to be designed to cater for this. Based on these issues, adaptations to the CDRD approach are envisaged for implementation in Mogadishu.

The different local government structure in Mogadishu requires CDRD to identify appropriate local government levels of operation, size of grants and links with formal and informal local government structures.

In the rest of Somalia the entry point for CDRD is usually the lowest level of local government i.e. the village councils. The sizes of the village councils differ, but usually represent around 200 households. In Mogadishu the lowest level is the Tabelle, which comprises between 50 and 250 households. In most cases, however, the number is on the lower end, making the transaction costs for engaging with the Tabelle relatively higher per household. Consequently, the logical entry point would be the next layer i.e. the Laan level.

Once the entry point of the programme has been identified, the primary priority will be to ensure that there is ownership of the programme with all formal and informal decision-making institutions at city and local level. As the more informal structures have a higher degree of legitimacy at local level, bringing them onboard is key to ensure anchoring of the programme, and limit potential horizontal or vertical conflicts in the CDRD communities and districts. A pragmatic approach is needed.

Initial endorsement for the project was given during this mission by the City of Mogadishu. CDRD will now need to engage with the de facto leadership at the local level to enable operational engagement. A precondition for engagement is an acceptance from the local level leaders of the community participation approach applied by CDRD and thus the election of representatives.

To enhance community commitment to the CDRD approach and provide a basis for more sustainable institutional development, CDRD should consider running two implementation cycles (i.e. two grants). With the Laan having an approximate size as the current operations elsewhere with village councils, this

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suggests that the level of funding should be the same in Mogadishu. If each Laan receives two funding cycles in all three assessed districts (48 Laans in total) the total grant distribution would reach USD 1.6 million.

The extensive CDRD mobilisation approach takes up to six months to implement, before funds start to flow to the communities. However, the Mogadishu context is assessed to require a reduction in the number of preparatory days and ensure that funds start flowing earlier than in other areas of Somalia.

As in many other parts of Somalia, the programme will need to deal with the risk of elite capture. CDRD has in the past been effective in limiting elite capture in its approach (but not eliminating it). This has been possible due to, on the one hand, the extensive social mobilisation process, and on the other hand, the insistence on having elected village councils with mixed clan as well as female representation. There is no indication in the field analysis that the same approach cannot be applied in Mogadishu.

Finally, CDRD will have to relate to challenges posed by the security situation and to monitoring in the fragile Mogadishu context. For this CDRD can use its experiences from South Galkayo and Abudwaq, including the use of mobile phones, GPS and photo streaming for remote monitoring. Relative to harmonising the activities of the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance (UN-JPLG) and CDRD, the two teams should explore how to implement their activities based on an adaptation of the ‘Roadmap for Harmonisation of JPLD and CDRD’. The team suggests two initial steps: (1) Supporting the development of appropriate financial management procedures. (2) Facilitating the development of governance and accountability systems to enhance demand-side governance and downwards accountability.  

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1 Introduction  The Community Driven Recovery and Development (CDRD) project was asked by DFID to undertake a district-based political economy analysis in Mogadishu.

The analysis was implemented in two phases. The first phase focused on the local level/community structures in all of Mogadishu (that is all districts in the Benadir Region). The objective of phase 1 was to identify the most suitable districts for CDRD implementation. A Phase 1 report was produced with the ranking methodology and findings. That analysis is included as part of this report.

In phase 2, a more in-depth analysis was undertaken of the three districts identified in phase 1: Cabdicasis, Howlwaadaag and Shibis. The analysis was produced to identify entry points for CDRD in the three districts and ensure a minimum of Do No Harm in the CDRD approach.

The overall main aims of the analysis include: 1) Helping practitioners better understand the political and economic

realities in the communities where they work and uncovering the underlying processes that drive or block change for development;

2) Helping CDRD to ‘do no harm’ by identifying risks and helping to avoid exacerbating existing problems;

3) Contributing to more effective aid by identifying where politically feasible opportunities exist (i.e. the ‘entry points’).

In the following we first reflect on the methodology and limitations to the study (the full methodology can be found in the Inception Report in Annex A). We then present a brief overview of the Mogadishu context (chapter 3) and a summary of the individual districts (chapter 4) (a more detailed overview of each district can be found in Annex C). To understand the formal power structures that the CDRD will work with, the local government structures are explained in chapter 5 with reflections on the grey area between the formal and informal. With the context outlined, chapter 6 has a brief discussion on the feasibility of implementing CDRD in Mogadishu. In chapter 7 the findings of the political-economy analysis of the three selected districts are introduced, and based on this, chapter 8 presents the recommendations on how to apply CDRD in the Mogadishu context.

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2 Methodology  and  Limitations  The methodology for the analysis is described in detail in the Inception Report in Annex A. The methodology is a perception based approach triangulation the perception of the different interviewees of political-economy structures at local level in Mogadishu. Below is a summary of the implementation of the methodology as well as reflections on limitations.

The field missions were implemented in two phases. The phase 1 methodology has been developed to provide an overview of the context and main power structures in all districts of Mogadishu, while the phase 2 provides a more in-depth analysis of three selected districts. A total of 53 semi-structured interviews were undertaken in phase 1 and 32 semi-structured interviews in phase 2. In conjunction with the local level interviews, interviews were held in Nairobi with development partners experienced in implementing development and humanitarian activities in Mogadishu, and in Mogadishu with municipal and district authorities and NGOs. A list of interviewees from the field can be found in Annex B. The information has been used to complement the field research and for triangulation.

The questionnaires from phase 1 have been analysed and synthesised in the matrix presented in Annex C, while the data from phase 2 is presented in this report.

Phase 1 provided a greater degree of detail on the local government structures. Consequently, the phase 2 semi-structured interviews were redesigned to enable a more in-depth discussion on the role, legitimacy and representation of the different local government structures in the three districts analysed.

Undertaking research on conflict and power structures in Mogadishu is challenged by the context and thus presents a number of limitations and challenges. These include:

1) Lack of availability of reliable data. Although the team was made aware of some studies that had been carried out on Mogadishu, it proved difficult to come by these or other recent analysis of Mogadishu at district and sub-district level. The most accessible data is primarily geared towards IDP tracking and support. This lack of comparable data limits the ability to triangulate the information obtained. For the same reason, the data in the matrix in Annex C (that provides information on specific districts) is based on the responses provided by the interviewees. Responses are based on perceptions, which are useful for understanding the security situation and governance and power structures. However, detailed descriptions involving quoting of data (i.e. number of households, IDPs, and clan percentages) are based on the synthesis of replies from the respondents, thus showing the general trend rather than exact numbers and it may so happen that ‘Others’ have a different opinion than that expressed by the respondents. This will remain the case until more accurate data is developed.

2) Security situation guiding the selection of interviewees. While Al Shabaab has left most of Mogadishu, there were still violent clashes in

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Heliwa, Deynile, and Dharkeenley at the time of interviews, limiting the area of operation of the interviewees. Similarly, some of the persons approached were uncomfortable about participating in the interviews, and furthermore, some of the leaders of the districts expressed disapproval with the interviews. Irrespective of this the consultants were able to approach and receive information from 3-4 respondents in each district. The security situation is therefore assessed to have had only limited influence on the outcome of the field mission findings. However, as no counterfactual data is available, this assumption remains to be tested.

3) Overload of surveys. The new accessibility in great parts of Mogadishu has meant that a number of agencies are undertaking different surveys, although most are related to IDP and food security assessments, as opposed to governance. This has resulted in survey-fatigue among some of the district commissioners.

4) Political economy without specific financial analysis. The survey was interpreted by some stakeholders in Nairobi as a broader political economy analysis of the Benadir Region with emphasis on local and regional financial flows and control of finances. As detailed in the introduction, this is not the case. Instead, the survey is a snapshot of the districts and the governance relations within these, with the objective of providing recommendations to the implementation of CDRD.

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3 Mogadishu  Context  Background

Mogadishu, also referred to as the Benadir Region, is the capital of Somalia. The city is divided into 16 districts, each governed by a district commissioner. The districts are: Dharkenley, Wadajir, Waberi, Daynile, Hodan, Hawlwadag, Xamar Jabjab, Xamarweyne, Wardhigley, Bondhere, Shangani, Shibis, Yaqshid, Cabdicasis, Karan and Heliwa. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has its headquarters in the city, in Howlwadaag. A mayor appointed by the TFG governs the city (see section 5).

