Russia and the WestPOS GU4875Spring 2020

Mon. and Wed. 2:40-3:55pm Room: TBA

Prof. Kimberly MartenOffice: Milstein Center 1106

Office Hours: Most Tuesdays by appointment through my Google calendar account:

(Note: please be sure your own Google calendar is open, and set to the US East Coast time zone.)https://calendar.google.com/calendar/selfsched?

sstoken=UU40NUVZZE42NklNfGRlZmF1bHR8ZGJhZWE3MTNkNTlhM2Q3M2JkYWQ3ZDNkZTNmMTkzNzM

email: km2225@columbia.eduTwitter: @KimberlyMarten

Course DescriptionThroughout history Russia has had an ambiguous relationship with the Western world (defined more or less geographically as Europe, the United States, Canada, NATO, and the EU). Sometimes “the West” has been vilified as a threat or an enemy, and other times it has been held up by Russians as a model to emulate. Russia and the Western world have never treated each other with indifference, and this love/hate relationship is in full force today—even as longstanding Western liberal democratic norms and values are under challenge from within. Historical memories and parallels abound in popular discussions. In this course, we will examine why this has been the case and what it means for Russian foreign and security policy today. Drawing on contributions from philosophers, historians and international relations scholars and practitioners, we will discuss whether Russia’s interaction with the West has been driven by realist great power considerations, by a cultural cycle of Orthodox Slavic nationalism or “Eurasianism” vs. pro-Western internationalism, by domestic political and economic interests, or by the idiosyncratic visions and interests of individual Russian leaders—and in turn, how choices made by “the West” have affected all these things. Students will be encouraged to come up with their own answers to these riddles, in class discussions and assignments including a final independent research paper. This is not a survey course, but no background knowledge is required—only a deep interest in understanding Russia and its relationship to the West. There are no prerequisites.

Learning ObjectivesStudents who complete this course successfully will be able to: Demonstrate broad factual knowledge of selected key current and historical Russian political,

foreign policy, and security issues. Apply causal theories drawn from the political science literature and other sources, to

analyze, compare, and evaluate events and trends in Russian relations with the West. Synthesize facts and arguments across cases in order to reason critically and argue creatively,

through both in-class oral discussions and written assignments.

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Perform rigorous and independent research, including through use of sources available electronically through the Columbia Library system.

Write a compelling independent research paper.

Course Requirements and GradingAll written assignments will be submitted online via Courseworks/Canvas, and must be in either Word or PDF format. Please note that undergraduate and graduate students will be graded separately (in other words, undergraduates are not competing against the graduate students in the course.)

Midterm Exam: All students will complete a take-at-home midterm exam, writing an essay of up to 2,000 words in response to a single prompt focused on applying theories to make predictions about Russian policy toward Ukraine. It will be due at 5pm on Friday, Mar. 6. The prompt will be emailed to students at least two weeks in advance.

Final Exam: All students will complete a take-at-home final exam, completing two essays of approximately 1,000 words each (2,000 words total). There will be a choice of questions on each essay. One set of prompts will focus on the historical sections of the syllabus; the other set will focus on the recent and current events sections of the syllabus outside of Ukraine (including topics from earlier in the semester). The exam will be due via Courseworks at the date and time set by the university for the final exam in this course: Wednesday May 13 at 4pm (please note the earlier hour; Barnard rules require all take home finals to be due at the close of the regularly scheduled exam). Questions will be emailed to students at least two weeks in advance.

There are two major purposes of the exams: (1) to monitor whether the student is doing the assigned readings and is analytically engaged with the material, and (2) to measure the student’s capacity to independently synthesize concepts across sections of the syllabus and make a coherent, original argument. In-class discussions allow students to practice these skills.

Research Paper: All students will also write an independent research paper. The purpose of the paper is to explain a particular recent or historical event or decision (or a related series of events or decisions) in Russian (or Soviet) foreign or security policy, of the student’s choice. (The only topic that is off-limits is Russian policy toward Ukraine since 2013, since that is the focus of the midterm exam.) The topic need not relate to the West (so a paper on a Russian policy decision toward China, for example, would be fine), but must focus on the question of why Moscow did what it did. The topic should be narrowly focused so that deep research can be done. (If you are struggling to think of a topic, you might get some ideas by reading ahead on the syllabus.) The paper must present two or three contending arguments from the literature that attempt to explain Moscow’s policies or decisions, and then present evidence that allows the student to analyze which explanation is best and why. A separate handout will present ideas for a good paper outline.

