Political Science

Eric KeelsPh.D. Candidate

Department of Political ScienceUniversity of North Texas

erickeels@my.unt.edu

Post-War Electoral Reform and Peace Duration

Following Negotiated Settlements

Political Science

Building Peace after Civil Wars

Negotiated settlements are often unstable Post-civil war peacebuilding and civil war

recurrenceo Peacebuilding security objectiveso Successful Agreements

Reduce Commitment Problems (Walter 2002; Fortna 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003)

Share Information (Mattes and Savun 2010) Raise costs for Defection (Mattes and Savun 2009)

o Peacebuilding and democratization

Incompatibility between security and democracy objectives

Political Science

War-to-Democracy Dilemma

Democratization may generate post-civil war instabilityo Paris (2004), Jarstad and Sisk (2008), Autesserre

(2009), Brancati and Snyder (2013) Democracy objectives may undermine post-war

security

Security objectives may undermine post-war democracy

How can post-war governments maintain security while instituting democratic reforms?

Political ScienceFalse Dichotomy

Post-Civil War Democratization and Securityo Joshi et al (2015)

Primary focus on elections rather than democracy more broadlyo Democracy Requires:

Broad participation Open competition Meaningful translation of votes into national

representation

Political ScienceTheory: Electoral Reform and

Peace Duration

Revisions to electoral laws act as a signal to opponents that the incumbent government is committed to the peace process

Revisions to electoral laws make it more difficult for dissidents to renege on peace process

Political ScienceTheory: Electoral Laws

Electoral laws have historically been a way for governments to limit political competition

Laws determine who is allowed to participate (vote or run for office) and how votes are translated into representation (electoral systems)

Post-war elections may occur under the old electoral system which limits competition

Political ScienceTheory: Reform as a Signal

Electoral reforms are costly for elites in the incumbent governmento Past systems may have ensured access to

goods and serviceso Elites shoulder considerable risk by alienating

their supporters

Implementing these reforms act as a costly signal that elites are interested in the peace process

H1: The implementation of electoral reforms called for in peace agreements reduces the risk of civil war recurrence.

Political Science

Theory: Reform as a Deterrent

Electoral reforms should make the initial post-civil war election more stableo Armed militant groups have an incentive to abandon

the peace process after losing (Brancati and Snyder 2013)

o Militant groups rely on some civilian supporto Electoral reforms make conventional participation more

attractive than supporting violent dissent

H2: First post-war elections that occur after electoral reforms are implemented reduce the risk of civil war recurrence as compared to first post-war elections that occur when no electoral reform has taken place.

Political Science Research Design

Post-Civil War Comprehensive Peace Agreements from 1989-2010 o UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2010)o UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011)o Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi and Darby 2012)

Dependent Variable: Civil War Recurrence (0,1) Independent Variable: Electoral Reform

o 0=No reform implemented, 1= Reform initiated, 2=Partial implementation, 3=Fully implemented

Independent Variable: First Post-War Election*Electoral Reforms

Political ScienceResearch Design cont.

Controls o Agreement Provisions: Disarmament, Demobilization,

and Reintegration. Transitional Power-Sharing and Peacekeeping

o Conflict Variables: Conflict Intensity, Conflict Duration, Ethnic Conflict, Incompatibility with Government

o Government Controls: Polity IIo Economic Controls: Logged GDP Per Capita

Unit of Analysis: Post-war Country Year Model: Weibull Duration Model

o Robustness checks with Cox Proportional Hazard Models and LogLogistic Duration Models

o Used Selection Models for robustness

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Results: Electoral Reforms after Full Implementation

Substantive Results

Predicted Impact on Recurrence

Actual Impact on Recurrence

Statistically Significant?

Reduction in Risk of Recurrence

H1 Electoral Reforms 

 Negative

 

 Negative

 Yes

(Reject H0 by 95%)

 97.2%

 H2Electoral Reforms *First Election 

  

Negative

  

Negative

  

Yes(Reject H0 by

99%)

  

99.9% 

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Impact of Electoral Reforms cont.