Since the fall of the Siyad Barre regime in 1990, Somalia, and more so south-central and Puntland regions, have witnessed a cycle of conflict that continues to date. Mogadishu has witnessed the most fighting. As a result, there has been a disruption to livelihoods, substantial displacement, with IDP camps sprouting all over the country, and an almost total destruction of basic services. The fighting has also had an effect on food security, exacerbating the effects of drought in the country.

A contested city

In the late 1990s, in an attempt to bring a semblance of order back to the region, Islamic courts in Mogadishu formed an alliance that coalesced into the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU enjoyed enthusiastic support from the business community. It was later ousted, in 2006, by the TFG and Ethiopian troops, eventually splintering into different factions out of which emerged the Al Shabaab.

In August 2011, TFG forces, in a joint operation with AMISOM, Kenya Army troops and a contingent of Ethiopian forces, launched an offensive against Al Shabaab and have reportedly managed to liberate almost all of Mogadishu. At the time of writing, Al Shabaab was said to have been pushed to the periphery of the city as the offensive continued. The group’s tactics have also changed, and they now utilise a more guerrilla-like strategy of suicide attacks, assassinations and roadside bombs. See Annex E for a timeline of the conflict in Mogadishu.

Several powerful individuals are reported to control their own clan affiliated militia groups, contributing to ongoing security concerns, as well as protection and ‘gate-keeping’ dilemmas for local communities.

Humanitarian and development situation

For close to 20 years, implementing development activities in Mogadishu has been close to impossible, an only a few development projects have been implemented by agencies such as UN-Habitat. Security has affected the effectiveness with which humanitarian assistance could be delivered. Delivering assistance to the many IDPs spread across the city continues to be a major priority, but in order to build on the peace dividend in the city, development initiatives – short, medium and long-term – also need to be taken into consideration. The people are in need of all basic services: water, education, health and infrastructure; government agencies need to be capacitated to serve the people again; and the trust of people in state agencies needs to be rebuilt.

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Some representatives of the TFG question the claim made by development agencies that so much money has been spent on Mogadishu. They lament that a lot of time and resources are spent on training and capacity building exercises – intangibles goods– and their administration, rather than on actual physical outputs.

Islamic countries and other ‘non-traditional’ donors are playing an increasingly important role in humanitarian and, more recently, development activities in Mogadishu. The Turkish government is the most visible, with plans to rehabilitate and construct a number of government institutions, including schools and major hospitals.

According to an OCHA analysis, the number of key organisations operating in Mogadishu as of February 2012 was as follows:

• International NGOs – 44 • Red Crescent Societies – 9 • Local NGOs – 39 (There are about 373 local NGOs registered with the

Ministry of interior, although as stated above, only 39 are currently operating)

• International Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) agencies and local OIC partners – 48

The role of private sector and the Diaspora

The role that the private sector continues to play in Somalia is quite significant. As reported by a number of people in Mogadishu, and as highlighted in a report published by Conciliation Resources in partnership with Interpeace, ‘The Somali business community has played an important role in Somalia’s recent troubled history: at some points hindering efforts at reconciliation by financing warlords and their militias; at others, working with local activists and NGOs seeking to establish peace.’1 As such, they wield significant influence within the power structures of Mogadishu. In terms of service provision, with the incapacitated government, the business community stepped in and is providing services in sectors such as health, education, water and electricity, albeit, mostly for profit purposes.

Many of the businesses in Mogadishu are owned by, or financed with money from the Diaspora. In addition, many Diaspora people are returning to Mogadishu and they can be found in key government positions; for example, the Mayor, his deputy and many technical staff in the Mayor’s office are all Diaspora people. The President himself is also from the Diaspora, and so too are a number of Ministers.

1  Accord,  Issue  21:  Whose  peace  is  it  anyway?  Connecting  Somali  and  international  peacemaking:  An  international  review  of  peace  initiatives.  Mark  Bradbury  and  Sally  Healy.  2010.  

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4 Overview  of  Findings  at  District  Level  The following section gives a snapshot of each of the 16 districts of Mogadishu. The district administration was more or less the same in most of the districts, with a few exceptions based on district size. However, the actual roles, relationships and power at the various levels varies.

The majority of the DCs were appointed by the TFG, but not all were new to the leadership position in the districts. In some cases, former warlords who already wielded considerable power locally entered into agreement with the TFG and were appointed as DCs.

Map of Mogadishu Districts

Source: Department of Health and Human Services

Based on a scoring criteria (see phase I report) agreed on at the beginning of the assessment, and based on eight assessment criteria2, each of the districts could score a maximum of 24. Below is a presentation of the districts with their requisite scoring. A more detailed matrix is presented in Annex C.

2    1)  The  presence  of  women  and  youth  in  the  district,    2)  Peaceful  clan  co-­‐existence,  3)  The  presence  of  other  development  agencies/NGOs  in  the  district,  4)   Ability  of  development  agencies/NGOs  to  operate  in  the  district,  5)  Major  violent/security  incidents  in  last  6  months,  6)  Local  Government  structures,  7)  Informal  local  governance  structures  in  place,    8)   The  degree  to  which  the  district  is  under  the  control  of  local  militia.  

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Dharkenley

As of early March, Dharkenley was still considered to be one of the more dangerous districts. It is also one of the most highly populated districts of Mogadishu. Although the TFG is in control of the central area, the periphery is still run by Al Shabaab. For the last two years the district has been under the control of the TFG and its allies the Alu Sunna WalJaammah, as well as AMISOM. But of late, there have been clashes between the government and the Al Shabaab, and between clan militias with regard to control of check points and IDPs settlements, as well as clan related incidents. The district too has the largest IDP camp in Mogadishu – Badbado. Most of the IDPs originate from Bay, Lower and Middle Shabelle and parts of Gedo region. A Unitar report indicates that by October 2011, an IDP shelter improvement process had started.

The Hawiye-Abgaal sub-clan is the most populous in the district, and the DC, appointed by former President Abdullahi Yusuf, has been in power for the last three years.

There are a number of agencies implementing humanitarian activities: wet feeding, running nutrition centres and distributing non-food items (NFIs).

Score:12

Wadajir

For the last four years, Wadajir has been under the control of the TFG and has not been occupied by Al Shabaab. The majority clan is the Abgaal sub-clan of Hawiye, with some areas being controlled each by Murosade, Hawadle and Habargidir sub-clans of Hawiye. The Benadir Administration is in the process of reclaiming government structures that have for a long time been inhabited by IDPs and, as a result, these evictees have moved into the district. It has one of the biggest, but also one of the better managed IDP camps in Mogadishu, called Rajo.

Real estate prices in the district are extremely high. As a result of its relative security, many INGOs and UN agencies have offices there. In addition, the airport, Hormud, Nation Link and Telesom telecommunication companies are located in the district. Popular hotels such as Peace Hotel, Sahafi, Shamo and Paradise are also located in the district. It is also home to the two largest public referral hospitals in Mogadishu – Medina and Benadir – that are being rehabilitated by donor agencies, with good recognition going to the Turkish Government. The above factors have pushed up rental prices and the cost of property in general.

The DC, who has held that post for the last five years, is extremely powerful and controls his own militia. It has been reported by interviewees that his militias have, on occasion, clashed with AMISOM forces. Nevertheless, the four other clans mentioned above also have their own militias, and these are affiliated to the executive members of the district, but the DC controls the biggest group. In terms of repelling Al Shabaab, these militia groups cooperated to ensure they did not get a foothold in the district but, otherwise, each controls their own area. These militia leaders, now part of the district executive

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committee, cooperate with the TFG, and their militias act as police within the confines of the district.

Wadajir is one of the few districts in which the court system is operational.

Score: 17

Waberi

Waberi, one of the most populated districts in Mogadishu, has never been under the control of Al Shabaab . There are 21 IDP settlements in the district, but it used to host many more IDPs who have since moved to other areas. This is because they had occupied government buildings, such as the Polytechnic and the October 2 high school building. When the government decided to reclaim these buildings, they evicted the IDPs.

The Turkish Government has committed to rehabilitate the Polytechnic to make it functional again.

It is estimated that the majority of inhabitants are from the non-Somali ethnic minorities – the Benadiri - including Jareer, Arabs, Braves and minority clans labelled ‘Others’ clans. Nevertheless, the Hawiye-Abgaal sub-clan dominates the higher levels of the district administration structure. The largest source of revenue for the district is the Mogadishu Airport. Its location is also strategic because it is on the main route to the Presidential Palace.