Students are strongly encouraged to make an office hours appointment with Prof. Marten to talk about their proposed topic before March 11, both to ensure they are on track, and so that their topic area is included in the in-class presentation of research materials on that day. For those who are unable to make an office hours appointment, 45 minutes of class time on Feb. 26

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will be set aside for open discussion on paper topics. The research paper is due via Courseworks by 5pm on Friday, Apr. 24. All research papers must make use of materials presenting Russian (or Soviet) viewpoints, such as memoirs, press reports or television interviews, government documents, etc. Students who read Russian are encouraged to use these sources in the original; students who do not read Russian are expected to use English translations of Russian materials that are available on CLIO or the open web. Undergraduate students will complete an independent research paper of approximately 3,000 words (10-12 double-spaced pages). Graduate students will complete an independent research paper of approximately 5,000 words (15-20 double-spaced pages.

Class participation: Discussion is an important component of this course. Students are expected to attend all class sessions, to have completed the assigned course readings before class, and to be prepared to comment on assigned readings. Roll will be taken. Please email Prof. Marten in advance if you must miss class. Everyone is allowed to miss one class without penalty, for any reason. If you must miss more than one class, please plan to submit a one-page answer to one of the day’s discussion questions to make up for class participation that day. For most sessions, Prof. Marten will lecture for 30-45 minutes, followed by discussion. Grading:Separate handouts specify grading criteria for the exam and paper essays and for discussion participation.

Midterm exam (due Friday, Mar. 6): 20% of total course gradeResearch paper (due Friday, Apr. 24): 30% of total course grade Final exam (due Wednesday, May 13): 30% of total course gradeDiscussion participation: 20% of total course grade

PLEASE READ This Entire Section: Honor Code and PlagiarismAll assignments in this class are to be completed in accordance with the Barnard Honor Code, whether or not the student is a Barnard student. Courseworks will utilize Turnitin.com to check all essays for plagiarism. “Plagiarism” is the use of someone else’s words or ideas without full and proper attribution. It is, at its core, the act of falsely implying or claiming credit for intellectual work that someone else did—and it is a violation of the Honor Code.

A paper is not “written” by cutting and pasting phrases from the work of others. Even if a cite is included to say where the cutting and pasting came from, and even if a word is changed here and there to make what some might call a “paraphrase,” that’s still plagiarism. One plagiarized phrase or sentence is plagiarism, even if the rest of the paper is original.

A paper is written by reading the work of others with an open and critical mind, taking notes in your own words on that writing, thinking about the issues independently and deeply, and then using your own words to analyze issues, while citing (not quoting) the contributions of others to your thinking. You should only be using word-for-word quotations from a published source when the exact words matter greatly. Such quotations should be brief, rare, and placed in quotation marks. All students receive in-depth briefings on plagiarism and proper citation techniques as part of their introductory days at Barnard and Columbia, and the definition here is

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standard not merely in the United States but globally (for example, at Sciences Po in Paris); it should not come as a surprise to anyone. Any student who nonetheless has any remaining questions about proper citation technique or about how to avoid plagiarism should discuss these questions and concerns with Prof. Marten before turning in the assignment in question. Plagiarism is often committed as an act of desperation under pressure. If you ever feel so pressured on an assignment that you are tempted to plagiarize, please contact Prof. Marten instead. Together we can work out a fair extension.

Any essay which contains cut-and-pasted or “paraphrased” phrases or sentences where the source is correctly cited, but without quotation marks, will earn the lowest passing grade of 70. Any essay which contains similar phrases and sentences that are NOT properly cited will earn a zero. Any student who violates the Honor Code on any assignment, including through plagiarism, will face dean’s discipline at their home college. Students affirm that all work turned in is their own, and that they have fully and accurately cited every written source, including web-based sources and unpublished sources (such as prior student papers), used in their writing. Students are allowed to consult with anyone they like as they begin thinking about their exam essays and research papers, but no further collaboration is allowed once they begin outlining and writing. In other words, both the argumentative structure and the wording of all essays must be completely the student’s own work.

All students may use the Barnard and Columbia Writing Centers with no restrictions. If you know that you have problems with your writing—and especially if you get comments on an assignment indicating that there are problems with your writing—you are strongly encouraged to use the Writing Centers. Please note that appointments there fill up fast, so you need to be proactive in scheduling them [hint: you know the due-dates of assignments already…].