Table II:Hazard Ratios for each stage of implementation

 Electoral Reforms

Initiated

 Electoral Reforms

Mostly Implemented

 Electoral Reforms Fully Implemented

 Electoral Reform Implementation

 Reduced Risk by

69.7% 

 Reduced Risk by

90.9% 

 Reduced Risk by

97.2% 

Political ScienceGraphical Illustration

Figure I: The Impact of Electoral Reforms on the Survival of Peace Following Negotiated Settlements

Political ScienceFurther Robustness Checks

Examine rates of Pro-Government and Antigovernment violence after civil warso SCAD dataset (Salehyan et al 2011)o Peace agreements in Africa and Latin Americao Measured simple inclusion of Electoral Reform in peace

agreementso Reduced rates pro-government violence by 76.8% o Reduced rates of antigovernment violence by 81%o Results remain robust when only looking at election

violence

Political Science

Substantive Findings and Conclusion

Post-Civil War Electoral Reforms o Reduce the risk of civil war recurrence

Implementing these costly reforms signals a willingness to abide by the peace process

o Ensures that post-war elections are stable Reduces the ability of dissidents to abandon the peace process

by allowing conventional participation

o Results remain robust when looking at post-war event data

Political ScienceThank you for your time

Questions?

Eric KeelsPh.D. Candidate Department of Political ScienceUniversity of North Texaserickeels@my.unt.edu

Political ScienceDescriptive Statistics

Descriptive Statistics

Total Peace Agreements Electoral Reform Inclusion

Average Implementation

MinimumImplementation

Maximum Implementation

  37 57% 1.37 0 3

Political ScienceFull Model

Table I        Weibull Hazard Model on Risk of Peace Failure Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4         Implemented Disarmament   -8.816*** -8.835*** -8.788***    (0.453) (0.456) (0.472)Implemented Demobilization   1.883*** 1.872** 1.660**    (0.702) (0.753) (0.713)Implemented Reintegration   -8.756*** -9.193*** -8.167***    (1.305) (1.846) (0.716)Implemented Transitional Political Power-Sharing   0.0391 0.0168 0.0158    (0.343) (0.344) (0.342)lnGDP Per Capita   -0.589 -0.619 -0.617    (0.470) (0.457) (0.450)Major War   1.715 1.773* 1.768*    (1.070) (1.067) (1.059)War Duration   -1.296*** -1.299*** -1.305***    (0.111) (0.113) (0.106)Government Incompatibility   0.119 0.140 0.150    (0.753) (0.765) (0.760)Polity II   -0.157** -0.162** -0.162**    (0.0627) (0.0653) (0.0650)Peacekeeping Operation   0.179 0.254 0.248    (0.721) (0.725) (0.720)First Post-war Election     0.660 0.690      (1.180) (1.200)Implementation of Electoral Reforms -1.156** -1.231** -1.214** -1.193**  (0.470) (0.598) (0.594) (0.599)Electoral Reform*First Election       -7.147***        (1.012)Ethnic War   -0.500 -0.500 -0.497    (0.762) (0.766) (0.765)Constant -2.170*** 2.573 2.629 2.618  (0.310) (3.292) (3.260) (3.224)         P 0.78 1.22 1.24 1.24

6.04** 1736.95*** 1634.08*** 2586.91***Observations 329 329 329 329

Coefficients Listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Political Science DDR Robustness Check

Table IV  DDR Index Check Model 1   DDR Index -69.73***  (3.645)Transitional Political Power-Sharing 0.0158  (0.342)lnGDP Per Capita -0.617  (0.450)Major War 1.768*  (1.059)War Duration -1.328***  (0.104)Government Incompatibility 0.150  (0.760)Polity II -0.162**  (0.0650)Peacekeeping Operation 0.248  (0.720)First Post-war Election 0.690  (1.200)Implementation of Electoral Reforms -1.193**  (0.599)Electoral Reform*First Election -7.247***  (1.012)Ethnic War -0.497  (0.765)Constant 2.643  (3.224)   Chi Squared 2253.24***P 1.24Observations 329

Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Political Science

Selection Model (whether reforms are implemented)

Log Logistic Regression    Selection Model Selection Stage

(Probit Predicting Implementation)Full Model

(Log Logistic Duration Model)