Score: 19

Daynile

The district was an Al Shabaab stronghold from 2007 to July 2011 when the TFG and AMISOM forces gained control of most parts of the district. However, Al Shabaab still occupies and controls the northern part. They destroyed the District Headquarters and the administration had to move its offices to a new area called Seven. It is also one of the newer districts of Mogadishu, and is said to have relatively fewer services compared to the other districts.

In 2007, many IDPs displaced from Yaaqshiid, Howlwadaag and Heliwaa districts were hosted in Daynile district and its periphery. Many of the people returned to their original districts or were again displaced to others after conflict between Al Shabaab and TFG/AMISOM started in 2010.

Daynile used to be a major industrial area of Mogadishu, but many of the industries were destroyed: oil, seed, cigarette, matches, and metal factories were all destroyed. However, there are still a few new industries that have started up in the area, including the major water company – Caafi –supplying bottled water, as well as a mattress factory.

There are a few agencies providing humanitarian relief services in the district. These include Medecins Sans Frontier, Nowegian Refugee Council and the Danish Refugee Council.

AMISOM and TFG military provide security to the local people (there are six bases in the district). The police are not supported by the TFG and they are mainly local volunteers recruited by the district administration. Central police do not assist as they, await the departure of Al Shabaab.

Score: 15

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Hodan

In the last four years, some of the deadliest conflict between insurgents and the TFG/AMISOM occurred in the district. Habargidir and Dudble sub-clans of the Hawiye are the majority inhabitants. Historically though, the Darod used to occupy most of the district before they were driven out by general Aideed during the liberation struggle from the Siyad Barre regime.

Recently, the district has witnessed a significant number of returnees and some of them have been able to reclaim – through the assistance of the elders – some of their property. However, there is still a large number of IDPs , with up to 82 IDP camps as of October 20113. The district holds Mogadishu's khat distribution centre and the fruit and vegetable section of Bakara market.

Score: 17

Howlwadaag

The major sub-clan residing in the district is the Murosade of the Hawiye. The district is home to the Bakara market, which occupies 2Km2 of the 4Km2 that makes up the district. Because of the opportunity for income generation through taxing of traders, Al Shabaab succeeded in gaining control of the market for a while, but were eventually pushed out after a long engagement with AMISOM.

There are 41 IDP camps. In addition, former district residents, especially women and children, have started returning after having been away for three years in IDPs settlements in the Afgoye corridor, or staying with relatives in Waberi, Wadajir, Xamarjajab and Xamarweyne districts.

The district is relatively safe; there are no local militia groups in operation , and there is a handful of civil society groups mobilising the public around issues such as sanitation.

Score: 21

XamarJabjab

The district has existed as an administrative area since 1935 and was officially labelled as a district in 1970. The Jareer sub-clan of the Bantus makes up the majority of the population, and are mainly to be found in the areas of Bur Kuroole and Buulo Elaay. However, the executive members of the district administration are all Habargidir, a sub-clan of Hawiye.

The DC has joined forces with TFG and his militia now act as the police force . Three previous DCs were assassinated mainly due to clan disputes. However, the district is considered to be relatively safe, and there are a number of agencies running humanitarian projects.

Score: 19

3  Update  3:  Continued  expansion  of  IDP  shelter  concentration  in  Mogadishu  –  12  September  to  18  October  2011.  United  Nations  Institute  for  Training  and  Research  (Unitar).    

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Xamarweyne

The district has never been under the control of Al Shabaab, and it enjoys relative security. It is also a key business district. Xamarweyne is mostly inhabited by the Banadiri clans (Shashi, Bandhabow, Camudi, Baajuuni) or coastal people, although the district administration is mainly made up of the Habargidir sub-clan of Hawiye. It hosts some IDPs, although not as many as in other districts; it has 11 IDP camps in total. The district has the largest fish vending shop and vegetable market in Mogadishu.

Government structures, such as the Central Bank of Somalia, and some government ministries are housed here. The DC, who has been a DC since the time of Siyad Barre, although in other districts, cooperates with the TFG, and his militia now act as district police. There has been a lot of intermarriage between the Banadiri women and Hawiye men, not always voluntarily and, in return, these minority clans receive protection from the Hawiye.

There are some NGOs operating and they carry out activities such as garbage collection, sanitation and HIV/AIDS awareness raising.

Score: 19

Wardhigley

This is the only district in Mogadishu that has a woman DC. The major clan is the Habargidir sub-clan of Hawiye. It was mentioned that displacement here started in the sub-sections of Argentina and Tokyo in 1991. There are a few IDPs, although it was reported that the number was increasing daily. Unlike most districts, it has five sub-districts instead of the normal four. Because the District Administration holds weekly public meetings, the DC is considered to be very active and in touch with the people.

Security is considered to be good, although it continues to be a target for Al-Shabab attacks primarily because the Presidential Palace, the parliament buildings and the Mogadishu stadium are located in the district. There are a number of NGOs and UN agencies operating in the district, as well as a variety of civil society organisations (CSOs), such as women and youth groups.

Score: 18

Bondhere

This is one of the oldest districts in Mogadishu, and it is mainly inhabited by the minority groups: Arabs, Shareer, Reer and Xamar. However, as in most other districts, the Hawiye clan, through the Abgaal sub-clan, occupy the higher administrative positions. Although the clans co-exist, the minority clans are reported to be marginalised by the more powerful Hawiye.

Business activity is still very low and this is attributed to the greater majority of the population having been marginalised for a long time.

There are clan-based militia under the control of the DC, but they are collaborating with the TFG and have been issued TFG uniforms. It is reported by some interviewees that these militias, at times, take advantage of being affiliated to the TFG to harass civilians, especially from the minority clans, and have been known to do the same with NGO. They have also been reported to exert pressure or to try and control humanitarian assistance.

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There is minimal presence of aid agencies working in the district.

Score: 13

Shangani

The district has been under the control of the TFG for the last four years and Al Shabaab have never occupied it. AMISOM has had its main base here since 2010. It is the smallest district of Mogadishu and, before the collapse of the government, it was home to Benadiri clans, most of whom fled when the conflict started. It is still dominated by the Arabs and the DC is an Arab, a marked difference from other districts where the Hawiye tend to dominate the district leadership posts, even when they are clearly the minority in terms of numbers.

In its heyday, it was a popular tourist destination and home for wealthier people and expatriates. It is one of the more secure districts, and some NGO presence can be seen, although, because of its size, the residents say the NGOs prefer to implement projects in other bigger districts. The administration is by respondents said to be active in trying to develop the district, and holds regular meetings with the CSOs operating within the district.

Score: 21

Shibis

The District was occupied by Al Shabaab for two years until it was liberated in August 2011, and the TFG appointed a DC. The majority of the population is from the Arabs (of the ‘Others’ clans), and unlike in most districts, the district administration is made up of both Arabs and Hawiye-Abgaal, although there is still a feeling of being marginalised by the more powerful Hawiye.

It is relatively safe, but there are only a few NGOs operating, giving humanitarian assistance to IDPs, such as wet feeding and provision of NFIs.

The district does not host a big number of IDPs, however, and there are only about nine settlements.

Score: 22

Yaqshid

According to interviewees, between 2007 and 2009 Yaqshid experienced the most assassinations of DCs and their deputies: three DCs, two Vice DCs and three sub district leaders were killed by Al Shabaab. It is controlled by the Hawiye-Abgaal sub-clan and they hold all the administrative positions. There are a number of IDP settlements and, recently, it was reported that the district administration, with help from local elders, managed to remove close to 1,000 people that had occupied government buildings. These people had to move to other IDP shelters.

Since it was liberated from Al Shabaab in the period between August 2011 and January 2012, it has remained relatively safe, and there are a number of aid agencies operating there. But the northern part remains difficult to access due to threats from Al Shabaab.

Yaqshid is another district that has more sub-districts than the usual four; because of its size it has six.

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Score: 18

Cabdicasis

The district was among the first districts to be formed back in 1928. It is mainly occupied by the Hawiye-Abgaal sub-clan, who also control the district administration. It is home to one of the largest beaches and largest football stadiums in Mogadishu. It is under the control of the TFG and is considered to be secure, with no major security incidents having taken place in the last six months. There are a few NGOs operating, but no aid agencies are based here.