Academic Accommodations Statement If you are a student with a documented disability and require academic accommodations in this course, you must register with the Office of Disability Services (ODS) for assistance. Students requesting accommodations will need to first meet with an ODS staff member. Once registered, students are required to request accommodation letters each semester to notify faculty. Accommodations are not retroactive, so it is best to contact ODS early each semester to access your accommodations. If you are registered with ODS, please schedule an appointment with Prof. Marten via her Google calendar, to bring your faculty notification letter and discuss your accommodations for this course. Students are not eligible to use their accommodations in this course until they have met with me. Barnard ODS is located in Milbank Hall, Room 009/008. Please note that all written assignments in this class are take-at-home essays, and that time-and-a-half disability accommodations do not apply to take-at-home assignments. Please explicitly discuss with ODS the fact that this class has no in-class exams.

Barnard Wellness StatementIt is important for students to recognize and identify the different pressures, burdens, and stressors they may be facing, whether personal, emotional, physical, financial, mental, or academic. We as a community urge you to make yourself—your own health, sanity, and wellness—your priority throughout this term and your career here. Sleep, exercise, and eating well can all be a part of a healthy regimen to cope with stress. Resources exist to support you in

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several sectors of your life, and we encourage you to make use of them. Should you have any questions about navigating these resources, please visit these websites:

http://barnard.edu/primarycare http://barnard.edu/counseling http://barnard.edu/wellwoman/about Stressbusters Support Network

Electronic devices and laptops: Laptops and other electronic writing devices are not permitted in class, except in special circumstances with Prof. Marten’s written permission. You should expect to take notes by hand. (Because this course is largely discussion-based, audio recording is not allowed, to protect the privacy of students.) If you require an exception to the laptop rule, please come and talk to Prof. Marten in office hours. In that case you will be expected to sit at the far back of the classroom, so that your computer screen doesn’t bother other students.

Note: you will likely learn more and retain information better if you take notes by hand! See:https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-learning-secret-don-t-take-notes-with-a-laptop/

Required ReadingsStudents should finish the assigned readings before class, so that we can discuss them in class. On longer and complex assignments in particular, students are not expected to read things word-for-word. Instead, it is important to learn the skill of strategic skimming—reading for the key arguments and content of each piece. Remember that you can refer back to all readings when writing the exams—and class discussions will likely highlight new aspects of assignments for all students. Please read things in the order that they are listed on the syllabus, as items listed earlier within each class session will provide important background for those that follow.

All readings are assigned because they are important elements in ongoing debates—not because they necessarily present the “truth.” In other words, read each piece critically and with a grain of salt. In discussion and in your essays, you will be expected to analyze and critique the readings, not merely summarize them.

Many assignments are found on CLIO, the Columbia Library online system. They are easily accessible to anyone with a Columbia or Barnard ID. Start by searching by the article title to see if it comes up; if it does not, try putting in the journal title, and then searching chronologically within the journal for the date the article was published. Please access PDF versions of articles when available, so that you can cite specific page numbers in exam essays that might use them. Other items, such as book chapters, have been uploaded as PDFs to the Courseworks Files webpage for the course. Some items are available on the open web.

Course readings are subject to change in response to current events, or as new academic articles are published. Therefore please consider this syllabus a living document that may change as the semester progresses.

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CLASS SCHEDULE

Jan. 22: Introduction.Please read these pieces before our first class if possible. In the discussion today, students will be asked to apply the theories outlined by Walt to the arguments made by Gurganus and Rumer.

Columbia Library online (CLIO):Stephen M. Walt, “One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110 (Spring 1998): 29-

46. Note: even though this piece is old, and concentrates on issues that are long past, many of the theoretical themes it raises are still used by international relations scholars today—and the competing theories are explained well here. We will be returning to this framework all semester.

Open web:Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rumer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace Working Paper, Feb. 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/RumerGurganus_Perspective_final.pdf

Section I. Theoretical Models: What Explains Russia’s Policy Choices?

Jan. 27: The theory of realism as interpreted by Russian analysts—and why “neoclassical realism” can be an analytic trap.

CLIO:Dmitry Trenin, “Russia Leaves the West,” Foreign Affairs, 85, no. 4 (July/Aug. 2006):

87-96.Open web:Tatiana Romanova, “Neoclassical Realism and Today’s Russia,” Russia in Global Affairs

3 (Oct. 7, 2012), https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Neoclassical-Realism-and-Todays-Russia-15681

Courseworks files:William C. Wohlforth and Vladislav Zubok, “An Abiding Antagonism: Realism,

Idealism, and the Mirage of Western-Russian Partnership after the Cold War,” International Politics 54, no. 4 (2017), pp. 405-419.