     Integrated Army 1.700** -2.009**  (0.705) (0.931)

 

DDR -0.483 -1.418  (0.764) (1.435)

 

GDP per Capita -4.60e-05 0.00148**  (6.60e-05) (0.000696)

 

Peacekeeping Operation 2.326** -4.814  (0.928) (3.009)

 

Polity II   -0.300    (0.254)

 

Major War   -2.400***    (0.651)

 

War Duration   0.354**    (0.145)

 

Ethnic Fractionalization   -0.900    (1.078)

 

Electoral Reforms   12.19***    (3.032)

 Inverse Mills Ratio   -1.564**    (0.739)Monopoly Ethnic Group -2.570*    (1.413)

  

Political Power-Sharing 0.121    (0.760)

  

Constant -2.992*** 11.40***  (1.128) (3.981)     Observations 371 308

18.88*** 381.62***Gamma   0.54

(0.30)

Robust standard errors in parentheses. Inverse Mills Ratio measures degree of selection effects.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Political Science

Selection Model (Whether reforms are included in peace

agreement)Bivariate Probit Model Predicting a) Choice to Include Electoral Reform and b) Choice to Return to Civil War

Model I

Equation Predicting Return to Violence  Implementation of Electoral Reforms -1.00

(0.41)**GDP Per Capita -0.0003

(0.0001)***War Duration 0.10

(0.04)**Major War 0.86

(0.32)***Peacekeeping Operation 0.16

(0.45)Polity II -0.07

(0.03)**Transitional Power-sharing Government 0.38

(0.36)Ethnic War 0.44

(0.37)T1 -0.13

(0.04)***T2 0.03

(0.05)T3 -0.02

(0.03)Constant 230.3

(113.6)**Equation Predicting the Inclusion of Electoral Reforms in Peace Agreements

 

Peacekeeping Operation 1.09 (0.49)**

GDP Per Capita 0.00001(0.00004)

Ethnic War -1.65 (0.50)***

Polity II -0.08 (0.04)*

Past Experience with Democracy 0.28(0.44)

Constant 0.55(0.44)

Rho -0.23(Not statistically different) 77.32***N 357

Robust standard errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Political ScienceSCAD Data

TABLE INegative Binomial RegressionTotal Violence vs. Election Related Violence

Total Antigovernment

Violence

Election Antigovernment

Violence

Total ProGovernment

Violence

Election ProGovernment

Violence  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4         Lagged Antigovernment Violence 0.274** 0.149      (0.114) (0.161)    Electoral Reform -1.660* -4.359** -1.460** -5.152***  (0.858) (2.050) (0.590) (1.339)Disarmament 0.256 1.570*** 0.198 1.159***  (0.201) (0.339) (0.244) (0.353)First Election -0.856 1.893** -0.155 4.013***  (0.547) (0.785) (0.724) (1.115)Peacekeeping Operation -0.875 -1.407 -2.110*** -2.683**  (0.631) (1.854) (0.517) (1.109)Ongoing Civil War -0.405 -1.992** -0.149 -1.822  (0.378) (0.789) (0.512) (1.191)Transitional Power-Sharing 0.430** 1.579*** 0.780*** 1.517***  (0.204) (0.540) (0.241) (0.431)Infant Mortality Rate -0.00258 0.0100 0.0181 -0.0109  (0.00877) (0.0267) (0.0119) (0.0222)Total Casualties 1.48e-06** 2.98e-06 2.70e-06*** 3.62e-06*  (6.10e-07) (2.72e-06) (5.40e-07) (2.08e-06)Duration 0.00282 0.00792 0.00204 8.94e-05  (0.00231) (0.00592) (0.00272) (0.00527)Lagged Polity II -0.0544 -0.0566 -0.0160 0.210***  (0.0408) (0.0633) (0.0372) (0.0754)Lagged Pro-Government Violence     0.522 -0.134      (0.343) (0.231)Constant -0.0270 -5.184* -3.066* -3.277  (1.122) (2.921) (1.571) (2.608)          75.00*** 188.62*** 56.79*** 516.46***

Alpha 3.73 17.1 5.03 20.3Observations 260 260 260 260

Coefficients listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1