Al Shabaab is reported to occupy a few pockets of land in the areas bordering the Middle-Shabelle region but, otherwise most of the district is under TFG control.

There are very few IDP camps, and by October it was estimated that there were only five such settlements.

Score: 19

Karan

Karan is the largest district in Mogadishu and reported to have the largest number of returnees as well. Although some parts have come under the control of the TFG since August 2011, there are still parts that have not been liberated from Al Shabaab, as a result of which there are still skirmishes between them and TFG/AMISOM forces.

In addition, there are clan tensions in a struggle for control of the district, and the clan militias are therefore an additional source of insecurity. Consequently, civilian presence in the streets is more subdued due to uncertainty about the security situation.

Being the largest district, it comprises six sub-districts, as opposed to the regular four.

The business sector has been affected by the presence of Al Shabaab, and it is still struggling to recover.

Although some NGOs provide humanitarian assistance to the inhabitants, none of them is based there.

Score: 13

Heliwa

Heliwa has been under Al Shabaab control for the last four years, and only as recently as March 2012 were many parts of the district liberated by TFG/AMISOM troops. It is reported to be one of the districts that has experienced some of the heaviest fighting between 2007 and 2012.

The district acts as a route connecting central Somalia to Lower Shabelle, and has therefore experienced a lot of IDP movement. However, not many of them are settled here due to the fighting, and there are only about nine IDP settlements.

The main group occupying the district is the Habargidir sub-clan of Hawiye, followed by the Abgaal.

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There is minimal NGO presence, although they do come in to provide humanitarian assistance.

Score: 14

Based on the district assessment the districts were scored and ranked as described in details in the phase 1 report. An overview is presented in table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1 Summary district scoring

District Score out of 24

Dharkenley 12

Wadajir 17

Waberi 19

Daynile 15

Hodan 17

Howlwadaag 21

Xamarjabjab 19

Xamarweyne 19

Whardigley 18

Bhondere 13

Shangani 21

Shibis 22

Yaqshid 18

Cabdicasis 19

Karan 13

Heliwa 14

Following the ranking exercise the districts were subject to the policy and political-economy assessment criteria outlined in the phase I report. The three primary criteria were: (a) avoiding districts with extensive development and NGO activity (b) choosing districts that were favoured by the Mogadishu Mayor and district Commissioners, and (c) ensuring a decent spread across clans. These three extra criteria were applied to all districts scoring 19 points and above (see Annex C).

Criteria (a) reduced the number of ‘score 19 and above districts’ to five. Out of these only two meet criteria (b), i.e. they fall under the priority of the City of Mogadishu: Cabdicasis and Shibis. Applying criteria (c), the two districts differ in terms of clan majority with Haiwiye Abgaal dominance in Cabdicasis and Arab dominance in Shibis. However, in Shibis, the Arab clans still feel excluded by the minority presence of the Abgaal sub-clan, even though both are marginally represented in the district administration. To reach out to other sub-clans in the City, Howlwadaag was selected as the third district for the phase 2 analysis.

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Howlwadaag is dominated by the Murusade sub-clan, and it scored second highest in the initial ranking exercise.

The main characteristics of the three districts are summarised in table 5.1 below.

The 4.2 The three districts identified for phase 2 Category  /  District   Cabdicasis   Howlwadaag   Shibis  Women  and  youth  presence   3   3   3  Peaceful  clan  co-­‐existence   2   3   3  Other  humanitarian/development  activities   2   2   2  Ability  of  NGOs  to  operate   2   3   3  Major  security  incidents   3   2   3  Local  government  structures  in  place   3   3   3  Informal  governance  structures   2   2   3  District  controlled  by  militants   2   3   2  Total  (minimum  score  8,  maximum  score  24)   19   21   22  

       Other  parameters              Clan  composition  (first  and  second  in  percentage  of  full  population  –  an  estimate  by  interviewees  in  phase  1)  

1)  Hawiye  (Abgaal),  2)  Darood  

1)  Hawiye  (Murusade)  

1)  Arab,  2)  Hawiye  (Abgaal,  Wacbuudhan)  

Mayor  of  Mogadishu  priorities   X       X  DRC  presence   X   X   X  

IDP  presence  (households)   15000  41  settlements   1500  

Degree  of  displacement  in  Jan.  2012  (0:  low,  6:  high)   1   1   0  

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5 Local  Governance  in  Mogadishu  The legal basis for the local governance setup in Mogadishu is not fully clear to the persons interviewed. The original law provides Mogadishu with 16 ‘councils’ and a City Council with 65 members, as well as the authority to establish ‘Lower Tier Councils’. The City and Councils has geographical overlap with the Benadir Region and its 16 districts.4 The main difference is in the mandate, with the Governorate being responsible for security-related links to the TFG, while the City is responsible for service delivery.

In 2010 the United Nations Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG) facilitated a process aimed at revising the Mogadishu City Act into the Mogadishu City Charter. Agreements were reached on a number of issues, including the expansion of the Mogadishu City Council to 80 members consisting of five from each council. However, the process was later discontinued and the recommendations were never officially endorsed.

In 2008 the then Prime Minister of Somalia abolished the Mogadishu City Council and replaced the Mayor. The new Mayor was also appointed Governor of Benadir Region and, with the City Council abolished the change of Mayor de facto led to a merger of the two administrations of the Governorate and the City and its combined 38 departments.

While the legal basis for the local governance in the Benadir Region and Mogadishu City remains unclear, the de facto structures, appointees and functions of these, are clear to the Mogadishu administration as well as to the men and women interviewed.

The City is divided into 16 districts (called councils in the old act and districts in the draft City Charter). Each district is headed by a DC appointed by the Governor and endorsed by the President of the TFG following consultations with community elders. There is currently no chairperson for the districts. Consequently, the levels below the district now report to the DC, thus merging into the structure of the governorate. The DC appoints a deputy commissioner as well as a district secretary responsible for the daily operations. There is currently no operational district council.

There are three local government tiers below the DC: The Waah level which comprises 4 divisions (exceptions are Shibis with 3 Waahs, Wardhigley with 5, and 6 in Karaan and Heliwa); the Laan level that always comprise four sub-divisions under each Waah; and finally, the Tabelle, or neighbourhood, level of which there are four under each Laan. Depending on the size of the district, each Tabelle comprises 50 to 250 households. Consequently, on average each district will have four Waah, 16 Laan, and 64 Tabelle (for an overview see fig.

4  The  team  was  not  able  to  obtain  the  legal  documents  supporting  this  setup,  instead  the  assessment  is  based  on  informal  translations,  interviews  with  City  and  Governorate  officials  in  Mogadishu  and  the  available  drafts  of  the  Mogadishu  City  consultations  2010  under  the  JPLG.  

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5.1). Ideally, the chairpersons for each level should be selected by the community elders and endorsed by the DC but, as the analysis in this phase 2 indicates, this is the exception and not the norm, and the DC, more often than not, makes the selections.

Figure 5.1 Local government structure

The Laan Leaders in each Waah make up the Waah Committee, and the Tabelle Leaders in each Laan make up the Laan Committee.

Fig. 5.1 illustrates the description of the local governance structures based on interviews with citizens and representatives living in the 16 districts (see also Annex B and C) as well as the team’s interviews with the Mayor and selected DCs. It is, however, also clear from discussions with, in particular, the international NGOs and donor community that there is little recognition of the existence of these structures.

The phase 2 analysis has shown that in most districts the local government structures are in place, but the de facto leadership at local level is split between informal institutions such as clan leadership, which holds the highest level of legitimacy and the formal local government structures, in particular the Mayor and the District Commissoner (see chapter 7). In some places citizens are not aware of the Laan and Waah level representation. However, in most places there is an overlap of personalities between the informal and formal leaders (e.g. the district commissioner is also the local warlord, or the Tabelle leader is

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the local clan leader). Any support will thus need to navigate between the formal and informal structures and use this as a stepping stone for improving the capacity of the formal local governance structures.

All formal government representatives are appointed by the Mayor. In a few districts the appointment has been in consultations with the citizens in the districts, while in other areas consultations have only been held with the district level leaders. This setup means that the accountability of the formal local government representatives first and foremost are towards the Mayor’s office and less so towards the citizens. On the one hand, this leaves a democratic deficit. On the other hand, this is partly balanced by the perception in most of the communities analysed of the need of local leaders for ‘organising’ or ‘consulting’ the community for development related decisions.