Jan. 29. The role of personality in an authoritarian system.CLIO:Stephen Benedict Dyson and Matthew J. Parent, “The Operational Code Approach to

Profiling Political Leaders: Understanding Vladimir Putin,” Intelligence and National Security 33, no. 1 (2018): 84-100.

Tuomas Forsberg and Christer Pursiainen, “The Psychological Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy: Putin and the Annexation of Crimea,” Global Society 31, no. 2(2017): 220-44.

Valerie Sperling, “Putin's Macho Personality Cult,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 49 (2016): 13-23.

Recommended but not required (for those who doubt that Putin was actually in control this whole time): Lukáš Tichý, “Security and Foreign Policy of Dmitry Medvedev in the Period 2008-2012,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27 (2014): 533-52.

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Feb. 3. The impact of domestic informal patronage networks on foreign policy. Courseworks Files:Henry Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective

(New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014), chapters 2-3 (pp. 19-60).Brian D. Taylor, The Code of Putinism (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2018), chapter 3

(pp. 78-105).

Feb. 5. Constructivism part I: Status, emotions, decline, and nationalism.CLIO:Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Russia Says No: Power, Status, and

Emotions in Foreign Policy,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47 (Sept. 2014): 269-79.Fyodor Lukyanov, “Putin's Foreign Policy: The Quest to Restore Russia’s Rightful

Place,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 3 (May/June 2016): 30-37.

Feb. 10: Constructivism part II: Slavophiles, Westernizers—and the role of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Courseworks Files:Vera Tolz, “The West,” in A History of Russian Thought, ed. William Leatherbarrow and

Derek Offord (New York: Cambridge, 2010), pp. 197-216.CLIO:Alexander Lukin, “Eurasian Integration and the Clash of Values,” Survival 56, no. 3

(June-July 2014): 43-60. Alicja Curanović, “Russia’s Mission in the World: The Perspective of the Russian

Orthodox Church,” Problems of Post-Communism 66, no. 4 (2019): 253-67.

Feb. 12. A case-study: explaining Russian policy towards Syria (and Iran).CLIO:Robert O. Freedman, “From Khrushchev and Brezhnev to Putin: Has Moscow’s Policy in

the Middle East Come Full Circle?” Contemporary Review of the Middle East 5, no. 2 (2018): 102-15.

Kimberly Marten, “Informal Political Networks and Putin’s Foreign Policy: The Examples of Iran and Syria,” Problems of Post-Communism 62 (2015): 71–87. (Note: This was published before Russia’s September 2015 military intervention in Syria.)

Open web:Kimberly Marten, “Putin as Patron in Syria,” Ballots & Bullets Blog (University of

Nottingham School of Politics and International Relations), Oct. 12, 2015, https://nottspolitics.org/2015/10/12/putin-as-patron-in-syria/

Marianna Belenkaya, “The Iran Crisis Can Be a Boost for Russia,” Carnegie Moscow Center Commentary, Jan. 7, 2020, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/80712

Jeffrey Mankoff, “How Will Russia React to the Killing of Soleimani?” Center for Strategic and International Studies Commentary, Jan. 6, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-will-russia-react-killing-soleimani

Andrei Kortunov, “The Astana Model: Methods and Ambitions of Russian Political Action,” chapter 3 in The MENA Region: A Great Power Competition, ed. Karim Mezran and Arturo Varvelli (Milan: Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 2019), pp. 53-63, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/mena-region-great-power-competition-24090

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Feb. 17: Constructivism part III: The Neo-Eurasianists.Courseworks Files:David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, “The East,” in A History of Russian Thought, ed.

William Leatherbarrow and Derek Offord (New York: Cambridge, 2010), pp. 217-40.CLIO:Kirill Kalinin, “Neo-Eurasianism and the Russian Elite: The Irrelevance of Aleksandr

Dugin’s Geopolitics,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 5-6 (Nov. 2019): 461-70 Courseworks Files:Marlene Laruelle, “Dangerous Liaisons: Eurasianism, the European Far Right, and

Putin’s Russia,” in Laruelle, ed., Eurasianism and the European Far Right (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), pp. 1-31.

Feb. 19: Case-study: Russia and the intervention in Ukraine, part I: Background. The European Union, NATO, and Russia.

Courseworks Files:Tuomos Forsberg and Hiski Haukkala, “The ‘Common Neighborhood’ and Regional

Cooperation,” chapter 8 of Forsberg and Haukkala, The European Union and Russia (New York: Palgrave, 2016), pp. 192-219.

CLIO:Kimberly Marten, “Reconsidering NATO Expansion: A Counterfactual Analysis of

Russia and the West in the 1990s,” European Journal of International Security 3, no. 2 (June 2018): 135-61.

Open web:Andrew Higgins, “Finger Pointed at Russians in Alleged Coup Plot in Montenegro,” New

York Times, Nov. 26, 2016.Courseworks Files: recommended, not required: for a deeper argument that NATO

enlargement did not threaten Russia, see Kimberly Marten, “NATO Enlargement: Evaluating Its Consequences in Russia,” Jan. 17, 2020, article forthcoming in International Politics.

Feb. 24: Case-study: Russia and the intervention in Ukraine, part II: What happened when?

CLIO:Samuel Charap & Timothy J. Colton, “Breaking Point,” chap. 3 in Everyone Loses: The

Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia, Adelphi Series [electronic journal—note, this was also published as a book, but the Adelphi Series version is accessible online] 56, no. 460 (2016): 113-50. (This provides a fairly objective description of exactly what happened when in the Ukraine crisis.)

Open web:“Rebels without a Cause: Russia’s Proxies in Eastern Ukraine,” International Crisis

Group Report no. 254 (July 16, 2019), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/254-rebels-without-a-cause%20(1).pdf

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Feb. 26: Case-study: Russia and the intervention in Ukraine, part III: Recent and current events. Note: today’s class will have a different framework. The first half hour will be open discussion about current and recent events in Ukraine, which will be relevant for the midterm. The last 45 minutes will be “open office hours” for students to discuss their research paper topic ideas with Prof. Marten.

Open web:Cory Welt, Ukraine: Background, Conflict with Russia, and U.S. Policy, Congressional

Research Service Report, Sept. 19, 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45008.pdf “Judy Asks: Can the Minsk Agreement Succeed?” Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe,

Carnegie Europe, Feb. 22, 2017, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/68084 David B. Larter and Matthew Bodner, “The Sea of Azov Won’t Become the New South

China Sea (and Russia Knows It),” Defense News, Nov. 28, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/11/28/the-sea-of-azov-wont-become-the-new-south-china-sea-and-russia-knows-it/

Recommended, not required: Kimberly Marten and Olga Oliker, “Ukraine’s Volunteer Militias May Have Saved the Country, but Now They Threaten It,” War on the Rocks, Sept. 14, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/ukraines-volunteer-militias-may-have-saved-the-country-but-now-they-threaten-it/

Section II. Tsarist and Soviet Experiences with the West: Selected Historical Legacies

Mar. 2: Peter the Great and Catherine the Great: Opening to, and Competing with, the West.

Courseworks Files:Nicholas V. Riasanovsky and Mark D. Steinberg, A History of Russia, 8th ed. (New York:

Oxford, 2011), pp. 211-38, 251-69.Open web:Carolyn Harris, “When Catherine the Great Invaded the Crimea and Put the Rest of the

World on Edge,” Smithsonian.com, Mar. 4, 2014, www.smithsonianmag.com/history/when-catherine-great-invaded-crimea-and-put-rest-world-edge-180949969/

CLIO:Simon Sebag Montefiore, “Putin’s Imperial Adventure in Syria,” New York Times, Oct.

9, 2015.

Mar. 4: The Decembrists, Nicholas I, and Alexander II Courseworks Files:Riasanovsky and Steinberg, pp. 316-36, 363-75.Vitaly Bogatov, “The Decembrists,” in A History of Russian Philosophy, vol. 1, ed.

Valery A. Kuvakin (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1994), pp. 103-112.Open web:Sean Cannaday and Paul Kubicek, “Nationalism and Legitimation for Authoritarianism:

A Comparison of Nicholas I and Vladimir Putin,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 5, no. 1 (Jan. 2014): 1-9.

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Friday March 6, 5pm: Midterm due on Courseworks.

Mar. 9: Stalin, the purges, the Great Patriotic War—and historical memory.Open Web:Maria Lipman, Lev Gudkov, and Lasha Bakradze, The Stalin Puzzle: Deciphering Post-

Soviet Public Opinion (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013), pp. 1-54, https://www.ciaonet.org/catalog/31319

CLIO:Todd H. Nelson, “History as Ideology: The Portrayal of Stalinism and the Great Patriotic

War in Contemporary Russian High School Textbooks,” Post-Soviet Affairs 31, no. 1 (2015): 37-65.