The local governments have very limited capacity at district level and below. Laan and Tabelle level representatives have no physical infrastructure available. Waah level in most cases have a room at the district office, while the district level has basic office premises and some employees ranging between seven and as many as 20 (not taking into account the formal titled leaders such as vice DCs, and Waah leaders), the numbers differing from district to district. None of the different layers have plans, budgets or financial systems in place.

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6 Feasibility  of  applying  CDRD  in  Mogadishu  The team was requested to assess whether the CDRD approach is feasible in the Mogadishu context. The phase 1 data presented in this report and summarised in Annex C and D provides the basis for the analysis.

According to the CDRD Operations Manual: ‘The CDRD program cannot be successfully implemented unless the target location meets a certain number of preconditions: strong political commitment to local empowerment and decentralization, a well-designed decentralization program geared toward local empowerment, availability of quality baseline data, and government and donor willingness to work toward unified disbursement mechanisms. It is therefore important that these elements are already in place or are being put in place at the start of the project.’

CDRD is based on the assumption that the community is willing to and capable of prioritising and engaging actively in the development of its own community/neighbourhood. This requires that there is sufficient stability to enable operations in the district and thus engage in long-term dialogue and capacity development activities with the people on the ground. Based on the same understanding, there must also be relative tranquillity and peace in the community, as the inducement of additional resources can otherwise become a factor of dispute within the community.

Given the nature of the activities undertaken and the medium-term planning of the programme, this stability must be expected to be in place for the entire programme period 24-26 months (two funding cycles). The history of Mogadishu is marred by conflict and instability, and the conflict potential for the future remains. Having said this, the departure of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu, provides a new degree of neighbourhood stability confirmed by the phase 1 analysis on the ground. CDRD can, in the long term, contribute to enhanced community coherence and stability if no immediate conflict emerges.

In terms of community willingness, interviews on the ground identified opportunities for community empowerment reflected in the existence of active Tabelle institutions and the wish to engage further in, and contribute to, community development.

Secondly, the ability of CDRD to operate and ensure longer term sustainable interventions will require that the links with the local authorities are sustained over time. In the best of worlds, this will require legitimate and elected local governments (the TFG announced plans to hold elections of the Mogadishu City Council in August 2012 and it remains to be seen if and how these will carried out). However, this is rarely the case in the current areas of CDRD implementation in Somaliland, Puntland and Central Somalia. Instead, the CDRD approach can assist with enabling the communities to take a proactive role in engaging with the local government structures. In Mogadishu, local government structures are in place in most districts with the neighbourhood

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level (the Tabelle and the Laan) providing the most obvious entry point for CDRD operations (see previous chapter). In most of the districts, rudimentary local government structures are in place, while in other districts these structures are more developed. But, given the relatively weak state of affairs of some of these institutions, CDRD will have to focus on further capacitating the local government structures to enable the programme to meet its objectives.

Operating in Mogadishu will require endorsement from the authorities in the areas of operation. Discussions with the Mayor of Mogadishu/Governor of the Benadir Region revealed a general fatigue with ‘turn-key’ development and humanitarian activities, which did not involve the local communities, as well as a degree of mistrust stemming from an alleged lack of transparency by the implementing partners in Mogadishu. The Mayor and the DCs were however very appreciative of the CDRD approach and confirmed a keen interest in the CDRD type of support as long as it is provided in a transparent and accountable manner.

Finally, qualitative baseline data is the last prerequisite for CDRD implementation. With exception of this analysis and a handful of other studies, no comprehensive data on Mogadishu exists. Consequently, CDRD will need to establish appropriate baseline data at the inception phase of the CDRD in Mogadishu. A summary of the prerequisites can be found in table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1 prerequisites for CDRD implementation in Mogadishu

Prerequisite Prerequisite met

Prerequisite partially met*

Prerequisite not met**

Strong political commitment to community empowerment

Community willingness to engage in CDD

Relative stability

Local government structures or similar governance structures in place

Baseline data available

* Security situation in selected districts stable at the moment. Long term prospects uncertain.

** Baseline data to be completed during inception phase.

In short, the basic requirements for CDRD implementation are in place in at least parts of Mogadishu.

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7 The  Three  Districts  

Phase I of this task saw the selection of three districts that would go through a more in-depth assessment: Cabdicasiis, Howlwadaag and Shibis.

Below are some general findings that were common in all three districts:

Unemployment and poverty: In all three districts, poverty and lack of a stable income were evident. Unemployment, especially of the youth, is rampant, as it is in all of Mogadishu. Idleness among the youth was named by respondents as one of the factors affecting security; either because the youth try to make a living through alternative means such as petty crime, or because they find that joining radical groups like the Al-Shabab and clan militias, or other armed groups, for example, the Alusunnah WalJammah, to be a better alternative to remaining unemployed.

Role of religious leaders: In all three districts, the analysis points to towards the fact that religious leaders do not play any significant role in the development activities in the community. In fact, some of the residents expressed reservations about engaging too closely with them because previously some of them have been known to have close associations or to be sympathisers of Al Shabaab and other radical groups. The team is also of the opinion that because Mogadishu is more urban than most of the rest of South and Central Somalia, the role of religious leaders in development is somewhat diminished as compared to the more rural settings.

Role of women: Women appear to play a very active role in the social development of the community, and, although their efforts are very well appreciated, their status, as dictated by culture, remains very low. It is a common feature for women to be organised into groups. They get involved in sanitation campaigns, in small businesses for family upkeep, and other voluntary activities. There are many female headed households as a result of the conflict.

Lack of basic services and infrastructure: Most of the school structures and health facilities have been destroyed by the years of fighting and not many qualified teachers or health personnel remain. Many children attend Koranic schools or informal schools called biribaati that offer language and handwriting skills. Access to electricity is also not easy and is considered to be too expensive for most of the population.

Role of clan elders and chieftains: According to most of the respondents, these are the leaders that have the most legitimacy with the people. They play a key function in the governance of the districts - although informally- with their main role being to mediate and provide guidance in local disputes. They are trusted and respected and appear to be the first port of call whenever an issue arises. However, they do not appear to have such a big influence on development affairs in the districts and, in cases where they do, it is because the district administration has allowed it.

DC, Waah, Laan and Tabelle leaders: Ideally, the community is meant to select from amongst themselves the people who should represent them as Tabelle and Laan Leaders. In practice however, save for a few cases, all tiers of the district administration are endorsed by the DC and appointed by the Mayor. The clans

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with powerful militias, as well as influential business men, usually have a say on who gets appointed. In some of the districts, some people did not even know that they had a Tabelle leader. However, at the Laan level, although how representative the Laan leaders are is still in question, they maintain good working relationships with the people, despite the fact that this relationship is based on clans.

These leaders are not accountable to the citizens but to the DC, and then to the first vice DC who is in charge of security and political affairs. Any action they take must first be endorsed by the DC. They are under resourced and were reported to lack basic administration and leadership skills. Apart from the DC, vice DCs and the Waah, who get a token as salary, the lower tiers work on a voluntary basis. This was said to be one of the drawbacks because, as volunteers, the Laan and Tabelle leaders are not very motivated to deliver services but, rather, are more involved in other activities to sustain themselves and their families. Another is the lack of clear guidelines on what their roles are as leaders.

The three district administrations have offices from which they operate. They receive an income from the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA), but this is mainly to cover the token salaries mentioned above. They therefore do not have any financial system in place, apart from a payroll, and this is manual.

These leaders stay in post as long at the DC remains or as long as he wants them there. It is interesting to note that, at the voluntary levels of Laan and Tabelle, there are more women leaders than at the higher levels of Waah and DC. This bears out the point above of women being more willing to engage in voluntary activities.

7.1 Cabdicasiis  (Abdiaziz)  Socio-economic setting

The clans in the district co-exist peacefully, but, as mentioned earlier, the ‘Others’ clans feel marginalised by the more powerful Hawiye clans. It was mentioned that whenever there is aid or assistance given in the community, the District Administration turns a blind eye whenever the ‘Others’ are molested by TFG uniformed personnel who they accused of, at times, forcefully taking away whatever material items have been given/donated to them.

The district has a rundown fish market, which the residents think would be a good source of employment for the youth and other inhabitants if it was to be rehabilitated. Fishing is one of the main sources of revenue for the district, but most of the fishermen take their merchandise to Xamarweyne market which has better facilities.

Many parts of the district do not have access to electricity supply. The district administration office does not have electricity either because they said they could not afford to pay for it. According to most of the administration, lack of electricity is holding back the development of the district.

With regard to the prioritisation of needs in the district, preliminary findings are that the administration is mostly concerned with infrastructure development, for example, electricity, roads, and offices, while the citizens mentioned schools, health facilities, water as the most urgent development needs. Income generation and youth employment was a common theme for both groups.

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Clan coexistence and security

Although the various clans in the district coexist peacefully, there are tensions beneath the surface about resource allocation. Those members of the Abgaal sub-clan of Hawiye who belong to the militia or police carry guns; but, the ‘Others’ clans do not as they do not get positions in the militias or police. This, according to them, leaves them vulnerable to exploitation by the Hawiye clans.

The security situation in Mogadishu is fluid and things tend to change very quickly. For instance, on 12 April 2012, the Mayor of Mogadishu removed the incumbent DC from power. This angered the DC and he rounded up some clan militias who then attacked the Mayor and new DC’s convoy while they were enroute to the inauguration ceremony. It was reported that two civilians died as a result, and a number of ‘Others’ were wounded.

Power dynamics

The DC and the Executive members of the District Administration are all of the Hawiye-Abgaal sub-clan, with the Arabs occupying the lower levels of authority.

In addition to the clan power dynamics mentioned previously, the DC wields most of the power in the district. As an example, the selection of Tabelle leaders is meant to be undertaken by the community, after which the selected candidate should be endorsed by the DC and appointed by the Mayor. However, in Cabdicasiis, the practice is for the DC to endorse people of his choice for appointment in all the administrative positions without community consultations. These appointments do, however, take into account the clan dynamics, as well as local militia.

7.2 Howlwadaag  Socio-economic setting

There are a number of clans living in Howlwadaag, but the majority clan is the Murosade sub-clan of Hawiye. Other clans include the Habargidir, Abgaal, other Hawiye sub-clans and ‘Others’ clans.

Bakara market forms the mainstay of employment creation and income generation in the district. There are a few women involved in business who have become quite well-off as a result, and they are involved in organising other women in the district to form women’s groups. The Tabelle leaders rely on these women’s groups for awareness raising, sensitisation and mobilisation of the community.

The priority needs named by the administration were road rehabilitation, electricity supply and sanitation. Both the administration and the citizens were concerned with schools, health facilities and employment creation.

There was a strong feeling among all respondents that the DC is not particularly concerned with development in the district, and that apart from what he hears from the Waah and Laan leaders, he is not in touch with the community.

The district administration offices are in need of rehabilitation. It was reported that out of the 14 rooms, only three were in a functional state.

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Clan coexistence and security

The clans in Howlwadaag coexist peacefully. This might be due to the fact that most of them are from the Hawiye clan.

Power dynamics

As with all other districts, the DC is the ultimate authority in the district. At the lower levels, there are both women and minority clan leaders at the Tabelle level. For example, in the Laan of Hillac, the four Tabelle Leaders comprise two men and two women and two of these leaders are from the Jareer clan of the Bantu (a minority clan), while the other two are both from Murusade and Abgaal sub-clans of Hawiye. In contrast to most other places, the community was involved in selecting their Tabelle and Laan leaders and this is evident in the representative nature of their makeup.

7.3 Shibis  Socio-economic setting

The clans in the district co-exist peacefully, with Arabs making up the majority of the population, the ‘Others’ being Hawiye-Abgaal and Bantu clans.

It was reported that there are over 700 Arab families in the district. They own land, private schools and markets but, despite this, they do not play any major role in the district’s administration.

Through fundraising, the Arabs have been able to establish a primary school in the district. Schools and health facilities are among the first priorities of the citizens. The administration recognises the need for enhanced leadership capacity at all levels, but more so at the Laan and Tabelle levels. Apart from schools and health facilities, maintenance of security is one of the other priorities of the administration.

Clan coexistence and security

The clans were reported to coexist peacefully with no major clan related incidents being witnessed in the recent past. The district police however do not have a good relationship with the local people as they are accused of harassing them.

Power dynamics

Although the majority of the inhabitants are Arabs, the Agoonyar sub-clan, which is in turn a sub-clan of Hawiye-Abgaal, wields the power in the district. The DC is Agoonyar and it was said that this sub-clan controls the major resources in the district. This also happens to be President Shariff’s clan. One of the reasons given for this dominance was that the ‘Others’ clans like the Arabs and the Bantus are not organised into any significant social groups that can put pressure to change the status quo.

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The DC is reported to stay in power due to the support he gets from other powerful clan leaders and influential businessmen. The district Police Chief also props him up as he is from the Agoonyar sub-clan, as are most of the police officers.

7.4 Stakeholders  Table 7.1 below illustrates to what degree various stakeholders influence development activities at the local level. The level of influence is dictated by how much power and interest each has.

Table 7.1 Stakeholder analysis as assessed by different interviewees

Stakeholder Interests pursued / Role

Assessment of the stakeholder’s room to manoeuvre

Level of influence

Governor/

Mayor

1) Establishing a professional district administration

2)Ensuring security

3) Advocating community needs with NGOs and funding agencies

3)Approving/endor-sing activities in the districts

The Mayor/Governor being a TFG appointee is able to operate freely between the formal and informal structures. However, office’s willingness to collaborate on development issues with the lower tiers of the administration appears to be minimal. There also appears to be some resentment from the various tiers of the district administration about the overall honesty of the administration (in terms of managing funds) and ability to deliver, as well as how well this office can actually coordinate the activities of the DCs

The TFG has allocated 15% of the earnings from the port to the BRA, but because of the extremely top heavy bureaucracy, this is only enough to give only tokenistic salaries, with the lower tiers of Laan and Tabelle working on a voluntary basis

The Mayor has significant influence in prioritising development in the districts, with support from the DCs. He is able to negotiate directly with NGOs and other funders on what projects to implement. However, there is also a perception that the Mayor’s office lacks policies and guidelines that would better guide the planning and implementation of development activities

District Commissioner

1) Security and securing their areas against Al-Shabab

They are mainly appointed by the Mayor although many of them were already in

They command great influence in the districts, but are constrained by a lack

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Stakeholder Interests pursued / Role

Assessment of the stakeholder’s room to manoeuvre

Level of influence

2) Prioritising and controlling development activities in the districts

leadership positions as warlords

They are the recognised authority within the districts by all administrative levels below. All citizens are aware of the name of DC and his/her status as formal government representative

of funds to implement development activities

They stay in power based on clan backing, support from influential business people, and ability to call on support from clan-based militias

Waah Leaders 1) Security vigilance

1) Community mobilisation

They are appointed by the DC on clan basis. They are able to easily access the communities and the DC

The Waah Committee is made up of Laan Leaders and they therefore have a better understanding of community needs

They have limited decision-making power and must refer everything to the DC

Laan Leaders 1) Security

2) Community mobilisation

3) Development prioritisation

The Laan leaders are appointed by the DC

The Laan Committee is made up of all the Tabelle leaders in a Laan

There is more representation of women at this level so the Laan is able to liaise directly with them

Their appointments are primarily made by the DCs with some consultation with Waah, but largely based on clan affiliation

They can still easily access the DCs

They work on voluntary basis so performance is dependent on individual motivation and interest

They can mobilise community members through the Tabelle Leaders

Their level of influence is greater with their clan members

They have no decision-making power and must refer to the Waah and the DC

Tabelle Leaders

1) Security

2) Community mobilisation

3) Prioritising development needs

Their existence is not widely known among the community

They are appointed by the DC in consultation with clan members so have access to DC

Hardly any influence with the people

No decision-making power

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Stakeholder Interests pursued / Role

Assessment of the stakeholder’s room to manoeuvre

Level of influence

They work on a voluntary basis so performance is patchy and based on personal motivation

There is greater representation of women and minority groups leaders at this level

Security forces (local level)

1) Almost exclusively concerned with maintaining security.

2) No role in prioritising development unless as inhabitants of the district

Many are former militias turned into police so very split along clan lines

They are considered to be undisciplined and harass civilians at will

Influence is indirect, through the district leadership as they and their commanders usually belong to the same clan as the DC

Chieftaincy 1) Peace and security

2) Development

They are the elders of clans. The position is either hereditary or based on how wise and articulate one is judged to be

Access to the DC is based on clan affiliation so they have limited access if from different clan, especially the minorities

They enjoy great legitimacy with the community, have enormous influence and respect in day to day lives and dispute resolution functions.