Peter Rutland and Neil Shimmield, “Putin’s Dangerous Campaign to Rehabilitate Stalin,” Washington Post, June 13, 2019.

Alisa Ganieva, “Russia’s Revisionist History,” New York Times, Dec. 3, 2018.Recommended, not required: Timothy Snyder, “Hitler vs. Stalin: Who Killed More?”

New York Review of Books 58, no. 4 (Mar. 10, 2011), and Snyder, “Stalin & Hitler: Mass Murder by Starvation,” NYRB 59, no. 11 (Jun 21, 2012). These two articles are excerpts from Snyder’s highly recommended (and controversial) book, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2012).

Mar. 11: The Cold War and the correlation of forces.Note: at the start of class today, Prof. Marten will review sources available on CLIO and the open web that are relevant for the topics of student research papers.

Open web:Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Cold War: A View from Russia,” Khazar University

Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 13, no. 4 (2010): 5-14, https://jhss-khazar.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/01-1.pdf

CLIO:John Lewis Gaddis, “Grand Strategies in the Cold War,” in The Cambridge History of the

Cold War, vol. 2, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1-21.

Julian Lider, “The Correlation of World Forces: The Soviet Concept,” Journal of Peace Research 17, no. 2 (1980): 151-71.

Mar. 16, 18: Spring Break, no class meetings.

Mar. 23. Two different Cold War eras: the leadership of Khrushchev and BrezhnevCLIO:James Hershberg, “The Cuban Missile Crisis,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold

War, vol. 2, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 65-87.

Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman, “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962–1975,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 2, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 134-57.

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Vladislav Zubok, “Soviet Foreign Policy from Détente to Gorbachev, 1975–1985,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. 3, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 89-111

Mar. 25. Halfway measures: Gorbachev and “Westernization” at home.CLIO:Valerie Bunce, "Domestic Reform and International Change: Gorbachev in Historical

Perspective," International Organization 47 (Winter 1993): 107-138.M. Stephen Fish, “The Hazards of Half-measures: Perestroika and the Failure of Post-

Soviet Democratization,” Demokratizatsiya 13, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 241-253.E-book: Chris Miller, The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and

the Collapse of the USSR (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), ch. 3 (“Gorbachev’s Gamble: Interest Group Politics and Perestroika”).

Mar. 30. The end of the Cold War.CLIO:Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Power, Globalization, and the End of the

Cold War: Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas,” International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01): 5-53.

Archie Brown, “Perestroika and the End of the Cold War,” Cold War History 7, no. 1 (2007): 1-25.

Open Web:US CIA Directorate of Intelligence, Gorbachev’s Foreign Policy: An Intelligence

Assessment, Feb. 1989 (declassified), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000499113.pdf

Apr. 1. The 1990s: Yeltsin and the WestCLIO:Robert H. Donaldson, “Boris Yeltsin's Foreign Policy Legacy,” Tulsa Journal of

Comparative & International Law 7, no. 2 (March 2000): 285-326.Michael McFaul, “A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian

Foreign Policy,” International Security 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/98): 5-35.

Section IV. Russia and the West Today (topics and readings subject to change based on current events)

Apr. 6. The failure to reform Soviet intelligence agencies—and the criminal aftermath. CLIO:Kimberly Marten, “The ‘KGB State’ and Russian Political and Foreign Policy Culture,”

Journal of Slavic Military Studies 30, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 131-51.Brian D. Taylor, “The Russian Siloviki & Political Change,” Daedalus 146, no. 2 (Spring

2017): 53-63.Open web: Mark Galeotti, “Putin’s Hydra: Inside Russia’s Intelligence Services,” European Council

on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, May 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_169_-_PUTINS_HYDRA_INSIDE_THE_RUSSIAN_INTELLIGENCE_SERVICES_1513.pdf

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Sebastian Rotella, “Gangsters of the Mediterranean,” Atlantic.com/ProPublica, Nov. 10, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/russian-mob-mallorca-spain/545504/

Mark Galeotti, “Gangster Geopolitics: The Kremlin’s Use of Criminals as Assets Abroad,” Russia Matters Blog, Jan. 17, 2019, https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/gangster-geopolitics-kremlins-use-criminals-assets-abroad

Recommended, not required: Watch the documentary movie Icarus (available on Netflix) about the 2014 Olympics

Russian doping scandal and the role of the FSB in it. The key findings are summarized here: Rebecca R. Ruiz and Michael Schwirtz, “Russian Insider Says State-Run Doping Fueled Olympic Gold,” New York Times, May 12, 2016.