They get involved in prioritising development, e.g. through mobilisation of communities, but have little influence in how development activities are implemented. The Laan and Waah leaders consult with them occasionally

Religious institutions/Leaders

Religious instruction

There is not much collaboration between them and the administration

They are not perceived to have much involvement in development activities although they do get involved in community mobilisation

Apart from providing religious instruction, the people think of them as being too conservative and therefore only have influence in religious matters

Some respondents expressed reservations in collaborating with them due to fear of radicalisation

Local Not present in the

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Stakeholder Interests pursued / Role

Assessment of the stakeholder’s room to manoeuvre

Level of influence

militia/insurgency groups

three districts although because they are clan affiliated, the DC has access to other clan militias based elsewhere

UN Service provision, but emphasis has been on humanitarian aid

They have easy access to all levels of leadership

They have a high level of influence because they have funding to implement development activities

Other NGOs Service provision, but emphasis has been on humanitarian aid

They only interact with selected members of community and projects primarily planned and implemented between Mayor, DC and the agency

They only have influence on their projects

Women 1) Awareness raising

2) Fund raising

They are very active in community life and have good access at the Laan and Waah levels as they are organised into groups

They are recognised to be very active and are consulted by Waah and Laan leaders, but their overall status in community remains low

Men 1) Interested in local development but not as engaged as the women

They are better able to access the leadership than the women are

They have greater influence by virtue of being men, but also depends on their standing in the society

Youth 1) Are more open to work voluntarily

2) Have been used by local leaders to support security by keeping track of Al-Shabab infiltration

They are limited by their lack of income and harassed by security personnel

They lack skills so those who are lucky are involved in menial jobs

They have no major influence

They are seen as highly impressionable and in danger of joining radical groups

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8 Applying  CDRD  in  the  Context  of  Mogadishu  –  discussion  and  recommendations  

CDRD has worked in fragile settings in Central Somalia as well as urban settings in places such as Bossaso and Berbera, and thus has experience with most of the contextual elements of working in Mogadishu. None of the places have however been so heavily contested as Mogadishu, and the local government structures have differed considerably from those of Mogadishu. In this section, the main considerations and suggested changes to the CDRD approach for Mogadishu are presented.

8.1 Considerations  for  CDRD  implementation  in  Mogadishu  Operating with CDRD in Mogadishu requires the programme to operate in a fragile environment with contested and parallel authorities. In short, the CDRD will need to take into consideration:

1) A ‘Do No Harm’ approach in the context of Mogadishu. The inducement of resources and engaging in community mobilisation in Mogadishu can exacerbate existing conflicts. To limit the conflict potential and ensure a minimum of Do No Harm, the CDRD will need to engage all relevant stakeholders early in the process and ensure that there is sufficient ownership with these for the programme. This should serve to ensure that the formal and informal authorities at all levels are comfortable with the approach, and do not feel undermined.

2) Legitimacy. Related to 1 above, CDRD must be conscious of the fact that the legitimacy and the de facto leadership at local government level rests with institutions that are instituted through tradition or force. While there is, in many cases, an overlap of personalities between these and the formal representatives of the local government structure, the legitimacy rests first and foremost with the informal institutions (clan leaders and warlords). A key challenge will thus be to transfer some of this legitimacy to the more formal institutions and instil an elevated degree of transparency and accountability in this process.

3) Local governance structures. Relying on existing local government structures and taking into consideration the many different layers. Most countries have three local government layers: National, regional and local. In the rest of Somalia the local level has one more layer, i.e. the Village Council. In Mogadishu the current formal structure has four layers (region/city, district, Waah, Laan and Tabelle). Each layer has a political representation. However, the capacity of each layer is limited, there is no budget, and the recognition and legitimacy among the citizens of Mogadishu is limited.

4) Political risks. As the recent incident in Cabdicasiis shows, the links between the different political layers in Mogadishu (city-district-waah etc.) are fragile, and the alliances change over time. As CDRD is a medium-term intervention (2-3 years), there is a high probability that these links will change during the course of implementation. The

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programme will thus have to balance these differences while still aiming at improving the local government capacities from below.

5) Fragile urban context. There are a number of challenges, which CDRD will need to take into consideration. These include: (i) the opportunity costs of women and men living in urban areas of getting involved in the programme, (ii) involving women as well as men in the process, (iii) the size of the grants, given the needs as well as the cost levels in the urban areas, (iv) and the time required from mobilisation to the distribution of the first instalment, versus quick impact and ensuring beneficiary of ownership of CDRD initiated sub-project.

6) Security of staff and issues related to programme implementation and monitoring. The implementation of the phase 1 and 2 missions to Mogadishu shows the relative ability of operating at district level in the safer districts in the city. If the situation remains relatively stable, national CDRD staff should be able to operate in the selected districts as long as the operations are endorsed and supported by the city and most importantly the informal power holders at local level. This underscores the importance of seeking local level ownership prior to the implementation and maintaining this throughout. The security situation is, however, still fragile to the extent that international staff will not be in a position to visit the communities. The monitoring arrangement will therefore have to be designed to cater for this. Finally, the history of Mogadishu shows that the situation on the ground may change with short notice. Consequently, the design of the support should ensure a high degree of self-implementation by the communities to enable continued implementation in periods of increased instability.

Based on these issues, adaptations to the CDRD approach are envisaged for implementation in Mogadishu.

8.2 Revising  the  CDRD  operations  The different local government structure in Mogadishu requires CDRD to identify appropriate local government levels of operation, size of grants and links with formal and informal local government structures.

In the rest of Somalia the entry point for CDRD is usually the lowest level of local government i.e. the village councils. The sizes of the village councils differ, but usually represent around 200 households. In Mogadishu the lowest level is the Tabelle, which comprise between 50 and 250 households. In most cases, however, the number is in the lower end, making the transaction costs for engaging with the Tabelle relatively high per household. Consequently, the logical entry point would be the next layer i.e. the Laan level.

The disadvantage of using the Laan is two-fold. First, there is currently very limited capacity at Laan level for the programme to operate with (no staff and no physical structures), and second, the Laan, although it is recognised, enjoys little legitimacy among the citizens. Reinvigorating the Laan and making it a credible local government institution in the areas of operation is however

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assessed to be manageable as the Laan comprises the Tabelle Leaders. Their endorsement is a prerequisite for the endorsement of the Laan.

For CDRD to be effective it will have to rely on the Laans to become operational. In this initiation phase of CDRD, extensive focus will therefore have to be applied to the Laan (and indirectly Tabelle) level capacity development. Furthermore, to focus on the community will provide a strong basis for local level ownership, which is more likely to withstand political changes at district/city/TFG level.

Once Laans are reinvigorated and operational, CDRD may move to the Waah level for cross-Laan cooperation. The chairpersons of the Laans will meet and discuss cross-Laan cooperation at Waah level (the Waah Committee is made up of Laan leaders). All plans should be forwarded and discussed with the DC to ensure district endorsement and involvement. However, given the needs of building the capacity at Laan level and the fragile situation at district level, the focus of CDRD should be in accordance with its comparative advantage of building local governance from the grassroots level.

Recommendation 1: Use Laan as entry point for community mobilisation, prioritisation, planning, procurement and monitoring, and Waah level for cross-Laan cooperation.

Once the entry point of the programme has been identified, the primary priority will be to ensure that there is ownership of the programme with all formal and informal decision-making institutions at city and local level. In the rest of Somalia, CDRD has been able to rely primarily on the formal structures to ensure endorsement. However, as the more informal structures have a higher degree of legitimacy at local level, bringing them onboard is key to ensure anchoring of the programme, and limit potential horizontal or vertical conflicts in the CDRD communities and districts. A pragmatic approach is needed.

Initial endorsement has been given during this mission by the City of Mogadishu. This will need to be reconfirmed with the Mayor and the relevant district commissioners. Following this CDRD will need to engage with the de facto leadership at local level to enable operational engagement. A precondition for engagement is an acceptance from the local level leaders of the community participation approach applied by CDRD and thus the election of representatives.

Recommendation 2: Engage with formal as well as informal leaders to ensure acceptance and ownership of CDRD at local level.