Michael Schwirtz, “How a Poisoning in Bulgaria Exposed Russian Assassins in Europe,” New York Times, Dec. 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/world/europe/bulgaria-russia-assassination-squad.html

Apr. 8. The Wagner Group, the West, Syria, and AfricaCLIO:Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Use of Semi-State Security Forces: The Case of the Wagner

Group,” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (2019): 181-204.Open web:Kimberly Marten, “Into Africa: Prigozhin, Wagner, and the Russian Military,” PONARS

Eurasia Policy Memo 561 (Jan. 2019), http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm561_Marten_Jan2019_0.pdf

Kimberly Marten, “Russ-Afrique? Russia, France, and the Central African Republic,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 608 (Aug. 2019), http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm608_Marten_Aug2019..pdf

CLIO:Kimberly Marten, “Russia’s Back in Africa: Is the Cold War Returning?” The

Washington Quarterly 42, no. 4 (Dec. 2019): 155-70.

Apr. 13. Oil, natural gas, and Russia-West relations.Open web: U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Country Analysis Brief: Russia,” Oct. 31,

2017, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Russia/russia.pdf

Jake Cordell, “6 Things You Need to Know About OPEC+,” Moscow Times, Dec. 4, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/12/04/6-things-opec-russia-a68409

Tatiana Mitrova and Tim Boersma, “The Impact of US LNG on Russian Natural Gas Export Policy,” Columbia SIPA Center on Global Energy Policy, Dec. 2018, https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/Gazprom%20vs%20US%20LNG_CGEP_Report_121418_2.pdf

“Russia, Ukraine Reach Five-Year Gas-Transit Deal,” RFE/RL, Dec. 31, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/long-russia-ukraine-reach-five-year-gas-transit-deal/30353000.html

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Todd Prince, “Russia Launches Into New Export Territory With TurkStream Natural-Gas Pipeline,” RFE/RL, Jan. 7, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-launches-itself-into-new-export-territory-with-turkstream-natural-gas-pipeline/30364755.html

Climate Action Tracker, “Russian Federation,” https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/russian-federation/

Recommended, not required: Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja Yafimava, The Russo-Ukrainian Gas Dispute of January 2009: A Comprehensive Assessment, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies NG27 (Feb. 2009), pp. 4-25 (this section lays out the history of both the 2006 and 2009 disputes), https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NG27-TheRussoUkrainianGasDisputeofJanuary2009AComprehensiveAssessment-JonathanSternSimonPiraniKatjaYafimava-2009.pdf

Apr. 15. International sanctions and Russian politics.CLIO:Daniel W. Drezner, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and

Practice,” International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (Mar. 2011): 96-108.Open web:Cyrus Newlin and Jeffrey Mankoff, “U.S. Sanctions Against Russia: What You Need to

Know,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Critical Questions blog, Oct. 31, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-sanctions-against-russia-what-you-need-know.

Tatiana Mitrova, “Western Sanctions on Russia’s Oil and Gas Sector: a Damage Assessment,” Carnegie Moscow Center blog, July 25, 2018, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/76909

CLIO:Steven Lee Myers, Jo Becker and Jim Yardley, “It Pays to Be Putin’s Friend,” New York

Times, Sept. 27, 2014.Andrew Higgins and Kenneth P. Vogel, “Two Capitals, One Russian Oligarch: How

Oleg Deripaska Is Trying to Escape U.S. Sanctions,” New York Times, Nov. 4, 2018.Open web: Recommended, not required: CSIS Russian Sanctions Tracker,

https://russiasanctionstracker.csis.org/ , has a detailed list of all US sanctions against Russia.

Apr. 20. The collapse of nuclear arms control.CLIO:Olga Oliker, “Moscow’s Nuclear Enigma: What Is Russia’s Arsenal Really For?”