As in many other parts of Somalia, the programme will need to deal with the risk of elite capture (see CDRD evaluation from 2011). CDRD has in the past been effective in limiting elite capture in its approach (but not eliminating it). This has been possible due to, on the one hand, the extensive social mobilisation process, and on the other hand, the insistence on having elected village councils with mixed clan as well as female representation.

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There is in the field analysis no indication that the same approach cannot be applied in Mogadishu. There are already female representatives in several of the district administrations and women are very active in outdoor activities (from education to vending) in most parts of Mogadishu. The challenge of CDRD will however, be that the introduction of more democratic principles for community representation goes against the current structure where the Mayor, through the DCs, appoints (in some cases indiscriminately) local level representatives. Changes to this setup will thus need endorsement from the Mayor’s office. However, there is a clear link between community development prioritisation and grant distribution in the CDRD approach, and it is likely that the Mayor’s Office will be very open to such changes in procedures in pilot districts.

Recommendation 3: Seek approval from the Mayor’s office for the application of existing CDRD approach to limit elite capture, including elections for Laan level representation. In Mogadishu, the elections/caucus may follow the current local government structure with elections at Tabelle level for Laan representation. Broad representation at Laan and Tabelle level are key for the successful application of the CDRD approach and implementation of CDRD must be preconditioned by acceptance of this by the formal and informal decision-makers in Mogadishu.

To enhance community commitment to the CDRD approach and provide a basis for more sustainable institutional development, CDRD should consider running two implementation cycles (i.e. two grants). With the Laan having an approximate size as the current operations elsewhere with village councils, this suggests that the level of funding should be the same in Mogadishu. However, there are indications that the price of raw materials for construction work is higher in Mogadishu. If this is the case, CDRD should consider increasing the grant size accordingly.

If each Laan receives two funding cycles in all three assessed districts (48 Laans in total) the total grant distribution would reach USD 1.6 million. With a possible 25% upward revision the total would amount to USD 2 million.

Recommendation 4: Keep current grant funding levels (adjusted to price levels in Mogadishu) and apply two funding cycles in all three districts.

The extensive CDRD mobilisation approach takes up to six months to implement, before funds start to flow to the communities. However, the Mogadishu context is assessed to require a reduction in the number of preparatory days and ensure that funds start flowing earlier than in other areas of Somalia. This is based on the following observations: (i) initial discussions with the district commissioners and the Mayor show scepticism towards the programme length, and there is a need to show results in order to ensure city and district level endorsement over time; (ii) enhancing the local level legitimacy at Laan level is closely linked with the ability of the Laan to deliver services. The sooner services are delivered the higher the probability of more formalised recognition of the Laan, which is a prerequisite for CDRD operations, (iii) closely linked to this, the citizens of Mogadishu have work engagements (ensuring income/nutrition), which require use of most of their working day limiting the ability to participate in lengthy mobilisation exercises; (iv) the fluctuating situation in Mogadishu requires that the CDRD is anchored in strong

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local level institutions to remain sustainable. Again, institutional development is closely linked with legitimacy, which again is linked to service delivery.

Recommendation 5: Reduce the time between CDRD engagement and the first flow of funds to the communities. The CDRD should in addition, consider linking with other development partners implementing ‘quick impact’ activities in the area of operation.5

Finally, CDRD will have to relate to security and monitoring in the fragile Mogadishu context. For this CDRD can use its experiences from South Galkayo and Abudwaq, including the use of mobile phones, GPS and photo streaming for remote monitoring. These may be equally applied in Mogadishu.

8.3 CDRD  and  JPLG  CDRD and JPLG are planning to implement projects in the same districts in Mogadishu. To ensure complementarity the two teams will explore how to implement the programmes as per the joint Roadmap for Harmonisation from 2009.

Based on the analysis of the districts these may be classified in accordance with the phases identified in the ‘Roadmap for Harmonisation of JPLG and CDRD’ (Bryld, E, et al 2009). The classification of three phases is:

1. Phase I: No legitimate and/or capacitated local government/council.

2. Phase II: Legitimacy: (a) The council is established with councillors in place; (b) the council is recognised by the authority of the region; (c) the council is respected by the people its constituency and/or elected by the constituency; (c) the council is committed to partake in the programme and sign up to undertake participatory planning and implementation: (d) the council is willing to continuously publish plans, budgets, accounts and audit reports. Capacity: (a) council executive committee members in place; (b) accounting system and staff to operate system in place; (c) willingness to build capacity of all council functions as per Local Government Act.6

3. Phase III: The council is established and elected in accordance with legislation and are fully compliant with all relevant indicators of the current JPLG MIS system. It is furthermore suggested, that a move to phase III can only be undertaken once the Local Government Acts have been approved.7

5 A  possibility  is  to  use  the  South-­‐Central  Somalia  time-­‐frame  in  the  Operations  Manual  (p  9)  and  further  reduce  the  days  for  task:  8-­‐A,  8-­‐B,  10,  11-­‐A,  11-­‐B,  15-­‐A,  and  15-­‐B.    6  See  JPLG  MIS  Report  particularly  sections  3  and  4  7  It  should  be  noted  that  the  movement  from  one  phase  to  the  next  is  not  linear,  but  will  facilitate  decision-­‐making  for  the  CDRD  management  on  the  entry  level  and  therefore  the  kind  of  support  to  provide.  

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The analysis shows that the three districts identified for CDRD support in Mogadishu fall between phase I and II. There are local government structures in place with some legitimacy, but the capacity to manage funds in a way that ensure internal and external accountability at district level and below is still non-existent.

A key objective of CDRD and JPLG will therefore be to assist the districts in making the full transfer from phase I to phase II. This means emphasising on creating local level accountability and enabling service delivery, i.e. the ability of local level of Mogadishu City to deliver services in a transparent and accountable manner.

To cater for the insufficiencies, we have redesigned the Roadmap for Harmonisation directives to cater for the Mogadishu context. The following steps are suggested, building on the lessons learned of CDRD and JPLG:

1. Supporting the development of suitable financial management procedures to ensure: (a) appropriate financial management, and (b) that procedures ensuring downwards accountability are adhered to.

2. Supporting the development of accountability and governance systems that will enhance demand side governance and further ensure downwards accountability.

Financial management procedures

A Financial Management Agent (FMA) will work with City of Mogadishu to assess the individual districts in financial management and accountability and transparency (and triggers as described below). In practice, the process will follow South-Central Somalia legislation and regulations as fleshed out in the JPLG planning and investment manual. The objective will be to build the capacity of the city and the lower tiers and, with time, enable funds to be handled by the authorities, but under the oversight of an FMA. This process will indirectly assist in developing the financial management capacity and improve accountability and transparency of the authorities at central and decentralised levels. As mentioned earlier, all tiers should be involved in the planning and budgeting process. This will call for a greater degree of coordination between CDRD and JPLG with regard to how and when the stages in their programme processes are undertaken. In parallel to this, financial management capacity can be built to enable transfer over time.

This means that in Mogadishu, both JPLG and CDRD will use the same funds transfer mechanism, i.e. either through a district basket fund, local development fund, or a hybrid of the two, which will also determine who the FMA will be. The financial reporting will be through one system at the district (possibly the Accounting Information Management System).

Triggers for starting to transfer funds through local government structures should include measures such as the availability of budgets, accounts and audits for the individual projects implemented in the communities. Likewise from a demand-side perspective the following should be in place: (1) Accountability triggers: Laan participation in planning, project design and monitoring; (2) Transparency triggers: publication of plans, budgets, accounts and audits of

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Laan, as well as creating access to council and procurement committee meetings for the public, and providing information on budget and accounts of community projects to the citizens. This is closely related to the following step on governance and accountability.

Governance and accountability systems

Under step two on governance and accountability, focus will initially be on the capacity of the Tabelle and Laan entities. They will be supported to undertake participatory planning, implementation and monitoring. To accommodate for the current limited functionality of the Tabelles and the Laans, and their lack of downwards accountability (described above), representative Laans should be introduced in all communities covered. The function of the Laan will be to ensure demand side governance by representing the community in the planning process, project design process, undertaking monitoring of the implementation of service delivery and communicating issues from the community to the waah and district level.

As consequence of the above, it is suggested that CDRD focuses on capacity development at Tabelle and Laan level and JPLG at City and district level. The two programmes may share the work related to the Waah level, with CDRD focusing on demand-side governance and planning and JPLG on financial management systems. The timing and division of tasks between CDRD and JPLG will have to be discussed further by the technical teams.