Foreign Affairs 97, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2018): 52-57.Open web:Robert E. Berls, Jr., Leon Ratz, and Brian Rose, Rising Nuclear Dangers:

Diverging Views of Strategic Stability, Nuclear Threat Initiative Paper, Oct. 2018, https://www.nti.org/media/documents/Rising_Nuclear_Dangers.pdf

Amy F. Woolf, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report R43832, updated Oct. 29, 2018, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43832.pdf

Pranay Vaddi, “Bringing Russia’s New Nuclear Weapons into New START,” Lawfare blog, Aug. 13, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/08/13/bringing-russia-s-new-nuclear-weapons-into-new-start-pub-79672

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Apr. 22. “Information war” and cyber conflictOpen web:Robert Coalson, “Explainer: Russia Takes A Big Step Toward The 'Internyet',” RFE/RL,

Nov. 1, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/explainer-russia-sovereign-internet-law-censorship-runet/30248442.html

Keir Giles, “Russia and Its Neighbours: Old Attitudes, New Capabilities,” and James J. Wirtz, “Cyber War and Strategic Culture: The Russian Integration of Cyber Power into Grand Strategy,” in Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression against Ukraine, ed. Kenneth Geers (Tallin, Estonia: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, 2015), pp. 19-37,https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/CyberWarinPerspective_full_book.pdf

Andrzej Kozlowski, “Comparative Analysis of Cyberattacks on Estonia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan,” European Scientific Journal February 2014 /SPECIAL/ edition vol.3, www.eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/download/2941/2770

Kim Zetter, “Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Wired, March 3, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-ukraines-power-grid/

Kimberly Marten essay (#3), in “Policy Roundtable 1-7: Russia and the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election,” H-Diplo International Security Studies Forum, Mar. 26, 2017, https://issforum.org/roundtables/policy/1-7-russia

Gustav Gressel, “Fellow Travellers: Russia, Anti-Westernism, and Europe’s Political Parties,” European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, July 14, 2017, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR225_-_FELLOW_TRAVELLERS1.pdf

Apr. 24: Research paper due on Courseworks.

Apr. 27. Russia and the West in the ArcticOpen web:Scott Borgerson et al., The Emerging Arctic, Council on Foreign Relations InfoGuide

(2014), https://www.cfr.org/interactives/emerging-arctic#!/emerging-arctic Courseworks files:Colin Reisser, “Russia’s Arctic Cities: Recent Evolution and Drivers of Change,” in

Sustaining Russia’s Arctic Cities: Resource Politics, Migration, and Climate Change, ed. Robert Orttung (New York: Berghahn, 2016), pp. 1-22.

Open web: Mathieu Boulègue, Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in

a ‘Low Tension’ Environment, Chatham House Research Paper, June 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-06-28-Russia-Military-Arctic_0.pdf

Michael Scollon, “Russia Rubs Its Hands At The Prospect Of Profit From Climate Change,” RFE/RL Dec, 28, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-rubs-its-hands-at-the-prospect-of-profit-from-climate-change/30348840.html

The Barents Observer, “Russia Is Removing Critical Voices Ahead of Arctic Council Chairmanship, Indigenous Expert Claims,” Moscow Times, Dec. 2, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/12/02/russia-is-removing-critical-voices-ahead-of-arctic-council-chairmanship-indigenous-expert-claims-a68415

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Apr. 29. Russia’s relations with China (and why it matters to the West)Courseworks files:Sergey Karaganov, “The New Cold War and the Emerging Greater Eurasia,” Journal of

Eurasian Studies 9, no. 2 (July 2018): 85-93.CLIO:Alexander Lukin, “A Russian Perspective on the Sino-Russian Rapprochement,” Asia

Policy 13, no. 1 (Jan. 2018): 19-25Open web:Alexander Gabuev, “Friends with Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations

After the Ukraine Crisis,” Carnegie Moscow Center, June 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP278_Gabuev_revised_FINAL.pdf

Alexander Gabuev, “China’s Pivot to Putin’s Friends,” ForeignPolicy.com, June 25, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/25/chinas-pivot-to-putin-friends-xi-russia-gazprom-timchenko-sinopec/

CLIO:Saori N. Katada, Cynthia Roberts, and Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The Varieties of Collective

Financial Statecraft: The BRICS and China,” Political Science Quarterly 132, no. 3 (Fall 2017): 403-433.

May 4. There is nothing so difficult to predict as the future…Open web:Kadri Liik, The Last of the Offended: Russia’s First Post-Putin Diplomats, Policy Brief,

European Council on Foreign Affairs, Nov. 2019, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/Kadri_Liik_russias_first_post_putin_diplomats.pdf

CLIO:Chris Miller, “Putin’s Not Ready to Call It Quits,” ForeignPolicy.com, July 22, 2019.Open web:Denis Volkov, “Who Russians Think Will Succeed Putin in 2024,” Moscow Times, May

17, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/05/17/who-russians-think-will-succeed-putin-in-2024-a65621

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